Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, there is, I believe, overwhelming bipartisan support for repeal of the recent changes to the 1099 reporting requirement. Small businesses in my State and across the country have told us that the new reporting requirements they face under the Affordable Care Act will create an unnecessary burden that can make already tough times even tougher. I believe there may even be a consensus among our colleagues that we should act, but I strongly oppose one of the methods proposed to address this problem. That method would undermine Congress's role in the constitutional scheme of separation of powers among the branches of government and it would abdicate Congress's responsibility to decide on the spending of taxpayer dollars. We can and we should remove the 1099 burden on small businesses. We can and we should do so without abandoning our role in determining Federal spending. The power of the purse should not be handed to the President, any President. The challenge we face is that repealing the section 1099 provision carries a cost of about $22 billion over 10 years. The mechanism that some support to meet that cost would empower the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to decide by himself which funds we have appropriated but that have not yet been obligated--which of those unobligated funds should be cut to pay the cost of repeal. To some this may be a convenient way to relieve Congress of its responsibility to make difficult choices. To others it may be a convenient way to shift the blame for the painful impact of any cuts from Congress onto the President. But what is convenient is not always right. The Constitution places in our hands and ours alone the authority to appropriate funds. We cannot statutorily pass that buck, and we should not. The Framers of the Constitution consciously and deliberately placed the power of the purse in the hands of the Congress. James Madison described this authority as, ``the most complete and effectual weapon with which any Constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people.'' We do not know what programs the Director of OMB will decide to reduce under the approach that some have proposed, but I do know that what they are proposing is that this would be his decision and his decision alone. What are some areas the OMB Director could unilaterally cut? What is the universe of the potential cuts? Do we care? We surely should, because the implications for our constituents will be significant. Disaster Relief Enhancement Funds were set aside to help States affected by natural disasters in 2008. According to the Appropriations Committee, 13 States received such funding and they all have unobligated balances. Would the Senators from those States turn over to the OMB Director the decision whether to eliminate the unobligated balances affecting their States? I would not. But that is what could happen under the proposal that is going to be considered here later. The Appropriations Committee tells us that the EPA has $624 million in unobligated balances in the Clean Water State Revolving Fund and $343 million in the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund. In addition, there is $388 million unobligated in specific State sewer programs approved by Congress. The two State revolving funds, $967 total, include projects in all 50 of our States. So there is a $1.3 billion target that could affect sewer and drinking water infrastructure in every one of our States. We appropriated those funds and if they are going to be cut, then we should do the cutting and not hand that power over to the executive branch, to the President's OMB Director. According to our Appropriations Committee, the Department of Justice had a total of $1.25 billion in unobligated funds as of November 30 last year. It is probably lower now, but what is it? What programs are part of it? Do we know? Do we care? We surely should. Will the OMB Director decide to cut funding for U.S. Attorneys' investigations and prosecutions? What about U.S. Marshals, who provide security to our courthouses? Will the OMB Director decide to reduce funding for Project Gunrunner, which is focused on firearms enforcement along the Southwest border? NASA had a total unobligated balance of $155 million as of the end of January. About $10 million of that is for Constellation, the follow-on manned space vehicle to the shuttle. According to the Appropriations Committee, in recent years spending for the Women, Infants and Children Program, the WIC Program, has totaled more than $6 billion. Is the OMB Director going to decide to cut unobligated balances in the WIC Program? He could do so if we adopt the approach that is going to be before us after the vote on our amendment. I might agree to some of these cuts in a larger package but I would surely want to know what is in the whole package so we can adopt some priorities. I favor the repeal of the 1099 reporting requirement and I favor paying the cost of repeal, whether through spending reductions or closing tax loopholes. But I strongly oppose paying for the repeal by abdicating our power of the purse, the power we have under the Constitution. We cannot and we should not abdicate this to the executive branch to unilaterally make spending cuts to programs we have previously enacted. The provisions we are going to debate today but hopefully not adopt must also be understood in a larger context, one that foresees the difficult decisions ahead on how we will return to fiscal discipline. There are many, perhaps even some in this Chamber, who believe that we in the Senate and here in the Congress are incapable of making these decisions. They point out there are only two ways of lowering the deficit, reducing spending or increasing taxes, and that neither of these is popular with our constituents. They argue we will prove unable to muster the political courage to make decisions that we know will be unpopular, and there is some truth in those sentiments. Restoring fiscal balance will be painful and we are in the fiscal hole we are in because spending is popular and so are tax cuts, and we have provided plenty of both. It would certainly be easier for all of us if we could hand somebody else the authority to decide how to remedy the excesses of the past. But we cannot and should not run from this responsibility. Justice Kennedy once put it this way: ``Failure of political will does not justify unconstitutional remedies.'' He added: ``The Constitution is a compact, enduring for more than our time, and one Congress cannot yield up its own powers. . . . Abdication of responsibility,'' he said, ``is not part of the constitutional design.'' We must not run from painful decisions. Difficult or not, only the Congress can decide how to pay for repeal of these reporting requirements. And difficult or not, only Congress can decide the larger issue of how to bring our spending in line with our revenues. If we cannot today exercise our responsibility on the finding of $22 billion to pay for the repeal of these reporting requirements, how can we expect to tackle the much larger budget deficit we face? There is an alternative amendment which we are offering today. I, along with Senator Inouye and others, am proposing today an amendment which will make specific decisions on spending cuts and revenue increases to account for the cost of repealing this provision. We would reform unjustified tax expenditures related to oil and gas production by large oil companies, companies that are enormously profitable with or without these tax expenditures. Our amendment will reform a loophole that provides tax credits to filers who pay taxes both in the United States and in foreign countries, and our amendment will eliminate some unintended loopholes used to avoid clearly intended rules on gift tax exemptions. If there are better alternatives than the ones we are proposing, fine. Let's consider them. But what we cannot support is the abdication of our responsibility to make these decisions. It was the will and the wisdom of the Framers of the Constitution to give us that responsibility and I urge our colleagues not to shrink from it but to exercise it. I will yield the floor but first I call up our amendment and ask for its consideration.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I have just spoken on this. I ask unanimous consent that we be allowed to yield back the time on both sides.