Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I commend the Senator from Nebraska for his amendment. What he has done is to bring back before us and before the Nation a very important issue, which is, what is the necessary level of nuclear weapons in our inventory for our own security. Do we need as many as we have? Should we legislatively bake in that level if we do not need the START I level or should we at least be free to consider options to go to what the necessary level is for our own security? The Senator's gift to us and to the Nation here is that he is bringing before us an issue which the Joint Chiefs want us to consider but we have not yet considered, and that is, what is the level of nuclear weapons that we need for our own security and should that be determined by a legislative level, on a piece of paper, set in law, or should that be determined by our security needs? If we have a larger number of nuclear weapons than we need, we do two things. The Senator from California has just illuminated those two things. No. 1, if we have more nuclear weapons than we need for our own security, we are wasting valuable resources. That is No. 1. But, No. 2, what we are doing is we are then telling the Russians: Look, we're going to stay at this level, which in turn will encourage them, unhappily, to remain at the same level. That increases the proliferation threat to us because as the Senator from Nebraska has pointed out, the greatest threat to this Nation is the inventory of nuclear weapons on Russian soil. The Chinese threat does not come close. You are talking dozens in that case and not nearly as accurate. In the case of the Russians, you are talking many, many thousands of nuclear weapons which are not only pointed at us but also the more that are there on Russian soil, the greater the risk that one of them might be lost or not counted and leave Russian soil and get into the hands of a terrorist state or a terrorist group. So both from a proliferation perspective and from the perspective of the wise use of our resources, we ought to at least be open to consider options of fewer nuclear weapons than the START I level provides for. We may decide we want to stay at that level. It may be determined that we want to stay at that level. But the Joint Chiefs say that it may not be necessary. They want to consider options that would go down to a lower level of nuclear weapons, because they may not need as many nuclear weapons, regardless of what the Russians do. Even if the Russians stay at the START I level, we may not need as many nuclear weapons as the START I level allows us. There is no point in keeping them just because the Russians have them if we do not need them. There is no point keeping them if that helps to push the Russians to keep their own, with all of the proliferation threats which that engenders. I close by reading a couple answers that we have received to questions that I have addressed to Secretary Cohen and to General Shelton. I asked Secretary Cohen: Should we maintain the requirement in law that our forces be maintained at the START I level or should we now let that expire and do what our military requirements indicate we should do, rather than to put it in a legislative form? Secretary Cohen's answer: . . . I do not think we need to have the legislation, . . . . I think it is unnecessary. . . . General Shelton was even more pointed. General Shelton, in answer to that question, said: I would definitely oppose inclusion of any language. . . .

Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator would yield 2 additional minutes?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in order to protect Senator Harkin, which I know the Senator from Virginia is determined to do--

Mr. LEVIN. We do not know of any other time. So we are clear then, we will not close off debate on this until Senator Harkin has an opportunity to come back and claim his 20 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, if I still have that standing.

Mr. LEVIN. Senator Harkin was informed that at 7:15 he would be granted, how many minutes?

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. That is probably what will happen. In the middle of debate on another amendment, we will go back to the reconsideration. I have no objection to that happening at 5 o'clock.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Virginia for his efforts to accommodate Senator Kerrey. An additional hour is needed for his amendment, but because of his vice chairmanship on the Intelligence Committee which begins meeting right now, he is unable to be here.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Congress likes to ask the Joint Chiefs every once in awhile how much more money they think they need and where should we add it? What are their priorities? Those are legitimate questions for us to ask. But they are also relatively pretty easy issues to address. Our duty as Members of Congress extends far beyond pitching and hitting softballs. We have an obligation to the men and women in uniform to listen to the Chiefs when they ask us to do something that is hard to do. The Chiefs' opinions are important to us when following them is easy to do, when they give us their priorities if we can find some additional funds. But now they are asking us to do something that is hard politically to do, and that is to heed their advice, to close some additional bases. I do not know of anybody in the Department of Defense or anybody in this Chamber who likes closing bases. Not many people like going to the dentist or losing weight either. It is just a lot more fun to eat dessert than to look after your health. But we have an obligation--and it is difficult--in the best interests of this Nation, and for the health of our military, to do not what is easiest, but to do what is essential. What is essential has been told to us very eloquently in these letters from the Chiefs, in this letter from the Secretary of Defense, in this letter from the three Service Secretaries. These letters tell us as pointedly, dramatically, strongly, forcefully as they can, that it is essential that additional bases be closed. ``Our military judgment is that further base closures are absolutely necessary.'' I began my few minutes of comments with that quote and I end them with that quote, because I hope we will all think about that as we make a politically tough decision on how to vote on the pending McCain-Levin amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Feingold be added as a cosponsor of the pending amendment.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LEVIN. Could we ask the Senator from Colorado about how long his remarks will be?

Mr. LEVIN. That is fine with me. He has also been very accommodating to us. I just want to see if I can get a signal. Do we know whether or not Senator Kerrey would have any objection to that? Mr. President, may I suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I wonder if the good Senator from New Hampshire would consider yielding me 3 minutes of his time so we can preserve the 10 minutes that we have left for Senator McCain who I understand is on his way over.

