Joseph Lieberman

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on April 17, 2012, at 2:30 p.m.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate, on April 17, 2012, at 10 a.m., in room SD 226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, to conduct a hearing entitled ``Ending Racial Profiling in America.''

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I know there are many who dismiss the President's proposal of the so-called Buffett rule as an election year tactic which has no chance of being enacted. But, for me, it must be taken as a serious proposal because it touches important economic principles at a very difficult economic time for our country. Although I was unable to be present for this afternoon's vote, I would have voted against the motion to proceed to the Paying a Fair Share Act of 2012, S. 2230, and I want to explain why. I am not opposed to the Buffett rule because I am opposed to raising income taxes on the wealthiest Americans. I am opposed to the Buffett rule because it would double to 30 percent the capital gains tax on one group of investors and therefore reduce exactly the kind of capital investments we need to get our economy growing again and create jobs. To protect America from being drowned in public debt we will eventually have to raise revenues, hopefully through broad tax reform, and, of course, we will also have to cut expenditures, particularly the rate of increased spending on so-called entitlement programs. But that is different from the question of how to tax gains on capital investments. I have long believed in the value of having a lower tax on capital gains than on regular income because capital investments are one of the engines that has driven this great economy of ours, made us the land of opportunity, and created the American middle class. Someone once said that if you take the ``capital'' out of capitalism, all you have left is an ``ism.'' There is a lot of truth in that play on words. My support for a lower capital gains rate was probably born when one of the great political inspirations of my life, President John F. Kennedy, advocated lower capital gains taxes as part of his ``a rising tide raises all boats'' fiscal policy. During my first term in the Senate in 1989, I supported President George H.W. Bush's proposal to lower the capital gains tax. I was one of a small group of Democrats to do so. During the 1990s, I worked alongside the late, great Jack Kemp in support of lower capital gains rates, especially for gains made on capital investments in low-income urban and rural areas which we called enterprise zones. Throughout the years, I cosponsored broad proposals to lower the capital gains tax with Senator Hatch and other Members of the Senate from both political parties. To me, economic history proves that lower capital gains taxes grow our economy and higher capital gains taxes don't increase revenues. This particular tax increase is especially ill-timed, since it is clear that literally billions of dollars are now being held back from new investments in America by individuals and businesses because they are uncertain about the future of our economy and the future of government policies that will affect their businesses and their investments. The best thing we could do to regenerate economic growth is to adopt broad-based tax and entitlement reform that would bring our government books into balance and give American businesses and investors a sense of certainty about the economic environment in which they will be living for years to come. The Buffett rule, on the other hand, targets a particular kind of economic activity--capital investments--which are what America's economy and people urgently need now. And that is why I would have voted against the Buffett rule.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to urge our colleagues to vote for cloture to proceed to the Postal Service bill. I will speak very briefly. This a great American institution, right there from the founding of our country. In fact, it is in the Constitution to provide post offices. It is an institution that is today in trouble. Last year, it lost almost $10 billion. Why? Part of it is the economic recession, but the real explanation is that mail volume has dropped 21 percent in the last 5 years, and mostly that is because people are using the Internet and e-mail instead of traditional mail. Yet the Postal Service not only itself provides a great service, but it facilitates various sectors of our economy that employ 7 million people--mailers, mail order catalogs, and the like. Our committee, when confronted with this crisis--and the statement from Postmaster General Donahoe that if nothing was done, he would have to begin curtailing operations sometime this year because he would essentially run out of enough money to operate the Postal Service as it is--tried to get together and work on a balanced program. We reported out a bipartisan bill. Some people said it was too much; some people said it was too little. We think it was just about right. There has been a lot of dialog with Senator Sanders and others, people on both sides of the aisle. When we take this up--and I sure hope it is ``when'' and not ``if'' because I do not know how we could just turn away from this problem and essentially say to the Postmaster: We are not going to provide you any help; you are going to have to handle this. What he is going to do is close a lot of post offices, in my opinion, close a lot of mail processing facilities, raise prices to the extent he can under existing law. This is a balanced program. It creates some protections for small and rural post offices before they can be closed. It creates new standards in the delivery of mail so the Postmaster will, in his wisdom, be able to thin out employment at some of the mail processing facilities, perhaps close some of them but nowhere near what he wanted to do earlier. The Postmaster asked us for authority to go from 6 days of delivery of mail to 5 days of delivery of most mail, and we essentially said: You may have to do that, Mr. Postmaster, but do not do it for 2 years. See if the other things we are authorizing you to do enable you to get the Postal Service back in fiscal balance. But if not, after the 2 years, with the process we ordained, they will have to go to 5 days of delivery. Here is the bottom line: We are trying everything we can to save this great institution. It is not a relic. It is a fundamental part of the modern economy, and it has some great resources. First is its presence all over the country. One of the things we are doing--we worked on this with Senator Sanders and others--in the substitute, we will create an advisory commission, a new commission which will be charged with the responsibility of not only reviewing the operations of the Postal Service to make sure it is being managed and run most efficiently but for looking for a new business model, for new ways to use the great assets of the Postal Service--one, that it is all over the country in the post offices; and, two, that no one else can cover the last mile of delivery to everybody's house or business in the country regardless of where you live, including the iconic burros that help deliver the mail in the Grand Canyon and the mailmen on snowshoes who deliver it in rural parts of Alaska. Right now, FedEx, UPS, and others use that service of the last mile to complete their delivery to their customers. We want to see if we can figure out how the Postal Service can make more money so it can stay alive. This is a great American institution which I believe has a great future, but it is not going to have it unless we help. So here we are challenged again. Are we going to fall into ideological rigidity or partisan conflict and let this great institution slide and fall into a deep crisis or are we going to work together, as I believe our committee has, to present a bipartisan solution which will guarantee, in a very different time in American history, that the post office--the U.S. Postal Service--can play as vital a role as it has throughout all the rest of our history. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I rise today to support cloture on the motion to concur in the House amendment to the ``Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act,'' the ``STOCK Act''--S. 2038. We have come a long way in a short time in a bipartisan fashion on this bill, which does many good things. I want to start by thanking my colleagues, Ranking member Collins and Senators Gillibrand and Brown for all their work on this bill. And I want to thank Majority Leader Reid for making the STOCK Act the first bill the Senate debated after the winter recess. Mr. President, this problem received a jolt of momentum late last year when ``60 Minutes'' aired allegations that some Members of Congress and their staffs used information gained on their jobs to enrich themselves with time-sensitive investments in the stock market and nothing could be done because Congress had exempted itself from insider trading laws. We took the issue up at a hearing of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in December and established that the charge that Congress had exempted itself from insider trading laws was just not true. However, it was also clear that existing laws needed to be clarified. At our committee hearing, several securities law experts told us that there was ambiguity in the law and they could not be sure how a court would rule if there was a challenge to the SEC's authority to bring an insider trading case against a Member of Congress. That is because, as the experts explained, a person may be found to have violated the insider trading laws only if he or she breaks a fiduciary duty, a duty of trust and confidence owed to somebody--to the shareholders of the company, or to the source of the nonpublic information, for example. The experts told us that it is possible that a judge looking at existing case law might conclude that Members of Congress owe no duty to anyone with respect to the nonpublic information they receive while carrying out their duties. Now, if I were a judge, I would not see it that way. It seems self-evident that public office is a public trust, and that Members of Congress have a duty to the institution of Congress, to the government as a whole, and to the American people not to use information gained during their time in Congress--and unavailable to the public--to make investments for personal profit. But the fact is that there are some very smart legal experts who are concerned that a judge would not see it that way. And this lack of clarity could in fact shield a Member of Congress from prosecution for insider trading. The STOCK Act clarifies this ambiguity in the Security Exchange Act of 1934 by explicitly stating that Members of Congress and our staffs have a duty of trust to the institution of Congress, to the U.S. Government, and to the American people--a duty that Members of Congress violate if they trade on non-public information they gain by virtue of their position. The bill also requires the Ethics Committees of both houses of Congress to issue guidance to clarify that Members and staff may not use non-public information derived from their position in Congress to make a private profit. Besides these changes aimed at insider trading, the STOCK Act includes other significant Congressional ethics legislation. For example, it requires Members of Congress and their staffs to file public reports on their purchases or sale of stocks, bonds, commodities futures or other financial transactions exceeding $1,000 within 30 days of the transaction. Currently these trades are reported once a year. Timelier reporting will allow the SEC and the public to assess whether there is anything suspicious about the timing of the trade. The bill also contains important language that requires financial disclosure forms filed by Members and staff be filed electronically and--perhaps even more significantly--be available online for public review. There really is no sensible reason to make someone come physically into the House or Senate to see a copy of one of these financial disclosure forms, which are public records. The bill will also require the Government Accountability Office to study and report back to Congress on so-called ``political intelligence'' consultants who sell information derived from government officials to investors. The STOCK Act also contains several provisions that were added in the Senate or House to strengthen the bill, including language offered by Senator Blumenthal related to the denial of Congressional benefits to Members who commit public corruption crimes; language offered by Senator Boxer that will, for the first time, require Members of Congress and senior Executive Branch officials to disclose their mortgages on their annual financial disclosure forms; and language offered by Senator McCain to prohibit executives of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from receiving bonuses while the firms remain in federal conservatorship. This is a very strong bill, in fact, the strongest Congressional ethics reform bill that has been passed by Congress since we passed the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act in 2007. This bill was reported as an original bill out of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs on December 13 by a vote of 7 to 2. Then, after thorough debate on the Senate floor, including the consideration of 20 amendments, the bill passed the Senate on Feb. 2 by a vote of 96 to 3. The bill was sent to the House, which moved quickly and approved the STOCK Act just a week later by a lopsided majority of 417 to 2. This is Congress at its best. A problem was identified that cut directly to the public's faith in this institution and we dealt with it quickly and on a bipartisan basis in both Houses. This should not only be applauded but serve as a model as we take up other crucial legislation, such as Postal reform and cybersecurity. This shows we can work together rather than engage in a perpetual partisan tug of war. Mr. President, in his farewell address to the Nation, President Washington said that ``virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government'' and that we cannot ``look with indifference'' at anything that shakes that foundation. The STOCK Act offers us a chance to restore trust in our elected government and to show those who, with their votes, gave us the honor of representing them here, that the only business we do here is the people's business. Duty Provisions

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair. I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support this bipartisan and now bicameral congressional ethics measure. This started as a response to stories and allegations that Members of Congress would not be held liable for insider trading. It then developed into what I think is the most significant congressional ethics legislation we have adopted in at least 5 years. It has been in a lot of other public disclosure and good government measures. I wish to give particular thanks to Senator Kirsten Gillibrand and Scott Brown, who led the effort and took the initiative that got this ball rolling. I yield the rest of my time to Senator Gillibrand.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator from Nevada. I am happy about the reforms that Congress has adopted, and I agree that the STOCK Act is not intended to limit government transparency or hinder dissemination of information to interested parties regarding Congressional activities and deliberations. In the interest of clarity for the record, I would like to state that the STOCK Act does not turn information regarding Congressional activities and deliberations that was previously not material, into material information with respect to securities laws. I would also note that a Member or employee of Congress who, in the course of performing their duties, has a nonpublic conversation with a citizen or constituent does not automatically violate the duty imposed by Section 4(b)(2) the STOCK Act.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Democratic leader is correct. As the Director of Enforcement at the SEC, Robert Khuzami, stated in his testimony before the House Financial Services Committee: ``You have to be acting with corrupt intent, knowledge, or recklessness. If you act in good faith, you're not going to be guilty.'' My staff had detailed conversations with the SEC while drafting the duty provisions and raised these concerns specifically. Our goal in drafting the duty provisions of the STOCK act was to ensure that insider trading restrictions apply to government officials no differently than they do to the rest of the public, but at the same time, avoid unintended consequences that could curtail interaction between Congress and the public.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. That is correct. It is not the intent of the STOCK Act to override the President's authority for necessary exemptions for intelligence activities.