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation that is an important step for the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing by continuing the nurturing of the market for the next generation of electric vehicles. This bill will continue the availability of the $7,500 consumer tax credit for plug-in hybrid vehicles. Current law limits the availability of this plug-in hybrid tax credit to the first 200,000 vehicles per manufacturer, which is too small to support the revolutionary technological change that we are hopefully going to witness. Failure to provide this support risks falling short of President Obama's important goal of putting 1 million electric vehicles on the road by 2015. The U.S. auto industry is poised for a technological explosion that promises to fundamentally change transportation here and around the world. Already, the success of GM's Volt has demonstrated that electric vehicles are not just an engineer's dream or a science fiction story. They are real, and there is plenty more innovation ready to be unleashed. But like almost every transformational technology, from the great railroads to the Internet, this technological revolution needs support if it is to spread. President Obama last week laid out a vision of how this kind of technology can help ensure our economic future. With the proper support, we can transform transportation and create new jobs for American workers. But if we fail to support this revolution, we risk missing an opportunity that we may never get back. If we do not get it right, there is no doubt that other countries will--and their workers-- in China, India, South Korea and elsewhere--will then build these vehicles instead of American workers. So I am pleased today to be introducing this bill that is identical to one that my brother Sandy Levin introduced last week in the House of Representatives. This legislation will increase the cap on the number of vehicles eligible for the plug-in hybrid tax credit in current law and provide much greater certainty to our manufacturers. It says to our manufacturers that we will support technology of great potential and it says to consumers we will continue to help make these vehicles more available and affordable. This change in law will make a difference immediately, and it is an important signal of future support for the transformation of our transportation sector. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation that is an important step for the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing by continuing the nurturing of the market for the next generation of electric vehicles. This bill will continue the availability of the $7,500 consumer tax credit for plug-in hybrid vehicles. Current law limits the availability of this plug-in hybrid tax credit to the first 200,000 vehicles per manufacturer, which is too small to support the revolutionary technological change that we are hopefully going to witness. Failure to provide this support risks falling short of President Obama's important goal of putting 1 million electric vehicles on the road by 2015. The U.S. auto industry is poised for a technological explosion that promises to fundamentally change transportation here and around the world. Already, the success of GM's Volt has demonstrated that electric vehicles are not just an engineer's dream or a science fiction story. They are real, and there is plenty more innovation ready to be unleashed. But like almost every transformational technology, from the great railroads to the Internet, this technological revolution needs support if it is to spread. President Obama last week laid out a vision of how this kind of technology can help ensure our economic future. With the proper support, we can transform transportation and create new jobs for American workers. But if we fail to support this revolution, we risk missing an opportunity that we may never get back. If we do not get it right, there is no doubt that other countries will--and their workers-- in China, India, South Korea and elsewhere--will then build these vehicles instead of American workers. So I am pleased today to be introducing this bill that is identical to one that my brother Sandy Levin introduced last week in the House of Representatives. This legislation will increase the cap on the number of vehicles eligible for the plug-in hybrid tax credit in current law and provide much greater certainty to our manufacturers. It says to our manufacturers that we will support technology of great potential and it says to consumers we will continue to help make these vehicles more available and affordable. This change in law will make a difference immediately, and it is an important signal of future support for the transformation of our transportation sector. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I wanted to take a moment to commend and thank several of my colleagues for their work to end the abuses of the Senate rules. Senators Schumer, Harkin, Merkley, Udall of New Mexico, Udall of Colorado, and many others dedicated time and effort to this cause. Without their effort, the Senate would not be voting on these resolutions today. I want to briefly outline my views on the five measures we will vote on shortly. While I believe there are superior ways to end the use of the secret hold, I intend to support the Wyden-McCaskill-Grassley resolution. I oppose the use of the secret hold, which is a notice by an anonymous Senator of his or her intention to object to proceeding to a measure or matter. Under current Senate practice, a Senator can place a hold on a measure or matter by notifying the Senate leadership of his or her intention to object. Such a notice does not prevent Senate leadership from moving to a particular measure or matter. The problem is that the threat of a filibuster of the motion to proceed is allowed. It should not be. But if Senators threaten to filibuster, that should be made public so they should have to openly defend their threat. Nowhere in the Standing Rules of the Senate is there any mention of a hold. The hold, secret or otherwise, ends when the leader moves to proceed. I believe the most effective way to end secret holds would be to amend the rules to simply say: ``No Senator may object on behalf of another Senator without disclosing the name of that Senator.'' But the Wyden proposal is useful nonetheless. The resolution by the Senator of Colorado, Mr. Udall, would establish a non-debatable motion to waive the reading aloud of an amendment if that amendment has been filed at least 72 hours before the motion and is printed in the Record. I support the resolution which is designed to end an abuse of the rules where Senators force or threaten to force the reading aloud of amendments, not to advance their position, but only to delay and prevent debate. The Harkin resolution would permit a decreasing majority of Senators to invoke cloture. I believe the Harkin resolution goes too far in weakening the fundamental minority rights. The Harkin resolution would allow limited germane amendments during postcloture consideration of a measure, but in my opinion the germane standard is too technical and restrictive. The Harkin resolution would deny the minority the right to offer relevant amendments and therefore I will vote against it. The substitute amendment to S. Res. 10 offered by Senator Tom Udall, Senator Harkin, Senator Merkley and others makes important improvements to a measure designed to end abuses of the rules that have prevented the Senate from doing its work in recent Congresses. I support most of the provisions in this resolution. I support ending filibusters on motions to proceed; I support limiting postcloture consideration of nominations; and, I support the elimination of secret holds in the manner prescribed in this resolution. Those meritorious provisions would go a long way towards ending current abuses of the Senate rules. Those improvements to Senate procedure offset my concern with the extended debate provision. I will address this point in more detail when discussing the Senator from Oregon's provision. In spite of my concerns with the extended debate provision, I believe this resolution would end many of the common abuses of the rules and deserves support. Senator Merkley has put together a thoughtful proposal to address the abuses