Mr. LEVIN. I greatly appreciate that. Mr. President, we have had several years of debate now about the President's alleged role in the last base closure round on the privatization-in-place proposals for Sacramento and San Antonio. This just simply cannot be allowed to be an issue, and it should no longer be an issue. Because of the hard work of the Armed Services Committee, we just resolved the depot issue in a fair way. Our amendment deals with the privatization-in-place issue by including language for the 2001 BRAC round that would allow privatization-in-place closing of a military installation only when it is recommended explicitly by the Base Closure Commission and when it is the most cost-effective approach. Our amendment also ensures the entire BRAC process takes place after the next administration is in office. The base closure statute explicitly recognizes already that the President can decide whether or not to have a BRAC round, and he can decide not to have a BRAC round simply by deciding not to nominate BRAC commissioners. If the new President decides not to have a BRAC round, he simply will not nominate the new commissioners. If there is a BRAC round, the new Secretary of Defense will oversee the process of the statutory steps in the round done under the new administration under the timetable which is in this amendment. Short of banning people from even thinking about base closures until 2001, there is just really nothing more that can be done to ensure that there will be no politicization at all. I know there were strong feelings on the 1995 round. But I don't think we should keep punishing the taxpayers and keep spending money which we need for the men and women in uniform to have the right pay and the right equipment by continuing to raise the allegations which were leveled about the Sacramento and San Antonio actions. As it turned out, by the way, things came out quite well. The bidding team that represented the privatization in place of those two facilities lost during a competitive bidding process. We have to be willing to take the heat. We can no longer just say that the last round was politicized if, in fact, it was cured in the next round. We just cannot eternally and constantly look back at these allegations and debate what may or may not have happened in the 1995 round as an excuse for not doing our duty here in 1999 in terms of saving the money, which is so essential if we are going to have the defense budget rationally devoted and rationally spent. We are talking here about a significant chunk of money. We cannot waste this money. Our uniformed personnel and our civilian leadership are pleading with us to authorize an additional base closing round. This amendment assures that it is the next administration--not this one--which will determine whether to proceed with a base closing round. All we would be doing is authorizing it. The next administration would be the one that would be administering this next round. It would not be this administration. The timetable that we put in here assures every single statutory step, from picking the commissioners to do the work that is necessary to sending in the recommendations. All of that will take place with the new President and not with this President. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. The majority leader is correct.

Mr. LEVIN. Do we have any time left on this amendment?

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 5 minutes. On December 7, 1941, when Pearl Harbor was attacked by Japan, the commanders on the ground were Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short. Rear Admiral Kimmel was serving in the grade of admiral as commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet and commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. Major General Short was serving in the grade of lieutenant general as commander of the U.S. Army Hawaiian Department. Based on their performance at Pearl Harbor, both officers were relieved of their commands and were returned to their permanent ranks of rear admiral and major general on December 16, 1941. The duty performance of Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short has been the subject of numerous military, governmental, and congressional inquiries since that time. The most recent examination was by Under Secretary of Defense Edwin Dorn in 1995. The Defense Department, after reviewing all of these inquiries, has concluded that posthumous advancement in rank is not appropriate. In short, in this 1995 review, the Department of Defense concluded that Admiral Kimmel and General Short, as commanders on the scene, were responsible and accountable for the actions of their commands. Accountability as commanders is a core value in our Armed Forces. Rear Admiral Kimmel's and Major General Short's superiors at the time determined that their service was not satisfactory and relieved them of their commands and returned them to their permanent grades. We should not, in my judgment, some 57 years later, substitute the judgment of a political body--the Congress--for what was essentially a military decision by the appropriate chain of command at the time. Those who were in the best position to characterize their service have done so. Their superiors concluded that Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short did not demonstrate the judgment required of people who serve at the three- and four-star level. I do not believe that this political body should now attempt to reverse that decision made by the chains of command in our military service. So I join the chairman of the Armed Services Committee in opposing this amendment. I also note the letter from the Secretary of Defense to the then chairman of our committee, Strom Thurmond, saying the following: While Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Mr. Edwin Dorn, conducted a thorough review of this issue in 1995. He carefully considered the information contained in nine previous formal investigations, visited Pearl Harbor and personally met with the Kimmel and Short families. His conclusion was that responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster must be broadly shared, but that the record does not show that advancement of Admiral Kimmel and General Short on the retired list is warranted. I appreciate the fact that the overwhelming consensus of the organizations and personnel mentioned in your letter recommend exoneration of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Absent significant new information, however, I do not believe it appropriate to order another review of this matter. Ed Dorn and I both agree that responsibility for this tragic event in American history must be broadly shared, yet I remain confident in the findings that Admiral Kimmel and General Short remain accountable in their positions as leaders. To highlight very briefly the findings of the Under Secretary of Defense in the Dorn report, referred to by the Secretary of Defense, I will quote three or four of the findings. Finding 1: Responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; it should be broadly shared. Finding 2: To say that responsibility is broadly shared is not to absolve Admiral Kimmel and General Short of accountability. Military command is unique. A commander has plenary responsibility for the welfare of the people under his or her command, and is directly accountable for everything the unit does or fails to do. . . . Command at the three- and four- star level involves daunting responsibilities. Military officers at that level operate with a great deal of independence. They must have extraordinary skill, foresight and judgment, and a willingness to be accountable for things about which they could not possibly have personal knowledge. . . . It was appropriate that Admiral Kimmel and General Short be relieved. Then he goes into the information that he had. I yield myself just 1 additional minute.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, finally in finding 3, the Dorn report says: The official treatment of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was substantively temperate and procedurally proper. Then finally: There is not a compelling basis for advancing either officer to a higher grade. Their superiors concluded that Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not demonstrate the judgment required of people who serve at the three- and four-star level. * * * * * In sum, I cannot conclude that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were victims of unfair official actions and thus I cannot conclude that the official remedy of advancement on the retired list [is] in order. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that portions of the Dorn report and the Secretary of Defense letter in opposition to the advancement of these two gentlemen be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator from Rhode Island yield?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the Department of Defense strongly opposes the amendment because it would unacceptably put at risk the lives of U.S. military personnel.

Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, how much time is left to the opponents of Senator Gramm's amendment?