Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 3 minutes to Senator Biden.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I yield myself 6 minutes. Mr. President, this bill will not contribute to our national security. As a matter of fact, it will weaken and jeopardize our national security. That is not just me saying it and those of us who oppose this bill. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has written us a very, very strong letter supporting the current national missile defense policy, which is to develop defenses against these long-range missiles but not to commit to deploy such defenses, since such a commitment will violate an agreement that we have with Russia which has made it possible for us to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in this world. Committing to break out of a treaty which has allowed us to reduce the number of nuclear weapons will result in Russia--they have told us this--not ratifying START II, and then, indeed, deciding to reverse the START I reductions. START I reductions, START II reductions, and hopefully START III reductions are based on an agreement that we have with Russia that neither party will deploy defenses against long-range missiles. If we violate that agreement--this bill commits us to a position which would violate that agreement--if we violate that agreement, we are going to see Russia reverse the direction in which it is going-- reduction of nuclear weapons. Indeed, there will be a much greater threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, because thousands of additional weapons will then be on Russian soil. This bill is a pro-proliferation of a nuclear weapons bill. That is not the intent, obviously. But that is the effect of this bill, because instead of Russia just having a few thousand nuclear weapons on its soil--which are then subject to being stolen, or pilfered, or sold--it will have many more thousands of nuclear weapons. It is not in the security interests of this Nation to trash the START II agreement by threatening another treaty called the Antiballistic Missile Treaty upon which START II is based, upon which START I is based, and upon hopefully START III will be based. Can we negotiate a modification in that ABM Treaty? I hope so. Might it be desirable for both sides to move to defenses against long-range missiles? I think so. Should we develop defenses against long-range missiles but not commit to violate the ABM Treaty by committing to deploy those missiles? Yes. We should develop those defenses. And we are at a breakneck speed--by the way, a very high-risk speed. This bill, which would change our policy, will not speed up the development of national missile defenses by 1 day. We are already developing those defenses as fast as we possibly can. Mr. President, I want to just read briefly--if my 4 minutes are up, I ask for an additional 2 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I have been informed that the Glenn amendment, which adds, I believe, $2.8 million to the FEC budget, is part of what has already been incorporated in a unanimous consent agreement and it will not need to be separately offered. Am I correct?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we have negotiated this modification in the McConnell amendment so that it is no longer targeted at the sitting general counsel of the Federal Elections Commission. That was my objection to it, my very strong objection to it. This amendment has been modified now so it has no effect on the current general counsel until the year 2008. He is eligible to retire at that date in any event. And even then, the amendment has now been changed so that three of the six members of the Federal Elections Commission can renew the appointment of the general counsel or staff director. It would not take four of the six to renew the appointment of a general counsel or staff director. So in effect we have grandfathered the current general counsel. And with respect to future general counsels and staff directors, we have provided that once they are appointed, which of course will take a majority vote of the Commission, they shall serve for 6 year terms and their terms can be renewed by a vote of three of the six members of the Federal Elections Commission. This is a very significant change that makes this perfectly acceptable to me. I want to thank Senator McConnell for working with us on this. With that, I support the amendment. After this is concluded, I understand that we will then be offering and there will be general support for an amendment of Senator Glenn, if I understand what we worked out here correctly.

