Carl Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote regarding the amendments agreed to en bloc.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Senator for making that point. We want to see additional amendments if they are out there. We will do our best to clear them but, if not, debate them. We appreciate the cooperation of everybody. I yield the floor. Amendment No. 1044

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, let me thank Senator McCaskill for her great work on the amendments she has just described. These are significant amendments, important amendments. They reflect the kind of dogged determination the good Senator from Missouri shows every day. These amendments are so important to the procurement process. I thank Senator McCaskill for her three amendments, which have strengthened the bill by, No. 1, reinforcing requirements to make trade-offs between cost, schedule, and performance, by directing the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to review requirements and ensure that such trade-offs have been made; No. 2, enhancing the role of combatant commanders in developing requirements by spelling out issues on which their input should be solicited and considered; and No. 3, reinforcing competitive prototyping requirements in the bill by requiring a GAO review and assessment of any waiver on the requirement on the basis of excessive cost. These amendments improve the bill and reflect Senator McCaskill's consistent dedication to acquisition reform in the best interests of the taxpayers. I commend the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona. What we are trying to do is see if we can't limit amendments. We think we know the amendments that are still out there, but we need people who want to pursue amendments to let us know that and give us an opportunity to look at them, to discuss the amendments with folks. I have not had an opportunity to talk with the majority leader about whether there will be an opportunity to have votes tonight if we can't work out amendments, but I better not say anything until I have that opportunity to check it out with the majority leader. I know Senator Chambliss is here to be recognized. I yield the floor. Amendments Nos. 1053 and 1054

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, first, let me commend the Senator from Georgia for the amendment which we have adopted, amendment No. 1053, that makes a very useful clarification of the standard for the separate business unit definition on this original conflict-of-interest provision we have. I wish to commend my friend from Georgia for doing that, for catching that, and for making that suggested change which we have now adopted in amendment No. 1053. We would oppose amendment No. 1054, if it were offered, for the following reasons: There has been a report from the Defense Science Board Task Force that, because of consolidation in the defense industry, there has been a substantial reduction in innovation and competition. In order to stimulate that, to make sure the avenues are open for small business, we have a provision in this bill which basically adopts the approach of the Defense Science Board Task Force and is consistent with the concerns they raise about the lack of competition resulting from consolidation. But, equally important, we hear from small business owners consistently that they have been excluded by prime contractors from competing for subcontract work. When they do that, they, of course, are reserving the business for themselves, for the prime contractors themselves. As the Senator from Georgia mentions, there is now some oversight. But the problem is, there is no ability to veto, in effect, the decision to keep the work in-house. We would not take over the competition or the contracting bidding process. But what we do provide for is the veto of a decision to keep work in-house, where we think it is anticompetitive or unfair. It is kind of an in-between position. The Defense Science Board actually suggested we go further than we have. What we do in this bill is say that if a decision is made that the contractor is keeping work in-house, which should be put up to competition to allow small businesses to bid on it, the discretion would be available for the Department to override that decision. We think that is kind of an appropriate thing to do to protect small businesses, to protect competition, and to make sure there is reasonable oversight of that decision of any prime contractor to keep the work for themselves instead of bidding it out, which, of course, would open it to smaller businesses and greater innovation. So we would oppose this amendment should it be called up. On the other hand, we want to, again, commend the Senator from Georgia because he has gotten into issues such as this. While we disagree with him on this one, we do want to note he has been very deeply involved in this bill. He has worked with us on this bill, and we greatly appreciate his support for our bill. I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I would call up, on behalf of Senator Bingaman, amendment No. 1055. I understand this has been cleared now. It is a useful clarification of the relationship between the developmental testing requirements in the bill and the testing reforms that were enacted 6 years ago.