Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. And it is the hope of the chairman that both of those be debated in the morning?

Mr. LEVIN. I hope that during this evening we will be able to try to schedule timing for those amendments, if possible.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield myself 6 minutes. I can't think of a worse signal to send to Milosevic in the middle of a conflict than this amendment would send to him. Congressional gridlock is not unheard of around here. We have plenty of examples of Congress being unable to act. We had a recent example in the House where the House could not even agree to support an air campaign that is presently going on, a tie vote. Under this funding cutoff approach, that air campaign presumably would not be able to continue under a comparable resolution applying to the use of military forces. I know this only applies to ground forces and not to an air campaign, but that vote in the House of Representatives is a wonderful example of how Milosevic, when he looked at this resolution, would say, well, gee, this would require Congress to affirmatively act, and since the House can't even get a majority to act to support an ongoing operation, I could comfortably rely, he would say to himself, on the fact that they would never authorize in advance a ground campaign, even in a semipermissive environment. The President has been criticized for taking the possibility of ground troops off the table. The argument is that Milosevic doesn't have to worry as much about that possibility, given the position of the administration. I think we ought to want Milosevic to worry and to worry more, not less. This is a ``worry less'' amendment, not a ``worry more'' amendment. This says Congress would have to affirmatively approve ground forces in advance, even in a semipermissive environment, and it seems to me Milosevic could quite comfortably say to himself that is not a very strong likelihood. There are a lot of practical problems with the wording of this amendment. For instance, what happens if U.S. intelligence discovered that American forces in Albania or in Macedonia were about to be attacked by Yugoslav army forces and it was determined to be necessary for U.S. ground forces to conduct a preemptive attack into Kosovo in self-defense? We are just about ready to be attacked; can we hit the attacker? Not under this amendment. You have to come to Congress first. Our military would be told, whoops, you are about to be attacked in Albania or Macedonia, but Congress passed a law saying they have to authorize the use of ground forces. Do we want to tie the hands of our commanders that way in the middle of a conflict, to tell our commanders that even in circumstances where they think they are about to be hit that they cannot preemptively go after the attackers in Kosovo with ground forces? They have to then just take it on the chin? And what if U.S. forces in Albania or Macedonia were attacked by Yugoslav army forces, actually attacked in Macedonia or Albania. Would counterattacking U.S. forces have to stop at the Kosovo border, thereby giving the Yugoslav army a haven from which they could conduct ground attacks across the border but not be pursued by American ground forces? The commander would have to stop at the border and come to Congress? So it is the worst kind of signal we could give in the middle of a conflict to Mr. Milosevic, and it creates burdens on our commanders that are intolerable in the middle of a conflict. We have been advised by the Department of Defense on this amendment that ``it is so restrictive of U.S. operations and so injurious to our role in the alliance that the President's senior advisers would strongly recommend that the final bill be vetoed if this language is included in the bill.'' That is information we have just received from the Department of Defense. Gridlock. Fifty votes in the House. Now, under this amendment, we have to affirmatively approve something. What happens if a majority of us want to approve it but we are filibustered? The Senator from Pennsylvania said, well, those are the rules. Those are the rules. But under his amendment, it would mean that even if a majority of the Senate wanted to give approval to ground forces, a minority in the Senate could thwart that action. I think this is the kind of tying of our hands in the middle of a conflict that would tell Milosevic this country is not serious about the NATO mission. This NATO mission is so critical in terms of the future of Europe; it is so critical in terms of the stability not only of Europe but of the North Atlantic community that for us to adopt language that in advance says you can't do something without Congress acting, knowing, as we do, how difficult it is to get Congress to act even in the middle of a conflict, would be simply a terrible result for the success of our mission. Mr. President, I yield myself an additional 3 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. I do not know the status, particularly, of the first one, but I would like to work on that this evening.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, does any time remain on our side?

Mr. LEVIN. Could I use the 10 seconds?

Mr. LEVIN. I want the Record to be clear, that comment came from the prime sponsor of this legislation. That there would not be a computer keyboard touched in the bowels or any level of the Pentagon prior to January 21 of next year--would the Senator accept that amendment?

