Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I do.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my good friend from Arizona. Madam President, what these soft money contributions allow the parties to do is many things, but more and more, pay for ads, TV ads, which are claimed to be about issues but in reality are ads to help candidates. I want to look at two ads: A Republican ad and a Democratic ad. They both have the same problem. First, Bob Dole's ad. In this TV commercial, Mr. Dole said: ``We have a moral obligation to give our children in America the opportunity and values of the Nation that we grew up in.'' Then it talks a lot about Bob Dole and his very strong personal qualities. Then it ended by Bob Dole saying, ``It all comes down to values. What do you believe in? What do you sacrifice? And what do you stand for?'' That ad was paid for with soft money contributed by the Republican National Committee. It is viewed as permissible under current law because that ad does not explicitly ask the viewer to vote for or support Bob Dole. It spends its whole time talking positively about his character. If it added four words at the end, which said, ``Vote for Bob Dole,'' it would be treated as a candidate ad, not an issue ad, and would be subject to hard money limits. Any reasonable person looking at that ad at that particular time in the Presidential season would say: It's not an ad about welfare or wasteful spending; it is an ad about why should we elect that particular nominee. Democrats avail themselves of the same loophole. In the 1996 Presidential campaign, the Democratic National Committee ran ads on welfare and crime and the budget which were basically designed to support President Clinton's reelection. At our hearings on campaign finance reform, Harold Ickes was asked about these DNC ads and to the extent to which people looking at the ads would walk away with the message to vote for President Clinton. And here is what Harold Ickes said. And my good friend from Utah, I think, is nodding because I think he remembers this. Harold Ickes was asked: Do you think people looking at these ads would walk away from these ads with the message that they should vote for President Clinton? His answer: ``I would certainly hope so. If not, we ought to fire the ad agencies.'' Those kinds of ads are paid for with soft money--so-called-- unregulated, unlimited money. They are not supposed to be candidate ads. So we should not delude ourselves either about what the American people believe this system is all about, and how it is run, and how it sells access for huge contributions. They are not deluded, and we should not be deluded about their feelings about this system. And we should not be deluded about how this money is spent. We should not kid ourselves. People are arguing that unless we can get the entire original bill which was introduced by Senators McCain and Feingold, we should simply not accept half a loaf, which is what the revised version does. And my answer to that simply is this: I would prefer the original McCain- Feingold bill because I think it is important that we not kid ourselves about issue ads, how they are funded, and what their purpose and intent is. But the sponsors of the bill have indicated--and they are very honest, smart people, with tremendous integrity--that we do not have a chance of getting the original McCain-Feingold approach passed, that our best chance of passing a bill with campaign finance reform in it is to try to ban soft money, to close that loophole, to stop parties and candidates from either soliciting, themselves or through their employees, or through their agents, money which is not regulated by law. And I accept that. I think if that is the best we can get, if that is going to be the most we can accomplish, that would be a significant accomplishment. It is not my preference, but it would be a significant accomplishment. I would only say this: To a nation that is hungry for reform, a half a loaf is better than no loaf. I hope that, at a minimum, we will be able to achieve that success this year. The only way we will do it, I believe, is that when people --if they do--filibuster against this approach, against the ban on soft money, that those of us who support this reform not withdraw from the field. The civil rights days proved that the only way to get these very difficult reforms achieved is by telling the filibusterers: You have a right to filibuster. That is your right, and we'll protect it. But we don't have to withdraw because you are filibustering. With voting rights, it took four cloture votes and about 6 weeks before cloture was able to be invoked and voting rights passed. I would hope we would act with the same kind of determination as they did in those days and the same kind of passion as the opponents have against this reform. Finally, I want to close with a tribute to Senators McCain and Feingold. I know of no two people in this body who have taken an issue as they have and tried as long and as hard as they have to bring this to the fore, to bring this to national attention. They are entitled to the thanks of the Nation for what they are doing. I want to end my remarks with a personal thank you to our two good colleagues for the fight that they are waging on this reform. It cannot happen without them, without their integrity, without their determination. And they have shown it in the past. I am personally very much in their debt. Much more important, the Nation will always be in their debt for the fight they have waged and are waging and will wage for campaign finance reform.

Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. LEVIN. I believe in the view of the American people, and it is a reasonable view which has been sustained by the Supreme Court: Inherent in unlimited campaign contributions, inherent, is an appearance of impropriety which undermines public confidence in our institutions. I believe the same thing. More important, the American people believe the same thing. The timing of it is not the issue. The issue is that the solicitation of unlimited amounts, huge amounts of contributions, and frequently or very often in exchange for access, is inherently inappropriate in a democracy and creates public disrespect and a lack of public support for our democratic institutions. That is, No. 1, my own belief very deeply. I believe the American people believe that very deeply. Most important, though, in addition to what the American people believe, the Supreme Court has directly said that inherent in unlimited contributions is an appearance of impropriety. The Supreme Court has specifically said that in Buckley. When you put on top of that these kind of sales of access for $50,000 and $100,000 to the President or Committee Chairmen around here, you have, it seems to me, made it triply clear what the Supreme Court did not even need to see or find. They did not even look at the access issue. That was not even in Buckley. But it sure adds fuel to the fire, and that fire is a fire which can burn the institutions of this Government. That is my judgment. Maybe a majority of us do not feel that way. But, again, I challenge my good friend from Utah. I challenge him, take home one of these invitations and try a town meeting; $100,000 for a meeting with the President, $50,000 for a meeting with the Committee Chairman of your choice. Give it a try at a town meeting. See what they think about it. I think I know what you will find. Maybe not; I don't represent Utah. I think you will find they would tell my good friend from Utah that this is wrong. This is wrong. Unlimited huge contributions, buying access--which is frequently the case--is wrong. I happen to agree with them. (Ms. COLLINS assumed the chair.)