Mr. LEVIN. Reserving the right to object--and I will not --I understand, that the manager, then, will be supporting the Glenn amendment when I offer it after this unanimous consent is agreed to.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank my friend from Colorado. Amendments Nos. 3386 and 3380

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the leader for his leadership and for his comments.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the leader for yielding. I do have a number of questions. First, let me say I think we have never been closer to enacting comprehensive campaign finance reform than we are at this moment. The majority of the Senate favors it. The House, through a very courageous act on the part of many of its Members, has overcome the opposition of the House leadership to pass Shays-Meehan. It was said earlier this year that there would be no way of passing Shays-Meehan against the will of the leadership of the House of Representatives. But a very stalwart, gutsy coalition of Democrats and Republicans in the House found a way to have the majority rule in the House of Representatives. It was not easy. It took incredible energy and willpower. They exercised it and they prevailed, and the majority prevailed over the wishes of the leaders of the House of Representatives. So, now we are in a situation where the majority of the Senate favors comprehensive reform and the House has passed comprehensive reform. The leader has spoken earlier as to what it is that is stopping us from trying to get comprehensive reform adopted in the Senate this year. The majority of the public clearly favors it. All public opinion polls show it. They are skeptical that we will do anything about it-- the polls show that as well--but they favor it. Now we are going to come down, it seems to me, to a test of wills, a great and a historic test of wills in the U.S. Senate. The opponents of campaign finance reform have the right to filibuster. They have used that right, and they have the right to filibuster. But the proponents, the supporters of campaign finance reform, do not need to withdraw simply because there is a filibuster on the floor. If that were done, we would not have civil rights legislation. The people who supported civil rights legislation did not always have 67 votes going in. You can start with a majority and offer an amendment, or offer a bill, and just because the opponents filibuster the bill does not require us, those of us who support campaign finance reform, to give up our right to offer the amendment and to have the amendment disposed of by the Senate. And if the filibusterers want to tie up the Senate and prevent the Senate from voting, that is their right. But the supporters of campaign finance reform are not obligated to withdraw an amendment simply because the opponents use their right to filibuster. That is why what we are now facing, given the opposition to the unanimous consent request this morning, is a historic test of wills between the majority that favors campaign finance reform, a bipartisan majority that now has seven Republicans and all the Democrats, and those who oppose campaign finance reform. We must not withdraw in the face of a filibuster. The stakes are too huge. They have been illuminated here this morning eloquently by the Democratic leader. The stakes are whether we are going to restore public confidence to a campaign finance system which is in tatters. We are supposed to have limits on contributions. It is supposed to be $1,000 per person per campaign. Corporations are not allowed to contribute to campaigns, and neither are unions. Yet, we have corporations and unions contributing huge amounts of money which, for all intents and purposes under any reasonable interpretation, support or oppose campaigns. That is what is now happening because of the soft money loophole. We have a chance this year, better than we have ever had, to close that soft money loophole and to restore public confidence in the campaign finance system. We have a chance to do it. If we will show the same courage on a bipartisan basis as was shown in the House of Representatives, down that hall just a few weeks ago, we can pass campaign finance reform in the Senate. But what it will take is a determination on the part of the supporters not to withdraw our majority view in the face of a filibuster. The filibusterers have their rights to tie up the Senate. We have our rights to offer an amendment and seek a vote on that amendment. And, in the face of a filibuster, we need not withdraw and give in to a filibuster. My question of the Democratic leader is this: Was it his hope this morning, and intent this morning in offering this unanimous consent proposal, that we have a course of action which would allow the Senate to work its will, to permit amendments to Shays-Meehan providing they are relevant? As I read the unanimous consent request and heard the unanimous consent proposal, relevant amendments would be in order. Was it the Democratic leader's proposal this morning that we have an opportunity to resolve this issue in a way which would allow us to do all of our other business and to avoid the kind of filibuster which we now very clearly see is going to be forthcoming from the objection to this unanimous consent agreement?