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following be the only first-degree amendments in order to S. 454, other than the committee-reported substitute amendment, that the listed first-degree amendments be subject to second-degree amendments which are relevant to the amendment to which offered; that with respect to any subsequent agreement which provides for a limitation of debate regarding an amendment on the list, then that time be equally divided and controlled in the usual form; that if there is a sequence of votes with respect to these amendments, then there be 2 minutes equally divided and controlled prior to a vote in relation thereto; that upon disposition of the listed amendments, the substitute amendment, as amended, be agreed to, the bill, as amended, be read a third time, and the Senate proceed to vote on passage of the bill. The amendments I am including in this unanimous consent proposal are as follows: The Snowe amendment No. 1056 regarding small business contracting; a Thune amendment regarding weapons systems; a Coburn amendment regarding financial management, which we think we may have worked out, by the way; the Chambliss amendment No. 1054 regarding ``make buy;'' the Bingaman amendment, which we have already adopted so I will not refer to that; and the Murray amendment No. 1052 regarding national security objectives.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair, and I thank my friend from Arizona and the staffs who worked this out. I think these amendments then would be considered probably tomorrow morning, although I don't know that we have final word on that. We ought to probably doublecheck that with our leaders, and I would note the absence of a quorum while we do that.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to a period of morning business, with Senators recognized to speak for up to 10 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. I note the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, for the Committee on Armed Services I report favorably the following nomination lists which were printed in the Record on the dates indicated, and ask unanimous consent, to save the expense of reprinting on the Executive Calendar that these nominations lie at the Secretary's desk for the information of Senators.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on May 6, 2009, at 9:30 a.m., to conduct a hearing entitled ``Regulating and Resolving Institutions Considered `Too Big to Fail'.''

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 6, 2009, at 10 a.m., in room SD-366 of the Dirksen Senate office building.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 6, 2009, at 9:30 a.m., to hold a hearing entitled ``Engaging Iran: Obstacles and Opportunities.''

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 6, 2009, at 2:30 p.m., to hold a subcommittee hearing entitled ``NATO Post-60: Institutional Challenges Moving Forward.''

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate, to conduct a hearing entitled ``Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security,'' on Wednesday, May 6, 2009, at 10 a.m., in room SD-224 of the Dirksen Senate office building.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Veterans' Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 6, 2009, at 9 a.m. The Committee will meet in room 418 of the Russell Senate office building beginning at 9:30 a.m.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, and the Internet of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 6, 2009, at 2:30 p.m., in room 253 of the Russell Senate office building.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Wednesday, May 6, 2009, at 2:15 p.m.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Special Committee on Aging be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate, on May 6, 2009, from 2 p.m.--4 p.m. in Hart 216 for the purpose of conducting a hearing.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am introducing legislation today, along with Senator Collins, to strengthen the transparency, accountability, and stability of a key aspect of our nation's financial system. Right now, trillions of dollars in complex financial transactions known as swap agreements are being marketed, traded, and implemented by financial institutions operating in the U.S. without adequate oversight or regulation. Swaps are typically an agreement between two parties placing a bet on future cash flows. Some swaps bet on whether a stock price, interest rate, commodity price, or currency value will rise or fall; others bet on whether a company will default on payment of a bond. Stock price bets are referred to as equity swaps; bets on whether companies will be unable to pay their debts are referred to as credit default swaps. As of June 2008, according to data compiled by the Bank of International Settlements, worldwide swaps markets included credit default swaps with a total notional value of $57 trillion; commodity swaps with a notional value of $13 trillion; equity swaps with a notional value of $10 trillion; foreign currency swaps with a notional value of $62 trillion; and interest rate swaps with a notional value of $458 trillion. These multi-trillion-dollar swap transactions are going on full bore, without appropriate U.S. disclosure requirements, clearing requirements, capital or liquidity safeguards, or other measures to protect the U.S. financial system against systemic risk. Why? Because current law prohibits key Federal financial regulators-- including the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, CFTC--from exercising oversight or issuing regulations to ensure the safety and soundness of swap transactions. That prohibition has been