Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the privilege of the floor be granted to John Bradshaw, who is a fellow in Senator Wellstone's office, during the pendency of this bill.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we will propound a unanimous consent agreement hopefully after the Senator from Colorado has completed his presentation. I will need about 10 minutes in support of the Landrieu- Levin amendment, which is a critically important amendment. It should be discussed before we vote on it because of the impact it will have, I believe, on the bill and perhaps on the vote on the bill, because it will also have an impact on the recommendation of the senior advisers to the President as to whether or not he will veto this bill. Because it is so significant--it is simple but very vital and very significant--it is important that there be discussion of the Landrieu amendment. So I will need about 10 minutes on that, I alert my friend from Mississippi. We can figure out if any time agreement is possible after the Senator from Colorado has completed. I thank him for his courtesy.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the amendment of Senator Landrieu that is pending is a very simple and a very straightforward amendment, but it is a vital amendment. It will make a major difference in this bill, because if this amendment is adopted, this bill will contain two policy statements. It now contains but one. The policy statement that it currently contains has to do with the deployment of a missile defense system. The policy statement, which the Landrieu amendment will add, is that it is the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces. This is a very significant policy statement, and I want to take just a minute and explain why. In my opening comments on this bill, I addressed what I consider to be a number of flaws or omissions in this bill. I talked about the fact that there is no reference here to ``operational effectiveness.'' One can look at the word ``effective'' in this bill's language and argue, I think reasonably, that operational effectiveness is included in that term ``effectiveness.'' Nonetheless, I think the bill would be stronger if that were clearer. That was one of the issues which was raised. It is a very important question to our uniformed military and to the Secretary of Defense, because they want to be sure that before any decision is made to deploy, that we have an operationally effective system, that it works. And those are not just casual words. ``Operational effectiveness'' are words that have a very important technical meaning to our military. I also pointed out in my opening remarks that there was no reference in here to cost. Now there is. With the Cochran amendment that was adopted earlier this afternoon, we now at least have an acknowledgment that the usual authorization and appropriation process is going to apply to national missile defense. The authorizers and the appropriators naturally look at cost. So there is now, at least in this bill with the adoption of the Cochran amendment, a way in which the cost issue will be addressed in the years to come. Another factor which the uniformed military and our civilian leadership wanted to look at is the threat. I think it is clear to most of us that there is a threat that was not predicted to come this quickly but which is either here or will soon be here from states such as North Korea. Finally--and this was the one which to me was the greatest sticking point--is the omission in this bill, until Senator Landrieu's amendment was introduced and hopefully will be adopted, of the acknowledgment of the importance of continuing to negotiate reductions in Russian nuclear forces. Those reductions are critically important to our security. Those reductions have been carried out, and hopefully additional reductions will be carried out, because we have a treaty with Russia which has allowed for these reductions to be carried out in a way which is strategically stable. That treaty, called the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, has been critically important to nuclear arms reductions. Hopefully, there will be further reductions negotiated. Hopefully, the Duma will ratify START II. But it is important that we be aware of the fact that arms reductions, nuclear arms reductions, are very important in terms of reducing proliferation threats and very important in terms of the terrorist threat. If we act in such a way that leads Russia to stop the reduction of the nuclear weapons on her soil, to stop the dismantling of the nuclear weapons on her soil, to stop negotiating further reductions in nuclear weapons, we are taking a very dangerous step in terms of our own security. That is why the fourth point which our uniformed military has pointed to as being important, in terms of considering national missile defense deployment, is the effect of that deployment on nuclear arms reductions. Nobody is going to give Russia or any other country a veto over whether or not we deploy a national missile defense system. That issue has got to be resolved in terms of our own security. If it adds to our security, we should do it. If it diminishes our security, we should not. But whether or not it adds to our security is dependent upon a number of factors. And one of those factors is the effect on the nuclear weapons reduction program on Russian soil. This has been pointed out at the highest level between President Clinton and President Yeltsin. In their Helsinki summit statement in March of 1997, they emphasized--and these are their words-- ``the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms'' and they recognized explicitly, in their words, ``the significance of the ABM Treaty for those objectives.'' Secretary Cohen, has recognized and stated the importance of that treaty between ourselves and Russia in terms of accomplishing these nuclear arms reduction objectives. Sandy Berger, in a letter which he has addressed to us, has recognized and stated the importance of that treaty between ourselves and Russia in terms of reducing nuclear arms and the threat of proliferation to this country. In his letter he said: The Administration strongly opposes S. 257 because it suggests that our decision on deploying this system should be based solely on a determination that the system is ``technologically possible.'' This unacceptably narrow definition would ignore other critical factors that the Administration believes must be addressed when it considers the deployment question in 2000. . . . And then he went on to say: A decision regarding national missile defense deployment must also be addressed within the context of the ABM Treaty and our objectives for achieving future reductions in strategic offensive arms through START II and [START] III. The ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability, and Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agree that it is of fundamental significance to achieving the elimination of thousands of strategic nuclear arms under these treaties. What this amendment before us does is simply acknowledge the policy of the United States to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces. That is all that it says. In that sense it is very straightforward, very direct. But it also, to me at least, and I think to many other Members of this body, acknowledges that we have a number of policy goals that we should be achieving. One is the deployment of an effective national missile defense system to meet a threat--I believe that is a legitimate policy goal that Senator Cochran's bill sets forth--a policy to deploy a cost-effective, operationally effective national missile defense to meet a threat. We do not have that system yet. It is being developed as quickly as we possibly can. Hopefully, someday we will have a cost-effective, operationally effective national missile defense system. And hopefully, we can take that step after negotiating modifications with the Russians to that treaty, so that we can proceed consistent with a cooperative relationship with the Russians and not in a confrontational way. If we cannot do it cooperatively and with an amendment to that treaty, and if our security interests indicate that we should do it because we have something operationally effective and cost effective, and the threat is there, then we should do it anyway. But what the Landrieu language does is state a very important policy objective that I hope all of us share: to seek continued negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces. It is that straightforward. It is that important. I commend the Senator from Louisiana for framing an amendment in a way which hopefully will attract broad bipartisan support but at the same time makes a very important addition to this bill by setting forth, if this is adopted, two important policies of this Government. Ms. LANDRIEU addressed the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, just a couple of additional brief points. First, there is one thing we do agree on, I hope unanimously, in this body, which is that our highest priority is to defend the security interests of the United States. I do not know of anybody in this body who would disagree with that premise. The question is, Is our security advanced or is it harmed by making a statement that we are going to deploy a system that violates a treaty with Russia, without first trying to at least negotiate a modification in that treaty so that we can do so jointly without a unilateral breach? The stakes here are huge. We should make no mistake about it. The stakes are that Russia has been reducing the number of nuclear weapons on its soil. Indeed, we have been helping to dismantle those weapons so that we are safer. And what they have told us is that the reason they have done that is because they have a treaty with us which has permitted them to do that called the ABM Treaty, and that without that treaty in place--indeed, without that treaty enhanced--those reductions are going to end. We want fewer nuclear weapons on Russian soil. The fewer weapons they have on their soil, the more secure we are. We have a treaty which has permitted a significant reduction of those weapons on Russian soil, and other states in the former Soviet Union. The fewer weapons they have, the less the chance of proliferation. I think most of us would agree that the greatest threat that we face--security threat that we face--is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And the leakage of even one of those weapons from Russian soil to a rogue state or a terrorist organization would create a greater threat to the security of this Nation than any Soviet threat we face, because a rogue nation could use it against us, where the Soviets would have been committing suicide and would have cared about committing suicide if they started an attack. The proliferation threat against us is real. We keep talking about it in this body. We keep saying the greatest emerging threat is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Before we take any step which would lead Russia to stop reducing the number of nuclear weapons on its soil, surely we ought to sit down and negotiate with Russia to see if we cannot do two things: One, accomplish a national missile defense here, assuming we can come up with one which is operationally effective; and, two, keep those reductions of nuclear weapons flowing. Those goals are not incompatible. We are seeking both of them right now. We are negotiating with the Russians in terms of a modification of the ABM Treaty, and we are developing national missile defense as quickly as is possible to develop. There is no