Joseph Lieberman

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the Senator from Virginia is absolutely correct, in many ways. First, that the Bosnians have consistently asked that the arms embargo be lifted. Second, they have been confronted with this question: If you have to choose between lifting the embargo and the U.N. forces remaining in Bosnia, which will you choose? And they have said clearly lifting the embargo. The language of this proposal before the Senate today is intended to give some ear finally to the victims and give them the opportunity to request, and in that sense to formally require that they request, the United Nations leave if that is their judgment as a precondition for the lifting of the embargo. And there are those who have said, well, they want the United Nations to leave, but they really do not. This says that the condition on which the embargo will be lifted is if the Government of Bosnia says officially, formally that they request the United Nations to leave. Then the embargo will be lifted.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. How can we continue to justify delay, while those older women going to the drinking fountain are getting hit by Serbian shells? We will not--the Bosnians themselves have the ability to defend themselves. We are not intruding ourselves in. We are finally getting ourselves out.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I say to the Senator from Massachusetts, I will be glad to join with him, as soon as this measure passes, in introducing a package authorizing aid to allow the Bosnians to buy weapons that they need. There is an outstanding resolution----

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to be an original cosponsor of the Middle East Peace Facilitation Act [MEPFA] of 1995 joining the majority and minority leaders, Senators Dole and Daschle, the chairman and ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senators Helms and Pell, my coauthor of the 1989 PLO Commitments Compliance Act, Senator Mack, and Senator Feinstein. This act supports continued progress in the important process of achieving a stable, lasting peace for Israel and the Middle East. This act alone will not bring peace to this troubled region, but without it the task becomes exceedingly difficult if not impossible. America's support for the peace process has been long, steady and essential. The Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995 enables the United States to continue the important role we have played and must continue to pay. Much of the road to a secure peace remains ahead of us. Yet we must not forget how much progress has already been made. Prime Minister Rabin and Chairman Arafat have taken considerable risks--both personal and for their people--to reach the point we are at today. The United States, and most especially President Clinton and Secretary Christopher, has remained by the side of the negotiators every step of the way--facilitating the process, prodding where necessary, and, always, supporting the negotiating parties. It is critical that the provisions which MEPFA allows--waiver of certain restrictions and authorities--remain in force if we are all to remain on the path to peace. I continue to believe that PLO compliance with its commitments remains an essential element in the quest for peace. There is little doubt that the Palestinian Authority has not yet fulfilled all the commitments Chairman Arafat made in the declaration of principles signed at Oslo and other agreements reached between Israel and the PLO. The Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995 maintains conditions and reporting requirements critical to ensure that the PLO commitments are carried out. This act strengthens the requirements which the Palestinian Authority must meet in order for United States aid and waiver authorities to continue. It takes into account many of the criticisms which have, correctly, been made of existing legislation. The act makes far clearer the linkage between United States assistance and the firm obligation of the Palestinian Authority to comply with all the commitments it has freely made. There should be no confusion that the United States--and the cosponsors of this bill--is intent on seeing this process through to a real peace brought about by both sides negotiating in good faith and fulfilling their obligations. The Middle East Peace Facilitation Act has been a vital component of the Middle East peace process, and has served as an effective and powerful tool in monitoring and compelling PLO compliance with its commitment to peace and fighting terror and extremism. This bill strengthens MEPFA. The peace process and this bill deserve our full support.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I voted for the rescission bill that passed the Senate earlier today because I believe so strongly that we must bring our Federal budget under control, and hopefully balance it in the near future. The longer we delay this process the more difficult our choices become in cutting spending for truly important Federal programs. But I remain strongly opposed to the provision in this rescission bill to exempt Federal logging from all Federal environmental laws for 2 years under the justification of salvage harvests. Not only is this provision unrelated to spending cuts--and probably will be budget negative--it sets very inadvisable policy and precedent. ``Timber salvage'' in this provision is defined broadly to include virtually all Federal forests, potentially including areas set aside or managed scientifically for critical watersheds, endangered species, roadless areas, or special recreation uses. It defines salvage to include ``dead, dying, and associated trees''--which may include virtually all mature timber. And, it provides exemptions from citizens suits, appeals, and judicial review of agency actions. These actions do not appear warranted based on timber harvest data from public lands. According to U.S. Forest Service data, since 1992 less than one-half of 1 percent of forest sales by volume have been delayed by citizen suits, and less than 3 percent by litigation. In the first 11 months of 1994 over 1 billion board feet of timber was harvested from the ``Option 9'' areas developed for salmon and spotted owl protection--very close to the 1.2 billion board feet promise made for the 12 month period of 1994. Further, U.S. Forest Service data shows that a substantial number of timber sales in this region have been offered but not taken due to lack of demand. In a recent issue of Random Lengths, industry's weekly report on North American Forest Products Markets, the lead story states that: Consensus has developed that there is simply too much production chasing too few orders. Most buyers and sellers now agree that unless demand revives in a big way, and soon, the industry is headed for widespread shutdowns and curtailments. Futures prices for softwood continue to be very low in relation to past years, further indicating low demand relative to supply. Many experts believe that the timber industry faces a crisis of demand, not supply. Even if this were not the case, it is doubtful that exemptions from Federal environmental laws would help smaller mills facing log shortages. Mills that are most threatened by log shortages from public lands often cannot outbid larger mills at auction. Auctions tend to be won by deep pockets, with no guarantee that mills needing logs the most will get them. During debate over original passage of this bill Senator Murray offered a moderating amendment, which I voted for, that would have expedited but not eliminated implementation of environmental laws on Federal forest lands. It failed by only one vote. The timber provision that finally passed contains a change over previous language to expand the role of the Secretary of Agriculture to require his signature in order to implement new sales. Although I do not think this is a sufficient fix to this legislation, I do think it is essential for the administration to faithfully execute this authority in order to prevent serious abuse of the legal exemptions in this provision. This timber provision is an unrelated, inadvisable and unnecessary addition to the rescission bill that will only further confuse our efforts to bring thoughtful, balanced reform to Federal environmental protection, without sacrificing important safeguards.