Mr. LEVIN. May I suggest, if the Senator will yield, that the Senator needs the support and help of the Senator from Maine. But before that suggestion resonates through this Chamber, I will say just one other thing. Would the Senator accept an amendment that says no staff work can begin until January 21 of the year 2000? If we added that language in the bowels of the Pentagon, nobody----

Mr. LEVIN. This work would begin and somehow or other it would take hold. So we delayed the transmittal to September 1 of the year after the new President is elected, 6 months--more than that, 8 months after the new President is in office. It seems to me at this point that the argument about politicization is now being used as an excuse not to act. We have done everything we possibly can to eliminate any possibility of that. The new President is not required to transmit names for a base closure commission. As the good Senator from Virginia knows, if the new President does not want a base closing round, he or she need not have it. That is the law. All the new President has to do is not nominate anybody. So you have total control in the new President. You have 9 months to submit the recommendations. At this point, the politicization argument, it seems to me--talking about reaching down? I think the good Senator, my good friend, is reaching back.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. But for some of us who planned to actually leave here at 12:30, I think it is important, if there is an understanding to this effect, that there be no further amendments offered or any other business carried on between now and the time that we recess for the luncheons. Is that agreeable?

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I thank you. I want to withhold comment on what the chairman just said in terms of sequencing votes, because we are checking with some Senators on this side who may wish to debate one or more of those amendments to which the Senator has referred. We have not seen final language on any of them, I do not believe, so I want to at least alert the chairman I would not want my silence to indicate concurrence in what he indicated and said until we have had a chance to review that. There is the possibility we would want to withhold votes on those until tomorrow, for instance, but we need to see the language on those amendments.

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for one moment?

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for one moment?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, as our chairman indicated, the committee spent a great deal of time addressing security concerns at the Department of Energy. The revelations of Chinese espionage directed at the DOE nuclear weapons program underscore 20 years of failure by the FBI and the Department of Energy, over the course of three administrations, to take adequate steps to address security problems in the Laboratories. This problem has been ongoing for 20 years, through three administrations, and we have not seen, until a Presidential decision directive last year, an effort to significantly tighten security at the Laboratories. We have in that Presidential decision directive, which is called PDD- 61, a strong effort by this administration to tighten that security. What we do in this bill is to build on that effort, and we do so in a way which does not undermine the ability of the Department of Energy to perform its vital national security function. I commend our chairman for his leadership in this effort. It is important that we do strengthen the security at the Department of Energy. It is important that we take the effort which finally was made when this administration signed a Presidential decision directive, and the President did so, but that we build additional safeguards which need to be in law. Here is what we have done. We have written much of that Presidential decision directive into law. We have established an outside Commission on Safeguards, Security and Counterintelligence at the Department of Energy facilities. We have required a certification of the security aspects of the lab-to-lab and foreign visitors programs from the Secretary of Energy, the Director of the CIA, and the Director of the FBI. The bill reported by our committee includes many other important provisions which will contribute to the national security and the effective management of the Department of Defense. Some of these provisions are: a provision establishing a single account for all Department of Defense funds to combat terrorism, both at home and abroad; a series of provisions to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of health care provided to service men and women under the TriCare Program; a provision promoting reform of Department of Defense financial management systems; a series of provisions promoting more effective management of defense laboratories and test and evaluation facilities; a provision extending the Department's mentor-protege program for small disadvantaged businesses. I conclude by, again, thanking our new chairman, Senator Warner, for the manner in which he and his staff have handled this bill. He has maintained a great tradition of this committee, working with all members to make sure that all voices are heard in the effort which will always be needed to protect the Nation's security. I know there is going to be vigorous debate on some provisions of this bill. We hope that Senators will, indeed, come to the floor and offer their amendments so that we can complete Senate action on the bill in a timely manner and go to conference. But whatever the outcome of the debate on specific amendments or the vehemence of that debate, I think I can say unequivocally that our chairman, following in the footsteps of Senator Thurmond, has done so with tremendous strength and has, in doing so, enhanced the security of this Nation. I yield the floor. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor to the amendment. One of the points raised by the Senator from Virginia is a technical drafting issue, which I think is a relevant one. I believe we can correct it in conference. I think its importance was pointed out.

Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President--no objection.