Mr. LEVIN. One solicitation offered, for a contribution of $10,000, the choice of ``attending one of 60 small dinner parties, limited in attendance to 20 to 25 people, at the home of a Senator, Cabinet Officer, or senior White House Staff member.'' One offer for the Republican Senatorial Trust said, ``Trust members can expect a close working relationship with all Republican Senators, top Administration officials and other national leaders. Personal relationships are fostered at informal meetings throughout the year in Washington, D.C. and abroad.'' Another solicitation went so far as to say that, ``Attendance at all events is limited.'' Listen to this one, ``Benefits are based on receipts''; ``Benefits are based on receipts.'' You can't pledge money--cash must be in hand for that meeting with the chairman of your choice. That's how blatant these offers to purchase access have become. It is largely because of soft money. The amounts we see on these solicitations, selling access, are not the $1,000 and $2,000 contributions. They are large--$25,000 and $50,000 and $100,000 in soft money contributions. The soft money loophole has increased and intensified the sale of access. Do these large money contributions create an appearance of personal access and improper influence by big contributors? This is what the Supreme Court said in Buckley v. Valeo. I think they answered that question. The Supreme Court said there is an appearance of corruption that is created from the size of the contribution alone. They didn't even get to the question of the sale of access. They just said that unlimited contributions inherently create an appearance of impropriety. It is inherent in unlimited contributions. That is the Supreme Court answering, I believe, for the American people. The Court in Buckley upheld contribution limits as a reasonable and constitutional approach to deterring, not actual corruption, but the appearance of corruption. This is what the Court said: It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose--to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions--in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation. Under a system of private financing of elections, a candidate lacking immense personal or family wealth must depend on financial contributions from others to provide the resources necessary to conduct a successful campaign. To the extent that large contributions are given to secure political quid pro quos from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our position of representative democracy is undermined. And then the Supreme Court said this, ``Of almost equal concern''-- the Supreme Court is saying: Of almost equal concern to actual quid pro quos is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions. . . . Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence is also critical . . . if confidence in the system of representative government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent. I want to repeat a few of those words: The impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions. . . . And that, I believe, is what the American people are most deeply concerned about. We, according to the Court, can correct it. The Court went on to say: . . . And while disclosure requirements serve many salutary purposes, Congress was surely entitled to conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure, and that contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial contributions, even when the identities of the contributors and the amounts of their contributions are fully disclosed. The Buckley Court repeatedly endorses the concept that the issue of contributions without limits, alone, is enough to create the appearance of corruption and to justify the imposition of limits. Selling access in exchange for contributions would only take the Court's concerns and justifications for limits a step further. The Buckley Court also said: Not only is it difficult to isolate suspect contributions but, more importantly, Congress was justified in concluding that the interest in safeguarding against the appearance of impropriety requires that the opportunity for abuse inherent in the process of raising large monetary contributions be eliminated. Add to the equation the actual sale of access for a large contribution and you have an even greater ``opportunity for abuse'' and the appearance of corruption.

Mr. LEVIN. Include you in which way? Someone joining me in congratulating and thanking them, or including you as one of the reformers? I am happy to do either one.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my good friend from Nevada, and I think everybody who is supporting this cause thanks him for his support of this effort, as well. So, Mr. President, this kind of candidate advertising, which should clearly be subject to contribution limits, escapes those limits through the soft money loophole. And it's that soft money loophole that the two amendments before us would close. Now some of my colleagues argue that if we only close the soft money loophole to political parties, the money we cut off to the parties will be redirected to special interest groups. Well if the Daschle amendment could pass, I would prefer it and I've supported similar proposals for years, because it not only stops the soft money loophole to parties, it stops the use of sham or phony issue ads by third party organizations. But I also say if all we can do is stop soft money to the parties and that money then goes to outside groups, so be it. Candidates and public officials running for reelection won't be raising it, the parties won't be raising it, and the contributors won't be buying access to us with it. This bill would preclude a candidate or office holder from soliciting soft money for private organizations running issue ads. Under this legislation, I couldn't go and solicit money for an outside group to use for issue ads in some campaign. This bill would bar that. Will contributors of these large sums want to buy access to the Sierra Club or the National Rifle Association? Perhaps. If so, let them do it. Will they be able to buy access to us through these unlimited contributions to third parties? No. If that were to occur, then it would be in direct violation of the law. Under this soft money ban, public officials and candidates will be out of the soft money fundraising loop, and that's the important step we'll be taking with this legislation. To a nation hungry for reform, a half of loaf is better than no loaf. Mr. President, we've been here before--trying to pass campaign finance reform, trying to stop the explosion of soft money. The question is--will it be different this time? 70% of the American people want campaign finance reform. 70% of the American people want us to clean up our act. We're the only ones who can do it. The soft money loophole exists because we in Congress allow it. It is time to stop pointing fingers at others and take responsibility for our share of the blame. Congress alone writes the laws. Congress alone can shut down the loopholes and reinvigorate the federal election laws. Mr. President, the Reid amendment closes the biggest loophole in our campaign financing system and it restores that system to what Congress intended in the 1970's--that there should be reasonable limits to what a person can contribute to a candidate, a PAC or a party and that unions and corporations should not be allowed to contribute to either parties or candidates. It's that simple. We had that system in the 1970's; it operated pretty well for many years; soft money has torn apart that system, and the Reid amendment puts it back together. The public is appalled at these huge contributions which buy access to candidates and office holders and fund television ads which are for all intents and purposes about candidates. As the Supreme Court said in Buckley, the appearance of corruption is ``inherent in a system permitting unlimited financial contributions.'' And permitting the appearance of corruption undermines the very foundation of our democracy--the trust of the people in the system. We have the right to protect our democratic institutions from being undermined by the open sale of access for large contributions which people believe reasonably translates into influence. And the greater the purchase price, the greater the perception that access yields influence. Mr. President, we can't afford to give Mr. Tamaraz a next time. We've got to stop this practice of selling access now. And the amendment before us is the way to do it. It is time to enact campaign finance reform. That is our legislative responsibility. Otherwise we will be haunted by the words of Roger Tamraz that in the next election he will give $600,000. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. I will yield for a question.

Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield to the Senator.

Mr. LEVIN. No, I don't think that is true.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the city of Detroit is grieving over the loss of Cody High School sophomore Darryl Towns, who was fatally shot just days before his sixteenth birthday. Darryl was murdered in his own backyard over a minor dispute that eventually turned into a major tragedy. What started off as a fist fight between life long friends ended up in murder: three fatal shots with a semiautomatic pistol. Now, Darryl's community is left in shock as they grieve over the ``foolish'' and ``senseless'' death of their friend, known among many as a ``respectful,'' ``responsible'' young man. Friends and parents are forced to ask the troubling question: If a person like Darryl, who stayed out of trouble, isn't safe from gun violence, who among our teens is safe? Unfortunately, there is no one who can answer that question or predict the future. Yet, common sense tells us that the widespread proliferation of guns will only result in additional tragedies like Darryl's. I urge my colleagues to take up a meaningful debate on gun safety and end the easy access to weapons that results in the destruction of so many young lives. I submit for the Record a letter printed in the Detroit Free Press, written to Darryl's mother, Annette Towns, expressing sympathy over such a difficult loss. The letter follows. [From the Detroit Free Press, Sept. 15, 1999] Mothers: Teach Sons About Love, Guns (By Kim Kingston) Darryl Towns, 15, died senselessly and tragically on Sept. 9 (``Slaying questioned: One teen in custody is a childhood friend,'' Sept. 11). Many of us knew of him only as ``the baby.'' Most of us knew him through the stories from a mother's heart--of trials and tribulations, and the joys and challenges of trying to raise a son up right. Some of us knew only his voice, as it changed over the years from that of a soft-spoken boy to that of a man, calling his mom every evening at work, just to check in. His mama was always saying with a glitter of pride in her eye: ``He's such a good and responsible boy.'' Fifteen years of love and dedication were ripped away in an instant by a senseless act, so very irreversible. For every mother of every son, teach your sons the magnitude of a mother's love, and how guns lead to the destruction of so many lives--but none so insurmountable as that of a mother's anguish at the loss of her son. Guns have no place in untrained hands--your hand or my hands--let alone in the emotionally charged squabbles of teenaged boys. The only ones powerful enough to stop it are the young men themselves--young men like Darryl, who stood apart from some of his peers. He didn't carry a gun. He tried to do what was right. If his death could change the heart of just one boy, then he would not have died in vain. To Annette, his Mother: We, your friends at work, want to thank you for sharing a part of your dear son with us through your eyes. To Darryl, forever ``Mama's Baby'': We dedicate you to a better, safer place in the loving arms of your Creator.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, with this fateful vote tonight the world becomes a more dangerous place. That is what our top military leaders are telling us. To quote General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: The world will be a safer place with the treaty than without it. And it is in our national security interest to ratify the treaty. Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen says that this treaty will ``help cap the nuclear threat.'' Mr. President, we no longer have standing, when we defeat this treaty, to tell China or India or Pakistan or any other country: Don't test nuclear weapons. We will have lost our standing, and I believe will have lost our bearings. By rushing headlong into this vote tonight and defeating a treaty which 150 nations have signed--it was said a few moments ago that our lab Directors say that the treaty would endanger their safety and reliability testing. I ask unanimous consent that a joint statement of the lab Directors be printed in the Record saying that ``we are confident that a fully supported and sustained Stockpile Stewardship Program will enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing.''

