Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the chairman for yielding.

Mr. LEVIN. We welcome the proposal of the majority leader. We have worked very closely, on a bipartisan basis, on the committee on what is in the bill already and to which the majority leader has made reference. We will continue and look forward to working with the majority leader, on a bipartisan basis, on his proposal. The committees of jurisdiction and I are reviewing that. We got it last night. We welcome very much these kinds of suggestions and will address them in the same kind of bipartisan approach that the good Senator from Virginia, our good chairman, has just made reference to.

Mr. LEVIN. Would the Senator yield while the majority leader is on the floor so I could give a 30-second comment?

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I understand that Senator Warner may wish to speak on the Kerrey amendment for perhaps 5 minutes before we move to the BRAC amendment. If so, we are trying to reach Senator--Mr. President, I withdraw that. Are we now on the BRAC amendment?

Mr. LEVIN. I believe this debate will take longer than 35 minutes, and there is no time agreement on this debate. There are others who want to speak on both sides. I address this to the chairman, because this seems to me likely to take more than 35 additional minutes. Since the debate is scheduled to restart on BRAC at 11:45, I wonder whether the chairman might want to delay that for perhaps 15 minutes or half an hour.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield 10 minutes to the Senator from Nevada.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, how much time remains on the BRAC matter?

Mr. LEVIN. I am not suggesting we have a time limit of 12 noon. I am suggesting if we delay the beginning of the BRAC debate until noon, there is at least a chance that this debate could conclude by then. If it does, we could vote on this amendment immediately after BRAC. I don't think the Senator from Nebraska is willing or should be willing to agree to a time agreement yet because he has not heard the debate on the other side. I suggest the debate on BRAC begin at noon--we change the unanimous consent--instead of 11:45, and hope that at least there is a chance that this debate could in 35 minutes be completed but not ``bake'' that into the unanimous consent.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, from 1989 to 1997 the Department of Defense reduced the total active-duty military end strength by 32 percent. That figure is going to grow to 36 percent by 2003, over a third reduction in our end strength will be achieved by 2003. We are already about a third. Even after four base closure rounds, the reduction in the Department's base structure in the United States has been reduced only 21 percent. The Department of Defense analysis concluded that the Department has about 23 percent excess capacity in its current base structure. Let me give a few examples of that excess that we are now funding, spending taxpayers' money supporting, which is no longer needed. The Army will have reduced the personnel at its classroom training commands by 43 percent, but the classroom space has only been reduced by 7 percent--personnel reductions, 43 percent in classroom training commands but the space only by 7 percent. Why do we want to maintain all that excess classroom space that is not being used? What is the point of doing that? The answer to me; it is pointless. The uniformed military are saying: Please let us close it. The Air Force will have reduced the number of fighters and other small aircraft by 53 percent since 1989, but the base structure for those aircraft will be only 35 percent smaller. The Navy will have 33 percent more hangers for its aircraft than it requires. And on and on. Secretary Cohen's report to us documents substantial savings that have been achieved from past base closure rounds. It has been argued that those savings can't be audited. What the CBO says about that argument is that firm measures of BRAC savings that were requested by the Congress do not and, indeed, cannot exist. That is because BRAC savings are really avoided costs. They are the difference between what the Department of Defense actually spent and what it would have had to have spent in the absence of the BRAC action. Because the latter is never actually observed, the figures for BRAC savings that the Department of Defense provides will never be firm measures; they must always be estimates. Then the CBO says--talking about the Department of Defense report on savings--that the report's basic message is consistent with the CBO's own conclusion: Past and future BRAC rounds will lead to significant savings for the Department of Defense. That, it seems to me, is the heart of the measure. This is a Congressional Budget Office letter, which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. The heart of the matter, it seems to me, is that our auditors, our budget experts, have said that it is their conclusion that ``past and future BRAC rounds will lead to significant savings for the Department of Defense.'' What are those estimates of savings? By 2001, the Department estimates that BRAC actions will produce a total of $14.5 billion in net savings. After 2001, when all BRAC actions must be completed, steady State savings will be $5.7 billion per year. This is just from past base closure rounds, which some Members say can't be audited in terms of precise savings. That is a lot of money, $5.7 billion per year--steady State savings. Is it possibly $5.6 billion or $5.8 billion? Nobody can state with certainty. It is significant. What can be stated is what the CBO's conclusion is, that these are significant savings and are similar to the kind of savings that the CBO believes are achieved with base closing. Last July, as I indicated, the CBO gave their own conclusions, so while we can debate this issue on the floor about audit trails and how precise the estimates are, our auditors, our experts, have reached the critical conclusion that the savings, indeed, are significant. Earlier this month we received letters from Secretary Cohen, from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, from all of the Joint Chiefs, from the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy and the Air Force. In his letter, Secretary Cohen says the Department's ability to properly support America's men and women in uniform today and to sustain them into the future hinged in great measure on realizing this critical savings that only BRAC can provide. Our ability to support the men and women in uniform depends on future savings from BRAC rounds. A letter which we just received, signed by all six members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, makes their views crystal clear: Simply stated, our military judgment is that further base closures are absolutely necessary. Those are pretty strong words and these are our uniformed military leaders. On the Armed Services Committee, we put a lot of stock in their judgment on most issues. Once in a while we may disagree with them, as is our right and our duty, but when the top military leadership, civilian and uniform, in this Nation tell Members that more BRAC rounds are ``absolutely necessary'' we should take heed. General Shelton said in last year's Department of Defense report: I strongly support additional base closures. Without them, we will not leave our successors the war-fighting dominance of today's force. That is not a political statement; that is a military man's statement. That has to do with warfighting dominance. We can argue about audit trails or specifics on this floor, but when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs says we will not leave our successors the warfighting dominance that we have in today's force without additional base closures, those are words which have a special meaning, it would seem to me, to all of the Members who have this special responsibility. We have to face up to this responsibility. A decade ago, after years of prodding by Senator Goldwater and under the leadership of Senator Nunn and Senator Warner, Congress had the vision and the courage to start the BRAC process. Just imagine the financial problems that we would have today if we could not count on the savings from previous BRAC rounds. If the Senators a decade ago did not succeed in persuading us to start the BRAC process, think of the problems we would have today. Those are the problems we are going to have 4, 5, 6, 7 years from now if we do not continuing a process, if we do not continue the process, if we do not shed the excess infrastructure which is no longer needed.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, how much time do I have?