in place for nearly 10 years now, since the year 2000; it has never made any sense; it helped cause the financial crisis that is engulfing the American economy; and it ought to be eliminated immediately. The bill we are introducing today, the Authorizing the Regulation of Swaps Act, would do just that. It would immediately repeal the statutory prohibition on the SEC and CFTC from regulating swaps. In addition, the bill would give authority to federal financial regulators, including bank, securities, and commodities regulators, to oversee and regulate all types of swap agreements, whether traded on an exchange or over-the-counter, including credit default, commodity, equity, foreign currency, and interest rate swaps. The bill would enable financial regulators, for the first time since 2000, to exercise oversight of the now largely hidden and unregulated swaps markets. To understand why this legislation is needed and should be enacted promptly without waiting for the larger financial reform bill that's coming, I want to review some history. Twelve years ago, in 1997, Brooksley Born, then the head of the CFTC, raised a red flag about the growing use of over-the-counter swaps and other derivatives that were being traded outside of regulated exchanges and outside of normal federal oversight. She called for a study of those over-the-counter transactions and for comments on whether they should be subject to some type of regulation. Her effort was immediately met with resistance, however, from not only the financial industry that profited from swaps trading, but also other Federal regulators then in office. For example, then Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, then Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, and then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt all opposed her effort to even examine over-the-counter swap agreements. The dominant view at the time was that regulation was unnecessary and would only slow down a booming market. In 1998, at the urging of then Chairman Greenspan, Secretary Rubin, Chairman Levitt, and others, Congress enacted legislation which actually barred the CFTC from conducting the study that Chairman Born wanted and from developing any regulatory alternatives for over-the- counter swaps. In 2000, Congress went farther. In late December, during the final days of the 106th Congress, legislation affecting a range of financial issues was slipped without notice into a conference report of an omnibus appropriations bill. That legislation, called the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, included provisions which together created a flat out prohibition on the regulation of every kind of swap the authors could think of, including credit default, commodity, equity, foreign currency, interest rate, and even weather swaps. That type of sweeping statutory prohibition had never been included in any bill voted on by the Senate before being inserted into a must-pass appropriations bill in December 2000. That omnibus appropriations bill was approved by the Senate on a voice vote. Today we are living with the disastrous consequences of that ill- conceived prohibition on the regulation of swaps. One example says it all: AIG. AIG is a financial holding company that, all by itself, has cost taxpayers more than $150 billion so far. Over a period of years, AIG had issued more than $400 billion in credit default swaps without setting aside sufficient capital or liquidity reserves. After its swaps began losing value, AIG's counterparties required AIG to post multi-billion-dollar collateral to secure payment on those swaps, and a credit rating downgrade threatened to increase its collateral calls, AIG came pleading for a taxpayer bailout. The $150 billion in taxpayer dollars was needed not only to keep AIG afloat, but also to bail out a dozen other large financial institutions that had purchased credit protection from AIG, including Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Bank of America. Apparently, none of those credit default swap exposures had been known to Federal regulators until AIG informed the Federal Reserve on a Friday that it was likely to go out of business the following week unless provided billions in taxpayer support. When regulators understood how far in the hole AIG had fallen and how many financial institutions would be affected by its financial collapse, they determined that they had no choice but to prop up the whole mess with taxpayer dollars. AIG is not the only financial institution with risky credit default swaps. But even if federal regulators know of other high-risk problems, the law has tied their hands in terms of what steps can be taken in response. Even measures that most experts believe would reduce systemic risks, such as requiring companies to use credit default swap clearinghouses or requiring traders to disclose all credit default swap transactions, cannot be fully implemented, because Federal agencies lack the authority to regulate swaps. Seven months ago, during a Senate hearing in September 2008, Christopher Cox, then chairman of the SEC, testified that the credit default swap market was ``completely lacking in transparency'' and ``ripe for fraud and manipulation.'' A few days later he called on Congress to take ``swift action'' to give regulators the authority to oversee credit default swaps. But the statutory barriers prohibiting swaps regulation have remained in place. Giving the regulators what they have asked for is long overdue. It does not make sense