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, our three allies, in an unprecedented move, have directly appealed to this Senate to ratify this treaty. Great Britain, France, Germany, directly appealed to this Senate. Finally, it is unprecedented that this Senate would defeat a treaty of this magnitude with this speed without a report even from the Foreign Relations Committee. I think we are doing a real disservice to world peace and stability by defeating this treaty. I thank my friend for the time he has yielded me.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my good friend from Delaware. I thank him also for the leadership he has shown, both on the floor and off the floor, in trying to bring this treaty to hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee, so that the full Senate could look at the pros and cons of this in a deliberative way. I start with a reference that Senator Biden made to three of our good allies--France, Germany, and Great Britain. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is here and perhaps he will recollect otherwise; and I would trust his recollection on this, if he does--but I cannot remember when three of our closest allies' leaders have addressed a direct plea to the Senate. At least in the 20 years I have been here, I do not remember a letter coming in from the Chancellor of Germany and the President of France, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain pleading with us to ratify a treaty. That is how serious the stakes are in this debate. The world is looking to the Senate. Sometimes we say that and believe it is true; but in this case we say it and know it is true. Because the world has signed on both to a nonproliferation treaty and to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. There are a few exceptions, obviously. There are some states which will not sign any such treaty. But except for a few rogue nations, the world has signed on to a nonproliferation treaty and a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The world is looking at us, expecting our leadership. Even though the world is looking to us to ratify, that does not mean we should ratify this treaty if it makes us less secure. We should do what is in our security interests. But unless all of our allies and the rest of the world are wrong, the world will be a much more secure place if we stop testing nuclear weapons and if other countries stop testing nuclear weapons as well. How do we tell India ``don't test'', if we ourselves want to test? How do we tell Pakistan, ``don't test; for God's sake, for your security and the world, don't test'', if we say, oh, but we want to continue to test? What does that do to our argument? I would suggest it destroys it. It destroys our standing to try to persuade countries that want to become nuclear powers, that want to add to their inventories, that want to improve their inventories--it wipes out our standing to make the argument, if we say everybody else ought to stop testing but us. We are the only superpower in this world. That gives us certain responsibilities. But one of those responsibilities is that we should be not just a superpower, but we should be superwise as well. We should realize that we are not always going to be the world's only superpower--nuclear or otherwise. We should behave with the realization that our actions today are going to affect the rest of the world, including the direction they go in terms of nonproliferation. As I said, I would not care if every country in the world signed or ratified this treaty if it was not in our security interests. I think we ought to listen, we ought to understand what the rest of the world is saying to us, we ought to remember our own commitments. We signed up to the indefinite extension of the nonproliferation treaty, and made a commitment to the world to conclude a comprehensive test ban treaty. We should remember our own commitments. We should consider what our allies and the rest of the world are saying to us. But if it were not in our own security interest, I would not recommend that we ratify the treaty. But we should surely listen to our top military leaders as to what they recommend to this Senate? What does the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend strongly to the Senate? He says: The test ban treaty will help limit the development of more advanced and destructive weapons and inhibit the ability of more countries to acquire nuclear weapons. It is true that the treaty cannot prevent proliferation or reduce current inventories, but it can restrict nuclear weapons progress and reduce the risk of proliferation. General Shelton said: In short, the world will be a safer place with the treaty than without it. And it is in our national security interest to ratify the CTBT. Secretary Cohen said the following: By banning nuclear explosive testing, the treaty removes a key tool that a proliferator would need in order to acquire high confidence in its nuclear weapons designs. Secretary Cohen said: Furthermore, the treaty helps make it more difficult for Russia, China, India, and Pakistan to improve existing types of nuclear weapons and to develop advanced new types of nuclear weapons. Secretary Cohen said: In this way, the treaty contributes to the reduction of the global nuclear threat. Thus, while the treaty cannot prevent proliferation or reduce the current nuclear threat, it can make more difficult the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and thereby help cap the nuclear threat. What the three world leaders, to whom I referred before and to whom Senator Biden referred earlier, said in their article and in their letter to us was the following: Rejection of the treaty in the Senate would remove the pressure from other states still hesitating about whether to ratify it. Rejection would give great encouragement to proliferators. Rejection would also expose a fundamental divergence within NATO. The United States and its allies have worked side by side for a comprehensive test ban since the days of President Eisenhower. This goal is now within our grasp. Our security is involved as well as America's. For the security of the world we will leave to our children, we urge the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty. We have President Chirac, Prime Minister Blair, Chancellor Schroeder of Germany, from their perspective, pleading with us to ratify this treaty. We have our top military leadership, uniformed and civilian, urging us to ratify this treaty. That is the kind of assessment which has been made of the value of this treaty. That is the kind of analysis which has been made. We should think carefully before we reject it; before we defeat a treaty that is aimed at reducing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world; before we give up our leadership in the fight against proliferation; and our efforts to go after proliferators. We keep saying the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the greatest threat this Nation faces; our military leaders tell us this treaty is an important step in the fight against proliferation. Before we give up that leadership and defeat a treaty which is adding momentum to the battle against proliferators, we surely should stop and assess what it is this Senate is about to do. It has been argued that we need testing for the safety of our stockpile. The answer is that the stewards of the stockpile, the lab Directors, for the last 7 years have been certifying safety and reliability of the stockpile based not on testing, which we have given up for 7 years already, but based on a Stockpile Stewardship Program which has allowed them to certify with a high degree of confidence that our stockpile is safe and reliable, without one test in the last 7 years. Will they be able to do that forever? They think they can, but they are not sure. They told us they believe they will be able to continue to certify the safety and reliability of our stockpile without testing. They have also told us something else. Here I want to read a letter from them because there has been such a misunderstanding about what these three lab Directors have told us at our hearing. After the hearing, they wrote a joint statement from which I want to read: While there can never be a guarantee that the stockpile will remain safe and reliable indefinitely without nuclear testing, we have stated that we are confident that a fully supported and sustained stockpile stewardship program will enable us to continue to maintain America's nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing. If that turns out not to be the case, Safeguard F--which is a condition for entry into the Test Ban Treat by the U.S.