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and the majority leader for yielding the floor and for his statement on the latest developments from London with regard to the crisis in Bosnia. Mr. President, I share the sense of disappointment that the Senate majority leader has expressed about the developments in London today. The statement from the London conference is a threat, not a policy, and a limited threat at that, extending, as it does, to only one of the four remaining safe areas, so designated by the United Nations. Why the conferees would feel that it was critical enough to issue this threat with regard to Gorazde but not with regard to Tuzla, Sarajevo and Bihac, I do not know. Why the conferees did not speak clearly and in a united fashion about opening up the supply road for humanitarian aid to Sarajevo along the Mount Igman Road, I do not know. And why is there not clarity, at least, yet on the question of the dual-key arrangement which has done nothing but frustrate the rare occasions when there seemed to be some will to respond to Serbian aggression by subjecting the desire of military commanders to the control of political authorities from the United Nations? There is some suggestion that there is still a dual-key approach for implementing this threat that was issued today about what would happen to the Serbs if they attacked Gorazde. There is some indication, though not clarity, that perhaps the military commanders on the ground, the U.N. military commanders, will be the ones to have the final say and a decision will not be bounced up for a veto from the U.N. politicians at the top. But that is not clear to me, and therefore is also grounds for disappointment in the communique from the London conference. So I would call the communique from the London conference a threat, not a policy; and a limited threat at that. If, in fact, the threat is carried out, as so many threats against the Serbs before in this war have not been carried out--if this threat is carried out, if the Serbs take aggressive action, attack Gorazde, then at least it will be the beginning of an implementation of half of the policy that many of us--I am honored to say including the distinguished Senate majority leader and myself and many others from both parties in this Chamber--have been advocating, appealing for, crying out for, for now 3 years, which is the lift and strike policy. The communique does at last suggest that if the Serbs cross this line, which is a narrow line--it is not a broadly drawn line, it is a line of protection only around Gorazde--then they will finally be subjected to the substantial and decisive NATO air power which we have possessed throughout this conflict and refused to use. Even though going back 2 or 3 years, at hearings of the Armed Services Committee on which I am honored to serve, asking the Chief of Staff of the Air Force whether he felt that these raids could be carried out from the air with minimal risk to American personnel and maximal probability of success-- he said yes. So, from this communique from London, implementing, if the threat is carried through, at least the beginning of one-half of the lift and strike policy, I take some small hope and find some small reason for the Bosnian people, who are understandably cynical and unbelieving, to think that perhaps the international community will finally lift a finger, a hand, to protect them from aggression. But, this threat, even if carried through by the allied powers, does nothing to lessen the moral and strategic imperative to lift the arms embargo imposed on the nations of the former Yugoslavia. It is illegal because it denies the people of Bosnia the right they are given under international law, under the charter of the United Nations, to defend themselves, a basic right that we have as individuals and that nations have under the United Nations Charter. This right has been taken away from them, not by any great act of international law, but by a political act, by a decision of the U.N. Security Council in 1991. Looking back at it, a naive, in some sense a cynical decision, or motivated by cynical behavior; an embargo, requested by the Government of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, now the Serbian Government, understanding that when Yugoslavia broke apart, as it surely would, and Serbia began its aggression, as it clearly intended to, against its neighbors, then the effect of the embargo would leave everyone in that region but the Serbs without the arms with which to fight because the Serbs in Serbia, by an accident of history and of hate, ended up controlling the warmaking capacity of the former Yugoslavia. Immoral--Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for 2 more minutes. I say the embargo was immoral because we have watched not only aggression and the frustration of the people to have the means with which to fight back, the victims, but we have watched genocidal acts. We have watched people singled out because of their religion, in this case Moslem; torn from their homes, herded into concentration camps, women raped systematically as an act of war--unheard of. Men--again, it is happening--between the ages of 18 and 55, herded off allegedly for investigations to determine whether they were criminals or terrorists, but tortured and then, and we saw this 3 years ago: Concentration camps, emaciated figures, Moslems tortured, unfed, slaughtered. So I say, Mr. President, to my colleagues here in the Senate that the moral and strategic imperative to lift the arms embargo remains undiminished by this limited threat and not a policy that was issued from London today. I hope and strongly believe that when we take up the proposal which Senator Dole and I, and many others of both parties, introduced on Tuesday to lift the arms embargo, that the result will be a resounding nonpolitical, nonpartisan, overwhelming majority in favor of lifting the embargo, giving the people of Bosnia the weapons with which to defend themselves, and creating finally the basis of a genuine policy that can impose upon the Serbs some pain for their aggression that will give them finally, and for the first time in this conflict, a reason to come to the peace table to negotiate a just end to this conflict. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. Mr. PRESSLER addressed the Chair.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. No, there is not.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Excuse me. We do not need in this resolution to order a strike. It is unfortunate enough we have to go to a point in a congressional action to try to urge the administration to lift this embargo which has put blood on our hands. We can determine--and these discussions are apparently finally going on with our allies to strike-- this is a policy. This is the best policy. In fact, if we had followed this policy of lifting the arms embargo and striking from the air, I am confident that the war would be over today. I am confident that the war would be over today, because the Serbs would have felt some pain, had some fear about what would happen if they continued their aggression, and that would have brought them to the peace table and we would have had an agreement. So I say to the Senator from Massachusetts, good luck in your attempt to fortify the United Nations and NATO. Good luck in your attempt-- finally, after 3 years of temporizing and irresoluteness and mixed messages and consequent suffering by people in Bosnia and for the rest of the world, good luck in trying to do that. But that is no excuse for voting against this policy of finally lifting the arms embargo, because regardless of what the effect or intention of the United Nations is, or NATO, this arms embargo is immoral. It strikes at the most fundamental right that we, as individuals, have, to defend ourselves and our families, as countries have under international law in the charter of the United Nations. It is an outrage. So, good luck in strengthening the U.N. mission, if there is any hope in doing that. But it is no excuse for not supporting this proposal, and, unfortunately, because I believe that, I must say this. I do not impugn the motives or the sincerity of the Senator from Massachusetts. It is just the latest in a line of arguments and excuses for not lifting the arms embargo. Mr. President, I thank my friends from Maine for their patience. I yield the floor. Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, this has been an important colloquy. I note that the Senator from Maine has been on the floor for some period of time. I want to yield to him in a moment--both Senators from Maine, as a matter of fact. I just want to say finally, in response to the Senator from Massachusetts, is this a policy, the lift and strike? You bet your life it is.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. It has always been a half solution, but we have given them no hope, no solution.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Then why does the Senator not support the lifting of the arms embargo? How can the Senator justify that?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Excuse me. They have been asking for 3\1/2\ years that we give them weapons to defend themselves, long before there was ever any talk of American troops. As a matter of fact, at every point, the Bosnians have said, ``We don't want American soldiers on the ground. We have plenty of soldiers. We just don't have weapons.'' So I say to the Senator from Massachusetts, respectfully, this is not the hour to speak against this proposal on the basis of either what the United Nations might do, after its sorry record of the last 3\1/2\ years, or to speak against it, because it finally gives one ear to the victims of this aggression, the direct victims, the Bosnians, or to impute cynical motives to them in this.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, if there had been any indication over the last 3 years that there was the kind of resolve and willingness to stand up against aggression that the Senator from Massachusetts describes, my response would be more open than it is. The fact is that we have gone through more than 3 years in which the United Nations has acted with weakness and has been a cover for Serbian aggression against the Moslem people. We have acted for 3 years pursuant to a policy that has lacked purpose and force in such a way that we have demeaned the greatest military alliance in the history of the world, NATO, and raised questions about its continued viability. And we have diminished ourselves, the United States, the greatest power in the world. Mr. President, if I had any hope--and I would like to still have hope--that the United Nations' mission in the specific areas that the Senator from Massachusetts refers to, protecting the safe areas, getting the humanitarian assistance in, would be fortified, I would be glad to see that happen. I would be glad to see that happen. But it would not be for me an excuse not to end this immoral embargo. How can we justify that for more than 3 years now we have imposed an embargo that, incidentally, is Milosevic's embargo? He called for it in 1991. Why? Because he knew he had plenty of tanks and personnel carriers and planes and weapons. And we went along in naive good faith that was somehow to stop the conflict from breaking out, and with every passing week and month as the conflict went on and the Serbs took more land and kicked more people out of their homes and killed and raped and tortured more people and put them in concentration camps, we continued to enforce that embargo. May I say, after those 3 years of history, it ill behooves us to raise any questions about the motivation of the leaders of Bosnia, to suggest that we not lift the arms embargo or not give them the right to have some say in determining when they think the U.N. mission has ended all purpose for them and impute that somehow this is their intent to trap us into this----

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask----

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Right now, all right in the newspapers, the British, the French, and our administration are not agreeing on an alternative policy.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I must take into account the history of the last 3 years. At every moment we have brought this proposal up again--Is this the first step? It was the first step that President Clinton brought into office with him and our allies with Europe frustrated with its implementation. So I say to my friend, obviously we have to look at the history. I say this with respect to my friend from Massachusetts. I know he speaks with sincerity. At every point that the option was given to the Senate, to the House, to the administration, to the Western allies to lift the embargo, stop this immoral refusal to let these people defend themselves, use air power to help them resist aggression, there has always been another excuse for delay. And so, respectfully, when my friend comes in today and says, is this the replacement for policy--this is what we have been crying out for for more than 3 years. And it is time to stop finding excuses for not at least giving these people the opportunity to defend themselves. If I had any confidence that there would be a stronger Western policy, I would listen--although I would still push forward--but, respectfully, the voices that I hear are not the voices telling me to delay. The voices I hear are the voices of the Bosnian people who have suffered as a result of just what you have used, the words you have used: weakness, lack of guts, and lack of policy.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I answer my friend from Massachusetts, he asks, are we so weak? Do we so lack guts? Do we have no policy that this is the alternative? And I say to my friend, look at the history of the last 3 years. And all you will see is weakness, lack of policy, and no guts. And who has paid for it?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. That is just what we have done for 3 years.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, in responding to my friend and colleague from Massachusetts, this is not the first choice, but it is the choice that is offered in the context of the failure of the other choices that have been made, the other choices that have done damage and been inconsistent with the policy of a free people and a great nation and have done extraordinary damage not only to the Bosnian people but to the rule of law. The policy that this proposal advocates, lifting the embargo and striking from the air, is the policy that President Clinton brought into office with him in 1993, that our allies in Europe opposed, and then the policy was changed. So, of course, if the United Nations had played any role other than passing resolutions--and I say to my friend, it is my personal judgment that the United Nations has suffered terribly in this conflict because it has been misused and its soldiers, brave soldiers, have been misused. When did the United Nations go in? It went in after the aggression of the Serbs became clear and the first wave of terrible atrocities became visible to the world, when the concentration camps were seen by British television and sent around the world. Camps that were operated by the Serbs with the Moslems: the haunting pictures, the echoes of the Second World War, emaciated bodies, stories of mass slaughter, rape, all the rest. The Western Powers could not sit by when that happened, but instead of being forceful, lifting the arms embargo, striking