Sander Levin

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. It is now my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the distinguished Representative from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur).

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pallone).

Mr. LEVIN. So why don't you call on one. Then I'll take mine, and then you'll have one more person.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 1 minute to the gentlelady from California (Ms. Woolsey).

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to a very active Member on these issues, the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. McGovern).

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 1 minute to the gentlelady from California (Ms. Lee).

Mr. LEVIN. It is now my pleasure to yield 1 minute to the very distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lynch).

Mr. LEVIN. This is a somewhat unusual structure here. Each of us is going to take 15 minutes of our total allotment. I want to talk to Mr. Camp. I think we have used all but 2 of our minutes. I want to use those 2 minutes to close the 15 minutes, but I'm not quite sure where you are on your 15 minutes.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield myself 2 minutes. We have three FTAs before us. Each one of those should be taken on their own. And let me express my strong views about the Colombia FTA based on my three trips there. Trade is about more than tariffs or the flow of goods. As important as they are, it's about people. And where workers have no rights, increased trade with another country can work against us and can work against the other country. Colombia, in that regard, has presented a special case. A violation of basic rights has gone on for decades, and not only those violations of laws but violation of persons, violence, and death. The Santos administration came to power and said it wanted to do it differently. Our two governments sat down and worked on an agreement on worker rights. It was a step forward, but there is a serious set of problems. First of all, the implementation of that in important instances has been spotty, especially as to the vehement misuse of cooperatives in Colombia and so-called collective PACs. And, secondly, there was an absolute resistance, refusal on the part of the Republican majority to have any reference in the action plan to the implementation bill. That is a serious, serious flaw. For that reason, I am very much opposed to this agreement.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute. As I said with regard to Colombia, each of these agreements should be taken on their own. The Panama FTA, as originally negotiated by the Bush administration, failed to address serious concerns about Panama's labor laws and status as a tax haven. It has been changed through the efforts of congressional Democrats and the Obama administration, and it now deserves our support. Fully enforceable labor and environmental standards are included in the core of this agreement. Panama has brought its laws into full compliance with ILO standards. And late last year, Panama signed a tax exchange information agreement, and they have changed their laws to implement this agreement. Republicans negotiated a flawed agreement. It has been fixed. It now deserves our support. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott), the ranking member on our Trade Subcommittee. (Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LEVIN. Could I ask how much time is remaining?

Mr. LEVIN. I now yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Cuellar).

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 1 minute to the gentlelady from Wisconsin (Ms. Baldwin).

Mr. LEVIN. Madam Speaker, could I inquire as to how much time I have remaining?

Mr. LEVIN. I yield myself 2\1/2\ minutes. I voted against NAFTA. I led the battle against CAFTA on this floor. I did so because in those agreements there were not enforceable international worker rights. We face this in Panama. As originally negotiated, there was not the implementation of those rights in Panama. They had certain provisions relating to newer businesses. They also had restrictions in terms of trade zones. And what we said to the Panamanians was, bring your laws up to international standards. That's exactly what they did. This is the opposite, in that respect, of NAFTA and CAFTA. So it is not accurate to say this is a NAFTA-type agreement. It simply is not. In terms of government procurement, we want access for our companies and workers to the construction that's going on in the Panama Canal zone. It's vital for our companies. And so essentially in this agreement there is a provision that we can have access there, with limits, as they can, with limits, to us. It's mutually beneficial. Lastly, there has been reference to the tax haven. Panama was a tax haven, one of the most striking in the world. And we insisted that they enact a TIEA. They've done exactly that. So if we take these one at a time, this is an agreement that meets our standards and changes the agreement from the way it was negotiated by the Bush administration. We should support this agreement.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. It is now my distinct pleasure to yield 4 minutes to our whip, the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Hoyer).

Mr. LEVIN. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEVIN. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Berman), the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. LEVIN. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. LEVIN. Could I inquire how much time remains for the three of us?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3\1/2\ minutes, but I may use only 2\1/2\. First I want to emphasize each of these agreements should be on their own merit. Trade is so polarized, it's easy to lump things all together. We won't carve out a new trade policy if that's the way we proceed. Secondly, there's been reference to NAFTA. This is really kind of an anti-NAFTA agreement. The labor standards are the new standards that we put into Peru and are incorporated here. The reference to job loss and EPI, it bases its assumption that what happened after NAFTA in terms of trade will happen as well with Korea. They are very different situations. And that's why many suggestions are that there will be major increases in jobs. Thirdly, there's been reference to this as the George Bush FTA. No, this is the FTA renegotiated by the Obama administration. And why was it renegotiated? To open up the markets of Korea, to change one-way trade to two-way trade. That's jobs. And that's exactly what this agreement does. Tomorrow we will outline how it does it. In all respects, it will make sure that the Korean market at long last is open to American automotive products, which is the major source of our trade deficit. That's why the automotive companies issued this statement: ``As representatives of the largest exporting sector, this FTA will help open an important auto market for Chrysler, Ford, and GM exports. Our companies make the best cars and trucks on the road, and we are excited for the export opportunity this agreement represents.'' That's why it's supported by the UAW. It will open up markets. That's why Ford sat down today to describe how they're going to penetrate the market of Korea. They're determined to do that, as the other companies are. So this is a market-opening provision at long last, in that sense a major change from the Bush-negotiated agreement. I strongly urge support for the Korea FTA. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. LEVIN

Mr. LEVIN. How much time is remaining on both sides?

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the ranking member on the Trade Subcommittee, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McDermott). (Mr. McDERMOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)