--provides for the President, in consultation with Congress, to withdraw from the treaty under the standard ``supreme national interest'' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required. People can quote different parts of the lab Directors' testimony. I was there for it. The bottom line is, while they cannot guarantee that the Stockpile Stewardship Program will always allow them to certify safety and reliability, they believe it will be able to do so, and therefore they are, in the words of one of them, ``signed onto'' this treaty. That is because if they can't certify the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile in some future year they have the assurance in safeguard F, by which we can withdraw from the treaty if we need to conduct a nuclear test. We have incorporated that safeguard and, indeed, strengthened it in the amendment to this resolution, that we will withdraw from this treaty and begin nuclear testing again if necessary. We do not want our stockpile to be unsafe or unreliable. Nobody does--none of us. The question then is, Can we join the rest of the world, at least the civilized world, in a comprehensive test ban to fight the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and at the same time assure ourselves that if we need to test again, we will be able to do so by notifying the rest of the civilized world in advance that we retain the right to withdraw from the treaty and test if our security requires it? In other words, in the event the day comes when testing is needed to certify safety and reliability, we are putting the world on notice now that we intend to exercise that withdrawal clause. Could somebody cheat? That is the other argument which has been used, that somebody could cheat at a very low level of testing, that somebody might be able to get away with it, that our seismic detection capability is not such that we would be certain we would catch a very low level test. This is what Secretary Cohen says about the cheating question: Is it possible for states to cheat on the treaty without being detected? The answer is yes. We would not be able to detect every evasively conducted nuclear test. And from a national security perspective, we do not need to. But I believe that the United States will be able to detect a level of testing, the yield and number of tests, by which a state could undermine the U.S. nuclear deterrent. So the Secretary of Defense is testifying that militarily significant cheating would be caught, that a low-level test by a power would be taking a huge risk in cheating, because there are other means besides seismic detection to get evidence of a cheating. But most importantly, if a signatory to this treaty decided to cheat and take that risk, they could not undermine our nuclear deterrent. It would not be a militarily significant cheating that could occur without our knowing it seismically. We would not have to rely on other means in order to discover a militarily significant act of cheating. Plus, General Shelton and Secretary Cohen have both told us that the treaty, if it comes into effect, will increase our ability to observe and monitor tests because it will create over 300 additional monitoring stations in 90 countries specifically in order to detect nuclear testing. I will conclude with two points. One, this Senate is not ready to ratify this treaty. Indeed, maybe it never will ratify the treaty. But it is clear now that this Senate will not ratify the treaty at this time. I believe at a minimum we should do no damage, do no harm. There are many of us who have not focused adequately on these issues, by the way. This has been a very truncated period of time for consideration, with very few hearings focused directly on the treaty. I know we had three hearings in the Armed Services Committee, and there was one in Foreign Relations last week that focused directly on this treaty. We are here under a unanimous consent agreement which allows only one amendment by the majority leader and one by the Democratic leader to this treaty, an unusual restriction for consideration and deliberation of a treaty. No other amendments are in order; no other restrictions, conditions on a resolution of ratification, but the one. So we are here in a very restricted circumstance and a very short time limit. It is not a deliberative way to address a treaty. This Senate should do better. At a minimum, my plea is, do no harm. Do no harm to the cause of antiproliferation. The way to avoid doing harm, regardless of where people think they are on the merits of the treaty, is to delay consideration of this treaty. My final point has to do with the delay issue. There is a precedent for delaying a vote on a treaty even though a vote had actually been scheduled. The precedent is the most recent arms control treaty we looked at, I believe, which is the Chemical Weapons Convention. There was a vote actually scheduled on the Chemical Weapons Convention. There was a vote that was scheduled on the Chemical Weapons Convention for September 12, 1996. Shortly before that vote, Senator Dole, who was then a candidate for President, announced his opposition to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It was decided on the 12th, which I believe was the actual day scheduled by unanimous consent for a vote on the convention, it was decided to vitiate that unanimous consent agreement and to delay the vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. A vote was set, by unanimous consent agreement, but given the opposition of one of the Presidential candidates--similar to what we have going on now, by the way, where we have opposing positions taken by Presidential candidates of both parties--it was decided then that it was the wiser course for the Senate to delay the vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention. I said before on this floor last week that I think we are in an analogous situation to what occurred back in September of 1996. I raise it again for a very specific point. At that time, there were no conditions attached to the decision to delay the vote. The Senate agreed to vitiate the unanimous consent agreement, to delay the vote; but there was no requirement, no condition attached as to when it would be brought up or not brought up. It was simply to vitiate. People decided--we decided in this body--that it was a wiser course of action not to proceed under the circumstances--one similar to what exists now, but there are different circumstances now that are, I think, additional reasons not to vote at this time, including the very narrow UC under which we are operating, with the strict consideration of a total of two amendments. I suggest we look back--and we are going to do what each of us always does, which is follow our own consciences as to what is best for this Nation. In my judgment, ratification is best, but, clearly, that is not where the Senate is now. I hope there is a majority of us who believe, for various reasons, the better course of wisdom is that we not proceed to defeat this treaty at this time--whether it is because that defeat would constitute a blow to our leadership in the battle against proliferation in this world, as three major allies have told us, or whether it is because this institution has not had adequate time yet to fully understand and consider and deliberate over this very complicated treaty; for whatever reason--and many exist--I hope we will delay this vote. I cannot foresee a circumstance, as I have told my good friend from Virginia, where I would want to see this treaty brought up next year, given the fact that the election is at the end of next year. However, I can't preclude any circumstance from existing. I can't predict every world circumstance that would exist, where I would be comfortable saying we should under no circumstances consider this treaty, no matter what happens. But I can, in good conscience, say I can't foresee any such circumstances because I can't. Will the world situation change? Will India and Pakistan begin testing because we fail to ratify? Will that then lead to China to begin their testing again? Will that have an impact on Russia? Will the political situation change in the United States where candidates of both parties will possibly decide that this treaty is in our best interest? Can I foresee any of that happening? No. Do I believe any of that will happen? No. But it could. Circumstances can change. So I would not want to see us saying there are no circumstances under which anybody could even raise the question of consideration of this treaty next year. It is a very straightforward statement and, again, I conclude by saying, personally, I hope we delay the vote. Personally, I can foresee no circumstances under which this should be brought up next year. We should wait until after the Presidential elections, in the absence of some unforeseeable circumstance. But I hope that is what the Senate, in its deliberative wisdom, decides to do. At this time, I have been authorized to yield 5 minutes to Senator Dorgan. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we have before the Senate the conference report on H.R. 1906, the fiscal year 2000 Appropriations Act for Agriculture, Rural Development, and Related Agencies. Included in this Act is more than $4 billion for the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children commonly known as the WIC program. This is one of the most successful programs provided by the federal government, and I am glad to see that an increase above last year's level is provided in this Act. However, I have concerns about language in the statement of managers to accompany this conference report about the WIC program. This language relates to the so-called ``sugar cap'' and I would like to ask my friend from Wisconsin, the ranking member of the appropriations subcommittee, about this specific provision.

