Joseph Lieberman

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today with my friend and colleague Senator John McCain to introduce a second version of our Climate Stewardship Act with improvements--the Climate Stewardship AND Innovation Act (CSIA). In the computer age, we might call this Climate Stewardship 2.0. In this new version we take the time-tested strengths of the Climate Stewardship Act--like the emissions cap and trade program--and add new features to spur innovation and lead us into a 21st Century energy economy that prizes zero- or low-carbon emission technologies. And we do all this with market-driven programs that will promote a competition for efficient technologies and that don't drain the federal budget. Let me start with the basics. Climate change is real and its costs to the economy will be devastating if we don't act. Consider this very real example: 184 Alaskan coastal villages already need to be relocated because their land and infrastructure are being destroyed by advancing seas and warmer temperatures that are melting the permafrost. It will cost more than $100 million to relocate just one of these towns. What would be the price if we needed to do the same for New Orleans, Miami, or Santa Cruz, California? SwissRe, North America's leading reinsurer, projects that climate driven disasters could cost global financial centers more than $150 billion per year within the next ten years. The original Climate Stewardship Act asked the American people and businesses to reduce their carbon emissions to 2000 levels--which were quite close to today's levels by the end of the decade. All we are saying is ``Don't make the problem worse! Do no further harm.'' Our proposal--then and now--will reduce carbon emissions by putting a price on them with a cap and trade policy similar to the one used so successfully in the Clean Air Act of 1990 which reduced acid rain. Simply put, a business that doesn't reach its emissions target can buy emissions credits from those under the target. And, by the way, at the time we debated the acid rain program, industry estimated it would cost $1,000 a ton to comply and would ruin the economy. Today those emissions credits sell for between $100 and $200 a ton. America's innovators found a way to make it work for the economy and the environment--twin challenges that can and must move together in concert, not conflict. Because ``cap-and-trade'' creates a price for greenhouse emissions, it exposes the true cost of burning fossil fuels and will drive investment toward lower-emitting technologies. If we are going to meet the challenge of climate change, while making sure that our economy remains strong, we need a program that gives business and industry both a push and pull. The push will come from requiring business and industry to cut their greenhouse gas pollution; the pull from giving them incentives to innovate, along with financial support for bringing the best innovations forward. There are many actions we can take today to meet the targets set in our original bill, ranging from increasing the efficiency of our operations, to boosting the use of renewable energy, for which so many states are now admirably pushing. But to advance beyond this goal and maintain emissions reductions in the future with a growing economy, we will need to push both innovation and the deployment of climate friendly technologies that already exist. While we're on the subject of technology and investment, I want to be sure that everybody sees that our emissions trading market itself will unleash a multi-billion dollar flow of capital into technology and innovation. Our opponents insist that everybody see the emissions reduction requirements of this bill as costs. The truth is that these so-called costs are vital investment flows necessary to bring about innovation, invention and technological change in an era where our climate, our economy and even our national security depend on our ability to wean ourselves from our dependence on oil, so much of which is imported from unstable regions in the world. Because technological change and innovation are so important for both climate change and energy independence, our bill creates a dedicated public sector mechanism for ensuring that some of that investment flow is directed at the technologies we need--including, for example, biofuels and clean ways of burning coal, to name just two examples from a potentially open-ended menu of climate-friendly technology choices. The new bill we are introducing today helps assure that the most important and efficient technological alternatives are supported. We do not pick winners or losers. That's for the market to do. Our bill is technology neutral, but does make sure that if there are barriers to developing or using new technologies, the resources are available to knock those barriers down. This bill provides support for first-of-its-kind innovation or early- adoption of new energy technologies with minimal cost to the federal budget. Instead of turning to the taxpayer, our bill uses a self-funding mechanism by empowering the Secretary of Energy to use some of the money generated through the purchase of emissions credits, funneled through a new public corporation our bill creates, to help bring innovations to market. And this is not small change. It is a substantial multibillion dollar contribution every year. Mr. President, this kind of public sector support has many encouraging precedents. From the telegraph to the Internet, it was the timely intervention of the federal government that helped bring new technologies to market. And, if we don't help bring these new low-carbon or zero-carbon technologies to market, we will be buying them from the nations that do. We only need look at the popular hybrid cars--low-emitting vehicles that consumers have shown they want by the long waiting lists that exist to buy them. And then remember that American manufacturers must license this technology from Japan. Our bill also ensures that assistance is provided to help with the transition to new technology and energy production with programs to reduce consumer costs, to help dislocated workers and communities, and to substantially support the deployment of climate friendly technology and energy production. We also know that some regions--like my State of Connecticut--and businesses like DuPont, BP, and Kodak have already acted pro actively and are working to reduce emissions on their own. We commend these actions. Even more important, our bill ensures that credit will be given to them for their good work. Just a few months ago, the head of the international panel on climate change, Dr. R. Pachauri, said that ``we are already at a dangerous point when it comes to global warming. . . . Immediate and very deep cuts in greenhouse gases are needed if humanity is to survive.'' Let me repeat those last words, ``If humanity is to survive.'' When I quoted Dr. Pachauri on this floor in February, I reminded the Senate that the Bush Administration lobbied heavily for Dr. Pachauri's appointment to the IPCC leadership because it considered him a more cautious and pragmatic scientist. I quote him today because his warning words are so clear and strong. Global warming is truly one of the great challenges of our age--a challenge where the Heavens and the Earth meet. It is a challenge of Biblical proportions--to meet God's call in Corinthians to be ``stewards'' of His mysteries--and in Genesis to go forth and ``replenish the earth'' to both work and guard the garden. If we don't take these simple steps now--steps that are well within both our technological and financial grasp--the generations to come will rightfully look back at us with scorn and ask why we acted so selfishly . . . why we cared only for our own short-term profits and comforts . . . and why we left them a world environment in danger. We must act on our vision of a better future, a future that is most definitely within our reach. That is what Senator McCain and I are convinced our CSIA will do. We put forth this innovation and technology proposal to start a conversation here in the Senate with colleagues whose support we need to get to a majority, and to provide some ideas for how to accelerate and build a climate friendly future. We hope that our colleagues will join us in this conversation so we can put forth--and pass--the best proposal possible.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today with my friend and colleague Senator John McCain to introduce a second version of our Climate Stewardship Act with improvements--the Climate Stewardship AND Innovation Act (CSIA). In the computer age, we might call this Climate Stewardship 2.0. In this new version we take the time-tested strengths of the Climate Stewardship Act--like the emissions cap and trade program--and add new features to spur innovation and lead us into a 21st Century energy economy that prizes zero- or low-carbon emission technologies. And we do all this with market-driven programs that will promote a competition for efficient technologies and that don't drain the federal budget. Let me start with the basics. Climate change is real and its costs to the economy will be devastating if we don't act. Consider this very real example: 184 Alaskan coastal villages already need to be relocated because their land and infrastructure are being destroyed by advancing seas and warmer temperatures that are melting the permafrost. It will cost more than $100 million to relocate just one of these towns. What would be the price if we needed to do the same for New Orleans, Miami, or Santa Cruz, California? SwissRe, North America's leading reinsurer, projects that climate driven disasters could cost global financial centers more than $150 billion per year within the next ten years. The original Climate Stewardship Act asked the American people and businesses to reduce their carbon emissions to 2000 levels--which were quite close to today's levels by the end of the decade. All we are saying is ``Don't make the problem worse! Do no further harm.'' Our proposal--then and now--will reduce carbon emissions by putting a price on them with a cap and trade policy similar to the one used so successfully in the Clean Air Act of 1990 which reduced acid rain. Simply put, a business that doesn't reach its emissions target can buy emissions credits from those under the target. And, by the way, at the time we debated the acid rain program, industry estimated it would cost $1,000 a ton to comply and would ruin the economy. Today those emissions credits sell for between $100 and $200 a ton. America's innovators found a way to make it work for the economy and the environment--twin challenges that can and must move together in concert, not conflict. Because ``cap-and-trade'' creates a price for greenhouse emissions, it exposes the true cost of burning fossil fuels and will drive investment toward lower-emitting technologies. If we are going to meet the challenge of climate change, while making sure that our economy remains strong, we need a program that gives business and industry both a push and pull. The push will come from requiring business and industry to cut their greenhouse gas pollution; the pull from giving them incentives to innovate, along with financial support for bringing the best innovations forward. There are many actions we can take today to meet the targets set in our original bill, ranging from increasing the efficiency of our operations, to boosting the use of renewable energy, for which so many states are now admirably pushing. But to advance beyond this goal and maintain emissions reductions in the future with a growing economy, we will need to push both innovation and the deployment of climate friendly technologies that already exist. While we're on the subject of technology and investment, I want to be sure that everybody sees that our emissions trading market itself will unleash a multi-billion dollar flow of capital into technology and innovation. Our opponents insist that everybody see the emissions reduction requirements of this bill as costs. The truth is that these so-called costs are vital investment flows necessary to bring about innovation, invention and technological change in an era where our climate, our economy and even our national security depend on our ability to wean ourselves from our dependence on oil, so much of which is imported from unstable regions in the world. Because technological change and innovation are so important for both climate change and energy independence, our bill creates a dedicated public sector mechanism for ensuring that some of that investment flow is directed at the technologies we need--including, for example, biofuels and clean ways of burning coal, to name just two examples from a potentially open-ended menu of climate-friendly technology choices. The new bill we are introducing today helps assure that the most important and efficient technological alternatives are supported. We do not pick winners or losers. That's for the market to do. Our bill is technology neutral, but does make sure that if there are barriers to developing or using new technologies, the resources are available to knock those barriers down. This bill provides support for first-of-its-kind innovation or early- adoption of new energy technologies with minimal cost to the federal budget. Instead of turning to the taxpayer, our bill uses a self-funding mechanism by empowering the Secretary of Energy to use some of the money generated through the purchase of emissions credits, funneled through a new public corporation our bill creates, to help bring innovations to market. And this is not small change. It is a substantial multibillion dollar contribution every year. Mr. President, this kind of public sector support has many encouraging precedents. From the telegraph to the Internet, it was the timely intervention of the federal government that helped bring new technologies to market. And, if we don't help bring these new low-carbon or zero-carbon technologies to market, we will be buying them from the nations that do. We only need look at the popular hybrid cars--low-emitting vehicles that consumers have shown they want by the long waiting lists that exist to buy them. And then remember that American manufacturers must license this technology from Japan. Our bill also ensures that assistance is provided to help with the transition to new technology and energy production with programs to reduce consumer costs, to help dislocated workers and communities, and to substantially support the deployment of climate friendly technology and energy production. We also know that some regions--like my State of Connecticut--and businesses like DuPont, BP, and Kodak have already acted pro actively and are working to reduce emissions on their own. We commend these actions. Even more important, our bill ensures that credit will be given to them for their good work. Just a few months ago, the head of the international panel on climate change, Dr. R. Pachauri, said that ``we are already at a dangerous point when it comes to global warming. . . . Immediate and very deep cuts in greenhouse gases are needed if humanity is to survive.'' Let me repeat those last words, ``If humanity is to survive.'' When I quoted Dr. Pachauri on this floor in February, I reminded the Senate that the Bush Administration lobbied heavily for Dr. Pachauri's appointment to the IPCC leadership because it considered him a more cautious and pragmatic scientist. I quote him today because his warning words are so clear and strong. Global warming is truly one of the great challenges of our age--a challenge where the Heavens and the Earth meet. It is a challenge of Biblical proportions--to meet God's call in Corinthians to be ``stewards'' of His mysteries--and in Genesis to go forth and ``replenish the earth'' to both work and guard the garden. If we don't take these simple steps now--steps that are well within both our technological and financial grasp--the generations to come will rightfully look back at us with scorn and ask why we acted so selfishly . . . why we cared only for our own short-term profits and comforts . . . and why we left them a world environment in danger. We must act on our vision of a better future, a future that is most definitely within our reach. That is what Senator McCain and I are convinced our CSIA will do. We put forth this innovation and technology proposal to start a conversation here in the Senate with colleagues whose support we need to get to a majority, and to provide some ideas for how to accelerate and build a climate friendly future. We hope that our colleagues will join us in this conversation so we can put forth--and pass--the best proposal possible.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to pay tribute to a true American hero, COL. David H. Hackworth, who spent his last years in Connecticut. Colonel Hackworth was one the most legendary and highly decorated soldiers of the U.S. Army. As Memorial Day approaches, there is no better time to remember the sacrifices, courage and tactical genius of this legendary soldier who spent more than half a century fighting on the world's most dangerous battlefields. As World War II was coming to a close, a 14-year-old David Hackworth lied about his age to join the Merchant Marine and a year later joined the U.S. Army-- spending the next 26 years fighting our nation's battles. A true leader, ``Hack'' as he was known, received a battlefield commission in Korea to become the Army's youngest captain and was promoted in Vietnam to the Army's youngest full colonel. Three times he was nominated for the Medal of Honor. His decorations are numerous and include the Army Medal of Valor, the Distinguished Service Cross, ten Silver Stars, eight Bronze Stars and the United Nations Peace Medal. But the awards of which he was proudest are his eight purple hearts and the Combat Infantryman's Badge. Mr. President, As you know, there is only one way to get this badge: serve 90 days in a front-line infantry unit under fire and survive. In just one example of his bravery, Colonel Hackworth got out on the strut of a helicopter to drag to safety his men who were pinned down and facing certain death. It is no wonder, Colonel Hackworth has so many supporters. But these statistics do not capture the Colonel Hackworth, the iconoclastic straight talker, who lead from the front and spoke from his heart. One of the most telling stories about Colonel Hackworth's leadership was his transformation of the 4/39 Infantry Battalion from a demoralized outfit into an effective counter-insurgency fighting force that routed enemy units in the jungles of Vietnam. Colonel Hackworth's training methods and tactics were so successful, he wrote them down in a book ``The Vietnam Primer'' that is still read by commanders today. GEN. Hal Moore, the coauthor of ``We Were Soldiers Once and Young,'' called him ``the Patton of Vietnam,'' while General Creighton Abrams, the last American commander in that disastrous war, described him as ``the best battalion commander I ever saw in the United States Army.'' Gruff and full of purple prose, Colonel Hackworth ran afoul of the Army's top leadership and retired following a confrontation in which he said in 1971 that the Vietnam War was hopeless. Often called the champion of the common soldier, ``Hack'' spoke truth to power. After leaving the service, Colonel Hackworth launched himself into new careers as a journalist, businessman, restaurateur and best-selling author as he cast his sharp and experienced eye on the military-industrial complex. He always cast a glaring spotlight on concerns when the ``grunts'' were not getting the equipment they needed to do their jobs. I extend my deepest condolences to Colonel Hackworth's wife, Eilhys England, and his many children, step-children, grandchildren and step- grandchildren. But of all the tributes I know will come Colonel Hackworth's way, I think the tribute he would appreciate most will be from the average soldier whose loyalty he earned in combat and whose welfare became his life's cause in his retirement, for he knew they are the men and women who are out on point securing our Nation's freedom.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce a bill that aims to redefine and enhance the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America. At this point in our history we stand at the threshold of a new era in American Foreign policy and indeed of world history. For the first time ever an economic and military superpower is about to emerge without war or catastrophe: Asia's middle kingdom: the People's Republic of China, stands at the precipice of becoming one of the two most influential nations on Earth. I have always held that our foreign policy is best conducted when our values as a Nation form the basis of our policies. With that in mind, I stand before you today to introduce legislation that will deepen the scope and breadth of America's relationship with China through the reaching out of our Nation's hand in friendship. We introduce this with a bit of humility because history constantly shows us that the more things change, the more they stay the same. Fortunately American history is filled with good ideas to guide us. Back in 1871, President Ulysses S. Grant told Congress that trade imbalances with China were threatening the viability of key United States' industries and warned that federal intervention might be needed to restore the balance of trade. That is true today and I am both sponsoring and supporting legislation to fairly revalue the Yuan so that U.S. industries and workers enjoy a fair playing field in the global market. But Grant also thought many problems with China could be solved if we just better understood Chinese language and culture. He proposed sending at least four American students a year to China to study the language and culture and who would then act as effective translators for business and government officials. Grant's idea was never acted on and years of unfortunate history separated China from the rest of the world anyway. But China is back and so are the challenges. Those versed in international affairs and trade are fully aware of China's emerging influence. However, our present education system is not equipped to supply the number of skilled professionals required to constructively interact with China. According to the 2000 Census there are about 2.2 million Americans that speak Chinese. Of that 2.2 million, approximately 85-95 percent are Americans of Chinese descent. According to several studies there is a dearth of knowledge among college-bound students regarding Chinese cultural pillars like Mao Zedong in the United States. China, on the other hand, mandates English instruction beginning in--what we would call--the third grade. For every student we send to China to study there, they send 25 to study here. If you combine these findings with the fact that well over half of the 500 largest companies are currently invested in China, with many more drawing up plans to do so, it becomes clear to me that the talent pool for future American-produced leaders with expertise in Chinese affairs is woefully inadequate. If you take a look at China's top ten trading partners, seven of those have a trade surplus with China and most importantly, five of those seven have a significant population with deep-seated knowledge of Chinese language and culture. America needs more people with the expertise to transact with China in international affairs and to increase the number of professionals that will assist both nations in growing and balancing our economic interdependency. The future repercussions of our lack of knowledge about Chinese culture are immense. The Chinese have just begun to compete with U.S. firms for precious natural resources to feed the exponential growth of their economy. China is the world's biggest consumer of steel and in another decade will be the biggest consumer of petroleum. Currently, China's middle class is the fastest growing anywhere in the world. Over 400 of the world's Fortune 500 companies are invested in China's economy, which will soon be the largest consumer market in the world. Already, our trade with Asia is double that with Europe and is expected to exceed one trillion dollars annually before 2010. China, soon to be the biggest economic power in Asia, will play a large role in that growth. Consequently, the one in six U.S. jobs that are currently tied to international trade will grow substantially. If the U.S. is to grab a significant piece of China's burgeoning consumer market, we must begin by engaging China as experts of their culture. The United States-China Cultural Engagement Act of 2005 authorizes $1.3 billion over the five years after its enactment. This is a symbolic gesture for the recent birth of China's one billion three hundred millionth citizen. One may argue that is too much given other important--under-funded--national priorities. However, the dividend from this investment in our future business and government leaders pays for itself a hundred or even a million times over in opportunities for economic growth and in potential foreign crises that will be averted. In this legislation, I propose to significantly enhance our schools and academic institutions' ability to teach Chinese language and culture from elementary school through advanced degree studies. This act will expand student physical exchange programs with China as well as create a virtual exchange infrastructure for secondary school students that study Chinese. Initiatives were included, that offer the Department of State more flexibility in granting visas to Chinese scientists to come here and study at American academic institutions. For American businesses, I seek a substantial increase in Foreign Commercial Service officers stationed in China to uncover and facilitate more American export opportunities. For non-corporate entrepreneurs, provisions that provide for the expansion of state specific export centers and greater Small Business Administration outreach were also included. Engaging China as an ally in international affairs and as a partner in building economic prosperity is of the utmost importance to the United States. Only if we succeed in fostering this relationship can we have a future that is as bright as our past. Education experts, corporate leaders, and even some government officials have talked for sometime about the convergence of economic, demographic, and national security trends that require our young people to attain a greater level of international knowledge and skills to be successful as workers and citizens in our increasingly dynamic American economy. The rise of China comes with a whole set of challenges. But the ability to talk to and understand each other should not be among them. The United States-China Cultural Engagement Act sets forth a strategy for achieving that level of understanding and cooperation with China, I urge my colleagues to look favorably upon this measure.