Joseph Lieberman

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia is absolutely right. Again, I say to my colleagues, to quote the Scriptures, ``If the sound of the trumpet be uncertain, who will follow in the battle?'' The sound of the trumpet that was sounded in London on Friday is extremely uncertain, and there is no reason to use that communique as an excuse for not voting to lift the arms embargo. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from North Dakota. Actually, I have watched him as he has been listening to this debate. I have seen, because I know him, his own struggling and anguish about this. And I respect the seriousness with which he has gone out, and the sincerity and the relevance of the questions that he asks now. Let me answer the two questions. In the first place, what is the policy? Who can offer a policy that will do any better than what is happened now? I will say to my friend, the policy that the Western World and the world has followed up until now, which is to send the United Nations into what I consider to be a mission impossible, to keep the peace where there was only war has not worked. The London communique raised some hope that it might begin to work if the allies can get together and use their air power to give some meaning to the word ``safe'' as applied to safe areas. Right now they are the furthest things from safe. Combined with that the very weak and confused U.N. presence, the continued arms embargo, that has been the policy up until now. I judge that to be a failure. It has not stopped Serbian aggression and not stopped the suffering of the Bosnian people and it has done terrible damage to the credibility of the United Nations, NATO, and unfortunately the United States. The alternative policy, the preferable policy, which is in part implemented by the proposal that we will vote on in awhile, is the so- called lift-and-strike policy that in fact President Clinton adopted in the 1992 campaign and carried with him into 1993 and to the Presidency. He was frustrated in his desire to implement that lift-and-strike policy in the spring of 1993 when our allies in Europe refused to go along. So what we are asking in putting this proposal here is to begin to finally, though the hour is late and ever more difficult in Bosnia, to implement the lift-and-strike policy. Lifting through this action and striking hopefully through the broadening of the measures agreed to and the toughening of the measures agreed to in the London communique.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Obviously, I would not say that.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I read to the Senator from an Associated Press article written today, dateline Washington, Barry Schweid, diplomatic writer, quoting Ahmed Fawzi, a spokesman for U.N. Secretary General Boutros- Ghali, saying that ``authority to order an attack'' in Bosnia ``remains with the Secretary General for the time being,'' and that there was general agreement at the allies' high-level meeting in London that ``the dual key arrangement remains in place.''

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Does the Senator agree that there is a difference between the embargoes or sanctions applied to Iran and Iraq, which are lawbreaking countries, as opposed to an embargo placed on a country, Yugoslavia, which does not exist, now enforced against Bosnia, a section of that former country, independent, a member of the United Nations, having committed no violation of international law or U.N. resolutions? Does the Senator not agree that there is a difference there?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator. May I first thank him for his extraordinary statement, if I may say, extraordinary for most of the rest of us, but not for himself. Because I have come to appreciate the range that he has shown, again, the Senator from New York, in his ability to look beyond the events of the day, both backward and forward, and to help us understand the significance today of both of those points of view. I want first to thank him overall for the force of his statement and for reminding us of what the history of the United Nations is and what has brought us to this day. And of the impact on the United Nations of what has happened in Bosnia, second, which was the misuse of the U.N. troops to go in where there was war and not peace, in sending them in as noncombatants though they were seen as combatants by particularly the Serbs. Also, I want to thank him for pointing out what is too often missed here as we localize this conflict, but it does go to the heart of the genocidal aspects of it, which is that a people are being singled out because of their religion, in this case, Moslems. And the consequences are broad throughout the world, throughout the Islamic world and throughout the world. They have an effect on our relations with that great and rising force of Islam in the world. I note for the Senator from New York that last week on Thursday, July 20, the Gulf Cooperation Council called for a lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnians and told the European leaders that it wanted to help stop what it called the great tragedy of the 20th century. This was followed over the weekend by the meeting that the Senator from New York has referred to in Geneva of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, which announced it was considering the arms embargo to be invalid and was prepared to assist. I would like to ask this question of the Senator. Would he care to comment for a moment on the impact of this sad story in Bosnia on NATO, on what NATO's position has been, and what it suggests to us about what will become of NATO in the post-cold-war world?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, respectfully, I do not. Clearly they are hoping for arms in Bosnia. That is what they most desperately want and need. As I indicated earlier, their first choice is to receive them from former Warsaw Pact countries, not from us. Second, yes, they would like air support in the transitional period. That is up to NATO. But they have never asked for more active military support. In fact, Senator Dole and I, on every occasion we met with them, have said, ``Please do not expect that American troops will end up on the ground fighting for you in Bosnia.'' And they have said over and over again, ``Not only do we understand that, we do not want that.''