for Federal regulators to be statutorily barred from requiring disclosure of swap transactions, mandating use of clearinghouses, or imposing other safeguards particularly in light of the size of the swaps market with trillions of dollars in credit default swap, interest rate, commodity, equity, foreign currency, and other swaps. Even some past opponents of swaps regulation have rethought their opposition. Alan Greenspan acknowledged last October that there are ``serious problems'' associated with credit default swaps. Robert Rubin recently acknowledged that derivatives, which include swaps, ``create systemic risk.'' Arthur Levitt said it was a mistake not to have regulated swap agreements. Top financial officials in the Obama Administration, including Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, National Economic Council Chairman Larry Summers, SEC Chair Mary Schapiro, and CFTC nominee Gary Gensler have all called publicly for stronger regulation of over-the-counter transactions, including swap agreements. Congress and the Administration are now engaged in an effort to enact comprehensive financial reforms to safeguard our economy. While some of those reforms require a lot of time and deliberation to get right, others can--and should--be implemented more quickly. Removing the prohibition on regulating swaps is one of those reforms that can and should be done now, so our regulators can begin, without the hindrance of ill-conceived statutory barriers, to design a sensible regulatory framework for swaps. Here is what my bill would do. First, it would repeal about a dozen provisions in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act and other laws that prevent federal financial regulators from overseeing and regulating swap agreements. Second, it would give Federal financial regulators, including bank, securities, and commodity regulators, immediate authority to oversee and regulate swaps involving the financial institutions and exchanges that they already regulate. To ensure regulators have sufficient authority, the bill would use the same comprehensive definition of swap agreement that is used in current law to prohibit swaps regulation. These measures would give regulators immediate authority to acquire swap-related data. That would allow them to evaluate swap risks at specific companies as well as across the financial system. Regulators could then use this data to look into what additional safeguards are needed and what abuses need to be stopped. One thing the bill would not do is require federal financial regulators to regulate swaps or tell them how to regulate swaps if they decide to do so. That is left for the larger regulatory reform bill coming later this year. The only instruction provided in this bill is that, if any regulator decides to act, it must consult, work, and cooperate with all of the other federal financial regulators to ensure swaps are treated in a consistent way. I see this bill as a necessary first step to eliminate harmful statutory barriers that tie regulators' hands, impede oversight of the multi-trillion-dollar swaps markets, and create systemic risk. The bill does not take the needed second step of laying out ways to regulate swaps. It does not, for example, specify swaps recordkeeping, disclosure requirements, clearing requirements, capital or liquidity safeguards, or other measures. Senator Collins has another bill that, in part, addresses credit default swaps clearinghouses; I have a separate bill that specifies safeguards in the area of commodity swaps. Other colleagues have introduced bills that address a variety of swaps issues. The legislation we are introducing today does not contradict or preclude any of those other approaches it is an interim measure that would clear the way for more specific swaps requirements in subsequent reform legislation. The Levin-Collins bill offers a limited, commonsense way to restore immediate federal authority over a high-risk, high-dollar financial sector that has operated for too long in the shadows, and whose failure has cost us hundreds of billions of dollars so far. Due to the trillions of dollars and financial risk involved, I urge the Senate to act on this bill as soon as possible. I would also like to take a moment to extend my thanks and appreciation to the SEC, CFTC, and Treasury officials who took the time to provide technical assistance in drafting this legislation. I hope those agencies, and the Obama Administration as a whole, will announce their support for the bill and work for its enactment. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I am introducing legislation today, along with Senator Collins, to strengthen the transparency, accountability, and stability of a key aspect of our nation's financial system. Right now, trillions of dollars in complex financial transactions known as swap agreements are being marketed, traded, and implemented by financial institutions operating in the U.S. without adequate oversight or regulation. Swaps are typically an agreement between two parties placing a bet on future cash flows. Some swaps bet on whether a stock price, interest rate, commodity price, or currency value will rise or fall; others bet on whether a company will default on payment of a bond. Stock price bets are referred to as equity swaps; bets on whether companies will be unable to pay their debts are referred to as credit default swaps. As of June 2008, according to data compiled by the Bank of International Settlements, worldwide swaps markets