Joseph Lieberman

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to congratulate the University of Connecticut Huskies on their national championship, the fourth in the school's history. With their impressive 73-68 victory over the Tennessee Lady Vols, another powerhouse program, the Huskies proved that they could do much more than rebuild their team after last year's undefeated season. The Huskies showed that they could repeat as the best team in the land. That makes them just the third repeat champion in women's college basketball history. With this victory, the great Geno Auriemma--national coach of the year--has earned a place, alongside Jim Calhoun of course, as one of the best basketball coaches in America. Diana Taurasi, the Naismith Player of the Year and the Final Four's Most Outstanding Player, has become a full-fledged superstar. And the rest of this young team has demonstrated a harmony and chemistry that are almost impossible to match, especially for such a young group. Do you realize this is the first team ever to win the championship without a senior on the roster? That says a lot about the coaching prowess of Geno, the leadership of Diana, and the spirit of the UConn program. This season, things did not come quite as easy as they did in the last one. Last year, the program dominated with its four superstar seniors and its then-sophomore phenom. This time, many, many games were close. Sometimes they came close to blowing big leads. They even lost . . . once. Honestly, after their record-breaking 70-game winning streak, that single loss in an otherwise perfect season was big, big news in my State of Connecticut. But this team did not flinch. They did not waver. They kept their eyes on the prize and reached down into their gut, game after game. The championship game itself was no different. It was intense, hard fought. Everybody found a way to contribute. Tough play in the paint, graceful outside shooting. Strong defense. And ``D''--that's Diana-- scored 28 in a passionate and poised performance. After the game, she was humble about it. ``No superstars, just blue collar,'' she said. In the process, Connecticut-Tennessee has become, hands down, the best rivalry in women's college basketball. The Huskies against the Vols. Geno Auriemma against Pat Summit, both basketball legends. And, with my condolences to the Tennessee delegation, I must say proudly that Connecticut has the upper hand, with four straight victories over the Lady Vols, including in the 1995, 2000, and 2003 title games. I do not want to get mushy here, but when speaking of the Huskies, it is hard to stop myself from wagging my tail with joy. All of Connecticut, and especially girls who love basketball like my daughter, are cheering today, and eager to welcome the Huskies home for a victory celebration. With so much success already under the belt of this great program, it is hard to say that we are surprised by what they have accomplished yet again. But with such a remarkable road to their second straight title, it is easy to say we are proud.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I thank my friend from Montana. I rise to speak in favor of the CARE Act, the Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment Act. This began as an attempt to give support to faith- based groups to perform good works. Congratulating the UConn Women Huskies If I may use that as a segue for a seemingly unrelated comment, I want to express this morning the pride and exultation of the people of Connecticut whose faith in our UConn Women Huskies was vindicated last night as they achieved an extraordinary victory over a very tough and proud Tennessee team. The UConn Women won another national championship for the UConn Women Huskies, the fourth in the program's history. My congratulations to Coach Geno Auriemma, Assistant Coach Chris Dailey, and the great UConn women who rebuilt a lot of young talent that came together and made us all proud. They set an extraordinary example for young women all over America who, like my 15-year-old daughter, love basketball, love to play it, and are inspired by the skill and grit and team spirit of the UConn Women Huskies. So our faith was redeemed, and you give us faith, Lady Huskies, as we go on. Returning to the CARE Act, I must say that I am proud and, in some senses, relieved to join my colleagues in supporting this act. This act is a compromise version of the initial faith- based and community initiative. It comes to the Senate floor after a difficult path. But the important point is that we are here. This is a different plan than the President originally proposed. It is different than the plan that Senator Santorum--who I have been so pleased to work with as lead cosponsor with him--and I negotiated with the White House to address concerns that were blocking its initial movement. Perhaps most notably, it no longer contains any provisions targeted specifically at carving out a larger lawful space for faith-based groups in our social service programs. But despite this evolution, the heart of the proposal remains the same; and I guess, I would add, the soul of the proposal remains the same as well. That is why the CARE Act enjoys overwhelming support from America's philanthropic community, with endorsements from more than 1,600 charities of all sizes and denominations, as well, as we can see, strong bipartisan support here in the Senate. And that is why I feel confident this measure will help transform the spirit of good will in America today into more good works at a time of growing hardship and make this country as good as its values are. Any doubt about the vitality of America's spirit was firmly laid to rest on September 11, 2001, when so many Americans gave so much and all of us collectively embraced the values of compassion and community. But if we truly hope to keep moving America closer to our founding ideals, we have to extend that commitment to helping those who continue to live in a different type of need--children living in poverty and despair; drug addicts desperate for treatment and a better life; low income working families who are struggling for self-sufficiency. Our Government, of course, runs many programs at the Federal, State, and local levels that aim to fill those needs as best they can by establishing a safety net. But all of us here, regardless of party or geography, recognize that Government can't do it all on its own, nor should it. We have long relied on a wide network of private charities and social service providers, community organizations and religious groups, what you might call the sinews of our civil society, to partner with the public sector, to fill in the gaps of the Government's reach and, in particular, to target aid to local priorities and problems. That is what this bill will do. We start with a new focus on building and leveraging the capacity of the small faith-based and community organizations who are often in the best position to help people in need because they are closest to them. But in many cases, they don't have the technical wherewithal to find the public resources to do so. So to help those groups, the CARE Act creates a Compassion Capital Fund authorized at $150 million a year that will underwrite a wide range of technical assistance efforts. But the bill goes beyond just expanding the pool of applicants and enlarges the pie of resources that is available to America's charities and social services providers. That will be particularly critical at this difficult time in our Nation's economic history when charities are stretched. I saw an article in the paper in the last 24 hours that said the United Way expects a significant drop in its fundraising this year because of the economic problems America faces. I hope and believe this bill will create the incentives for more giving to the United Way and a host of other charities, national and local. It will do so by creating several well targeted tax incentives over the next years that total $10.6 billion which, working from the general rule that most tax incentives are worth about 30 cents on the dollar to a taxpayer, should lead to new donations to charities, community-based, faith-based, of more than $30 billion over the next 10 years. How much good will come from that is wonderful to contemplate. Part of the CARE Act that may make as big a difference and of which I am particularly proud is the $1.3 billion increase in Social Service Block Grant (SSBG) funding over the next 2 years. The CARE Act will finally make good on our commitment by restoring SSBG funding to its authorized level of $2.8 billion over the next 2 years and in so doing would empower charities across the country to do good for so many people in need. I want to mention one other provision in the bill which has been a labor of love for me and Senator Santorum. That provision would expand on the use of innovative savings accounts, known as Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), to help low-income working families build wealth and achieve financial self-sufficiency. There have been a number of IDA demonstration projects around America that have proven successful in making home ownership, college, and small business not just a dream but a reality for thousands of low-income people nationwide. The CARE Act aims to build on those successes and significantly increase the availability of IDAs by offering America's financial institutions new incentives to help low-income families who want to save for their future which represents a whole new strategy in fighting poverty. It is based on a growing body of research that shows the best path to the middle class comes not just from hard work but also through savings and asset accumulation. In sum, this CARE Act represents a comprehensive response to a complicated problem. That is why it is broadly and enthusiastically embraced by charities all over America. This bill puts our shared values into action by elevating the priority we place on helping our most vulnerable citizens. For that I thank my colleagues for their support. I particularly thank Senator Santorum with whom it has been a pleasure to work in this long-time effort. His dedication, his commitment, his faith, his persistence, and his willingness to accommodate and reach common ground is a good part of the reason why we are on the verge of this very significant accomplishment. I thank the leaders of the Finance Committee, Senator Grassley and Senator Baucus, and I thank my leader, Senator Daschle, who worked with us as we negotiated this logjam-breaking compromise with the administration and then pushed hard among our ranks to have this bill considered on the Senate floor. Senator Daschle's staff, particularly Jennifer Duck and Andrea LaRue, has been indispensable to this mission. Finally, I thank my own staff for the dedicated work they have done on this exceedingly challenging but important legislation. Specifically, I am grateful to Laurie Rubenstein, Debbie Forrest, Dan Gerstein, Chuck Ludlam, and Michelle McMurray. We could not have passed the bill without them. I urge my colleagues to support the bill and yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I am disappointed that the administration has put out a statement today opposing the SSBG provisions in this bill, especially after we negotiated a bill with the Administration that included those provisions. The SSBG funding is critically important to this bill. It funds a number of essential social services that have been harmed by cuts to that program. I'd like to put in the record here the results of a survey done by the United Way of America. In January 2000, UWA conducted an informal survey to assess the impact cuts to SSBG have had on local United Ways and their community partners. This study represents the impact of cuts from a funding level of $2.8 billion to SSBG in fiscal year 1995, to $1.9 billion in fiscal year 1999. Since conducting the survey, SSBG funding has been further reduced to $1.7 billion. Following summarizes ``The Stories Behind the Social Services Block Grant: A Survey by United Way of America.'' Effect of SSBG Cuts on Health and Human Service Agencies: One hundred thirty-eight agencies from 26 States responded. Effect on budget: 38 percent received less SSBG money in 1999 than in the 1995; 42 percent have been level funded for the past 5 years. Effect on services: 17 percent of the total respondents had to cut programs to compensate for SSBG cuts; 29 percent of the agencies that received less SSBG money in 1999 than in 1995 were forced to cut programs; 32 percent of the total respondents had to cut staff to compensate for SSBG cuts; 50 percent of the agencies that received less SSBG money in 1999 than in 1995 had to cut staff; 46 percent of the total respondents were forced to serve fewer clients; 73 percent of the agencies that received less SSBG money in 1999 than in 1995 were forced to serve fewer clients. Respondents' median 1999 grant: $70,472.00. Median percent of respondents' budget that SSBG represents: 10 percent. Median number of people served with respondents' SSBG funds: 180. The survey found that further cuts to SSBG would greatly reduce the reach and impact programs that provide services for a full range of health and human services from child welfare and child care to youth development, job training and other work supports for those transitioning off welfare, assistance for domestic violence victims, respite care, home care services and information and referral. The administration's backtracking on its assurances about funding this program will further damage these efforts.