Sander Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from the great State of Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer), another distinguished member of our committee.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield the gentleman an additional 15 seconds.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to another member of our committee, the gentleman from New York (Mr. Crowley).

Mr. LEVIN. I yield the gentleman an additional 15 seconds.

Mr. LEVIN. It is my pleasure to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Costa).

Mr. LEVIN. I yield the gentleman an additional 15 seconds.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEVIN. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam Speaker, would you tell us each our remaining time?

Mr. LEVIN. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. LEVIN. This is an important discussion, and I want to be clear what is really at stake here. It's the automotive industry of this country, but it's more than that. There's a basic principle involved in the Korea FTA issue, and that is whether we will replace one-way trade with two-way trade. When this was negotiated by the Bush administration, it failed to take the most important step relating to Korea. They were shipping hundreds of thousands of cars to the United States. We were shipping, at that time, less than 10,000. So this, indeed, while it mainly involved automotive--and that was 75 percent of our deficit--it was even more than that, opening up markets for our goods produced in the United States of America. This was a Make It in America issue. And there was a Korean iron curtain against our products--by the way, not only automotive, but refrigerators and others. The number one priority of the Koreans was to eliminate the 2.5 percent U.S. tariff, because if you ship 600,000 to 700,000 cars, that's a lot of money. We said to the administration, no way, we were not going to let the Korea free trade agreement be approved if it continued to embody one-way trade. The Korean Ambassador met with Mr. Rangel and me often, and the Trade Minister, and they said, We aren't going to talk about it. And we said, Well, if you don't talk, there will be no agreement. And then what happened was that the new administration came into being, the Obama administration, and it began to work on this issue. And what happened was there were major changes in the agreement. Instead of the elimination of the tariff on most vehicles, immediately it was delayed to the 5th year, and on trucks it was delayed for 8 years to give time to make sure that the one-way street became a two- way street. That has been accomplished, and to make entirely sure of this, there were provisions to make sure that they could no longer use their tax provisions and their environmental standards to keep out our products. And to make it even safer, we made sure that there was a safeguard, so if there's a surge of automotive products into the United States, we could defend ourselves. That was unique. And that's why the big three are saying the following: ``As representatives of the largest exporting sector, this FTA will help open up an important auto market for Chrysler, Ford, and GM exports. Our companies make the best cars and trucks on the road, and we are excited for the export opportunity this agreement represents.'' And that's why the UAW has indicated its support, because workers making their cars will now be able to see that their cars can be shipped to Korea. And Ford has said they're going to use Korea as a base to penetrate, with American products, the markets of the rest of Asia. So that's what this is all about. No, it won't be China getting into the U.S. It will be the U.S. getting into Korea. That's really what this is all about. I want to say a word about the issue relating to issues of transshipment. We insisted in the FTA that there be provisions relating to transshipment, and I want to quickly refer to them. If Customs has any doubt about a shipment, it can require Korean exporters to provide documentation showing that the goods qualify for FTA treatment. If a Korean exporter refuses or the document is not acceptable, Customs can deny FTA treatment to the good. U.S. Customs can also do site visits--this is something different--to Korean factories to verify information. And if our Customs officials are denied access or the visit shows problems, they can deny entry to the Korean goods. And exporters who intentionally or repeatedly make false claims are subject to penalties. I have a letter embodying this from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection that I would like to insert in the Record. I would also like to insert in the Record the letter that I referred to from the automobile association and from the UAW. I also want to quote the statement from the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers Association. It says as follows: ``The pending FTAs offer real opportunities for parts manufacturers and our employees in two of the fastest growing regions: Asia Pacific and South America. We can ill afford to neglect these and other markets as key competitors.'' I would like to insert this letter from MEMA into the Record. So that's what the issue is here today. We faced a one-way market with impenetrable barriers. These are now being torn down. This is a jobs bill. This is a jobs bill. We have to be able to compete, and our auto industry can now compete. In order to be able to compete effectively, we have to tear down the markets of other countries and make sure that our markets are not only open to them, but their markets are open to us. We worked very hard to make this happen. It wasn't an easy job. There were times when the administration, perhaps, the new one, the Obama administration, was going to settle for something less than was necessary. We pressed. We pressed effectively. The Obama administration rose to the occasion and, in the end, said to Korea, You must agree to open the market or we will not send this agreement, this revised agreement to the U.S. Congress. This revised agreement has now been sent here. I urge its support. U.S. Customs and Border Protection U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: CBP's Enforcement Mechanisms U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) plays an integral role in the implementation and enforcement of free trade agreements, which provide duty-free or reduced duty access to the U.S. market for qualifying merchandise. CBP is responsible for assessing and collecting duties, taxes, and fees and ensuring compliance with all import laws. CBP works to ensure that the benefits afforded by Trade Agreements accrue only to eligible importations. CBP will utilize its layered trade enforcement approach to ensure compliance with the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement's (KORUS) provisions. If CBP finds violations, CBP will take action to recover duty losses, pursue penalties when necessary, and establish enforcement criteria to prevent future potential fraudulent claims. CBP will use the various enforcement mechanisms listed below to implement KORUS. Many of these mechanisms are used in the enforcement of all Trade Agreements, but will be tailored to take into consideration factors that are unique to Korea and the provisions listed in KORUS. Targeting High-Risk Imports CBP will conduct trend analysis to spot unusual trade patterns such as U.S. imports of products that South Korea does not produce. CBP will monitor the emergence of new importers or changes in importer behavior. CBP will review intelligence provided by other governments or industry. Under KORUS, CBP can also take several other courses of action, including but not limited to: conducting comprehensive cargo exams or importer audits and performing laboratory analysis on the contents of imports. Trade Agreement Verifications Under KORUS, CBP will conduct extensive verifications as warranted of imports that seek preferential duty treatment to ensure that they legitimately qualify under the agreement. CBP will request documentation from importers to substantiate their preference claims, as needed. If an importer cannot substantiate its preference claim, CBP will bill the importer for the duty amount owed, as well as other associated fees. Under KORUS, CBP can visit South Korean factories to validate a factory's production capability as well as compliance of the goods with the requirements of KORUS. If a factory does not have the facilities to produce goods or documentation to support a KORUS claim, CBP can deny duty- free treatment under KORUS on future shipments. CBP can also visit South Korean exporters or any other individuals or companies that may have evidence relative to the verification of a KORUS claim. CBP can deny the preferential treatment granted under the agreement to any good when verification can not be completed because of a lack of cooperation from the foreign entity. Textiles and Apparel Goods KORUS includes provisions similar to other Trade Agreements that allow CBP to address major concerns of the U.S. business community, such as the transshipment of textile or apparel goods from China or other countries to take advantage of the duty preference. Under KORUS, CBP can visit South Korean textile factories to validate a factory's production capability as well as compliance of the goods with the requirements of KORUS. If a factory does not have the facilities to produce goods or documentation to support a KORUS claim, CBP can deny duty- free treatment under KORUS on future shipments. CBP can also visit South Korean exporters or any other individuals or companies that may have evidence relative to the verification of a KORUS claim. CBP can deny the preferential treatment granted under the agreement to any textile or apparel good when verification can not be completed because of a lack of cooperation from the foreign entity. Korea is required to provide CBP with an annual report detailing those factories that are involved in textile and apparel production. This information will be used to validate legitimate yarn, fabric, and apparel producers to assist CBP with their targeting.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I rise in strong support of this proposal, this bill. It restarts TAA and the GSP program. You know, this should have happened long ago. The Republican decision to let it lapse over 8 months ago was very wrong. And as a result, and we're not sure of the exact numbers because that isn't public, but hundreds of service workers were completely shut out. Fewer manufacturing workers became eligible, and those who did qualify for TAA received less assistance and support. So now we're taking action today that's long overdue. I heard last night somebody said that the trade agreements were being held ``hostage'' to the TAA program. They just got it 180 degrees wrong. It was the TAA program that was being held hostage to trade agreements, and that never should have happened. Well, now we can act. I just want to say, some people, I think, look upon TAA as kind of the teaspoon of sugar to make the trade agreements go down. That could not be more incorrect. What TAA does is to help those who are thrown out of work because of trade, through no fault of their own. And if we're going to have a competitive workforce, people need to be able to be retrained. And interestingly enough, if you go to any place where TAA operates, you'll see a wide variety of people who have become eligible and who are being helped. So I very, very much support this bill which preserves the integrity, although not all, of the TAA program, and the 2009 reforms. I close by saying I also support the GSP provisions in this bill. I think there is a misconception. It does help, indeed, developing countries who rely on the GSP. But as our ranking member knows from all of his work, it also benefits American companies and the workers they employ. In fact, the majority of GSP imports are inputs used to support U.S. manufacturing, including raw materials, parts and components, and machinery and equipment. So not only did failing to extend GSP hurt developing countries, it hurt American businesses and their employees. A wide spectrum supports this bill, and I hope all of us on this side of the aisle will vote in favor of it.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I have a motion to recommit at the desk.

