Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. LEVIN. I take 30 seconds, on my time, to thank the Senator from Oregon for his very thoughtful and very heartfelt statement, based on a tremendous amount of study of Europe. I also ask unanimous consent that Senator Voinovich be recognized after the conclusion of Senator Hagel's remarks.

Mr. LEVIN. I will take 30 seconds, on my time, to thank the Senator.

Mr. LEVIN. Would the Senator yield?

Mr. LEVIN. This language says that we are deciding now that next year the troops must leave, unless--unless--later on Congress changes its mind. It is on automatic pilot. If the President does not request in a year, and unless the Congress authorizes in a year--in other words if the Congress does nothing, if the Congress does not change its mind--we are saying now that the troops are out of there in a year. That creates a year of very dangerous uncertainty, according to our recent commander, according to the head of NATO, according to the Secretary of Defense. It is that year of dangerous uncertainty which is being created here. This is not a question, if I may say on my time, of the power of Congress. I could not agree with the Senator from West Virginia more. We have the power to do what is being proposed. There is no doubt about it. We can set deadlines. We can set conditional deadlines. We can set deadlines which are going to take place unless something else happens. The question here is the wisdom--the wisdom of doing what is being proposed here, of deciding now that troops are going to come out of Kosovo, that they must be withdrawn unless, a year from now, the Congress changes its mind and decides to authorize it following a request from the President. What that precipitates is a year of very dangerous uncertainty, of wavering commitment to an alliance, and this is what both General Clark, the head of NATO, and our Secretary of Defense have outlined for us. Again, the question is not the power of the Congress to do what is being suggested by my good friend from West Virginia. That is indisputable. If that were the issue--does Congress have the power to do this--this vote I hope would be 100-0, that we have the power to do this. The question is its wisdom. What is the impact of the uncertainty, the trumpet that is unclear and uncertain, when we have just been successful in Kosovo with NATO allies? We are now asking NATO allies to do more--and they are doing more; now up to 85 percent of the ground forces. The question is the wisdom then to put into place language which says unless Congress changes its mind a year from now we are out of this? And if I can quote, since I am on my time, this is the main objective of the language. According to the sponsors' Dear Colleague letter, the provision has three main objectives. First, it terminates funding for the continued deployment of U.S. ground combat troops in Kosovo after July 1, 2001, unless the President seeks and receives congressional authorization to keep troops in Kosovo. In other words, a year from now something happens automatically unless we reverse ourselves.

Mr. LEVIN. My guess is, and I could be wrong on this, that happened on two recent occasions at least. We properly, in my judgment, said troops must be out of Somalia by a certain date; troops must be out of Haiti by a certain date, period. We approved that and I supported that. This language is very different from that.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 2 additional minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will make a revised unanimous consent request, after talking with Senator Robb who just came in, and with gratitude to Senator Hagel. I ask unanimous consent for this order of speakers: Senator Smith of Oregon, then Senator Robb for 6 minutes, then Senator Hutchison, and then Senator Hagel.

Mr. LEVIN. Would this be on the Senator's time?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent we go in that order: Senator Smith for 10, Senator Hagel for 12, and then the Senator from Texas. Before the Senator from Georgia leaves, if I could just take 30 of my seconds to thank him for his constant contribution to the debates and to this body. While we disagree on this particular issue, it is not very easy for me; he always makes a major contribution, and we are grateful for it.

Mr. LEVIN. We don't have to etch the stone, then.

Mr. LEVIN. I do appreciate that. Senator Smith would be 10 minutes and Senator Hagel 12 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. As we indicated before, we had a number of Senators on the way. If we could have, now, two of ours, since my colleague had two or three of his in a row, it would be, I think, better order.

Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield?

