Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield 8 minutes to me?

Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if Senator Snowe would yield 10 minutes to me? How much time does the Senator from Maine have?

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield for two unanimous consent requests relative to staffs' presence on the floor?

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk on behalf of Senators Snowe and Cleland and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, the Senator from Idaho, Senator Kempthorne, has done what he indicated in committee that he intended to do, which was to offer a modification of his previous language when this bill got to the floor. That is being carried out with the support of his good colleague from Idaho. We have no objection to the modification in the language. My understanding is there is further discussion or debate relative to this subject which will be forthcoming at a later time, but I have no objection to this amendment. Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator withhold the yeas and nays, because the yeas and nays have been ordered on the underlying amendment. I wonder whether or not the Senator might accept a voice vote on the second- degree amendment. I think it has strong support.

Mr. LEVIN. The Senator from Indiana is the prime sponsor of this resolution and is exactly correct. Further, in response to his question, I again state that this is our expression of what Congress intends, that we intend for Europeans to understand, and what we intend, of course, for the President to understand. Part of this, paragraph 5, is that the President should inform the European NATO allies of this expression of the sense of the Congress, should strongly urge them to undertake preparations for establishing a Western/European Union-led or a NATO-led force as a follow-on force to the NATO-led stabilization force, if needed, to maintain peace. In other words, there may be a need--in my judgment there will be, by the way--for a long period of time for there to be an outside force in Bosnia. But what this resolution is saying, it cannot have American combat forces as part of that force beyond a reasonable period of time and we are putting you on notice. Whether we understand your exit strategy, whether we agree with your exit strategy, Mr. President, whatever differences there are as to the interpretation of it, that is not the point. The point is this is what Congress is telling you and telling the Europeans. This is not an unlimited commitment. We are sending you a very clear statement that we are only going to support the presence of American combat forces there for a reasonable period of time. Plus, as long as they are there, we will support them. We are not going to harm them by setting a specific exit date or a specific reduction schedule. We are not going to jeopardize the well-being of our forces with a specific date for an exit, because our top military leaders have told us that is what the effect would be. We are not going to do that in this resolution, at least. I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Indiana.

Mr. LEVIN. That is the strategy, that implementation can continue without the support of a major military force. And what the next step is is for General Clark to submit to us, as he said he would, within 2 months of our hearing, which was early June, June 4--so that, hopefully, by the end of July we will then have his timelines for the achievement of the benchmarks. At that point we will take whatever action we think is appropriate. This resolution is aimed at stating what our position is, again, relative to not having an unlimited commitment from ground combat forces in Bosnia. That is what this resolution says. We are not going to do that. We are going to say they are there for a reasonable time period. That is what this resolution does, which is what we think is the responsible thing to do at this time, without having more information as to what those estimated timelines are. But I would not want to tell you what action, if any, Congress would appropriately take after it receives estimates of timelines, perhaps ranges, from General Clark before we actually see his response. I don't think it would be responsible for us to project in advance what action, if any, we would think would be appropriate beyond adopting this resolution which states quite clearly that we intend that our ground forces only be there for a reasonable period of time.

Mr. LEVIN. Absolutely, without the support of a major NATO-led military force.

Mr. LEVIN. First, I think I want to just restate what the President's statement here is. It is not that these will be achieved before. That is not what this states. It is that ``implementation can continue.'' I just want to again reiterate what this document says.

Mr. LEVIN. But I think the Senator would need to then read what it is in entirety, which is to establish conditions under which implementation can continue without the support of major NATO-led military forces. But that could be argued to read as that implementation of this can continue--not that it has to be achieved before the force can leave--but that it could continue after a major-- major; a qualification--NATO-led force can continue. But I will simply repeat and then yield the floor. It is because we have our responsibility to state what we believe our policy should be in Bosnia that this bipartisan resolution has been introduced. We are trying to state we are not there indefinitely, in our judgment. And we want to let the Europeans know we will not be there indefinitely. We are not writing a blank check. We are not making an open-ended commitment. We are putting you on notice, we are there for a reasonable period of time. Now, why don't we set a specific date? Why don't we then say how many troops, by what date? The answer is, because our top military leaders say that would undermine the safety of our troops. That will jeopardize the well-being of our troops. That will play into the hands of those that want us out of there by one means or another and that will use force if necessary to get us out of there. That is because we want to support our troops as long as they are there and not harm them. Setting a specific date or setting a specific reduction timetable would, in the judgment of General Clark and General Shelton and Secretary Cohen, jeopardize the well-being of our troops. So what our resolution does is say we want to express ourselves, put everybody on notice that we are not there for an indefinite period of time. And by the way, we surely are not there until these goals are achieved. There is no way--no way --we are going to be there until these goals are achieved. But that is the expression of our opinion. I would be happy to yield for a question or yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, if I can reclaim the floor for a final moment. Our resolution, it seems to me, clearly speaks for itself. People can try to interpret the President's statement in different ways, and I will read one line from it in a moment, but our resolution is very clear: Our forces cannot be there indefinitely. We want our forces out within a reasonable period of time. It is our belief that it will take a long time for these kinds of civilian reforms to occur. If you want to read the President's report as saying that the forces cannot leave, in his judgment, until these are achieved, I think that is really stretching what the President has said, but I will read it, and then one can interpret it the way one wants: The goal of the military presence is to establish the conditions under which Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. That is what the President reports. He wants to establish the conditions under which progress can continue--``Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force.'' The way I read that is that these do not need to be reality before the President intends to remove combat forces from Bosnia. If one wants to read that differently, one is free to do so. But however one reads the President's report, what our resolution makes clear is we are not going to be there. We don't believe we should be there for as long as it takes to achieve this. That is the point of our resolution.

Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. LEVIN. I will do that, and then I will be happy to yield the floor. There are 10 benchmarks. The third benchmark I just referred to: An effective judicial reform program being in place. The fourth benchmark--again, this is for civil implementation, now, of Dayton. This is not our military mission. I want to be real clear, I read our military mission before. I read our military tasks before. This is the civil implementation side of Dayton. 4. Illegal pre-Dayton institutions . . . are dissolved . . . And they specify which ones they are talking about. And I would be happy to give you a list. There are four of them: and revenue and disbursement mechanisms under control of legitimately elected officials. 5. Media are regulated in accordance with democratic standards; independent/alternative media are available throughout [Bosnia]. 6. Elections are conducted in accordance with democratic standards, and results are implemented. 7. Free-market reforms (e.g. functioning privatization and banking laws) and an IMF program are in place, with formal barriers to inter-entity commerce eliminated. 8. A phased and orderly minority return process is functioning, with Sarajevo, Mostar, and Banja Luka having accepted significant returns. 9. In Brcko, the multi-ethnic administration functioning and a secure environment for returns is established. 10. The Parties are cooperating with [the International Criminal Tribunal] in the arrest and prosecution of war criminals. Those are the 10.

Mr. LEVIN. What I simply was saying was, for instance, benchmark No. 3, ``An effective judicial reform program is in place.'' I said to the general, ``My heavens, we are not going to be doing that in a matter of years. If it is highly successful, that could take a decade to achieve. But we cannot be there that long. We have to let the Europeans know in some way that we can only be there for a reasonable period of time, and then our ground forces must be removed, because we are stretched thin. We are all over the place, all over the world in many different ways, and our readiness is going to be jeopardized if we continue to have our forces in Bosnia for an unlimited period of time.'' So what General Clark committed to do is to give us, within a matter of months, estimated time lines for achieving these benchmarks. That is what we are awaiting. I think it will be very helpful. I think all of us look forward to his estimates, as to how long would it take for an effective judicial program to be in place. He said he is not going to give us a specific year. Then I said, ``Can you give us a range as to how long it might take?'' He said he will go through this, benchmark by benchmark, in order to give us that range. So I think we are kind of after the same goal here, both making sure our mission is clear--and I just put that in the Record, making sure that our particular military tasks are clear, and I just put those in the Record. But as far as these benchmarks being accomplished, the best we are going to do, I think, is to get the time lines, the estimates on it, and then make the best judgment as to how long the forces can be there while these processes, hopefully, continue. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Several Senators addressed the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN. That means--what it means is, the civilian control over the police, and that the police will operate within the standards which are followed in democratic countries, which means a semblance, presumably, of process for its citizens, avoidance of physical violence against its citizens, and the kind of implementation of the law which democratic countries seek to achieve. I may say to my good friend from West Virginia that it was because these benchmarks, in the judgment of many of us, including me, are not achievable within a reasonable period of time--that this involves too long a period, that this would require some significant restructuring-- that we pressed General Clark, when he was here, for what would be the estimated timeline to achieve those kinds of goals. This is not the military mission, by the way. This is the civil restructuring that mission seeks to support. That was what I just previously read from. The military mission is what I just read from a moment ago. These are the benchmarks which the Dayton implementation, hopefully, will follow and achieve. But I must say, I agree with the Senator from West Virginia--at least as to what I believe he is driving at--that these benchmarks will take a significant period of time. That was the point that I made to General Clark. That is why I pressed him very hard to give us the timeline within which he believes these individual benchmarks could be achieved, because I expressed then, and I will express again: I do not believe these benchmarks can be achieved--that these goals, these civilian goals, can be achieved within years. I think this will take decades, in some instances, to achieve these. So if I could just conclude, and I will be happy to yield further.

Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. LEVIN. We on the committee pressed General Clark to give us some kind of timeline for the accomplishment of those benchmarks, and it is that timeline, for how long will it take to establish each of these benchmarks--to achieve, excuse me, each of these benchmarks that General Clark is referring to and he is going to be sending to the Congress within the next few months. This amendment builds on an amendment to the 1998 supplemental appropriations bill that urged the President to seek concurrence among the NATO members on the benchmarks detailed in that March 3, 1998, report to Congress on estimated target dates for achieving the benchmarks and a process for NATO to review progress toward achieving the benchmarks. It required a report to be submitted, which was submitted semiannually thereafter on such progress. NATO has now adopted those benchmarks and will use those benchmarks as it conducts its own 6-month reviews of the mission and the size of the NATO led stabilization force in Bosnia. Our amendment is designed to keep the pressure on our NATO allies, to continue the process where the United States is able to withdraw our ground combat forces from Bosnia, while our NATO allies and other nations maintain or increase their share of the stabilization forces, total force strength in Bosnia. Again, the amendment does not mandate specific force levels. It does not mandate a specific withdrawal or reduction timetable because we do not believe it would be prudent to do so. Indeed, based on General Clark's testimony and on the letter from General Shelton and Secretary Cohen, we believe it could endanger our forces if we mandated a specific date for withdrawal or reduction. The people who do not want those forces there would then know what our forces would be doing and when, when they would be leaving and in what numbers. And it is not to their safety, it is not to our advantage, it would jeopardize their well-being for us to state legislatively in advance that a certain number of troops are going to be leaving in a certain number of months or years, or to set forth a timetable for the reduction or removal or withdrawal of those ground combat forces. Well, then, how do we keep the pressure on our European allies? How do we let them know we are not there for an indefinite period of time? How do we avoid writing that open-ended commitment or blank check? The answer is set forth in this resolution which attempts to let our allies know that we are not there indefinitely. At the same time, we do not in any way undermine the morale or the safety of our forces. Finally, Mr. President, the NATO-led mission in Bosnia has been very successful. It has been able to carry out its military tasks without a single combat death. The civilian implementation of the Dayton accords has not proceeded as well as the military implementation, but some progress has been made in the last 6 months. The upcoming September election, which will involve virtually every elective office in Bosnia, will be a major event. If things go well, it could lead to a major reduction in the U.S. ground combat presence there. I have been to Bosnia on a number of occasions, as have many of our colleagues. On each of my visits I have been struck by the high morale and the positive attitude of the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces there. They feel, and I surely concur, that they are making a contribution to the maintenance of an enduring peace in Bosnia. Those who work with the Russian forces on joint patrols in the United States sector also feel that they are contributing to a better understanding of, and a closer relationship with, Russia. But we have worldwide commitments, and our forces are stretched thin. We cannot remain in Bosnia indefinitely. This amendment--it is a bipartisan amendment with strong support--serves to pressure our European allies to redouble their efforts to bear more of the burden in Bosnia so that United States ground combat forces can be withdrawn within a reasonable period of time. Finally, I will read from the mission statement that guides our forces, and then I will put the entire statement in the Record. The mission and objectives of the U.S. military forces deployed in and around Bosnia are as follow: SFOR and the U.S. military forces participating in it will continue to deter a resumption of hostilities and provide support for civil implementation in a manner similar to the previous approach of SFOR. So that is the very narrow mission of the military forces--to deter a resumption of hostilities and to provide support for civil implementation in the manner that was adopted by the previous force. The objective of the current mission will be: . . . to consolidate the gains achieved to date while sustaining the current pace of civil implementation. This approach will encourage the implementation process to become progressively more self- sustaining without exceeding SFOR's current level of intensity and involvement. The key military tasks to create that mission have been set forth as follows: Maintaining deterrence of renewed hostilities. Preventing removal of heavy or air defense weapons from cantonments. Maintaining the operation of the joint military commissions. Ensuring force protection, freedom of movement and continued compliance with the cease-fire and Zone of Separation. Monitoring the military components of the Dayton Accords and, if required, enforcing compliance. Controlling the airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovinia. Contributing, within means and capabilities and in a manner similar to the SFOR previous approach, to a secure environment within which civil implementation can continue. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that document setting forth the mission, setting forth the key military tasks, and then setting forth the key supporting tasks be printed in the Record at this time.

Mr. LEVIN. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. LEVIN. There is nothing stated beyond that relative to the mission in this letter. Of course, we have other statements from them as to what their mission is, but this letter does not restate what their mission is.

Mr. LEVIN. I apologize. I started too late in the quote, and I will go back. The letter starts off with the quote that I gave before. We write to express our concerns with any amendment that would legislate a date or schedule for withdrawal or reduction of U.S. forces from the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. Such amendments would make it more difficult to accomplish the mission which has been remarkably successful to date.

Mr. LEVIN. Yes. We will conduct regular reviews of our force posture and progress towards the benchmarks we have established, and we expect further reductions will be possible but----

Mr. LEVIN. I would be happy to yield.