Mr. LEVIN. I am.

Mr. LEVIN. I want everybody to know what this is. This is a bill on currency. This is the opportunity for people to once again stand up and be counted. This is the bill that passed last year 349-79, with 99 Republicans supporting it. This is the House bill that has 225 cosponsors. More than 60 are Republicans. It's clear that China's currency manipulation is a major cause of hundreds of thousands of lost manufacturing jobs, and imports from China are about half of that. So we're talking about 1 million jobs, at the least. What is also clear is that the manipulation of currency tilts the playing field in favor of China at least 25 percent, and it's not getting better. China's currency manipulation isn't the only cause of that deficit and loss of jobs. But because it's not the only cause doesn't mean we should address it. It's a major one. It's clear we haven't been effectively confronting China on this issue, and China pushes ahead. So in a few words, the time has come for action. Eight years of talk have yielded very meager results. As said, this has broad bipartisan support. And to make it utterly clear, last night the Senate passed a bill on currency by 63-35. Sixteen Republican Senators supported it. This will not kill the bill. It will not send it back to committee. If adopted, the bill will immediately go to passage. So, as I said, now is the moment for all of us to be counted, to stand up and be counted. No excuses. As Robert Samuelson said in The Post last weekend, there's already a trade war between them and us, but only one side is fighting. Now we'll make sure that both sides are in this effort. I now yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania who is so active on this issue.

Mr. LEVIN. How much time do I have remaining?

Mr. LEVIN. That's all it will take. The issue is clear: Act. Act. You must stand up and be counted. This is the moment on currency for every Member of the House.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. LEVIN. Madam Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. It is now my privilege to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott), the ranking member on Trade.

Mr. LEVIN. I am now privileged to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell), a very distinguished member of our committee.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. The Bush administration negotiated three seriously flawed FTAs. The key flaw in the South Korea FTA was that it violated a fundamental principle of sound, overall trade policy: two-way trade. It locked in one-way trade for Korea in the automotive sector, the source of three-quarters of the American trade deficit with Korea. Last year, urged by congressional Democrats, the Obama administration negotiated specific provisions opening up the Korean market for automotive products made in America. These vital changes would not have happened if, as the Republicans continually insisted, the FTA had passed as originally negotiated. The Panama FTA as originally negotiated by the Bush administration failed to carry out another key provision of sound trade policy, incorporating international standards on worker rights. Congressional Democrats and the Obama administration successfully worked with the Panamanian Government to correct these flaws, and it also took the necessary concrete steps to change its role as a tax haven. The Colombia FTA, as originally negotiated, fell far short of addressing the longstanding concerns about the specific challenges in Colombia to worker rights and the persistence of violence and impunity. The Obama administration and the new Santos administration undertook the important steps of discussions on these issues, culminating in an action plan relating to labor rights. Unfortunately, there remains serious shortcomings in the plan's implementation. What's more, giving in to congressional Republican insistence, there is completely lacking any link in the implementation bill to the action plan, necessary to assure its present implementation and future enforcement actions under the FTA. In view of those conditions, I oppose the Colombia FTA.