Mr. LEVIN. Regarding that change, we are happy to have two or three of our speakers in a row when the Senator from Georgia is finished.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield myself 1 minute. I happen to agree with the Senator and fought very hard with him to get the Europeans to do more. We have succeeded. They are not up to 85 percent of the combat forces, which is exactly what we wanted them to do. They are coming across with more police because of the pressure we put on them. Senator Warner, I, and others put pressure on the Europeans to do more to carry through with their commitments. I think that pressure is useful. The language before the Senate has two parts. The first part says if they don't meet specified targets in a certain date, we are out of there--unless, of course, Congress decides to change its mind. What we are putting in place on automatic pilot, we are out of there unless certain, specific, commitments can be kept. The head of the Office of Management and Budget, by the way, has gone through the items and has said those specific items at this moment can't be certified, at least three out of four, for some very technical reason. But there is a second part to this. Even if the Europeans do all that is required by this amendment in the first half of it --or in half of it--we are pulling out anyway. The second part of the amendment says unless Congress changes its mind by next July, we are pulling our forces out of there. This is a totally inconsistent message in the language before us. Half the message is: You have to do certain things by certain dates, Europeans. The second half of the message is: Even if you do that, we are out of there. We need a plan, and unless the President requests and Congress authorizes, our troops are out of there. Those are inconsistent directions. It seems to me wrong for many reasons which have been outlined. I notice the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from West Virginia are on the floor. I do not know if the Senator from Connecticut is ready, and I do not know if the Senator from West Virginia is ready. But I inquire, perhaps of both of them, if I could, whether or not they both wish to proceed at this time. Could I ask the Senator from West Virginia?

Mr. LEVIN. We are going to have too many on our side to speak with little time to do it.

Mr. LEVIN. Parliamentary inquiry: Is the time just used by my good friend from Virginia taken from the other side?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wonder if the Senator will yield 30 seconds to the Senator from New Jersey.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Byrd-Warner provision would make the decision that U.S. ground troops must pull out of Kosovo starting in August of this year if the Europeans don't meet certain specified percentages of their financial and civilian police commitment, unless the Congress changes its mind and decides otherwise. It did decide, in any event, that even if the Europeans do meet their commitments, even if they do meet the commitments we have been urging them to meet--and they have been making progress--even if they meet those commitments, next year, in any event, our troops are coming out of Kosovo, unless Congress changes its mind. It is all self-executing. If Congress does nothing from this point on, if we adopt the Byrd- Warner language, next year, in the middle of the year, our troops must come out of Kosovo. Now, the issue here isn't whether we have the power to set a withdrawal date and to enforce it with the power of the purse. That is not the issue. I think all of us would support the right of this Senate and this Congress to set a withdrawal date for our forces from anywhere. We have exercised that power. We exercised it in Somalia and in Haiti. The issue before us is the wisdom of setting a withdrawal date today, putting it on automatic pilot, and saying that a year from now, unless Congress reverses its position, those troops must come out. That creates a dangerous period of uncertainty, a destabilizing period of uncertainty, which we have been urged not to set in motion by our Secretary of Defense, by the Secretary General of NATO, and by the recent commander of our forces in Kosovo. First, Secretary Cohen, on May 11, said: I strongly believe the Kosovo language in the supplemental is counterproductive to peace in Kosovo and will seriously jeopardize the relationship between the U.S. and our NATO allies. I ask unanimous consent that Secretary Cohen's letter be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my good friend from Arizona for his statement and for the clarity and passion he brings to this issue, as he does on so many important issues confronting this Nation, including our security, and thank him for his longstanding involvement and contribution to this Nation's well-being. His voice in this debate is an exceedingly important one. I hope all Members have had a chance to listen to his remarks today. Mr. President, I wonder if I could ask what the time situation is. How many minutes do I have remaining?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we would be happy for their side to go forward. We have many other speakers, but they are still on their way.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for 30 seconds, I thank the Senator from Massachusetts for the contribution he just made, pointing out with extreme accuracy that, No. 1, this is not an issue of the prerogative of the Senate--we have the prerogative to do this if we choose to exercise it--but raising the question: Is it wise this year to set a deadline for the withdrawal of troops next year and the dangers that will ensue in the interim both to the troops, the alliance, and to the cause for which they fought? His experience, both in war and in peace, has been invaluable and his contribution this morning is very clear. I thank him for that.

Mr. LEVIN. We would precede Senator Byrd with our 22 minutes. That means Senator Byrd has 8 minutes left. I thought that was going to be used at this time. If Senator Byrd does not use that time now--at least my understanding was we either go to Senator Warner or Senator Byrd before Senator McCain and I use our 22 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.