Mr. LEVIN. If the Senator will yield further while she is being interrupted, I want to commend the good Senator from Louisiana for her steadfastness, and for the sponsors' steadfastness on that very point. There was no provision for amnesty in Dayton. There was no provision for amnesty at Rambouillet. There should be no such provision, nor should the door be opened a crack to any such possibility. People must be held accountable for war crimes. I do not think for 1 minute that there is room for negotiation on that issue, or else we will see an endless repetition of the kind of cleansing of ethnic groups that we have seen in the Balkans. I commend the sponsors, and particularly the Senator from Louisiana for her strength and support.

Mr. LEVIN. My only point in response to the Senator from Virginia, is that nobody suggested in 1991 that those words created a new binding obligation or commitment on the United States. I didn't hear it in 1991; I didn't hear it in 1992; I didn't hear it in 1993; I didn't hear it in 1994. ``Global context'' alliance security must take account. Why didn't anybody make that argument in the 8 years since 1991? The answer is, because it didn't create any commitment or obligation, or else I assume somebody on this floor would have argued there was a new commitment or argument--the very similar language. In 1990, NATO got together and said the Soviet Union has fallen apart, and developments taking place in Europe have a far-reaching impact. This is a fundamental strategic review. The only point I am making is I have no difficulty with the language in the good Senator's amendment, because I think we should have the assurance that there is no binding obligation or commitment represented by these new strategic concepts that NATO adopts. I happen to think that is very important. I repeat that the Senator has received that assurance from the President of the United States. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, that is a view I fully share. The bill we bring to the floor is a sound bill that goes a long way to meet the priorities which have been established by Secretary Cohen and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is brought to the floor based on a very sound foundation because General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has assured us, assured the committee, assured the Congress, and assured the Nation our Armed Forces are fundamentally sound and fundamentally capable of fulfilling their role in our national military strategy. So we start with that sound foundation. Obviously, there are some places where we have to put some additional resources. But the foundation is a sound one and the Chairman of our Joint Chiefs has assured us of that. So, what we seek to do in this bill is build on that sound foundation. I believe we have done so. In accordance with the fiscal year 2000 budget resolution, the bill includes an $8 billion increase in budget authority above the level provided in the President's budget. Unlike some of the budget increases in the past years, the added money in this bill will be spent in a much more responsible way than we have sometimes done in the past, because the money we have added this year is entirely spent for programs for which the Department of Defense has indicated a real need. The bottom line is, this bill will improve the quality of life for our men and women in uniform. It will improve the readiness of our military. It will continue the process of modernizing our Armed Forces to meet the threats of the future. Virtually all the items for which the committee added funding were taken from either the Services' unfunded priority list for fiscal year 2000 or from the outyears of the future years' defense program, the so- called FYDP, which we deal with in the Armed Services Committee. These add-ons include substantial increases for the highest priority readiness items identified by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including an added $554 million for real property maintenance, $420 million for base operations, $120 million for ammunition, $73 million for spare parts, $60 million for reserve component training, $40 million for depot maintenance. This money will significantly enhance the ability of our Armed Forces to carry out their full range of missions. These are areas where we sometimes fall short. These are not the most glamorous areas. They do not have a lot of people lobbying for them. But they are critically important areas--real property maintenance, base operation, spare parts, reserve component training, depot maintenance. In addition, the bill includes the triad of pay and retirement initiatives sought by Secretary Cohen and by the Joint Chiefs--a 4.8- percent military pay raise for fiscal year 2000, reform of the military pay table to increase pay for midcareer NCOs and officers, and changes to the military retirement system. These changes will, hopefully, help address recruiting and retention problems we have in the services. When S. 4 was considered on the Senate floor, we indicated then we wanted to do everything we could to ensure the men and women in uniform received fair compensation for the service they provide to our country. At that time, I expressed concern about proceeding with the pay bill outside the context of the defense authorization bill and before Congress had passed a budget resolution. We have now revisited this issue in the context of the budget resolution and the authorization bill. I am pleased to report the changes in military pay and benefits proposed in this bill are all paid for. Unfortunately, the committee has not yet been able to find a way to fund one of the most important aspects of S. 4, and that aspect is Senator Cleland's proposals to enhance the GI bill, which is so important in providing educational opportunities to the men and women in our Armed Forces. These provisions, Senator Cleland's proposal, would provide substantial incentives to help address the current recruiting and retention problems which face the military services while offering our men and women in uniform an educational opportunity in the proudest tradition of our country. I expect Senator Cleland will raise this issue again as we debate the bill on the floor. I sincerely hope we will find a way to adopt these proposals. They are very important proposals. They are important to the retention we need to enhance. They would be important even if there were not a retention problem, in terms of opportunities we should offer to the men and women in