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, the progress in Iraq has been stunning. The war is not over, but it is within sight. I think we can safely say this looks like the beginning of the end. Saddam Hussein, that brutal and murderous dictator, is nowhere to be seen. Baghdad has been reclaimed, and the Iraqi people are being liberated. But let us not for a moment forget the service and sacrifice of our brave and brilliant men and women in uniform, which brought us to this day. And let us not for a moment forget that in the midst of all this, while the Iraqi people are being freed, men and women of the American military remain prisoners--prisoners of the remnants of Saddam's brutal regime. We all recall the heroic rescue of PFC Jessica Lynch last week. One soldier rescued, and so much joy. But that joy and the rush of events in Iraq cannot overshadow the danger that continues to face others like her who were not so fortunate to be saved from captivity. We cannot and we shall not forget any missing American or POW, not for a moment. And, whether this regime is dying or dead, we cannot and will not allow the brutal treatment of American prisoners at the hands of Saddam's regime to unchallenged. One way to do that, is to have the American Government speak with a strong and unified voice against this abhorrent behavior. That is precisely what the resolution before us, S. Con. Res. 31, does. It expresses support for our troops reaffirms the international standards that have bound and will continue to bind the U.S. military in our treatment of Iraqi prisoners, makes clear the outrage of this Congress at Iraq's appalling and criminal treatment of American prisoners of war, and commits us, as a nation, to follow through and hold those who commit crimes against our soldiers accountable for their actions. My colleague from Virginia and I offer this resolution proudly, for those Americans in captivity and those who may fall into captivity from this day forward. I am sure that I speak for both of us when I say that we are deeply gratified that our colleagues from Alaska and Hawaii, Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye--two honorable men whose contributions to this Nation on the battlefield are well-known--have joined us in cosponsoring this resolution. I further wish to thank Senator Frist, our majority leader, and my good friend, Senator Tom Daschle, the Democratic leader, for their support. This is not a partisan issue. It is not a question of politics. This is a matter of honor. And honor is something clearly lacking in the Iraqi regime. The insulting and humiliating manner in which American prisoners of war have been publicly paraded and interrogated on state television is bad enough. To have members of the American Armed Forces allegedly executed in public--shot in the back of the head--is reprehensible. To have their bodies publicly displayed on state television was inhumane sacrilege. I have been appalled--and I know I am not alone--by the flagrant violations of the rules of warfare and the Geneva Convention that we have witnessed these past weeks. It is a violation of the Geneva Convention and the customary rules of war to mistreat prisoners of war. If the detailed legal terms are too much for Iraq's rulers, let me put it simply. You don't shoot prisoners. You don't torture them. You protect them. You treat them with decency as enemies in combat but fellow human beings. But I am not surprised at what Saddam's henchmen are doing. For anyone who has yet to be convinced of the evil and tyrannical nature of Saddam's regime, I cannot imagine what greater proof is needed than the conduct of this regime in this conflict. During the course of this war, which is hopefully now drawing to a close, Saddam has once again proven himself to be every bit as barbarous, every bit as cruel, and--yes--every bit as evil as we knew him to be. Saddam and his son, Uday, have inserted members of the Fedayeen into the regular army in order to force soldiers and conscripts to fight, under the threat of murder or torture. They have sent those same Fedayeen into the villages and streets of Iraq, intimidating and terrorizing innocent civilians. These disgraceful thugs have been reported to have turned their guns on innocent Iraqi civilians--their own people--attempting to leave Basra. The list goes on and on. Last week, paramilitary troops hid in the Ali Mosque in Kut, and opened fire on coalition forces--hoping that we would respond, and fire upon one of the holiest shrines in Shi'a Islam. I am pleased to note, that our troops showed restraint. Respect. They did not respond to the provocations. That is honor. That is the understanding that even in war there are norms and there are rules. There is a difference between right and wrong. That is why the Coalition forces are providing prisoners of war with food and water. We have given the Red Cross free and open access. We do not believe that the crimes and inhumanity of Saddam's regime naturally extend to every member of his military. We have especially sought to spare civilian life. It is a painful reality of war that civilian lives are lost in conflict. But the precision with which our military operates, the care we take to avoid civilian casualties, is unparalleled in the history of armed conflict. It has been said that the United States is more concerned about the safety and welfare of Iraqi civilians than the Iraqi Government. That is sadly, true. Let me say again. This is--and I hope I can change the verb tense soon to ``has been''--a just and necessary war against a dangerous dictator. Coalition forces have fought with honor, with nobility, and with morality. Our attempts to avoid civilian casualities, however, have been made more difficult by the Iraqi regime's adoption of terrorist tactics: Weapons hidden in hospitals, anti-chemical warfare suits and antidotes secreted in schools, troops hidden in civilian clothing who surrender, only to shoot our troops in the back. The Iraqi regime has officially sanctioned the use of suicide bombings against our soldiers--adopting a tactic they have seen used with what they would call success against innocent civilians in Israel. All this made clear that in Iraq we were not fighting, are not fighting, a separate war from the war against terrorism. Some say Saddam and bin Laden have different ideologies, different ambitions. But they share the same inhumane tactics, the same hatred for all who are different, the same fear of freedom, the same brutality and cruelty. The resolution that we offer today cannot adequately convey our shock and disgust at the manner in which Saddam's regime has acted because there are not sufficient words to do so. But it is a clear statement of anger and of principle, and a clear statement of our intent to hold all those who commit war crimes accountable. There should be no mistake. America does not simply speak about the rules of war. We live by them. And we do not merely condemn atrocities. We, as a Nation, will find those responsible and make them pay. This is only a resolution. It cannot do what those Marines and Special Forces did in rescuing an American POW any more than a yellow ribbon tied around a lamppost or a tree. But it is an appropriate expression of our values, of our resolve, and a statement of our solidarity with those who risk their lives half a world away to secure our freedom. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise in strong support of Senator Schumer's amendment, which I am proud to cosponsor. We spent much of last year on the Senate floor talking about how to reorganize our Federal Government to meet and beat the challenge of terrorism. In the end, we passed a bill creating a Department of Homeland Security that for the first time is refocusing and reorganizing the Federal Government to make America safer. But we have said all along that while better organization is a necessary prerequisite to making us safer, it isn't enough. We need to put dollars where the danger is. You can't protect your house in a dangerous neighborhood with a jerry-rigged lock or no lock at all. A ``Beware of Dog'' sign isn't good enough. You need to spend some money. You need to buy a real lock. You need to get a decent dog. The President often says that America has the resolve it needs to win this war against terrorism. And that is true. Americans are resolute. They are courageous. They are prepared to face down danger and do what it takes to overcome it. That is especially true of the men and women in our fire departments, police departments, emergency medical offices, and hospitals the men and women we call first responders. Resolve, however, will only go so far if it isn't matched by real resources. Can resolve buy interoperable communications equipment? Pay for firefighters' overtime? Install a security system at a port? Upgrade the information sharing databases in local communities? Dramatically improve public health systems to deal with biological or chemical attacks? No all those urgent improvements and others demand more than resolve. They demand resources. Right now the resources are nowhere to be found. This administration seems determined to do homeland security on the cheap adding just $300 million to the budget for next fiscal year for homeland security. And the reason boils down to one reason and one reason only. The administration is committed to protecting $2 trillion in unfair, unfocused, and ineffective tax cuts, at all costs. On this, it will not budge. It will not yield. It will not reconsider a single digit or a single dollar. That irrational and ideological commitment to those unaffordable tax cuts has squeezed out every other priority. It has raided the national cupboard at a time when we desperately need new resources to tackle new threats. America has the greatest military in the world, and that is because we have paid for it. Generation after generation, we have worked together across party lines and every other division to invest in our Armed Forces and the men and women who dedicate their lives to the common defense. We are truly, to recall President Kennedy, willing to pay any price and bear any burden to deter and defeat foreign threats. There is no way around this: If we want the best domestic defenses, we will have to pay for them, too. At the State and local level, where fiscal crises are already forcing cuts in services, the Federal Government's failure to invest is especially serious. The amendment under consideration today addresses the critical shortfalls facing our local communities by providing $3 billion in first responder grants to States in the wartime supplemental budget, and over $1 billion for grants to high threat urban areas. In addition to these first responder grants, the amendment provides $155 million in grants to fire departments to fully fund the $900 million authorized level, and an additional $130 million to the COPS Program, which will fund additional police costs. This is the least we can provide. As you may know, I have called for a still greater investment--$7.5 billion for our first responders above and beyond the President's proposal in next year's budget--and $16 billion overall in that budget above and beyond the paltry $300 million increase. But this amendment, along with the other amendments I am proud to cosponsor that will come before the Senate today, is a good start, a necessary start. Let me give you a few examples of the urgent needs throughout America today that it would begin to address: New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg said his city is currently spending $5 million a week to post armed units at potential targets like Times Square, conduct bioterrorism detection, and prepare police in the five boroughs to operate as independent departments should the Manhattan headquarters be disabled in an emergency. According to The Washington Post in an article published April 1-- and, no, unfortunately it wasn't an April Fool's joke--Los Angeles ``has grown so desperate waiting for federal money that last week it reluctantly raided a municipal trust fund for $4.5 million and bought 1,000 chemical protection suits for firefighters and police.'' L.A. has also reduced staffing at its 24-hour emergency operation center in part to save money on security costs. According to The Baltimore Sun, the mayor's office in Baltimore estimates that the city needs to spend another $8.4 million on new communications and hazmat equipment, protective gear, and training, not to mention another $122 million to upgrade water treatment plants, build a new emergency operations center, and more. The list goes on. My own home community of New Haven, CT, has been able to outfit about 10 percent--just 10 percent--of its 300 firefighters with protective equipment that will be needed to respond in the event of a chemical or biological attack. Let's face it. Meeting those needs and others will take more money from Washington, plain and simple. But some don't seem to understand that. The majority leader, Senator Frist, was quoted in CongressDaily as saying that, ``It is unnecessary and wasteful to spend more money at the federal level. The problem is not the federal availability of money. It's getting it down to the local level.'' With all respect, that is just not the case. In fact, according to the National Governors Association, States have already obligated or spent more than 90 percent of their Federal funds. And to complicate things, many States have been spending their own money for 15 months but have yet to be reimbursed by the slow and cumbersome process through which money flows from the Federal Government to States and localities. This is only exacerbating budget crises at the State and local level, where many communities are actually laying off and reducing the number of first responders--so we are going backwards. The reality is that we need to get more funding to first responders, and we need to get it to them as quickly as possible. The bottom line is this: We must get our first responders more resources and we need to do it without further delay. Enough posturing, enough politics. Let's rise above partisanship and put the national interest first. The strain on our local first responders has put them in a fiscal straitjacket of historic proportions--one we must relieve now if we are to protect Americans from terrorism. Nevertheless, let's be fair. Let's realize that, yes, we have made some progress in the 18 months since September 11. Today we are better equipped to handle a second September 11. Our skies are safer. The FBI has announced major reforms, which are in progress. I hope we are beginning to tackle the problem of intelligence coordination that plagued us in the weeks and months leading up to that dark day. But the terrorists constantly change their methods. Next time, the threat isn't likely to come in the form of airplanes crashing into buildings. The weapon might only be visible under the microscope. Instead of arriving with a loud crash and flames, it might come quietly, secretly, surreptitiously. Just as September 11 challenged our police officers and firefighters as never before, a biological or chemical attack would challenge our public health first responders as never before. The reality is, if that happens, we are nowhere near ready. As resolute and resourceful as our public health professionals are, they lack the support, the capabilities, and the funding they need to detect these deadly diseases swiftly and protect us effectively. We need significant new investment today to improve our readiness tomorrow. Look at the reaction to the recent outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, or SARS. An unknown microbial agent. A mysterious name. Those harrowing pictures of children with surgeon's masks covering their mouths and noses. The slow but consistent spread throughout Asia, and now around America. Travel warnings from the World Health Organization placing large swaths of the world off limits. This, by all accounts, is simply a serious disease with which we are unfamiliar--but the profile of the outbreak is frighteningly close to what we imagined a bioterror attack might look like. The public health officials in our local communities are well informed and well trained. But working together with the CDC, they just don't have the tools to determine what is causing SARS. They don't have the tools to treat the victims. They don't have the tools to try to stop the spread of the disease in its tracks. If SARS is 4-percent lethal, what will we do with a disease that is 80 percent lethal? What will we do with a disease that spreads faster and is harder to diagnose? Let's not cross our fingers and hope. Unfortunately, that is exactly what we are forced to do under the administration's budget, which shortchanges investment in our local public health systems and hospitals. As a result, our hospitals--already constrained by drastic budget cuts, are now rubbing quarters together when they need to be building substantial new capabilities to contend with the new threats. Time magazine put it this way: ``Speed and