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, in responding to my colleague from Virginia, in all of the conversations I have had with the various representatives and leaders of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina there has never once been a condition set for the lifting of the arms embargo--never once a condition set. And that is again why I think some of those who argue against lifting now are using very stretched, tortured, circuitous logic. It is not the Bosnians who have requested the United States to come in to help the United Nations out. It was obviously not the Bosnians who have made the commitment, a commitment which I think is appropriate, but that is for another day, to have American troops go in and help the United Nations out. The Bosnians have said consistently, ``We have the soldiers. Please give us the weapons.'' Now, I will say, to give a complete answer to my friend, in recent conversations there have been occasions when the Bosnian leadership has requested, but certainly not said it was an obligation, that the full lift-and-strike policy be implemented, which is to say that not only should the arms embargo be lifted, but that they would be assisted in a transitional period while they are receiving arms if NATO could use airpower to keep the Serb aggressors at bay. No obligation ever. In fact, I have said to them, because others have said it to me, I said, ``You understand that people are saying to us, if you lift the arms embargo, there will be a bloodbath. You will demand that American troops come in.'' They have said, ``No, Senator. Not only do we have enough troops on the ground, but how could there be a bloodbath any worse than we have already had? So we are ready to take the consequences.'' No obligation.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator from Virginia is absolutely correct. If the Senator will allow me, I just want to amplify on my answer to that question. It is a substantial change, and it is a change that has been inserted out of sensitivity both to our allies in Europe and other nations that have troops on the ground wearing the blue helmets of the United Nations. It is also an act of sensitivity and respect and deference to colleagues within this Chamber and, in fact, to the administration, which has expressed concern repeatedly on earlier occasions when the embargo lifting has been raised about the impact it would have on our allies. So we are saying here we owe it to our allies, who have had soldiers serving bravely in the most difficult of circumstances, essentially unarmed in a hostile situation, to give them the opportunity to get out of there before we lift the arms embargo. I must say to my friend from Virginia that I am particularly perplexed, angered by some who now say that the trouble with this proposal, S. 21, as substituted before the Senate now, is that it will require the U.N. troops to leave as a precondition for lifting the embargo. Well, we have put it in there, Senator Dole and I and others, to respond to the concerns that these same critics offered, issued a year ago or so, that just lifting the embargo was not respectful or fair to our allies and their brave soldiers on the ground. So the Senator is absolutely correct; it is a substantial change from the earlier version of this proposal.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, if I may respond very briefly to the question of the Senator from Virginia, I was in the same meeting and I thought the answer was unclear. I thought the Secretary of State said that the rapid reaction forces in the vicinity of Sarajevo were capable of responding to attacks against the population there as well as against U.N. forces. But it was not clearly their authority to do so at this point. And the news wires carry stories today of the British troops that are there as part of the rapid reaction forces on the hills around Sarajevo saying that their understanding of their mission is to respond only to attacks by the Serbs against them, against the U.N. forces, and not against the civilian population. Mr. President, I want to thank our friend and colleague from California for a very powerful statement. It is not just that I am honored she will support this legislation before us, but it is the strength of the high road that she took in her statement, and I am very grateful for it, and it encourages me as we begin this debate.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in favor of this proposal, which I am privileged to cosponsor with the distinguished Senate majority leader and a large number of other Senators from both sides of the aisle. If passed, and we hope it will be passed overwhelmingly, this proposal will provide for a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo that was imposed against the former Yugoslavia in 1991 and remains in effect today, most notably victimizing the people of Bosnia. There are times when people speak of this arms embargo as if it were Holy Writ, it were descended from the heavens, it were the Ten Commandments or the Sermon on the Mount. The arms embargo against Bosnia is a political act, adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations in 1991, when Yugoslavia was still intact. It is, in the narrow legal sense, therefore, in my opinion, illegal as it is applied to