our Armed Forces. The bill reported by the committee also provides full funding for the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program with Russia and with other countries of the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, two of the three companion programs at the Department of Energy received substantially less funding than requested by the administration. The bill also contains some unfortunate restrictions on the DOE Nuclear Cities Program, which I hope we will be able to address on the Senate floor. The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the related Department of Energy programs are one positive cornerstone of our relationship with Russia. They play a vital role in our national security by reducing the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from Russia and from rogue nations with which Russia might be pressured to form closer ties in the absence of these programs. One area where I am most disappointed with the outcome of the markup is base closures, and our chairman has made reference to this issue. The case for additional rounds of base closures is overwhelming. The Secretary of Defense has told us that more base closures are critical to meeting our future national security needs. The Secretary's letter reads, in part, as follows: [N]o other reform-- No other reform-- even comes close to offering the potential savings afforded by even a single round of BRAC. Which is the base closing process. There simply is no substitute for base closure and realignment. He went on to say: The two additional rounds under consideration by the Committee will ultimately save $20 billion and generate $3.6 billion annually. Both the Congressional Budget Office and the GAO affirm the reasonableness and credibility of our estimates for savings from BRAC. In exchange for property that we neither want nor need, we can direct $3.6 billion on an annual basis into weapons that give our troops a life- saving edge, into training that keeps our forces the finest in the world, and into the quality of life of military families. The Secretary concluded: The Department's ability to properly support America's men and women in uniform today and to sustain them into the future hinge in great measure on realizing the critical savings that only BRAC can provide. As such, the Chairman and Joint Chiefs are unanimous in their support of our legislative proposals, and I most strongly solicit your support and that of your colleagues. The Chiefs themselves--all of them, the Chairman and the other Chiefs--wrote to us on May 10, a very strong letter, about the necessity of adopting an additional round of base closings. Here is what they wrote to our chairman: Previous BRAC rounds are already producing savings--$3.9 billion net in 1999 and $25 billion through 2003. We believe that two additional rounds of BRAC will produce even more savings--an additional $3.6 billion each year after implementation. This translates directly into the programs, forces, and budgets that support our national military strategy. Without BRAC, we will not have the maximum possible resources to field and operate future forces while protecting quality of life for our military members. We will also be less able to provide future forces with the modern equipment that is central to the plans and vision we have for transforming the force. These are our top military officials telling us about the importance of additional rounds of base closings, to remove the unneeded infrastructure that we are now supporting, which drains resources that are needed for modernization, for readiness, for morale, for training. We cannot justify maintaining excess infrastructure that we do not need and, at the same time, say we have needs that must be addressed. We cannot have this both ways. We do have needs that must be addressed, and we have infrastructure we do not need which, if removed, will provide the resources to meet those needs. Our top uniformed officers tell us the following: BRAC is the single most effective tool available to the Services to realign their infrastructure to meet the needs of changing organizations and to respond to new ways of doing business. No other initiative can substitute for BRAC in terms of ability to reduce and reshape infrastructure. Simply stated, our military judgment is that further base closures are absolutely necessary. Absolutely necessary is what the chairman and the members of the Joint Chiefs tell us. These are not words of subtlety; these are very direct words which come from our uniformed leadership in this country, and we should heed them. I hope we will do that during consideration of this bill. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the two letters to which I have referred, in addition to a letter from the Service Secretaries dated May 11, be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the chairman of the Armed Services Committee in bringing S. 1059 to the floor. This is our fiscal year 2000 defense authorization bill. It is the product of many months of hard work by the committee under the leadership of our new chairman, Senator Warner, who has taken the baton from Senator Thurmond, who had done an extraordinary job. Senator Thurmond, who is on the floor, was chairman of our committee for many years. This year he turned that responsibility over to Senator Warner, and Senator Warner has carried on with great strength and great commitment that is in keeping with the leadership Senator Thurmond showed when he was chairman of this committee. I commend Senator Warner for carrying on that tradition of Senator Thurmond and, indeed, those before Senator Thurmond. As Senator Warner has pointed out, our staffs have been instrumental in helping us bring this bill to the floor. We had a unanimous vote for this bill in committee. I think that is a real testament to the chairman's leadership. I commend him for it.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in 1991 this is what the NATO new Strategic Concept said: Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instability that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. They could . . . lead to crises inimical to European stability and to armed conflicts. That is section 9. Then they say, in addition to article 5, article 6 which they made reference to, an armed attack of the territory of the allies from whatever direction. In 1991, this new Strategic Concept said, ``However, alliance security must also take account of the global context.'' That is 1991--``Global context.''