calm, both critical in a state of emergency, can be taught without special gear, but training in certain techniques and life-saving equipment, like $25,000 protective suits, don't come cheap. That means most of America's hospitals are ill- prepared to face a major disaster.'' According to the Greater New York Hospital Association, hospitals throughout the State have spent more than $200 million on security and emergency response improvements that they never imagined would be necessary before September 11--with plans to spend more than that in the coming year. What has Washington's contribution been? About $8 million in new funding--less than the hospitals will spend on the new smallpox vaccination program alone. These new demands are only further straining emergency rooms that are already stretched to the limit. Dr. Cai Glushak, director of emergency medicine at the University of Chicago, described the state of Chicago's hospitals this way: ``The hospitals are vastly lacking in resources and have yet to address major things with brick and mortar to create truly adequate facilities to deal with a major contamination issue.'' He went on to say of his hospital, ``If we had an onslaught of 20 people in this emergency room, it would be a catastrophe. It would be sending an external disaster on top of an internal overload.'' How can we expect our hospitals, clinics, labs, and public health departments to protect us from unknown biothreats when they themselves are on the verge of being fiscally bedridden? Now, of course money isn't all that local hospitals need from the Feds. They also need information, expertise, and guidance. They are getting some of that from the CDC. But a sustained improvement in our bioterror defense demands more than that. It demands a real investment. It demands Federal leadership. Those are sorely lacking in the budget requests that we have seen from this administration. For the next fiscal year, I have called for $3 billion in new homeland security funding over and above the president's proposal to shore up bioterror preparedness. Mr. President, $1 billion of that increase would increase CDC grants to help State public health departments care for and track infectious disease outbreaks, $500 million would help local hospitals increase capacity, training and supplies, and $1.5 billion would help get new medical research as quickly as possible from ``bench to bedside''--meaning, from the discovery phase into actual use. Hand in hand with these efforts, we simply must jumpstart efforts to spark private sector production of the drugs, antidotes, and countermeasures we need to fight unknown chemical and biological agents. Again, the SARS example is instructive here as well. We have no antidote for this disease. No vaccine. No countermeasure. No diagnostic. It is possible that the only effective medical response will turn out to be quarantine. Imagine a biological weapon that spreads twice as fast and is twice as deadly. Do we really want quarantine to be our only answer? No--we need real medical shields to fight back against the biological and chemical weapons our enemies might use. And we can't simply hope and pray for these to appear. Stocking our medicine cabinet with the right drugs to protect people from SARS will take months or years of research, months or years of investment, months or years of hard work by private and government professionals. That is why we need to begin today--not in 6 months, not in a year-- engaging every national resource we have to develop the drugs, vaccines, and antidotes we may need in the event of a biological attack. We know of dozens upon dozens of deadly agents for which we currently have no defense, and this does not even count the hybrid or genetically modified organisms we may see in the future. America is blessed with thousands and thousands of brilliant researchers in universities and companies across the country. Why not harness their ingenuity to develop those antidotes, those vaccines, those medicines? Senator Hatch and I have proposed legislation that would do exactly that. I do not believe that Project Bioshield, the limited incentive program the President has proposed, is remotely enough. At best, it focuses on short-term procurement of existing countermeasures, not on long-term research to deal with the threats for which we have no countermeasure. It will not lead to development of a broad-spectrum antibiotic, or to the development of powerful new research tools that will enable us to quickly develop an antiviral to deal with a new threat like SARS. It is a start, but it is late and it does not reflect the urgency that is warranted by the threat. The bill Senator Hatch and I have introduced will put in place a broad range of incentives our private sector needs to start filling our medicine cabinet today so our public health first responders are not caught emptyhanded tomorrow, as they have been caught with SARS. We are at war against terrorism. Our first responders--whether they go to work in firehouses, police precincts, hospitals, or laboratories--are our first line of defense. Let's not frustrate and condemn to failure those whose job it is to protect us--many of whom risk their lives--by failing to provide them the resources they need to meet and beat the new and unfamiliar threats to our homeland. The war against terrorism cannot be won with a magic wand, tough talk, or wishful thinking. It will take talent, training, and technology. It will take real, not rhetorical, partnership among every layer and level of government. It will take bipartisan action in Congress. It will take money. To begin providing our Government the resources it needs to protect us from terrorism, I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill, with Senator Olympia Snowe, to encourage the use of fuel cells, a clean and cutting-edge energy technology. Specifically, the bill would give consumers a tax credit for purchasing residential and commercial fuel cell systems to power their electricity. The tax credit would apply to stationary and portable fuel cell systems, and would be applicable for 5 years. First used for space missions in the 1960s, fuel cells use an electrochemical reaction to convert energy from hydrogen-rich fuel sources into electricity. Because no combustion is involved, fuel cells produce virtually no air pollution and significantly reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Fuel cell units in operation today are capable of running 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with only routine maintenance. They are installed around the world in power plants, hospitals, schools, banks, military installations, and manufacturing facilities. Smaller units for homeowners and small businesses will enter the commercial market shortly. Fuel cell technology offers a clean, secure, and dependable source of energy that should be part of our national energy strategy. With oil and gas prices now reaching record highs, fuel cells are one excellent answer to our heightened energy demand and dependence on foreign oil. This legislation will power fuel cell technology by speeding its market introduction and by increasing its uses in our everyday lives. Mr. President, I ask that the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill, with Senator Olympia Snowe, to encourage the use of fuel cells, a clean and cutting-edge energy technology. Specifically, the bill would give consumers a tax credit for purchasing residential and commercial fuel cell systems to power their electricity. The tax credit would apply to stationary and portable fuel cell systems, and would be applicable for 5 years. First used for space missions in the 1960s, fuel cells use an electrochemical reaction to convert energy from hydrogen-rich fuel sources into electricity. Because no combustion is involved, fuel cells produce virtually no air pollution and significantly reduce carbon dioxide emissions. Fuel cell units in operation today are capable of running 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with only routine maintenance. They are installed around the world in power plants, hospitals, schools, banks, military installations, and manufacturing facilities. Smaller units for homeowners and small businesses will enter the commercial market shortly. Fuel cell technology offers a clean, secure, and dependable source of energy that should be part of our national energy strategy. With oil and gas prices now reaching record highs, fuel cells are one excellent answer to our heightened energy demand and dependence on foreign oil. This legislation will power fuel cell technology by speeding its market introduction and by increasing its uses in our everyday lives. Mr. President, I ask that the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to honor Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, an intellectual pioneer who I felt honored to serve with in the U.S. Senate. He rose from humble beginnings to Harvard, and to a life of service in four different Presidential administrations, as an ambassador to India and the U.N., and as New York's Senator for four terms. Throughout his career in service, he paved his own path--one of integrity, independence, and principled leadership on the critical national questions of our age. Whenever he spoke I listened closely, because I knew I would always learn something from him. He possessed tremendous intellect and foresight, showed unflagging courage in championing unsung causes, and commanded extraordinary respect on both sides of the aisle. He was a true renaissance man who put action behind his diverse interests: from protecting the sanctity of the American family, to preserving historic art and architecture, to restoring Pennsylvania Avenue as America's ``main street,'' to saving Social Security for future generations. I offer my condolences to his wife Elizabeth, who was truly his life partner. There will no doubt be a memorial built in his honor someday soon on the streets of New York; but Senator Moynihan's legacy is already living--in safer streets in our cities, a cleaner environment, and a stronger national community. To borrow a memorable Moynihan phrase, his life defined public service and public policy up for all who aspire to contribute to our country.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to SSgt. Phillip A. Jordan, United States Marine Corps, of Enfield, CT. Staff Sergeant Jordan lived as a true patriot and defender of our great Nation's principles of freedom and justice. A veteran of Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf and Operation Just Cause in Kosovo, Staff Sergeant Jordan was a proud family man and an example of the powerful American spirit that permeates this Nation's history. A member of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Staff Sergeant Jordan and his unit were ambushed when Iraqi soldiers feigned surrender before opening fire. By the time the dust settled around this despicable and cowardly act, nine gallant marines, including Staff Sergeant Jordan, were dead. Staff Sergeant Jordan was more than a marine. He was a husband and a father; he was devoted to his friends and to his family. He was known as ``Gump'' by those who knew and loved him. He quickly offered a hand wherever and whenever needed. Staff Sergeant Jordan was a true citizen soldier--a model marine, and a credit to his family, his community, his corps, and his country. Staff Sergeant Jordan served as a messenger of high justice and idealism in the best tradition of American principles and patriotism. I am both proud and grateful that we have the kind of fighting force exemplified by Staff Sergeant Jordan serving in the Persian Gulf--and the strong families back at home sending their love and support. Our Nation extends its heartfelt condolences to his wife Amanda and his son Tyler. We extend our appreciation for sharing this outstanding marine with us, and we offer our prayers and support. You may be justifiably proud of his contributions which extend above and beyond the normal call of duty.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the ``Colon Cancer Screen for Life Act of 2003.'' I am pleased that my colleagues Senators Collins, Bunning, Dayton, Hollings, and Landrieu have joined me in introducing this very important bill. As many of my colleagues know from personal experience, colon cancer is a devastating disease, taking the lives of 57,000 Americans each year. It is the fourth most commonly diagnosed cancer in both men and women and the second most common cause of cancer-related death in the nation. Close to 150,000 new cases are diagnosed each year. But colon cancer can be combated, controlled, and potentially conquered if it's caught in the earliest stages. In fact, colon cancer is a rare form of cancer in that it can even be prevented through screening--if pre-cancerous polyps are quickly identified and removed. The survival rate when colon cancer is detected at an early, localized stage is 90 percent. But only 37 percent of such cancers are discovered at that stage. The later the disease is caught, the lower the survival rate. That's why, in 1997, Congress led the fight against colon cancer by making screening for the disease a covered benefit for every Medicare recipient. That is especially significant because the risk of colon cancer rises with age. Heightened awareness and greater access to treatment are working. Over the last 15 years, we've seen steady, if slow, annual declines in both incidence rates and mortality rates tied to colon cancer. But we can do more, because barriers to screening still exist. Since the preventive benefits were enacted in 1997, there has been only a one percent increase in utilization by Medicare beneficiaries of either a screening or diagnostic colonoscopy. The Centers for Disease Control reports that screening for colon cancer lags far behind screening for other cancers. We must do better and we can. Modern technology has blessed us with extremely accurate screening tools, in particular the colonoscopy--which results in higher colon cancer identification rates and better long-term survival rates. A consultation with a doctor before a colonoscopy is required to ensure that patients are properly prepared before they undergo the procedure. Unfortunately, Medicare does not pay for that consultation before a screening, creating an obvious obstacle to preventive treatment for many men and women. The Colon Cancer ``Screen for Life'' Act would cover these medical visits so that more Medicare beneficiaries will have easy access to screening. Further, with this legislation, just as Congress has done for screening mammography, screening colonoscopy will not count toward a senior's Medicare deductible. This will remove additional financial disincentives to screening. Finally, with this bill, we're breaking through another big barrier to early detection and treatment. The medical reality is that colonoscopy procedures are invasive and require sedation to perform--making it safer for them to be conducted in a hospital setting, where safety standards and emergency procedures are in place, rather than in a private doctor's office. But when doctors perform colonoscopies for Medicare patients in a hospital, they take a hit on cost--because reimbursement for the procedure performed there has decreased by nearly 36 percent since 1997. As a result, to balance their budgets, doctors and hospitals may choose to space out their Medicare patients, creating long waits for and limited access to these vital screenings. The job of medical services should be cutting cancer, not cutting costs. Unfortunately, today something as critical as colon cancer screening is moderated not by the real needs of patients and their medical doctors, but by market forces and market forces alone. To address the problem, the ``Screen for Life'' Act would increase the payment rates for colonoscopies performed in hospital facilities by 30 percent. The result will be more access to early detection and treatment and thousands of lives saved. Colon cancer is a formidable foe, but we can make a difference in the fight against it. Early detection and treatment is our first line of defense. With the help of the Colon Cancer ``Screen for Life'' Act, I hope that in a decade we'll have fewer cancer cases to contend with and more survivors to celebrate the simple fact that screening saves lives.