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I voted to table the McCain amendment because I believe it undermines the agreement we have in place with North Korea that is designed to denuclearize North Korea. This could effectively give North Korea an excuse to produce plutonium that it could use for nuclear weapons, which would be absolutely contrary to our most basic national security interests. The McCain amendment would add a requirement for a certification relative to North Korea that would undermine the Agreed Framework that has frozen North Korea's nuclear weapons plutonium production program, because it would change the terms of that agreement. Before any of the fiscal year 1999 funds for implementation of that Agreed Framework could be spent, the McCain amendment would require the President to certify that North Korea is essentially denuclearized, which is not yet the case but which is the very goal of the Agreed Framework. The Agreed Framework stipulates that North Korea must freeze its plutonium production facilities, namely three graphite-moderated nuclear reactors (either operating or under construction) and a plutonium reprocessing facility, in exchange for an international consortium (the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, or KEDO) providing two proliferation-resistant light water nuclear power reactors. Before the U.S. delivers key nuclear components to the North Korean light-water reactor program, North Korea must come into full compliance with its nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It was understood from the outset that it would take a number of years, and probably not before the year 2003, before North Korea would come into full compliance with its obligations under the NPT. The whole idea of the Agreed Framework was in fact to bring North Korea into full compliance with the NPT and to go beyond the NPT's requirements by requiring North Korea to freeze and then dismantle its plutonium production facilities, and to place all its spent nuclear fuel in canisters safeguarded and monitored by the IAEA and eventually remove that spent fuel from North Korea. These represent significant security gains for the United States and we should honor our commitments under the agreement to realize these gains. We should not give North Korea an excuse to walk away from its obligations under the Agreed Framework and to resume the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. I believe that is what the McCain amendment would do, and that is why I voted to table the McCain amendment. Amendment No. 3526

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment would set arbitrary dates for reductions of troops. It runs smack against the advice of our top military officials, both uniformed and civilian. In a letter which has been quoted by a number of Senators, including the Senator occupying the Chair, General Shelton and Secretary Cohen, on May 21, told us the following: Under a legislated approach, military commanders would be forced to restructure their force and mission tasks based on an arbitrarily mandated schedule rather than on mission accomplishment, operational considerations, and the fluid tactical situation they face. Mr. President, that is why military commanders, including our top commander, oppose this amendment. That is why General Shelton opposes this amendment. It is why Secretary Cohen opposes this amendment. It would be mandating an arbitrary date for a troop reduction. That jeopardizes the well-being of our forces in Bosnia. Mr. President, I want to talk about a number of provisions in the amendment with which I disagree. First of all, I want to correct an impression that I believe is created by the findings in this amendment. The findings imply that Congress has not played any role nor exercised its oversight authority since U.S. forces were first deployed to Bosnia. I would remind my colleagues of the provisions that were included in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 and the National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1998. Those Acts required the President to certify that the continued presence of U.S. armed forces in Bosnia, after June 30, 1998, is required in order to meet the national security interests of the United States and that it is the policy of the United States that U.S. armed forces will not serve as, or be used as, civil police in Bosnia. It also required the President to submit to Congress a report on why the U.S. armed forces' presence in Bosnia was in the U.S. national security interests, the expected duration of such deployment, the mission and objectives of the U.S. armed forces, the exit strategy of such forces, and a number of other matters. The President submitted the required certifications and report to Congress on March 3, 1998. In detailing the exit strategy for U.S. forces, the report contained 10 benchmarks that were the goal of the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia. The report stated that ``These benchmarks are concrete and achievable, and their achievement will enable the international community to rely largely on traditional diplomacy, international civil personnel, economic incentives and disincentives, confidence-building measures, and negotiation to continue implementing the Dayton Accords over the longer term.'' I ask unanimous consent that the 10 benchmarks from the President's March 3, 1998 report to Congress be printed in the Record immediately following my remarks.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Change of Vote

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry. Has the agreement been entered into?

Mr. LEVIN. I would like 5 minutes, if I could.

Mr. LEVIN. On the pending amendment.