Mr. LEVIN. That is correct. Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first I commend our good friend from Kansas for the energy he has put into a very significant issue which has to do with the new Strategic Concept of NATO. This is not a new issue. The question of NATO's role since the fall of the Soviet Union has been an issue of a number of new Strategic Concepts. Listen to what NATO said in 1990. We have heard a lot about 1999 in Washington, but just listen to the heads of state in July 1990, speaking in London. Here is what the heads of state said: While reaffirming the basic principles on which the alliance has rested since its inception, they recognized the developments taking place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which its aims would be met in the future and the need for a fundamental strategic review, fundamental strategic review. And what came out of that strategic review in 1991, fundamental strategic review for NATO? They have listed many new security challenges and risks in 1991. Listen to risk No. 9, language very similar to what was adopted in Washington this year: Risks to allied security less likely to result from calculated aggression against a territory of the allies but, rather, from adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of the members of the alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the alliance. Does it sound familiar? It sure does to me. It sounds like 1999 to me. Risks to allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against a territory of allies but, rather, from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes. . . . I didn't hear too many calls then for a submission of amendments to the NATO treaty. I don't think we heard any calls then, although the risks changed. They changed in a significant way: No longer likely to come from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies but from adverse consequences of instabilities. I don't think there was a change to the NATO treaty then, and I don't think there is a change to the NATO treaty now. There were no new commitments or obligations for the United States then, in 1991, nor do I believe there are any now. Are there different challenges? Yes. Is there a different strategic concept? Yes. Are there different risks? Yes. But is there a change to the treaty, new commitments or obligations for the United States now? I don't think so. Were there in 1991 when all the allies signed a new strategic concept? No. Even though the Soviet military capability still was constituting the most significant factor, all of a sudden because of the decline and fall of the Soviet Union, we now had new risks. Listen to these words in paragraph 12. This is the 1991 Strategic Concept, paragraph 12: Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Wow. You talk about a different challenge and you talk about a new strategic concept. In 1991, the NATO allies suddenly say that alliance security must take account of the global context. Those are pretty broad words. But I didn't hear any suggestion back in 1991 that it was an amendment to the NATO treaty that required submission to the Senate--and for a good reason. There were no commitments or obligations undertaken in 1991, and there are no strategic concepts which contain new commitments or obligations in 1999. In 1999, the allies said that alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources, and actions of terrorism and sabotage. That is a lot different from an attack on the territory of the allies. But nobody suggested in 1991 that was an amendment to the NATO treaty, to the Washington Treaty. Why didn't anyone suggest that in 1991? Because that did not constitute the undertaking of new commitments or obligations for the United States, even though we all agreed that alliance security must take into account the global context--and that is a lot beyond Europe. In 1991, everyone agreed to that. I don't remember one amendment, not one amendment, not one proposal that suggested that the new Strategic Concept constituted a commitment or obligation binding upon the United States which would require a change in the NATO treaty. It wasn't suggested in 1991 because there was no new commitment or undertaking binding upon us, because there was simply a new strategic concept. The 1999 Strategic Concept does not constitute a new commitment or obligation, either. The same principle applies now as applied then. So the amendment of the Senator, which says if there are new undertakings, whether or not the new Strategic Concept imposes any new commitments or obligations on the United States, it seems to me is a requirement on the President that is perfectly appropriate. I have no difficulty whatsoever in asking the President to tell us whether or not the 1999 Strategic Concept represents new commitments or undertakings. It is perfectly appropriate--as this resolution does--to call on the President to inform us as to whether or not there are new commitments or undertakings. As a matter of fact, the President has already informed us of exactly what this resolution says he should inform us. The President wrote Senator Warner on April 14 that ``the Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations for the United States.'' Those are the President's words. So what this resolution does is say: Does it? The President said, in April, that it won't. I have no doubt that the President will reaffirm that it didn't. But I must say I don't have a difficulty with what Senator Roberts is doing because it is perfectly appropriate to ask the President: Is there anything in this new Strategic Concept which imposes on us a new obligation for commitment? If so, submit it to us as a treaty amendment. This is very