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce a bill that aims to redefine and enhance the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America. At this point in our history we stand at the threshold of a new era in American Foreign policy and indeed of world history. For the first time ever an economic and military superpower is about to emerge without war or catastrophe: Asia's middle kingdom: the People's Republic of China, stands at the precipice of becoming one of the two most influential nations on Earth. I have always held that our foreign policy is best conducted when our values as a Nation form the basis of our policies. With that in mind, I stand before you today to introduce legislation that will deepen the scope and breadth of America's relationship with China through the reaching out of our Nation's hand in friendship. We introduce this with a bit of humility because history constantly shows us that the more things change, the more they stay the same. Fortunately American history is filled with good ideas to guide us. Back in 1871, President Ulysses S. Grant told Congress that trade imbalances with China were threatening the viability of key United States' industries and warned that federal intervention might be needed to restore the balance of trade. That is true today and I am both sponsoring and supporting legislation to fairly revalue the Yuan so that U.S. industries and workers enjoy a fair playing field in the global market. But Grant also thought many problems with China could be solved if we just better understood Chinese language and culture. He proposed sending at least four American students a year to China to study the language and culture and who would then act as effective translators for business and government officials. Grant's idea was never acted on and years of unfortunate history separated China from the rest of the world anyway. But China is back and so are the challenges. Those versed in international affairs and trade are fully aware of China's emerging influence. However, our present education system is not equipped to supply the number of skilled professionals required to constructively interact with China. According to the 2000 Census there are about 2.2 million Americans that speak Chinese. Of that 2.2 million, approximately 85-95 percent are Americans of Chinese descent. According to several studies there is a dearth of knowledge among college-bound students regarding Chinese cultural pillars like Mao Zedong in the United States. China, on the other hand, mandates English instruction beginning in--what we would call--the third grade. For every student we send to China to study there, they send 25 to study here. If you combine these findings with the fact that well over half of the 500 largest companies are currently invested in China, with many more drawing up plans to do so, it becomes clear to me that the talent pool for future American-produced leaders with expertise in Chinese affairs is woefully inadequate. If you take a look at China's top ten trading partners, seven of those have a trade surplus with China and most importantly, five of those seven have a significant population with deep-seated knowledge of Chinese language and culture. America needs more people with the expertise to transact with China in international affairs and to increase the number of professionals that will assist both nations in growing and balancing our economic interdependency. The future repercussions of our lack of knowledge about Chinese culture are immense. The Chinese have just begun to compete with U.S. firms for precious natural resources to feed the exponential growth of their economy. China is the world's biggest consumer of steel and in another decade will be the biggest consumer of petroleum. Currently, China's middle class is the fastest growing anywhere in the world. Over 400 of the world's Fortune 500 companies are invested in China's economy, which will soon be the largest consumer market in the world. Already, our trade with Asia is double that with Europe and is expected to exceed one trillion dollars annually before 2010. China, soon to be the biggest economic power in Asia, will play a large role in that growth. Consequently, the one in six U.S. jobs that are currently tied to international trade will grow substantially. If the U.S. is to grab a significant piece of China's burgeoning consumer market, we must begin by engaging China as experts of their culture. The United States-China Cultural Engagement Act of 2005 authorizes $1.3 billion over the five years after its enactment. This is a symbolic gesture for the recent birth of China's one billion three hundred millionth citizen. One may argue that is too much given other important--under-funded--national priorities. However, the dividend from this investment in our future business and government leaders pays for itself a hundred or even a million times over in opportunities for economic growth and in potential foreign crises that will be averted. In this legislation, I propose to significantly enhance our schools and academic institutions' ability to teach Chinese language and culture from elementary school through advanced degree studies. This act will expand student physical exchange programs with China as well as create a virtual exchange infrastructure for secondary school students that study Chinese. Initiatives were included, that offer the Department of State more flexibility in granting visas to Chinese scientists to come here and study at American academic institutions. For American businesses, I seek a substantial increase in Foreign Commercial Service officers stationed in China to uncover and facilitate more American export opportunities. For non-corporate entrepreneurs, provisions that provide for the expansion of state specific export centers and greater Small Business Administration outreach were also included. Engaging China as an ally in international affairs and as a partner in building economic prosperity is of the utmost importance to the United States. Only if we succeed in fostering this relationship can we have a future that is as bright as our past. Education experts, corporate leaders, and even some government officials have talked for sometime about the convergence of economic, demographic, and national security trends that require our young people to attain a greater level of international knowledge and skills to be successful as workers and citizens in our increasingly dynamic American economy. The rise of China comes with a whole set of challenges. But the ability to talk to and understand each other should not be among them. The United States-China Cultural Engagement Act sets forth a strategy for achieving that level of understanding and cooperation with China, I urge my colleagues to look favorably upon this measure.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to submit a Resolution with my good friend, Senator Jeff Sessions. Our resolution reaffirms the Senate's support for a National Moment of Remembrance at 3:00 p.m. on Memorial Day, and calls upon all Americans to observe the National Moment of Remembrance this Memorial Day. Memorial Day is a holiday unique in the world and distinctly American in spirit. On Memorial Day we honor no single man or woman--no general or admiral--but generations of Americans who selflessly answered their Nation's call to defend not national boundaries but a noble cause. On Memorial Day we pay homage not to a single battle or war, but to the enduring struggle for freedom that stretches from Bunker Hill to Baghdad. In these challenging times, when we hear almost daily of American servicemen and women who have sacrificed their lives to defend this great Nation, it is especially important that all Americans take a moment on Memorial Day to honor all these fallen heroes who throughout our history have made the ultimate sacrifice so that we may enjoy the freedoms we have today. Many may not be aware, but Americans began formally recognizing the sacrifice of those who had given their lives in the service of their country in 1868 when General John A. Logan, Commander of the Grand Army of the Republic, designated May 30 as Decoration Day. The first large observance was held that year in Arlington National Cemetery. Those early commemorations encouraged Americans to decorate the graves of war dead with flowers. The goal of this, as General Logan eloquently put it, was that ``We should guard their graves with sacred vigilance. . . Let pleasant paths invite the coming and going of reverent visitors and fond mourners. Let no neglect, no ravages of time, testify to the present or to the coming generations that we have forgotten as a people the cost of a free and undivided republic.'' Through Decoration Day, General Logan began a noble tradition that we carry forward to this day. We in Congress recently sought to reinforce that tradition and encourage all Americans to not lose sight of the meaning of Memorial Day, as Decoration Day has been known since 1971. In 2000 we passed and the President signed the ``National Moment of Remembrance Act'' which encouraged all Americans to pause wherever they are at 3:00 p.m. local time on Memorial Day for a moment of silence to remember and honor those who have died in service to their country. Since we passed that legislation, we have seen our Nation attacked. Once again our fighting men and women have responded to the call to defend their Nation. They have done so magnificently. Their courage and valor are inspiring and are important reminders that we must continue to support those that fight, and honor those who have fallen. We honor our heroes who founded and preserved our Nation and have since carried the torch of freedom into corners of the world where people huddled under tyranny's dark shadows. We honor these heroes with the words of President Abraham Lincoln in our heart when he said: ``The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart . . should swell into a mighty chorus of remembrance, gratitude and rededication.''

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to support the supplemental appropriations bill. I do so because it supports the men and women of the American military, in my opinion the greatest fighting force in the history of the world. I say that, really having thought about it. It supports them in their efforts to advance the cause of freedom and to protect the security of every American by what they are doing to fight terrorism and terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan. I do want to note, however, my strong objections to House provisions known as the REAL ID Act that have been included in the conference report. The REAL ID Act will repeal ID security provisions enacted with overwhelming bipartisan support last year at the urging of the 9/11 Commission and place them with rigid and unworkable Federal mandates on State government for the issuance of driver's licenses, long exclusively a matter of State law. The conference report from the House also includes punitive immigration provisions we rejected last year and that have no place on an emergency spending bill. In my opinion, our Nation is safer if we continue to implement the protections we passed last December rather than allow an ideological debate over immigration policy to derail those initiatives so vital to the war against terrorism. Notwithstanding my strong objections to the REAL ID components of the conference report, I strongly support the report and I do so based particularly on a visit I was able to make last week to Iraq, the third I have been privileged to make in the last 10 months. I am back feeling we are at a tipping point and it is moving in the right direction in Iraq. It requires the sustained, strong, and visible American support that is expressed in this supplemental appropriations. There is no doubt that the recent spate of suicide bombings has riveted the media's attention and as a result the attention of the American people, but I assure my colleagues those suicide bombings and those suicide bombers are a small, though devastating, part of life in Iraq today. They have got to be understood in context. I come back from Iraq seeing it this way: There are more than 25 million people in Iraq. Eight million of them came out in the face of terrorist threats to vote for self-governance on January 30 of this year. They have stood up a government which is impressive and inclusive. Their military is gaining strength and self-sufficiency every day. There are 25 million on one side wanting to live a better, freer life. On the other side are the insurgents, the terrorists, the enemy, variously estimated at 10,000 to 12,000, some would say less. For as long as I can remember as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee in briefings we have received and on previous trips to Iraq when I have asked who are these insurgents, every other time I have been told most of them are former regime elements, leftovers from Saddam Hussein who want to go back into power and stop this new government, particularly a government which represents the majority of people in Iraq, Shi'a Muslims, to take power. Then I was always told a minority is terrorists who are people associated with Zarqawi and al-Qaida. This time it began to turn around and that is a very significant development. I was informed that the number of former regime elements, the number of Iraqi Sunni Muslims involved in the insurgency, is dropping. In fact, some of them have begun to reach out to come over to the other side because they see the future tipping in another direction. However, there is an increase in the movement into Iraq of foreign terrorists. Sometimes they are people recruited over the Internet, recruited at religious sites, coming into Iraq usually from Syria for as short as a day before they are strapped with bombs, sent in a vehicle aimed at a crowd of Iraqis in a marketplace, sent to be in a line of Iraqis ready to enlist in the Iraqi military or in the police force, who then blow themselves up. What I am saying is there is a historic transformation going on in Iraq that already has and, if it can continue to go with our support, will resonate throughout the Arab world. I know that as the American people every night see only the suicide bombings, they begin to lose hope about what is happening in Iraq. I appeal to the American people to understand that those bombings, as devastating as they are, are the result of the fanatical work of a minority of people, the same people who attacked us on September 11, 2001--same attitude, same mindset, same hatred. If we diminish our support for our presence in Iraq today for the Iraqis who want so desperately to find a better life and govern themselves, we will have lost a moment of historic opportunity and we will ultimately pay the price for it ourselves. I had the opportunity to meet with the new leadership of Iraq, the new President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, a Kurdish leader for decades, who many of us have met and come to know, a good man, a strong man. I sat with him and realized this is the duly elected successor to the brutal, murdering dictator Saddam Hussein. It is a miracle, something that neither he nor I, nor most of us, and particularly the Iraqi people, could have imagined just a few years ago. President Talabani deserves our support. I met with the new Prime Minister, Ibrahim al-Jaafari. I never met him before. He is a good man. I found him to be thoughtful, strong, clear, very religious, very inclusive. Neither the Shi'a nor the Kurds who suffered terribly under Saddam--and one might understand the human instinct for revenge--have yielded to it. They have reached out to the Sunnis. We have not seen it in the papers and on the TV, but they are reaching out to bring them into the Government to try to create a leadership by consensus that will assure a better future for the Iraqi people. I want to say a final word about the American military. As I said at the outset, it is the finest in the world. It deserves our support. The election, the negotiations with the Sunnis, the increasing capability of the Iraqi military, all bring Iraq to a tipping point in the right direction. It is historic. The American military understands what is going on. I had the privilege, over the last 16 years, to visit many of our men and women in uniform around the world. I have never seen our military more proud of what they are doing, with morale higher, more skillful, better equipped to carry out the mission than they are carrying out. This bill helps them to do what we have asked them to do. I want to say, finally, that we have to exploit this moment, this tipping point, and act aggressively with the Iraqi government to bring over more of the insurgents, thus isolating the foreign fighters, the terrorists, the al-Qaida/Zarqawi network people, and making it harder for them to move freely and resupply themselves. This has really now become quite explicitly a war against the terrorist movement that struck us on September 11, 2001. That, to me, means moving aggressively to close the border with Syria to stop the flow of terrorists, and further help bring stability to Iraq. Operation Matador, now in its third day in Iraq near the Syrian border, is the kind of sustained military effort we need. Our pride, our prayers, our gratitude go out to the Marines and others in the American military who have advanced Operation Matador with such remarkable success. Our engagement in Iraq is crucial. It is in the best bipartisan traditions of American foreign policy that run from Woodrow Wilson to George W. Bush, with a lot of good Democratic and Republican Presidents in between. This supplemental supports that policy. It advances the cause of freedom. It protects American security. It supports the American men and women who are performing so valiantly and constructively. I urge its adoption. I yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce, along with my colleague from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, legislation that will bolster the content and pedagogical knowledge of our K-12 teacher workforce. This measure provides resources and incentives to enlist college and university faculties in partnerships with public school districts throughout the Nation in an effort to strengthen public school instruction. My proposal will establish, over the next five years, forty new Teacher Professional Development Institutes in locales throughout the Nation. Based on the model which has been operating at Yale University and the City of New Haven for over 25 years, Teacher Professional Development Institutes consist of partnerships between one or more institutions of higher education and local, economically disadvantaged public school systems. These Institutes will strengthen the present teacher workforce by giving participants an opportunity to gain more sophisticated content knowledge and instructional skills, and will provide them a chance to develop--in conjunction with their Institute colleagues--practical curriculum units that they can implement in their classrooms and share with their schools and districts. Since 1978, the Yale-New Haven Institute has offered five to seven thirteen-session seminars each year, led by Yale faculty, on topics that teachers have selected to enhance their teaching mastery. To begin the process, teacher representatives from the Institute solicit teachers throughout the school district for ideas on how to help meet their perceived needs--for example, improving content area knowledge, preparing instructional materials, managing the classroom, or addressing accountability standards. As a consensus emerges regarding seminar content, the Institute director identifies and enlists university faculty members with the appropriate expertise, interest, and desire to lead the seminar. Because the topics are ultimately determined by the teachers who participate, seminars offer content which teachers believe is pertinent, valuable, and practical for both themselves and their students. It is, in fact, the cooperative and emergent nature of the Institute seminar planning process that ensures its success--rigorous topical instruction and relevant materials are provided based on participants' self- identified needs. Granted the opportunity to examine and act on their own skills and knowledge, teachers gain a sense of self-sufficiency, and