included credit default swaps with a total notional value of $57 trillion; commodity swaps with a notional value of $13 trillion; equity swaps with a notional value of $10 trillion; foreign currency swaps with a notional value of $62 trillion; and interest rate swaps with a notional value of $458 trillion. These multi-trillion-dollar swap transactions are going on full bore, without appropriate U.S. disclosure requirements, clearing requirements, capital or liquidity safeguards, or other measures to protect the U.S. financial system against systemic risk. Why? Because current law prohibits key Federal financial regulators-- including the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC, and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, CFTC--from exercising oversight or issuing regulations to ensure the safety and soundness of swap transactions. That prohibition has been in place for nearly 10 years now, since the year 2000; it has never made any sense; it helped cause the financial crisis that is engulfing the American economy; and it ought to be eliminated immediately. The bill we are introducing today, the Authorizing the Regulation of Swaps Act, would do just that. It would immediately repeal the statutory prohibition on the SEC and CFTC from regulating swaps. In addition, the bill would give authority to federal financial regulators, including bank, securities, and commodities regulators, to oversee and regulate all types of swap agreements, whether traded on an exchange or over-the-counter, including credit default, commodity, equity, foreign currency, and interest rate swaps. The bill would enable financial regulators, for the first time since 2000, to exercise oversight of the now largely hidden and unregulated swaps markets. To understand why this legislation is needed and should be enacted promptly without waiting for the larger financial reform bill that's coming, I want to review some history. Twelve years ago, in 1997, Brooksley Born, then the head of the CFTC, raised a red flag about the growing use of over-the-counter swaps and other derivatives that were being traded outside of regulated exchanges and outside of normal federal oversight. She called for a study of those over-the-counter transactions and for comments on whether they should be subject to some type of regulation. Her effort was immediately met with resistance, however, from not only the financial industry that profited from swaps trading, but also other Federal regulators then in office. For example, then Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, then Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, and then SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt all opposed her effort to even examine over-the-counter swap agreements. The dominant view at the time was that regulation was unnecessary and would only slow down a booming market. In 1998, at the urging of then Chairman Greenspan, Secretary Rubin, Chairman Levitt, and others, Congress enacted legislation which actually barred the CFTC from conducting the study that Chairman Born wanted and from developing any regulatory alternatives for over-the- counter swaps. In 2000, Congress went farther. In late December, during the final days of the 106th Congress, legislation affecting a range of financial issues was slipped without notice into a conference report of an omnibus appropriations bill. That legislation, called the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, included provisions which together created a flat out prohibition on the regulation of every kind of swap the authors could think of, including credit default, commodity, equity, foreign currency, interest rate, and even weather swaps. That type of sweeping statutory prohibition had never been included in any bill voted on by the Senate before being inserted into a must-pass appropriations bill in December 2000. That omnibus appropriations bill was approved by the Senate on a voice vote. Today we are living with the disastrous consequences of that ill- conceived prohibition on the regulation of swaps. One example says it all: AIG. AIG is a financial holding company that, all by itself, has cost taxpayers more than $150 billion so far. Over a period of years, AIG had issued more than $400 billion in credit default swaps without setting aside sufficient capital or liquidity reserves. After its swaps began losing value, AIG's counterparties required AIG to post multi-billion-dollar collateral to secure payment on those swaps, and a credit rating downgrade threatened to increase its collateral calls, AIG came pleading for a taxpayer bailout. The $150 billion in taxpayer dollars was needed not only to keep AIG afloat, but also to bail out a dozen other large financial institutions that had purchased credit protection from AIG, including Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Bank of America. Apparently, none of those credit default swap exposures had been known to Federal regulators until AIG informed the Federal Reserve on a Friday that it was likely to go out of business the following week unless provided billions in taxpayer support. When regulators understood how far in the hole AIG had fallen and how many financial institutions would be affected by its financial collapse, they determined that they had no choice but to prop up the whole mess with taxpayer dollars. AIG is not the only financial institution with risky credit default swaps. But even if federal regulators know of other high-risk problems, the law has