of the rules in recent Congresses where a few Senators with too little effort have prevented the Senate from doing its work. However, it does not protect the minority adequately. Under the provisions of his resolution, a simple majority could offer a bill, fill the amendment tree, and file cloture on the bill. If there are more than 50 but fewer than 60 votes to invoke cloture--that is, if cloture is not invoked--once the minority is eventually exhausted, the Senate would proceed to a simple majority vote on the bill without the minority having the opportunity to offer amendments. Because the Merkley resolution does not protect the right to offer amendments, under the rules of the Senate the minority could be precluded from offering amendments. I am concerned that the Merkley resolution, which is designed to end abuses of the minority, could thereby become a tool of abuse by the majority. Under the current practices and procedures of the Senate, I believe there is too much protection for the minority. However, before the rules are changed for ending debate, sufficient protections in the rules must be provided to the minority to offer relevant amendments. I do not believe this resolution provides those protections and I, therefore, will vote against it. Madam President, I yield the floor.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I want to add my voice to the many others heaping deserved praise onto Senator Barbara Mikulski, who sets a record today as the longest serving woman in the history of the U.S. Senate. Tough but compassionate, an effective advocate for Maryland and for the national interest, Senator Mikulski has achieved more than just longevity. She has been an energetic and effective advocate for the interests of children, a staunch ally of seniors, a defender of services for our veterans, and a supporter of efforts to involve all Americans in solving our Nation's problems through service and voluntarism. Her support of education and scientific research promises benefits that will last long after we all have departed the Senate. I have been a proud partner with her on making commonsense changes to our Nation's immigration system. She also has been a strong advocate for Federal programs that promote manufacturing, such as the Commerce Department's Manufacturing Extension Program and the Technology Innovation Program. Senator Mikulski is rightly seen as a mentor and leader of women who come to the Senate. The successes of the many female Senators who have been the beneficiaries of her guidance stand as a testament to the power of her example. Senator Mikulski has admirably brought the lessons of her early career as a social worker to her work in the Senate, understanding that real families with real problems are looking to us for solutions. The people of Maryland and of this Nation are fortunate to have the benefit of her service. I am proud to call her a colleague and a friend. I congratulate her on her accomplishment and I await the many more achievements I know are to come.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, today the Senate will resume consideration of the New START treaty. Yesterday, cloture was invoked on the treaty, which limits debate to 30 hours. He hopes some of the postcloture debate time can be yielded back so we can complete action on it early this afternoon. In addition to the treaty, the majority leader would like the Senate to consider the Department of Defense authorization bill, the 9/11 health legislation for first responders, and a number of executive nominations, including that of James Cole to be Deputy Attorney General, before we leave for the holidays. Senators will be notified when any votes are scheduled.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, in legislative session and in morning business, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 717, H.R. 6523, the Department of Defense authorization bill, that a Levin-McCain amendment that is at the desk be agreed to, the bill, as amended, be read the third time and passed, the motions to reconsider be laid upon the table, with no intervening action or debate, and that any statements related to the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. The Senator from Arizona is correct. It is the bill-- slightly reduced to eliminate some of the controversial provisions, which would have prevented us from getting to this point, but this is the Defense authorization bill, and 90 to 95 percent of the bill is the bill we worked so hard on in committee on a bipartisan basis. I am very certain that our men and women in uniform, as this Christmas season comes upon us, will be very grateful indeed that we did this in the 49th year--and if the House will move swiftly today and pass this bill, as we have done in the previous 48 years--passed an authorization bill--which is so essential to their success.

Mr. LEVIN. I am prepared to direct staff immediately to initiate an investigation into the release of proprietary data to determine if laws and fair competition regulations have been appropriately followed. I also intend to hold one or more hearings by February 1 to consider these issues and to review the propriety of the procurement process of the KC-X tanker competition as it relates to this issue. Pay For Nonregular Service

Mr. LEVIN. I appreciate the Senator from Arkansas bringing this issue to my attention, and I will work with him next year to find a resolution.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the proud tradition our committee has maintained every year since 1961 continues with the Senate's passage of this, the 49th consecutive national defense authorization bill. We always have to work long and hard to pass this bill, but it is worth every bit of the effort we put into it because it is for our troops and their families as well as, obviously, our Nation. I thank all Senators for their roles in keeping this tradition going. Our bipartisanship on this committee makes this moment, as late as it is, possible. I am proud to serve with Senator McCain and am grateful for his partnership. I thank all our committee staff members. With their extraordinary drive and many personal sacrifices to get this bill done--and we had to get it done twice because we had to modify the bill that was originally presented to the Senate, as everybody here knows. Our staff has given another meaning to this season of giving. Led by Rick DeBobes, our committee's staff director, and Joe Bowab, our Republican staff director, they have given everything imaginable, and some things unimaginable, to get this bill passed. So we thank all of them. I ask that, as a tribute to the professionalism of our staff, and our gratitude, their names be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, on April 8, 2009, President Obama and President Medvedev concluded negotiations, which had begun under President Bush, and signed the New START treaty. This new treaty is a key part of the reset of the U.S.-Russian relationship. Even though the Cold War ended 20 years ago, this relationship has been unclear; Russia is not an adversary but neither is it an ally. There have been divides and disagreements even though we share many common goals and interests. President Obama is rightly intent on moving the relationship in a more positive direction. Ratification of the New START treaty is an important part of this process. On May 13 of this year, President Obama submitted the New START treaty to the Senate. In carrying out its responsibility the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Service Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence held a total of 20 hearings and 4 briefings. Seven hearings and three briefings were held by the Armed Services Committee. Even before the new treaty was submitted to the Senate, the Department of State provided the Senate National Security Working Group multiple briefings on the status of and issues discussed during negotiations. It is now time for the Senate to provide its consent to ratification. As Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said about the START treaty on December 12, ``this is a national security issue of great significance and the sooner we get it done the better.'' The Director of National Intelligence is also eager to get this treaty finished and restore the insight into Russian nuclear forces that this treaty will