are more enthusiastic about their participation. Teachers gain further confidence as they practice using the materials they obtain and develop among their peers, ensuring that the experience not only increases their subject-matter proficiency, but also provides immediate hands-on active learning materials that can be transferred to the classroom. In short, by allowing teachers to determine the seminar subjects and providing them the resources to develop curricula relevant to their classroom and their students, the Institutes empower teachers. Teachers are the front line--they are the interface between the educational system and the students it aspires to shape and inform--and they know what should be done to improve their schools and increase student achievement. The Teacher Professional Development Institutes promote this philosophy. From 1999-2002, the Yale-New Haven Teachers Institute conducted a National Demonstration Project to create comparable Institutes at four diverse sites with large concentrations of disadvantaged students. These demonstration projects were located in Pittsburgh, PA; Houston, TX; Albuquerque, NM; and Santa Ana, CA. Based on the success of that Project, the Institute has launched the Yale National Initiative--a long-term endeavor to establish exemplary Teachers Institutes in states throughout the nation, just as the legislation I have introduced would do. Follow-up evaluations have garnered encouraging reactions from teachers who have participated both in the Yale-New Haven Institute and in the demonstration Institutes. These data strongly support the conclusions that virtually all teachers felt substantially strengthened in their mastery of content knowledge and that they developed increased expectations for students' achievement. Further, because of their personal involvement in the course selection and curriculum development process, teacher participants have found these seminars to be especially relevant and useful in their classroom practices--in fact, ninety-five percent of all participating teachers reported them to be beneficial. Finally, study results have found that these Institutes foster teacher leadership, develop supportive teacher networks, heighten university faculty commitments to improving K-12 public education, and create more positive partnerships between school districts and institutions of higher education--something I believe is essential to improving students' readiness for college. Several studies assert that teacher quality is the single most important school-related factor in determining student achievement. Accordingly, the No Child Left Behind Act requires a ``highly qualified'' teacher to be in every classroom by the end of the 2005- 2006 academic year. Effective teacher professional development programs that focus on content area and pedagogical knowledge are proven means of enhancing the success of classroom teachers and helping to meet the ``highly qualified'' criteria. Yet, a 2003 Government Accountability Office Report on Teacher Quality found that many state and local school districts view shortcomings in their current professional development practices as a significant barrier to meeting this requirement. These local agencies are looking for innovative, research-proven alternatives to their current programs, and this is precisely what Teacher Professional Development Institutes will provide. Nationwide, projects developed to conform to the Yale-New Haven Institute model have proven to be successful in providing innovative teacher professional development. Virtually all teacher participants felt substantially strengthened in their mastery of content knowledge and their teaching skills. My proposal would open this opportunity to many more urban teachers and would provide high quality professional development to educators and policy makers throughout the Nation. In this way, we can set high standards for effective teacher professional development as we have done for student achievement outcomes. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Teachers Professional Development Institutes Act be printed in the Record.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce, along with my colleague from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, legislation that will bolster the content and pedagogical knowledge of our K-12 teacher workforce. This measure provides resources and incentives to enlist college and university faculties in partnerships with public school districts throughout the Nation in an effort to strengthen public school instruction. My proposal will establish, over the next five years, forty new Teacher Professional Development Institutes in locales throughout the Nation. Based on the model which has been operating at Yale University and the City of New Haven for over 25 years, Teacher Professional Development Institutes consist of partnerships between one or more institutions of higher education and local, economically disadvantaged public school systems. These Institutes will strengthen the present teacher workforce by giving participants an opportunity to gain more sophisticated content knowledge and instructional skills, and will provide them a chance to develop--in conjunction with their Institute colleagues--practical curriculum units that they can implement in their classrooms and share with their schools and districts. Since 1978, the Yale-New Haven Institute has offered five to seven thirteen-session seminars each year, led by Yale faculty, on topics that teachers have selected to enhance their teaching mastery. To begin the process, teacher representatives from the Institute solicit teachers throughout the school district for ideas on how to help meet their perceived needs--for example, improving content area knowledge, preparing instructional materials, managing the classroom, or addressing accountability standards. As a consensus emerges regarding seminar content, the Institute director identifies and enlists university faculty members with the appropriate expertise, interest, and desire to lead the seminar. Because the topics are ultimately determined by the teachers who participate, seminars offer content which teachers believe is pertinent, valuable, and practical for both themselves and their students. It is, in fact, the cooperative and emergent nature of the Institute seminar planning process that ensures its success--rigorous topical instruction and relevant materials are provided based on participants' self- identified needs. Granted the opportunity to examine and act on their own skills and knowledge, teachers gain a sense of self-sufficiency, and are more enthusiastic about their participation. Teachers gain further confidence as they practice using the materials they obtain and develop among their peers, ensuring that the experience not only increases their subject-matter proficiency, but also provides immediate hands-on active learning materials that can be transferred to the classroom. In short, by allowing teachers to determine the seminar subjects and providing them the resources to develop curricula relevant to their classroom and their students, the Institutes empower teachers. Teachers are the front line--they are the interface between the educational system and the students it aspires to shape and inform--and they know what should be done to improve their schools and increase student achievement. The Teacher Professional Development Institutes promote this philosophy. From 1999-2002, the Yale-New Haven Teachers Institute conducted a National Demonstration Project to create comparable Institutes at four diverse sites with large concentrations of disadvantaged students. These demonstration projects were located in Pittsburgh, PA; Houston, TX; Albuquerque, NM; and Santa Ana, CA. Based on the success of that Project, the Institute has launched the Yale National Initiative--a long-term endeavor to establish exemplary Teachers Institutes in states throughout the nation, just as the legislation I have introduced would do. Follow-up evaluations have garnered encouraging reactions from teachers who have participated both in the Yale-New Haven Institute and in the demonstration Institutes. These data strongly support the conclusions that virtually all teachers felt substantially strengthened in their mastery of content knowledge and that they developed increased expectations for students' achievement. Further, because of their personal involvement in the course selection and curriculum development process, teacher participants have found these seminars to be especially relevant and useful in their classroom practices--in fact, ninety-five percent of all participating teachers reported them to be beneficial. Finally, study results have found that these Institutes foster teacher leadership, develop supportive teacher networks, heighten university faculty commitments to improving K-12 public education, and create more positive partnerships between school districts and institutions of higher education--something I believe is essential to improving students' readiness for college. Several studies assert that teacher quality is the single most important school-related factor in determining student achievement. Accordingly, the No Child Left Behind Act requires a ``highly qualified'' teacher to be in every classroom by the end of the 2005- 2006 academic year. Effective teacher professional development programs that focus on content area and pedagogical knowledge are proven means of enhancing the success of classroom teachers and helping to meet the ``highly qualified'' criteria. Yet, a 2003 Government Accountability Office Report on Teacher Quality found that many state and local school districts view shortcomings in their current professional development practices as a significant barrier to meeting this requirement. These local agencies are looking for innovative, research-proven alternatives to their current programs, and this is precisely what Teacher Professional Development Institutes will provide. Nationwide, projects developed to conform to the Yale-New Haven Institute model have proven to be successful in providing innovative teacher professional development. Virtually all teacher participants felt substantially strengthened in their mastery of content knowledge and their teaching skills. My proposal would open this opportunity to many more urban teachers and would provide high quality professional development to educators and policy makers throughout the Nation. In this way, we can set high standards for effective teacher professional development as we have done for student achievement outcomes. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the Teachers Professional Development Institutes Act be printed in the Record.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, once again we are on the floor of the Senate facing the destructive proposal to drill for oil in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Before the day is out, the Senate will be voting on a budget resolution that, if adopted, will open the way for this destructive action. I cannot support such a proposal, and, as a result, I cannot support the budget resolution. This is what happens when we attempt to make policy decisions--in this case a disastrous one--outside the normal process of deliberation and full, unlimited debate. I serve on the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, which has jurisdiction over wildlife refuges. Under the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act, the management of the National Wildlife Refuge System, it is the Secretary of the Interior acting-- ``through the United States Fish and Wildlife Service''--who is to administer refuge lands. For nearly 30 years, the wisdom of that approach has been borne out in the form of a thriving network of refuges and wilderness areas. Today, however, the Senate, without full deliberation and unlimited debate, is prepared to ignore the true purposes of a wildlife refuge, and run roughshod over them through a back-door budget-process maneuver. This is clearly the wrong way to make this decision and the wrong decision to make. Two months ago, more than 1,000 leading U.S. and Canadian scientists called on President Bush to protect the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge from oil drilling. In their letter to the President, dated February 14, 2005, the scientists questioned assertions that oil could be safely extracted from the Refuge and urged President Bush to ``support permanent protection of the coastal plain's significant wildlife and wilderness values.'' The scientists said oil development could seriously harm caribou, polar bears, muskoxen and snow geese--among other wildlife. They warned it could disrupt the fragile ecosystem of the coastal plain, which they said could lead to even more widespread injury to wildlife and its habitat. The signers categorically rejected the notion that the impacts of drilling could be confined to a limited footprint, as pro-drilling forces claim, noting that the effects of oil wells, pipelines, roads, airports, housing facilities, processing plants, gravel mines, air pollution, industrial noise, seismic exploration and exploratory drilling would radiate across the entire coastal plain of the Arctic Refuge. What they said adds up to the obvious--that, by definition, opening up the refuge for oil drilling will be the end of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge as true wilderness. The scientists who signed the letter are experts in the fields of ecology, wildlife, and conservation biology, natural resources management and cultural anthropology. They include Edward O. Wilson, winner of the National Medal of Science and two Pulitzer Prizes for his landmark books on social biology, and Anne Ehrlich, who is a well known biologist from my home State. Hundreds of scientists are telling us that throwing the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge open to oil companies will harm wildlife and permanently disrupt the wild nature of this unique place. It simply does not make sense to destroy the Arctic refuge for oil that will not lower prices and will not make a noticeable dent in our dependency on foreign energy. In particular, according to even the most optimistic projections of the Bush administration's own experts, Arctic refuge oil will only reduce our dependence on oil imports from 62 percent to 60 percent, 10 years from now. Clearly, that falls short of the type of impact needed to influence the price of oil on the world market. The numbers I just cited were projected in 2003, before the current steep climb in oil prices. They are the latest we have, and I doubt that the point changes--that the impact on our country's oil imports would be minimal even with the most optimistic view of Arctic oil. In fact, the recent jump in oil prices makes an even more important point--that drilling the Arctic refuge is a hunt for fool's gold; not only would it do little to change the flow of oil imports into our economy, but it would dangerously distract us from the real challenge our Nation--faces and the real solution our Nation needs--turning away altogether from our rampant usage of oil. These arguments are well known and well understood. That is why the majority of the Nation opposes this drilling plan and why there are not the votes to authorize drilling were we to follow our regular way of doing our business. But since there are not close to the votes in this Chamber needed to authorize drilling where the debate belongs--in the Energy bill--we are being forced to debate it in the context of the budget. Is there anyone in this Chamber who believes that the purpose of this provision is to generate revenue for the budget? That in the context of a $2.6 trillion dollar budget, we must force the opening of a wildlife refuge to get an essential $2 billion of revenue? Of course not! The real purpose of this provision is to frustrate the rules of the Senate--rules that not only protect the minority but also the very process of judicious deliberation--in order to jam through a provision through reconciliation that its proponents have been unable to pass for years. The generation of revenue? Merely incidental to that purpose. Mr. President, I therefore ask my colleagues to look not just at the substance of this issue--on which the merits are clear--but to the policy principle at stake. If the procedural sleight of hand in this measure can stymie open and unlimited debate, where will we be drilling next? What other areas can we open for drilling, and incidentally gain revenue from, through the budget? The Great Lakes? The areas off of our coasts? And what other measures, all across the substantive spectrum, could now be free from unlimited debate? Just ask yourself, how many provisions out there have been debated that incidentally generate revenue or incidentally reduce outlays? Are they all now to be free from unlimited debate? As we all know, this institution's historic commitment to open and unlimited debate could soon be besieged on another front. Has the mere prospect of this already made us so cavalier about the Senate's long hallowed rule of law for itself? Early last month, the senior Senator from West Virginia, Mr. Byrd, spoke so eloquently about the need to protect open debate and about the extent to which the Senate honors this tradition. Of course, our practice of open debate goes back to the very way in which our Founders and Framers conceived of the Senate. I have heard the Senator from West Virginia say, and have been moved by it, that the rule of unlimited debate is there to protect the Nation and its values from falling to the passions of the moment that destroy something timeless. I cannot think of a better example of that need than this, where we are threatened with the loss of an irretrievable piece of our natural heritage. As we consider how to vote on this resolution, I suggest to my colleagues that this is not a time to ignore the basic conservative values of our country that teach us we ought not to look at every available natural resource area in our country as a place to exploit. Our values are stronger than that and longer term than that. Nature, after all, reminds us of our humanity, and provides us with transcendent moments--for tranquility and for gratitude for God's Creation. And that is what conservation and the battle over this provision are all about. Today's vote asks us to decide whether we truly value, and will stand firm to protect, this great country's natural legacy. One hundred years ago, the great Republican President Teddy Roosevelt first showed us the way to do this, and acting in his spirit, President Eisenhower brought that protection to the Arctic range. Do we join them in valuing this land and protecting it or are we going to break ranks with those two great presidents and desecrate it, diminish it, change it forever for a small amount of oil? Is that really what our energy policy should be about? Does it really offer us any hope of more energy independence which we strive for? The answer of course is, no. It is not worth it. The mark of greatness in a generation is not just the opportunities it builds for itself, but in the resources it creates and leaves for its children. Not least are wilderness resources. I urge my colleagues to vote down this conference report.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, Senator Hatch, Senator Brownback and I are pleased to introduce today the Project BioShield II Act of 2005. This is the fourth bill I have introduced on this subject, and the third with Senator Hatch as my lead cosponsor. We are delighted today to be joined by Senator Brownback, a leading advocate for research to cure deadly tropical diseases. None of us on the Hill--especially those of us with offices in the Hart Building--will forget October 15, the date of the anthrax attack on Senator Daschle's office. This date is the bioterrorism equivalent of September 11. We also need to remember October 5, the third anniversary of the 2001 anthrax death of Bob Stevens, a photo editor at American Media in Boca Raton, Florida, and November 17, the third anniversary of the discovery of a similar anthrax laced letter mailed to Senator Leahy. Similar anthrax attacks during these weeks were directed at NBC, ABC, CBS and other news organizations. All told five people died and thousands who might have been exposed were put on Cipro, including many of us and many of our staff. This attack on civilians with weapons grade anthrax was unprovoked. And unlike the case with the 9/11 attacks, we still don't know who mailed the anthrax letters. As with the 9/11 attacks, we were totally unprepared for the anthrax-laced letters. We are responding forcefully to the 9/11 attacks--the commission that Senator McCain and I proposed has issued a superb report and the Government Affairs Committee, where I serve as the Ranking Democrat, is hard at work translating its recommendations into legislation. Unfortunately our response to the 10/ 15 anthrax attack has not been as forceful. Unlike our response to 9/11, we have not seemed to consider the 10/15 attack to be the equivalent of a declaration of war. While we have taken a few constructive steps to strengthen our Bioterror defenses, we remain painfully vulnerable to another Bioterror attack, or a chemical or radiological attack. Many of us believe that enactment of BioShield I, last July, is a step in the right direction, but we don't believe that BioShield is sufficient. If we listen carefully, we will hear that the biopharma industry--which is hiding on this issue--is saying that BioShield is not enough. So we already have strong warning signs that more needs to be done. There is no terror threat greater than that of Bioterror. With an attack with a plane, a chemical attack or a radiological dispersion device, dirty bomb, the loss of life can be catastrophic, but the perimeter of the attack is fixed. With an infectious disease, the perimeter of an attack might grow exponentially as the infection spreads. It is possible to kill thousands with a bomb, chemical or radiation, but it is possible to kill millions with a bioterror pathogen. In the 2001 anthrax attack, the terrorist wrote a note in the letter to Senator Daschle that said, ``09-11-01. You can not stop us. We have this anthrax. You die now. Are you afraid? Death to America. Death to Israel. Allah is great.'' If this note had not been included in the letter, and if the intern who opened the letter hadn't been suspicious, it is possible that some Senators and many Capitol Hill staff from our offices--perhaps hundreds--might have died. We would only have discovered the attack in hospital emergency rooms, where Cipro might have proven to be ineffective. Cipro works as a prophylaxis only when it catches anthrax early, before the toxins are released into the bloodstream, which can happen within 24 hours of an infection. Our current anthrax vaccine is administered in six shots over 18 montns. The 9/11 Commission report states that al-Qaida ``was making advances in its ability to produce anthrax prior to Sept. 11'' and cited former CIA Director George Tenet as warning that an anthrax attack is ``one of the most immediate threats the U.S. is likely to face.'' Russia developed dozens of strains of anthrax and the security at these former bioweapons laboratories is suspect. It is estimated that a mason jar of anthrax spores sprayed over an urban area could infect 400,000 residents, and if undetected until they started showing up in emergency rooms, kill half of them. It is also estimated that one hundred anthrax laced letters could cross contaminate thirty million letters and infect 10,000 people with