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I rise today to join my colleagues in congratulating Senator Barbara Mikulski from Maryland on becoming the longest-serving woman in the history of Congress. Senator Mikulski has thus reinforced her distinctive mark on this institution and her unmistakable place in our Nation's history. Those who have worked beside Senator Mikulski know her to be a dynamic force of nature. While she is not the tallest senator, she reaches the greatest heights with her strong principles, indomitable spirit, and steely resolve. From the neighborhoods of east Baltimore to the Halls of Congress, she has spent her career in the political trenches fighting for others--for women, for working Americans, and for her beloved Maryland. Senator Mikulski has been a practical leader for better women's health care. She fought to have women included in clinical trials and medical research at the National Institutes of Health and helped establish federal standards for mammograms. Her impact is not only felt in the lives of those she serves, but also in her relationships with those she serves with. At this time in our politics when the partisanship pulls us apart, when tribal instincts have coarsened our discourse and weakened our bonds, Senator Mikulski is a unifying force of comity in the Senate. She brings a sense of civility and a sense of humor to this institution at a time when both are sorely needed. Women senators fondly know Senator Mikulski as their Dean. She hosts regular bipartisan dinners for them and is a trusted mentor. She understands that while many of us come to Congress with competing goals, at the end of the day, we are colleagues. We have to work together. Unless we can affirm our bonds as colleagues and fellow humans, the work we are tasked with by the American people will not get done, and the public interest will suffer as a result. Senator Mikulski's remarkable career continues to inspire women across our country on the nobility of public service and the ability for one person to bring about positive change in the lives of others. It is a pleasure to serve beside her, and I wish her my very best for many more productive years here in the Senate.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I come to the floor to express my opposition to the Roberts amendment No. 1826, which, among other provisions, would have opened the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge for drilling. I should start by stating that there are several provisions in this amendment that I would support, such as an extension of tax credits for our short-line railroads or those for brownfields remediation expenses. Unfortunately, these positives were outweighed by the negative provisions, several of which we have already voted on, including Keystone XL and offshore drilling. I guess it is only fitting that, in my last year to serve in the Senate, we should be faced with this challenge once again. In 1988, I took up the protection of the Arctic Refuge in my first Senate campaign; and since then, I have made it one of my missions to protect this great unspoiled natural American treasure. Throughout the years, many colleagues have joined together in this important bipartisan endeavor. Today I am proud to continue the fight to protect the refuge alongside my colleague from Washington, Senator Cantwell, as well as with many others, including the chairman of the Environment and Public Works Committee, Senator Boxer. In keeping with Secretary of State George Schultz's dictum that ``nothing ever gets settled in this town,'' some of our colleagues have found a new way to try and open the Arctic Refuge to drilling. Yesterday, they proposed that we tie the as yet unknown proceeds from drilling in the Arctic Refuge to the transportation bill that the Senate is now debating. Is there anyone in this chamber who believes that the purpose of this amendment is to generate revenue to rebuild our Nation's infrastructure? Of course not. Instead, the true purpose of this amendment was to try and package this provision, which has been defeated so many times already in the chamber, with other issues that Members may be inclined to support, in an attempt to finally jam it through. Well, I can tell my colleagues that no matter how it is packaged, we will remain steadfast in saying ``No'' to drilling in the Arctic Refuge. Proponents of drilling use two principle arguments: that drilling in the Arctic Refuge will lower oil prices and that it will be minimal in its disruption to the refuge. Let's look at these propositions more closely. With regard to the claim that drilling in ANWR could solve our Nation's energy crisis, the Energy Information Agency tells us that peak production in the Arctic Refuge would be fewer than 1 million barrels per day, and that peak will not be reached until 2030 at the earliest. At that point, if we continue our current oil consumption trends, the refuge would only reduce our imports of foreign oil by 3 percent. To put this level of production in context, the Department of Energy reported in 2008 that: ``ANWR oil production is not projected to have a large impact on world oil prices. . . . Additional oil production resulting from the opening of ANWR would be only a small portion of total world oil production, and would likely be offset in part by somewhat lower production outside the United States.'' Destroying one of the greatest wilderness areas in the United States, a region often referred to as ``America's Serengeti,'' under the banner of energy security would be a dubious proposition under any circumstances. But to do despoil this wilderness when doing so would not really enhance our energy security would be truly senseless. We have plenty of untapped or unused wells and leases on public lands that have potential energy resources. In fact, of the 41 million acres of Federal lands that are leased, oil and gas companies are only drilling on about 12 million of those acres. Let's be sure the remaining 29 million acres are used effectively before we irreversibly ruin a beautiful natural treasure such as the Arctic Refuge. Proponents of drilling in the Arctic Refuge argue that if we drill, it will only be on this limited strip of land and will not alter the landscape. But the effects of oil wells, pipelines, roads, airports, housing, gravel mines, air pollution, industrial noise, seismic exploration, and exploratory drilling would in fact radiate across the entire coastal plain of the Arctic Refuge. Look at the Prudhoe Bay oil field. When it was opened for development in the 1970s, the oil industry argued that it could drill safely and in an environmentally friendly manner. What happened? It is a sprawl of industrialization, emits more air pollution than many cities in the lower 48, and routinely sees oil and toxin spills. And what about the wildlife, which the refuge was established to protect? Crucial habitat for some of our Nation's most beloved wildlife species would be destroyed, and sacred land for the Gwich'in people would be forever lost. It makes no sense to destroy this awe-inspiring landscape for oil that won't lower prices for our consumers or give us true energy security. We all agree that we have an urgent energy problem in this country. However, America can balance its energy needs with our conservation heritage. We can implement a new, diverse energy policy--one that creates jobs through clean and sustainable energy solutions, even while protecting precious natural resources such as the Arctic Refuge. As I have said every time I have come to the floor to speak about the Arctic Refuge, the mark of greatness in a generation lies not just in what it builds for itself, but also in what it preserves for the generations to come. I want to close by quoting President Theodore Roosevelt, one of our Nation's greatest leaders: ``Our duty to the whole, including the unborn generations, bids us restrain an unprincipled present-day minority from wasting the heritage of these unborn generations. The movement for the conservation of wildlife and the larger movement for the conservation of all our natural resources are essentially democratic in spirit, purpose, and method.'' His words are even more relevant today; and as we consider the issue at hand, I am pleased my colleagues recalled those visionary words and his legacy and voted no on the Roberts amendment.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, last year we were all saddened to learn of the passing of Casey Ribicoff, a remarkable woman and the wife of former Connecticut Senator Abe Ribicoff. In honor of Mrs. Ribicoff, I would like to have printed in the Record the moving tributes that were given at her funeral by some of those who knew her best.