provide and that is so important for the intelligence community. Director Clapper said, ``the sooner, the better. From an intelligence perspective, we are better off with the Treaty than without it.'' Retired General Brent Scowcroft, the National Security Adviser for both Presidents Gerald Ford and George H.W. Bush, and a supporter of the Treaty, said, ``to play politics with what is the fundamental national interest is pretty scary stuff.'' Some have suggested that this new treaty should not be taken up in this lameduck session of the 111th Congress. I couldn't disagree more. Almost as soon as this session of Congress began, the President announced his intent to complete negotiations on the new strategic arms agreement to replace the START I treaty. Various Senate committees of this Congress and the Senate National Security Working Group of this Congress were briefed on numerous occasions by the negotiating team on the new treaty. This Congress got the updates on the progress and the issues and this Congress provided guidance along the way. The committees of this Congress held 20 hearings and briefings on this new treaty. This Congress hosted several all-Member briefings including one such session with the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, to get his views on the importance of the treaty. The next Congress will not have the benefit of all that work and insight. It is in fact the obligation and the duty of this Congress to take up this treaty. When President Obama submitted the START treaty to the Senate for consideration he made six key points. The treaty will enhance the national security of the United States. The treaty mandates mutual reductions and limitations on the world's two largest nuclear arsenals. The treaty will promote transparency and predictability in the future strategic relationships of Russia and the United States. The treaty will enable each party to the treaty to verify that the other party is complying with its obligations through a regime of onsite inspections, notifications, comprehensive and continuing data exchanges, and provisions for unimpeded use of national technical means. The treaty includes detailed procedures for elimination or conversion of treaty accountable items, and The treaty provides for the exchange of certain telemetric information on ballistic missile launches. Equally important to this discussion is what the START treaty does not cover. It does not limit U.S. missile defense plans and programs. It does not limit U.S. conventional prompt global strike programs. It does not provide authority within the treaty to modify the terms and conditions of the treaty without the advice and consent of the Senate. It does not constrain in any way the ability of the United States to modernize the nuclear weapons complex, modernize, maintain, or replace strategic delivery systems, or the ability to ensure that the stockpile of U.S. nuclear weapons remains safe, secure, and reliable. It also does not cover nonstrategic nuclear weapons--often referred to as tactical nuclear weapons. The START treaty covers, as have all previous nuclear arms reduction treaties, strategic offensive nuclear arms. Dealing with tactical nuclear weapons is certainly an area of arms control that needs to be addressed but has proved elusive to previous administrations, Democratic and Republican. It remains to be addressed. The START III treaty was to have covered these weapons but when the START II treaty, which was signed by President George H.W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1993, was not ratified, any hope of addressing tactical nuclear weapons in a START III treaty died along with the START II treaty. 17 years later President Obama is trying to get nuclear arms reductions back on track, by resuming discussions with Russia and signing the START treaty. Hopefully, entry into force of this START treaty will allow the United States and Russia to discuss an agreement on tactical nuclear weapons. While getting an agreement to limit tactical nuclear weapons will be very difficult, without ratification of the New START treaty, it will be impossible. Because this treaty does not require any significant reductions in either U.S. nuclear weapons or delivery systems, it is a fairly modest treaty. The so-called Moscow Treaty, which was signed in 2002 by President George W. Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, limited both Russia and the United States to a range of operationally deployed nuclear warheads by the year 2012. Under the Moscow Treaty, each side could have between 1700 and 2200 total operationally deployed nuclear weapons. Russia has already met this goal and the United States is very close. Under the START treaty, each side will have no more than 1550 deployed nuclear weapons, a reduction of just 150 weapons below the Moscow Treaty. The START treaty does not limit the number of nondeployed nuclear weapons, an issue of importance to the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, GEN. Kevin Chilton. The limits in this treaty were agreed to after careful analysis by U.S. military leadership, particularly GEN Kevin Chilton, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command and the man responsible for these strategic systems. At a hearing before the Armed Services Committee on July 20, 2010, GEN Chilton stated that the force levels in the treaty meet the current guidance for deterrence for the United States. That guidance was laid out by President George W. Bush The options we provided in this process focused on ensuring America's ability to continue to deter potential adversaries, assure our allies, and sustain strategic stability for as long as nuclear weapons exist. This rigorous approach, rooted in deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary capabilities, supports both the agreed-upon limits in New START and recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The strategic deployed forces allowed under the treaty will ensure the retention of the nuclear triad--all three delivery legs of the triad, bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs. On that point GEN Chilton was very clear, saying ``We will retain a triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems.'' Secretary of Defense Gates has also been very clear that the nuclear triad will be maintained. In an op-ed in May in the Wall Street Journal, Secretary Gates said the New START treaty ``preserves the U.S. nuclear arsenal as a vital pillar of our nation's and our allies' security posture. Under this treaty the U.S. will maintain our powerful nuclear triad . . . and we retain the ability to change our force mix as we see fit.'' Some have said that the United States will have to make significant reductions to reach the force levels under the treaty and that the Russians will have to make no reductions. According to GEN Chilton this argument is a distraction. At an Armed Services Committee hearing GEN Chilton commented on the lower level of Russian forces and said: New START limits the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads that can target the United States, missiles that pose the most prompt threat to our forces and our nation. Regardless of whether Russia would have kept its missile force levels within those limits without a New START Treaty, upon ratification they would now be required to do so. While the START treaty will also not require significant reductions in the number of U.S. strategic delivery systems, there will be some reductions but not for 7 years. More importantly the START treaty will provide certainty for both Russia and the United States as to the size of the deployed nuclear force of the other. This is particularly important to the United States because Russia is now below the proposed delivery system limits of the START treaty, but has plans to build the number of strategic delivery systems. It is very much in the interest of the United States to have a cap on that build-up. An unrestrained build up would quickly bring back the ghosts and burdensome costs of the Cold War. Under this new treaty, Russia and the United States will each have a total of 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, and 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. The treaty does not limit nondeployed nuclear warheads, nondeployed ICBMs, nondeployed SLBMs, or heavy bombers that are not equipped