wait-and-see approach that has been going on here. The uniformed military have told us this is a high-risk development program. We are trying to do in a few years what usually takes us over 10 to develop. So we are engaged as quickly as we can in what Deputy Secretary Hamre called the closest thing to a Manhattan project as exists in the Defense Department. We are trying to develop a national missile defense. I think most if not all Members of this body are in favor of that development. The issue here in this bill is whether we commit to deploy that system before it is developed, before it is shown to be operationally effective, with no consideration to cost and without considering the need to try, if possible, to negotiate a modification in a treaty with the Russians which has allowed us and them to significantly reduce the number of nuclear weapons on their soil. We can accomplish all those things, hopefully, but not if we perceive to tell the Russians, in advance of these negotiations being completed or at least proceeding, that we are pulling out of this treaty in order to deploy a system. There is not the slightest awareness in this resolution of the desirability of modifying the ABM Treaty with Russia so that we can continue to see reductions in nuclear weapons on their soil. For heaven's sake, aren't we more secure if they have fewer nuclear weapons on their soil and if the ones that are being reduced are dismantled, ``defanged,'' so they no longer threaten us? Shouldn't we ask ourselves, Why is it the senior military leadership of this country does not support this bill, people who spend their lives and have dedicated their lives to the security of this Nation--our top military officials--do not support this bill. Shouldn't we ask ourselves why? There is no use invoking the question of Scud missiles. The defense against Scud missiles does not violate a treaty between us and Russia. The Patriot antimissile system, which we continue to support I think unanimously in this body and continue to seek to improve it, is a defense against theater ballistic missiles, the missiles such as the Scud missile. There is no issue about that. I think everybody in this body has for decades supported a theater missile defense system. That is not a violation of the ABM Treaty. A limited national missile defense system probably will violate that treaty. Before we commit to do as this bill does, we should seek to modify a treaty between us and Russia so that we can do two things at once: Deploy a system, assuming we can get one that is operationally effective against the rogue states, at the same time that we continue to obtain and achieve the reduction of nuclear missiles on Russian soil. Those goals are compatible, they are both desirable, they are both achievable. At least we hope they are both achievable. Surely we ought to explore whether they are both achievable without committing ourselves to a course of action which tells the Russians, on the eve of the visit of Prime Minister Primakov we are going to do something, like it or not, whether it violates a treaty between us or not. I must again ask this question: If the Russian Duma had taken an action 1 week before our President went to Moscow, which tore at the basic fundamental security relationship between us and Russia, what would our reaction be in this Senate? What troubles me the most is it is so needless. We are not advancing by 1 day the development of a national missile defense system in this bill; not by a day. I think everybody in this body wants to develop a national missile defense system as quickly as can be done. The money is in the budget to do so and has been there. The Congress has added some hundreds of millions dollars, by the way, over the years for broad support in order to make sure we do develop a national missile defense as quickly as we possibly can. The President's budget has the money in there to deploy such a system--assuming we can develop it. We are not advancing by 1 day the development of a national missile defense with this bill. What we are doing is jeopardizing the reductions of nuclear weapons on Russian soil for no gain in terms of the development of national missile defense. That commitment to deploy, which this bill represents, gains us nothing in terms of developing more speedily the system which we all want to be developed, but jeopardizes the reduction of nuclear weapons on Russian soil which is so important to the security of this Nation. My good friend from Mississippi surely speaks for all of us when he says that is our top priority as a Senate. I couldn't agree with the Senator more. There are very strong differences, however, as to whether or not that priority is achieved with this bill, which ignores one-half of a very important issue, which is the relationship between the deployment of a national missile defense and the reduction of nuclear weapons on Russian soil and the proliferation problem that is increased when we act in a way that reduces the prospects of those continuing reductions. I yield the floor. Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I share the goal of providing the American people with effective protection against the emerging long- range missile threat from rogue states. I support developing an operationally effective, cost-effective limited national missile defense, and making an effort to negotiate with Russia, for a reasonable period of time, any appropriate modifications to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that might be necessary to permit deployment of a limited national missile defense system. That is why, Madam President, I support the Defense Department's National Missile Defense Deployment Readiness Program to develop a limited NMD system to protect the United States against such a developing threat. But that is not what this bill before us does. This bill says we are going to deploy a national missile defense system ``as soon as technologically possible.'' No other factors are to be considered. Don't consider if the system is operationally effective. Those are important words to the military, ``operationally effective.'' But we are not supposed to consider that under this bill. Don't consider if it is cost-effective. Don't consider whether it ends the elimination of thousands of nuclear weapons in Russia under the START process. Don't consider whether it increases the threat of the proliferation of these terrible weapons to rogue states interested in getting them by any means possible. This bill says to heck with all of these considerations--we are going to deploy a national missile defense system as soon as it is technologically possible, no matter whether it is operationally effective, no matter if it increases the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons, no matter what it costs. The fundamental question that we should ask ourselves is whether passing this bill will make us more secure or less secure. That is truly the fundamental question that all of us must address. I agree with the President's senior national security advisors that enacting this bill will make us less secure. It puts at risk our decades-long efforts to reduce strategic offensive nuclear weapons in Russia and increases the likelihood that these weapons will proliferate to rogue states. concerns of the uniformed military And where is the support of our uniformed military leaders for this bill, Madam President? The answer is, there isn't any. I have not heard any of our senior military leaders say they support this legislation. Our military leaders tell us that we are not ready yet to make a decision to deploy a national missile defense system. They are worried that if we make a hasty and head-long rush to deployment, we will be less able to deal with other very real--and unfortunately more likely-- threats to our security, including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their use by terrorists. General Shelton, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Armed Services Committee in January that the decision to deploy a national missile defense system should be made only after considering a number of critical factors: There are two aspects of the National Missile Defense [issue] that we have to be concerned with. No. 1 is: is the technology that allows us to deploy one that is an effective system, and within the means of this country money-wise? Second is the threat and whether or not the threat, when measured against all the other threats that we face, justifies the expenditure of that type of money for that particular system at the time when the technology will allow us to field it? Right now it is not a matter of whether or not we should field one because the technology has not reached the point that we have the capability. It is a 12-year system that we have been trying to do within 3 years. It is a high risk program which has yet to prove that we will be able to make a bullet hit the bullet. Certainly we need to continue to pursue this technology, and DOD has that within their program right now to pursue it. They are also putting money into the program so that at the time that we have the technology, that if in fact the threat justifies it, then we in fact could go ahead with the fielding. If not, then we need to continue with the R&D that will develop a system that could provide missile defense. Listen to just a few of the factors that General Shelton says that we ought to be concerned with; that is, that the technology, one, is effective. Is it within the means of this country moneywise? Assess the threat. Measure the threat against all the other threats that we face, and then see whether or not that justifies the expenditure of that type of money for that particular system at the time the technology will allow us to field it. And he points out that it is a high-risk program. Lieutenant General Lester Lyles, the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Office, made similar points in January: We've always stated within the National Missile Defense program that a decision to deploy is based essentially on four basic things. One, whether or not we have a valid threat; two, whether or not we have the right amount of dollars budgeted for deployment; three, whether the issue with the treaty has been addressed; and four, are we technically ready, is the technology ready in order to make such a decision and to support the deployment. That is the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Office who says four basic things must be considered. This bill considers one. Is it technologically possible? The Director of the Missile Defense Office in charge of this program, who surely is interested in securing this Nation as much as anybody against an attack, says there are four factors that need to be considered. General Lyles says that these four factors are essential. At least we surely should not limit General Lyles, General Shelton, and the Secretary of Defense to considering the sole criterion of ``technologically possible,'' as this bill does. The Joint Chiefs have expressed reservations about the commitment now to deploy a national missile defense system; they have raised these concerns in many ways and at many times. Last September, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer told the Armed Services Committee: ``I think we need to have something that's practical; has a degree of success. I think it also has to be balanced against other priorities.'' The question of other priorities--other threats--is a major concern of the Joint Chiefs. In an interview last month, General Shelton pointed out: ``There are other serious threats out there in addition to that posed by ballistic