anthrax. Imagine what would happen if our mail system--which processed over 200 billion pieces of mail last year--were closed for a few months. What we need, and don't yet have, is a therapeutic that disarms the anthrax toxins at a late stage of the disease--which is the aim of a pending RFP at the Department of Health and Human Services. We saw the potential for morbidity and mortality, and massive economic disruption, with SARS. When SARS was rampant, Beijing, Hong Kong and Shanghai closed down. Quarantines were imposed and China authorized the death penalty on anyone who willfully spread the disease. During the epidemic, there were reports that the SARS virus was mutating to become more virulent. In China's countryside, fear of SARS has led to some villages setting up roadblocks to keep away people from Beijing and at least four riots against quarantine centers have been reported in recent days. Thousands were quarantined in China. In the end SARS spread to thirty countries on five continents, sickening nearly 9,000 and killing 850. SARS is a zoonotic disease that apparently can jump back and forth between animals and man, which makes it much more difficult to eradicate it. We may not have seen the last of it. We can also remember the devastating impact of the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic that killed more than died in the first World War, about 30-40 million people equivalent to 100 million today. In the month of October, 1918, 200,000 Americans died of the disease, 43,000 soldiers died, and 28 percent of our population was infected. The flu's lethality rate was only 2.5 percent the lethality rate of the most common form of smallpox, variola major, is 30 percent and for hemorrhagic smallpox it approaches 100 percent. The lethality rate for SARS was about 15 percent. If the 1918 flu pandemic killed the equivalent of 100 million people, think of how many smallpox or SARS-- both of which could be weaponized by terrorists--could kill. Public health authorities are concerned about the incidence of avian influenza in humans. There is now concrete evidence that this virus can be transmitted human-to-human. When humans contract the pathogen from birds, the death rates are very high; a majority die. Since January 2004, a total of 23 confirmed human cases of avian influenza virus infections have been reported in Vietnam with 19 deaths and 12 cases in Thailand with 9 deaths. These cases were associated with widespread H5Nl poultry outbreaks that occurred at commercial and small backyard poultry farms. Since December 2003, nine countries have reported H5Nl outbreaks among poultry. More than 100 million chickens have been culled in an effort to stop the outbreak. The virus now appears to be able to infect mammalian hosts, including pigs and cats, an unusual prowess for an avian virus. This raises concern as pigs are also hosts of human flu viruses and this could yield a hybrid avian flu strain that can be passed human-to-human. The avian flu virus apparently is now carried by migratory birds so it may be very difficult to eradicate the virus. We have no vaccine for the disease and the one therapeutic Tamiflu--is only effective if given very early after the onset of symptoms. It is feared that the virus might evolve resistance to Tamiflu. Public health officials believe that in theory the avian flu could cause a ``pandemic killing millions of people worldwide, and possibly hundreds of millions.'' Whether H5N1 could be used as a Bioterror weapon against agriculture or humans is not known. In 1947 there was an outbreak of smallpox in New York City. Eventually two of the twelve who were infected died. But the smallpox vaccination campaign was massive 500,000 New Yorkers received smallpox vaccinations the first day and eventually 6.35 million were vaccinated in less than a month, 85 percent of the city's population. President Truman was vaccinated prior to a trip to New York City. If we suffered another smallpox outbreak, it is not likely that a vaccination campaign would go so smoothly. It is now estimated that if the current smallpox vaccine were deployed in the United States 350 to 500 individuals might die from complications. The current vaccine is not recommended for patients who have eczema or are immunosuppressed, HIV-positive or are pregnant. Even worse, based on a 1971 accidental release of smallpox from a Soviet bioweapons laboratory, some speculate that the Soviets successfully weaponized a rare and especially lethal form of smallpox, hemorrhagic smallpox, with near 100 percent lethality. Mother Nature's pathogens are dangerous--smallpox, anthrax, plague, tularemia, glanders, typhus, Q fever, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, brucellosis, botulinum toxin, dengue fever, Lassa fever, Russian spring-summer encephalitis, Marburg, Ebola, Bolivian hemorrhagic fever, Argentinean hemorrhagic fever and fifty other pathogens could kill thousands or even millions. But on the horizon are more exotic and deadly pathogens. We have reports that the Soviet Union developed genetically modified pathogens such as a hybrid plague producing diphtheria toxin. This manipulation increased virulence and made the plague microbe more resistant to vaccine. Other possibilities include a Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis-plague hybrid is a combination of the virus and bacteria; we have no idea what symptoms such a pathogen would manifest or how we might diagnose or treat it. Other hybrid pathogens might be developed, including a Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis-Ebola hybrid. We have reports that the Soviet Union developed a powdered Marburg, a hemorrhagic fever where every cell and organ of the victim bleeds. Symptom of Marburg include kidney failure, recurrent hepatitis, inflammation of the spinal cord, bone marrow, eyes, testes, and parotid gland, hemorrhaging into the skin, mucous membranes, internal organs, stomach, and intestines, swelling of the spleen, lymph nodes, kidneys, pancreas, and brain, convulsions, coma and amnesia. Genetically modified pathogens are another possibility. In 2001 the Journal of Virology reported that Australian scientists seeking to create a contraceptive for mice used recombinant DNA technology to introduce Interleukin 4 into mousepox and found that it created an especially virulent virus. In the words of the scientists, ``These data therefore suggest that virus-encoded IL-4 not only suppresses primary antiviral cell-mediated immune responses but also can inhibit the expression of immune memory responses.'' This public research suggests that introducing IL-4 can create an Andromeda stain of a virus, information of potential use to terrorist sociopaths. In addition, published studies describe how to create a recombinant vaccina virus to induce allergic encephalomyelitis in rabbits, and potentially--highly lethal smallpox virus capable of causing paralyses in humans and how to synthesize the polio virus in a biochemical laboratory . Other possible pathogens--some of which the Soviet worked on--include antibiotic resistant pathogens. The Soviets apparently developed a strain of plague resistant to ten different antibiotics, and a strain of anthrax resistant to seven different antibiotics. Some claim the Soviets developed a strain of anthrax resistant to the current U.S. anthrax vaccine. A part of this research in a hamster model was published in ``Vaccine'' so this information is available to terrorists. Other exotic pathogens might include autoimmune peptides, antibiotic induced toxins, and bioregulators and biomodulators. An autoimmune peptide might stimulate an autoimmune attack against the myelin that sheaths the target's nerve cells. Antibiotic induced toxins are hybrid bacteria-viruses where antibiotics administered to treat the bacterial infection stimulate the virus to release a deadly toxin; the greater the doses of antibiotics, the more toxins are released. Bioregulators and biomodulators are synthetic chemical that bond to and disrupt receptors that govern critical functions of the target, including nerve, retinal, liver, kidney, heart, or muscle cells to cause paralysis, blindness, schizophrenia, coma, or memory loss. Some of these might be available now from the 60 bioterror research laboratories maintained by the Soviet Union. Eventually, terrorists might be able to set up full-blown biotechnology laboratories. Rogue states could do so and they might then transfer bioweapons to terrorists or lose control of them. Over the long term, as the power of modern biotechnology grows, the bioterror threat will grow and increasingly virulent and exotic weapons might become threats. In November 2003 the CIA's Office of Transnational Issues published ``Our Darker Bioweapons Future,'' which stated that the effect of bioengineered weapons ``could be worse than any disease known to man.'' The rapid evolution of biotechnology makes monitoring development ofbioweapons extremely difficult. Some ofthese weapons might enable the development of ``a class of new, more virulent biological agents engineered to attack distinct biochemical pathways and elicit specific effects, claimed panel members. The same science that may cure some of our worst diseases could be used to create the world's most frightening weapons.'' It specifically mentioned the possibility of ``binary BW agents that only become effective when two components are combined (a particularly insidious example would be a mild pathogen that when combined with its antidote becomes virulent)''; ``designer'' BW agents created to be antibiotic resistant or to evade an immune response; weaponized gene therapy vectors that effect permanent change in the victim's genetic makeup; or a ``stealth'' virus, which could lie dormant inside the victim for an extended period before being triggered. Illustrating the speed with which biotechnology is advancing to create new bioterrorism threats is a recent announcement by Craig Venter and his Institute for Biological Energy Alternatives that in fourteen days they had synthetically created working copies of the known existing bacteriophage virus Phi X174. Other researchers had previously synthesised the poliovirus, which is slightly bigger, employing enzymes usually found in cells. But this effort took years to achieve and produced viruses with defects in their code. So the timescale has shifted from years to weeks to make a virus. There are other bigger viruses that would require more time to assemble. Venter asserts that his team could make a bacteria with about 60 times larger genome from scratch within about a year of starting. Does this mean that the debate about whether to destroy smallpox virus stocks is pointless because any virus or bacteria whose DNA sequence is published is eventually going to be easily creatable by labs all around the world? These pathogens might be deployed by terrorists, sociopaths or rogue states that have no compunctions about killing massive numbers of ``infidels'' or enemies in the west. They would experience great joy in sowing widespread panic, injury and death in America. Osama Bin Laden's spokesman, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, bragged that al Qaeda has ``the right to kill 4 million Americans'' in response to deaths he claims the west has inflicted on Muslims. We are facing sociopaths with no compunction about using whatever weapons of mass destruction they can develop or secure. They would see the potential to unleash a weapon in North America and trust that our borders would be closed so that it would only rage here and not spread to the Muslim world. The Brookings Institution estimated that a bioterror attack would cause one million casualties and inflict $750 billion in economic damage. An earlier Office of Technology Assessment found that there might be three million casualties. If there are this many casualties, what can we expect in the way of public panic and flight? A 2004 poll finds that ``most Americans would not cooperate as officials would expect them to during a terrorism incident.'' Only 2/5 said that they'd ``follow instructions to go to a public vaccination site in a smallpox outbreak'' and only 3/5 would ``stay in a building other than their own home . . .'' A vivid vision of what an attack might look like is found in Albert Camus' The Plague, with its incinerators and quarantine camps. We can review the history of the Black Death, which killed up to one half of Europe's population between 1348 and 1349. Imagine what would happen if the attack involves a pathogen for which we have no diagnostic, vaccine or therapeutic. If we resorted to quarantines, what would the rules of engagement be for the police and military forces we deploy to enforce it? Would it be possible to establish an effective quarantine if there is mass panic and flight? Would our hospitals be overwhelmed by the ``worried well'' ? Would public health workers continue to serve or also flee? If our hospitals are contaminated, where would Americans receive medical care for non- terror related emergencies? What would happen if a bioterror, chemical or radiological attack closed Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport--which handled nearly eighty million passengers last year? Or what would happen if we put a hold on the one hundred and twenty million international airline arrivals and departures we see each year? What would happen if we were forced to close our borders with Mexico and Canada--with 500 million crossings last year? What would happen if we restrained the 2.79 trillion automobile passenger miles driven in the U.S., one billion of which exceeded 100 miles? What would happen if a terror attack rendered certain types of business activity uninsurable? What will happen if large swaths of residential real estate--none of which is currently insured for acts of terror--were contaminated and rendered worthless with anthrax spores? We are vulnerable to a bioterror attack in many ways, but one of the most troubling is that we have essentially none of the diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines we need to treat those who might be exposed or infected. If we don't have these medicines, we are likely to see quarantines and panic, which will amplify the damage and disruption. My office is on the 7th floor of the Hart Building, immediately above Senator Daschle's office. We were told if we immediately started a course of treatment with Cipro we would not die, so there was no panic. Think what would have happened if the government had said, ``We don't know what this is, it's deadly, we have no way to tell who has been exposed, and we have no medicines to give you.'' In the summer of 2000 the Defense Science Board found that we had only one of the fifty-seven diagnostics, drugs and vaccines we most need to respond to a bioterror attack, we had a therapeutic for chlamydia psittaci, a bacteria. It projected that we'd have twenty of the fifty-seven within 5 years and thirty-four within 20 years. But today we have only two of the fifty-seven countermeasures, we now have a diagnostic for anthrax. At this rate of developing these medical countermeasures, we won't have twenty of them available until 2076 and we won't have thirty-four until 2132. This list does not include antibiotic resistant pathogens, hybrid pathogens, genetically modified pathogens, and a host of other exotic bioterror pathogens. The Congress administration have not responded to the anthrax attack with an appropriate sense of urgency, especially with regard to the development of medicines. We have not responded with a crash industrial development program as we did when we developed radar during the Second World War or as we are now undoubtedly undertaking to detect roadside bombs. Reluctantly, I would characterize our national response as lackadaisical. December 4 is the third anniversary of my introduction of legislation to provide incentives for the development of medical countermeasures-- including diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines--for bioterror pathogens, S. 1764. Chairman Hatch, October 17 is the second anniversary of our introducing our first bill together on this subject, S. 3l4, and we introduced our current bill on March 19 of last year (S. 666). Twenty months ago President Bush proposed Project BioShield, a bill based on one of the twelve titles in our bills, and it was finally enacted into law on July 21. If we enact one of the titles of our bill every two years, it'll take 22 more years to complete our legislative work. The critical issue for this hearing is whether Project BioShield, Public Law 108-276, is sufficient or whether we need to supplement it with BioShield II, a bill that you and I intend to introduce this Fall. BioShield is only one title of our proposal--the title that provides that the government will define the size and terms of the market for a Bioterror countermeasure in advance before a biopharma company puts its own capital at risk. This is a necessary first step; companies won't risk their capital to develop a product unless they can assess the possible rate of return, product sale on their investment. Enacting BioShield is a step in the right direction. If we were to enact only one idea first, this is the right first step. We will now see how the Department of Health and Human Services implements this law. We will see what R&D priorities it sets, whether it projects a market for these products sufficiently large to engage the better biopharma companies in this research, and whether it sets contract terms that company Chief Financial Officers find acceptable. Unfortunately, we all heard a deafening silence from biopharma industry--the target of this legislation--as BioShield was being considered. The industry did essentially nothing to fix the Administration's draft--which the industry privately stated was laced with dysfunctional provisions. The industry did essentially nothing to pass BioShield. And the industry has said essentially nothing since BioShield was enacted. It is clear to me that BioShield is not sufficient to secure development of the medical countermeasures we need, indeed, I believe it is woefully insufficient. The industry is skeptical that the government will be a reliable partner during the development bioterror countermeasures. The basis of its skepticism runs deep. The industry points to the Cipro procurement as a case in point. In 1999, before the anthrax attack, Bayer, the developer of Cipro, was asked by FDA and CDC to secure a label indication for Cipro for anthrax. The government wanted to have one antibiotic available that was explicitly labeled for anthrax--it understands that patients might be reluctant to take a medicine for anthrax where it is not labeled for this indication. Bayer incurred the expenses to do this with no expectation of ever utilizing the product in this manner, and when the attack occurred, Cipro was the only therapeutic with a label indication for anthrax. Bayer handled this emergency with honor. It immediately donated huge stocks of Cipro, 2 million tablets to the Postal Service and 2 million tablets to the Federal government to be used to protect those who might have been exposed or infected. The government then sought to procure additional stocks of Cipro and demanded that Bayer sell it as one-fourth the market price. Threats were made by Members of Congress that if Bayer would not agree to this price the government might step in to challenge the patent for Cipro. Bayer readily agreed to the deep discount. We can assume that every other purchaser of Cipro then demanded this same price and that this cut Bayer's market return for Cipro. To add insult to injury, Bayer has had to defend itself from lawsuits by those who took Cipro in response to the attack even though it did what was asked, provided more than enough free product to treat all patients and greatly reduced it's stockpile pricing. Bayer also was deeply concerned with employee and plant security risks when it was publicly identified as the sole source of this counter-bioterrorism agent. The industry view this incident as proving that with regard to bioterrorism research, no good deed will go unpunished. If a large pharmaceutical company can be manhandled this way, what would happen to a small biotechnology company? The industry expects that if there is an attack, and the company has the indispensable medicine we need to respond to it, the government is likely to steal the product. The industry is deeply skeptical of the government already. It has very complex and often contentious relationships with other HHS agencies, including the Center for Medicare Services, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Institute of Health. It has constant battles with state Medicaid agencies. This is not an industry that trusts government. Some in Congress have proposed legislation that feed industry fears. In 1994 and 1995 legislation was introduced in the House, H.R. 4370, introduced on May 10, 1994, and H.R. 761, introduced on January 31, 1995, that provided the government with eminent domain power with regard to AIDS to confiscate ``all potential curatives and all data . . . regarding their development,'' including the patents for such compounds. Similarly, in 1999 and 2001 legislation was introduced in the House, H.R. 2927, introduced on September 23, 1999, and H.R. 1708, introduced on May 3, 2001, that provided for the compulsory licensing of ``any subject invention related to health'' where the government finds it ``necessary to alleviate health or safety needs'' or the patented material is ``priced higher than may be reasonably expected based on criteria developed by the Secretary of Commerce.'' Legislation has been introduced that would deny the benefits of the R&D tax credit for research by pharmaceutical companies where the products that arise from that research are sold at higher prices abroad than in the United States. See H.R. 3665 introduced on February 15, 2000. The industry response to these threats to its patents must be seen in light of the events of March 14, 2000. On that day a White House spokesman apparently indicated that the government might move to challenge some biopharma industry patents for genes. The industry lost $40 billion in market capitalization in the panic that ensued on Wall Street. That was not only the beginning of a deep drought in biotech company financing, it was the beginning of the collapse of the entire NASDAQ market. A similar collapse and drought had occurred in 1993-1994 the Clinton Administration proposed that the prices of ``breakthrough drugs would be reviewed by a special government panel.'' The issue of price controls and patents was recently considered and rejected by NIH in response to a petition for the government to march- in on the patent of Abbott Laboratories for ritonavir, sold under the name of Norvir, an AIDS therapeutic. The petitioner, Essential Inventions, asked that the government cancel the license of this patent to Abbott, which it alleged was charging too much for Norvir. The petitioner had also been involved in the 1994-1995 NIH proceeding, where NIH reviewed the impact of its 1989 protocol to review whether ``reasonable'' prices were being charged by companies that had licenses with NIH. NIH found that this price review process was destroying the NIH technology transfer program--companies simply would not enter into agreements with NIH. As a result, NIH repealed the price review process. The new march-in petition raised essentially the same issues and if the petition had been granted, we could have expected that the NIH tech transfer process will be crippled--again, as it was from 1989- 1995. In rejecting the petition, NIH did not