for nuclear armaments. This is particularly important for the B-1B bomber fleet, as those airframes have not been in nuclear service for many years and will not be counted under the START treaty when simple modifications are completed. This START treaty brings a practical approach to strategic systems and counts real delivery systems and real warheads. Over the years, the old START I treaty had resulted in exaggerated nuclear force numbers. For instance, under the old START I treaty, the four Ohio class submarines that have been converted to conventional use, were still counted as 96 deployed SLBMs and 768 deployed nuclear warheads. These exaggerated force structure levels have led to uncertainties for military planners and increased costs for the United States. Under this treaty they will not be counted. One of the additional benefits of this START treaty is that the treaty provides a clear mechanism to remove systems from being counted under the treaty. The ability to clearly and easily remove systems, such as heavy bombers from under the treaty, is also of great importance to General Chilton, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. For example the United States currently has 76 B-52 bombers and 18 B- 2 bombers, a total of 94 nuclear capable bombers. Under the current plan for implementing the treaty there will be up to 60 nuclear capable bombers. The remaining 34 can be converted to conventional only capability and will no longer count under the treaty. They do not have to be destroyed. I think this fact is often misunderstood and there may be an impression that the 34 bombers will have to be destroyed under the treaty. That is not the case. This past May, Secretary of Defense Gates wrote an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal. Drawing on his long history and involvement with strategic arms control agreements, which dates back to 1970, Secretary Gates said that the question is always the same for each treaty: ``Is the United States better off with an agreement or without it?'' With respect to the START Treaty Secretary Gates' answer to the question is unequivocal: ``The United States is far better off with this Treaty than without it.'' That is also the issue now before the Senate. Is the United States better off with this START treaty? The 20 hearings and 4 briefings have clearly demonstrated that it is. In that same op-ed, Secretary Gates emphasized the current state of affairs that has existed since the end of December 2009 when the START I treaty expired. Since that time, there has been no verification and inspection regime, no visibility into the Russian strategic programs, and no limits on delivery vehicles. As the Secretary said: Since the expiration of the old START Treaty in December 2009, the U.S. has had none of these safeguards. The new treaty will put them back in place, strengthen many of them, and create a verification regime that will provide for greater transparency and predictability between our two countries, to include substantial visibility into the development of Russian nuclear forces. This rigorous inspection and verification regime, which when coupled with our national technical means, will allow this treaty to be monitored and verified. Nevertheless there has been an argument made that Russia cheated on the START I treaty and therefore we shouldn't ratify the new treaty. According to the State Department that is simply not the case. In testimony before the Armed Services Committee in July, Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller said, regarding the State Department's 2010 Treaty Compliance Report: I want to point out that Russia was in compliance with START's central limits during the Treaty's life span. Moreover, the majority of compliance issues raised under START were satisfactorily resolved. Most reflected differing interpretations on how to implement START's complex inspection and verification regime. The old START I treaty was a complicated and complex treaty, many of the lessons learned from the inspections during the course of that treaty have been incorporated into the new treaty. There were issues on both sides. According to the 2010 Treaty Compliance Report: The United States stated on several occasions to our Treaty partners that the United States was compliant with the Treaty; however as might be expected under a verification regime as complex as START, the United States and Russia developed a difference of views with regard to how the sides implemented certain Treaty requirements. This is not the same as cheating. Our senior military leaders believe the new treaty can be monitored and verified and that if Russia did cheat there is high confidence that any cheating could be detected before such cheating rose to a level of military significance. General Chilton said during testimony before the Armed Services Committee, ``New START will reestablish a strategic nuclear arms control verification regime that provides access to Russian nuclear forces and a measure of predictability in Russian force deployments over the life of the treaty.'' In a discussion on the ability to detect cheating I asked General Chilton, ``In other words, the verification provisions give you confidence that Russia cannot achieve a militarily significant advantage undetected?'' General Chilton said: ``Yes, that's correct.'' Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, in her July testimony before the Armed Services Committee, made it clear that any cheating could be detected before it became militarily significant. She also believes that the United States is well positioned to deter cheating as well. In that regard she said: Deterrence of cheating is a key part of the assessment of verifiability, and is strongest when the probability of detecting significant violations is high, the benefits to cheating are low, and the potential costs are high. We assess that this is the case for Russia cheating under the New START Treaty. One of the areas on which we have had substantial discussion is missile defense. The U.S. missile defense program isn't covered or limited by the New START treaty. It--the missile defense program--has nevertheless become a major focus of the debate on the treaty. Our missile defense programs and policies are based on developing and fielding the missile defense capabilities we need to meet the missile threats we face, not on any of these treaty matters. The New START treaty does not limit the missile defense capabilities we need. Secretary of Defense Gates, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee on June 17, said: The Treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses. I remain confident in the U.S. missile defense program, which has made considerable advancements, including the testing and development of the SM-3 missile, which we will deploy in Europe. Secretary of State Clinton, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee on June 17 said: This Treaty does not constrain our missile defense efforts. I want to underscore this because I know there have been a lot of concerns about it and I anticipate a lot of questions. During that same hearing Secretary Clinton went on to say: The Treaty's preamble does include language acknowledging the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces, but that's simply a statement of fact. It too does not in any way constrain our missile defense programs. In a July 20 hearing before the Armed Services Committee, GEN Kevin Chilton, the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command said: As the combatant command(er) also responsible for synchronizing global missile defense plans, operations, and advocacy, I can say with confidence that this treaty does not constrain any current or future missile defense plans. Assistant Secretary of State, Rose Gottemoeller, the lead negotiator of the Treaty, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations hearing on June 10, said: The Treaty does not constrain our current or planned missile defense and, in fact, contains no meaningful restrictions on missile defenses of any kind. Later, on July 29, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee, Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller said: There were no--and I repeat--no secret deals made in connection with the New START Treaty, not on missile defense nor on any other issue. As the Ballistic Missile