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to address Senator Blunt's amendment to the surface transportation bill, which deals with the Obama Administration's recent proposal to require group and individual health insurance plans, with the exception of those issued to churches or other houses of worship, to cover contraceptive care for all women. I believe the administration's proposal is inadequate, but I will not support the Blunt Amendment because I believe it is too broad. I want to discuss how this amendment came before the Senate and then I will lay out the reasons why I will vote against it and offer a different way forward. The question before us deals with one of the most controversial matters raised by the Affordable Care Act--which is finding a balance between requiring health insurance plans to cover a core level of benefits and respecting the religious rights and moral beliefs of those who will be mandated to purchase these health insurance products. This is a difficult issue because religious freedom, as enshrined in the Bill of Rights, is literally the first of our freedoms. And the issue of access to quality health insurance for every American is at the cornerstone of the Affordable Care Act. I would like to quickly review how the administration has addressed this question in its regulations implementing the Affordable Care Act. The ACA, as adopted by Congress, directs all health insurance plans to cover a number of preventative care services, without cost sharing or copays, to include some immunizations, preventive care and screenings for children and adolescents, and with respect to women, additional preventive care and screenings that the Secretary of Health and Human Services has determined should include contraception and contraception screening. In explaining its decision to include contraceptive services within that mandate, the administration has referenced the Institute of Medicine's conclusion that there are significant health benefits derived from providing women with access to contraceptive care. I agree with the Institute of Medicine and the overwhelming majority of Americans who believe that having access to contraceptive care is important for women and is a right protected by U.S. Supreme Court precedent. But then we have to ask, must the cost of contraceptive coverage be covered by the health insurance plans of every employer? In answering this question, we are required to address the concerns of those who oppose the use of contraceptives based on their religious or moral convictions. The administration provided, correctly in my view, a total exemption from this mandate for houses of worship that oppose the use of contraception on moral and religious grounds. But the administration did not extend this total exemption to such church- affiliated, non-profit organizations as hospitals, charities, and schools. In response to the public outcry to the original regulation, the President amended his proposal in order to allow church-affiliated, non-profits, such as hospitals, schools, and charities, to exclude contraceptive coverage in the health insurance plans they provide to their employees, but only if their insurer directly contacts each employee covered under their health insurance plan and makes them aware that they are eligible to obtain contraceptive coverage at no cost if they choose to do so. In my view, this proposed compromise falls short of protecting the values and beliefs of America's faith-based institutions. It can and should be strengthened to give religiously affiliated organizations the same protection of their religious beliefs as the administration would give to houses of worship. I do not see why religious affiliated institutions like hospitals, universities and their employees should be treated differently from churches, synagogues and their employees. Many States, ever the laboratories of our democracy, have already addressed this question in a reasonable and responsible way that is different from the administration's response. In fact, many States have established their own mandates with regard to contraceptive coverage, and along the way devised their own approaches to respect the balance between requiring health insurance plans to cover a core level of benefits and respecting the right of conscience for those who purchase or offer a private health insurance plan to their employees. Specifically, I believe that Connecticut's approach to this question is one that could serve as a model of how to address this issue on a national level. In Connecticut, health insurance plans are required to cover contraceptive care for all women, but the law provides a full exemption for health insurance plans purchased and provided by churches and church-affiliated organizations, acknowledging their unique, faith- inspired mission and core religious values. Specifically, the law in Connecticut states that churches and their affiliated institutions, may be issued a health insurance policy that, ``excludes coverage for prescription contraceptive methods which are contrary to the religious employer's bona fide religious tenets.'' The law in Connecticut also allows any individual beneficiary in any health insurance plan to opt out of contraceptive coverage as long as she or he notifies their insurance provider, ``that prescription contraceptive methods are contrary to such individual's religious or moral beliefs.'' Unlike Connecticut's approach, Senator Blunt's amendment would provide a broad based exemption from all mandated health insurance benefits required by the Affordable Care Act--by allowing any business or organization to refuse to offer any coverage to its employees that it finds objectionable on a religious or moral basis. Such a broad exemption could undermine the intent of Congress in mandating coverage for such essential services as maternity care, mental health, and immunizations. In conclusion, the experiences of many of our States, including Connecticut, shows that it is possible to find a better balance between requiring health insurance companies to offer a quality health insurance product and respecting the religious liberties of our Nation's religious-affiliated organization than either the administration or this amendment offers. There is a better way forward on this important decision than the options that have been presented so far and I hope to work with my colleagues in the Senate to develop one.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I came to the floor to introduce the Cyber Security Act of 2012. I am here with Senator Susan Collins. I thank her for all the work we have done together in what has been a wonderfully bipartisan, nonpartisan relationship to deal with a very serious national problem. I am honored that we are joined in introducing this bill by the chairs of the two committees that have been most involved in questions of cyber security, chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Rockefeller, and the chair of the Intelligence Committee of the Senate, Senator Feinstein of California. We have also had the involvement of the chairs and others on the Foreign Relations Committee, Judiciary Committee, and Energy Committee. I am very proud this is a bill that Senators Collins and Rockefeller and Feinstein and I introduced today. I wish to give particular thanks to the majority leader, Senator Reid, for his unflagging support, based on his personal concern about cyber defenses and based on classified briefings he received on this problem. He pushed us to work across party and committee lines to pull the bill together that we are introducing today. It is interesting to note--since there has been a lot of commentary in the last 24 hours about President Obama's budget--that President Obama has recognized, in the most tangible terms, the danger that confronts us by recommending adding at least $300 million in the coming year to our cyber security effort. Still, I know that while it is February 14, 2012, those of us who have worked on this problem fear that when it comes to protecting America from cyber attack, it may be September 10, 2001, all over again. The question is whether America will confront this grave threat to our security before it happens, before our enemies attack. We are being bled of our intellectual property every day by cyber thieves. The consequences of their thievery are very real to America's economy, our prosperity, and indeed our capacity to create jobs and hold the ones we have. Enemies probe the weaknesses in our critical national assets every day, waiting until the time is right, through cyber attack, to cripple our economy or attack, for instance, a city's electric grid with the touch of a key on the other side of the world. The fact is our cyber defenses are not what they should be, but such as they are they are blinking red. Yet, again, I fear we will not be able to connect the dots to prevent a 9/11-type cyber attack on America before it happens. The aim of this bill is to make sure we don't scramble here in Congress after such an attack to do what we can and should do today. Intellectual property worth billions of dollars has already been stolen, giving our international competitors access in the global marketplace without ever having to invest a dime in research. The fact is that even the most sophisticated companies are being penetrated, and our