Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. How many seconds?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the language in the bill that the Senator from Texas seeks to strike makes it possible for the private sector to compete. That sounds so fundamental in our country that maybe it comes as a shock that I would even suggest that you need to have language in a bill to permit the private sector to do this. But we do. We just want to make it legal for the private sector to offer a product to its Government, our Government, and not to have Federal Prison Industries say: Sorry, you cannot bid. It is almost bizarre to me that we would have to pass any kind of legislation for that to come about, but we do because under the current law and regulations, Federal Prison Industries has the sole, exclusive determining voice. If it says that its product is within a range in the market--maybe at the high end of that range, and they may be wrong--but once FPI says that, that is it; private business cannot compete. In a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee earlier this week, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, David Oliver, described the results of the survey we referred to. He said the following: I think if you looked at the study, you would see that people were generally not satisfied with Federal Prison Industries as a provider. Essentially, with regard to efficiency, timeliness, and best value, they found that Federal Prison Industries was worse than the other people they bought from. Now, we know that the administration has decided to oppose this change, to prohibit the private sector from bidding on things that Federal Prison Industries says it wants to supply exclusively. So we understand what the Department of Defense's official position is. But I also understand what the testimony of their acquisition people is. The study shows that people were generally not satisfied with Federal Prison Industries as a provider with regard to efficiency, timeliness, and best value. They found that Federal Prison Industries was worse than the other people they bought from. I don't believe for one minute that Federal Prison Industries is going to be able to sell anything to the Department of Defense just because they are going to have to compete. They have such a huge advantage in terms of cost and price of labor that they are going to be able to sell a huge amount. But they are going to have to compete. If a private company can outbid them or provide the same product at a cheaper price, then the private company is going to get it. But for the Senator from Texas to say, suddenly, that wipes out all of the sales to the Department of Defense, that is a terrible indictment about what Federal Prison Industries is now doing. That would mean they can't compete on anything they are selling to the Department of Defense. That is a huge exaggeration. It is not the case. But it is the case that now they don't have to compete when they decide that the Department of Defense must buy that missile part. If Federal Prison Industries says the Department of Defense must buy that missile part Senator Warner referred to, that has to happen--even though a private contractor can sell a better quality at a better price. Once FPI, in its unilateral judgment, says we can supply it within a price range of what the private sector can do, that is it, no competition. DOD can't bid it out--the opposite of what we should be doing in this free enterprise society of ours. Mr. President, I hope the language in the Senate bill will be retained and that the amendment of the Senator from Texas to strike that language will be defeated. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield back our time.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support this amendment. It says that the President should say to us whether or not the new Strategic Concept imposes new commitments or obligations upon us. It does not find that there are such new obligations or commitments. The President has already written to us in a letter to Senator Warner that the Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations. In 1991, the new Strategic Concept, which came with much new language and many new missions, was not submitted to the Senate. Indeed, much of the language is very similar in 1991 as in 1999. In my judgment, there are no new commitments or obligations imposed by the 1999 Strategic Concept. The President could very readily certify what is required that he certify by this amendment, and I support it.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, the only question I have is that on the second half here, which is the one that is before us, I suggest that it read ``prior to a motion to table or a motion on adoption'' so that there is an option as to whether there is a motion to table or a vote on the amendment itself.

Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to yield. May I inquire of the Chair how much time the opponents have?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we want, I hope, to do two things. One is to tell the President, as we have, how important it is that there be consultation and that he seek support from the Congress, and he has committed to do so. But that is a very different thing from what this amendment provides. This is an advance funding cutoff, unless something happens that can be thwarted by gridlock. We should not ever forget the likelihood of gridlock in this Congress. Even if a majority wanted to support the use of ground forces in a nonpermissive environment, a minority of the Senate could thwart that majority view. I believe the signal to Milosevic that he will be the beneficiary of gridlock, and only if gridlock can be overcome would he then have to fear the possibility of the use of ground forces, is a signal that would undermine the current mission in a very significant way. Again, reading from the information paper the Department of Defense has shared with us this afternoon: The Department strongly opposes this amendment because it would unacceptably put at risk the lives of U.S. and NATO military personnel, jeopardize the success of Operation Allied Force, and inappropriately restrict the President's options as Commander in Chief. These are now the words of the information paper shared with us by the Department: . . . effectively give Milosevic advance notice of ground action by NATO forces, should NATO commanders request consideration of this option. While we have made no decision to use ground forces in a nonpermissive environment, it would be a mistake to hamstring this option with a legislative requirement for prior congressional approval. The Department says: This would be construed to prohibit certain intelligence or reconnaissance operations essential to a successful prosecution of Operation Allied Force. It would prohibit any preemptive attack by U.S. forces based on advance warning or suspicion of an impending attack by the Yugoslav forces. It would prohibit U.S. ground personnel from pursuing those forces, conducting hit and run, or similar attacks across international boundaries. But the words that we should pay the most heed to in this memorandum from the Department of Defense--the words that I hope this Senate will think very carefully about before we consider adopting this amendment-- are that the Department strongly opposes amendment No. 383 because it would ``unacceptably put at risk the lives of U.S. and NATO military personnel and jeopardize the success of Operation Allied Force.'' Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the opponents have how much time left?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, very briefly, this amendment would send the worst possible signal to Milosevic, which is don't worry, weather the storm--that even though there is going to be gridlock in the Congress, you will be the beneficiary of any gridlock and any effort that authorizes in advance the use of ground forces. This is not the message which we should be sending to Milosevic--that he would be the beneficiary of the congressional gridlock, which would almost certainly occur before any such resolutions could be passed. I hope we will not send that signal to Milosevic. I think our troops deserve better. Our commanders deserve better. The administration believes so strongly in this that a veto would almost certainly occur, if this provision were in, and understandably so, because the hands of our commanders in the field would be tied by this resolution. They would have to come to Congress to see whether or not the terms were met. That is not the way to fight either a war or to engage in combat.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am sorry. I was discussing something with the chairman. I know that he is conscience of the time. I am wondering whether he might repeat the unanimous consent request so that we could both hear it.

Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield, the Senator from Virginia said how much confidence he has in the Secretary of Defense. Is the Senator suggesting that the Secretary of Defense is going to stand by while some political person from somewhere reaches around him into the bowels of the Pentagon to give a signal that some base should not be considered? It is because our good friend from Virginia did not want there to be any possibility of any political involvement by anybody that we delayed the date for the Secretary of Defense to transmit the base closure recommendations to September 1, 2002. The new President and the new Secretary of Defense--or the current one, if he is continued--will have until September 1 to transmit the base closure recommendation. We delayed it 6 months because the Senator, in committee, said he was concerned that the preliminary work could be done now and somehow or other, unbeknownst to an honest Secretary of Defense--who I think our good friend would concede is an honest one----

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I oppose the amendment. It would send the worst possible signal, I believe, to Milosevic at this time. A kind of ``don't worry'' signal, if you weather the storm, no matter how weakened your military is, the President isn't going to be able to go in even in a semipermissive environment in order to return the refugees, because Congress has tied his hands, tied the purse to say that only if Congress affirmatively approves the expenditure of funds, then and only then could ground forces go in, even in a semipermissive environment. Mr. President, how much time do the opponents have?

Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object and we will have to object--

Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I think that is correct. The timing of the letter is exactly as the chairman says it is. But the statement of the President is that ``the Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations for the United States.'' The caption of the amendment by the Senator from Kansas is ``Relating to the legal effect of [this] new Strategic Concept.'' I think it is quite clear from our conversations with the State Department that the President can, indeed, and will, indeed, make this certification, and should--and should. I think it is an important certification. I commend the Senator from Kansas. I think we need clarity on this subject. If there is a legally binding commitment on the United States in this new Strategic Concept, it ought to be sent to the Senate for ratification. But if this 1999 Strategic Concept is like the 1991 Strategic Concept--not a legally binding document but a planning document, a document setting out concepts, not legal obligations--that is a very different thing. NATO has adopted strategic concepts continually during its existence. By the way, again, let me suggest there is nothing much broader than section 12 of the 1991 Strategic Concept which said: ``Alliance security must take into account the global context.'' Does that represent a binding commitment on the United States? It surely did not, in my judgment, and need not have been submitted to the Senate for ratification. I believe that the current Concept, which has been adopted, does not contain legally binding commitments.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I think it clearly means the legal effect of this. But let us, rather than arguing over what is in or not in this amendment--I understand that there was going to be an effort made here to clarify language on the certification. If there is going to be such an effort, I would ask that be made now and that we then ask for the yeas and nays so we are not shooting at a moving target here. Really, I think it would be useful, if in fact that change relative to the certification requirement is going to be sent to the desk, it be sent to the desk at this point; and then I am going to ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. LEVIN. I do yield. Amendment No. 377, As Modified (Purpose: Relating to the legal effect of the new Strategic Concept of