Mr. LEVIN. I yield myself an additional 2 minutes. I will finish and then ask unanimous consent that after I am completed, in 3 minutes or so, Senator Robb be recognized.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, my understanding is that the chairman has no objection if at 5 o'clock we have the vote on reconsideration, even though we were in the middle of another debate. I have no objection if he doesn't.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. It is my understanding that it is the intent, at least of the chairman, that this would then be the last vote?

Mr. LEVIN. That that is the intent?

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 4 minutes to the Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Vote on Motion to Reconsider Amendment No. 392

Mr. LEVIN. I know that is not the decision until the leader --

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes. Mr. President, this amendment contains a funding cutoff that is far broader than the one that was contained in the Specter amendment that the Senate tabled yesterday. This would cut off funding effective October 1 for U.S. air or ground operations, including peacekeeping operations. So the Senator from New Hampshire has in no way stated inaccurately what this amendment does. It is his intention, and he said so quite clearly, that this amendment leads to the withdrawal of our effort, the termination, the ending of our effort in Serbia, including the air campaign. The Senate voted just a few months ago, 58-to-41, to support that air campaign. What this amendment says is we want to terminate the air campaign. This would have the Senate blow hot and blow cold on the same issue, whether or not we want to support an air campaign which is presently going on. At the same time, it tells Milosevic all you have to do is hang in there until October 1 and you will not even face an air campaign. You will not face any kind of campaign. You will have succeeded in Kosovo. Milosevic has not accomplished what he set out to accomplish because he is under severe attack in Kosovo and in Serbia. He will accomplish what he set out to accomplish if this amendment passes. That will be the victory. That will seal the success for Milosevic if this amendment is agreed to, because this amendment cuts off all funds, including those for the air campaign to attempt to reduce Milosevic's military capability, which is our military mission, and our broader mission will then be totally impossible. The broader mission is to return over 1 million refugees who have been burned out, who have been raped, whose villages have been destroyed--500 villages. Those refugees, then, will have no hope of returning. Whereas now they have, indeed, a very real hope of returning because Milosevic is gradually being weakened and his forces are under tremendous stress. There is great evidence of that all over. The KLA, the Kosovo Liberation Army, is beginning to move back in to their villages and into their homes. Nothing will scare Milosevic much more than having to face the KLA again, which will be the result of his failure to negotiate a settlement which provides for the return of these refugees in safety with protection. We cannot allow Milosevic to succeed, which is what this amendment hands to him. We cannot allow Milosevic to shape the future of Europe. That is what his success would do. His ethnic cleansing, if not reversed, will shape Europe for the next century. This century began with a genocide against the Armenians. It is ending with an ethnic cleansing of the Kosovars. And in between was a Holocaust. If we do not want the next century to be a repeat of this century, Milosevic cannot succeed. Europe's future is on the line and that means our own security is on the line. NATO's future is on the line. The adoption of this amendment will tell NATO they have failed. The adoption of this amendment will be the statement to Milosevic: You have succeeded. We are pulling out. That is what the intention of this amendment is, according to its sponsor. This amendment will tell our 19 allies in NATO: Forget NATO. Forget NATO cohesion. Forget NATO unity. We are pulling out. And this amendment will send the worst possible message to the most important of all the people, the men and women who wear our uniform who are out there in harm's way now, who would then be told by this amendment we are pulling out. This Senate must send a very different message than that. I hope this amendment is tabled by an overwhelming vote. I will be happy to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator. General Shelton said: I would definitely oppose inclusion of any language that mandates specific force structure levels. This is the highest level of uniform military leadership we have in this Nation. This is what he says: The Service Chiefs and I feel it is time to consider options that will reduce our strategic forces to the levels recommended by the Nuclear Posture Review. The START I legislative restraint will need to be removed before we can pursue these options. Major costs will be incurred if we remain at START I levels. He went on: The Service Chiefs and I agree it is time to reduce the number of our nuclear platforms to a level that is militarily sufficient to meet our national security needs. . . . ``[M]ilitarily sufficient to meet our national security needs. . . .'' General Shelton went on: The statutory provision that keeps us at the START I level for both Trident SSBNs and Peacekeeper ICBMs will need to be removed before we can pursue these options. So we have the leadership of this Nation's military--civilian and uniform--urging us not to have a restraint in law that will make it difficult for them to pursue options which they need to pursue in order to avoid the waste of resources, options which will allow us to be militarily sufficient and not to promote proliferation in Russia.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair, and I again thank my colleague from Nebraska.

Mr. LEVIN. About how much longer will you be taking?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to be certain that the chairman is in agreement with my understanding of what this would be. At 8:00, the chairman would move to table, and if in fact it is tabled, that would end it. But if it is not tabled, there will be then no limitation as part of this unanimous consent agreement on time.