state, however, that is has no right to march-in based on the price of a product, implying that it could or might assert such power in the future. This can only have a chilling impact on companies considering entering into biodefense procurement and research agreements. Aside from fears about government actions, we could not have picked a worse time to ask the industry to undertake a whole new portfolio of research. The biotech NASDAQ index stood at 1380 and it now stands at about 725. The Amex biotech index peaked at 801 and it now stands at about 525. The Dow Jones pharmaceutical index peaked at 420 and it now stands at about 275. The biotech industry raised $32 billion in capital in 2000 and only $16 billion last year. In June of this year, 36 percent of the public biotech companies had stock trading at less than $5 per share. There were 67 biotech IPOs in 2000 and only 7 last year. The industry losses each year continue run to $4 billion. The National Venture Capital Association reports that only 2 percent venture money went into biodefense following the October anthrax attack. Of the 506 drugs publicly disclosed to be under development by the 22 largest pharmaceutical companies, only 32 are for infectious disease and half of these are aimed at HIV/AIDS. In 1967 we had 67 vaccine companies and in 2002 we had 12. World wide sales vaccines is about $6 billion, but the world wide sales of Lipitor are $10 billion. In addition, it is not clear whether the government is able or willing to provide the industry with the operating margins--profits--it sees for its other products. The operating margin for successful biopharma companies is 2.76 to 3.74 times as great as the operating margins for major defense contractors. This means that the defense contractor model will not work to engage biopharma companies in developing medical countermeasures for bioterror agents. Whether the successful bipharma companies are ``too profitable'' is a separate issue. The issue addressed here is the operating margin that successful biopharma companies seek and expect as they assess lines of research to undertake. If the operating margin for biodefense research is less, or substantially less than the operating margin for non-biodefense research, it is not likely that these companies will choose to undertake biodefense research. This research is a voluntary undertaking putting their capital at risk; there is no requirement that they do this when the prospects for profits are not competitive with that from other lines of research. Mostly we are seeing the industry hiding, not commenting on the pending legislation, not participating in the legislative process, and making every effort not to seem to be unpatriotic or greedy. Companies do not say in public that they are disinterested. They will not say what package of incentives would be sufficient to persuade them to take up biodefense work. They fear a debate on patents. They feel besieged by the current drug import debate, pressure from CMS over drug prices, and the debate over generic biologics. While I understand these fears, we simply have to know what it would take in the way of incentives to establish a biodefense industry. If the incentives in BioShield or BioShield II are not sufficient, we need to know what incentives are sufficient. We need to know what reassurances would persuade the industry that what happened to Bayer will never happen again. And only the industry can give us a clear answer to these questions. We cannot have a dialogue on these urgent national questions without the government listening and the industry speaking. The goal of BioShield II is to shift the risk of countermeasure research and development to the industry. Given the skepticism of the industry about the reliability of the government as a partner, shifting the risk to the industry--with it risking its own capital to fund the R&D--will be difficult. But engaging the industry as entrepreneurs, rather than as defense contractors, is likely to be less expensive for the government and it's much more likely to secure the development of the medicines that we need. If the Government funds the research, the industry can expect to receive the operating margins that are typically paid to defense contractors--8.5-9 percent. If the industry risks its own capital and funds the failures and cost overruns, the industry believes it would be justified demanding the operating margins that are typically paid in the commercial sector--28-32 percent. If the Government funds the research, the industry expects that the government will control or own the patents associated with the medicines. If the industry funds the research, it believes it has claims on all the patents. The only companies that are likely to accept a defense contractor model are companies with no approved products, no revenue from product sales, and no other source of capital to keep the lights on. For them Government funding is ``non-dilution'' capital, meaning it's a form of capital that does not dilute the ownership shares of its current shareholders. Many biotech companies have stock trading in the low single digits, so they cannot issue another round of stock that would enrage the current shareholders. For them this Government funding might validate the scientific platform of the company, generate some revenue, and hype the stock. Biotech industry executives state in private that if their capital markets strengthen they will be even less likely to consider bioterror countermeasure research. One CEO whose company has received an NIH grant for bioterror countermeasure research stated in private that his company would never have considered this entanglement with the Government if it had any other options to fund its research. Our goal with BioShield IT should be to engage the successful biopharma companies in this research--companies that have brought products to the market--and persuade them that the Government will be a reliable partner. Then the risk of failure and cost overruns is shifted to the industry and we've engaged the companies with a track record of bringing products to the market. The Government will need to provide substantial rewards if--and only if--the companies do succeed in developing the medicines we need, but then the Government is only paying for results. When the Government funds the research, it funds a process with no guarantees of any success. Providing the industry with substantial rewards for success is a model that engages the industry as entrepreneurs, drawing on the greatest strength our Nation has in the war on terror. Our bill addresses a critical question: who is in charge for Government if there's a mass casualty event and how do they lead the multifaceted response. The legislation sets up an interagency board to map out and develop the response to such an event and places a new Assistant Secretary Chief Medical Officer at the Department of Homeland Security as its chair. In addition, the new Assistant Secretary would lead the DHS assets and resources as part of this effort. While this proposal is the result of discussions with some of the experts in this area, we recognize there may be different points of view about the optimal structure for the medical response capabilities within DHS and the proposed structure in this bill is open to further discussion. I look forward to working with the chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, Senator Collins, and others in exploring these complex issues. On these issues, this bill is a discussion draft. We should not need a 9/11 Commission report to galvanize the administration and the Congress to respond to the unprovoked and deadly bioterror attacks of 3 years ago. The threat could not be more obvious and what we need to do is also obvious. If we don't develop the diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines to protect those who might be exposed or infected, we risk public panic and quarantines. We have the world's preeminent biopharma industry and we need to put it to work in the national defense. BioShield I is a step in the right direction, but it is a small step that does not take us where we need to go. We need to follow the implementation of BioShield very carefully and set clear metrics for determining its effectiveness. We should not wait to begin to review the policy options available to supplement BioShield. Senator Hatch and I will be proposing BioShield II and we will press for its consideration. We should press the biopharma industry to present its views on what it will take to engage it in this research and what it will take to establish a biodefense, research tool, and an infectious disease industry. The American philosopher, George Santana said, ``Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.'' It's only been 3 years since the anthrax attack but I fear our memory of it already has faded. Let this hearing stand as a clear statement that some of us in the Congress remember what happened and are determined not to permit it to happen again. War has been declared on us and we need to act as if we noticed.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, Senator Hatch, Senator Brownback and I are pleased to introduce today the Project BioShield II Act of 2005. This is the fourth bill I have introduced on this subject, and the third with Senator Hatch as my lead cosponsor. We are delighted today to be joined by Senator Brownback, a leading advocate for research to cure deadly tropical diseases. None of us on the Hill--especially those of us with offices in the Hart Building--will forget October 15, the date of the anthrax attack on Senator Daschle's office. This date is the bioterrorism equivalent of September 11. We also need to remember October 5, the third anniversary of the 2001 anthrax death of Bob Stevens, a photo editor at American Media in Boca Raton, Florida, and November 17, the third anniversary of the discovery of a similar anthrax laced letter mailed to Senator Leahy. Similar anthrax attacks during these weeks were directed at NBC, ABC, CBS and other news organizations. All told five people died and thousands who might have been exposed were put on Cipro, including many of us and many of our staff. This attack on civilians with weapons grade anthrax was unprovoked. And unlike the case with the 9/11 attacks, we still don't know who mailed the anthrax letters. As with the 9/11 attacks, we were totally unprepared for the anthrax-laced letters. We are responding forcefully to the 9/11 attacks--the commission that Senator McCain and I proposed has issued a superb report and the Government Affairs Committee, where I serve as the Ranking Democrat, is hard at work translating its recommendations into legislation. Unfortunately our response to the 10/ 15 anthrax attack has not been as forceful. Unlike our response to 9/11, we have not seemed to consider the 10/15 attack to be the equivalent of a declaration of war. While we have taken a few constructive steps to strengthen our Bioterror defenses, we remain painfully vulnerable to another Bioterror attack, or a chemical or radiological attack. Many of us believe that enactment of BioShield I, last July, is a step in the right direction, but we don't believe that BioShield is sufficient. If we listen carefully, we will hear that the biopharma industry--which is hiding on this issue--is saying that BioShield is not enough. So we already have strong warning signs that more needs to be done. There is no terror threat greater than that of Bioterror. With an attack with a plane, a chemical attack or a radiological dispersion device, dirty bomb, the loss of life can be catastrophic, but the perimeter of the attack is fixed. With an infectious disease, the perimeter of an attack might grow exponentially as the infection spreads. It is possible to kill thousands with a bomb, chemical or radiation, but it is possible to kill millions with a bioterror pathogen. In the 2001 anthrax attack, the terrorist wrote a note in the letter to Senator Daschle that said, ``09-11-01. You can not stop us. We have this anthrax. You die now. Are you afraid? Death to America. Death to Israel. Allah is great.'' If this note had not been included in the letter, and if the intern who opened the letter hadn't been suspicious, it is possible that some Senators and many Capitol Hill staff from our offices--perhaps hundreds--might have died. We would only have discovered the attack in hospital emergency rooms, where Cipro might have proven to be ineffective. Cipro works as a prophylaxis only when it catches anthrax early, before the toxins are released into the bloodstream, which can happen within 24 hours of an infection. Our current anthrax vaccine is administered in six shots over 18 montns. The 9/11 Commission report states that al-Qaida ``was making advances in its ability to produce anthrax prior to Sept. 11'' and cited former CIA Director George Tenet as warning that an anthrax attack is ``one of the most immediate threats the U.S. is likely to face.'' Russia developed dozens of strains of anthrax and the security at these former bioweapons laboratories is suspect. It is estimated that a mason jar of anthrax spores sprayed over an urban area could infect 400,000 residents, and if undetected until they started showing up in emergency rooms, kill half of them. It is also estimated that one hundred anthrax laced letters could cross contaminate thirty million letters and infect 10,000 people with anthrax. Imagine what would happen if our mail system--which processed over 200 billion pieces of mail last year--were closed for a few months. What we need, and don't yet have, is a therapeutic that disarms the anthrax toxins at a late stage of the disease--which is the aim of a pending RFP at the Department of Health and Human Services. We saw the potential for morbidity and mortality, and massive economic disruption, with SARS. When SARS was rampant, Beijing, Hong Kong and Shanghai closed down. Quarantines were imposed and China authorized the death penalty on anyone who willfully spread the disease. During the epidemic, there were reports that the SARS virus was mutating to become more virulent. In China's countryside, fear of SARS has led to some villages setting up roadblocks to keep away people from Beijing and at least four riots against quarantine centers have been reported in recent days. Thousands were quarantined in China. In the end SARS spread to thirty countries on five continents, sickening nearly 9,000 and killing 850. SARS is a zoonotic disease that apparently can jump back and forth between animals and man, which makes it much more difficult to eradicate it. We may not have seen the last of it. We can also remember the devastating impact of the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic that killed more than died in the first World War, about 30-40 million people equivalent to 100 million today. In the month of October, 1918, 200,000 Americans died of the disease, 43,000 soldiers died, and 28 percent of our population was infected. The flu's lethality rate was only 2.5 percent the lethality rate of the most common form of smallpox, variola major, is 30 percent and for hemorrhagic smallpox it approaches 100 percent. The lethality rate for SARS was about 15 percent. If the 1918 flu pandemic killed the equivalent of 100 million people, think of how many smallpox or SARS-- both of which could be weaponized by terrorists--could kill. Public health authorities are concerned about the incidence of avian influenza in humans. There is now concrete evidence that this virus can be transmitted human-to-human. When humans contract the pathogen from birds, the death rates are very high; a majority die. Since January 2004, a total of 23 confirmed human cases of avian influenza virus infections have been reported in Vietnam with 19 deaths and 12 cases in Thailand with 9 deaths. These cases were associated with widespread H5Nl poultry outbreaks that occurred at commercial and small backyard poultry farms. Since December 2003, nine countries have reported H5Nl outbreaks among poultry. More than 100 million chickens have been culled in an effort to stop the outbreak. The virus now appears to be able to infect mammalian hosts, including pigs and cats, an unusual prowess for an avian virus. This raises concern as pigs are also hosts of human flu viruses and this could yield a hybrid avian flu strain that can be passed human-to-human. The avian flu virus apparently is now carried by migratory birds so it may be very difficult to eradicate the virus. We have no vaccine for the disease and the one therapeutic Tamiflu--is only effective if given very early after the onset of symptoms. It is feared that the virus might evolve resistance to Tamiflu. Public health officials believe that in theory the avian flu could cause a ``pandemic killing millions of people worldwide, and possibly hundreds of millions.'' Whether H5N1 could be used as a Bioterror weapon against agriculture or humans is not known. In 1947 there was an outbreak of smallpox in New York City. Eventually two of the twelve who were infected died. But the smallpox vaccination campaign was massive 500,000 New Yorkers received smallpox vaccinations the first day and eventually 6.35 million were vaccinated in less than a month, 85 percent of the city's population. President Truman was vaccinated prior to a trip to New York City. If we suffered another smallpox outbreak, it is not likely that a vaccination campaign would go so smoothly. It is now estimated that if the current smallpox vaccine were deployed in the United States 350 to 500 individuals might die from complications. The current vaccine is not recommended for patients who have eczema or are immunosuppressed, HIV-positive or are pregnant. Even worse, based on a 1971 accidental release of smallpox from a Soviet bioweapons laboratory, some speculate that the Soviets successfully weaponized a rare and especially lethal form of smallpox, hemorrhagic smallpox, with near 100 percent lethality. Mother Nature's pathogens are dangerous--smallpox, anthrax, plague, tularemia, glanders, typhus, Q fever, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, brucellosis, botulinum toxin, dengue fever, Lassa fever, Russian spring-summer encephalitis, Marburg, Ebola, Bolivian hemorrhagic fever, Argentinean hemorrhagic fever and fifty other pathogens could kill thousands or even millions. But on the horizon are more exotic and deadly pathogens. We have reports that the Soviet Union developed genetically modified pathogens such as a hybrid plague producing diphtheria toxin. This manipulation increased virulence and made the plague microbe more resistant to vaccine. Other possibilities include a Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis-plague hybrid is a combination of the virus and bacteria; we have no idea what symptoms such a pathogen would manifest or how we might diagnose or treat it. Other hybrid pathogens might be developed, including a Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis-Ebola hybrid. We have reports that the Soviet Union developed a powdered Marburg, a hemorrhagic fever where every cell and organ of the victim bleeds. Symptom of Marburg include kidney failure, recurrent hepatitis, inflammation of the spinal cord, bone marrow, eyes, testes, and parotid gland, hemorrhaging into the skin, mucous membranes, internal organs, stomach, and intestines, swelling of the spleen, lymph nodes, kidneys, pancreas, and brain, convulsions, coma and amnesia. Genetically modified pathogens are another possibility. In 2001 the Journal of Virology reported that Australian scientists seeking to create a contraceptive for mice used recombinant DNA technology to introduce Interleukin 4 into mousepox and found that it created an especially virulent virus. In the words of the scientists, ``These data therefore suggest that virus-encoded IL-4 not only suppresses primary antiviral cell-mediated immune responses but also can inhibit the expression of immune memory responses.'' This public research suggests that introducing IL-4 can create an Andromeda stain of a virus, information of potential use to terrorist sociopaths. In addition, published studies describe how to create a recombinant vaccina virus to induce allergic encephalomyelitis in rabbits, and potentially--highly lethal smallpox virus capable of causing paralyses in humans and how to synthesize the polio virus in a biochemical laboratory . Other possible pathogens--some of which the Soviet worked on--include antibiotic resistant pathogens. The Soviets apparently developed a strain of plague resistant to ten different antibiotics, and a strain of anthrax resistant to seven different antibiotics. Some claim the Soviets developed a strain of anthrax resistant to the current U.S. anthrax vaccine. A part of this research in a hamster model was published in ``Vaccine'' so this information is available to terrorists. Other exotic pathogens might include autoimmune peptides, antibiotic induced toxins, and bioregulators and biomodulators. An autoimmune peptide might stimulate an autoimmune attack against the myelin that sheaths the target's nerve cells. Antibiotic induced toxins are hybrid bacteria-viruses where antibiotics administered to treat the bacterial infection stimulate the virus to release a deadly toxin; the greater the doses of antibiotics, the more toxins are released. Bioregulators and biomodulators are synthetic chemical that bond to and disrupt receptors that govern critical functions of the target, including nerve, retinal, liver, kidney, heart, or muscle cells to cause paralysis, blindness, schizophrenia, coma, or memory loss. Some of these might be available now from the 60 bioterror research laboratories maintained by the Soviet Union. Eventually, terrorists might be able to set up full-blown biotechnology laboratories. Rogue states could do so and they might then transfer bioweapons to terrorists or lose control of them. Over the long term, as the power of modern biotechnology grows, the bioterror threat will grow and increasingly virulent and exotic weapons might become threats. In November 2003 the CIA's Office of Transnational Issues published ``Our Darker Bioweapons Future,'' which stated that the effect of bioengineered weapons ``could be worse than any disease known to man.'' The rapid evolution of biotechnology makes monitoring development ofbioweapons extremely difficult. Some ofthese weapons might enable the development of ``a class of new, more virulent biological agents engineered to attack distinct biochemical pathways and elicit specific effects, claimed panel members. The same science that may cure some of our worst diseases could be used to create the world's most frightening weapons.'' It specifically mentioned the possibility of ``binary BW agents that only become effective when two components are combined (a particularly insidious example would be a mild pathogen that when combined with its antidote becomes virulent)''; ``designer'' BW agents created to be antibiotic resistant or to evade an immune response; weaponized gene therapy vectors that effect permanent change in the victim's genetic makeup; or a ``stealth'' virus, which could lie dormant inside the victim for an extended period before being triggered. Illustrating the speed with which biotechnology is advancing to create new bioterrorism threats is a recent announcement by Craig Venter and his Institute for Biological Energy Alternatives that in fourteen days they had synthetically created working copies of the known existing bacteriophage virus Phi X174. Other researchers had previously synthesised the poliovirus, which is slightly bigger, employing enzymes usually found in cells. But this effort took years to achieve