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the ``Colon Cancer Screen for Life Act of 2003.'' I am pleased that my colleagues Senators Collins, Bunning, Dayton, Hollings, and Landrieu have joined me in introducing this very important bill. As many of my colleagues know from personal experience, colon cancer is a devastating disease, taking the lives of 57,000 Americans each year. It is the fourth most commonly diagnosed cancer in both men and women and the second most common cause of cancer-related death in the nation. Close to 150,000 new cases are diagnosed each year. But colon cancer can be combated, controlled, and potentially conquered if it's caught in the earliest stages. In fact, colon cancer is a rare form of cancer in that it can even be prevented through screening--if pre-cancerous polyps are quickly identified and removed. The survival rate when colon cancer is detected at an early, localized stage is 90 percent. But only 37 percent of such cancers are discovered at that stage. The later the disease is caught, the lower the survival rate. That's why, in 1997, Congress led the fight against colon cancer by making screening for the disease a covered benefit for every Medicare recipient. That is especially significant because the risk of colon cancer rises with age. Heightened awareness and greater access to treatment are working. Over the last 15 years, we've seen steady, if slow, annual declines in both incidence rates and mortality rates tied to colon cancer. But we can do more, because barriers to screening still exist. Since the preventive benefits were enacted in 1997, there has been only a one percent increase in utilization by Medicare beneficiaries of either a screening or diagnostic colonoscopy. The Centers for Disease Control reports that screening for colon cancer lags far behind screening for other cancers. We must do better and we can. Modern technology has blessed us with extremely accurate screening tools, in particular the colonoscopy--which results in higher colon cancer identification rates and better long-term survival rates. A consultation with a doctor before a colonoscopy is required to ensure that patients are properly prepared before they undergo the procedure. Unfortunately, Medicare does not pay for that consultation before a screening, creating an obvious obstacle to preventive treatment for many men and women. The Colon Cancer ``Screen for Life'' Act would cover these medical visits so that more Medicare beneficiaries will have easy access to screening. Further, with this legislation, just as Congress has done for screening mammography, screening colonoscopy will not count toward a senior's Medicare deductible. This will remove additional financial disincentives to screening. Finally, with this bill, we're breaking through another big barrier to early detection and treatment. The medical reality is that colonoscopy procedures are invasive and require sedation to perform--making it safer for them to be conducted in a hospital setting, where safety standards and emergency procedures are in place, rather than in a private doctor's office. But when doctors perform colonoscopies for Medicare patients in a hospital, they take a hit on cost--because reimbursement for the procedure performed there has decreased by nearly 36 percent since 1997. As a result, to balance their budgets, doctors and hospitals may choose to space out their Medicare patients, creating long waits for and limited access to these vital screenings. The job of medical services should be cutting cancer, not cutting costs. Unfortunately, today something as critical as colon cancer screening is moderated not by the real needs of patients and their medical doctors, but by market forces and market forces alone. To address the problem, the ``Screen for Life'' Act would increase the payment rates for colonoscopies performed in hospital facilities by 30 percent. The result will be more access to early detection and treatment and thousands of lives saved. Colon cancer is a formidable foe, but we can make a difference in the fight against it. Early detection and treatment is our first line of defense. With the help of the Colon Cancer ``Screen for Life'' Act, I hope that in a decade we'll have fewer cancer cases to contend with and more survivors to celebrate the simple fact that screening saves lives.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I wish to elaborate on Amendment No. 277, which would provide an additional $16 billion next year to fund our urgent homeland security needs. Because of the failure of the Schumer amendment--which would have provided a substantial but smaller increase in homeland security funding next year--it is clear that my amendment will not carry the Senate. Nevertheless, I would like to set forth the following statement on the reasons behind my amendment and the urgency of dramatically increasing our investment in homeland security. America has the greatest military in the world--as we are witnessing in Iraq today--and we have it because we pay for it. For generation after generation, presidents, members of Congress, and the American people have come together across partisan divides and every other conceivable divide to invest what's necessary in our military, and in the men and women in uniform who make our military what it is. If we want the best domestic defenses, we'll have to pay for them, too. But consider this comparison. Under the resolution before us, between this year's and next year's budgets, defense spending would be increased by some $19 billion. I support that increase. But over the same period, this resolution would invest only $300 million more in improving our homeland defenses. Why? One reason and one reason only: the President's unaffordable, unfair, and unfocused tax cuts are leaving no room for necessary investments. They're crowding out every other priority. It's bad enough that they haven't done anything to create jobs, to grow the economy, to expand the middle class. On top of that, they have raided the national cupboard. There's little money left for urgent needs--not for healthcare, not for education, not for Social Security or homeland security. Little money left for smart tax cuts that will spur real growth and innovation. Little money left to keep down the deficit at a time when we're looking at $2 trillion in additional debt. I urge my colleagues to stop and think about this for a second. The President's budget would have us spend about $100 billion next year alone on brand new tax cuts for those who need them least. $100 billion of our national treasure on unfocused, unaffordable and unfair tax cuts when we are at war against terrorism here at home, forced to marshal our strength to defend against a ruthless and unpredictable new enemy. And that's to say nothing of the cost of the war to disarm Iraq, the peace that will follow, or every other critical need facing our country from healthcare to education to Social Security. For this administration and those who support this resolution, all of those needs are down the list. Those needs can wait. Those needs can suffer. As long as someone preserves the precious new tax cuts--which will do little if anything to create new jobs--they're happy. That's crazy. It's irresponsible. And it's downright unfair to those who are working day and night to protect us, and who desperately need new resources to do their job well. My father ran his own small store and, like any decent businessman, he understood that making a good living and paying the bills started with sound and honest budget planning. If he needed to put a new lock on the door, he would set aside some money to do it. Those who run our government now don't seem to get it. They underestimate or hide serious expenses. They squander money when business is bad. They overestimate revenue. And they seem to think that our security will magically fund itself, rather than setting aside money for it, as my Dad would have. It's time for this administration and those who back this resolution to show some economic common sense. It's time for them to let go of their pet tax cuts and dedicate some resources to our critical common needs. This amendment would do that. Rather than giving homeland security short shrift by settling for a paltry $300 million increase, it would start to put real dollars where the danger is. After extensive study and consultation with experts, I've determined it will take $16 billion to start truly raising our guard in the next fiscal year. That's what this amendment would provide. How will we pay for it? It's an important question--and unlike this administration, we'll answer it. Because we understand, as the American people understand, that we can't have it all. Leadership is about making tough choices--about tradeoffs. So we propose paying for this new investment in homeland security by redirecting $32 billion in new tax cuts proposed by the President. Half of that money will go toward deficit reduction--to start digging ourselves and our children out of the ditch of debt in which we now find ourselves. And half of it will pay for urgent homeland security improvements. Aren't those two common goals, both of which will broadly benefit the American people, a far, far better use of our precious resources than brand new unfocused, unaffordable, and ineffective tax cuts to those who need them least? The answer is obvious to me. I hope it's clear to others in this chamber as well. Let me now talk about some of the critical security needs that this $16 billion would help us meet. Our commitment needs to start with first responders, who are our frontline troops in this homefront war. In communities across the country, our firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical technicians are struggling for the funds they need to meet the new threats we face. It's time for us to give them the support they need and their jobs demand. This budget resolution would provide virtually no new funding for our first responders. Virtually no new funding--at this time of unprecedented need and danger. That's unacceptable. There is equipment to buy. There are professionals to hire. There are people to train. All of that--like it or not--takes money. This amendment provides for $10 billion in FY 04--$6.5 billion above the President's request--to help first responders prepare for and combat terrorism, including attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, the amendment provides for $1 billion in FY 04 for firefighter grants, money that would be available to hire additional firefighters. This is the first installment of the SAFER Act--of which I am an enthusiastic supporter--which would provide more than $7.5 billion over 7 years to help communities hire badly needed new firefighters. Unlike in the President's proposed budget, I believe that new funds should not come at the expense of existing programs for first responders like the COPS program, the Local Law Enforcement Grants, or the Byrne Grant program. Within this overall commitment, $4 billion should be dedicated to helping first responders obtain interoperable equipment--a vital challenge that has been estimated to cost $18 billion overall. Nor should we wait for the FY 04 appropriations cycle to help our first responders. The recently-approved FY 03 omnibus spending bill comes up far short for first responders. We will need to seize every opportunity to fix that, and I am cosponsoring amendments today to ensure that this happens. I will fight also for more money for first responders in the supplemental appropriations process. Our second critical unmet priority is shoring up port security--which my amendment would accomplish by committing a $2 billion investment above the pending resolution. About 7 million containers arrive at these ports each year, yet only a tiny fraction are searched. This poses a risk not only at the ports, but also inland--as many of those containers travel many miles to their final destination without being searched. Yet the administration's budget proposal and this budget resolution mostly ignore the physical security of our ports. The Coast Guard has estimated that it will cost $4.4 billion to improve basic physical security at the nation's ports, starting with close to $1 billion the first year. In addition, the Maritime Security Act mandates certain security measures without providing a funding mechanism. In an effort to jumpstart these vital improvements, this amendment provides $1.2 billion in port security grants for fiscal year 2004. Because the ports themselves are a potential target, we do not want to wait until dangerous containers arrive to investigate. Rather, we must ``push the borders back'' and identify and inspect as much high- risk cargo as possible before it enters our harbors. The Customs Service has made some valuable strides in this direction through the Container Security Initiative. This program stations Customs officers at overseas ports to allow for inspection of some containers before they begin their voyage to the U.S. Yet the Administration is not expanding this valuable program as forcefully as circumstances require. President Bush has requested $62 million for this program in fiscal year 2004, a request that is echoed in this budget resolution. My amendment would provide an additional $100 million to allow for aggressive and effective expansion of this program, and for related initiatives to inspect and track containers as close as possible to their point of origin. Moving beyond physical security, my amendment would enable the Coast Guard to step up its supervision of the ports and adjacent maritime areas. I believe we must accelerate efforts to recapitalize the Coast Guard fleet--specifically, to speed up implementation of the long- planned Deepwater Initiative to upgrade and integrate the Coast Guard's fleet and related communications equipment. The budget resolution before us, following the President's budget proposal, has proposed $500 million for this project in fiscal year 2004, which is only enough to complete the project in 20 years or longer--the timetable outlined before the September 11 attacks. Clearly, current circumstances call for greater urgency. This amendment would provide an additional $700 million, for a total of $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2004, to