Defense Review report made clear, the administration is pursuing a variety of systems and capabilities to defend the homeland and different regions of the world against missile threats from nations such as North Korea and Iran. A good example of that is the phased adaptive approach to missile defense in Europe. The Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended it unanimously. It is strongly supported by our NATO allies. The November 20, NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration says that ``the United States European Phased Adaptive Approach is welcomed as a valuable national contribution to the NATO missile defense architecture.'' During the NATO Lisbon Summit NATO announced its own decision to build a missile defense system to protect European populations and territory against missile attack, consistent with the phased adaptive approach. The phased adaptive approach is designed to provide effective missile defense capabilities in a timely manner against existing or emerging Iranian missile threats. Those are the missile threats faced by our military personnel, allies, and partners in Europe. As the Secretary of Defense and numerous other officials have made clear, the treaty does not limit our missile defense plans or programs. The Armed Services Committee also knows that, and our authorization bill stated that fact. Section 221(b)(8) of the Ike Skelton national Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 2011 that we passed this morning in the Senate states, ``there are no constraints contained in the New START Treaty on the development or deployment of effective missile defenses, including all phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe and further enhancements to the Ground- based Midcourse Defense system, as well as future missile defenses.'' To be very clear there is one provision in the treaty that prohibits each side from using ICBM silos or SLBM launchers for missile defense interceptors, and vice versa. But using these silos and launchers are not in our missile defense plan and should not be in our plan because it would be very much against our interest to use strategic missile interceptor silos for ballistic defense purposes. It would be more expensive than building new silos, the strategic missile silos aren't in the right locations to defend against missiles from North Korea, and most importantly, it would be destabilizing to launch ballistic missile interceptors from ICBM silos or SLBM launchers. Lieutenant General O'Reilly, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, has made clear, we don't want, need, or plan to use such silos for missile defense purposes. In a June 16 hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Lieutenant General O'Reilly made it very clear saying ``replacing ICBMs with ground-based interceptors or adapting the submarine-launched ballistic missiles to be an interceptor would actually be a setback--a major setback--to the development of our missile defenses.'' That one limitation has no impact on our plans for missile defense, plans that are more effective and less expensive than converting ICBM or SLBM silos to missile defense use. There is one other area of the many that have been discussed in connection with the START treaty that I would like to raise, and that is modernization of the nuclear weapons complex and maintaining the ability to certify annually that our stockpile remains safe, secure and reliable. Shortly before Congress instituted a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing in the early 1990s, the United States established a stockpile stewardship program to design and build advanced scientific, experimental, and computational capabilities to enable the annual certification process for the nuclear weapons. This program has been very successful. Beginning in 2005, however, support for the program started to wane and the budgets for nuclear activities started to go down. Without enough money the weapons complex was forced to have layoffs at the nuclear weapons laboratories and the production facilities, to defer maintenance on many important buildings and facilities, to delay key acquisitions, and to delay design and construction of the last two major new production facilities. President Obama, in his fiscal year 2011 budget request and in the plans for the future years, has turned this situation around by providing $4.1 billion more over the next five years than previously planned. This level of funding is unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. President Obama laid out his funding plan for the nuclear enterprise in the November Section 1251 report, a report that would provide an additional $1.2 billion over 2 years, a 15 percent increase and a total of $41.6 billion for fiscal years 2012-2016 for the National Nuclear Security Administration. With these amounts has the administration committed enough to modernization and sustainment of the complex and the life extension programs for the nuclear stockpile? The directors of three nuclear weapons laboratories all say yes. In a joint December 1, 2010, letter to Senators Kerry and Lugar, the three Directors of the nuclear weapons laboratories said that the finding level proposed in the section 1251 report `` would enable the laboratories to execute our requirements for ensuring a safe, secure, reliable, and effective stockpile under the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.'' The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, under both President George W. Bush and President Obama, Tom D'Agostino, said, in testimony before the Armed Services Committee in July: Our plans for investment in and modernization of the Nuclear Security Enterprise--the collection of NNSA laboratories, production sites, and experimental facilities that support our stockpile stewardship program, our nuclear nonproliferation agenda, our Naval nuclear propulsion programs, and a host of other nuclear security missions--are essential irrespective of whether or not New START is ratified. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee took the right approach on this issue in its resolution of ratification by not making entry into force contingent on a certain funding level, but by including a sense of the Senate that the United States is committed to a robust stockpile stewardship program. The list of both Republican and Democratic supporters of this Treaty is broad and strongly bipartisan, including eight former Secretaries of State--Madeleine Albright, Warren Christopher, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger, George Schultz, Henry Kissinger--four former Secretaries of Defense--Harold Brown, Frank Carlucci, Bill Cohen, Bill Perry, and Jim Schlesinger--seven former commanders of the U.S. Strategic Command, President George H.W. Bush, President Clinton and a long list of national security experts. Our NATO allies support this treaty and have urged us to ratify it without delay. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rassmussen said at the NATO summit in Lisbon in November: A ratification of the START Treaty will contribute strongly to an improvement of the overall security environment in the Euro-Atlantic area, and all members of the NATO-Russia Council share the view that an early ratification of the START Treaty would be to the benefit of security in the Euro- Atlantic area. I'd also have to say that it is a matter of concern that a delayed ratification of the START Treaty will be damaging to the overall security environment in Europe. So we strongly urge both parties to ratify the START Treaty as early as possible. I believe that the Senate should consent to ratification of the New START treaty and that ratification of this treaty is in the national security interest of the United States. Ratification of the New START treaty will provide predictability, confidence, transparency and stability in the United States-Russian relationship. The New START treaty will make us safer today, and leave a safer world for our children and grandchildren. The Senate should ratify the New START treaty now.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until 9 a.m., on Wednesday, December 22; that following the prayer and pledge, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed expired, the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day; that following any leader remarks, the Senate proceed to executive session and resume consideration of the New START treaty; and finally, I ask that the time during adjournment or period of morning business count postcloture.