different from some earlier language that was circulated in the Armed Services Committee. This doesn't make a finding that there are new commitments or obligations in this agreement in Washington in 1999. The language before us doesn't make any such finding. The language before us in the Senator's resolution, which I find to be appropriate, requires the President to determine and certify whether or not the Strategic Concept imposes any new commitment or obligations on the United States--whether or not. And so as I read this resolution, I think the language is appropriate in this resolution, that the President reaffirm what he told us on April 14, tell us if there is any change in his thinking on that. Again, as he wrote Senator Warner on April 14--and this letter has been made part of the Record now, I believe--the President said: The Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations for the United States, but rather will underscore NATO's enduring purposes, outlined in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. There has been reference here to the significance of changes in strategic concepts, and I think it is important that the Senate spend some time doing what Senator Roberts and others have done, both on the committee and off, in focusing on this Strategic Concept. It is important that we understand what these new threats and risks are. It is important, in my judgment, that we make a determination as to whether or not we do have new legal commitments and obligations. I don't believe the 1999 Strategic Concept creates any new binding obligations or commitments any more than I did that the 1991 Strategic Concept created any new binding commitments and obligations. But our committees of jurisdiction surely should focus on that resolution. Senator Warner has indicated in the last few minutes that the Armed Services Committee will, indeed, be holding a series of hearings on this subject. As he stated it, if I heard him correctly, those hearings will occur after the events in Kosovo are resolved. But as of this time, we have not yet had such hearings. I am not certain of this. But I don't believe that the Foreign Relations Committee has either, at least after the Washington agreement was signed. There may have been a hearing before the Washington agreement. But I don't believe there has been one since it was signed. The agreement has some very significant provisions in it relative to a European commitment to take on greater responsibility for European defense. Senator Warner made reference to the European Security and Defense Initiative, a very significant change--a very significant initiative in terms of what Europe will do. It is something that I have believed for some time that Europe should do. The reference is very specific inside of the Washington agreement. Two, the European allies taking on--in the words of the agreement-- ``assuming greater responsibility in the security and defense field in order to enhance the peace and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area, and, thus, the security of all allies.'' Then it goes on to say: ``On the basis of decisions taken by the Alliance in Berlin in 1996 and subsequently, the European Security and Defense Initiative will continue to be developed within NATO.'' I think it is a very significant change. It is something which we in the United States should welcome. It means that the Europeans will be taking on greater responsibility for the defense of Europe against threats, old and new. We ought to welcome as well the reference or the discussion of a new initiative where European countries will have greater defense capability; capabilities to address appropriately and effectively the risks that are associated with weapons of mass destruction; new capabilities so that they can deploy more readily greater mobility, greater survivability of forces, greater infrastructure and sustainability. These are initiatives inside of the new strategic doctrine which will make it possible for Europe to take greater responsibility for the defense of Europe. We should welcome this. I don't think there has been very much emphasis in the United States on what Europe has agreed to do in the new Strategic Concept--what they have, in effect, put into black and white, the commitment to greater European resources being used for the European defense. As I said a few moments ago, this resolution which is before us says that if there are new commitments and obligations--if--then the President should so certify to the Senate. And I believe there is none. Indeed, the Senator from Virginia has been assured by the President in the letter which he put in the Record that the Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations. I believe there is none in this 1999 Strategic Concept, and I believe there was none in the 1991 Strategic Concept. There was none in 1991. Even though the language is very similar--again, my good friend from Virginia being here--I just want to read some of the language in the 1991 Strategic Concept again. I will be very brief. But article 12 of the 1991 Strategic Concept said that ``alliance security must also take account the global concepts''--``global concepts.'' ``Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorists and sabotage.'' That was in 1991. That is just one part of a Strategic Concept which we all agreed to. Did that represent changes in the North Atlantic Treaty? No, it did not, in my judgment. Nobody suggests that it did back then. No one suggested that the President back then, President Bush, submit that kind of change in strategic concept to the Senate as a change in the treaty, for a very good reason: It did not constitute a legal obligation or commitment which represented