complete the Deepwater Initiative in closer to 10 years. In addition to the port security initiatives I have outlined, we must strengthen other components of our border security. In particular, the amendment calls for an additional $1 billion in FY 04 to increase border personnel and to improve information technology systems for the border. On personnel, we must strengthen the presence of Customs and immigration inspectors and of Border Patrol agents in key areas. Indeed, some of these enhancements were mandated by the Patriot Act and the Border Security Act but have not been funded and filled to date. I would allocate additional funds to hire at least 2,000-3,000 new border personnel. With respect to technology, it is especially critical that we expedite implementation of the biometric document system as mandated by the Patriot Act and Border Security Act. The biometric document system will include biologically unique identifiers for immigrants, reducing the risk that immigrants will enter illegally or under an assumed identity. The budget resolution before us clearly has not allocated significant new resources to achieve this new system in the required timeframe, or anything close to it. The additional $1 billion in my amendment would allow us to make significant progress on these border security needs. We must also invest more in transportation security by increasing funding $1.7 billion over the levels proposed by the administration and the pending budget resolution. As we saw tragically on September 11, 2001, terrorists can exploit weaknesses in our transportation networks to turn them into instruments of terror. The Transportation Security Administration, TSA, was created to confront that grim reality, but it cannot succeed without more support from the Administration and Congress. The TSA has made its initial mark at our airports, overseeing passenger screening and requirements that baggage be screened for possible explosives. Now, the agency must build on that work by expanding rapidly to other transportation sectors. Unfortunately, the budget resolution before us allows for neither task. It would provide just $4.8 billion for TSA in FY 04, a 10 percent decrease from the Administration's FY03 request of $5.3B. My amendment calls for $1.7 billion in additional resources to improve transportation security. Among other things, this would restore the Administration's proposed cut to the overall TSA budget, ensure the agency can continue to fulfill its existing missions, and enable the TSA to begin to expand its work beyond passenger airline security to other critical transportation needs including bridges, railways, tunnels, subways and buses. In addition to this general increase, the amendment would invest an additional $500 million in FY 04 on freight and passenger rail security enhancements, based on legislation approved by the Commerce Committee last session, S. 1991. The bulk of that money would fund security improvements for Amtrak, such as protection of bridges, tunnels and key facilities. Amtrak would also receive money to help improve equipment for emergency communications equipment and other security needs, and to train personnel to detect and handle potential attacks. With respect to mass transit, the amendment would provide $500 million for grants to address urgent transit security needs, as identified by GAO, including communications systems, surveillance equipment and mobile command centers. Additionally, the amendment would call for $200 million in FY 04 for bus security grants, as outlined in legislation S. 1739 that won the endorsement last session of the Commerce Committee. These grants would enable carriers to improve passenger screening, training and communications, surveillance equipment and other security measures. Next comes preparing ourselves for bioterror attacks and attacks using other weapons of mass destruction--which demands an investment in FY 04 of $3 billion above the pending resolution. Some of the most chilling scenarios posed by homeland security experts are those of a chemical, biological or radiological attack. We are depending on our public health network to help prepare for and respond to such an assault. Yet these health providers have not been given nearly enough resources to fulfill this role. For example, despite the scope of the threat and our relative lack of preparedness, the resolution would invest just $940 million--flat funding--in CDC grants to help state public health departments care for and track infectious disease outbreaks. That's just not enough. My amendment would provide an additional $1 billion in FY 04--essentially double the proposed and existing funding level--to help these departments detect and cope with a bioterror attack. Among other things, this funding could help defray the costs of administering the Administration's smallpox vaccination program. In the same vein, my amendment would double the federal appropriation for the Health Resources and Services Administration, which provides money to help hospitals increase capacity, training and supplies. These improvements are essential if our hospitals are to be prepared for a biological, chemical or radiological event, yet, again, President Bush has proposed flat funding for this program. Instead, we should increase this account by $500 million, for a total of about $1 billion. It will mean little to prepare our health infrastructure, however, if they have no tools to employ--no detective or preventive measures, or countermeasures to administer after an attack. The budget resolution would provide some new funds to confront this challenge--such as the proposed Project Bioshield--but those proposals do not go far enough and are not targeted effectively enough to provide the jumpstart we need in this area. My amendment would call for an additional $1.5 billion for biothreat and other key research and development countermeasures--particularly efforts to get research from ``bench to bedside,'' translating basic discoveries into usable products. I recommend that the money be available through the following entities: the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, HSARPA, the National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center and the Strategic National Stockpile. Increased funding of these three programs would permit adequate funding of promising countermeasures research, essential investigation of the underlying mechanism of biological threats, and procurement of needed medicines and vaccines to our defensive pharmaceutical arsenal. In addition, some of this money should be available to compensate health care workers who suffer ill effects from the smallpox vaccination program urged by the President. The last but by no means least funding priority I want to address today is permanent protection of our critical infrastructure, which demands a half-billion increase over the pending budget resolution. Homeland security experts have increasingly highlighted the vulnerability of the nation's critical infrastructure as one of the most dangerous gaps in our homeland defenses. About 85 percent of these resources--which include such vital systems as energy distribution grids, chemical and nuclear plants, or financial networks--are in private hands, complicating the process for assuring adequate security. The administration, and the resolution before us, seem content to continue studying the vulnerabilities of these systems. They have requested about $500 million for this process in FY 04. This would enable far too sluggish progress for such a vital task. My amendment calls for an additional $500 million in FY 04 to get these assessments done at once so that we can move to create action plans and conduct needed security enhancements at the earliest possible moment. Halfway around the world, the American military and our allies are fighting to disarm a dictator who refused to give up his weapons for 12 long years. I believe our brave men and women in uniform will accomplish their mission--and that when they do, the world will be a safer place for peaceful people, and a worse place for terrorists and tyrants. But here at home, to guard the land beneath our feet, other men and women in uniform are engaged in another front of the war against terrorism--and unlike the men and women of our armed forces, we have not given them all the support, the training, the technology, and the resources they need to succeed. We owe it to our nation and ourselves to do better. On September 3, 1939, shortly after Britain declared war on Germany, Winston Churchill said, ``Outside, the storms of war may blow and the lands may be lashed with the fury of its gales, but in our own hearts this Sunday morning there is peace. . . . Our consciences are at rest.'' Our consciences as Americans--and as parents to our children--will only rest when we demonstrate the leadership and invest the resources to counter the fury the terrorists seek to bring upon us. Protecting the American people in an age of terrorism demands strong leadership and enormous resources--and it demands them now. I yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, today, as the hearts and minds of all Americans are with our brave men and women in uniform who are embarking on the most perilous of journeys, I rise to speak in support of Senator Lautenberg's amendment and fulfill what I see as one of the most important duties of any Senator. The Constitution of the United States invests the President with the authority of the Commander in Chief, but it also establishes the Congress as the guarantor of the quality and size of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines because it is the Congress that authorizes the expenditure of moneys to fund the military. As Senators we have a great responsibility to watch over those who man the walls of our Nation's defenses. Along the Iraq-Kuwait border the U.S. military is striking. Our Armed Forces are engaged the world over in a fight against terror. Our uniformed commanders have testified before us that not since the Second World War has the U.S. military been so dispersed; not since that conflict have our Armed Forces been engaged with the enemy in so many locales and climes. My colleagues and I on the Senate Armed Services Committee are aware of the difficulties our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines and their families face as a result of these strenuous deployments. We have applauded the Department of Defense's efforts to address the quality of life of its troops. Following in the best traditions of this Chamber, we have worked together in a truly bipartisan fashion to increase military pay levels. We have addressed spousal benefits and we will, in the upcoming months of this Congress, debate, and I hope determine once and for all the issue of concurrent receipt. Year after year we strive to provide funding to equip our forces with the most advanced technology the world has ever seen. Therefore, Mr. President, as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, as a strong supporter of our Armed Forces, as one who recognizes the strain of current operations upon our force structure and the importance of maintaining funding levels for the Department presently and for the foreseeable future, I cannot agree with any proposal which will reverse the important gains that we have made. I believe we must oppose any attempt to decrease essential funding for our national defense in order to paper over the fiscal havoc that the President's proposed tax cuts cause. It is irresponsible to, when we are at war, when the challenges that our men and women in uniform face are so omnipresent, contemplate slashing the future funds that will make it possible for them to maintain their dominance into the next decade. I direct my colleagues' attention to the Senate Republican budget resolution, which cuts defense spending after 2009 by more than a $100 billion--$100 billion. The resolution calls for a $6.5 billion drawdown in 2009 from the funding level that the Congressional Budget Office estimates as required for the maintenance of the 2008 spending levels. In 2010 that shortfall would be $15.5 billion. A year later it is a $21.0 billion shortfall. A year later it grows to $27.5 billion. By 2013 the amount is $34.0 billion. And why? To try to correct the fiscal damage the tax cuts have put us in. Now, I think we are all in agreement with Chairman Nickles that the record-setting deficits that will be the bitter fruit of the President's tax cuts need to be dealt with. But to deal with them by cutting moneys that will fuel our planes, feed our marines, steam our ships, and arm our weapons is unfortunate indeed. I challenge the proponents of this plan to go out into the Kuwaiti desert and stand in front of a U.S. platoon, and tell them that the future funding that is to secure them better communications gear or more money to fund training or better body armor is being cut. Cut because the Senate majority refuses to take the President to task for pursuing fiscally irresponsible tax cuts on the eve of a war, and in the midst of an international campaign against terror. The amendment that I rise in support of offers another way. Let's carve out a $103.5 billion fund from the $1.4 trillion tax cut and use it to create a designated fund for the defense of our Nation's security. In doing so we will serve to offset the proposed reductions in defense spending set forth in the Budget Resolution. By our actions we will prevent the diversion of cash from accounts that fund the defense of this country to an ill-considered, nonstimulative tax cut. We are at war. Our military, the most powerful professional armed force ever arrayed on the face of the earth is shouldering a heavy burden. To discuss cutting the very funding that will keep them the preeminent military force is more than poor politics--it is irresponsible. I like to think that what Lincoln called ``the better angels of our nature'' still, in these troubled times, hold sway over our baser instincts. I urge you to support this amendment.