Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment expresses the sense of the Congress on a number of aspects of our presence in Bosnia. First, it says that our forces should not remain in Bosnia indefinitely. We do not simply want to authorize a significant amount of funds without any statement as to the length of time that our forces should remain in Bosnia. As the Senator from Indiana very ably put it, we don't want to set a deadline. We don't want to mandate a certain force structure as of a certain time. We think that would diminish the safety of our forces. We think that would pull the rug out from under our forces. On the other hand, we don't want to write a blank check. We don't want to simply say, here are billions of dollars for our presence in Bosnia, and not continue to make a statement about the necessity within a reasonable period of time to remove our combat forces from Bosnia. So this sense-of-the-Congress amendment is an effort to avoid both the blank check downside but also to avoid setting a mandated date for the removal of those forces. First, I would note, Mr. President, for our colleagues, that the Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shelton, in their letter of May 21 wrote to Senator Thurmond and to me to express their concerns about some of the proposals that were being offered relating to Bosnia. In that letter, they said the following: We write to express our concerns with any amendment that would legislate a date or schedule for withdrawal or reduction of U.S. forces from the NATO-led mission in Bosnia. Such amendments would make it more difficult to accomplish the mission, which has been remarkably successful to date. Later on in that letter, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton said the following: We will conduct regular reviews of our force posture and progress towards the benchmarks we have established, and we expect further reductions will be possible, but that determination is best based on the actual situation on the ground, the military advice of our commanders in the field, and the approval of the NATO military and political authorities, not an arbitrary withdrawal or reduction date determined long in advance.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank our good friend from West Virginia. General Clark appeared on June 4th before the Armed Services Committee, and, of course, General Clark commands our U.S. and NATO forces in Europe, including Bosnia, and we asked him what effect the adoption of a legislatively mandated reduction of U.S. forces in Bosnia would have. And this was part of his response: I would not favor as a military professional a mandated limit because it would, I think, hinder our accomplishment of the mission on the ground. Then he went on: In so doing, I think it could jeopardize force protection. I mean, one of the things that has kept our troops safe, and all of our NATO troops, it has been made very clear to those who might seek to do us harm that it will not be tolerated, that we will take action. We made that very clear personally and in many different statements. So if such a commitment were to be taken by those over there that this was some change in policy, that we were somehow less committed, that it somehow meant that we were not as firm in our resolve, then I would say that could pose a force protection threat. And he went on a little later in his testimony as follows: I hope that we could move through and live with the benchmark approach that we were urged to adopt. We have some pretty specific benchmarks. We will take a look at how long it might take to achieve these. We will try to do all that we can to encourage those who are responsible for them other than SFOR to move as rapidly as possible on this. But they are not, there cannot be deadlines. There are too many intervening factors, and it will just have to be recognized as such. Now, these are the benchmarks that were referred to by General Clark. This perhaps addresses the issue of our good friend from West Virginia. The goal of the military presence-- And now I am quoting from these benchmarks-- is to establish the conditions under which the Dayton implementation can continue without the support of a major NATO-led military force. And at this point the 10 specific benchmarks are set forth. And after those benchmarks are set forth the following statement is made: These benchmarks are concrete and achievable, and their achievement will enable the international community to rely largely on traditional diplomacy, international civil personnel, economic incentives and disincentives, confidence- building measures and negotiation to continue implementing the Dayton Accords over the longer term. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the entire document be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, are we under any time limits?

Mr. LEVIN. I wonder if the Senator will yield to me. Is it not true, I ask the Senator from Connecticut and the Senator from New Hampshire, obviously, as well, that the amendment says the following in paragraph (c)(1) that ``after March 31, 1999, none of the funds''--none of the funds appropriated or authorized here or anywhere else can be used ``to support the continued deployment of United States ground combat forces in Bosnia * * * except for'' withdrawal. Is that not your amendment? I guess since the Senator from Connecticut has the floor, let me ask the Senator from Connecticut, is that not the amendment before you.

Mr. LEVIN. If there is no further debate at this time, I was going to note the absence of a quorum because I do have some things I want to say about the amendment, but I want to get the amendment straightened out.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I take 1 minute because I understand the Senator from Arizona now is here to move to table. This amendment, I believe, is seriously flawed. What it will do is keep our troops nervous and our commanders nervous, because if there is not a vote that occurs on March 31 next year, then no funds can be spent to support our troops. So it really is the worst of all worlds. It attempts to guarantee there will be a vote. Of course, you never can tell what efforts will be made to thwart that. What this amendment says, if there is no vote by a certain date, the funding is cut, the troops must be withdrawn, the troops will not be supported--if there is no vote. That is a ``keep the troops and commanders nervous'' approach. I think it is a terrible mistake. I hope our last vote, which was overwhelming in this body, will be considered the view of this Senate.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Mr. KEMPTHORNE addressed the Chair.

Mr. LEVIN. Would the Senator yield for a unanimous consent for two staffs' presence on the floor?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, on behalf of my colleagues, Senator Bingaman, and Senator Domenici, I ask unanimous consent that the privileges of the floor be granted to Peter Lyons of his office during the pendency of S. 2057 and any votes thereon.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared on this side, Mr. President.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2993 (Purpose: To authorize the President to advance Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., to the grade of general on the retired list of the Air Force)

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2991 (Purpose: To provide for accountability of the Director and Deputy Director of the Naval Home)

Mr. LEVIN. I ask unanimous consent that further reading of this amendment be dispensed with, and that further reading of all the amendments be dispensed with after the enumeration of the number by the clerk.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Wyden and Senator Smith of Oregon, I call up amendment numbered 2796 which would express the sense of the Senate that the State of Oregon should continue to have access to appropriate information and cleanup activities at the Hanford site located in the State of Washington.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2796 (Purpose: To state the sense of the Senate regarding the memoranda of understanding with the State of Oregon relating to Hanford)

Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Harkin, I offer an amendment which would require the Department of Defense to develop a plan to address problems with the Department's inventories of in- transit secondary items.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay it on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2986 (Purpose: To require a plan for addressing problems in Department of Defense management of the department's inventories of in-transit secondary items)

Mr. LEVIN. The amendment has been cleared.