from the air at minimal risk to Western personnel, they threw in the United Nations, on a presumably humanitarian mission, and gave them no weapons with which to defend themselves, and were not willing to stand by the resolutions that were adopted subsequently by the United Nations to deny flight, to protect safe areas. And what have we had? Sadly, we have had the United Nations serving not as a guarantor of peace and security for the Bosnian people but now, not for a day, not for a month, but for 3 years being a cover for Serbian aggression. And every time we have begun to get up some backbone here to strike back at the Serbs for killing people, for shooting down American planes, for taking U.N. personnel hostage, they have just taken more hostages and said if you strike back at us, we will kill your personnel, and we have walked away. We have moved to the back. So I say to my friend from Massachusetts, policy of choice? We are late in the game. We are late in the day in Bosnia. If in 1991 and 1992, when the Serbs moved into Slovenia and then Croatia and Bosnia, the world had drawn a line and said: end of the cold war instability or not, do not think you can march now and not pay a price for it. We did not and as a result we have paid a price. I say to my friend, policy of choice? Let us listen to the victims. Let us listen to the people of Bosnia who have said through us, through their elected representatives over and over again, the United Nations is not helping us; it is hurting us. Get them out of here. Give us the weapons with which to defend ourselves. Please, help us from the air to strike at Serbian targets until we can make this a fair fight.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I want to respond to the very eloquent, very moving, and very strong remarks of my colleague and friend from California, Senator Feinstein. I appreciate very much the history that she told, the obvious concern and frustration that she expressed for the failure of the current policy, the haunting picture of a 20-year-old woman hanging from a tree, a victim of suicide for reasons that we do not know. But speaking for all of us of what happens when you leave a people defenseless, women defenseless, perhaps she was raped, perhaps she was separated from her family, or perhaps her husband or loved one was carted off with other young Bosnian males, young men; whatever. It is that picture, and so many others, that will haunt us as the indication and evidence and proof of the failure of the current policy and the effect of the current policy. I heard somebody speaking on one of the television programs today against lifting the arms embargo, a spokesperson for the administration, saying something that has been said over and over again, which is that, if we lift the arms embargo, it will lead to more bloodshed. How much more bloodshed could there be? Over 200,000 killed, 2 million-plus refugees, and the conflict goes on; one side with arms willing to take whatever action is necessary, violating all rules of international morality, with its leaders today the subject of an international inquiry at The Hague as to whether they are war criminals--Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic, the whole crew. So will lifting the arms embargo lead to more bloodshed? None of us can say it will not. It may lead to more bloodshed. It may lead to the shedding for the first time in any significant degree of Serbian blood. And until that happens, the Serbs, in by opinion, will not accept the peace at the peace table that the Bosnians could possibly accept. They will only seek unconditional surrender and the continuing death and torture of the Bosnian Moslems. I appreciate the sincerity of my colleague from California in suggesting the possibility of an alternate course here, a last chance, a 3- to 6-month period in which both sides, the Bosnian Serbs, Bosnia and Serbia, be given a chance to negotiate a peace, after which, if there is failure, the arms embargo will be lifted multilaterally. I appreciate the sincerity. I wish that such a policy had any chance of working. But I will offer this response to it. In the first place, insofar as part of it involves the movement of the remaining Bosnians who are in the east of Bosnia into the central area of Bosnia around Sarajevo, which is the relatively secure area, although Sarajevo continues to be shelled, unfortunately, it yields ground to the Serbians, which is exactly what they want. They want the greater Serbia, and eastern Bosnia. But more to the point, every peace offer that has been made by any credible authority, including most significantly the contact group, the international five-nation group that made the peace offer of 51 percent to the Serbs, the remainder to the Bosnians, 20 percent less than the Bosnians had at the beginning of the war before they were defenseless victims of aggression, the Bosnians accepted it; the Serbs did not. That has been the course of every peace offer made. The Serbs are not accepting terms of peace because they are running willfully, wantonly, brutally throughout the country and nobody is making them suffer. When outlaws are allowed to commit illegal acts, the worst illegal acts--theft of land, eviction of people, rape, murder, slaughter, separation of families--they will continue to do it because nobody stops them. We know that here in our own country. That is why we are all supportive of stronger law enforcement. So they continue to do that. They are not going to accept the peace. They have not accepted any peace. If I had one shred of hope that they would, I would say it was worth trying to pursue some opportunity to give them that. Let me add this, that any terms they would accept are unacceptable to the Bosnians, and none of us in the exercise of fairness would ask the Bosnians to accept. They have taken enough abuse. They have suffered enough. It is not for the international community at the point of a Serbian gun to force the Bosnians to accept the decimation of their country. They have already accepted every reasonable or not so reasonable peace plan they have been given. So I wish I could have some hope for the prospects of yet another cease-fire and a chance for negotiation. But at every turn the Serbs have not only rejected the suggestions; they have deceived us. They have tricked us. They have talked while preparing to attack. And the Bosnians and the United Nations and NATO and the United States have been the victims. And finally, so far as the suggestion made--and again I respect it and I know it is made in good faith and with a sense of hope--that at the end of the 6-month period Britain and France and the United States would multilaterally lift the arms embargo, I see no indication that our allies and friends in Europe are prepared to commit to that. So, Mr. President, again I note the presence in the Chamber of colleagues, and I yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I say to my colleagues or any staff who are following the proceedings in the Chamber, that I am going to continue for a while to deal with some of the issues which I think are involved in this debate, but I am more than happy to yield the floor to any colleagues who wish to speak on this proposal as they come to the floor. Mr. President, let me focus for a few more moments on the appeal that will be made today again that this is the wrong time to lift the embargo, the wrong time for the Senate to speak out because of the increased pace of discussions between the United States and our allies in Europe about a more robust policy to follow against Serbian aggression or for implementation of the U.N. policy. I have said a short while ago here that on every occasion when we have proposed lifting the arms embargo, there has always been another reason why people have said to us this is the wrong time. I truly hope and pray that my colleagues will not listen to these entreaties and will join in the strong, bipartisan, nonpartisan outcry against