a change in the North Atlantic Treaty. That is why nobody proposed back then that we have to ratify this. Those are broad words in here, section 9 of the 1991 new Strategic Concept--it was called new Strategic Concept 1991: Risks to allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the allies but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise in serious economic, social and political difficulties-- Listen to this-- including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. They could lead to crises in European stability. Did that create legally binding obligations and commitments on the United States in 1991? No, it didn't. And nobody suggested that the President should submit that language, because there is no legally binding obligation or commitment from that kind of language, although in the words of the Strategic Concept in 1991 they recognized--this is what our leaders said in all of the NATO nations--``that the developments they can place in Europe would have a far-reaching impact on the way in which NATO's aims would be met in the future.'' ``Far-reaching impacts,'' 1991. I commend--and I had an opportunity to do this a few minutes ago--the efforts of the Senator from Kansas, the Senator from Virginia, and the Senator from Maine, and others to bring to our attention what this new Strategic Concept is, so that we as a Senate can understand what it is that NATO is looking at in terms of a strategic concept. It is very important that those hearings the Senator from Virginia made reference to take place. In my own opinion, if the Foreign Relations Committee has not already done so--and I don't believe they have, but I may be wrong--it is important that the Foreign Relations Committee have hearings on this Strategic Concept. Again, I don't have any difficulty with the language in this resolution, because I think it is appropriate that the President tell us whether or not we have undertaken in this language any new obligations or commitments. The President wrote my good friend from Virginia on April 14 that the Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations for the United States. I assume that he will reaffirm that in fact there are no new commitments or obligations when he gives us the certification which is required in this resolution. I just want to summarize by saying that I have no difficulty with this language, because I think it is appropriate we have that assurance, because if there are new commitments or obligations--it seems to me there should be--then it would be presumably an amendment to a treaty which should be submitted to the Senate. But, again, just as there was none in 1991 when that new Strategic Concept which I just read was adopted by NATO, I don't believe there are more important--my belief is that the President has written the good Senator from Virginia that in fact there are no new commitments or obligations contained in this new Strategic Concept in 1999. Again, I want to commend the Senators who have focused on this. I think we must address the new kind of environment we face in this world, and that it is important that NATO, which is going to play such a critical role in the stability of Europe and the new kinds of threats which we and Europe face, address those threats, that we do so in the context of the most successful alliance in the history of mankind, an alliance which is now growing, an alliance which when we added three new countries in this Senate, on this floor--we adopted the Kyl amendment that, as I remember it, contained 10 provisions--very similar to what is in this 1999 Strategic Concept. I won't take the time to read more than just one section of the 10 principles in the Kyl amendment. The Senate understands that the policy of the United States is that the core concepts contained in the 1991 Strategic Concept of NATO, which adapted NATO's strategic strategy of the post-cold-war environment, remain valid today in that the upcoming revision of that document will reflect the following provisions, and there are many. One is: (IV) conflict in the North Atlantic area stemming from ethnic and religious enmity, the revival of historic disputes, or the actions of undemocratic leaders. That is one of the principles of the Kyl amendment in which we confirmed three nations would be added to the NATO alliance. I yield for a question.

Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to a remarkable person from my home state of Michigan, Mr. Edgar Lee Newton. On May 23, 1999, Mr. Newton will be honored upon his retirement after 18 years as the president of the Bay City branch of the NAACP. As president of the Bay City NAACP, Edgar Newton has fought many difficult battles for equality and civil rights. Although his tireless efforts on behalf of the NAACP are worthy of recognition in their own right, Mr. Newton has not confined his community service to the NAACP. He has also served with distinction in leadership roles with organizations like the American Red Cross, the United Way, Habitat for Humanity and the Kiwanis Club. Edgar Newton's departure from the NAACP will mark a new chapter in his life. I can only hope it is as successful as his civil rights career. Though I am sure he will remain active in the Bay City community, he will enjoy spending more time with his wife Shirley and his two children and grandchild. I am pleased to join his colleagues, friends and family in offering my thanks for all he has done. Mr. President, Edgar Newton can take pride in the many important achievements of his tenure with the NAACP. He has truly exhibited a dedication to justice and equality for all people. I know my colleagues will join me in saluting his commitment to civil rights and in wishing him well in his retirement.