Mr. LEVIN. I ask the Senator, did this or any similar language appear in either the House or Senate measures before the conference committee convened?

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator. I was surprised to learn that language relating to specific nutritional policy of the USDA--policy that has been the subject of significant study and debate within the agency for years--that language which appears to reach a conclusion on the outcome of years of study has been slipped into the fiscal year 2000 appropriations report. This language appeared, deus ex machina, at the very last minute and without discussion by all the conferees. Thankfully, the language is not binding on USDA, so the agency can continue with their decision making process, without being bound by the language in the conference report. Substantively, the report language conflicts with the USDA's own recommendations on children's diets. When the National Association of WIC Directors and the USDA's Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion both urge people to add fruit to their cereal, it is irrational and incoherent to deny people the opportunity to obtain fruit in their cereal. But that is what the report language would accomplish. USDA should make a determination on how the sugar cap on breakfast cereals in the WIC package of foods should be calculated and how best to incorporate fruit into WIC participants' diets. The agency should bring nutritional science and common sense to the task, and it should ensure that the rule is consistent with the nutritional recommendations that it makes regarding children's diets.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. You are not correcting the record at all. You are amplifying the record, if I may say to my good friend from Virginia.

Mr. LEVIN. If it is all right with the others in line, that is all right with me.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. I wish to begin also by thanking the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, for holding 3 days of hearings on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. These hearings were well balanced and very informative. They were also very much overdue. But at least we have begun the process of exploring this treaty. What do we know after 3 days of those hearings? We know the best professional judgment of our senior military leaders is that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is in our Nation's national security interest. The best professional judgment of our senior military leaders, civilian and uniform, is that we are better off with this treaty than without it. We know after these hearings that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will make it harder and more expensive for other countries to maintain existing stockpiles. We know the treaty would make it harder and more expensive for nations that do not yet have nuclear weapons to develop and deploy those weapons. We know that the treaty, as all treaties, is not perfectly verifiable. But we also know that tests conducted below our level of detection would not militarily disadvantage the United States. That doesn't come from me, although I believe it. It comes from our senior military leaders. We know that our overall monitoring and verification capabilities are very capable today and will improve with the entry into force of the treaty. We know, despite a 7-year moratorium on nuclear testing, that the U.S. nuclear stockpile remains safe and reliable today. We haven't tested in 7 years. We have relied on our Stockpile Stewardship Program. That program is up and running. We rely on it every year for a certification that our stockpile is safe and reliable. This isn't some future concept that is being discussed. It is a Stockpile Stewardship Program that is, of course, not finished. It may never be finished. But it has made significant progress. We rely on it. We have invested billions in it. And our lab Directors have said three times, based on a Stockpile Stewardship Program that we now have up and running, that our nuclear inventory is safe and reliable. Without that stewardship program, they cannot make those certifications now on which we so heavily rely. So the Stockpile Stewardship Program is already serving as a basis for certifying safety and reliability of this stockpile. We also know that its capabilities will improve substantially in the future, but that if at any point in the future the Stockpile Stewardship Program is not adequate to certify the safety and reliability of our stockpile at that point under the guarantees that are in the letter from the President--and that we will write into the ratification resolution-- then the United States will exercise its supreme national interest clause and begin testing again. We have informed every signatory that is what we will have the right to do. We have put all the parties on notice as to what our supreme national interest is. We have said that if we can't certificate safety and reliability without testing--and we believe that we can do it without testing--we will then return to testing. We also know there is no military requirement for the United States to resume testing at the present time and there are no plans to resume testing with or without a Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Most important of all, we know that if we do not ratify this treaty, we will miss an opportunity, which is a historic opportunity, to stem the tide of nuclear proliferation, and we will instead be encouraging a new and possibly worldwide nuclear arms race. Prohibition of nuclear weapons tests have been the goal of Presidents since President Eisenhower. It was President Eisenhower who said almost 40 years ago that not achieving a nuclear test ban, in his words, ``would have to be classed as the greatest disappointment of any administration of any decade of any time and of any party.'' The whole world, including nuclear weapons powers and countries that might want to become nuclear weapons powers, will be watching what the Senate does with this treaty. Our action is going to affect the willingness of other nations to ratify the treaty and our ability to persuade other nations to refrain from future nuclear testing. Rejection of this treaty will have a profound negative impact on the battle against proliferation of nuclear weapons. We urge other countries--particularly, most recently India and Pakistan--to give up nuclear testing, to sign this treaty. India and Pakistan test weapons and we say: Stop it for your sake, for the world's sake. It is a road you should no longer walk. It is a road which could lead to your mutual total destruction and could spread to other parts of the world. We make those pleas to India, Pakistan, and other