Bosnia because Bosnia did not even exist as a separate country at that time. But more to the point and ironically, cynically, when adopted by the United Nations Security Council in 1991, this arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia was requested by and supported by the then Government of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, which is to say the Milosevic government. And I say cynically because the pattern that was to follow was clear then, which was that the Milosevic government was going to set about systematically trying to create a greater Serbia and, therefore, knowing that Serbia itself, by accident of history, contained the warmaking capacity, the munitions, the weapons which were part of Yugoslavia, would enjoy essentially a monopoly of force as against its neighbors. But we took that political act, supported by well-meaning governments in the West and elsewhere, as a way to stop arms from flowing into the Balkans so as to stop a war from going on, and we have made it into the Holy Writ. It is not. It is immoral. It is quite the opposite of the Holy Writ. It is immoral and it is illegal; illegal not only for the technical legal reasons I cited a moment ago but because it denies-- this political resolution of the Security Council--denies Bosnia the rights it has gained as a member nation of the United Nations to defend itself. What could be more fundamental to a nation as the guarantor of its own existence then the right to defend itself? [[Page S 10604]] Yet, this resolution continues to be imposed to deny the Bosnians just that right. The embargo is illegal and, Mr. President, let me say respectfully, it is immoral. It is immoral because it is having an impact on people who have done no wrong. This is not some expression, some sanctions resolution imposed on a people who have acted against international law or against their neighbors. It is imposed on the Bosnians, who have not been accused of wrongdoing here. And, of course, more to the point, history has shown, since the embargo was imposed in 1991, that the Bosnians have been the painful and tragic victims of Serbian aggression and, yes, genocide. Talk about accidents of history, it is a quirk of fate that, on this day, when the Senate goes to this critical issue and debates the lifting of the arms embargo, word comes from the Hague that Bosnian leader Radovan Karadzic and his military chief of staff, Ratko Mladic, have been charged with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal established in the Hague for that purpose. They are charged with genocide and crimes against humanity arising from atrocities perpetrated against the civilian population throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is an indictment. This is a legal instrument of international law. The tribunal said today that, in the summer of 1992, Bosnian Serbs held over 3,000 Moslems and Croats at the Karaterm Camp. From the indictment, ``Detainees were killed, sexually assaulted, tortured, beaten, and otherwise subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment.'' In one incident, the indictment recalls, machineguns were fired into a room filled with 140 detainees, who all died. This is the indictment, turned out today by the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague. Karadzic and Mladic are accused of ordering the shelling of civilian gatherings, including the May 1995--this is July 1995; the May 1995, a few months ago--attack on Tuzla, in which 195 people were killed, and the seizure earlier this summer of 284 United Nations peacekeepers in Pale and Gorazde. Karadzic and Mladic are also charged with ``persecuting Moslem and Croatian political leaders, deporting thousands of civilians, and systematically destroying Moslem and Catholic sacred sites.'' I am not reading from any advocacy group for the Bosnians. I am reading from an instrument of international law, an indictment returned today in the Hague by an International Criminal Tribunal authorized by the United Nations, charging the leaders of the Bosnian Serb aggressors with war crimes and crimes against humanity. And as these crimes have been committed, as horrible as they are, what wells up inside me--and I know so many of my colleagues here--is that we were part of continuing to enforce this arms embargo which denied these victims of these war crimes and atrocities the weapons with which they could fight back. Just think of how we would feel ourselves if in a personal context somebody was attacking our home, our neighborhood, our community and for some reason the police were not available, and we had no capacity to defend ourselves or to fight back. That is what we have done and why it is time finally to lift this arms embargo. Mr. President, there always seems to be another reason not to do it. First, it was that if we lifted the arms embargo the Serbs would seize U.N. personnel as hostages. They have done that already. That reason for not lifting the arms embargo is gone, tragically and sadly. Then it was said that if we lift the arms embargo the Serbs would attack the safe havens and go back to the slaughters that the world saw in 1992, 3 years ago. We did not lift the arms embargo, and the Serbs have attacked the safe havens. Now the question is whether there is something happening coming out of London