adversaries are using information learned in one intrusion to plan the next more sophisticated one. Last year, the computer security firm McAfee conducted a study of 70 specific instances of data theft, and they issued a report on those instances. They included 13 defense contractors, 6 industrial plants, and 8 American and Canadian Government networks. Based on that report, the former vice president of McAfee, Dmitri Alperovitch, issued this ominous warning: I am convinced that every company in every conceivable industry with significant size and valuable intellectual property and trade secrets has been compromised--or will be shortly--with the great majority of the victims rarely discovering the intrusion or its impact. In fact, I divide this entire set of Fortune Global 2000 firms into two categories: those that know they've been compromised and those that don't yet know. These examples, of course, are deeply alarming, but in addition, lurking out in the ether are computer worms such as Stuxnet that can commandeer the computers that control heavy machinery and potentially allow an intruder to open and close key valves and switches in pipelines, refineries, factories, water and sewer systems, and electric plants in our country without detection by their operators. Obviously, this capacity could be used by an enemy to attack our country and do damage not only comparable to 9/11 but far in excess of it. Depending on the target or targets, these kinds of cyber attacks could lead to terrible physical destruction, massive loss of life, massive evacuations, and, of course, widespread economic disruption. Owners of these critical systems; that is, private sector owners-- and, remember, most of private infrastructure in America is privately owned and is what this bill is talking about--have sometimes told us we don't need to worry about the security of their systems because they are not connected to the Internet. But the reality today is that is simply not correct. The experts have told us that a truly air-gapped system, as they call it; that is, one not connected to the Internet--is as rare as a blizzard in the Caribbean. If it exists, our best cyber experts have yet to see it. And Stuxnet has shown us it doesn't matter if a system is air gapped, because one thumb drive plugged into a computer can lead to an infection that spreads. If we don't act now to secure our computer network, sometime in the future--and I believe it will be in the near future--we will be forced to act in the middle of a mega cyber crisis or right after one that has had an enormous, perhaps catastrophic, effect on our country. That is why we introduced this bill, and that is why we look forward to the debate on it, and why we hope it will pass and be enacted before a cyber catastrophe occurs in America. Let me briefly describe some of the important work this bill does. First, it ensures the computer systems--private systems--that control our most critical infrastructure that are currently not secure are made secure. Our bill defines critical infrastructure narrowly to include those systems that, if brought down, or commandeered in a cyber attack would lead to mass casualties, evacuations of major population centers, the collapse of financial markets, or degradation of our national security. This is critical infrastructure. After identifying the precise systems that meet the definition of high risk, the Secretary of Homeland Security would, under our legislation, then work with the private sector operators of those systems to develop cyber security performance requirements based on risk assessments of those sectors. The private sector owners would then have some flexibility to meet those performance requirements with hardware or software they choose so long as it achieves the required level of security. The Department of Homeland Security will not be picking technological winners and losers, so there is nothing in this bill that would stifle innovation. In fact, I think quite the contrary. If a company can show it already has met high security standards, it will be exempt from these requirements. The bill focuses on securing that which is not secure today, not on putting new requirements on industries that are doing everything they should be doing to protect themselves and our national security. Once these improved security systems come on line, I think many companies will want to apply them to noncritical systems that are not covered by this bill as a way to protect the privacy of their employees and customers, as well as giving these companies the chance to offer secure e-commerce services. But that will be up to each company. This bill also seeks to make compliance easier, more rational for covered critical infrastructure operators by creating a more streamlined and efficient cyber organization within the Department of Homeland Security. And at each step in the process created by our bill, the Department of Homeland Security must work with existing Federal regulators and the private sector they regulate to ensure no rules or regulations are put in place that duplicate or conflict with existing requirements. If a company feels the designation of its networks as critical infrastructure is somehow wrong, it has the right to appeal that decision through a system that the law requires DHS to set up or they can go to Federal district court. This bill also establishes mechanisms for information sharing between the private sector and the Federal Government and among the private sector operators themselves. Senator Feinstein and her committee made a significant contribution to this part of our bill. This is important because computer security experts in the private and public sectors need to be able to share information, compare notes, in order to protect us against the evolving cyber threat. Our proposal also creates appropriate security measures and oversight to protect privacy and preserve civil liberties. In fact, I was pleased to read recently that the American Civil Liberties Union said it had studied our bill and found it offers the greatest privacy protections of all the cyber security legislation that has been proposed. I am going to jump forward a little so I can yield to my distinguished ranking member in a moment. I have discussed some of the things the bill does, but I want to mention two it doesn't do. One myth about this bill is that it contains a kill switch that would allow the President of the United States in an emergency to seize control of the Internet. There is nothing remotely like that in this bill. At one time we had considered language that would, in fact, have limited powers the President has under the Communications Act of 1934 to take over electronic communications in times of war. But that provision was so widely misunderstood or misrepresented that we dropped it rather than risk losing the chance to pass the rest of this urgently needed legislation. I also want to make clear that nothing in this bill touches on any of the issues that quite recently have inflamed our consideration of the Stop Online Piracy Act or the Protect IP Act, known as PIPA. Many Members in the Chamber have, metaphorically speaking, scars that still show from that experience. No need to fear this bill. This bill does nothing to affect the day-to-day workings of the Internet. Internet piracy and copyright protections are important concerns in the digital age. We have to deal with that at some point, but they are simply not part of this bill. One final thing I do want to deal with is a complaint from, among others, our Chamber of Commerce that we are ``rushing forward with legislation that has not been fully vetted.'' Not true. This bipartisan legislation has been 3 years in the making, and its outlines have not only been shared with stakeholders and the public but their input has helped shape this final version of the bill we are introducing today. More than 20 hearings on cyber security have been held across seven different Senate committees, with dozens more held on questions related to cyber security. In fact, our own committee, since 2005, has held nine hearings on the subject and will hold another one this Thursday where we will hear reactions to this bill. I am very pleased to say that Senator Reid continues to be very committed to seeing us do everything we can to adopt legislation to protect our American cyber systems. I believe it is the leader's intent to bring up this bill in the next work period. I hope so. Because the truth is, time is not on our side. We are not adequately protected at this moment, and the capabilities of those who are attacking us for economic reasons or who prepare to attack us for strategic reasons grows larger and larger. I do want to say we have a growing number of companies in the private sector--information technology, cyber security and other companies in critical infrastructure areas--that are coming to support this bill. Two I want to mention are SISCO and Oracle, which gives you some sense of the range of support for the bill. Bottom line, I think this is a subject around which we should have a good healthy debate, an open amendment process, and a bipartisan agreement, because this is not at all about regulation, it is about our most fundamental national economic security and public safety. With that, I yield the floor to my distinguished ranking member, Senator Collins.