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I will yield the floor in just 2 minutes. I read this document quite clearly as meaning any new commitment or obligation, because it uses the word ``impose.'' I know no other way to impose an obligation or a commitment other than legal. When you use the word ``impose,'' it seems to me it is quite clear that that means it is imposed. So that is the way I read this language. If others want to read the language in a different way, they may. But I think that the certification requirement, which the Senator from Kansas wants to move into the front of this amendment instead of in the sense-of-the-Senate part of it, is simply a clarification of what was always the clear intent, which is that there be such a certification. And I think that that is more of a technical change than anything. I have no objection to an amendment which moves the certification requirement to the front of the amendment before the sense-of-the- Senate language and imposes that as a certification requirement--not sense of the Congress but as a requirement on the President. In my judgment, there is no doubt but that it is only if there is a legally binding commitment or obligation that this would require a referral to the U.S. Senate, because no other requirement or obligation other than one that is legally binding on us would rise to the dignity of a treaty. I hope the Senator will have a chance to move the certification requirement to an earlier position in his amendment. If I could just ask one question of my friend from Kansas, as I understand, that is what the modification does provide and nothing more; is that correct?

Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, and I do not plan to object, I wonder if the Chair can inform us as to how much time is remaining on both sides under the previous extension.

Mr. LEVIN. I want to protect the rights of the Senator from Minnesota who has been waiting.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support this amendment for the reasons previously given. It does not reach any conclusion as to whether there are any additional obligations upon the United States. Unlike earlier versions, it simply asks the President to certify whether or not there are additional obligations imposed on the United States. I have read from what was called then the new Strategic Concept of NATO in 1991. At the heading of that Concept, it was stated that: The alliance recognizes that developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in the future. And, indeed, adopted language such as: Alliance security must also take into account the global context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of flow of vital resources, actions of terrorism and sabotage. That did not impose any new obligations. It is very broad language. Listen to some of this language in this 1991 alliance new Strategic Concept: The primary role of the alliance military forces to guarantee security and territorial integrity of member states remains unchanged [we said in 1991]. But this role must take account of the new strategic environment in which a single massive and global threat has given way to diverse and multidirectional risks. Allied forces have different functions to perform in peace, crises, and war. That is section 40 in 1991. How about this one, section 41: Allies could be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions. How about that for a mission in 1991? Did that impose an obligation on us, legal obligation on this body, or on this Nation? Boy, I hope not. Not in my book it did not. Allies could be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations missions. This was adopted in 1991 as a new Strategic Concept. That did not impose a thing on us. It was a new Strategic Concept adopted by NATO, not a legally binding commitment on the alliance. It was not submitted to us then as a treaty change because it was not a treaty change, nor is this new Strategic Concept of 1999 legally binding upon us any more than the 1991 Strategic Concept was. So I think we ought to adopt this amendment. It is something which is highly appropriate to ask the President whether or not the new Strategic Concept of NATO imposes any new commitment or obligation on the United States, the key word there to me being ``imposes.'' I ask, Mr. President, before I yield the floor, that the yeas and nays be ordered on this amendment.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the privileges of the floor be granted to the following Pearson Fellow on the staff of the Foreign Relations Committee, Joan Wadelton, during the pendency of the Department of Defense Authorization legislation.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. Again, I will be supporting this amendment.

Mr. LEVIN. We are just using about 3 of our 8 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. Sure.