the current policy and plea for implementation of the right of self-defense of the Bosnian people, to which Senator Hutchison has so eloquently spoken. The other fact, in addition to the one I cited earlier, about why I believe passing this proposal will in fact strengthen the administration's hand in discussions with our allies for a robust policy is that it shows not just the impatience but the growing opposition, the strong opposition, the nonpartisan opposition to the current policy. It cannot be sustained anymore. It is not being sustained on the ground in Bosnia, and it cannot be sustained in the political representative community that we are for the American people. It is in that sense simply unfair of the Europeans to continue to press this administration to follow a policy that is not the one of lift and strike that it brought into office. The other thing to say about the timing may be a sad fact, but it is true that there is a temporal discontinuity between what may happen in this Chamber today, hopefully, perhaps tomorrow, in adopting this proposal and what is happening on the ground and the suffering of the Bosnian people and continued aggression of the Bosnian Serbs, as Zepa, effectively undefended, is about to fall; which is to say that even if we adopt this proposal, hopefully by a strong, overwhelming majority, that does not mean it becomes law. Something has to be done by the House. Either this will go to the House or the House will take up a separate proposal. I gather the latter is the more likely course. Then, as this Government of ours works, it will go to a conference committee. That will take some time. And then it will go to the President, and he has some period of time to decide in the normal course whether to sign or veto the proposal. So do not worry. If I were a Bosnian on the ground suffering, watching my country being taken away from me, watching tens of thousands of my country men and women being forced out of their homes, watching people being raped and murdered, I would worry about the timing, but for those who counsel against action today because of what may happen in London on Friday, do not worry about it. Do not worry about it. Unfortunately, there will be plenty of time, even if we adopt this proposal today or tomorrow, before the arms embargo is actually lifted. Mr. President, let me now go on to talk about some of what happens on the ground today in Bosnia and what I think is the attitude we have allowed to develop among the leadership of the Serbs and the Bosnian Serbs, which is a wanton disrespect of international order and morality and law. A story on the radio today that I heard coming in is that as these discussions of a more aggressive Western NATO policy in Bosnia--not to try to turn back Serbian aggression, which has already taken well over 70 percent of the country--but discussions are [[Page S 10274]] going on about a more aggressive NATO policy to protect the safe areas, to give some meaning to the word ``safe" to make it other than ludicrous, which is truly what it was, ludicrous and horrific for the 30,000 or 40,000 in Srebrenica who did not find that town to be a safe area. In other words, we are talking now about using Western air power and stronger defense forces to give some meaning to a resolution of the United Nations to create six safe areas in Bosnia, one of which has fallen, another of which is about to go, a resolution that I must say has the same source as the arms embargo, which we have painfully respected for so long and at such cost for everyone. And what is the response of the Serbs to even the discussion of more forcefully enforcing an act of international law, of the international community, of the United Nations? Mr. Karadzic, the President of the Bosnian Serb nation, operating out of Pale, says he warns the Western Powers that Bosnian Serb forces will shoot down any Western planes or helicopters that come in to defend the safe areas. Can you imagine the outrage here, the outrage that we have created? If you again let an aggressor go on and do not make them pay for their aggression, if they are rewarded for their aggression, if they essentially laugh at the United Nations, NATO, the Western World, what is the hope for order, for morality in an international society, in the post-cold war? What is the next step? Basically the Chirac proposal to protect the safe zones is really like a local police force saying it is going to carry out the law in a local area, and the criminals saying, ``If you bring police cars into this area to carry out the law, we are going to throw hand grenades at the police cars.'' What would our reaction to that be? But that is what we have invited here by our inaction. We have allowed not a great army, we have allowed a second-rate army, to put it mildly, to hold at bay, to take aggressive action, to punish, not just the Bosnian people, but the greatest military alliance in the history of the world; namely, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We have sent in these courageous soldiers wearing the blue helmets of the United Nations saying they are not combatants, giving them light arms, refusing repeatedly under this bizarre, ridiculous dual-key approval approach where NATO troops under fire wearing the U.N. uniform have to get the approval of the U.N. political authorities; namely, Mr. Akashi, to fight back, to call in air power. Efforts to call for strikes have been repeatedly frustrated and turned down. So we send in the United Nations and basically give these heroic soldiers wearing the blue helmets a mission impossible. And what we have done is diminish the credibility of this great allied force, this NATO force which held the Soviet armies at bay for the duration of the cold war and now is being made a fool of by a second-rate military in Serbia, such that the political leader of those Serbs says this morning, has the nerve to warn the West, that his forces will shoot down Western helicopters if they dare to enforce the law, which is to say to protect civilians in safe areas. That is what we have come to. Uncertainty, irresoluteness, weakness in the face of aggression will always draw more aggression. There is no reason to stop. Others say that if we lift the arms embargo we will Americanize the war. My first answer to that is the answer that Prime Minister Silajdzic respectfully gave when he was here a while ago. The Prime Minister of Bosnia said in one sense the war has already been Americanized. It is a tragic sense. It is a painful sense, which is to say that the continued American support of the arms embargo, the continued refusal to allow not just that we supply the Bosnians with weapons to defend themselves but that we make it difficult for others to do so, we continue to support this policy in the world community that effectively is America taking a position in this war. Certainly it is so on a moral basis that we have by our continued support of the arms embargo had an effect. We have Americanized the conflict by denying weapons to one side. And of all the bizarre and crazy results, we are denying weapons to the victims of aggression. Mr. President, as I said last night and I repeat here briefly, there is a tragic history and story to be told here about the origins of this embargo. It began in 1991 when Yugoslavia had not quite broken apart. And it was requested by the Government in Belgrade, the same government of Milosevic that has carried out this policy of aggression for the purpose of creating a greater Serbia. Why was it requested? Well, with some naivete let me say why I think a lot of people voted for it. The theory that was being presented was that if we closed the flow of arms into the Balkans, we would stop the outbreak of war there. And in 1991 it was possible for people of good faith to accept this argument, which looking back today is preposterous. But what is even more infuriating is that this arms embargo was requested by the Government in Serbia. And why did they request