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to honor a man of courage, conviction and integrity who was recently taken from his people and this world in the most brutal and shocking of circumstances. On Wednesday, March 12, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was slain in Belgrade, assassinated, gunned down, leaving his Belgrade office. He was, tragically, only 50 years old, and was taken from us long before his time. To his wife Rizica and his two young children, Jovana and Luka, I extend my deepest condolences. I had the pleasure of meeting Prime Minister Djindjic in 2001, during a visit to Belgrade. He was best known to Americans and the international community for his central role in the downfall of former Yugoslav dictator, Slobodan Milosevic, in October 2000. It was Djindjic who, in 2001, took the principled decision to render Milosevic to the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, where he is at this moment facing trial for genocide and crimes against humanity. It was this courage, this stand for integrity, that won Prime Minister Djindjic not only the respect of the internation community, but the love and admiration of the people of Serbia, whom he helped to free from the grips of dictatorship, oppression, and cruelty. Prime Minister Djindjic was someone who fought for the needs of his people. He devoted his life to the fight for progress, reform, and democracy, and a better life for the people of Serbia. Ultimately, he gave his life for that fight. He was imprisoned for his activities as a student dissident against the repressive Communist Yugoslav regime in the 1970s, but this did not diminish his zeal. In 1989, Djindjic, along with a group of dissident writers and intellectuals, founded the Serbian Democratic Party. One year later, he was elected its chairman, and in 1994, its president. In the 1990s, as a member and a leader of Serbia's Parliament, he remained at the forefront of the dissident movement, resisting the oppression of a new generation of post-Communist dictators, this time bent on ethnic cleansing and genocide. As his courage grew, so did the people's respect for him. In 1996, the people of Belgrade freely elected him the first non-Communist mayor sine World War II. It was in that position that he built the popular base and credibility that served him so well in the historical role he was about to play, in the downfall of Slobodan Milosevic. Djindjic was one of the chief strategists behind the September 24, 2002, Yugoslav Presidential elections and the October 5, 2000, uprising that resulted in Milosevic's overthrow. In December 2000, he led the Democratic Opposition of Serbia--a coalition of 18 parties spanning a broad range of the political spectrum--into Serbia's parliamentary elections, and won an impressive 65 percent of the popular vote. The DOS elected Djindjic to be Prime Minister of Serbia on January 25, 2001. That popularity speaks well of Zoran Djindjic, but it speaks volumes about the people of Serbia. After years--decades--of Communist and fascist dictatorship, the spirit of the Serbian people arose valiant, triumphant because the desire for freedom cannot be crushed. Prime Minister Djindjic was, in a large sense, the embodiment of their determination, their yearning to be free. Each time this man spoke of freedom and liberty, of reform and democracy, the people of Serbia supported him, sustained him, elevated him to lead them, and followed them into the brighter future that he hoped fervently to help them build. It appears that it was, ultimately, his pledge and his actions to stamp out corruption and widespread organized crime that brought him into the assassin's sights. In February, a truck swerved from its lane, headed directly for the motorcade carrying the Prime Minister, and narrowly missed. Prime Minister Djindjic very well could have been killed. Djindjic himself suggested that the incident might be the handiwork of members of organized crime rings, which flourished under Miloservic and remain linked to him to this day. Just as he did not permit prison to diminish his energy, Prime Minister Djindjic did not let this danger impede him or dim his spirit. He pressed on, valiantly, in his campaign against the crime and corruption that corrodes his society. The news of the Prime Minister's death has been a tremendous shock, not only to the people of Serbia, but to the entire region. President Stjepan Mesic of Croatia has rightly described the assassination as ``an act of madness,'' and raised concerns that this assassination will ``slow down [Serbia's] progress towards democracy.'' I certainly understand the Croatian President's concern. It would be a dishonor to the memory of Prime Minister Djindjic were his fears to be realized. After centuries of conflict and decades of oppression and crippling violence, Serbia and the entire Balkan region have made remarkable strides toward peace, democracy, economic development, and a better life for the people of all nations in the region. The United States has played a crucial role in furthering that progress. For the past 10 years, in Bosnia Hercegovina, in Kosovo, the United States has fought--diplomatically and militarily--to stop the forces of oppression and genocide, and to support the forces of liberty and democracy. There can be no greater way to remember this man than to ensure that his death will not be in vain, that his life's work will continue. And so, I urge all of us who are friends and supporters of democracy, and those who fight for it, to redouble our commitment to and solidarity with those who stand, as Prime Minister Djindjic did, for a better, freer, more democratic future for the people of Serbia.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I come to the floor to say that I am proud to be a cosponsor of this vital amendment for more homeland security funding being introduced by Senator Schumer. And I come to talk about the necessity of making hard choices. I know this administration can make hard choices. I know it because in taking military action against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, that is precisely what the President has done made a difficult but necessary decision for the sake of America's security. Unfortunately, I don't see the same willingness to make hard choices here at home, particularly when it comes to our budget and our economy. On Sunday, I saw Vice President Cheney on Meet the Press and he said something that stuck in my mind. The Vice President was asked why his administration wouldn't reconsider the unaffordable, unfair, and unfocused tax cuts that it pushed through in 2001, not to mention the new tax cuts called for this year, when we have so many other national needs: the cost of military action against Iraq, the cost of rebuilding the Nation after war, the cost of investing in homeland security, just to name three. His response was telling. He said that Presidents don't have the luxury of doing only one thing at a time, that this administration has many ``balls in the air,'' and that President Bush must tend to the economy even as he works to defend our national security. I agree with the Vice President on the premise--but could not disagree more strongly on the implication. Yes, Presidents must do more than one thing at a time, and our best Presidents always have. President Lincoln did. President Roosevelt did. President Kennedy did. But by putting the tax cut, which is itself an ineffective prescription for our economic woes, before every other priority, this administration isn't multitasking. It's unitasking. It's sacrificing every other critical mission and priority to one ideological pet project-- unfocused, unfair, and irresponsible tax cuts. As a result, our national cupboard has been raided. We have no resources left to shore up Social Security, pay down the debt, provide our seniors with the prescription drug benefit they need, or invest in the landmark education reform plan we promised our teachers and students. No money left to make smart investments and strategic tax cuts to spur growth. Not even enough money left to pay for homeland security, even though right here at home we are under unprecedented attack from an aggressive, unpredictable, and undeterrable new enemy against which we remain dangerously vulnerable. The casual question, which might not sound fit for the Senate floor, is: ``What gives?'' And the unacceptable answer is: ``Nothing gives.'' Tax cuts that help a select few Americans, tax cuts designed before September 11th, before the prospect of an expensive military action against Iraq and an expensive peace to follow, before Americans started losing jobs in the hundreds of thousands, trump everything else. No, with all these needs and demands, the President will hold onto his tax cut, come hell or high water. Mr. President, that is worse than a failure of arithmetic, as President Clinton called it. It is a failure of understanding. A failure of principle. A failure of priorities. Sadly, this administration has taken to believing that everything in its economic policy is absolute. Everything is extreme. There is no room left for learning. No room for pragmatic adjustment. No room for the critical needs of the American people. Today I want to discuss some of those needs--our urgent domestic defense priorities and how they can and must be paid for in this budget. Mr. President, America has the greatest military in the world, and that is because we have paid for it. Over the last half century, we have worked together across party lines and every other division to invest in our Armed Forces and the men and women who dedicate their lives to the common defense. We are truly, to recall President Kennedy, willing to pay any price and bear any burden to deter and defeat foreign threats. If we want the best domestic defenses, we will have to pay for them, too. But consider this. In its budget proposal for next year, the administration recommended a $19 billion increase in defense spending-- an increase I support. But in the very same budget proposal, the administration only called for $300 million more than they expected spending this year on our homeland defenses, which are far less prepared to protect our people today than the Pentagon is. This amendment would begin to correct that shortsighted shortfall. In the fiscal year 2003 budget, it would provide $5 billion above current levels in funding for our first responders, for port security, for bioterrorism preparedness, and for border security. I am supporting more funding both as part of this resolution and in the supplemental when it comes before the Senate--particularly for our first responders. In fiscal year 2004, Senator Schumer's amendment would provide $6.5 billion over the President's proposal for police, firefighters, and public health professionals, port security, bioterrorism preparedness, border security, transportation security, critical infrastructure protection, and more. All told, this amendment would invest $88 billion in the urgent domestic defense improvements we need to make between now and 2013--a long-term vision of rising to meet and beat these threats, not shrink from them. Independently, last month I called for an increased homeland security investment in next year's budget of $16 billion over the President's proposal, which is what I have concluded is necessary to begin doing all this vital work. So I see this amendment not as a complete number, but as significant progress in the right direction. Let me talk now about a few of the urgent needs that this amendment will help address. First, first responders. Just this Monday, I attended the legislative conference of the International Association of Firefighters, and I must say that, though these brave men and women are always ready to take on a challenge and rise to meet danger, our firefighters, police officers, and other first responders are tired. They are tired of lacking the resources to hire new people, get advanced training, and buy state-of- the-art technology, all of which are urgently needed to fight terrorism. Can't we come together now and get this done? Mr. President, it is downright irresponsible that the President's budget for next year would provide no new money for first responders. The President's proposal would make the same total $3.5 billion investment next year as was made this year. And even that is deceptive, because at the same time the budget would slash other funding for local law enforcement and emergency preparedness. This amendment would restore COPS and other local law enforcement programs in fiscal year 2004. It would provide the money for training, equipment, and qualified personnel. And it would call for $5 billion in funding this year--in an fiscal year 2003 supplemental the bulk of which would go to our first responders. There is a real crisis out there. We need to help our police officers, firefighters, emergency medical technicians and other first responders meet it. I believe the investment we make in our first responders needs to start by passing the SAFER Act, sponsored by my dear friends Senators Dodd and Warner which I am proud to cosponsor. That bill would provide more than $7.5 billion over 7 years so our communities can hire the firefighters they need. It is critical, it is bipartisan, and it should pass. This budget amendment we are discussing today would provide a good start in fiscal year 2004 for the bill. But that is just a beginning. First responders need advanced training, specifically in detecting and protecting against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. This amendment will provide more of the resources they need to get them that training. First responders need better equipment. On September 11th, the New Jersey State Police grew so frustrated at their inability to contact New York City authorities that they had to take a boat across the Hudson River and find a police commander at Ground Zero. And as we know, New York City firefighters tragically lost their lives because their communications equipment was not what it needed to be. This amendment will provide the resources to start to get first responders all over the country the communications equipment they need to prevent similar problems from occurring when they face emergencies. This amendment gives our local first responders--who are also our first preventers of terrorist attacks--more of the resources they urgently need to guard against terrorism. As we work to strengthen our local first responders' capabilities, we need to dramatically improve transportation security nationwide. The type of attack we suffered on September 11th was, of course, of a very particular and unexpected nature. In its wake, improving the security of air travel has received substantial attention and substantial funding. And we have made serious progress in the skies. But just as terrorists constantly change their means and mode of attack, the TSA must broaden its scope of defense--and rapidly. But under the President's proposal and this budget resolution, TSA's appropriation is actually decreased for next year--which will make it difficult to keep pace with their current responsibilities, much less take on new ones. This amendment would give the agency critical resources so that TSA could begin expanding its focus to other critical transportation security needs including roads, rails, bridges, tunnels, and subways. Let me give you another example--port security. Homeland security experts widely acknowledge that our ports are among the most vulnerable points in our homeland defenses. About 7 million containers arrive at these ports each year, but a tiny percentage are searched. Any one could become a vehicle to smuggle in a dangerous weapon, or even terrorists themselves. Again, this costs money to fix. The Coast Guard has estimated that it will take $4.4 billion to improve basic physical security at the Nation's ports, starting with close to $1 billion the first year. Yet the administration's budget proposal provided no new money in port security grants--and this budget resolution largely ignores the physical security of our ports. In an effort to jumpstart these vital improvements, I have called for $1.2 billion in port security grants for fiscal year 2004. This amendment will start moving us toward that goal. We must also invest more to permanently protect our critical infrastructure--our financial, transportation and communications networks, our energy systems and water supplies, chemical plants and hazardous materials, emergency services and public health systems. Eighty-five percent of these networks and facilities are under the control of the private sector. Though plenty of lip service has been given to this priority by the Department of Homeland Security, actual progress has been exceedingly slow. That's largely a question of leadership, but it's happened in part because the financial commitment has not been forthcoming. This can't wait. That is why this week I have sent a letter to Homeland Security Secretary Ridge outlining a series of urgent questions I believe he and his Department must answer so that we can begin seeing results, and better protecting our Nation's nervous system, its circulatory system, its respiratory system, and all its vital organs without delay. Finally, let me address one other crucial area of investment which receives vastly too little funding in this budget resolution-- protecting ourselves against biological attack. Some of the most chilling scenarios posed by homeland security experts are those that envision the use of diseases as weapons. We are depending on our public health network to help prepare for, protect against, and if necessary respond to such assaults. Yet in this budget, our health providers aren't being provided anywhere near adequate resources to do the job as well as they must do it. This amendment will provide a critical infusion to start improving these capabilities. On the floor today I have only mentioned a discrete set of the gaps we must close to protect the American people. There are many more, and still more gaps we have yet to identify are likely to rear their heads in the months to come. We are at war against terrorism. Let's not frustrate and condemn to failure those whose job it is to protect us--many of whom risk their lives--by failing to provide them the resources they need to meet and beat the threats. Whether our protectors work for the Department of Homeland Security or for the local fire department, they deserve not only our gratitude and our respect. They deserve the ability to rise to this challenge, the resources and the tools to do the job. We depend upon them for our safety. Surely they should be able to depend upon us for support. Let's put the safety of us all before the wallets of the few. Let's invest in our homeland defense.