tied their hands in terms of what steps can be taken in response. Even measures that most experts believe would reduce systemic risks, such as requiring companies to use credit default swap clearinghouses or requiring traders to disclose all credit default swap transactions, cannot be fully implemented, because Federal agencies lack the authority to regulate swaps. Seven months ago, during a Senate hearing in September 2008, Christopher Cox, then chairman of the SEC, testified that the credit default swap market was ``completely lacking in transparency'' and ``ripe for fraud and manipulation.'' A few days later he called on Congress to take ``swift action'' to give regulators the authority to oversee credit default swaps. But the statutory barriers prohibiting swaps regulation have remained in place. Giving the regulators what they have asked for is long overdue. It does not make sense for Federal regulators to be statutorily barred from requiring disclosure of swap transactions, mandating use of clearinghouses, or imposing other safeguards particularly in light of the size of the swaps market with trillions of dollars in credit default swap, interest rate, commodity, equity, foreign currency, and other swaps. Even some past opponents of swaps regulation have rethought their opposition. Alan Greenspan acknowledged last October that there are ``serious problems'' associated with credit default swaps. Robert Rubin recently acknowledged that derivatives, which include swaps, ``create systemic risk.'' Arthur Levitt said it was a mistake not to have regulated swap agreements. Top financial officials in the Obama Administration, including Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, National Economic Council Chairman Larry Summers, SEC Chair Mary Schapiro, and CFTC nominee Gary Gensler have all called publicly for stronger regulation of over-the-counter transactions, including swap agreements. Congress and the Administration are now engaged in an effort to enact comprehensive financial reforms to safeguard our economy. While some of those reforms require a lot of time and deliberation to get right, others can--and should--be implemented more quickly. Removing the prohibition on regulating swaps is one of those reforms that can and should be done now, so our regulators can begin, without the hindrance of ill-conceived statutory barriers, to design a sensible regulatory framework for swaps. Here is what my bill would do. First, it would repeal about a dozen provisions in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act and other laws that prevent federal financial regulators from overseeing and regulating swap agreements. Second, it would give Federal financial regulators, including bank, securities, and commodity regulators, immediate authority to oversee and regulate swaps involving the financial institutions and exchanges that they already regulate. To ensure regulators have sufficient authority, the bill would use the same comprehensive definition of swap agreement that is used in current law to prohibit swaps regulation. These measures would give regulators immediate authority to acquire swap-related data. That would allow them to evaluate swap risks at specific companies as well as across the financial system. Regulators could then use this data to look into what additional safeguards are needed and what abuses need to be stopped. One thing the bill would not do is require federal financial regulators to regulate swaps or tell them how to regulate swaps if they decide to do so. That is left for the larger regulatory reform bill coming later this year. The only instruction provided in this bill is that, if any regulator decides to act, it must consult, work, and cooperate with all of the other federal financial regulators to ensure swaps are treated in a consistent way. I see this bill as a necessary first step to eliminate harmful statutory barriers that tie regulators' hands, impede oversight of the multi-trillion-dollar swaps markets, and create systemic risk. The bill does not take the needed second step of laying out ways to regulate swaps. It does not, for example, specify swaps recordkeeping, disclosure requirements, clearing requirements, capital or liquidity safeguards, or other measures. Senator Collins has another bill that, in part, addresses credit default swaps clearinghouses; I have a separate bill that specifies safeguards in the area of commodity swaps. Other colleagues have introduced bills that address a variety of swaps issues. The legislation we are introducing today does not contradict or preclude any of those other approaches it is an interim measure that would clear the way for more specific swaps requirements in subsequent reform legislation. The Levin-Collins bill offers a limited, commonsense way to restore immediate federal authority over a high-risk, high-dollar financial sector that has operated for too long in the shadows, and whose failure has cost us hundreds of billions of dollars so far. Due to the trillions of dollars and financial risk involved, I urge the Senate to act on this bill as soon as possible. I would also like to take a moment to extend my thanks and appreciation to the SEC, CFTC, and Treasury officials who took the time to provide technical assistance in drafting this legislation. I hope those agencies, and the Obama Administration as a whole, will announce their support for the bill and work for its enactment. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the bill be printed in the Record.