and produced viruses with defects in their code. So the timescale has shifted from years to weeks to make a virus. There are other bigger viruses that would require more time to assemble. Venter asserts that his team could make a bacteria with about 60 times larger genome from scratch within about a year of starting. Does this mean that the debate about whether to destroy smallpox virus stocks is pointless because any virus or bacteria whose DNA sequence is published is eventually going to be easily creatable by labs all around the world? These pathogens might be deployed by terrorists, sociopaths or rogue states that have no compunctions about killing massive numbers of ``infidels'' or enemies in the west. They would experience great joy in sowing widespread panic, injury and death in America. Osama Bin Laden's spokesman, Sulaiman Abu Ghaith, bragged that al Qaeda has ``the right to kill 4 million Americans'' in response to deaths he claims the west has inflicted on Muslims. We are facing sociopaths with no compunction about using whatever weapons of mass destruction they can develop or secure. They would see the potential to unleash a weapon in North America and trust that our borders would be closed so that it would only rage here and not spread to the Muslim world. The Brookings Institution estimated that a bioterror attack would cause one million casualties and inflict $750 billion in economic damage. An earlier Office of Technology Assessment found that there might be three million casualties. If there are this many casualties, what can we expect in the way of public panic and flight? A 2004 poll finds that ``most Americans would not cooperate as officials would expect them to during a terrorism incident.'' Only 2/5 said that they'd ``follow instructions to go to a public vaccination site in a smallpox outbreak'' and only 3/5 would ``stay in a building other than their own home . . .'' A vivid vision of what an attack might look like is found in Albert Camus' The Plague, with its incinerators and quarantine camps. We can review the history of the Black Death, which killed up to one half of Europe's population between 1348 and 1349. Imagine what would happen if the attack involves a pathogen for which we have no diagnostic, vaccine or therapeutic. If we resorted to quarantines, what would the rules of engagement be for the police and military forces we deploy to enforce it? Would it be possible to establish an effective quarantine if there is mass panic and flight? Would our hospitals be overwhelmed by the ``worried well'' ? Would public health workers continue to serve or also flee? If our hospitals are contaminated, where would Americans receive medical care for non- terror related emergencies? What would happen if a bioterror, chemical or radiological attack closed Atlanta's Hartsfield International Airport--which handled nearly eighty million passengers last year? Or what would happen if we put a hold on the one hundred and twenty million international airline arrivals and departures we see each year? What would happen if we were forced to close our borders with Mexico and Canada--with 500 million crossings last year? What would happen if we restrained the 2.79 trillion automobile passenger miles driven in the U.S., one billion of which exceeded 100 miles? What would happen if a terror attack rendered certain types of business activity uninsurable? What will happen if large swaths of residential real estate--none of which is currently insured for acts of terror--were contaminated and rendered worthless with anthrax spores? We are vulnerable to a bioterror attack in many ways, but one of the most troubling is that we have essentially none of the diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines we need to treat those who might be exposed or infected. If we don't have these medicines, we are likely to see quarantines and panic, which will amplify the damage and disruption. My office is on the 7th floor of the Hart Building, immediately above Senator Daschle's office. We were told if we immediately started a course of treatment with Cipro we would not die, so there was no panic. Think what would have happened if the government had said, ``We don't know what this is, it's deadly, we have no way to tell who has been exposed, and we have no medicines to give you.'' In the summer of 2000 the Defense Science Board found that we had only one of the fifty-seven diagnostics, drugs and vaccines we most need to respond to a bioterror attack, we had a therapeutic for chlamydia psittaci, a bacteria. It projected that we'd have twenty of the fifty-seven within 5 years and thirty-four within 20 years. But today we have only two of the fifty-seven countermeasures, we now have a diagnostic for anthrax. At this rate of developing these medical countermeasures, we won't have twenty of them available until 2076 and we won't have thirty-four until 2132. This list does not include antibiotic resistant pathogens, hybrid pathogens, genetically modified pathogens, and a host of other exotic bioterror pathogens. The Congress administration have not responded to the anthrax attack with an appropriate sense of urgency, especially with regard to the development of medicines. We have not responded with a crash industrial development program as we did when we developed radar during the Second World War or as we are now undoubtedly undertaking to detect roadside bombs. Reluctantly, I would characterize our national response as lackadaisical. December 4 is the third anniversary of my introduction of legislation to provide incentives for the development of medical countermeasures-- including diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines--for bioterror pathogens, S. 1764. Chairman Hatch, October 17 is the second anniversary of our introducing our first bill together on this subject, S. 3l4, and we introduced our current bill on March 19 of last year (S. 666). Twenty months ago President Bush proposed Project BioShield, a bill based on one of the twelve titles in our bills, and it was finally enacted into law on July 21. If we enact one of the titles of our bill every two years, it'll take 22 more years to complete our legislative work. The critical issue for this hearing is whether Project BioShield, Public Law 108-276, is sufficient or whether we need to supplement it with BioShield II, a bill that you and I intend to introduce this Fall. BioShield is only one title of our proposal--the title that provides that the government will define the size and terms of the market for a Bioterror countermeasure in advance before a biopharma company puts its own capital at risk. This is a necessary first step; companies won't risk their capital to develop a product unless they can assess the possible rate of return, product sale on their investment. Enacting BioShield is a step in the right direction. If we were to enact only one idea first, this is the right first step. We will now see how the Department of Health and Human Services implements this law. We will see what R&D priorities it sets, whether it projects a market for these products sufficiently large to engage the better biopharma companies in this research, and whether it sets contract terms that company Chief Financial Officers find acceptable. Unfortunately, we all heard a deafening silence from biopharma industry--the target of this legislation--as BioShield was being considered. The industry did essentially nothing to fix the Administration's draft--which the industry privately stated was laced with dysfunctional provisions. The industry did essentially nothing to pass BioShield. And the industry has said essentially nothing since BioShield was enacted. It is clear to me that BioShield is not sufficient to secure development of the medical countermeasures we need, indeed, I believe it is woefully insufficient. The industry is skeptical that the government will be a reliable partner during the development bioterror countermeasures. The basis of its skepticism runs deep. The industry points to the Cipro procurement as a case in point. In 1999, before the anthrax attack, Bayer, the developer of Cipro, was asked by FDA and CDC to secure a label indication for Cipro for anthrax. The government wanted to have one antibiotic available that was explicitly labeled for anthrax--it understands that patients might be reluctant to take a medicine for anthrax where it is not labeled for this indication. Bayer incurred the expenses to do this with no expectation of ever utilizing the product in this manner, and when the attack occurred, Cipro was the only therapeutic with a label indication for anthrax. Bayer handled this emergency with honor. It immediately donated huge stocks of Cipro, 2 million tablets to the Postal Service and 2 million tablets to the Federal government to be used to protect those who might have been exposed or infected. The government then sought to procure additional stocks of Cipro and demanded that Bayer sell it as one-fourth the market price. Threats were made by Members of Congress that if Bayer would not agree to this price the government might step in to challenge the patent for Cipro. Bayer readily agreed to the deep discount. We can assume that every other purchaser of Cipro then demanded this same price and that this cut Bayer's market return for Cipro. To add insult to injury, Bayer has had to defend itself from lawsuits by those who took Cipro in response to the attack even though it did what was asked, provided more than enough free product to treat all patients and greatly reduced it's stockpile pricing. Bayer also was deeply concerned with employee and plant security risks when it was publicly identified as the sole source of this counter-bioterrorism agent. The industry view this incident as proving that with regard to bioterrorism research, no good deed will go unpunished. If a large pharmaceutical company can be manhandled this way, what would happen to a small biotechnology company? The industry expects that if there is an attack, and the company has the indispensable medicine we need to respond to it, the government is likely to steal the product. The industry is deeply skeptical of the government already. It has very complex and often contentious relationships with other HHS agencies, including the Center for Medicare Services, the Food and Drug Administration, and the National Institute of Health. It has constant battles with state Medicaid agencies. This is not an industry that trusts government. Some in Congress have proposed legislation that feed industry fears. In 1994 and 1995 legislation was introduced in the House, H.R. 4370, introduced on May 10, 1994, and H.R. 761, introduced on January 31, 1995, that provided the government with eminent domain power with regard to AIDS to confiscate ``all potential curatives and all data . . . regarding their development,'' including the patents for such compounds. Similarly, in 1999 and 2001 legislation was introduced in the House, H.R. 2927, introduced on September 23, 1999, and H.R. 1708, introduced on May 3, 2001, that provided for the compulsory licensing of ``any subject invention related to health'' where the government finds it ``necessary to alleviate health or safety needs'' or the patented material is ``priced higher than may be reasonably expected based on criteria developed by the Secretary of Commerce.'' Legislation has been introduced that would deny the benefits of the R&D tax credit for research by pharmaceutical companies where the products that arise from that research are sold at higher prices abroad than in the United States. See H.R. 3665 introduced on February 15, 2000. The industry response to these threats to its patents must be seen in light of the events of March 14, 2000. On that day a White House spokesman apparently indicated that the government might move to challenge some biopharma industry patents for genes. The industry lost $40 billion in market capitalization in the panic that ensued on Wall Street. That was not only the beginning of a deep drought in biotech company financing, it was the beginning of the collapse of the entire NASDAQ market. A similar collapse and drought had occurred in 1993-1994 the Clinton Administration proposed that the prices of ``breakthrough drugs would be reviewed by a special government panel.'' The issue of price controls and patents was recently considered and rejected by NIH in response to a petition for the government to march- in on the patent of Abbott Laboratories for ritonavir, sold under the name of Norvir, an AIDS therapeutic. The petitioner, Essential Inventions, asked that the government cancel the license of this patent to Abbott, which it alleged was charging too much for Norvir. The petitioner had also been involved in the 1994-1995 NIH proceeding, where NIH reviewed the impact of its 1989 protocol to review whether ``reasonable'' prices were being charged by companies that had licenses with NIH. NIH found that this price review process was destroying the NIH technology transfer program--companies simply would not enter into agreements with NIH. As a result, NIH repealed the price review process. The new march-in petition raised essentially the same issues and if the petition had been granted, we could have expected that the NIH tech transfer process will be crippled--again, as it was from 1989- 1995. In rejecting the petition, NIH did not state, however, that is has no right to march-in based on the price of a product, implying that it could or might assert such power in the future. This can only have a chilling impact on companies considering entering into biodefense procurement and research agreements. Aside from fears about government actions, we could not have picked a worse time to ask the industry to undertake a whole new portfolio of research. The biotech NASDAQ index stood at 1380 and it now stands at about 725. The Amex biotech index peaked at 801 and it now stands at about 525. The Dow Jones pharmaceutical index peaked at 420 and it now stands at about 275. The biotech industry raised $32 billion in capital in 2000 and only $16 billion last year. In June of this year, 36 percent of the public biotech companies had stock trading at less than $5 per share. There were 67 biotech IPOs in 2000 and only 7 last year. The industry losses each year continue run to $4 billion. The National Venture Capital Association reports that only 2 percent venture money went into biodefense following the October anthrax attack. Of the 506 drugs publicly disclosed to be under development by the 22 largest pharmaceutical companies, only 32 are for infectious disease and half of these are aimed at HIV/AIDS. In 1967 we had 67 vaccine companies and in 2002 we had 12. World wide sales vaccines is about $6 billion, but the world wide sales of Lipitor are $10 billion. In addition, it is not clear whether the government is able or willing to provide the industry with the operating margins--profits--it sees for its other products. The operating margin for successful biopharma companies is 2.76 to 3.74 times as great as the operating margins for major defense contractors. This means that the defense contractor model will not work to engage biopharma companies in developing medical countermeasures for bioterror agents. Whether the successful bipharma companies are ``too profitable'' is a separate issue. The issue addressed here is the operating margin that successful biopharma companies seek and expect as they assess lines of research to undertake. If the operating margin for biodefense research is less, or substantially less than the operating margin for non-biodefense research, it is not likely that these companies will choose to undertake biodefense research. This research is a voluntary undertaking putting their capital at risk; there is no requirement that they do this when the prospects for profits are not competitive with that from other lines of research. Mostly we are seeing the industry hiding, not commenting on the pending legislation, not participating in the legislative process, and making every effort not to seem to be unpatriotic or greedy. Companies do not say in public that they are disinterested. They will not say what package of incentives would be sufficient to persuade them to take up biodefense work. They fear a debate on patents. They feel besieged by the current drug import debate, pressure from CMS over drug prices, and the debate over generic biologics. While I understand these fears, we simply have to know what it would take in the way of incentives to establish a biodefense industry. If the incentives in BioShield or BioShield II are not sufficient, we need to know what incentives are sufficient. We need to know what reassurances would persuade the industry that what happened to Bayer will never happen again. And only the industry can give us a clear answer to these questions. We cannot have a dialogue on these urgent national questions without the government listening and the industry speaking. The goal of BioShield II is to shift the risk of countermeasure research and development to the industry. Given the skepticism of the industry about the reliability of the government as a partner, shifting the risk to the industry--with it risking its own capital to fund the R&D--will be difficult. But engaging the industry as entrepreneurs, rather than as defense contractors, is likely to be less expensive for the government and it's much more likely to secure the development of the medicines that we need. If the Government funds the research, the industry can expect to receive the operating margins that are typically paid to defense contractors--8.5-9 percent. If the industry risks its own capital and funds the failures and cost overruns, the industry believes it would be justified demanding the operating margins that are typically paid in the commercial sector--28-32 percent. If the Government funds the research, the industry expects that the government will control or own the patents associated with the medicines. If the industry funds the research, it believes it has claims on all the patents. The only companies that are likely to accept a defense contractor model are companies with no approved products, no revenue from product sales, and no other source of capital to keep the lights on. For them Government funding is ``non-dilution'' capital, meaning it's a form of capital that does not dilute the ownership shares of its current shareholders. Many biotech companies have stock trading in the low single digits, so they cannot issue another round of stock that would enrage the current shareholders. For them this Government funding might validate the scientific platform of the company, generate some revenue, and hype the stock. Biotech industry executives state in private that if their capital markets strengthen they will be even less likely to consider bioterror countermeasure research. One CEO whose company has received an NIH grant for bioterror countermeasure research stated in private that his company would never have considered this entanglement with the Government if it had any other options to fund its research. Our goal with BioShield IT should be to engage the successful biopharma companies in this research--companies that have brought products to the market--and persuade them that the Government will be a reliable partner. Then the risk of failure and cost overruns is shifted to the industry and we've engaged the companies with a track record of bringing products to the market. The Government will need to provide substantial rewards if--and only if--the companies do succeed in developing the medicines we need, but then the Government is only paying for results. When the Government funds the research, it funds a process with no guarantees of any success. Providing the industry with substantial rewards for success is a model that engages the industry as entrepreneurs, drawing on the greatest strength our Nation has in the war on terror. Our bill addresses a critical question: who is in charge for Government if there's a mass casualty event and how do they lead the multifaceted response. The legislation sets up an interagency board to map out and develop the response to such an event and places a new Assistant Secretary Chief Medical Officer at the Department of Homeland Security as its chair. In addition, the new Assistant Secretary would lead the DHS assets and resources as part of this effort. While this proposal is the result of discussions with some of the experts in this area, we recognize there may be different points of view about the optimal structure for the medical response capabilities within DHS and the proposed structure in this bill is open to further discussion. I look forward to working with the chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, Senator Collins, and others in exploring these complex issues. On these issues, this bill is a discussion draft. We should not need a 9/11 Commission report to galvanize the administration and the Congress to respond to the unprovoked and deadly bioterror attacks of 3 years ago. The threat could not be more obvious and what we need to do is also obvious. If we don't develop the diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines to protect those who might be exposed or infected, we risk public panic and quarantines. We have the world's preeminent biopharma industry and we need to put it to work in the national defense. BioShield I is a step in the right direction, but it is a small step that does not take us where we need to go. We need to follow the implementation of BioShield very carefully and set clear metrics for determining its effectiveness. We should not wait to begin to review the policy options available to supplement BioShield. Senator Hatch and I will be proposing BioShield II and we will press for its consideration. We should press the biopharma industry to present its views on what it will take to engage it in this research and what it will take to establish a biodefense, research tool, and an infectious disease industry. The American philosopher, George Santana said, ``Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.'' It's only been 3 years since the anthrax attack but I fear our memory of it already has faded. Let this hearing stand as a clear statement that some of us in the Congress remember what happened and are determined not to permit it to happen again. War has been declared on us and we need to act as if we noticed.