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I came to the floor to introduce the Cyber Security Act of 2012. I am here with Senator Susan Collins. I thank her for all the work we have done together in what has been a wonderfully bipartisan, nonpartisan relationship to deal with a very serious national problem. I am honored that we are joined in introducing this bill by the chairs of the two committees that have been most involved in questions of cyber security, chairman of the Commerce Committee, Senator Rockefeller, and the chair of the Intelligence Committee of the Senate, Senator Feinstein of California. We have also had the involvement of the chairs and others on the Foreign Relations Committee, Judiciary Committee, and Energy Committee. I am very proud this is a bill that Senators Collins and Rockefeller and Feinstein and I introduced today. I wish to give particular thanks to the majority leader, Senator Reid, for his unflagging support, based on his personal concern about cyber defenses and based on classified briefings he received on this problem. He pushed us to work across party and committee lines to pull the bill together that we are introducing today. It is interesting to note--since there has been a lot of commentary in the last 24 hours about President Obama's budget--that President Obama has recognized, in the most tangible terms, the danger that confronts us by recommending adding at least $300 million in the coming year to our cyber security effort. Still, I know that while it is February 14, 2012, those of us who have worked on this problem fear that when it comes to protecting America from cyber attack, it may be September 10, 2001, all over again. The question is whether America will confront this grave threat to our security before it happens, before our enemies attack. We are being bled of our intellectual property every day by cyber thieves. The consequences of their thievery are very real to America's economy, our prosperity, and indeed our capacity to create jobs and hold the ones we have. Enemies probe the weaknesses in our critical national assets every day, waiting until the time is right, through cyber attack, to cripple our economy or attack, for instance, a city's electric grid with the touch of a key on the other side of the world. The fact is our cyber defenses are not what they should be, but such as they are they are blinking red. Yet, again, I fear we will not be able to connect the dots to prevent a 9/11-type cyber attack on America before it happens. The aim of this bill is to make sure we don't scramble here in Congress after such an attack to do what we can and should do today. Intellectual property worth billions of dollars has already been stolen, giving our international competitors access in the global marketplace without ever having to invest a dime in research. The fact is that even the most sophisticated companies are being penetrated, and our adversaries are using information learned in one intrusion to plan the next more sophisticated one. Last year, the computer security firm McAfee conducted a study of 70 specific instances of data theft, and they issued a report on those instances. They included 13 defense contractors, 6 industrial plants, and 8 American and Canadian Government networks. Based on that report, the former vice president of McAfee, Dmitri Alperovitch, issued this ominous warning: I am convinced that every company in every conceivable industry with significant size and valuable intellectual property and trade secrets has been compromised--or will be shortly--with the great majority of the victims rarely discovering the intrusion or its impact. In fact, I divide this entire set of Fortune Global 2000 firms into two categories: those that know they've been compromised and those that don't yet know. These examples, of course, are deeply alarming, but in addition, lurking out in the ether are computer worms such as Stuxnet that can commandeer the computers that control heavy machinery and potentially allow an intruder to open and close key valves and switches in pipelines, refineries, factories, water and sewer systems, and electric plants in our country without detection by their operators. Obviously, this capacity could be used by an enemy to attack our country and do damage not only comparable to 9/11 but far in excess of it. Depending on the target or targets, these kinds of cyber attacks could lead to terrible physical destruction, massive loss of life, massive evacuations, and, of course, widespread economic disruption. Owners of these critical systems; that is, private sector owners-- and, remember, most of private infrastructure in America is privately owned and is what this bill is talking about--have sometimes told us we don't need to worry about the security of their systems because they are not connected to the Internet. But the reality today is that is simply not correct. The experts have told us that a truly air-gapped system, as they call it; that is, one not connected to the Internet--is as rare as a blizzard in the Caribbean. If it exists, our best cyber experts have yet to see it. And Stuxnet has shown us it doesn't matter if a system is air gapped, because one thumb drive plugged into a computer can lead to an infection that spreads. If we don't act now to secure our computer network, sometime in the future--and I believe it will be in the near future--we will be forced to act in the middle of a mega cyber crisis or right after one that has had an enormous, perhaps catastrophic, effect on our country. That is why we introduced this bill, and that is why we look forward to the debate on it, and why we hope it will pass and be enacted before a cyber catastrophe occurs in America. Let me briefly describe some of the important work this bill does. First, it ensures the computer systems--private systems--that control our most critical infrastructure that are currently not secure are made secure. Our bill defines critical infrastructure narrowly to include those systems that, if brought down, or commandeered in a cyber attack would lead to mass casualties, evacuations of major population centers, the collapse of financial markets, or degradation of our national security. This is critical infrastructure. After identifying the precise systems that meet the definition of high risk, the Secretary of Homeland Security would, under our legislation, then work with the private sector operators of those systems to develop cyber security performance requirements based on risk assessments of those sectors. The private sector owners would then have some flexibility to meet those performance requirements with hardware or software they choose so long as it achieves the required level of security. The Department of Homeland Security will not be picking technological winners and losers, so there is nothing in this bill that would stifle innovation. In fact, I think quite the contrary. If a company can show it already has met high security standards, it will be exempt from these requirements. The bill focuses on securing that which is not secure today, not on putting new requirements on industries that are doing everything they should be doing to protect themselves and our national security. Once these improved security systems come on line, I think many companies will want to apply them to noncritical systems that are not covered by this bill as a way to protect the privacy of their employees and customers, as well as giving these companies the chance to offer secure e-commerce services. But that will be up to each company. This bill also seeks to make compliance easier, more rational for covered critical infrastructure operators by creating a more streamlined and efficient cyber organization within the Department of Homeland Security. And at each step in the process created by our bill, the Department of Homeland Security must work with existing Federal regulators and the private sector they regulate to ensure no rules or regulations are put in place that duplicate or conflict with existing requirements. If a company feels the designation of its networks as critical infrastructure is somehow wrong, it has the right to appeal that decision through a system that the law