missiles. We know, for example, that there are adversaries with chemical and biological weapons that can attack the United States today. They could do it with a briefcase--by infiltrating our territory across our shores or through our airports.'' Does the bill we are debating today address any of these concerns raised by our senior military leaders? The answer is, Madam President, it does not. And that is one of the many reasons we do not see our senior military leaders supporting this bill. If this legislation would advance--even by one day--the development of an operationally effective and cost effective NMD system suitable for deployment, then maybe our military leaders would support it. But this bill doesn't do that. It doesn't advance by one day the development of an operationally effective, cost-effective national missile defense system. The bill simply says that we are going to deploy a national missile defense system as soon as it is technologically possible, without regard to operational effectiveness, without regard to cost, without regard to the impact on nuclear weapons reduction in Russia, without regard to proliferation of nuclear weapons that could result. If this legislation said that we should stop any further reductions of nuclear weapons on Russian soil, I do not think many Members of this Senate would support it. That may not be what the language of this bill says, but that will be the likely outcome of the policy in this bill. And here is why. At the Helsinki summit on March 21, 1997, President Clinton and President Yeltsin issued a joint statement on the ABM Treaty, on the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty, which began as follows: President Clinton and President Yeltsin, expressing their commitment to strengthening strategic stability and international security, emphasizing the importance of further reductions in strategic offensive arms, and recognizing the fundamental significance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for these objectives, as well as the necessity for effective theater missile defense systems, consider it their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability. That is a summit statement. That is not some casual comment to a reporter. That is a joint statement that was issued at the highest level by the two Presidents of the United States and Russia. Defense Secretary Cohen has made it clear that both pursuing a limited national missile defense program and maintaining the ABM Treaty are in our national interests and can both be accomplished. During his press conference in January, Secretary Cohen stated his view on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as follows: I believe it's in our interest to maintain that. I think we need to modify it to allow for a national missile defense program that I've outlined, but the ABM Treaty, I think, is important to maintain the limitations on offensive missiles. To the extent that there is no ABM Treaty, then certainly Russia or other countries would feel free to develop as many offensive weapons as they wanted, which would set in motion a comparable dynamic to offset that with more missiles here. The bill before us, S. 257, states that we will deploy a national missile defense system as soon as it is technologically possible despite our treaty commitment to Russia and the ABM Treaty and its importance to strategic stability and future nuclear arms reductions in Russia. The bill before us will jeopardize our recently begun effort to reach a negotiated agreement with Russia on possible changes to the ABM Treaty that may be necessary to permit deployment of a limited national missile defense system. We cannot, and we will not, give Russia or any other nation a veto over our national missile defense requirements or programs. I want to repeat that so it is not misunderstood. We cannot and we should not give any nation, including Russia, a veto over our decision whether or not to deploy a national missile defense. But making a decision now to deploy a national missile defense system before we attempt to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty, before the military and civilian leadership of the Defense Department say that the Nation can responsibly make such a decision, will likely reduce Russia's willingness to continue reducing nuclear weapons under the START process, likely lead Russia to retain thousands of nuclear weapons that it would otherwise eliminate, and thereby dramatically increase the threat of nuclear proliferation. The Committee on Armed Services has previously recognized the importance of a cooperative approach on missile defense and the ABM Treaty. Last year, the committee included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1999 that encouraged the United States to work in a cooperative manner with Russia on issues of missile defense. The conference report for that bill said the following: The conferees believe that a cooperative approach to ballistic missile defense could lead to a mutually agreeable evolution of the ABM Treaty, i.e., either modification or replacement by a newer understanding or agreement that would clear the way for the United States and Russia to deploy national missile defenses each believes necessary for its security. If implemented in a cooperative manner, the conferees do not believe that such steps would undermine the original intent of the ABM Treaty, which was to maintain strategic stability and permit significant nuclear arms reduction. That was from the conference report on our 1999 defense authorization bill. And how different it is from the bill before us, when the conferees said that a cooperative approach, cooperative approach to ballistic missile defense, could lead to a mutually agreeable evolution of the ABM Treaty. None of that is in the bill before us. Instead, S. 257 is inconsistent with this understanding of the importance of a cooperative approach toward the ABM Treaty, to maintaining strategic stability and permitting large reductions in nuclear weapons because it threatens a unilateral breach of the ABM Treaty. Passing this bill would make it much more difficult for the administration to maintain the continuing benefits of the ABM Treaty and the cooperative approach to nuclear arms reduction under the START process. Russia's Foreign Minister Ivanov recently noted the following: We believe further cuts in strategic offensive weapons can be done only if there is a clear vision for preserving and observing the ABM Treaty. There is no such vision or attempted vision, no reference to modification of the ABM Treaty here as being desired, to allow us to cooperatively move toward the deployment of national missile defense, nothing in the bill before us other than the statement, ``We're going to deploy this system as soon as technologically possible.'' And so by making the deployment decision now, S. 257, the bill before us, would be giving the Russians an ultimatum: We are going to deploy a national missile defense system regardless of the ABM Treaty. That kind of ultimatum will make it more difficult to negotiate possible changes to the ABM Treaty before the scheduled deployment decision in June of 2000. Some are going to say that we move forward with NATO expansion in the face of Russian opposition. Why not move forward this legislation to commit to deploy a national missile defense system in spite of Russia's objection. There is a critical difference. When we expanded NATO, we were not taking an action that explicitly violated a bilateral treaty with Russia such as the ABM Treaty. In all likelihood, the unilateral deployment of a national missile defense system that is truly an effective system to defend all 50 States would violate the ABM Treaty. How different from the expansion of NATO. NATO was not a treaty with Russia that we were violating by expanding it. The ABM Treaty is a treaty with Russia that we would almost certainly be violating with deployment of a 50-State national missile defense. There is another difference that has to go to the relationship between us and Russia. Russia may be economically extremely weak and militarily weak at the moment, but, nonetheless, Russia is still a power that has huge numbers in military capability and nuclear capability and will someday surely be even more powerful than it is now. But what did we do before we expanded NATO? All of the NATO members, including the United States, worked with Russia to explain that NATO expansion was not aimed at Russia. Indeed, the alliance entered into the NATO-Russia Founding Act and, as a result of those efforts, Russia has worked constructively with NATO on a number of issues. That is what we are trying to do now with the ABM Treaty. We are trying to negotiate with Russia right now to amend the ABM Treaty, to allow both the United States and Russia to retain this important treaty and the nuclear arms reduction benefits that it has brought us while still moving forward with the development and deployment of a limited missile defense. This bill will make that much more difficult. The President's National Security Advisor, on February 3, 1999, wrote us that: If S. 257 were presented to the President in its current form, his senior national security advisors would recommend that the bill be vetoed. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the full text of this letter be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. LEVIN. I will just read a few other portions of Mr. Berger's letter, where he explains the basis for the position of the President's senior national security advisors recommending that this bill be vetoed if it is passed: The Administration strongly opposes S. 257 because it suggests that our decision on deployment of this system should be based solely on a determination that the system is ``technologically possible.'' This unacceptably narrow definition would ignore other critical factors that the Administration believes must be addressed when it considers the deployment question in 2000, including those that must be evaluated by the President as Commander-in-Chief. We intend to base the deployment decision on an assessment of the technology (based on an initial series of rigorous flight-tests) and the proposed system's operational effectiveness. In addition, the President and his senior advisors will need to confirm whether the rogue state ballistic missile threat to the United States has developed as quickly as we now expect, as well as the cost to deploy. Then Mr. Berger went on to say the following: A decision regarding NMD deployment must also be addressed within the context of the ABM Treaty and our objectives for achieving future reductions in strategic offensive arms through START II and III. The ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability and Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agree that it is of fundamental significance to achieving the elimination of thousands of strategic nuclear arms under these treaties. Madam President, senior Defense Department officials have stated repeatedly that the Department of Defense is already developing a national missile defense system as fast as is technically possible. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre testified to the Armed Services Committee on October 2, 1998, that the national missile defense program: . . . is as close as we can get in the Department of Defense to a Manhattan project. We are pushing this very fast. And General Joe Ralston, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified at the same hearing: I know of no other program in the Department of Defense that has had as many constraints removed in terms of oversight and reviews just so that we can develop and deploy it as quickly as possible. As the Department of Defense has made clear on numerous occasions, adding more money will not accelerate the program because we are moving this program, the development program, as quickly as is possible, and there are no resource constraints on that development. In addition, on January 20, Defense Secretary Cohen announced four steps, demonstrating the commitment to develop an operationally effective national missile defense as quickly as possible, achieving the option to deploy, not only as quickly as possible, but also in a way consistent with continuing nuclear arms reductions. First, Secretary Cohen announced the Defense Department would be budgeting the funds--and they now have $6.6 billion--in the Future Years Defense Program for possible deployment of a limited national missile defense system. This funding will permit deployment if the decision is made to deploy. This would bring the total national missile defense funding for 1999 through 2005 to $10.5 billion. Second, Secretary Cohen affirmed that the administration expects that the threat of ballistic missiles from rogue nations will continue to grow and will pose a threat to the U.S. territory in the near future. Third, Secretary Cohen announced that the administration is seeking possible changes to the ABM Treaty with Russia in the event that deployment would require modification. I was particularly glad to hear that because I had been urging the administration to take this step myself for many, many months. Secretary Cohen also noted that if we cannot agree on changes to the treaty, the United States can exercise its right to withdraw from the treaty under the ``supreme national interest'' clause of the treaty, if necessary for our national security. Finally, Secretary Cohen announced that the earliest anticipated deployment date for the national missile defense system was going to be 2005 instead of 2003, because of concerns about the technology of the system and because certain critical tests will not occur until 2003. Secretary Cohen's announcement clearly demonstrates the administration's commitment to moving forward as quickly as possible with the development of an operationally effective national missile defense program. The Department of Defense policy, unlike the bill before us, permits consideration of a number of relevant factors, including operational effectiveness and cost, and permits us to pursue planned negotiations on possible ABM Treaty modifications before making a deployment decision next year, in the year 2000. The national missile defense program is a high-risk program. It faces numerous technical challenges. The integration of all the component parts into a system that can demonstrate its capability is still years away. The first integrated system test using a production interceptor is not scheduled to take place until the year 2003. Prior to that time, tests will rely on surrogate components for some of the most critical pieces of hardware. But S. 257 will make the deployment commitment now, prior to any demonstration of the capability of the system, prior to any ability to evaluate whether it is operationally effective--key word ``operationally''--and able to meet its system requirements. As the Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff have pointed out, if we were to commit to deployment of an NMD system ``as soon as technologically possible,'' we might be committing ourselves to building a system that is not as effective as we would need or desire to counter the evolving threat. In 1997, General John Shalikashvili, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified to the committee that the earliest possible system may not provide the necessary capability: If a decision is made to deploy an NMD system in the near term, then the system fielded would provide a very limited capability. If deploying a system in the near term can be avoided, DOD can continue to enhance the technology base and the commensurate capability of the NMD program system. That is why General Shalikashvili stated at the same time that the National Missile Defense Readiness Program of the administration is the program that ``optimizes the potential for an effective national missile defense system.'' The normal Department of Defense acquisition process for major weapons systems requires a rigorous review of numerous technical performance and cost considerations at each major decision point in the development or acquisition process. The Department of Defense has mandatory procedures for major defense acquisition programs that provide that ``threat projections, system performance, unit production cost estimates, life cycle costs, cost performance tradeoffs, acquisition strategy, affordability constraints and risk management shall be major considerations at each milestone decision point.'' S. 257 would make a deployment decision now while ignoring all of those critical requirements that have been applied, I think, with one exception where we paid a huge price, to the acquisition of every major system. Secretary Cohen's announcement that the actual deployment date is expected no sooner than 2005 is designed to reduce the risk of failure, but in mandating deployment ``as soon as technologically possible,'' the bill before us could undermine the Department's efforts to ensure that the national missile defense system is operationally effective, emphasis on the ``operationally.'' For example, it may be ``technologically possible,'' with a 1 in 20 success rate for a specific system to hit an incoming missile under certain circumstances, but do we really want to make a deployment commitment now to a national missile defense system under those conditions? The Joint Chiefs of Staff and our warfighting commanders certainly do not want a system that is not operationally effective. Gen. Howell Estes, the then-Commander in Chief of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, testified before the Armed Services Committee in March of 1997 that, from his perspective, ``it is vitally important that any ballistic missile defense system we ultimately deploy must be effective.'' The bill before us also ignores the issue of cost-effectiveness. If a system does not provide us with a capability at a cost that can be justified in light of other high priority national security requirements, then, it seems to me, we are missing an opportunity, indeed, a requirement, that a logical factor be considered as part of the decision process, because what happens then is that we will be saying, regardless of the cost, it makes no difference whether this is cost-effective or not, in light of whatever its capability is, regardless of whether it is operationally effective, if it is technologically possible, to heck with the cost, to heck with the operational effectiveness, and to heck with the impact on nuclear arms reductions. This cost-effectiveness issue is one of the four crucial factors that Secretary Cohen and National Security Advisor Berger have said that the administration will take into account in its deployment decision review in June of next year. We should not disregard cost-effectiveness completely, as this bill does. Madam President, Secretary Cohen has testified that the administration will make the decision in June of 2000 on whether to deploy a limited national missile defense system, after taking into account the threat, the operational effectiveness of the national missile defense system, the cost-effectiveness of the system, and the impact of deployment on nuclear arms reductions and arms control. This bill ignores these factors and reduces the issue to one--what is technologically possible and, when that is shown, then we are going to deploy regardless of what those other factors indicate. The bill would undermine the current effort of the administration to reach a negotiated agreement on any changes to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that may be necessary to permit deployment of a limited national missile defense system. Again, the summit statement of the two Presidents, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, in March of 1997, underscores the continuing importance of this treaty between us and the Russians for strategic stability and for further reductions in strategic offensive nuclear weapons. It pledges both parties to ``consider it their common task to preserve the ABM Treaty, prevent circumvention of it, and enhance its viability.'' This bill would throw that pledge into the wastepaper basket. As Secretary Cohen has made clear, we will not negotiate any needed changes to the ABM Treaty forever. There may come a time when we determine that we must withdraw from the treaty under the supreme national interest clause. That would be a very serious step, but it is not one that we need to take now or should take now before we have a system developed, before we have tried to modify the ABM Treaty to allow both the United States and Russia to move toward defenses against limited ballistic missile threats. Making a decision to deploy an NMD system before we even attempt to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty and before the Department of Defense says that the Nation can responsibly make such a decision will almost surely reduce Russia's willingness to cooperate with us on reducing nuclear weapons on her soil under the START process, and likely will lead Russia to retain thousands of nuclear warheads it would otherwise eliminate, and would, thereby, dramatically increase the threat of nuclear proliferation. The most likely threat that we face isn't an intercontinental ballistic missile strike with a return address guaranteeing our massive destruction of the sender. The most likely threat is a terrorist using weapons of mass destruction. This bill increases that threat by significantly increasing the odds that Russia will end the reduction of nuclear weapons, which the treaty that this bill would violate has led to, and for no good reason, because this bill would not accelerate the national missile defense development by a single day. It increases the proliferation risk from thousands of nuclear weapons that would otherwise be eliminated through the START process for no tangible benefit to this program. This bill reduces our security by increasing the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons to rogue states, and that is one of the many reasons why this bill has no support among our military leaders. Next week, the Prime Minister of Russia is coming to Washington for an important series of meetings. Senate adoption of this bill effectively says we are going to deploy a national missile defense system in violation of an important treaty that we have with Russia. The message that we are sending to Russia with this bill is we do not care about our treaty commitment. We do not care about cooperation on nuclear weapons reduction. I just wonder how the U.S. Senate would react if, on the eve of an American President's visit to Moscow, the Russian Duma passed legislation that undermined one of the basic foundations of U.S.