it? Because they had all the arms they needed. History and fate made it such that the warmaking capacity, the munitions, the military equipment of the former Yugoslavia were almost totally in what became Serbia, operating out of Belgrade. So I have viewed the arms embargo and certainly the request to support for it by the Government in Belgrade in 1991 as a cynical act which was done with full knowledge of their own intentions, the intention of the Government in Belgrade to begin aggression to extend their domain as a way to prevent their soon-to-be victims from obtaining weapons. That is the sad and twisted history of this embargo, which some have now raised to the level of great international law. It was an act of politics, an act of policy for some, a well-intended attempt to stop war from breaking out once again in the Balkans. But how can we have sustained that policy when on the ground it was clear that war had broken out, and the impact of the embargo was to deny one side, the Bosnians, the means with which to defend themselves while the other had plenty? So in response to this argument that lifting the arms embargo Americanizes the war, I offer the statement of the premise that unfortunately America's enforcement of the arms embargo Americanizes the war. There is an extent to which we have blood on our hands here by our inaction, if you will, although it is action. And insofar as we have continued to support the arms embargo, second, in a more direct sense, the war has already been Americanized. As I have said here before, weakness in the face of aggression encourages more outrageous aggression. And the most powerful testimony to that could be offered by Captain O'Grady in his F-16, taking off on a flight as part of Operation Deny Flight which was the United Nation's effort to enforce the no-fly zone which also was an act of the U.N. Security Council. What is the no-fly zone? The no-fly zone was the attempt after the initial mistakes of the United Nations to try to tone down the conflict acknowledging that most of the planes in the region were from Serbia. To keep them on the ground or at least not give them that brutal advantage from the air. So Captain O'Grady leaves on this mission flying this American plane, this F-16. As I indicated last night--I will say this again briefly--I pursued this with some intensity and detail because I wanted to understand from a military point of view what did the Serbs on the ground who fired that missile at Captain O'Grady know about that plane he was flying? What was their knowledge and intention as they did that? And the answers I have received from sources that I trust and have high regard for are, one, that the Serbs in Bosnia on the ground were operating as part of a very sophisticated integrated air defense radar system which actually had been used before the conflict as an air traffic control system for commercial air traffic by the former Yugoslavia. It extends back to Belgrade, although its parts can stand on their own, now being used primarily for military purposes. The Bosnian Serbs on the ground saw that plane in the air, one of several sorties flown. A large number of sorties are flown everyday as part of Operation Deny Flight. They had the capacity. They knew that that was an American plane. They could identify it. That is how sophisticated their air defense system is and, by the nature of its flight [[Page S 10275]] pattern, they also knew, because I asked, that it was part of Operation Deny Flight and not part of an airstrike mission. There have been airstrikes carried out by NATO. They have been very limited. They have been described as pin-prick airstrikes. They have had some partial success. But we never have, in any way, pulled the throttle on the air power capacity we have in that region. I asked those who know, ``Was it possible for the Serbs on the ground, seeing what they had identified as an American plane, an F-16, above to know whether that plane was on an aggressive mission to strike from the air or whether it was part of what I would call a nonaggressive patrol mission to see that Serbian planes had not left the airspace?'' The clear response I received was that because of the patterns the F- 16 was flying, it was absolutely clear that this American plane was flying as part of Operation Deny Flight, not on an aggressive mission, on a patrol mission. Again, if I may use a domestic metaphor here, it is as if the police car was going through an area of a town enforcing the curfew and was not on an aggressive mission. Mr. President, I am very pleased to see the Senator from Delaware [Mr. Roth], here. I will finish this line of argument and yield to him. So the Serbs on the ground, with their fingers on the missiles, missiles that they received from the Russians, that the Serbs from Belgrade brought into Bosnia to be at the disposal of the Bosnian Serbs, they knew that that F-16 was not on a mission to do them any harm. It was patroling, and they intentionally shot that American plane down. It is only by the grace of God and, of course, his own extraordinary courage that Captain O'Grady is alive today, through his heroism and bravery and the extraordinary capacity of American equipment that we have supported in this Chamber--global positioning systems to locate a distress signal at critical moments--picked up by American planes, we send in the CH-53 Super Stallion helicopters to pick him up. They are noticed by Bosnian Serbs and they too are fired on. Again, an intentional attack on American planes, in this case helicopters. What did we do about it? We did not do anything. We did not do anything, I suppose, because the Serbian forces were holding U.N. personnel. I think we should have done something in spite of those hostages that were being held, because it seems to me when you allow people to take hostages and hold them and they render you impotent, then they will simply act more outrageously. But an American plane on a nonaggressive patrol mission was intentionally shot down by the Serbs. So I offer that as evidence that the war, indeed, has been Americanized. Our soldiers, our pilots flying those missions, the NATO soldiers in U.N. uniforms may think they are noncombatants, but the Serbs do not think they are noncombatants. The soldiers have paid the price. Lastly, let me talk about Americanizing the conflict. Let me say, it is up to us. We are not going to be drawn into a conflict we do not want to be drawn into. Lift and strike that President Clinton brought into office with him is just that. We have a strategic interest in stemming the conflict in Europe. We have a moral mission of protecting the victims from genocide, but we do not really have enough of an interest, nor does the strategic situation demand it or call for it, to send American troops on the ground. We do have enough of an interest in stopping this conflict by using allied air power to stem aggression and by giving these people, the Bosnians, the victims, the opportunity to defend themselves. We are not putting ourselves, if we adopt this, on a slippery slope. It is up to us to make policy. Nothing irretrievably Americanizes this conflict. In my opinion, it is a lame excuse and an insult to our capacity to control the course of our behavior to be in opposition to S. 21, as amended by amendment No. 1801. Mr. President, I am pleased to see three other distinguished colleagues on the floor. I welcome their entrance into this debate. I yield the floor at this time. Mr. ROTH addressed the Chair.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, first, I thank my distinguished colleague and friend from Texas not only for her support of this call for lifting of the arms embargo but for a powerful and eloquent statement of moral principle as well as strategic interest and just good common sense. Mr. President, I am very pleased at this time to ask unanimous consent that the distinguished occupant of the chair, the Senator from Idaho [Mr. Kempthorne], be added as an original cosponsor of this measure.