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, cloture was invoked on the New START treaty today. We hope we will be able to reach an agreement to yield back some of the postcloture debate time. We will also continue to work on an agreement to consider the 9/11 health legislation and a number of other executive nominations. We also would hope that we can complete work on the Defense authorization bill tomorrow morning as well, early in the day, hopefully, right around 9 o'clock. Senators will be notified when any votes are scheduled.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that it adjourn under the previous order.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I understand the UC has us voting at 2 o'clock; is that correct?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I support the continuing resolution. One of the many reasons is that the Navy's urgent request for authority for the littoral combat ship, (LCS),--program is included. The original LCS acquisition plan in 2005 would have had the Navy buying both types of LCS vessels for some time while the Navy evaluated the capabilities of each vessel. At some time in the future, the Navy would have had the option to down select to building one type of vessel. But in any case, the Navy would have been operating some number of each type of LCS vessel in the fleet, which means that the Navy would have been dealing with two shipyards, two supply chains, two training pipelines, etc. Last year, after the bids came in too high, the Navy decided upon a winner-take-all acquisition strategy to procure the fiscal year 2010 vessels under a fixed-price contract, with fixed- price options for two ships per year for the next 4 years. This revised strategy included obtaining the data rights for the winning ship design and competing for a second source for the winning design starting in fiscal year 2012. Again, the Navy made this course correction because the Navy leadership determined that the original acquisition strategy was unaffordable. Earlier this year, the Navy released the solicitation under that revised strategy and has been in discussion with the two contractor teams and evaluating those proposals since that time. The bids came in, the competition worked, and the prices were lower than the Navy had expected. Both teams have made offers that are much more attractive than had been expected, and both are priced well below the original, noncompetitive offers. The Navy has now requested that we approve a different LCS acquisition strategy, taking advantage of the low bids and keeping the industrial base strong. The Armed Services Committee held a hearing on the subject of the change in the Navy's acquisition strategy. We heard testimony from the Navy that, after having reviewed the bids from the two contractor teams, they should change their LCS acquisition strategy. The Navy testified that continuing the winner-take-all down select would save roughly $1.9 billion, compared with what had been budgeted for the LCS program in the Future-Years Defense Program, or FYDP. The Navy further testified that revising the acquisition strategy to accept the offers from both LCS contractor teams, rather than down selecting to one design and starting a second source building the winning design, would save $2.9 billion, or $1 billion more than the program of record, and would allow the Navy to purchase an additional LCS vessel during the same period of the FYDP--20 ships rather than 19 ships. The Navy also testified that additional operation and support costs for maintaining two separate designs in the fleet for their service life over 40 to 50 years, using net present value calculations, would be much less than the additional saving that could be achieved through buying both the ships during the FYDP period--approximately $250 million of additional operating and support costs vs. approximately $900 million in savings. Those are the facts of the case as we heard from the Navy. Let me relay a few quotes from the Navy witnesses at the hearing to amplify on these points. Secretary of the Navy Raymond E. Mabus, Jr., referring the authority to revise the acquisition strategy, said the following: This authority, which I emphasize, requires no additional funding, will enable us to purchase more high-quality ships for less money and get them into service in less time. It will help preserve jobs in our industrial shipbuilding base and will create new employment opportunities in an economic sector that is critical to our Nation's military and economic security. ADM Gary Roughead, the Chief of Naval Operations, said: The dual award also allows us to reduce costs by further locking in a price for 20 ships, enabling us to acquire LCS at a significant savings to American taxpayers and permitting the use of shipbuilding funds for other shipbuilding programs. From a broad policy perspective, I believe that the Navy approach of a competitive, dual source alternative could help ensure maximum competition throughout the lifecycle of the program, meeting the spirit and intent of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, MSARA. Specifically, it calls for two shipbuilders in continuous competition to build the ships for the life of the program. The Navy plans to build a total of 55 of these ships, so that could take a number of years. Some have raised concerns because the Navy has been unable to reveal the specific bid information from the two contractors. Unfortunately, the Navy has been prevented from sharing specific bid information because that would violate the competitive source selection process by revealing proprietary information about the two contactors' bids. Because of these constraints, I do not know what is in the bids. But I take comfort from knowing that these bids are for fixed- price contracts and not for cost-type contracts where a contractor has little to lose from underbidding a contract. As far as the capability of the two vessels, we heard from Admiral Roughead at the hearing that each of the two vessels would meet his requirements for the LCS program. I asked Admiral Roughead: ``Do both of these vessels in their current configuration meet the Navy's requirements?'' Admiral Roughead replied: ``Yes, Senator, they do. Both ships do.'' Some have raised the possibility that development of the mission packages could cause problems in the shipbuilding program and lead to unexpected cost growth, and thereby fail to achieve the extra savings the Navy is projecting. In some other shipbuilding programs that might be a concern, but I believe that the Navy's fundamental architecture of the LCS program divorces changes in the mission package from changes that perturb the ship design and ship construction. In the past, when there were problems with developing the right combat capability on a ship, this almost inevitably caused problems in the construction program. In the case of the LCS, the combat capability largely resides in the mission packages that connect to either LCS vessel through defined interfaces. What that means is that changes inside the mission packages should not translate into changes during the ship construction schedule--i.e., they are interchangeable. And whatever is happening in the mission package development program would apply equally to either the down select strategy or the dual source strategy. In terms of the proposal's effects on the industrial base and on competition, I believe that there would be a net positive. The Navy would have the opportunity to compete throughout the life of the program, and any erosion in contractor performance could be corrected by competitive pressures. For the industrial base, there would be more stability in the shipbuilding program. Countless Navy witnesses have testified to the Armed Services Committee and the other defense committees that achieving stability in our shipbuilding programs is one of the best things we in the government can do to help the Navy support the shipbuilding industry. The Navy's proposal to change to a dual source selection strategy would promote that goal of stability, while effectively continuing competition throughout the program, and at the same time reducing acquisition costs and buying an additional ship over the FYDP. Why don't we just wait until sometime after the new Congress convenes to deliberate this changed acquisition strategy? Senator Jack Reed asked the Navy about this very issue at the hearing. He asked, ``What is lost or what do you gain or lose by waiting?'' Assistant Navy Secretary Sean Stackley answered that question as follows: ``Workforce is leaving, hiring freezes are in effect, vendors are stressed in terms of their ability to keep faith with the proposals, the fixed price proposals that they have put in place. They will need to have to then go back with any further delay and reprice their proposals.'' What that means is, if we were to let the bids expire at the end of December, we would lose the full benefits of the competition and our savings will likely be reduced. Mr. President, I support including the authority for the Navy to make this change in the continuing resolution before us.