-Russian relations. You can bet it would cause one heck of an uproar here, and I think Congress would be leading the chorus. Those of us who say that this bill will contribute to our national security have to answer the question: why don't our senior military and senior civilian defense and security leaders in this administration support the bill? Where are the senior military leaders supporting this bill? Why don't General Shelton and the Joint Chiefs of Staff support this bill? Why doesn't General Lyles, the Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Office, support this bill? Why doesn't the Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen, who is a proponent of national missile defense now and when he served in the Senate, support this bill? They don't support this bill because they know it will not contribute to our national security. Secretary Cohen's national missile defense plan has the strong support of General Shelton, has the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We should stick with it and vote against this bill. I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor. Exhibit 1 The White House, Washington, February 3, 1999. Hon. Carl Levin, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Levin: I understand the Senate Armed Services Committee will consider tomorrow S. 257--The National Missile Defense Act of 1999. I want to underscore that the Administration shares with Congress a commitment to ensuring the American people are provided effective protection against the emerging long-range missile threat from rogue states. That is why we have since 1996 diligently pursued a deployment readiness program to develop a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system designed to protect against such threats. We have now budgeted $10.5 billion between FY 1999-2005 for this program, including the funds that would be necessary during this period to deploy a limited NMD system. Secretary Cohen has recently made clear that the Administration will address the deployment decision in June 2000. The Administration strongly opposes S. 257 because it suggests that our decision on deploying this system should be based solely on a determination that the system is ``technologically possible.'' This unacceptably narrow definition would ignore other critical factors that the Administration believes must be addressed when it considers the deployment question in 2000, including those that must be evaluated by the President as Commander-in-Chief. We intend to base the deployment decision on an assessment of the technology (based on an initial series of rigorous flight-tests) and the proposed system's operational effectiveness. In addition, the President and his senior advisors will need to confirm whether the rogue states ballistic missile threat to the United States has developed as quickly as we now expect, as well as the cost to deploy. A decision regarding NMD deployment must also be addressed within the context of the ABM Treaty and our objectives for achieving future reductions in strategic offensive arms through START II and III. The ABM Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability, and Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agree that it is of fundamental significance to achieving the elimination of thousands of strategic nuclear arms under these treaties. The Administration has made clear to Russia that deployment of a limited NMD that required amendments to the ABM Treaty would not be incompatible with the underlying purpose of the ABM Treaty, i.e., to maintain strategic stability and enable further reductions in strategic nuclear arms. The ABM Treaty has been amended before, and we see no reason why we should not be able to modify it again to permit deployment of an NMD effective against rogue nation missile threats. We could not and would not give Russia or any other nation a veto over our NMD requirements. It is important to recognize that our sovereign rights are fully protected by the supreme national interests clause that is an integral part of this Treaty. But neither should we issue ultimatums. We are prepared to negotiate any necessary amendments in good faith. S. 257 suggests that neither the ABM Treaty nor our objectives for START II and START III are factors in an NMD deployment decision. This would clearly be interpreted by Russia as evidence that we are not interested in working towards a cooperative solution, one that is in both our nations' security interests. I cannot think of a worse way to begin a negotiation on the ABM Treaty, nor one that would put at greater risk the hard-won bipartisan gains of START. Our goal would be to achieve success in negotiations on the ABM Treaty while also securing the strategic arms reductions available through START. That means we need to recognize the address the interrelationship between these two tracks. The Administration hopes the Senate will work to modify S. 257 to reflect the priority that we believe must be attached to the ABM and START objectives I have outlined above. But if S. 257 were presented to the President in its current form, his senior national security advisors would recommend that the bill be vetoed. Sincerely, Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Mr. COCHRAN addressed the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the privilege of the floor be granted to David Auerswald of Senator Biden's staff.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, there is no objection on this side.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to honor Yvonne Gellise, who was awarded the Mary Maurita Sengelaub, RSM, Award for Meritorious Service for 1997. This award is presented annually to a person ``whose contributions to the healing ministry are in striking harmony with the works of Catherine McAuley, foundress and first Sister of Mercy.'' Yvonne Gellise was born in Bay City, Michigan, the fifth and last child of Levy and Regina Gellise. An early experience with polio fostered her early determination that characterized her many efforts on behalf the community. In 1995, Yvonne joined the Religious Sisters of Mercy and became Sister Yvonne Gellise. Since then, Sister Yvonne has served in several administrative positions in Mercy facilities in Michigan and Iowa. A milestone in her career came when she was named chief executive officer of St. Joseph Mercy Hospital, Ann Arbor. Sister Yvonne provided indispensable leadership during the relocation of the hospital to its current site. Sister Yvonne currently serves as senior advisor for Governance at Saint Joseph Mercy Health System, Ann Arbor. Mr. President, Sister Yvonne Gellise is a very deserving recipient of the Mary Maurita Sengelaub, RSM, Award for Meritorious Service. I know my Senate colleagues join me in honoring her on the notable contribution she made to our community.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to honor Dr. Steven Bolton, who was recently awarded the Mary Maurita Sengelaub, RSM, Award for Meritorious Service for 1998. This award is presented annually to a person ``whose contributions to the healing ministry are in striking harmony with the works of Catherine McAuley, foundress and first Sister of Mercy.'' Steve Bolton was raised in the city of Detroit. While growing up in the city his parents placed a strong emphasis on helping the less fortunate in our society, and he has passed that feeling along to his three sons. This experience led Steve Bolton, following in the footsteps of his older siblings, to dedicate himself to becoming a doctor in order to ``understand what makes us human and to use this knowledge to help others.'' Steve eventually came to understand how poverty affects the health of the ``working poor'' and is now a general surgeon at St. Joseph Mercy Oakland making a difference in the lives of working families. Steve Bolton has also served over the past seven years as volunteer medical director of Mercy Place in Pontiac, Michigan. Mercy Place is a clinic offering free health care to the community. In addition to his demanding work schedule as a general surgeon, Steve volunteers several days a week at the clinic. He also often donates his professional fees if a patient needs surgery and cannot afford to pay. Mr. President, Dr. Steve Bolton is most deserving of the Mary Maurita Sengelaub, RSM, Award for Meritorious Service. I know my Senate colleagues join me in honoring this extraordinary individual for the outstanding work he does on behalf of the community.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise today to voice my support for Senate Concurrent Resolution 5 and announce my opposition to the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state. Palestinian statehood is an issue that has been left to be resolved between Israel and the Palestinians during permanent status negotiations. Nevertheless, Chairman Yasser Arafat has stated on a number of occasions his intention to declare a Palestinian state on May 4, 1999. This action would seriously undermine the continuation of the Oslo peace process. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has stated publicly that he would respond to such a unilateral declaration by annexing parts of the West Bank. Such a chain of events would surely mark a major setback and probably the end of the peace process. In his September 9, 1993 letter to the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Chairman Arafat writes that ``all outstanding issues will be resolved through negotiations.'' The unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state would clearly violate this commitment as well as the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which was signed in Washington, D.C. on September 28, 1995. The agreement states that it is the understanding of the parties involved that permanent status negotiations ``shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest'' and further that ``neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.'' Mr. President, this resolution puts the U.S. Senate on record as opposing the unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood. It is a statement, in my mind, in support of the peace process and the continuation of negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Negotiation and mutual agreement are the only way a true and lasting peace can be reached in the Middle East. While a Palestinian state may indeed become a reality at some point in the future, it is my hope that any such entity would be born from the direct negotiations of the Israeli and Palestinian people and not a unilateral declaration.