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, America has a major flaw in its defenses against bioterrorism. Hearings I chaired in the Government Affairs Committee on bioterrorism demonstrated that America has not made a national commitment to research and development of treatments and cures for those who might be exposed to or infected by a biological agent, chemical toxin, or radiological material. Correcting this critical gap is the purpose of legislation we are introducing today. This legislation is a refined and upgraded version of legislation I introduced last year, S. 1764, December 4, 2001, and S. 3148, October 17, 2002, and I am delighted that Senator Hatch has joined me as the lead cosponsor of the new bill. Obviously, our first priority must be to attempt to prevent the use of these agents and toxins by terrorists, quickly assess when an attack has occurred, take appropriate public health steps to contain the exposure, stop the spread of contagion, and then detoxify the site. These are all critical functions, but in the end we must recognize that some individuals may be exposed or infected. Then the critical issue is whether we can treat and cure them and prevent death and disability. In short, we need a diversified portfolio of medicines. In cases where we have ample advance warning of an attack and specific information about the agent, toxin, or material, we may be able to vaccinate the vulnerable population in advance. In other cases, even if we have a vaccine, we might well prefer to use medicines that would quickly stop the progression of the disease or the toxic effects. We also need a powerful capacity quickly to develop new countermeasures where we face a new agent, toxin, or material. Unfortunately, we are woefully short of vaccines and medicines to treat individuals who are exposed or infected. We have antibiotics that seem to work for most of those infected in the current anthrax attack, but these have not prevented five deaths. We have no effective vaccines or medicines for most other biological agents and chemical toxins we might confront. We have very limited capacity to respond medically to a radiological attack. In some cases we have vaccines to prevent, but no medicines to treat, an agent. We have limited capacity to speed the development of vaccines and medicines to prevent or treat novel agents and toxins not currently known to us. We have provided, and should continue to provide, direct Federal funding for research and development of new medicines, however, this funding is unlikely to be sufficient. Even with ample Federal funding, many private companies will be reluctant to enter into agreements with government agencies to conduct this research. Other companies would be willing to conduct the research with their own capital and at their own risk but are not able to secure the funding from investors. The legislation we introduce today would provide incentives for private biotechnology companies to form capital to develop countermeasures--medicines--to prevent, treat and cure victims of bioterror, chemical and radiological attacks. This will enable this industry to become a vital part of the national defense infrastructure and do so for business reasons that make sense for their investors on the bottom line. Enactment of these incentives is necessary because most biotech companies have no approved products or revenue from product sales to fund research. They rely on investors and equity capital markets to fund the research. They must necessarily focus on research that will lead to product sales and revenue and, thus, to an end to their dependence on investor capital. There is no established or predictable market for countermeasures. These concerns are shared by pharmaceutical firms. Investors are justifiably reluctant to fund this research, which will present challenges similar in complexity to AIDS. Investors need assurances that research on countermeasures has the potential to provide a rate of return commensurate with the risk, complexity and cost of the research, a rate of return comparable to that which may arise from a treatment for cancer, MS, Cystic Fibrosis and other major diseases. It is in our national interest to enlist these companies in the development of countermeasures as biotech companies tend to be innovative and nimble and intently focused on the intractable diseases for which no effective medical treatments are available. The incentives we have proposed are innovative and some may be controversial. We invite everyone who has an interest and a stake in this research to enter into a dialogue about the issue and about the nature and terms of the appropriate incentives. We have attempted to anticipate the many complicated technical and policy issues that this legislation raises. The key focus of our debate should be how, not whether, we address this critical gap in our public health infrastructure and the role that the private sector should play. Millions of Americans will be at risk if we fail to enact legislation to meet this need. On November 26 of 2001, the Centers for Disease Control issued its interim working draft plan for responding to an outbreak of smallpox. The plan does not call for mass vaccination in advance of a smallpox outbreak because the risk of side effects from the vaccine outweighs the risks of someone actually being exposed to the smallpox virus. At the heart of the plan is a strategy sometimes called ``search and containment.'' This strategy involves identifying infected individual or individuals with confirmed smallpox, identifying and locating those people who come in contact with that person, and vaccinating those people in outward rings of contact. The goal is to produce a buffer of immune individuals and was shown to prevent smallpox and to ultimately eradicate the outbreak. Priorities would be set on who is vaccinated, perhaps focusing on the outward rings before those at the center of the outbreak. The plan assumes that the smallpox vaccination is effective for persons who have been exposed to the disease as long as the disease has not taken hold. In practice it may be necessary to set a wide perimeter for these areas because smallpox is highly contagious before it might be diagnosed. There may be many areas subject to search and containment because people in our society travel frequently and widely. Terrorists might trigger attacks in a wide range of locations to multiply the confusion and panic. The most common form of smallpox has a 30 percent mortality rate, but terrorists might be able to obtain supplies of ``flat-type'' smallpox with a mortality rate of 96 percent and hemorrhagic-type smallpox, which is almost always fatal. For these reasons, the CDC plan accepts the possibility that whole cities or other geographic areas could be cordoned off, letting no one in or out--a quarantine enforced by police or troops. The plan focuses on enforcement authority through police or National Guard, isolation and quarantine, mandatory medical examinations, and rationing of medicines. It includes a discussion of ``population-wide quarantine measures which restrict activities or limit movement of individuals [including] suspension of large public gatherings, closing of public places, restriction on travel [air, rail, water, motor vehicle, and pedestrian], and/or `cordon sanitaire' [literally a `sanitary cord' or line around a quarantined area guarded to prevent spread of disease by restricting passage into or out of the area].'' The CDC recommends that states update their laws to provide authority for ``enforcing quarantine measures'' and it recommends that States in ``pre-event planning'' identify ``personnel who can enforce these isolation and quarantine measures, if necessary.'' Guide C--Isolation and Quarantine, page 17. On October 23, 2001, the CDC published a ``Model State Emergency Health Powers Act.'' It was prepared by the Center for Law and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities, in conjunction with the National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, National Association of City and County Health Officers, and National Association of Attorneys General. A copy of the model law is printed at www.publichealthlaw.net. The law would provide powers to enforce the ``compulsory physical separation (including the restriction of movement or confinement) of individuals and/or groups believed to have been exposed to or known to have been infected with a contagious disease from individuals who are believed not to have been exposed or infected, in order to prevent or limit the transmission of the disease to others.'' Federal law on this subject is very strong and the Administration can always rely on the President's Constitution authority as Commander in Chief. Let us try to imagine, however, what it would be like if a quarantine is imposed. Let us assume that there is not enough smallpox vaccine available for use in a large outbreak, that the priority is to vaccinate those in the outward rings of the containment area first, that the available vaccines cannot be quickly deployed inside the quarantined area, that it is not possible to quickly trace and identify all of the individuals who might have been exposed, and/or that public health workers themselves might be infected. We know that there is no medicine to treat those who do become infected. We know the mortality rates. It is not hard to imagine how much force might be necessary to enforce the quarantine. It would be quite unacceptable to permit individuals to leave the quarantined area no matter how much panic had taken hold. Think about how different this scenario would be if we had medicines that could effectively treat and cure those who become infected by smallpox. We still might implement the CDC plan but a major element of the strategy would be to persuade people to visit their local clinic or hospital to be dispenses their supply of medicine. We could trust that there would be a very high degree of voluntary compliance. This would give us more time, give us options if the containment is not successful, give us options to treat those in the containment area who are infected, and enable us to quell the public panic. Because we have no medicine to treat those infected by smallpox, we have to be prepared to implement a plan like the one CDC has proposed. Theirs is the only option because our options are so limited. We need to expand our range of options. We should not be lulled by the apparent successes with Cipro and the strains of anthrax we have seen in the recent attacks. We have not been able to prevent death in some of the patients with late-stage inhalation anthrax and Robert Stevens, Thomas Morris Jr., Joseph Curseen, Kathy Nguyen, and Ottilie Lundgren died. This legislation is named in honor of them. What we needed for them, and did not have, is a drug or vaccine that would treat late stage inhalation anthrax. As I have said, we need an effective treatment for those who become infected with smallpox. We have a vaccine that effectively prevents smallpox infection, and administering this vaccine within four days of first exposure has been shown to offer some protections against acquiring infection and significant protection against a fatal outcome. The problem is that administering the vaccine in this time frame to all those who might have been exposed may be exceedingly difficult. And once infection has occurred, we have no effective treatment options. In the last century 500 million people have died of smallpox--more than have from any other infectious diseases--as compared to 320 million deaths in all the wars of the twentieth century. Smallpox was one of the diseases that nearly wiped out the entire Native American population in this hemisphere. The last naturally acquired case of smallpox occurred in Somalia in 1977 and the last case from laboratory exposure was in 1978. Smallpox is a nasty pathogen, carried in microscopic airborne droplets inhaled by its victims. The first signs are headache, fever, nausea and backache, sometimes convulsions and delirium. Soon, the skin turns scarlet. When the fever lets up, the telltale rash appears--flat red spots that turn into pimples, then big yellow pustules, then scabs. Smallpox also affects the throat and eyes, and inflames the heart, lungs, liver, intestines and other internal organs. Death often came from internal bleeding, or from the organs simply being overwhelmed by the virus. Survivors were left covered with pockmarks--if they were lucky. The unlucky ones were left blind, their eyes permanently clouded over. Nearly one in four victims died. The infection rate is estimated to be 25-40 percent for those who are unvaccinated and a single case can cause 20 or more additional infections. During the 16th Century, 3.5 million Aztecs--more than half the population died of smallpox during a two-year span after the Spanish army brought the disease to Mexico. Two centuries later, the virus ravaged George Washington's troops at Valley Forge. And it cut a deadly path through the Crow, Dakota, Sioux, Blackfoot, Apache, Comanche and other American Indian tribes, helping to clear the way for white settlers to lay claim