Mr. LEVIN. Those 10 benchmarks, however, were established unilaterally by the Administration and were not shared with or agreed upon by our NATO allies. Accordingly, I offered an amendment when the Senate was considering the emergency supplemental bill at the end of March. That amendment, which was accepted and eventually became part of the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act, urged the President to seek concurrence among the NATO members on the ten benchmarks, on estimated target dates for achieving the benchmarks, and on a process for NATO to review progress towards achieving the benchmarks. It also required the President to submit to Congress a report on these matters by June 30, 1998 and semiannually thereafter so long as U.S. ground combat forces remain in the Stabilization Force in Bosnia. Mr. President, two days ago the President submitted that report as required by the amendment to the 1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions Act. That report advises that benchmarks parallel to ours have been incorporated in NATO's Operation Plan or OPLAN for the post- June 1998 mission in Bosnia. The OPLAN requires SFOR to develop detailed criteria for each of those benchmarks, to be approved by the North Atlantic Council. The President's report also advises that the NATO allies agreed on June 10 to the United States' proposal that the NATO military authorities provide an estimate of the time likely to be required for the implementation of the military and civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement based on the benchmark criteria. During his testimony before the Armed Services Committee on June 4, General Wes Clark, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, stated that the development and approval of the criteria and estimated target dates should take two or three months. The President's report further advises that the benchmark criteria will be used during NATO's regular six-month review of the Bosnia mission in December. The President added that, although not required by the amendment to the Supplemental Appropriations Act, the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council has included language that corresponds to the benchmarks in its Luxembourg declaration of June 9. The Peace Implementation Council also called on the High Representative to submit a report on the progress being made in meeting those goals by mid-September. This means that both General Shinseki, the NATO on-scene commander, and High Representative Westendorp, the international community's senior civilian in Bosnia, will be using the same framework and that the North Atlantic Council will have the benefit of the judgment of both of these officials. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President's July 28, 1998 report to Congress be printed in the Record following my remarks.

Mr. LEVIN. Finally on this point, I would note that the Senate adopted an amendment during its consideration of the Defense Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 1999 that expressed the sense of Congress that, among other things, stated that the President should work with our NATO allies to withdraw U.S. ground combat forces from Bosnia within a reasonable period of time, consistent with the safety of those forces and the accomplishment of SFOR's military tasks. That amendment passed by a vote of 90-5 on June 24--a little more than a month ago. Mr. President, I thought that it was important to get that information on the record to correct any impression that Congress has not paid attention to the participation of U.S. military forces in the NATO-led force in Bosnia. But it is far more important, in my view, to focus on the other sections of the amendment, particularly the mandatory reduction of U.S. ground elements from Bosnia to a level of 6,500 by February 2, 1999, and 5,000 by October 1, 1999. First, I think it would be useful to put the size of the U.S. contingent in Bosnia in perspective. It should be noted that the United States provided about 20,000 of NATO's Implementation Force in 1996--or about 33 percent of the total force. Up until approximately June of this year, the United States provided about 8,500 troops to NATO's Stabilization Force--or about 25 percent of the total force. By September of this year, the United States will provide about 6,900 troops--or about 22 percent of the total force. So the percentage of the U.S. contribution to the NATO-led force has been declining over time--from 33 to 25 to 22 percent. The amendment before us, however, would use the power of the purse to reduce the number of U.S. ground troops in Bosnia by another 400 by February 2 of next year and then by an additional 1,500 by October 1 of next year. That is the main purpose and impact of this amendment. That is also what makes this amendment unacceptable to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and should make it unacceptable to us. When the Armed Services Committee was considering a series of amendments during its markup of the Defense Authorization bill earlier this year, we sought the views of the Department of Defense. Secretary Cohen and General Shelton, in their letter of May 21, 1998, gave us their views and I would like to quote from a few parts of their letter: We write to express our concerns with any amendment that would legislate a date or schedule for withdrawal or reduction of US forces from the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. Such amendments would make it more difficult to accomplish the mission, which has been remarkably successful to date. * * * * * We will conduct regular reviews of our force posture and progress toward the benchmarks we have established, and we expect further reductions will be possible. But that determination is best based on the actual situation on the ground, the military advice of our commanders in the field, and the approval of the NATO military and political authorities, not an arbitrary withdrawal or reduction dates determined long in advance. * * * * * Under a legislated approach, military commanders would be forced to restructure their force and mission tasks based on an arbitrarily mandated schedule rather than on mission accomplishment, operational considerations, and the fluid tactical situation they face. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the May 21, 1998 letter from Secretary Cohen and General Shelton be printed in the Record following my remarks.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton said it well. I agree with them--Congress should not mandate troop reduction by arbitrary dates. Mr. President, I also disagree with other sections of this amendment dealing with exceptions to the mandated drawdown and limitations on support for law enforcement activities in Bosnia. Finally, I would note that the Statement on Administration Policy states that the President's senior advisors would recommend veto of this bill if it contains a provision that would prescribe a arbitrarily scheduled force drawdown in Bosnia. Mr. President, for all these reasons I will vote against this amendment and I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment as well. Exhibit 1 Ten Benchmarks 1. The Dayton cease-fire remains in place, supported by mechanisms for military-to-military transparency and cooperation. 2. Police in both entities are restructured, re-integrated, re-trained and equipped in accordance with democratic standards. 3. An effective judicial reform program is in place. 4. Illegal pre-Dayton institutions (e.g. Herceg Bosnia, Strategic Reserve Office, Centreks and Selek Impeks) are dissolved and revenue and disbursement mechanisms under control of legitimately elected officials. 5. Media are regulated in accordance with democratic standards; independent/alternative media are available throughout B-H. 6. Elections are conducted in accordance with democratic standards, and results are implemented. 7. Free-market reforms (e.g. functioning privatization and banking laws) and an IMF program are in place, with formal barriers to inter-entity commerce eliminated. 8. A phased and orderly minority return process is functioning, with Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka having accepted significant returns. 9. In Brcko, the multi-ethnic administration functioning and a secure environment for returns is established. 10. The Parties are cooperating with ICTY in the arrest and prosecution of war criminals. These benchmarks are concrete and achievable, and their achievement will enable the international community to rely largely on traditional diplomacy, international civil personnel, economic incentives and disincentives, confidence- building measures, and negotiation to continue implementing the Dayton Accords over the longer term. Exhibit 2 To the Congress of the United States: Pursuant to section 7 of Public Law 105-174, I am providing this report to inform the Congress of ongoing efforts to meet the goals set forth therein. With my certification to the Congress of March 3, 1998, I outlined ten conditions--or benchmarks--under which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. Section 7 of Public Law 105-174 urges that we seek concurrence among NATO allies on: (1) the bench-marks set forth with the March 3 certification; (2) estimated target dates for achieving those benchmarks; and (3) a process for NATO to review progress toward achieving those benchmarks. NATO has agreed to move ahead in all these areas. First, NATO agreed to benchmarks parallel to ours on May 28 as part of its approval of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) military plan (OPLAN 10407). Furthermore, the OPLAN requires SFOR to develop detailed criteria for each of these benchmarks, to be approved by the North Atlantic Council, which will provide a more specific basis to evaluate progress. SFOR will develop the benchmark criteria in coordination with appropriate international civilian agencies. Second, with regard to timelines, the United States proposed that NATO military authorities provide an estimate of the time likely to be required for implementation of the military and civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement based on the benchmark criteria. Allies agreed to this approach on June 10. As SACEUR General Wes Clark testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee June 4, the development and approval of the criteria and estimated target dates should take 2 to 3 months. Third, with regard to a review process, NATO will continue the 6-month review process that began with the deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in December 1995, incorporating the benchmarks and detailed criteria. The reviews will include an assessment of the security situation, an assessment of compliance by the parties with the Dayton Agreement, an assessment of progress against the benchmark criteria being developed by SFOR, recommendations on any changes in the level of support to civilian agencies, and recommendations on any other changes to the mission and tasks of the force. While not required under Public Law 105-174, we have sought to further utilize this framework of benchmarks and criteria for Dayton implementation among civilian implementation agencies. The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) adopted the same framework in its Luxembourg declaration of June 9, 1998. The declaration, which serves as the civilian implementation agenda for the next 6 months, now includes language that corresponds to the benchmarks in the March 3 certification to the Congress and in