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to cosponsor this legislation to provide quality after school programs for our nation's youth. There are 23.5 million school-age children who have working parents, and of these children, 5 to 7 million are considered ``latchkey'' kids, or children who are alone at some point in the day. Mr. President, law enforcement statistics show that from the hours of 3:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m., students between the ages 12 to 17, are more likely to commit violent acts or be the victims of violent activity. We know that they are more likely to engage in these activities if young people are without adult supervision. According to a report published by the U.S. Departments of Education and U.S. Department of Justice in June of 1998, entitled Safe and Smart: Making After School Hours Work for Kids, ``first and foremost, after school programs keep children of all ages safe and out of trouble.'' There is no question that after-school programs keep most kids out of trouble, unfortunately, there are not enough of them to keep all kids on the right track. According to findings of Mr. Herbert Moyer of the Michigan State Board of Education, which were published in the March 10, 1999 Oakland Press: More than 80 percent of parents want their children to attend an after-school program, but only 30 percent of elementary and middle schools offer such programs. After- school hours are when juvenile crime rates triple and youth without positive alternatives may do drugs, smoke, drink or engage in sexual activity . . . eighth-graders who are left unsupervised for 11 hours or more a week are twice as likely to abuse drugs or alcohol as those under adult supervision. Mr. President, this amendment would make a substantial effort to resolve that problem. By increasing the appropriations for the 21st Century Learning Centers program to $600 million, a three fold increase over last year's funding, public schools will be able to develop after school centers for children that provide educational, recreational, cultural, health and social services. Specifically, activities and services may include: Literacy programs, telecommunications and technology education programs, mentoring, academic assistance, job skills assistance, expanded library services, nutrition and health programs, summer and weekend school programs, services to individuals with disabilities, drug, alcohol, and gang prevention. Last year, 21st Century Community Learning Centers grants were awarded to four school districts in my State. Schools in Armada, Benton Harbor, Grant Rapids and the Highland Park School have received these grants. I would like to share with you some of the possibilities that these grants can provide to local school districts around my state and nationwide. In the Armada Area Schools, the district planned a virtual network of middle school computer centers (called ``clubhouse''). The centers are meant to increase student engagement in learning through computer use; foster collaboration among students, schools and communities; and develop a model of statewide collaboration through the sharing of resources. The Benton Harbor Area Schools planned to partner up with local community groups and Western Michigan University to provide Community Learning Centers, which are established to assist middle school students in developing literacy and technology skills and they plan, produce, and present constructive projects that deal with community- wide issues such as poverty, violence, drug use, and teen pregnancy. The Grand Rapids Public Schools planned to create four local Learning Centers in its middle schools. The program is designed to operate on afternoons, one evening per week, and several hours on Saturdays and provide enrichment activities, recreational activities, parent and child activities and community support activities. The Highland Park School District, which collaborated with government, nonprofit groups, and local universities, planned to create two Learning Centers in their area. At these centers, students and community members can participate in academic programs, sports and recreational activities, literacy and family recreational activities. I would like to applaud the innovative ways in which Michigan educators have provided students with after school programs. These school districts were selected for the 21st Century Learning Centers grants because of their innovative projects in addressing their after- school needs. And, let me say, Mr. President, that Michigan students and parents are lucky to have people like Kathleen Strauss, Vice President of the Michigan Board of Education, who has championed the cause of after-school programs for our youth for many years. We are also lucky to have such dedicated educators, especially in Armada, Benton Harbor, Grand Rapids and Highland Park, who have helped students gain access to computers and new technologies, and to encourage student involvement in the community. I am pleased that Michigan schools are benefiting from these grants, and am hopeful that the model set by these school districts will encourage the establishment of similar initiatives in communities throughout my state and the nation. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with my colleagues Senator Murray, Senator Kennedy and others in introducing this Class Size Reduction amendment, which builds on last years successful effort towards reducing class sizes in grades 1-3 to 18 or fewer students nationwide. Last year, President Clinton proposed this historic initiative and Congress approved a down payment on this request last year, providing a $1.2 billion appropriation to help communities hire approximately 30,000 teachers nationwide. Under the initiative enacted into law last year, school districts will begin to receive funding this July 1 in order to hire teachers to begin reducing class size this fall. While last year's appropriation provided an important start on this seven year initiative, the amendment before us gives us a chance to support effective local planning by giving school districts the confidence they need that funding will be available under this initiative for future years. The average U.S. class size is 24 students with some as high as 30 students per class. A consensus of research indicates that students attending small classes in the early grades make more rapid educational progress than students in larger classes and that those achievement gains persist through at least the middle grades. More specifically, class size reduction leads to enhanced teacher-student quality relationships, higher student achievement, solid foundation for further student learning, and the ability of students to read independently by the end of the 3rd grade. Mr. President, there are 3,750 schools in my state of Michigan. Some of these schools have been fortunate enough to reduce some of their classes in the early grades. Last month, I visited about a dozen of them, witnessing first hand the benefits of smaller classes. I also visited several of the numerous schools in my state that are disadvantaged by large class sizes. For example, at the Calvin Britain Elementary School in Benton Harbor, where the student to teacher ratio is higher than the national average, teachers worry that they are not able to identify their students' learning needs. When I asked 2nd grade teacher Louise Hufnagel what it would mean to reduce her class of 26 down to 17 or 18, she said, ``It would make a world of difference. A lot of the children have special needs and it would make it easier to give them the individual attention they need.'' At East Leonard Elementary School in Grand Rapids, principal Tina Barwacz said she is convinced that lower class size improves academic performance. Teachers there are now giving more personalized attention to their students because their classes are smaller. Third grade teacher Dan Mayhew, with 17 students this year down from 23 last year, says that now he can get to each student more often and make sure the individual masters the standards and the core curriculum. Another third grade teacher, Sharon Uminski, with 17 students this year, down from 28 last year, says she gets to know her class better, including learning faster students strengths and weaknesses. She went on to say that it also allows her to initiate remedial education in a subject when necessary on an individual basis; and that she encounters less discipline problems resulting in more class time for instruction. First Grade teacher Teresa Guinnup who had 25 students last year and 17 this year says now she can talk to each child and check his or her ability. The students told me that they like smaller class sizes because it was easier to concentrate, there was more room and some kids get to sit at their own desk. At Winchell Elementary School in Kalamazoo where some classes have gone from 29 down to 17, teachers are seeing major improvements in their pupil's reading skills. First grade teacher, Mary Trotter, who had 28 students last year and has 19 this year said, ``I'm able to give children much more individual help. It's a dream.'' First grade teacher Kitty Wunderlin who had 29 students last year and 19 this year, said ``it is divine to have 19 students. I can give them one to one attention. With 29 students I felt overwhelmed.'' And, first grade teacher Kathie Gibson told me, ``I've seen great gains in my students reading skills this year.'' In Lansing, at Harley Frank Elementary School, kindergarten teacher Mrs. Zimmerman, who has been teaching for 34 years and who last year planned to retire until she heard class sizes were going to be reduced, said that she now has more control over her class, the kids are happier and more adjusted and in short, they are able to learn more. With smaller classes, teachers can assess each student's progress in a more timely manner and students develop more interest in learning, all of which create higher student achievement. Many other direct experiences of teachers and students were shared with me. For instance, at Merrill Community Elementary school in Flint, which started a class downsizing program five years ago for grades K-4. Before this program began, their student to teacher ratio was 30-1. One teacher, Mrs. Stephanie Thibault told me that ``having 30 first and second graders in a classroom was overwhelming and exhausting.'' Teachers would literally find themselves counselling some of their students in the hallways because their buildings and classrooms were so overcrowded. After the implementation of their new program, that ratio changed to 17 students to 1 teacher, and listen to the difference expressed by Mrs. Thibault. She exclaims ``As a teacher, my role has expanded beyond instruction. Having a 17-1 ratio allows me to know my students and their families better, allows me to personalize learning tasks for each child and it gives me opportunities to provide one-on- one help. Students benefit because they receive the attention and caring they deserve.'' Because of a class size reduction program, Mrs. Thibault can now give students the instruction they deserve. Isn't that exactly what we should strive for? Our teachers should not be overwhelmed and exhausted at the end of each day. Our students should not be competing with each other to get the attention of their teachers. Each child deserves that attention and caring that teachers like Mrs. Thibault can provide. But some teachers are not capable of providing that teaching environment. Too many of our classrooms are spilling out into the hallways and until we change this by reducing class size, our young people will be at a disadvantage. When we reduce class size, we not only help our teachers and students, but we meet needs of parents whose children are learning more and performing better in school. When the program to reduce class size first began in the Flint Community School District, test scores for students were low. For the 1994-95 school year, only 8 percent of the students at Merrill Elementary passed the ``Reading/Story'' portion of the Michigan Education Assessment Program, the MEAP test. For that same year, only 26 percent passed the ``Reading/Info'' section and just 10 percent passed the Math portion of the MEAP test. Since the implementation of the program, the students at Merrill Elementary school have seen their scores rise dramatically, and I'm not just taking about a couple of percentage points. Last school year, after just 4 years of smaller class sizes, 54 percent of those elementary students passed the ``Reading/Story'' portion of the test, an increase of 45 percent. In addition, 70 percent of Merrill elementary students passed the ``Reading/Info'' portion, a 44 percent increase and 55 percent passed the ``Math'' section of the MEAP test, a 44 percent increase. In just a few years, these students were receiving more attention in a better academic environment and were simply, learning more. Let's take the important lessons from these elementary schools in Michigan and apply them to this legislation. We must start reducing class sizes now. If we fail to pass this amendment, reducing class size, we fail the students of Michigan and the rest of the nation.