last Friday that gives us pause and should make us hesitate. Mr. President, I hate to say it, but it is hard to believe that the United Nations mission in Bosnia has not been a failure, has not collapsed. As for the London communique, I take some small heart from it because it is the first sign of a willingness by the Western allies to use air power to hold the Serb aggressors at bay, to make them pay for their aggression. Nonetheless, at this moment it is simply a threat. The London communique is a threat, not a policy calculated to end the war. And it is a limited threat, limited as it is to only one of the four safe havens that have not fallen to Serb aggression. Gorazde will be protected. But what about Bihac which is under fierce attack now? What about the great capital of Sarajevo? What about Tuzla? Why not them too? The threat remains uncertain, although the original stories coming out of London on Friday were heartening in that it was said that this dual-key approach which has so frustrated the brave soldiers who have worn the blue helmets of the United Nations, that this dual-key approach which gives the political leadership of the United Nations the opportunity to veto the request for air cover and air support from NATO, it appeared that this dual-key approach was finally ended, and NATO would be able to protect itself without getting approval from Mr. Akashi or Secretary General Boutros-Ghali. But there seems to be a disagreement about the timing of this. In this morning's news it is reported from New York that Mr. Fawzi, a spokesman for U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, said that the airstrikes are to defend U.N. peacekeepers, not to defend the safe area of Gorazde, and that the authority to order an attack ``remains with the Secretary General for the time being.'' So the dual-key is still an approach making even more uncertain the impact of the London communique. When will NATO air power be employed to strike back? Will it be when troops mass around Gorazde that they attack? What are the rules of engagement? It remained uncertain in the meeting in Brussels yesterday whether the NATO countries could resolve that. But I will say to you, Mr. President, that if the threat to protect the safe area is carried out, then there is some hope because it will amount to the beginning of an implementation of the strike part of the lift-and-strike policy which Senator Dole and I and others have advocated since 1992. But, Mr. President, what happened in London is no excuse to vote against the lifting of the arms embargo, illegal and immoral as it is. The embargo stands separate and apart as it in itself is an unacceptable act of the international community, and we must repeal it and let these people defend themselves. Mr. President, the other argument that is being used by some critics of lifting the arms embargo is that it will ``Americanize'' the war if we lift the arms embargo. And the implication here is that it will lead to the placement of American troops on Bosnian soil. Let me say here that from the beginning, when Senator Dole and I and others began to work on this proposal to lift the arms embargo, we have said we do not want American troops on Bosnian soil. We do not have enough of a national interest, and there is not enough of a strategic opportunity for those troops. And what is more, the Bosnians do not want them, and do not need them. They have said over and over and over again to us, ``We have soldiers on Bosnian soil. They are Bosnian soldiers. All we needed were the weapons, the tanks, the antitank weapons, the heavy artillery to help them fight a fair fight against the Serbs.'' So it is ironic to see at this moment the delays and the excuses for not lifting the arms embargo and, when we are finally at a point of having a strong bipartisan vote in favor of lifting the arms embargo, that the reason given by some to vote against it is that it will cause the ``Americanizing'' of the war. If it leads to the exit of the United Nations--and the United Nations, in my opinion, will exit for many more reasons than the lifting of the arms embargo--that will not be anything that we have desired, those of us who have proposed this policy for now more than 3 years. But why punish the Bosnians, the victims, for the error of our policy, for the inappropriateness of our commitments? They have been consistent all along. And I think we owe it to the victims to listen to them. So why say now because the United Nations' forces were sent in and the President made a commitment to send [[Page S 10605]] American troops to help extract the U.N. forces if that becomes necessary, that is a reason for us to sustain the illegal and immoral arms embargo and victimize further the Bosnian people? Mr. President, this question of whether the war is ``Americanized'' is up to Americans. The President, the Congress--we will decide when and where American troops will be sent. This will not happen. Automatically lifting the arms embargo does not put us on some slippery slope where we inevitably end up with troops on the ground there. Far from it; certainly not in combat positions. The other argument made is that lifting of the arms embargo will ``Americanize'' the war because we will have to send Americans there to bring the weapons and train the Bosnians. I have two