countries. How in the world can we expect other countries to refrain from nuclear testing if we are unwilling to do so? How will we have any standing to ask India, Pakistan, China, and other countries to stop nuclear testing for the sake of the world, for the sake of our kids, and their kids? How would we have the gall to ask other countries to refrain from testing if we, ourselves, are unwilling to do so? Our Secretary of Defense, our Joint Chiefs, four former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs--including General Shalikashvili, General Powell, Admiral Crowe, General Jones--have reviewed this treaty and have told the Senate Armed Services Committee that they also support this test ban treaty. General Shalikashvili's name was brought in by the Senator from Texas. I want to read what General Shalikashvili said this week. We heard what he said 2 years ago; now let's see what he says today. By the way, it is even stronger than where he was leading 2 years ago. In short, the chief and I have supported this treaty, together with the safeguards package, because it answered our military concerns and because our country is better off with this treaty than it is without it. That is General Shalikashvili putting in a nutshell what the issue is: Is this country better off with or without this treaty? His answer is, it is. General Shelton, who is the current Chairman of our Joint Chiefs, testified as follows before our committee: This treaty will help limit the development of more advanced and destructive weapons and inhibit the ability of more countries to acquire nuclear weapons. It is true that the treaty cannot prevent proliferation or reduce current inventory, but it can restrict nuclear weapons progress and reduce the risk of proliferation. In short, our top uniform military official says the world will be a safer place with the treaty than without it, and it is in our national security interests to ratify the treaty. Secretary Cohen, at the same hearings this week, testified that the treaty would restrain other nations from creating and building nuclear arsenals. He said: By banning nuclear explosive testing, the treaty removes a key tool that a proliferator would need in order to acquire high confidence in its nuclear weapons design. Further, the treaty helps make it more difficult for Russia, China, India and Pakistan to improve existing types of nuclear weapons and to develop advanced new types of nuclear weapons. In this way, the treaty contributes to the reduction of the global nuclear threat. Thus, while the treaty cannot prevent proliferation or reduce the current nuclear threat, it can make more difficult the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and thereby help cap the nuclear threat. Opponents of ratification have raised two major arguments. They contend other nations could cheat because a low-yield nuclear test might not be picked up by our sensors; and second, we need to conduct nuclear tests in order to maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear stockpile. General Shelton and Secretary Cohen, on the basis of current intelligence information, have said that we would be able to detect any militarily significant level of nuclear testing. Secretary Cohen explained the conclusion this way: Is it possible for States to cheat on the treaty without being detected? The answer is, yes. We would not be able to detect every evasively conducted nuclear test, and from a national security perspective we do not need to. This is his conclusion. Secretary Cohen said: I believe that the United States will be able to detect a level of testing, the yield and the number of tests by which a state could undermine the U.S. nuclear deterrent. General Shelton also pointed out that the treaty, if it comes into effect, will increase our ability to observe and monitor tests because it will create an international monitoring system of over 300 monitoring stations in 90 countries. Some refer to information developed by the intelligence community over the last 18 months. I specifically asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense whether or not their testimony, their opinion, includes consideration of all of the intelligence community's information that has been gathered in the last 18 months and before. Secretary Cohen states: I have been apprised of all the developments. I am not aware of any information at this point that would call into question our ability to maintain our strong nuclear deterrent, that any balance has shifted or would call into question our ability to defend ourselves. With regard to the safety of the stockpile, it is now safe, it is certified as safe, even though we have done no testing since 1992. The answer of the heads of our laboratories--when I directly asked them this question: Are you signed on to this treaty?--was: Yes, provided the safeguards are written into the ratification resolution and providing there is robust funding of our safeguards and our stockpile security program. The lab Directors are, in the words of one of them, ``on board'' under those conditions and those conditions now exist. My friend from Virginia apparently has a question, and I yield.

Mr. LEVIN. I said he supported the treaty; and I am glad to hear he supports delay in the vote, and I hope our colleagues will listen to both of his statements, both that we should not now vote on this treaty--because he is correct for many reasons--and also I hope they will listen to his statement of January 27, 1998, when he, along with General Shalikashvili, former Chairman Crowe, and former Chairman Jones said the following: On September 22, 1997, President Clinton submitted the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban (CTB) Treaty to the United States Senate for its advice and consent, together with six Safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into this Treaty. These Safeguards will strengthen our commitments in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and verification, stockpile stewardship, maintenance of our nuclear laboratories, and test readiness. They also specify the circumstances under which the President would be prepared, in consultation with Congress, to exercise our supreme national interest rights under the CTB to conduct necessary testing if the safety or reliability of our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified. This is his conclusion, General Powell, on January 27, 1998: With these Safeguards, we support Senate approval of the CTB Treaty. Those are his words. I am glad to have this printed in the Record and I am happy to hear at this point, at least, General Powell does support the delay in the vote. I think that is a wiser course to take for three reasons, and I will conclude with those reasons.