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Yesterday, Secretary Perry, the Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State Christopher, visited with both Republican and Democratic Senators, to report on events that are going on in former Yugoslavia, to discuss some new options, for it sounds like a more vigorous policy, particularly the employment, more aggressively, of NATO air power, and to ask the Senate to delay taking this measure up and lifting the arms embargo, saying it is the wrong time to do it, with the discussions going on now. Madam President, I have the greatest respect for Secretary Perry and Secretary Christopher. They are distinguished public servants. They have served with extraordinary skill, I think, in their respective positions, but I respectfully disagree with them. I hope that my colleagues will reject this call, this latest call, to delay action on lifting the arms embargo. I particularly appeal to my democratic colleagues who may have some understandable reluctance to oppose the President. I strongly support the President in general. I just respectfully and sincerely and deeply disagree with the policy the administration has followed in regard to Bosnia. Madam President, President Clinton, in the campaign in 1992, advocated the policy that I thought then held the best hope of a reasonable solution in Bosnia, and I still think does, which is to lift the arms embargo and strike from the air at Serbian targets, on the basic premise that there is an aggressor here and a victim. The aggressor is Serbia, led by President Milosevic. As I recounted last night, history will show and the record shows that beginning in 1988, President Milosevic of Serbia took a series of steps--clear, concerted, intentional--to create a greater Serbia by taking advantage of the instability that existed in Europe as a result of the end of the cold war, the coming collapse that could be seen as the years went on. The entity of Yugoslavia began this concerted effort through aggression and other means, to move into Srebrenica, Croatia, to be more aggressive, and control the Albanian majority in Kosovo-- aggressive is a tame word; abusive is a correct word--and to move into Bosnia, using Serbian agents, as it were, that is to say Serbs who lived in Bosnia and Croatia, as a fighting force, augmented, supplied, and in some cases actually supported right there by members of the Serbian armed forces--a clear stream of aggression. President Clinton saw that, I think, in 1992, and brought the policy of lift and strike into office with him, understanding, making the point that if aggression is allowed to go unresponded to, there will be more aggression. History shows us that. Common sense shows us that. If you let common criminals on the streets of any city or town in America continue to hold people up, abuse them, commit acts of assault and battery, larceny, and murder against them without the law taking any stand against that, without threatening them, without forcing them to have any fear, they will continue to do it. And that is exactly what has happened in the last 3\1/2\ to 4 years in Bosnia. In the spring of 1993, Secretary Christopher went over to Europe to speak to our allies in Britain and France, advocating the policy of lift and strike. They refused to go along. And that was the end of that policy for this administration. So I say to my colleagues, as we listen to the appeals that will be made today by our friends and our leaders in this administration, that, really, what we are asking in putting forward S. 21 today is that the administration be given a chance to implement the policy that it brought into office with it and that was essentially blocked in implementation by some of our good friends and allies in Western Europe who had a different point of view. At every step, when we have raised the idea of lifting the arms embargo, there has been another reason why it was the wrong time. Earlier it was the wrong time because the United Nations had to be given an opportunity to work its will, or the Owens-Vance peace mission had to be given an opportunity to work its will, or the Serbs had to be given a chance with the Bosnians to accept the peace proposal. It was very detailed, very fair--not so good for the Bosnians, because it left them with about 20 percent of the land that they had before the Serbian aggression began--but give them a chance to accept it. The Bosnians accepted it. The Serbs did not. It was the wrong time to lift the arms embargo because if it was lifted, people said to us, U.N. personnel who are there will be seized as hostages. The arms embargo was not lifted. The Bosnians continue to be victims of aggression, torture, ethnic cleansing, rape, murder--and yet, as we have seen, tragically, the U.N. personnel were seized as hostages. Then it was said last year, when we brought up this proposal to lift the arms embargo, you cannot lift the arms embargo, this will anger the Serbs. They will have no reason not to go into the safe areas that the United Nations has created for a humanitarian purpose, to protect the Bosnian victims. We did not lift the arms embargo and what has happened in the last couple of weeks? The Serbs moved into these undefended safe areas like Srebrenica, forcing out thousands--older people. I hate to see those pictures of those old women and men, forced marches, dropped off in the middle of the night in a no-man's land between the Serb and Bosnian forces, forced to walk their way across difficult terrain to find their way to Bosnian territory to get some food and shelter. The harrowing stories of young women taken away by Serbian soldiers from their families for God knows what reason. Young men of military age removed on trumped up charges that they were going to be investigated as criminals or terrorists. We have seen it before in this conflict. We saw--most notably in 1992 when British television crews found their way to what I would call concentration camps--what happens to these Bosnian men when they were taken away by Serbian forces: the emaciated bodies, the horrible echoes of the Second World War. They said, if we lifted the arms embargo, we would see this again, what we saw in 1992. We have not lifted the arms embargo, and the Serbs carried all of this out, all these atrocities again. Did you read the story of the 20-year-old woman, a Bosnian woman, found hanging from a tree at her own hand, blouse and skirt blowing in the wind? People could not really explain what had happened, except there were allegations that she had been taken away by the Serbs, perhaps raped, perhaps abused, perhaps separated. There was no family. No one knew who she belonged to. There were only rumors. Had her parents been separated from her? Did a husband get taken away as a person of military age? These are the consequences of Serbian aggression and the consequences of leaving a people undefended. Wrong time? Now the argument is that it is the wrong time to lift the arms embargo because of the horrific events in Bosnia in the last couple of weeks--the fall, the conquest of an undefended city. It was no act of bravery by the Serbian forces. There were 40,000 people there with an army whose weapons had been put into the U.N. compound, and U.N. soldiers, Dutch soldiers, brave Dutch soldiers, put into an impossible position with light arms [[Page S 10272]] to defend themselves against a Serbian invasion with heavy weapons-- tanks, armored personnel carriers, sophisticated weapons. This was no brave military conquest. As a result of the horrors we are seeing, we are now seeing a pickup in the pace of Western concern, responding to the Western public, who are obviously, all of us, outraged by these atrocities being committed against the Bosnian people. President Chirac proposes that the United Nations should become more aggressive in defending the safe areas, or get out. He is right. The United Nations has become a cover for Serb aggression. Every time the