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I introduce today legislation to repeal the Jones Act waiver contained in last year's Coast Guard Authorization bill for the vessel Columbus. Mr. President, I had serious objections to a provision in last year's Coast Guard Authorization bill that was inserted in the House bill in a managers' amendment with no hearings or vote in the Senate. This provision granted a waiver of existing law for a single vessel operating on the Great Lakes and elsewhere against the wishes of both Michigan Senators and other Senators and in circumvention of a Customs Service ruling regarding the type of dredge work this vessel is allowed to perform. This waiver is a discriminatory provision which gives special treatment and a competitive advantage to one vessel at the expense of its competitors and it should be repealed. Mr. President, the granting of this waiver is detrimental to other dredgers on the Great Lakes and elsewhere who are abiding by U.S. law and U.S. Customs Service interpretations of the Jones Act. The hopper dredge vessel Columbus, the vessel seeking the waiver, was challenged by a competitor for violating the Jones Act because it was performing dredging work that was not allowed under that Act. That challenge was upheld by the U.S. Customs Service. However, instead of abiding by or appealing the Customs Service ruling, a legislative waiver was sought to circumvent that ruling. The waiver was granted by the House, but not the Senate because the Senate passed Coast Guard authorization bill did not contain this discriminatory provision. The only reason this waiver was included in the final Coast Guard authorization bill was due to the circumstances under which that bill was considered. Under normal circumstances, I believe the Senate would have removed this controversial provision from the final bill. At the time of the Senate vote on the Coast Guard Authorization Conference Report, I engaged in a colloquy with my colleagues Senators Snowe and McCain. In that colloquy, they agreed to work with me to repeal this waiver as early as possible in 1999. The legislation I am introducing today with my colleague from Michigan, Senator Abraham, will do exactly that. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I introduce today legislation to repeal the Jones Act waiver contained in last year's Coast Guard Authorization bill for the vessel Columbus. Mr. President, I had serious objections to a provision in last year's Coast Guard Authorization bill that was inserted in the House bill in a managers' amendment with no hearings or vote in the Senate. This provision granted a waiver of existing law for a single vessel operating on the Great Lakes and elsewhere against the wishes of both Michigan Senators and other Senators and in circumvention of a Customs Service ruling regarding the type of dredge work this vessel is allowed to perform. This waiver is a discriminatory provision which gives special treatment and a competitive advantage to one vessel at the expense of its competitors and it should be repealed. Mr. President, the granting of this waiver is detrimental to other dredgers on the Great Lakes and elsewhere who are abiding by U.S. law and U.S. Customs Service interpretations of the Jones Act. The hopper dredge vessel Columbus, the vessel seeking the waiver, was challenged by a competitor for violating the Jones Act because it was performing dredging work that was not allowed under that Act. That challenge was upheld by the U.S. Customs Service. However, instead of abiding by or appealing the Customs Service ruling, a legislative waiver was sought to circumvent that ruling. The waiver was granted by the House, but not the Senate because the Senate passed Coast Guard authorization bill did not contain this discriminatory provision. The only reason this waiver was included in the final Coast Guard authorization bill was due to the circumstances under which that bill was considered. Under normal circumstances, I believe the Senate would have removed this controversial provision from the final bill. At the time of the Senate vote on the Coast Guard Authorization Conference Report, I engaged in a colloquy with my colleagues Senators Snowe and McCain. In that colloquy, they agreed to work with me to repeal this waiver as early as possible in 1999. The legislation I am introducing today with my colleague from Michigan, Senator Abraham, will do exactly that. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, on Friday, an amendment was offered to the Ed-Flex bill to block implementation of certain regulations which the banking regulators had proposed for financial institutions to establish Know-Your-Customer programs. That amendment is still pending before the Senate. On Friday, my colleague from the Banking Committee, Senator Sarbanes, made a number of thoughtful comments about the pending amendment. Today, I would like I to express some concerns about it as well. First, like Senator Sarbanes, I am struck by the irony of dealing with an amendment that addresses banking issues wholly unrelated to education, at the same time Democrats are being denied an opportunity to offer amendments on educational issues much more relevant to the Ed- Flex bill before us. Be that as it may, this banking issue has been put before us. And like all of my colleagues, I voted on Friday against tabling the pending amendment. I voted against tabling, because I think the amendment properly criticizes the proposed regulations for failing to protect ordinary law-abiding citizens from possibly unreasonable and invasive scrutiny by their financial institutions. At the same time, my vote against tabling was not a general endorsement of the amendment. To the contrary, like the proposed regulations it criticizes, the amendment is not drafted as carefully as it should be. The first part of the amendment prohibits the banking agencies from publishing ``in final form'' the flawed regulations proposed in December. I support that prohibition. But the second part of the amendment goes much farther. It also prohibits the banking agencies from proposing any regulation ``which is substantially similar to'' the proposals condemned in the first part. The question is what ``substantially similar'' means. If it means that the banking agencies should not propose know-your- customer regulations without including adequate privacy protections, that is fine. But if means that the agencies may not propose any know- your-customer regulations, no matter how finely tuned and protective of privacy, then the amendment is a serious mistake. If it means that agencies are not only prohibited from issuing regulations but should also start dismantling their existing know-your-customer practices, the amendment is a disaster. I say that because know-your-customer programs are today a key part of law enforcement efforts to stop money laundering. Virtually all major financial institutions operating in the United States today have well developed know-your-customer programs, and U.S. bank examiners already routinely test the adequacy and effectiveness of these programs. For example, existing examination procedures testing bank compliance with the most important anti-money laundering statute on the books, the Bank Secrecy Act, already spell out the elements of an adequate know-your-customer program and test that program as part of its ``core analysis.'' The purpose of these know-your-customer programs is to stop financial institutions from unwittingly helping criminals to launder illegal proceeds. Ten or twenty years ago, if an individual walked into a U.S. bank with a million dollars stuffed into a duffel bag and asked the bank to wire the money to an offshore account in a foreign country, most banks would have done so with few or no questions asked. And the bank would have collected a nice fee for arranging the wire transfer. But that was before the United States embarked upon a world-wide, intensive effort to educate banks and foreign governments about the benefits of battling crime by stopping money laundering. The goals are to make banks wary of moving funds for criminals, to seize illegal funds in the banking system, and to put money launderers in jail and out of business. Congress has played a key role in the advancement of this law enforcement strategy. For example, the subcommittee on which I am the ranking minority member, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, held landmark hearings 15 years ago on how criminals were using financial institutions in the United States to launder their funds. The House and Senate Banking Committees have held numerous hearings over the years outlining the problem and proposing legislation to detect and stop money laundering. In the last Congress, the House Banking Committee held a series of hearings and the Congress passed H.R. 1756, the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act. In this Congress, the leading crime bill proposed by the majority, S. 5, the Drug-Free Century Act, contains an entire title devoted to ``money laundering deterrence.'' Still another bill, H.R. 4005, the Money Laundering Deterrence Act of 1998, which passed the House by voice vote last year but was not brought before the Senate actually directed the banking agencies to propose know-your- customer regulations within 120 days. That's because virtually all money-laundering experts will tell you that know-your-customer programs are one of the most important tools financial institutions have to prevent money laundering. Two examples explain why as well as illustrate how a sensible idea can be pushed too far. First, suppose a stranger walks into a bank with a million dollars in small bills and asks the bank to wire the cash to a foreign bank account. Should the bank wire the money and then, after the customer is gone, report the transaction to law enforcement, or should the bank first determine who the customer is and, if not satisfied, decline to transfer the money? To me, the answer is clear that the bank should determine who the customer is before moving any money. Second example. Suppose a longtime customer of the bank with a modest savings account deposits $3,000 into that savings account. Should the bank report that $3,000 deposit to law enforcement? To me, the answer is obviously no. That type of report would unreasonably invade the customer's privacy, as well as be a waste of time for law enforcement. Surely, we can design regulations that distinguish between these two examples. At a minimum, different rules should apply to customers holding assets or conducting transactions below a specified threshold. We already do that with currency transaction reports, and the same could and should be done with know-your-customer programs. Additional privacy protections should be provided to prohibit banks from using know-your-customer data for purposes other than law enforcement, such as to sell products to the customer or sell the customer's personal data to third parties. I do not support the current know-your-customer proposals, because they do not include these and other privacy protections. Unfortunately, the amendment before the Senate, in its zeal to condemn the proposed regulations, goes too far. The first section, which prohibits the banking agencies from finalizing the regulations as proposed in December, is fine. But the second section, which also prohibits them from publishing ``substantially similar'' regulations, is ambiguous and troubling. It is my hope that the supporters of the amendment do not intend to reverse the gains of the last twenty years and free banks of any obligation to know who their customers are. It is my hope that their intent is to protect ordinary law-abiding customers, but to keep the heat on money launderers by maintaining longstanding requirements that banks ask appropriate questions. It is my hope that their intent to require the agencies to correct the flaws in the proposed regulations, but not block all know-your-customer regulations no matter how narrowly or carefully drawn. The pending amendment could easily be clarified. However, given the current parliamentary situation, it is not clear that anyone will be permitted to offer the additional language. If no clarification is provided, I want the record to show that my support for the amendment is based on the understanding that the amendment's ban on ``substantially similar'' regulations is a ban on know-your-customer regulations that lack adequate privacy protections for ordinary, law abiding individuals. It is not a ban on all future know-your-customer regulations, no matter how carefully drafted. Financial privacy is an important issue. It needs to be addressed. Senator Sarbanes is working on a comprehensive financial privacy bill that I hope this body is given an opportunity to consider. It is unfortunate that we are being asked to address an important aspect of the financial privacy debate in such a rushed and inappropriate context. Which brings me back to Senator Sarbanes' original question about why we are adding banking amendments to an education bill instead of the education amendments America wants and needs.