requires DHS to set up or they can go to Federal district court. This bill also establishes mechanisms for information sharing between the private sector and the Federal Government and among the private sector operators themselves. Senator Feinstein and her committee made a significant contribution to this part of our bill. This is important because computer security experts in the private and public sectors need to be able to share information, compare notes, in order to protect us against the evolving cyber threat. Our proposal also creates appropriate security measures and oversight to protect privacy and preserve civil liberties. In fact, I was pleased to read recently that the American Civil Liberties Union said it had studied our bill and found it offers the greatest privacy protections of all the cyber security legislation that has been proposed. I am going to jump forward a little so I can yield to my distinguished ranking member in a moment. I have discussed some of the things the bill does, but I want to mention two it doesn't do. One myth about this bill is that it contains a kill switch that would allow the President of the United States in an emergency to seize control of the Internet. There is nothing remotely like that in this bill. At one time we had considered language that would, in fact, have limited powers the President has under the Communications Act of 1934 to take over electronic communications in times of war. But that provision was so widely misunderstood or misrepresented that we dropped it rather than risk losing the chance to pass the rest of this urgently needed legislation. I also want to make clear that nothing in this bill touches on any of the issues that quite recently have inflamed our consideration of the Stop Online Piracy Act or the Protect IP Act, known as PIPA. Many Members in the Chamber have, metaphorically speaking, scars that still show from that experience. No need to fear this bill. This bill does nothing to affect the day-to-day workings of the Internet. Internet piracy and copyright protections are important concerns in the digital age. We have to deal with that at some point, but they are simply not part of this bill. One final thing I do want to deal with is a complaint from, among others, our Chamber of Commerce that we are ``rushing forward with legislation that has not been fully vetted.'' Not true. This bipartisan legislation has been 3 years in the making, and its outlines have not only been shared with stakeholders and the public but their input has helped shape this final version of the bill we are introducing today. More than 20 hearings on cyber security have been held across seven different Senate committees, with dozens more held on questions related to cyber security. In fact, our own committee, since 2005, has held nine hearings on the subject and will hold another one this Thursday where we will hear reactions to this bill. I am very pleased to say that Senator Reid continues to be very committed to seeing us do everything we can to adopt legislation to protect our American cyber systems. I believe it is the leader's intent to bring up this bill in the next work period. I hope so. Because the truth is, time is not on our side. We are not adequately protected at this moment, and the capabilities of those who are attacking us for economic reasons or who prepare to attack us for strategic reasons grows larger and larger. I do want to say we have a growing number of companies in the private sector--information technology, cyber security and other companies in critical infrastructure areas--that are coming to support this bill. Two I want to mention are SISCO and Oracle, which gives you some sense of the range of support for the bill. Bottom line, I think this is a subject around which we should have a good healthy debate, an open amendment process, and a bipartisan agreement, because this is not at all about regulation, it is about our most fundamental national economic security and public safety. With that, I yield the floor to my distinguished ranking member, Senator Collins.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to voice my support to the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act conference report which was passed by the Senate last night, and will provide a greater sense of financial security than the Federal Aviation Administration, FAA, has seen in a long time. No agency should be subjected to the budget uncertainties that FAA has been forced to experience, nor strung along year after year unable to make long-term plans. For more than 4 years, the FAA has operated under more than 20 short-term funding extensions. I think that is unprecedented in the history of agency funding. At any rate, it is no way to run a railroad or a national aviation system. I also support the conference report because it would finally allow the FAA to move forward on the NextGen air navigation program, would give the passenger's bill of rights the force of law, and would provide billions of dollars to improve and develop public airports across the country. For these reasons, the legislation is long overdue and sorely needed. The conference report, however, does contain a provision about aviation security and the Transportation Security Administration, TSA, that is deeply troubling to me and about which I feel duty bound to express my disapproval. At stake is TSA's management of the Screening Partnership Program, SPP, which allows a limited number of airports around the country to replace Transportation Security Officers, TSOs, with private contractors to screen passengers and their baggage. TSA has implemented this program at airports where, due to low-traffic volume, full-time, year-round Federal staff is unnecessary. A handful of larger airports take part in the program so TSA can measure and assess its performance and cost effectiveness against the private contractors. It is telling that TSA's assessment after comparing the two systems is that it can secure airports more economically than private screeners can. Regrettably, some of my colleagues in the House and Senate are resolved to undermine TSA--and therefore airport security itself--by advocating for the pre-9/11 system of screening by private contractors. My response to that is, how quickly we forget. Mr. President, we have already tried an aviation security system run by private contractors. It very tragically did not work. The 9/11 attacks did not occur because of one, two, or three specific vulnerabilities. They occurred because a number of our defenses-- including our system of airport screening--were simply inadequate. I know everyone has vivid memories of the days after the 9/11 attacks, and it is hard to forget the dramatic loss of confidence the public felt for the aviation security system. Air travel dropped off precipitously in the weeks and months after 9/11, the aviation industry was shaken to its core, and our economy suffered because of it. It became clear to many of us that aviation security was inseparable from national security, and we could not, and should not, rely on the private sector to do the job. The security of our skies would have to become a government responsibility. Americans need to be safe and secure wherever and whenever they travel. And while I would not want to cast blame or criticism on any one contractor, we have already witnessed the results of a system utilizing private security companies which were constantly pressured to focus on costs first and security second. Less than 2 weeks after the 9/11 attacks, a bipartisan group of 21 Senators introduced the legislation that would create TSA and turn airport screening over to Federal officials. Barely a month after 9/11, the Senate passed that bill by a vote of 100 to 0. The bipartisanship of that vote was heartening and demonstrated a unity among Members that I wish we could experience more often. In the years since, we have had a few near misses, and our defenses have been penetrated more than once, but no hijackings or terrorist incidents have been successfully carried out. In large part, we have a dedicated corps of TSOs to thank for that. I know it is fashionable in some quarters to criticize TSA. Understandably, people are unhappy with pat-downs, body scans, and invasions of privacy. But TSA establishes its policies for a reason. They are a direct response to real terrorist threats, and they have evolved as the threat has evolved. When a terrorist put explosives in his shoes and tried to light them afire mid-flight in 2001, TSA asked passengers to remove their shoes for screening. When a terrorist plot was uncovered in 2006 that involved lighting flammable liquids aboard several planes, liquids, except in small quantities, were prohibited. After the Christmas Day 2009 attempted attack