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to express my support for this historic nomination of Ambassador John Negroponte to be the first Director of National Intelligence named under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004--the most sweeping reform of the intelligence community in over 50 years. With this appointment, we will finally have a single official with the authority, responsibility, and accountability to lead a more unified and more integrated intelligence community capable of avoiding the unacceptable intelligence failures recounted in excruciating detail by the independent 9/11 Commission and, more recently, by the President's WMD Commission. I am confident Ambassador Negroponte is up to this admittedly difficult task. With a career in public service spanning over four decades, Ambassador Negroponte has demonstrated the commitment and determination this post demands. His service in numerous Foreign Service posts across Asia, Europe, and Latin America--and most recently as the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq--has certainly provided him with the global perspective of our intelligence needs that the position requires. And, having served in senior positions here in Washington at the State Department and at the National Security Council, Ambassador Negroponte has developed the bureaucratic skills that the DNI must exercise in order to be effective. The most important factor in whether Ambassador Negroponte--indeed, whether the entire intelligence reform effort--succeeds, is the degree of support provided by President Bush and the White House in the early but formative stages of this process. The path toward reform is always a difficult one, particularly with the likely array of bureaucratic and institutional obstacles the DNI is likely to confront. As the WMD Commission candidly recognized, ``The Intelligence Community is a closed world, and many insiders admitted to us that it has an almost perfect record of resisting external recommendations.'' It should come as no surprise that the array of strong statutory authorities provided to the DNI under the legislation can, in and of itself, only accomplish so much; implementation will now be the crucial test, and the President must show the same level of commitment he demonstrated during the final push to pass the intelligence reform legislation in the last Congress. I am encouraged in this regard by the President's remarks in announcing the nomination of Ambassador Negroponte. President Bush said: In the war against terrorists who target innocent civilians and continue to seek weapons of mass murder, intelligence is our first line of defense. If we're going to stop the terrorists before they strike, we must ensure that our intelligence agencies work as a single, unified enterprise. And that's why I supported, and Congress passed, reform legislation creating the job of Director of National Intelligence. As DNI, John will lead a unified intelligence community, and will serve as the principle advisor to the President on intelligence matters. He will have the authority to order the collection of new intelligence, to ensure the sharing of information among agencies, and to establish common standards for the intelligence community's personnel. It will be John's responsibility to determine the annual budgets for all national intelligence agencies and offices and to direct how these funds are spent. Vesting these authorities in a single official who reports directly to me will make our intelligence efforts better coordinated, more efficient, and more effective. Unfortunately, we had no single official who effectively forged unity of effort across the intelligence community prior to September 11. We had no quarterback. Prior to this legislation, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) had three jobs: No. 1. principal intelligence advisor to the President; No. 2. head of the CIA; and No. 3. head of the intelligence community. As the 9/11 Commission concluded: ``No recent DCI has been able to do all three effectively. Usually what loses out is management of the intelligence community, a difficult task even in the best case because the DCI's current authorities are weak. With so much to do, the DCI often has not used even the authority he has.'' The new Director of National Intelligence has two main responsibilities: to head the intelligence community and to serve as principal intelligence advisor to the President. As principal advisor to the President, the DNI is responsible--and accountable--for ensuring that the President is properly briefed on intelligence priorities and activities. The CIA Director will now report to the DNI, who is not responsible for managing the day to day activities of that agency while also heading the intelligence community. In fact, the legislation specifies that the Office of the DNI may not even be co-located with the CIA or any other element of the intelligence community after October 1, 2008. As head of the intelligence community, the DNI will have--and must effectively use--the wide range of strong budget, personnel, tasking, and other authorities detailed in the legislation to forge the unity of effort needed against the threats of this new century. I am pleased that Ambassador Negroponte, appearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, indicated he has heeded the advice from many quarters, including the President's WMD Commission, to push the envelope with respect to his new authorities. Perhaps the most significant of these authorities is the DNI's control over national intelligence funding, now known as the National Intelligence Program NIP. Money equals power in Washington, or to paraphrase one of the witnesses who testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee as we drafted the intelligence reform legislation, former DCI James Woolsey: ``The Golden Rule in Washington is that he who has the gold, makes the rules.'' For instance, with respect to budget development, the bill authorizes the DNI to ``develop and determine'' the NIP budget--which means that the DNI is the decision-maker concerning the intelligence budget and does not share this authority with any department head. Once Congress passes the national intelligence budget, the DNI must ``ensure the effective execution'' of the NIP appropriation across the entire intelligence community whether the funds are for the CIA, NSA, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or any element of the intelligence community. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget must apportion those funds at the ``exclusive direction'' of the DNI. The DNI is further authorized to ``direct'' the allotment and allocation of those appropriations, and department comptrollers must then carry out their responsibilities ``in an expeditious manner.'' In sum, the DNI controls how national intelligence funding is spent across the executive branch, regardless of the department in which any particular intelligence element resides. In order to marshal the necessary resources to address higher priority intelligence activities, the DNI has significantly enhanced authorities to transfer funds and personnel from one element of the intelligence community to another. And, in addition to these budget and transfer authorities, the legislation provides the DNI with many new and increased authorities by which to effectively manage the sprawling intelligence community and force greater integration and cooperation among intelligence agencies. The DNI has the power to develop personnel policies and programs, for example, to foster increased ``jointness'' across the intelligence community--like the Goldwater-Nichols Act accomplished in the military context. The DNI also has the authority to exercise greater decision-making with respect to acquisitions of major systems, such as satellites, to task intelligence collection and analysis, and to concur in the nominations or appointments of senior intelligence officials at the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Treasury, State, and Energy, the FBI, and elsewhere across the executive branch. More important than any individual authority, however, is the sum total. There is no longer any doubt as to who is in charge of, or who is accountable for, the performance of the United States intelligence community. It is the DNI. Until exercised in practice, however, these authorities are simply the words of a statute. And, unless exercised, they will atrophy. Timidity, weakness, even passivity are not an option. History will judge harshly a DNI who squanders this opportunity to spread meaningful and lasting reform across the intelligence community. And our national security depends upon it. I fully anticipate that Ambassador Negroponte will rise to the occasion. He must, and I believe he will, hit the ground running, boldly face the inevitable challenges and frustrations that lie ahead, and aggressively assert the authorities with which he has been provided. But the DNI will not be alone. With the full support of the President, the Joint Intelligence Community Council--composed of the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, and the Attorney General--will advise the DNI and make sure the DNI's programs, policies, and directives are executed within their respective departments in a timely manner. And, if confirmed, the President's nominee for Principal Deputy DNI, NSA Director Lieutenant General Michael Hayden, will be a most valuable asset in leading the reform effort. We have largely provided Ambassador Negroponte with the flexibility to establish the Office of the DNI as he sees fit in order to accomplish the goal of reform. In addition to his Principal Deputy, he may appoint as many as four other deputies with the duties, responsibilities, and authorities he deems appropriate. And, in addition to the National Counterterrorism Center, which is specifically mandated under the legislation, Ambassador Negroponte is authorized to establish national intelligence centers, apart from any individual intelligence agency, to drive community-wide all-source analysis and collection on key intelligence priorities. These national intelligence centers have significant potential to shift the center of gravity in the intelligence community from individual stove-piped agencies toward a mission-oriented integrated intelligence network. In sum, we have provided Ambassador Negroponte with the tools to get the job done. Now, with the backing of the President, he must use those authorities to transform the intelligence community as envisioned by the 9/11 Commission, expected by Congress, and needed for the security of the American people. On September 11, 2001, it became painfully evident that the threats we face as a nation had evolved, and that our national security structure needed to evolve accordingly. Ambassador Negroponte will now have the opportunity to help our intelligence community meet these new security challenges. I wish him well.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in opposition to the House legislation known as the REAL ID Act and to urge that it not be included in the conference report for this spending bill. Last year Congress enacted comprehensive antiterrorism legislation, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, which implemented the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. Some of the most important provisions we enacted strengthen our borders against terrorist infiltration and provide the government with new weapons in tracking terrorist travel around the globe. The act also requires minimum Federal standards to ensure that State-issued drivers' licenses are always secure and reliable forms of identification. The REAL ID Act would repeal much of our work from last year, and replace it with provisions that impose on State governments unworkable standards for drivers' licenses. The REAL ID Act also includes punitive immigration provisions that we rejected last year, and that have no place on an emergency spending bill. Do not be fooled. Our nation is safer if we implement the protections we passed just last December. We must not allow an ideological debate over immigration policy to derail initiatives vital to the war against terrorism. Last year I was privileged to work with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and in both Chambers to develop antiterrorism and intelligence reform legislation of which we can all be proud. Among other things, the Intelligence Reform Act called for large increases in the numbers of Border Patrol agents, immigration enforcement agents, and detention beds. It strengthened consular procedures for screening visa applicants. It closed a gaping vulnerability by requiring people entering the United States at our land borders to show a passport. And it required minimum Federal standards to ensure that State-issued drivers' licenses are always secure and reliable forms of identification. At the same time, I joined with my fellow conferees to ensure that the intelligence reform bill focused on genuine antiterrorism measures and excluded extraneous measures. In particular, in conference we rejected a number of antiasylum and anti-immigration provisions. The REAL ID Act simply recycles several of the controversial immigration provisions which we rejected last year. When the REAL ID Act was debated on the House floor this year many of its supporters claimed that these provisions had been recommended by the 9/11 Commission, and are essential to the war on terrorism. That is simply not the case. Last October, the 9/11 Commissioners made clear that the immigration provisions in the House bill were irrelevant to fighting terrorism. I would like to quote from a letter the conferees received from Gov. Thomas Kean and Congressman Lee Hamilton, a letter that reflected the unanimous view of the commissioners. Referring to the House provisions on immigration, they said, ``We believe strongly that this bill is not the right occasion for tackling controversial immigration and law enforcement issues that go well beyond the Commission's recommendations. We note in this regard that some of these provisions have been advocated in response to Commission recommendations. They are not Commission recommendations.'' The commissioners then added, ``We believe we are better off with broad bipartisan agreement on key recommendations of the Commission in support of border security than taking up a number of controversial provisions that are more central to the question of immigration policy than they are to the question of counterterrorism.'' As the commissioners made clear, the provisions in the REAL ID Act have more to do with immigration than with national security. These are controversial provisions that need to be fully considered by our Judiciary Committee. The legislation would make it harder for refugees fleeing oppressive regimes to get asylum. That provision does not target terrorists because current law already states that no member of a terrorist organization can be eligible for asylum. The REAL ID Act would suspend habeas corpus review in deportation proceedings. Not since the Civil War has habeas corpus been suspended. The House bill would allow the Department of Homeland Security to waive all laws so that fences and barriers can be built on any of our land borders. There is no limitation as to what laws can be waived environmental laws, labor laws, laws allowing property owners to be compensated for the confiscation of their land. These provisions have serious negative consequences and should be more carefully considered. I do not believe they could ever be enacted if they were carefully considered with our normal procedures. I would also like to address the provisions in the REAL ID Act that would establish new Federal standards for drivers' licenses. My colleagues no doubt remember that just last December Congress enacted standards for drivers' licenses, as recommended by the 9/11 Commission, to ensure drivers' licenses are secure and identities are verified. The standards are now being implemented through a rulemaking, in which state governments are given a seat at the table to share their expertise. These legislative standards were a great accomplishment, a result of fine work done by Senators McCain, Durbin, Collins, Alexander, and other colleagues. Last year the administration declared that the Senate's provisions were preferable to those drafted by the House, and the 9/11 Commission endorsed them. The REAL ID Act would repeal the work Congress did last year. It would replace our provisions with much more rigid provisions from last year's House bill. The provisions are so unrealistic that States could not implement them. All Americans applying for drivers' licenses would have to wait for weeks while State DMVs tried to confirm the authenticity of paper birth certificates and other records, records filed away at county offices across the country. State governments would have no opportunity to provide input for the regulations, as they have under current law. That is why the State government organizations think the REAL ID Act is a terrible idea. The National Governors' Association, the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Council of State Governments, and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators have all announced their strong opposition to the REAL ID Act. The organizations have written to congressional leadership that the REAL ID Act would impose requirements on state governments which, ``are beyond the current capacity of even the federal government.'' The State government groups have asked that the law we passed last December be given a chance to work. I ask unanimous consent that a joint letter from these four organizations be printed in the Congressional Record following the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, when the State governments of our Nation say that these drivers' license provisions are unworkable, we need to take notice. State governments have been issuing drivers' licenses for decades. They are the experts, and we will need their input and coordination if we are going to implement the drivers' license standards recommended by the 9/11 Commission. I urge my colleagues to oppose the REAL ID Act. We must ask our Senate conferees not to allow such a controversial measure to be pushed through Congress on an emergency spending bill. The REAL ID Act contradicts our historic identity as a nation that provides a haven for the oppressed. The REAL ID Act would not make us safer. It would make us less safe. It would repeal provisions enacting a central recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, and it would undermine a vital counterterrorism initiative. Exhibit 1 March 17, 2005. Hon. William H. Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Hon. Harry Reid, Minority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Senator Frist and Senator Reid: We write to express our opposition to Title II of H.R. 418, the ``Improved Security For Driver's Licenses and Personal Identification Cards'' provision, which has been attached to H.R. 1268, the fiscal year 2005 supplemental spending measure. While Governors, state legislatures, other state elected officials and motor vehicle administrators share your concern for increasing the security and integrity of the driver's license and state identification processes, we firmly believe that the driver's license and ID card provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 offer the best course for meeting those goals. The ``Driver's Licenses and Personal Identification Cards'' provision in the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 provides a workable framework for developing meaningful standards to increase reliability and security of driver's licenses and ID cards. This framework calls for input from state elected officials and motor vehicle administrators in the regulatory process, protects state eligibility criteria, and retains the flexibility necessary to incorporate best practices from around the states. We have begun to work with the U.S. Department of Transportation to develop the minimum standards, which must be completed in 18 months pursuant to the Intelligence Reform Act. We commend the Members of the U.S. House of Representatives for their commitment to driver's license integrity; however, H.R. 418 would impose technological standards and verification procedures on states, many of which are beyond the current capacity of even the federal government. Moreover, the cost of implementing such standards and verification procedures for the 220 million driver's licenses issued by states represents a massive unfunded federal mandate. Our states have made great strides since the September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks to enhance the security processes and requirements for receiving a valid driver's license and ID card. The framework in the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 will allow us to work cooperatively with the federal government to develop and implement achievable standards to prevent document fraud and other illegal activity related to the issuance of driver's licenses and ID cards. We urge you to allow the provisions in the Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 to work. Governors, state legislators, other state elected officials and motor vehicle administrators are committed to this process because it will allow us to develop mutually agreed-upon standards that can truly help create a more secure America. Sincerely, Raymond C. Scheppach, Executive Director, National Governors Association. William T. Pound, Executive Director, National Conference of State Legislatures. Linda R. Lewis, President and CEO, American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators. Dan Sprague, Executive Director, Council of State Governments. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to speak in morning business about the provision of this supplemental appropriations bill before us that rights a wrong done with regard to death benefits of those who served the United States in uniform. I begin my remarks by thanking my friend and colleague from Alabama, Senator Sessions, and acknowledge his leadership on this very important humanitarian reform. I also thank the Senate Appropriations Committee, under the leadership of Senator Cochran and Senator Byrd, for bringing forward this emergency supplemental in a way that includes an important provision to improve the financial benefits for families of our fallen soldiers. I am grateful that this supplemental uses the so-called HEROES bill, S. 77, which Senator Sessions and I cosponsored and introduced in January as the basis for the reforms to enhance the death benefit and the level of coverage under the Servicemen's Group Life Insurance Program. Yesterday, the Senate amended this provision and voted to increase eligibility for the expanded death benefit to $100,000, which was in our HEROES bill, to include all active-duty service men and women. These reforms honor the brave men and women wearing America's uniform who have made the ultimate sacrifice to defend our liberty by giving them and their families what we the American people owe them. Obviously, nothing can replace the loss of life. But a decent death benefit and adequate life insurance can provide our service members and their loved ones with a sense of security about their future which they deserve. For too long, they have not gotten that peace of mind, and indeed not the respect they deserve. Senator Sessions and I have worked together for some time as members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to investigate and then to react to this wrong. We began looking at the question of what survivor benefits were in place for our men and women in uniform as we were concerned that the benefits being provided to families of those who lose their lives in the service of this country lagged behind benefits provided for public service employees in high-risk occupations, namely policemen and firefighters. The families of fallen policemen and firefighters deserve those higher benefits. But so, too, of course, do the families of fallen military personnel. When Senator Sessions and I began this review, the death benefit paid to the families of service men and women who were killed in action was $6,000, an embarrassing sum. A small step forward was taken last year when the death benefit was increased to $12,000, but obviously that was still woefully inadequate. Two studies, one done by the Department of Defense and the other done by the Government Accountability Office, documented that survivor benefits provided to some of the public employee groups I have mentioned in high-risk positions were greater than those provided for our soldiers killed in combat. That was evidently unfair, and that is why our legislation, the HEROES bill, was worked on for over 2 years with the Pentagon's service member group and veterans groups which resulted in a bill to correct that imbalance by adjusting military survivor benefits to more equitably reflect today's world. I am very gratified that idea has taken hold, and it is reflected in the emergency supplemental before the Congress today. With the changes adopted, if soldiers buy the servicemen's group life insurance, their families will receive $250,000, for which the soldier pays, and then an additional $150,000 of insurance the U.S. Government will pay for. In addition to that will be the $100,000 death benefit. That is half a million dollars, which in these times is not a lot when we consider families left behind, a parent or a spouse and children who will need to go to college and all the expenses related to it. These families who have lost a family member have a terrible void. All of us who have visited with them in our respective States or elsewhere have felt that void and have tried to the extent we could to let them know we share it with them. But, of course, it is uniquely and singularly theirs as they go through their life. Nothing can fill that void. But the least we can do is what we do in this bill--give them some sense of financial security as they go forward, with a kind of security in a much more fundamental sense that their loved one's service has given each and every American. Theodore Roosevelt once said: A man who was good enough to shed blood for his country is good enough to be given a square deal afterward. Of course, in our time we say a man and a woman. T.R. was right, and the men and women who are shedding blood for our Nation today in the cause of liberty and doing so in a way that has fundamentally improved the security of the American people here at home should know their families will be taken care of no matter what happens to them. I can't think of a piece of legislation which I have been involved in my over 17 years in the Senate that I have felt better about. This is one of those occasions that doesn't get celebrated quite enough where we forget the party labels, Republican and Democrat, and act in a higher calling, which is our status as Americans which unites us all. I am glad to see we are about to put these reforms in place. We all recognize we have to keep faith with our service men and women. We have to give them a square deal. They are doing their duty to protect us, and it is our duty to protect their families, should they give their lives in defense of our liberty. That is what the provisions in the supplemental do. I am proud to have been a part of it. I am grateful to my colleagues for supporting it. I urge its adoption. I thank the Chair. I yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I wish to submit for the Record today a statement joining my colleagues and my countrymen and women in paying tribute to the departed and beloved Pope John Paul II. I join them in mourning his loss, and I extend my condolences to Roman Catholics in Connecticut and all over the world. It is impossible to overstate the great sense of loss that is being felt by the 1 billion Catholics worldwide, but a telling sign of the Holy Father's lasting legacy is that his life and death have touched billions of non-Catholics as well. The Pontiff built bridges to non- Catholics and transformed forever the Church's perception of Jews in particular from a separated people to ``older'' brothers and sisters in faith. Pope John Paul II's outreach to people of all faiths began when he was a young man. Known to his friends and family as ``Lolek,'' the future Pontiff grew up in Wadowice, Poland, in the 1920s and 1930s. Wadowice was a town of about 7,000, more than 20 percent of whom were Jewish, including young Lolek's best friend, Jurek Kluger. One of Lolek and Jurek's favorite pastimes was soccer. One day, Jurek went to the Parish church to meet up with Lolek before heading to a soccer match together. A woman in the church expressed her amazement at the sight of a Jewish boy standing next to the altar. To the future Pope, however, it was a natural and effortless interfaith communion. As the young Lolek remarked to the amazed onlooker, ``Aren't we all God's children?'' Pope John Paul II worked to protect all of God's children as a courageous champion of religious freedom and human rights and a tireless advocate for the poor and sick throughout the world. His fervent opposition to the brutal scourge of Nazism was matched by his tireless work to break Eastern Europe free from the oppressive grip of communism. In June of 1979, 8 months after being elected to take the throne of St. Peter, Pope John Paul II made a triumphant return to Poland. His beloved nation was struggling to survive under the iron fist of Soviet rule. An adoring crowd of 1 million supporters gave him a hero's welcome. For his fellow Poles, who for decades were deprived of their freedom to worship, the Pontiff had a strong, clear and inspirational message. ``You are men. You have dignity. Don't crawl on your bellies,'' he said. This visit was a crucial turning point in America's Cold War with the Soviet Union. Working together with the people of Poland and the United States, the Pontiff transformed his homeland into the spiritual battlefront of the Cold War. Forging an allegiance with Lech Walesa, the Pope provided religious support for the anti-communist Solidarity movement. Over the next decade, a tidal wave of the spirit overcame communism in Poland. One by one, the dominoes of Communist oppression fell across Eastern Europe as faith and freedom triumphed. Stalin once mocked the power of the papacy by asking, rhetorically, ``The Pope? How many divisions has he got?'' In one of history's sweet ironies, it was indeed a Pope none other than Pope John Paul II who helped dismantle Stalin's empire, not with divisions of armed soldiers, but legions of faithful followers who yearned to be free. In another historic trip 22 years later, the Pontiff made a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. He visited Yad Vashem, the Holocaust memorial, where he prayed and met with survivors. On his last day in Jerusalem, he went to the Western Wall of the Temple. There, the Holy Father prayed silently before leaving a small written prayer stuffed into a crack in the wall, surrounded by the thousands of notes and prayers people leave there every day. During his Papacy, while much of the world could not resist the temptation of moral compromise and material excess, Pope John Paul II remained steadfast in his morality and spirituality. He was a tower of integrity, a role model for everyone who sought to defend their values from the growing culture of moral relativism. In an age of materialism and genocide, he was the world's most consistent advocate of spiritual and humanitarian values. While the Pope's values remained traditional, his ability to communicate was progressive and modern. He forever revolutionized how the church could spread its teachings. He masterfully used modern technology to bring the church to the world. In each of the seven languages he spoke, he had a unique ability to touch each one in his presence as if they were the only one to whom he was speaking. The Pope was able to inspire those who came to hear his message to go forth and make the world a better place. On January 4, 2001, he called upon a group of hundreds of believers gathered in St. Peter's Square--including a Roman Catholic member of my own staff, Kenneth Dagliere--to make the most of their God-given potential. ``If you are to be what you are meant to be, you will set the world ablaze,'' he told them. Those words are as autobiographical as they are inspirational. Much as he did in life, Pope John Paul II provided a life-affirming example of dignity in his death. While we are saddened by his death, we take solace in knowing that he left us peacefully and surrounded by those closest to him in his Papal residence. Outside, in St. Peter's Square, hundreds of thousands of adorers held constant vigil, praying for a man who had touched their lives in a way few ever could. It was a spontaneous outpouring of love for a man who seemed to possess an eternal capacity to spread strength and love wherever he went. Mr. President, Pope John Paul II leaves behind a lasting legacy of faith and leadership. He will be truly missed by hundreds of millions of God's children throughout the world. I thank the Almighty for giving us the gift of Pope John Paul II. And I thank Lolek, who became Pope John Paul II, for using those gifts to bringing us all closer to God. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I voted for Senator Schumer's and Senator Graham's China currency amendment even though I prefer my own legislation, S. 377, on this issue, which is consistent with our international obligations. Nonetheless, I supported this amendment to send a message to the administration that the time for action on currency manipulation has come. I acknowledge that if passed, this legislation may be disruptive to our trade obligations. But as noted economist Fred Bergsten wrote in the Financial Times on March 15, the world economy would suffer from a rapid and precipitous decline in the U.S. currency. Such a shock could drive up interest rates and curb U.S. growth to the detriment of all our trading partners. These risks are greatly exacerbated by the growing U.S. current account deficit and the connected actions by some countries, including China, that are blocking the orderly adjustment of the U.S. dollar by their direct currency intervention. It is long past time for market forces to be allowed to work and time for the administration to press this issue. I note that if national security problems arise, the President under the amendment has waiver authority.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, had I been present for vote number 66, amendment No. 230 sponsored by Senator Coleman, to restore funding for Community Development Block Grants and other programs, I would have voted in favor of the amendment. Due to the rapid scheduling of amendments at this time, I was unable to be here for that vote. However, my position with respect to CDBG funding is crystal clear. In fact, I was a cosponsor of the Sarbanes amendment to restore CDBG funding, which unfortunately failed on a 50-50 vote. Although I preferred the offset in the Sarbanes amendment, I nonetheless would have voted for the Coleman amendment as well. CDBG provides critical funds to many communities in my State. It is one of the Federal Government's most effective neighborhood privatization programs. I am please that the Coleman amendment passed this body today, and I will continue to work in the Senate to ensure that the President's proposed cuts are not enacted into law.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for her principled leadership on this fight.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I come to this debate with some long history here, as other Members of the Senate have as well. This was one of the reasons I ran for the Senate. I was troubled by the plans to drill for oil in the Arctic refuge. It was an issue in my 1988 campaign. I have been battling this ever since. Why does it matter so much to me? Sure, it relates to our national energy policy. Does it develop enough oil to really matter to price or availability? No. Can we drill our way out of energy dependence on foreign oil? No. We have to think and innovate and entrepreneurize our way out of it. This all begins, for me, with the beginning--with the Bible and the instructions God gave to Adam and Eve that they should both work and guard the Garden of Eden, which is to say that they should develop and cultivate it but also protect it, because we are here for a short time. The Psalms tell us that the Earth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof. You have a responsibility to protect the beauty of nature that has been given to us for the generations that will follow us--to work and to guard. Let me come to the North Slope. We come to this day with a judgment having been made. Ninety-five percent of the North Slope in this part of Alaska is open for exploration, oil exploration and potential drilling. We drew a line. Our predecessors drew a line: This 5 percent should be preserved as a wildlife refuge; if you will, a small piece of Eden, preserved in this magnificent State. Now we are going to break that line, we are going to destroy that remaining part and have an inevitable negative consequence, both on the wilderness, the wildlife there, and also on the native people who depend on it and of whose heritage it is part. We can go back and forth about which side the native people are on. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a letter from Robert Thompson, Kaktovik Arctic Adventurers, containing a petition drive, which has secured 57 signatures from the people in Kaktovik, likely a majority of the voting adults there--it sounds like Dicksville Notch, doesn't it?--who support Senator Cantwell's proposal.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Let me come to the process. While I am on the Bible, I was taught as a kid those famous words: Justice, justice shalt thou seek. Why the double mention of justice? Because, I was told, you have to pursue what you believe is justice in a just way. We have different ideas of what justice is, what a good result is here. But I want to speak to the method, and that is to do this as part of a budget resolution, which clearly is an end run around the existing rules, an end run around the healthy fair fight we have been having for a lot of years about whether oil drilling should be allowed in the Arctic Refuge and the 60-vote requirement that has stopped that from happening. That is why the filibuster is there. People talk about the ``nuclear option'' with regard to judicial nominations. We have been looking over in this direction. The nuclear weapons have been fired from over here. This is the nuclear option. It sets a precedent. It allows anything that generates revenues, whether incidental or at the heart of the purpose, to be attached to the budget resolution and only require 51 votes. Just listen to the advocates, my dear colleagues and respected friends, proponents of the drilling in the Arctic Refuge. They are not talking about generation of revenue as its main purpose. They are talking about the provision of oil, provision of jobs, energy independence. We can debate that. But the revenues obtained here are incidental, and our rules make clear that when that is so, this kind of provision should not be on this budget resolution. It does set a precedent, where anything else, where the generation of revenues is merely incidental, whether on environmental matters or anything else, and something that has not been able to obtain the supermajority 60 will be able to be adopted by 51, when put on a budget resolution. Incidentally, one effect of this budget process in Congress is the budget process has broken down. We do not pass a budget resolution anymore. If we start putting what I believe respectfully are extraneous amendments, substantive battles on to the budget resolution, it is going to be harder and harder to follow the orderly budget process that the law and our rules provide. So for reasons of substance and reasons of procedure, I ask my colleagues to support the Cantwell amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I am honored to rise to speak on behalf of the amendment my distinguished colleague and friend Senator Collins of Maine has offered to this budget resolution. This amendment will make sure adequate funding is provided for key programs at the Department of Homeland Security. I am very grateful to Senator Collins, who is the chair of the newly named Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. I am privileged to serve as the ranking Democrat on that committee. I am very glad to join with Senator Collins in offering this amendment because it continues the statement that when it comes to security, whether in the world through the Armed Services Committee or here at home through the Homeland Security Committee, we ought to act in a bipartisan, nonpartisan fashion. This is genuinely a bipartisan amendment. This amendment and the increases it provides would be paid for by reducing administrative expenses and would not increase the deficit. It would provide an additional $855 million that we believe is vitally needed to prepare our first responders, to secure our ports, and to strengthen our borders. Our intelligence and security experts tell us the threat of terrorist attack here at home is one we are going to have to live with for some time to come. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Porter Goss, recently said ``it may only be a matter of time'' before terrorists strike again within the United States with weapons of mass destruction. And new intelligence informs us that the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, now affiliated with Osama bin Laden, leading a group of terrorists in Iraq, may have conferred with bin Laden about attacks within the United States at nonobvious targets spread throughout this country of ours. The fact is, we remain vulnerable. We are safer, as the 9/11 Commission said in its report last year, than we were on 9/11, but we are still not yet fully safe. In a recent letter to the Senate Budget Committee, looking at what I took to be the needs of our country with regard to homeland security, I recommended an additional $8.4 billion in homeland security spending governmentwide, with $4.2 billion going to first responders. In the current context, that is a large number, but I truly believe every dollar would have been well spent and would have improved and increased our sense of security from terrorism here at home. The fact is, we have the best military in the world, in the history of the world, as we have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq in recent years. One of the reasons we do, in addition to the extraordinary commitment, skill, and bravery of our personnel, is we have been willing to invest money to provide that first-rate defense. The same is true here at home. We will not become secure on the cheap. I understand that the $8.4 billion I proposed in my letter to the Budget Committee is not going to find majority support here on the Senate floor. But surely we can agree not to go backwards. Although the administration has recommended increases, some of them targeted to homeland security programs, in its fiscal year 2006 budget, those increases are very modest and very few. And, unfortunately, the proposed budget would actually cut key Department of Homeland Security first responder programs by 32 percent. It has been said before, but it cannot be said often enough, that our first responders are on the front lines of the war on terror here at home. In fact, they are more than our first responders. They can be hundreds of thousands of additional first preventers. We must give them what they need to do their jobs effectively for us. That means dollars to help train and equip State and local police, firefighters, and emergency medical technicians to be first responders, preventers, and to help detect or disrupt terrorist activity before an attack, and dollars to ensure that should an attack occur, these men and women who serve us will have the training and the equipment they need to respond, to save lives, to localize the damage. State and localities across our country are using a lot of their own money and taking a lot of initiative on their own to prepare to defend against terrorist attack. But they cannot do it alone, nor should they have to. Therefore, the amendment Senator Collins and I are proposing this evening would provide $565 million to restore the administration's proposed cuts to Homeland Security Department first responder programs, to get us back to where we have been. That would include State homeland security grants, firefighter grants, and emergency management planning grants. Maintaining these programs at their current levels is the least we can do given the enormous demands on our first responders in our municipalities and States. Mr. President, the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force, headed by our former colleague, Senator Warren Rudman, as an example of one standard of expenditures possibly necessary here, called for nearly $100 billion over 5 years just to prepare first responders. A recent survey by the National Governors Association found that communications interoperability is the top homeland security priority for many States. That is as it says. How can we make sure that in a moment of crisis those first responders from different agencies and different jurisdictions can, in fact, communicate with one another? Only a few States have achieved that interoperability because it is so expensive. Just last week, New York's Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response reported that emergency medical services personnel generally lack not only proper equipment but also proper training. Without more support, our first responders simply will not be able to provide the help we need if terror strikes. Second, in our amendment, Senator Collins and I also provide for $150 million in dedicated funding for port security. The budget resolution provides none--no funds--in this area. It is hard to overstate the importance of our ports to our economy and transportation network. Ninety-five percent of all our trade flows through our ports, and a potential terrorist attack at one of them would cause economic havoc for our country. In fact, the U.S. Coast Guard has estimated it will cost more than $7 billion to effectively secure America's ports. Unfortunately, this budget does not guarantee any spending for port security. Rather, it combines a large array of homeland security needs--including port security--into a catch-all fund for infrastructure protection. This fund is too small to cover all infrastructure protection needs. Therefore, the amendment that Senator Collins and I introduce tonight would guarantee that port security gets at least the fiscal year 2005 level of $150 million. Finally, border security. The 9/11 Commission bill passed by Congress and signed by the President at the end of last year authorized 2,000 new Border Patrol agents for this year. The President's budget funds only 210 new agents. These new hires, as I see them, would basically replace agents who were moved from the southern border to beef up staffing at the northern border. Our amendment would provide $140 million for border security. That would allow the Department of Homeland Security to hire 1,000 new agents in the coming fiscal year, which I am confident--and Senator Collins is, too--would be enough to make a noticeable difference in our border defenses. Mr. President, bottom line: This is a modest proposal. In large part, it is a status quo proposal, keeping us at least where we have been and not moving backward. The experts have told us that we need to invest billions more than we are. We are still learning of new vulnerabilities all the time. We cannot afford to retreat in our efforts, when we know there is still a great distance to go before our first responders are well prepared and other gaps at our borders and ports are closed. That is the intention of this bipartisan amendment. I urge my colleagues to support it. I thank the Chair and I thank Senator Collins for her leadership once again in proposing this amendment. I am proud to stand with her on this, as I have on so many other matters. I yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Paul Brand and Karen Pavese my staff be given floor privileges during the debate on the budget resolution.