Mr. LEVIN. There are at least three predicates I would support for delaying this treaty. I am glad to hear he reaches the same conclusion for whatever reason he wants to give now.

Mr. LEVIN. I am not going to comment on his reasons. I am delighted he reached the conclusion he did. I disagree with his reasoning as to how he reached his conclusion because I think the evidence is overwhelming, and the testimony, if anything, has grown stronger. In fact, one of the arguments against this treaty is that we need somehow to defeat it in order to protect our allies; that they are relying on our deterrent--which, of course, they are--that somehow or other our allies would be disadvantaged if we ratified this treaty. Yet three key allies have taken an unusual step. I do not remember when this has ever happened, when the heads of three states closely allied with us have urged this Senate directly to ratify a treaty. Yet that is what they are now doing. We have heard arguments for the last few days: Look how important our strategic deterrent is, not just to us, which it is, but to our allies, which it has been and will continue to be. What does President Chirac say and what does Prime Minister Blair say and what does Chancellor Schroeder say? They say: We need this treaty, Senate. They are directly addressing the U.S. Senate. I do not remember that ever happening.

Mr. LEVIN. Directly, directly asking the U.S. Senate to ratify the comprehensive test ban. What do they say: Rejection of the treaty in the Senate would remove the pressure from other states still hesitating about whether to ratify it. Rejection would give great encouragement to proliferators. Rejection would also expose a fundamental divergence within NATO. The United States and its allies [they say] have worked side by side for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty since the days of President Eisenhower. This goal is now within our grasp. Our security is involved as well as America's. For the security of the world we will leave to our children, we urge the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty. So much for the argument that somehow or other defeating this treaty is not only good for us but it is good for our allies. Not in their view, it is not. Not in my view, it is not. And I hope not in the view of the majority of this Senate. But I want to go back to the delay, and I am going to wind up because I do happen to agree, we should not vote on this treaty at this time-- for a number of reasons. First of all, because it would be tragic to reject this treaty, and if it comes to a vote now, it is going to be rejected. It would be tragic for our security--that is our top military leaders saying that, and I feel that keenly. It would be tragic for the world for us to defeat this treaty. It would reverse the direction in which we are heading, which is an ongoing effort to try to reduce the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons. That effort, which I hope all of us share, will be damaged severely if we reject this treaty. And because we will reject this treaty if it comes to a vote, I think we should delay it. No. 2, this treaty should not be involved in any way in Presidential politics, partisan politics, political meanderings, conflicts. We ought to be looking at this treaty based on its merits without this political environment being heeded. We cannot and are not doing that at this moment. It is a good reason to delay this treaty. We delayed the Chemical Weapons Convention. The reason we delayed our vote, even though it was scheduled--and I tell my good friend who is presiding, even though we had actually scheduled a vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention, by unanimous consent I believe, too--when Senator Dole came out against that Chemical Weapons Convention shortly before we were voting, and while he was running for President, we decided as a Senate we would delay that vote until after that Presidential election. We then, taking calm deliberation, adding conditions, reservations-- we then ratified that treaty. We took the time to do it. In fact, we spent a lot of time in the Old Senate Chamber, as I remember, as part of that deliberation. We should do that here. The third reason we should not proceed to vote at this time is that we as a Senate have a responsibility to deliberate on a treaty. We put ourselves in a position, through a unanimous consent agreement, where we could not do that adequately. I think that was a mistake. But we do not have to compound our mistakes and make a worse mistake by voting on it just because we agreed to a unanimous consent agreement that we would begin the debate on it. That does not force us to proceed to vote on that treaty. We have done some good with this unanimous consent agreement already, although I believe, looking back, it was a mistake to constrain ourselves as we did--that we could not add amendments other than one on each side, could not add reservations, could not add conditions, and so forth. What we have done as an institution is to put ourselves in a straitjacket with this unanimous consent reservation, which is not in keeping with the great traditions of the Senate. Senator Byrd, Senator Moynihan, and others made that point. I think they made it eloquently. I keenly believe it. We have a responsibility here to deliberate on a treaty, to be open to considering conditions, qualifications, reservations, statements--to complete our committee work. My good friend from Virginia knows--in fact he was the one, I think, who brought this out--we are currently in the middle of receiving a national intelligence estimate which is not yet completed. We should see that completed. We should have whatever hearings are needed. By the way, we should have a committee report. I cannot remember a treaty which has ever come to the floor of the Senate--at least of this magnitude--without a committee report. On the Chemical Weapons Convention, we had a committee report of 350 pages for consideration by this body. We do not have one page from any of the committees. So it seems to me it makes the most sense for us, under these circumstances--I am going to be perfectly candid; one of the reasons that compels me is that I believe if we voted now, this would be defeated. I think that would be a tragic setback in the fight against proliferation. But there are other very important institutional reasons, which I hope will appeal to others, that we should not ever as a body put ourselves in a position where we need to vote, or have to vote, on something which is not ready to be voted on.

Mr. LEVIN. As I said yesterday, indeed, the day before, in the absence of circumstances that I cannot foresee----