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank my good friend from Massachusetts. There has been reference made to a side agreement which was entered into at the time of START I. There is a major difference between what happened then and what is being proposed by Senator Kyl now. That side agreement, first of all, was in front of the Senate but there was no effort at that time to do what Senator Kyl's amendment does, which is to say prior to the entry into force of that treaty the President shall certify to the Senate that there was a legally binding side agreement. That was not part of START I, and it would seem to me would absolutely derail this New START agreement. Second, that was a political agreement, that side agreement that was entered into, which would last as long as the Presidents of both countries were in office but would not necessarily last beyond that because it was not a legally binding agreement in that sense. So there are two major differences between what happened at the time of START I and what is being proposed here by Senator Kyl. I hope we could defeat the Kyl amendment No. 4860.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I think all of us have an interest in the Defense authorization bill. Senator McCain and I have been working on this bill with members of the committee for about a year. This is a bill that has a lot of provisions critically important to our troops. To give a few examples, it authorizes health care coverage for military children, impact aid to local civilian schools, so-called CERP authority, which is the commander's emergency response program, and transfer of defense articles to the Afghan Army. It is about 800 pages. We have removed from this bill what we thought were the controversial items so that we could get it passed. We don't have the time to go through them, but that was our intent. We missed one controversial item which came over from the House having to do with Guam funding. We have now reached an agreement that we would remove that provision from the bill. That is a removal. But we can't add any controversial items to this bill; it will be objected to. The only way we can do this for the troops, as we have done for 45 years, is if we proceed with a unanimous consent agreement tonight. We haven't yet gotten there. I plead with our colleagues to let us get to this unanimous consent agreement tonight. It is the only time we can do it. The House will be in tomorrow. They could take it up tomorrow, if we pass it tonight. That is the status. Senator McCain, I know, will speak on his support. But this is a plea from the two of us who have worked so hard with Members and our staffs on a critically important bill.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, we will offer this later tonight. We are not offering it at this time.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, the amendment of Senator Thune would amend the treaty by changing one of the elements of the treaty, which is the number of deployed strategic forces that we have. Under the treaty, the limit, of course, is 700. But the critically important part to our military is that each side would have the ability to change the mix to reach 700 as it suits our respective needs. The amendment of Senator Thune would alter the limit of 700 to 720 deployed SLBMs, heavy bombers equipped with nuclear arms, and ICBMs. These limits, as the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee has just said, were agreed upon only after careful analysis by the U.S. military leadership, particularly General Chilton who is the commander of our U.S. Strategic Command and the man responsible for these strategic systems. Senator Kerry has quoted General Chilton. I want to add one additional quote of his which he testified to before the Armed Services Committee on July 20 of this year. General Chilton stated that the force levels in the treaty meet the current guidance for deterrence for the United States. By the way, that guidance was laid out by President George W. Bush. The options we provided in this process focused on ensuring America's ability to continue to deter potential adversaries, assure our allies, and sustain strategic stability for as long as nuclear weapons exist. This rigorous approach, rooted in deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary capabilities-- Here are the key words-- supports both the agreed-upon limits in the new START and recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). So General Chilton is on record in a number of places very precisely and specifically saying that the options which were provided, including the one which was adopted here, rooted in the strategy, rooted in the provisions, the guidance as laid out by President Bush, support the agreed upon limits in the START treaty. I don't know how much more precise and I don't know how much more significant you can get with the words of the commander who is in charge of these weapons. The 1251 report, the report says up to those numbers. It is not specifically committed to those numbers. The important thing about the report is not just that it says up to in I think at least two of the three cases it also says it is important that we remain flexible as to this number. So the 700 force structure that is in the treaty would retain the nuclear triad, retains all three delivery legs, bombers, SLBMs, and ICBMs. On that point General Chilton said we are going to retain the vital nuclear delivery systems, and if there is a failure technically in one of the nuclear systems, we can rearrange our deployed force structure and treaty limits to compensate. Some have said the United States will have to make significant reductions to reach the 700 level and the Russians will have to make none. According to General Chilton, this argument is a distraction. What he said is that the ``new START limits''--in his words, the ``new START limits the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads that can target the United States, missiles that pose the most prompt threat to our forces and our Nation. Regardless of whether Russia would have kept its missile force levels within those limits without a new START treaty, upon ratification they would now be required to do so.'' And that certainly is very important to our Strategic Commander, General Chilton, because he said: The constraints of the treaty actually do constrain Russia with regard to deployed launchers and deployed strategic weapons, and that is an important element as well. Without that they are unconstrained. He explained that the limits were important because without those limits There would be no constraints placed upon the Russian Federation as the number of strategic delivery systems or warheads they could deploy. And I think it is important for the United States-- he concluded that there be limits there, limits that we would also be bound by, obviously. General Chilton is not only comfortable with the limits in this treaty, it was his analysis that formed the underpinning for the 700 limit. He doesn't need the strategic, the additional 20 strategic nuclear delivery systems to maintain our strong deterrence, and other than to kill this treaty there is no reason to add these 20 additional systems. We should respect General Chilton's judgment that the United States can maintain an effective deterrent and that such a change would kill this treaty. I yield the floor and I thank the Chair.