Mr. LEVIN. We will have another full day in order to accomplish that. Amendment No. 2985 (Purpose: To require a report on leasing and other alternative uses of non-excess military property by the military departments)

Mr. LEVIN. I share your enthusiasm and hopefully your optimism, but at least your enthusiasm for completing this.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, this amendment sends the wrong message to every single person in the Defense Department. That message is: Do as I say, not as I do. We are telling the Department of Defense to be more efficient, to adopt better business practices, to do more with less, to go faster in reshaping the military for the threats of the 21st century. We are pushing the DOD to have their inventory maintained more efficiently, to cut acquisition personnel, cut headquarters personnel, cut the number of ships and aircraft and combat troops. But, apparently, the military forces of the future that some colleagues have in mind will cut equipment, people, and supplies, but leave all the empty buildings standing to impress people. This amendment tells our soldiers that despite what we say, our real priority would be to protect our turf back home, instead of protecting the well-being of our future soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Every single top uniformed military and civilian military have told us that the reality is that the money we spend maintaining more bases than we need is money that we can't spend buying our troops the things that they do need. You know, it is one thing not to authorize some more BRAC rounds, and it is something altogether different to make even an alignment that is currently possible without BRAC, to make that more difficult. This amendment takes us in exactly the wrong direction. It will make reductions more difficult than they are now. I happen to support BRAC rounds, but that is not the issue here. The issue here isn't whether we add a round or two rounds of BRAC, as much as that may be necessary in the judgment of some of us; the issue here is whether or not we make it more difficult to realign facilities that are currently realignable without BRAC. This amendment will make it more difficult. If this amendment is adopted, it is either going to kill this bill, or if the President does sign a bill that includes this provision-- which is a very uncertain prospect--it is going to put a very large wrench into the Defense Department's gears and bring the Defense Department's efforts to make its base structure more rational and efficient to a grinding halt. The Secretary and Deputy Secretary are trying to move the Defense Department into the 21st century. This amendment is trying to set the Defense Department in concrete. This is what Secretary Cohen wrote to Chairman Thurmond and me on June 22: Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to express the Department of Defense's strong opposition to an amendment to the fiscal year 1999 Defense Authorization Bill that has been proposed by Senators Inhofe and Dorgan. If enacted, this amendment would further restrict the Department's already limited ability to adjust the size and composition of its base structure. The Department will have views on other provisions in the Authorization Bill as well, but I want to draw your attention to this particular amendment before the Senate completes consideration of your bill. The Department can undertake closures and realignments only after first complying with the requirements of 10 USC 2687. As a practical matter, section 2687 greatly restricts the Department for taking any action to reduce base capacity at installations with more than 300 civilians authorized. The amendment being proposed would extend the application of section 2687 to an even greater number of installations. This proposal would seriously undermine my capacity to manage the Department of Defense. Even after eight years of serious attention to the problem, we still have more infrastructure than we need to support our forces. Operating and maintaining a base structure that is larger than necessary has broad, adverse consequences for our military forces. It diverts resources that are critical to maintaining readiness and funding a robust modernization program. It spreads a limited amount of operation and maintenance funding too thinly across DoD's facilities, degrading the quality of life and operational support on which readiness depends. It prevents us from adapting our infrastructure to keep pace with the operational and technical innovations that are at the cornerstone of our strategy for the 21st century. In short, this amendment would be a step backward that would harm our long-term security by protecting unnecessary infrastructure. I urge you to oppose the Inhofe/Dorgan amendment during floor consideration of the Authorization Bill. Its passage would put the entire bill at risk. Congress has given me the responsibility to organize and manage the Department's operations efficiently. I need to preserve my existing authority to fulfill that responsibility. Mr. President, I think all of us who are on the Armed Services Committee--including my friend who is proposing this amendment--are very sensitive to that question. We want an authorization bill, we want to get an authorization bill to the President, and we want him to sign an authorization bill. The Secretary of Defense is telling us in this letter, in his words, that passage of this amendment would ``put the entire bill at risk.'' There are many ways in which this amendment would make it more difficult for the Defense Department to realign bases that are currently realignable. It does that by changing, reducing the number of civilians at a base that would require notification to Congress, or would require realignment action by a base closing commission. This amendment lowers the threshold for any base with 300 people to a base with 225 civilians. Even though the current definition of 300 captures all of our major installations, this amendment would go deeper. This amendment would make it more difficult for the Secretary of Defense to make the kind of efficiencies that we are demanding everywhere else in the defense budget. So I hope this amendment will be rejected. It is a step in the wrong direction. If we don't have what, in my judgment, is the courage to adopt an additional round or two rounds of BRAC--of Base Closing Commission--with the power to make a recommendation to us and the President, and a certainty that that would be voted on--if we don't have the courage to do that because it will put at risk facilities in each of our States, for heaven's sake, we should not go backwards, dig ourselves into a deeper hole, require lesser efficiencies instead of greater efficiencies. We should not set the Department of Defense in deeper concrete, thicker concrete than it already is in. So I hope that this amendment will be rejected. I thank our colleague, Senator Inhofe, for a number of things. One is his willingness to raise this amendment tonight, even though it means there will be less time tomorrow for us to debate this amendment. His willingness to offer this amendment tonight is very courteous to all of us who are trying to move this bill. I thank him for that courtesy, and many other courtesies which he has extended. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.