the SFOR OPLAN. In addition, the PIC Steering Board called on the High Representative to submit a report on the progress made in meeting these goals by mid-September, which will be considered in the NATO 6-month review process. The benchmark framework, now approved the military and civilian implementers, is clearly a better approach than setting a fixed, arbitrary end date to the mission. This process will produce a clear picture of where intensive efforts will be required to achieve our goal: a self- sustaining peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina for which a major international military force will no longer be necessary. Experience demonstrates that arbitrary deadlines can prove impossible to meet and tend to encourage those who would wait us out or undermine our credibility. Realistic target dates, combined with concerted use of incentives, leverage and pressure with all the parties, should maintain the sense of urgency necessary to move steadily toward an enduring peace. While the benchmark process will be useful as a tool both to promote and review the pace of Dayton implementation, the estimated target dates established will be notional, and their attainment dependent upon a complex set of interdependent factors. We will provide a supplemental report once NATO has agreed upon detailed criteria and estimated target dates. The continuing 6-month reviews of the status of implementation will provide a useful opportunity to continue to consult with Congress. These reviews, and any updates to the estimated timelines for implementation, will be provided in subsequent reports submitted pursuant to Public Law 105-174. I look forward to continuing to work with the Congress in pursuing U.S. foreign policy goals in Bosnia and Herzegovina. William J. Clinton, The White House, July 28, 1998. Exhibit 3 The Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, May 21, 1998. Hon. Carl Levin, Ranking Democrat, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Carl: We write to express our concerns with any amendment that would legislate a date or schedule for withdrawal or reduction of U.S. forces from the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. Such amendments would make it more difficult to accomplish the mission, which has been remarkably successful to date. It is our intention to reduce our forces in Bosnia. Based on the progress achieved to date, our commanders already have been able to reduce U.S. troop levels from almost 20,000 in 1996 to the 6,900 that will be deployed after the current drawdown is completed in September. We will conduct regular reviews of our force posture and progress toward the benchmarks we have established, and we expect further reductions will be possible. But that determination is best based on the actual situation on the ground, the military advice of our commanders in the field, and the approval of the NATO military and political authorities, not an arbitrary withdrawal or reduction dates determined long in advance. Our military commanders in the field have determined the level and type of force required to carry out the mission within acceptable risk. The mission, forces and guidance of the force currently planned for June 1998 have been fully agreed to by NATO political and military authorities. Under a legislated approach, military commanders would be forced to restructure their force and mission tasks based on an arbitrarily mandated schedule rather than on mission accomplishment, operational considerations, and the fluid tactical situation they face. In addition, while those opposed to the Dayton Accords have been steadily isolated and diminished in their influence, legislating withdrawal of reduction dates would invite heightened intransigence and extremism. Additional factors that Congress should consider in reviewing any such amendment are the following: Under the proposed amendment, command of the SFOR operation and its element in MND-North might well be transferred to a non-U.S. officer early next year. Shifting to a posture in which the U.S. has much smaller force levels in Bosnia but enhances its force presence in regions surrounding Bosnia, as envisioned by the amendment, will not save money and indeed could cost more than our current operation in Bosnia. We are continually evaluating the force posture for Bosnia, and do not consider an over- the-horizon force appropriate now. Accordingly, we strongly urge you to oppose any legislated fixed date or timetable for withdrawal or reduction of U.S. forces in Bosnia. There is one other factor related to operations in Bosnia of great concern to us, and that is funding. The Department submitted an addition to the FY99 budget to fund a 6,900- person force in Bosnia. Authorizing that request is essential to accomplishing the mission without significantly reducing readiness in other areas. Without that funding, we would have to choose between Bosnia operations and the overall readiness of our Armed Forces. Sincerely, Henry H. Shelton. Bill Cohen.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I understand I have been allocated 1 minute. Is that correct?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me commend the Senator from Arkansas for the second-degree amendment, the modification in effect, which he has sent to the desk. I reluctantly voted to table his original amendment because I was troubled by his narrow focus on one country, when the problem exists not only in China, but a number of other countries. The problems he identifies in his amendment are real problems and they are problems we must be concerned with. He has shown that concern, and I think it is wise that we reflect the concern relating to people engaging in those practices that come from any country--China or anyplace else. And while I reluctantly voted to table his original amendment, the first-degree amendment, for the reason I just gave, I enthusiastically cosponsored the second-degree amendment of the Senator from Arkansas, and I hope it passes with a resounding vote. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment is directly aimed at the independence of the Federal Elections Commission. It is aimed at no other commission. Its purpose is obvious--to eliminate a general counsel who has taken an independent position, following the Federal Election Commission's decision relative to soft money and other issues. We should not muzzle them. We should not throttle them. We should not destroy their independence.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I have a number of problems with the amendment offered by the Senator from Texas that contains a series of findings, expresses the sense of Congress, and requires the President to submit a report relating to the readiness of the United States Armed Forces to execute the National Security Strategy. I realize that the managers of the Defense Appropriations bill are up against a tight deadline to finish their bill and I want to cooperate with them. But, I do want to note for the record a few points. I believe a number of statements in the amendment are overdrawn and I believe that the sense of Congress section of the amendment, particularly subparagraph (B), improperly singles out the Bosnia operation and badly overstates its impact on the units participating in and supporting that operation. Nevertheless, I believe that it would be useful to the Congress to receive a report from the President on the military readiness of the Armed Forces of the United States. Accordingly and despite the problems I have noted, I will not object to this amendment.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am delighted to support the nomination of Patrick T. Henry to be the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. P.T. Henry has served on the staff of the Armed Services Committee for the last five years. Before that, he had a distinguished career on active duty in the Marine Corps and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as well as serving as the Chief of Staff of the American Red Cross here in Washington. Mr. President, I can't think of a better person to serve in this important position. P.T. Henry has played a key role in virtually every Defense manpower and personnel issue in the last two decades. Whether the issue is quality of life issues, military pay and benefits questions, recruiting and retention, or military health care, the United States Senate and the men and women of our armed forces have benefitted tremendously from the advice and counsel of P.T. Henry. I know that every member of the Armed Services Committee agrees with me that P.T.'s expertise in the area of Defense manpower and personnel issues is exceeded only by his commitment to the welfare of the men and women of the armed forces and their families. I am disappointed that P.T. will be leaving the Armed Services Committee staff, but I am delighted and proud that he will be moving to such an important position in the Defense Department. The Senate's and the Armed Services Committee's loss is certainly the Army's gain. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank P.T. Henry for his service to the Senate and the nation. I know that he will do an outstanding job as the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, and that he will continue to be an effective advocate for the men and women of the Army. nomination of brigadier general allen e. tackett

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to join the people across our Nation paying tribute to the heroic actions of Officer Jacob J. Chestnut and Detective John M. Gibson. These two men, who were killed during a senseless act of violence last Friday, gave their lives in order to protect the American people and their Capitol. They died fulfilling their sworn duty to protect the men and women who work in the Capitol compound and the multitudes of visitors who tour each day. The loss of J. J. Chestnut and John Gibson is like a death in the family. However, despite the great loss that will feel, our thoughts and prayers are first with their families, who will bear the greatest burden of this tragic event. We hope that they may find some solace in knowing that the Nation joins them in their grief. These fallen protectors were true heroes. They faced gunfire and death in the line of duty. It is fitting that we are able to pay our final respects to them today in the very place where they worked and gave their lives. The Capitol Police serve with pride, efficiency and good humor. They handle the enormous task of allowing the multitude of people who visit our Capitol, the symbol of freedom and democracy the world over, access to it without a feeling of having to cross a barricade. This openness and accessibility have a heavy price, as we mourn the loss of these brave men. Today, J. J. Chestnut and John Gibson are being given an extraordinary honor by the Congress when their caskets are placed in the Capitol rotunda. It is an honor that has been bestowed upon very few of our Nation's exemplary public servants and one which is entirely fitting for J. J. Chestnut and John Gibson. They were public servants in the most fundamental sense. Their sense of duty and service were unmatched, and as we mourn the deaths of these two outstanding men we can also feel a sense of pride in the great sacrifice they made in the defense of democracy, our Capitol, and its visitors. Mr. President, I know my Senate colleagues and Americans everywhere join in honoring these two fallen heroes: Jacob J. Chestnut and John M. Gibson. in memory of officer gibson and officer chestnut