Serbs strike, in fear of reprisal they grab some U.N. soldiers as hostages and frustrate, emasculate, nullify any Western will to take action against them. And what is the response from Britain and the United States to Chirac's proposal? Uncertain, although now there seems to be a genuine interest in the more aggressive use of NATO air power, at least to protect the safe havens, but also to put the Serbs on notice that other Serbian targets in Bosnia and beyond may be vulnerable. So we are now asked not to take action on lifting the arms embargo because it somehow may affect the pace of these negotiations about the use of air power. I do not get it. I do not understand that argument. First, I think it is wrong. I think it is wrong to give us yet another argument why we should not be lifting the arms embargo, particularly as every passing day brings more powerful, painful evidence of the failure of the current policy. But it does not make sense. If the United States now, our Government, wants to be part of a more aggressive use of NATO air power to protect and give some meaning to the safe havens, it seems to me if this Senate, in a strong bipartisan majority, rises up and adopts S. 21, we are saying not just to lift the arms embargo, we are crying out. We are saying, united as Americans, as leaders, representatives of the people of the greatest power in the world, a power that has built its strength not just on military might but on the might of its morality, that this policy that the West has been following in Bosnia is a failure. I think for that message to be in the air, if we can pass this overwhelmingly today on a bipartisan basis, that message in the air as the allies gather again in London on Friday to discuss what course to follow can only help. It can only strengthen the hand of our representatives there, Secretary Perry, Secretary Christopher, to say, look what the Senate of the United States has said now by an overwhelming majority, perhaps even a veto-proof majority: We must strengthen the U.N. posture or we must get out and lift the arms embargo. So, Mr. President, the time has come. It is long past due. The hour is late in Bosnia. The suffering has gone on there. There is no perfect, no guaranteed solution. But what we clearly know is that the current policy has failed. It has failed for the Bosnian people, it has failed for NATO, for the United Nations, and for the United States. It is time to try the alternative, and this is the alternative. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor. Mrs. HUTCHISON addressed the Chair.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I want to speak for just a few moments in reaction to the speech made this morning by President Clinton on the subject of affirmative action. The principle that every individual should have an equal opportunity to rise as high as his or her ability will take them, regardless of race, gender, religion, nationality, or other group characteristic, is a defining ideal of our society. We must be very wary of any deviation from that principle, no matter how well intended. That is why it is clearly time to review all Government affirmative action programs in which an individual's membership in a group, whether defined by race, gender, national origin, or other similar characteristics, may determine whether he or she will be awarded a Government benefit. Mr. President, while America has clearly not yet realized the national [[Page S 10316]] ideal of equal opportunity for all, it is important to note that we have made considerable progress over the three decades since President Johnson issued the first Executive order calling for affirmative action to end job discrimination. I think we should be proud of that progress--long overdue as it may have been. Every President since President Johnson, and every Supreme Court since then, has acknowledged that affirmative action programs were intended to be temporary. In the debate that is ongoing now, and on which the President made a major statement today, I believe we should pause to acknowledge not only our continuing commitment to equal opportunity and the work we still have to do to realize it for all Americans, but also to acknowledge our success in overcoming what was not only a legally sanctioned system of discrimination in our country but also ingrained biases about race and gender which were extremely widespread in our country. We have come a long way from those days. Today, poll after poll shows a very high and broad national consensus about ensuring equal opportunity for all, which, of course, was what the civil rights movement was all about. Unfortunately, Mr. President, some poorly conceived and implemented affirmative action programs have done more to disturb and confuse that broadly accepted national consensus about equal opportunity than they have done to help their intended beneficiaries. Affirmative action is dividing us in ways its creators could never have intended because most Americans who do support equal opportunity, and are not biased, do not think it is fair to discriminate against some Americans as a way to make up for historic discrimination against other Americans. For, after all, if you discriminate in favor of one group on the basis of race, you thereby discriminate against another group on the basis of race. In discussing this subject the other day, a young man offered me this simple wisdom that we all learned from our mothers and fathers: ``Two wrongs,'' he said, ``don't make a right.'' President Clinton deserves our praise for his willingness to wade into this fray and examine whether affirmative action programs are advancing our goal of equal opportunity in a manner that is consistent with our ideals and our Constitution. In particular, I am encouraged by the President's expressed commitment to implement the Supreme Court's recent Adarand decision on affirmative action. The Department of Justice has informed all Federal agencies that every program employing race-based or similar criteria must be rigorously examined to ensure that it is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest that cannot otherwise be achieved. If a program does not meet that test, it must be significantly changed, or it must be eliminated. In my own view, Mr. President, most Government programs in which race, gender, or similar status are dominant factors, will not survive the Supreme Court's new Adarand test. If that is in fact the case, we must work together to find new and, I would hope, more broadly acceptable ways to achieve the goal of promoting equal opportunity for all--particularly our poorest neighbors. I accept the premise, as I believe most Americans do, that there is still much work to be done. We must be prepared to devote more resources to enforcing our civil rights laws vigorously. We need to direct our attention, energy, and money to helping poor people, regardless of race or ethnic background, by making greater investments in education and job training, economic opportunity, and empowerment. Doing so would not only be more effective in achieving our national ideal of equal opportunity for all, but I think would restore a sense of traditional American fair play to this field that, sadly, for too many has been lost. Some critics of affirmative action are simultaneously urging the dismantling of programs that are keys to helping poor people gain the education and skills that will make equal opportunity real for them. I will join the President, as I have before, in fighting both to preserve and reform, where necessary, those programs, and in finding ways to address the profound problems faced by those who are victims not only of discrimination, but of poverty. I invite all our colleagues within this Chamber, in the House, and all people of good will throughout the country, who are committed to making our society as fair as possible--whatever their party affiliation or views on affirmative action--to join this important effort in the months and years ahead.