responses to that. One is that if it becomes necessary to send Americans to train the Bosnians in the use of our weapons, we can do it in Croatia without sending them into Bosnia. But I will tell you, Mr. President, many of my colleagues here have had the same conversations about this with the Bosnians themselves. They say to us, if the arms embargo was lifted today, they really do not prefer American weapons. They do not prefer our American trainers. They prefer weapons from the former Warsaw Pact countries from when Yugoslavia was alive, and on which most of the fighters, the soldiers in the Bosnian Army, have been trained. They prefer them because they do not need a long period of training. They can get the weapons, and in a short time put them onto the battlefield. I think what they most hope for is that as soon as this embargo is lifted the United States and other countries of the world hopefully-- particularly Moslem countries who are infuriated by the one-sidedness of the battle and the way in which the international community has sustained that one-sidedness--will contribute funds for the Bosnians to use to equip them so as to make this fair play. Mr. President, it is true that over the weekend or late last week in Geneva, there was a meeting of the Council of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the foreign ministers of the so-called OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina voted that the member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference do not consider themselves legally bound to abide by the unlawful and unjust arms embargo imposed on Bosnia and Herzegovina which is a United Nations member. The ministers said that the burden of justifying the legality of maintaining the embargo imposed on Bosnia herself rested on the shoulders of the United Nations Security Council. So help may well be coming in implementing a lifting of the embargo. Mr. President, we have, as we have had all along I am afraid, a choice here between the policy that we are advocating of lift and strike and a policy of wait and see. And we have waited for 3 years, and we have seen aggression continue. We have seen more than 200,000 people killed. We have seen more than 2 million refugees created. It is time to stop waiting and stop seeing, and it is time for us to lift the arms embargo and strike from the air in the hope that will finally put some pressure on the Serbs that they have not felt up until this time, so that they will come to the peace table with the prospect of negotiating fairly and accepting a peace agreement for Bosnia that the Bosnians themselves, who have accepted every previous peace treaty offer, can accept to bring an end to this tragic war. That is a policy that I think more than any other which has been tried to date and those that have been tried have failed offers even at this late and difficult hour in Bosnia some prospect not only for peace, but for the resurrection of some credibility, some legitimacy in the institutions upon which Europe and the rest of the world must depend in the years ahead for security and order; that is to say, NATO, the United Nations, and most of all, the strength and leadership of the United States of America. Mr. President, I note the presence on the floor of my distinguished colleague and friend from Virginia, Senator Warner. And I yield to him at this time. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I simply want to thank the Senator from Delaware for his remarks. He was teased a bit about how long he was going to speak. As far as I am concerned, he can keep on speaking. He saw the situation, as he has many others, very clearly from the beginning. On several occasions before, as he has tonight, he has spoken with great eloquence and power. His voice pierces the stillness of this Chamber with the power of truth. I just want to say how grateful I am for his support of this measure and how proud I am to serve with him and to call him a friend. I thank the Senator from Rhode Island.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator from Rhode Island yield for a moment very briefly?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. We are clearly that capable, but we have been unwilling.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. The answer is that--

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Would the Senator not agree that----

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator not agree this is not the first time we have come to the floor? This is not an issue of first impression. We have been coming to the floor for 3\1/2\ years once war broke out in the former Yugoslavia saying, how can we justify not allowing one side, the Bosnians, who wish to defend themselves, to have the weapons? Would the Senator not agree that the United Nations and NATO have had all sorts of time to prove that they can be effective? And in all that time, the Bosnians have been ultimately defenseless and have been slaughtered?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I have an extraordinary respect for Mr. Christopher.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. We leave that to the President and our allies.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. No.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I note the absence of a quorum.