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair and I thank our colleagues from Michigan and Alabama.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Rosa Parks is truly one of this Nation's greatest heroes. Her personal bravery and self-sacrifice have shaped our Nation's history and are remembered with respect and with reverence by us all. Forty three years ago--December 1995--in Montgomery, Alabama the modern civil rights movement began. Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat and move to the back of the bus. The strength and spirit of this courageous woman captured the consciousness of not only the American people but the entire world. My home state of Michigan proudly claims Rosa Parks as one of our own. Rosa Parks and her husband made the journey to Michigan in 1957. Unceasing threats on their lives and persistent harassment by phone prompted the move to Detroit where Rosa Park's brother resided. Rosa Park's arrest for violating the city's segregation laws was the catalyst for the Montgomery bus boycott. Her stand on that December day in 1955 was not an isolated incident but part of a lifetime of struggle for equality and justice. For instance, twelve years earlier, in 1943, Rosa Parks had been arrested for violating another one of the city's bus related segregation laws, which required African Americans to pay their fares at the front of the bus then get off of the bus and re- board from the bus at the rear. The driver of that bus was the same driver with whom Rosa Parks would have her confrontation 12 years later. The rest is history--the boycott which Rosa Parks began was the beginning of an American revolution that elevated the status of African Americans nationwide and introduced to the world a young leader who would one day have a national holiday declared in his honor, the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. The Congressional Gold Medal is a fitting tribute to Rosa Parks--the gentle warrior who decided that she would no longer tolerate the humiliation and demoralization of racial segregation on a bus. We have come a long way towards achieving Dr. King's dream of justice and equality for all. But we still have much work to do. Let us rededicate ourselves to continuing the struggle on Civil Rights, and to human rights in Rosa Parks name. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a brief biography of the life and times and movement which was sparked by Rosa Parks, the mother of the civil rights movement, and excerpted from USL Biographies, be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair and I thank our colleagues from Michigan and Alabama.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to pay tribute to one of the greatest Americans to serve our Nation in this Capitol in this century. Mo Udall was a man of grace, humor and dignity. In this time in Washington when we have all suffered under the burden of too much partisanship and too much personal vitriol in our political life, it would serve us well to contemplate the life of Mo Udall. This is a man who fought hard for what he believed. This is a man who entered more than his share of bruising political battles and yet used his enormous wit to soften the edges and to civilize the struggle. More often than not, the butt of the humor was Mo Udall, himself. When we who work here in Washington take ourselves too seriously, we might remember Mo's explanation that he was ending his 1976 campaign for the Presidency after six second-place finishes in Democratic primaries ``because of illness. The voters got sick of me.'' He loved to quote Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's warning, ``Don't be humble, you're not that great.'' Mo Udall was both humble and great. Mo Udall's sense of humor was so much a part of his legacy that we sometimes forget his towering accomplishments as an environmentalist and reformer. I worked with Mo on one of his signal accomplishments the passage in 1980 of the Alaska Lands Act which more than doubled the size of the national park system and which President Jimmy Carter called ``the most important conservation legislation of the century''. Among his many successful efforts to protect our nation's environment was his decade-long battle in the 1970's to pass tough strip mining reclamation legislation. As Chairman of the House Interior Committee he repeatedly led efforts to expand the national park system and to protect the nation's wildlife, rivers, forests and wilderness areas. Throughout his career, Mo Udall was in the front ranks of those who fought for accountability and reform in public office. He battled for campaign finance reforms, and reforms in the Congress itself, including financial disclosure, reform of the seniority system, and lobby reform. He was among the leaders of the fight in 1971 for the Federal Election Campaign Act, the first substantial revision of campaign financing laws since 1925. In his 1988 book, ``Too Funny To Be President'', Mo Udall revealed that his ``guiding light'' came from Will Rogers: ``We are here for just a spell and then pass on. So get a few laughs and do the best you can. Live your life so that whatever you lose, you are ahead.'' Mr. President, Morris ``Mo'' Udall is way, way ahead.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join my colleagues, Senator John Kerry and Senator Gordon Smith, in the amendment to establish the Excellent Principals Challenge Grant program, which seeks to address the critical professional development needs of elementary and secondary school principals. Last month, during a meeting with the Michigan Association of Secondary School Principals (MASSP), a major concern expressed by them was the lack of professional development programs for school principals. What the school principals of my State said was, just as with the teachers and students around them, they too must keep growing in order to continue to be effective leaders; and as individuals most responsible for implementing vision, direction, and focus for their schools, principals must be fortified with the best knowledge and skills required to effectively manage positive change, including being cognizant of the best ways in which to integrate technology into their schools so that it enhances learning in the classroom. These are the views of the dedicated school principals of my State, including Jim Ballard, MASSP Executive Director, Sandy Feuerstein of Adams Elementary School in Livonia, Barbara Gadnes of Brighton Elementary School in Brighton, Jerry Dodd of Edsel Ford High School of Dearborn and Bob Cross of Troy Athens High School in Troy, Michigan. This amendment would facilitate the professional development needs expressed by the principals of my State and principals nationwide. It would establish a competitive grant program to the States, to fund local school districts for implementation of professional development programs for K-12 school principals. Authorized funding would be $250 million for each of the years FY 2000-FY 2004. State and local school districts would be expected to contribute 25 percent of the total cost, with the exception of the poorest school districts that would be exempt from the match. In addition, a commission would be created to study existing principal development programs and report on the best practices to train principals nationwide. Activities would include developing management and business skills, knowledge of effective instructional skills and practices, and learning about educational technology, which has been a special focus of mine in Michigan where I've brought together colleges and universities and other entities in a partnership to move towards making Michigan's standards for teacher training in the use of technology the nation's best. The expectations for our school principals are high. They are trusted to coordinate, assist and inspire teachers and students, while also monitoring their own personal growth. We must invest in our principals, who dedicate so much to investing in our children. This principal preparation program will allow principals to reach their full potential and at the same time, create public schools that are more organized, well-managed and modern. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, today I rise to speak to S. 346, legislation introduced by Senators Bob Graham (D-Florida) and Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-Texas), which provides that the federal money obtained by the states in the tobacco settlements remains in the hands of the states. Let me briefly review the history of why we are here today discussing tobacco recoupment. On November 23, 1998, 46 states, including my own state of Michigan, reached a $206 billion settlement with the major tobacco manufacturers. Michigan's share of the settlement is approximately $8.2 billion ($300 million per year over 25 years). States that entered into the settlement have begun to plan for the allocation of funds received under those agreements. This settlement was the result of a great undertaking by the states. Over the last decade, state governments initiated lawsuits against the tobacco industry, asserting a variety of claims, including the violation of consumer fraud and other state consumer protection laws. Several state lawsuits did not include any claims for reimbursement of tobacco related health costs paid under the Medicaid program. Some states, such as Michigan, included Medicaid recovery as a part of its claim. The Department of HHS claims a portion of the settlement represented by reimbursement of Medicaid costs it funded. However, because there were multiple bases for the state claims against the tobacco companies and because it would be difficult to accurately assess which portion of the states' settlement funds represents Medicaid reimbursement. I will support an amendment to this bill which will keep in the states any so called ``federal share'' funds if spent by the states on a variety of health and education related activities. It is with the preceding in mind that I have joined on as a co- sponsor of S. 346. I urge the passage of S. 346, with an amendment along the lines described. This will hopefully expedite the process of these funds being used in a responsible and healthy manner.