with explosives hidden in a terrorist's clothing, better screening technology was developed. These are not hypothetical cases or academic scenarios. They are real incidents and the reason that TSA makes so many demands on the flying public. And we should not delude ourselves or the American people into thinking that adopting a contract workforce will eliminate the need for body scanners, pat-downs, or any other security procedure TSA determines is necessary to secure air travel. Regardless of whether a U.S. airport uses Federal screeners or private ones, the security procedures implemented are the same. Yet a provision has been tucked into this bill that would make it more difficult for TSA to maintain its current system by lowering the burden of proof for admitting additional airports to the Screening Partnership Program. Right now, airports must demonstrate that a private screening workforce would be more effective, secure, and efficient, than the TSA. The standard tucked into this bill, however, would only require airports to demonstrate that using private screeners ``would not compromise security or detrimentally affect the cost- efficiency or the effectiveness of screening.'' While the TSA Administrator would still have the authority to deny an application to the Screening Partnership Program, this lower standard would make it far more difficult for him to do so. TSA Administrator Pistole has said that the Screening Partnership Program should be used judiciously and that airport screening is and should remain a core mission for the Department of Homeland Security since 9/11, and I agree with him wholeheartedly. Another provision in the bill strikes me as counterproductive. This provision would require TSA to provide recommendations to an airport that was denied its application to the SPP on how that airport can overcome the denial, if it decides to resubmit its application. If TSA believes that it can screen passengers and baggage better and with more cost efficiency than a private contractor, why would it provide tips on how an airport can escape that system? Private screening could also limit TSA's ability to react nimbly to intelligence threats. If screeners are privately employed and managed airport by airport, TSA may not be able to respond effectively by shifting personnel to where it is most needed or modifying procedures if it cannot exert direct control over screeners. Mr. President, private screening at airports could undermine not just public confidence in the aviation security system but in aviation security itself. We have been there and experienced the consequences of private screening. The American public must feel secure when it travels, and security is the first priority of TSA. Ultimately, I voted for the Federal Aviation Administration Modernization and Reform Act. But I believe we should reconsider and revisit the language related to TSA's Screening Partnership Program. I would urge my colleagues to remember the lessons learned after 9/11 and work with me to ensure we won't make the same mistakes again.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I wish to briefly thank the Senators from Vermont and Texas for this amendment. It strengthens the bill, as does the preceding amendment offered by Senator McCain, and I urge its adoption.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, in 6 or 7 minutes the Senate will begin a series of votes on the matter before us, the STOCK Act. I want to take a few moments to restate the underlying main purpose of the legislation, which is to respond to the public concern, informed by testimony before our committee from experts on securities law, that it is not totally clear that Members of Congress and our staffs are covered by anti-insider trading laws enforced by the SEC. The No. 1 accomplishment of this proposal will be to make that crystal clear. We are not exempt from that law; we should not be exempt. I presume most Members of Congress have assumed we have never been exempt. But this will make it clear if anybody crosses the line, they cannot defend themselves by saying that Members of Congress are not covered by the law. We have also added in committee a couple of provisions which embrace the old but still important notion that sunshine is the best disinfectant in government by requiring that the annual financial disclosure reports we file will now be filed electronically and will therefore be available on the Internet. Right now, these are public documents. When they are filed in the Office of the Secretary of the Senate, people have to go there and make copies of them to see them. As Senator Begich, our colleague from Alaska, said: That is not easy if you are an Alaskan. This will bring that system up to date. The third part--which I know is controversial for some, but I think it is sensible--is to require that within 30 days of any stock trades, disclosure forms must be filed with the Senate and also online. I can tell you that the Securities and Exchange Commission has made clear in testimony before the House committee and in discussions with our staff that that kind of periodic requirement for disclosure of trades in stock and securities will help them do the job we want them to do to make sure that insider trading laws are not being violated and, of course, will keep the public, our constituents, informed of what we are about. A number of amendments are up. As Senator Reid said, I hope we don't have rollcall votes on all of them. I think a number of them will receive unanimous support on both sides. I hope we can adopt them by voice. There is one amendment, Senator Shelby's amendment No. 1491, to which, as part of the agreement, I filed a side-by-side, as it were. I support the goal that Senator Shelby has of holding the executive branch accountable in ways similar to the way we are; that is, the amendment, generally speaking, would extend the 30-day reporting requirement, disclosure requirement, to a very large number of executive branch employees. That, to me, is the problem. It is too broad. It would create a cost and an unnecessary reporting system for many executive branch employees. I want to point out here that when it comes to avoiding and preventing conflicts of interest, the executive branch is probably well ahead of the legislative branch. The ethics rules requirement and guidance put forward over the years by the Office of Government Ethics at the agencies are extensive and address a wide range of potential conflicts of interest and/or improprieties. They have teeth, criminal sanctions. For instance, high-level executive branch employees already file financial disclosure forms that face a very extensive system of agency review. These agency officials and career civil servants are often forced to divest themselves of their stock holdings if they seem to be in conflict with their responsibilities or to recuse themselves, not to be involved in matters in order to minimize potential conflicts of interest. That is a much different standard than we impose on ourselves, which is the standard of disclosure. I have introduced a version of Senator Shelby's amendment, which I think achieves his goal in a significant way but not so broadly. Rather than the tens of thousands of people encompassed in the Shelby amendment, mine is targeted at policymakers most equivalent to those of us in Congress and those who work with us; that is, positions in our government that are Senate-confirmed and also certain high-level White House and agency staff who might not be Senate-confirmed but are policymakers. These individuals are public officials with visible high- profile roles, and the extra scrutiny that comes with increased reporting requirements seems to be more appropriate for this group-- including the President, Vice President, appointees in the White House, the so-called policy czars, special assistants to the President, as well as members of the Federal Reserve Board. I hope we can take this significant step to achieve what Senator Shelby had in mind, but not, if I can put it this way, overdo it in a way that will actually, according to comments we have had from people in the executive branch, get in the way of the existing very tough ethics rules they live under now. I yield the floor at this point.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to vitiate the 60-vote requirement on this amendment.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I have no objection.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I note the presence on the floor of the distinguished Senator from Delaware, to whom I am pleased to yield.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate, on February 2, 2012, at 10 a.m., in SD-226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, to conduct an executive business meeting.