to the western plains. The epidemics began to subside with one of medicine's most famous discoveries: the finding by British physician Edward Jenner in 1796 that English milkmaids who were exposed to cowpox, a mild second cousin to smallpox that afflicts cattle, seemed to be protected against the more deadly disease. Jenner's work led to the development of the first vaccine in Western medicine. While later vaccines used either a killed or inactivated form of the virus they were intended to combat, the smallpox vaccine worked in a different way. It relied on a separate, albeit related virus: first cowpox and the vaccinia, a virus of mysterious origins that is believed to be a cowpox derivative. The last American was vaccinated back in the 1970s and half of the US population has never been vaccinated. It is not known how long these vaccines provide protection, but it is estimated that the term is 3 to 5 years. In an elaborate smallpox biowarfare scenario enacted in February 1999 by the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, it was projected that within two months 15,000 people had died, epidemics were out of control in fourteen countries, all supplies of smallpox vaccine were depleted, the global economy was on the verge of collapse, and military control and quarantines were in place. Within twelve months it was projected that eighty million people worldwide had died. A single case of smallpox today would become a global public health threat and it has been estimated that a single smallpox bioterror attack on a single American city would necessitate the vaccination of 30 to 40 million people. The US government is now in the process of purchasing substantial stocks of the smallpox vaccine. We then face a very difficult decision on deploying the vaccine. We know that some individuals will have an adverse reaction to this vaccine. No one in the United States has been vaccinated against smallpox in twenty-five years. Those that were vaccinated back then may not be protected against the disease today. If we had an effective treatment for those who might become infected by smallpox, we would face much less pressure regarding deploying the vaccine. If we face a smallpox epidemic from a bioterrorism attack, we will have no Cipro to reassure the public and we will be facing a highly contagious disease and epidemic. To be blunt, it will make the current anthrax attack look benign by comparison. Smallpox is not the only threat. We have seen other epidemics in this century. The 1918 influenza epidemic provides a sobering admonition about the need for research to develop medicines. In two years, a fifth of the world's population was infected. In the United States the 1918 epidemic killed more than 650,000 people in a short period of time and left 20 million seriously ill, one fourth of the entire population. The average lifespan in the US was depressed by ten years. In just one year, the epidemic killed 21 million human beings worldwide--well over twice the number of combat deaths in the whole of World War I. The flu was exceptionally virulent to begin with and it then underwent several sudden and dramatic mutations in its structure. Such mutations can turn flu into a killer because its victims' immune systems have no antibodies to fight off the altered virus. Fatal pneumonia can rapidly develop. Another deadly toxin, ricin toxin, was of interest to the al-Qaeda terrorist network. At an al-Qaeda safehouse in Saraq Panza, Kabul reporters found instructions for making ricin. The instructions make chilling reading. ``A certain amount, equal to a strong dose, will be able to kill an adult, and a dose equal to seven seeds will kill a child,'' one page reads. Another page says: ``Gloves and face mask are essential for the preparation of ricin. Period of death varies from 3 to 5 days minimum, 4 to 14 days maximum.'' The instructions listed the symptoms of ricin as vomiting, stomach cramps, extreme thirst, bloody diarrhea, throat irritation, respiratory collapse and death. No specific treatment or vaccine for ricin toxin exists. Ricin is produced easily and inexpensively, highly toxic, and stable in aerosolized form. A large amount of ricin is necessary to infect whole populations--the amount of ricin necessary to cover a 100-km\2\ area and cause 50 percent lethality, assuming aerosol toxicity of 3 mcg/kg and optimum dispersal conditions, is approximately 4 metric tons, whereas only 1 kg of Bacillus anthracis is required. But it can be used to terrorize a large population with great effect because it is so lethal. Use of ricin as a terror weapon is not theoretical. In 1991 in Minnesota, 4 members of the Patriots Council, an extremist group that held antigovernment and antitax ideals and advocated the overthrow of the US government, were arrested for plotting to kill a US marshal with ricin. The ricin was produced in a home laboratory. They planned to mix the ricin with the solvent dimethyl sulfoxide, DMSO, and then smear it on the door handles of the marshal's vehicle. The plan was discovered, and the 4 men were convicted. In 1995, a man entered Canada from Alaska on his way to North Carolina. Canadian custom officials stopped the man and found him in possession of several guns, $98,000, and a container of white powder, which was identified as ricin. In 1997, a man shot his stepson in the face. Investigators discovered a makeshift laboratory in his basement and found agents such as ricin and nicotine sulfate. And, ricin was used by the Bulgarian secret police when they killed Georgi Markov by stabbing him with a poison umbrella as he crossed Waterloo Bridge in 1978. Going beyond smallpox, influenza, and ricin, we do not have an effective vaccine or treatment for dozens of other deadly and disabling agents and toxins. Here is a partial list of some of the other biological agents and chemical toxins for which we have no effective treatments: clostridium botulinum toxin, botulism, francisella tularensis, tularaemia, Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Marbug hemorrhagic fever, Lassa fever, Julin, Argentine hemorrhagic fever, Coxiella burnetti, Q fever, brucella species, brucellosis, burkholderia mallei, glanders, Venezuelan encephalomyelitis, eastern and western equine encephalomyelitis, epsilon toxin of clostridium perfringens, staphylococcus entretoxin B, salmonella species, shigella dysenteriae, escherichia coli O157:H7, vibrio cholerae, cryptosporidium parvum, nipah virus, hantaviruses, tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses, tickborne encephalitis virus, yellow fever, nerve agents, tabun, sarin, soman, GF, and VX, blood agents, hydrogen cyanide and cyanogens chloride, blister agents, lewisite, nitrogenadn sulfur mustards, and phosgene oxime, heavy metals, arsenic, lead, and mercury, and volatile toxins, benzene, chloroform, trihalomethanes, pulmonary agents, Phosgene, chlorine, vinly chloride, and incapacitating agents, BZ. The naturally occurring forms of these agents and toxins are enough to cause concern, but we also know that during the 1980s and 1990s the Soviet Union conducted bioweapons research at forty-seven laboratories and testing sites, employed nearly fifty thousand scientists in the work, and that they developed genetically modified versions of some of these agents and toxins. The goal was to develop an agent or toxin that was particularly virulent or not vulnerable to available antibiotics. The United States has publicly stated that five countries are developing biological weapons in violation of the Biological Weapons convention, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya, and stated that additional countries not yet named, possibly including Russia, China, Israel, Sudan and Egypt, are also doing so as well. What is so insidious about biological weapons is that in many cases the symptoms resulting from a biological weapons attack would likely take time to develop, so an act of bioterrorism may go undetected for days or weeks. Affected individuals would seek medical attention not from special emergency response teams but in a variety of civilian settings at scattered locations. This means we will need medicines that can treat a late stage of the disease, long after the infection has taken hold. We must recognize that the distinctive characteristic of biological weapons is that they are living micro-organisms and are thus the only weapons that can continue to proliferate without further assistance once released in a suitable environment. The lethality of these agents and toxins, and the panic they can cause, is quite frightening. The capacity for terror is nearly beyond comprehension. We do not believe it is necessary to describe the facts here. Our point is simple: we need more than military intelligence, surveillance, and public health capacity. We also need effective medicines. We also need more powerful research tools that will enable us to quickly develop treatments for agents and toxins not on this or any other list. We need to do whatever it takes to be able to reassure the American people that hospitals and doctors have powerful medicines to treat them if they are exposed to biological agents or toxins, that we can contain an outbreak of an infectious agent, and that there is little to fear. To achieve this objective, we need to rely on the entrepreneurship of the biotechnology industry. In the summer of 200_, the Defense Science Board completed a study of the countermeasures we have available. It focused on countermeasures-- diagnostics, vaccines, and drugs--for the top nineteen bioterror threats, and estimated what we have available today, what we might have available in five years and what we might have available in ten years. If one assumes that we need diagnostics, vaccines, and drugs for all nineteen of these bioterror threats, we need fifty-seven countermeasures (19 times 3). It found that today we have only one of these fifty-seven countermeasures, a drug for Chlamydia psittaci. It found that in five years we might have twenty of the fifty-seven countermeasures and in ten years we might have thirty-four of the fifty-seven. These are optimistic assessments. It set reasonable criteria for what constitutes an effective countermeasure. For diagnostics, it said that we are unprepared if our diagnostic takes more than 24 hours, requires confirmatory testing and the patient must be symptomatic. If said we are somewhat prepared if the diagnostic takes 12 to 24 hours, requires confirmatory testing, and works in some cases where the patient is asymptomatic. It said we are only truly prepared if the test takes less than 12 hours, requires no confirmatory testing, and detects the disease when the patient is asymptomatic. It found that we have no diagnostics today that meet the top standard and might have diagnostics for seventeen of the nineteen terror threats in five years and eighteen of the nineteen in ten years. For vaccines it found that we are unprepared if we have no vaccine. We are partially prepared if we have a vaccine but have production or use limitations. And we are fully prepared if we have a vaccine generally available. It found that we have no vaccines today that meet the top standard and might have vaccines for two of the terror threats in five years and nine in ten years. For therapeutics it found that we are unprepared if we have no approved treatment. We are partially prepared if we have a treatment available but have production or use limitations. And we are fully prepared if we have a treatment available. It found that we have one treatment that meets the top standard and might have treatments for the same agent in five years and seven treatments in ten years. Obviously, we are woefully unprepared. The Defense Science Board only focused on the top nineteen threats, and there are many others for which we are also unprepared. My proposal would supplement direct Federal Government funding of research with incentives that make it possible for private companies to form the capital to conduct this research on their own initiative, utilizing their own capital, and at their own risk--all for good business reasons going to their bottom line. The U.S. biotechnology industry, approximately 1,300 companies, spent $13.8 billion on research last year. Only 350 of these companies have managed to go public. The industry employs 124,000, Ernest & Young data, people. The top five companies spent an average of $89,000 per employee on research, making it the most research-intensive industry in the world. The industry has 350 products in human clinical trials targeting more than 200 diseases. Losses for the industry were $5.8 billion in 2001, $5.6 billion in 2000, $4.4 billion in 1999, $4.1 billion in 1998, $4.5 billion in 1997, $4.6 billion in 1996, and similar amounts before that. In 2000 fully 38 percent of the public biotech companies had less than 2 years of funding for their research. Only one quarter of the biotech companies in the United States are publicly traded and they tend to be the best funded. There is a broad range of research that could be undertaken under this legislation. Vaccines could be developed to prevent infection or treat an infection from a bioterror attack. Broad-spectrum antibiotics are needed. Also, promising research has been undertaken on antitoxins that could neutralize the toxins that are released, for example, by anthrax. With anthrax it is the toxins, not the bacteria itself, that cause death. An antitoxin could act like a decoy, attaching itself to sites on cells where active anthrax toxin binds and then combining with normal active forms of the toxin and inactivating them. An antitoxin could block the production of the toxin. We can rely on the innovativeness of the biotech industry, working in collaboration with academic medical centers, to explore a broad range of innovative approaches. This mobilizes the entire biotechnology industry as a vital component of our national defense against bioterror weapons. The legislation takes a comprehensive approach to the challenges the biotechnology industry faces in forming capital to conduct research on countermeasures. It includes capital formation tax incentives, guaranteed purchase funds, patent protections, and liability protections. We believe we will have to include each of these types of incentives to ensure that we mobilize the biotechnology industry for this urgent national defense research. Some of the tax incentives in this legislation, and both of the two patent incentives I have proposed, may be controversial. In our view, we can debate tax or patent policy as long as you want, but let's not lose track of the issue here--development of countermeasures to treat people infected or exposed to lethal and disabling bioterror weapons. We know that incentives can spur research. In 1983 we enacted the Orphan Drug Act to provide incentives for companies to develop treatments for rare diseases with small potential markets deemed to be unprofitable by the industry. In the decade before this legislation was enacted, fewer than 10 drugs for orphan diseases were developed and these were mostly chance discoveries. Since the Act became law, 218 orphan drugs have been approved and 800 more are in the pipeline. The Act provides 7 years of market exclusivity and a tax credit covering some research costs. The effectiveness of the incentives we have enacted for orphan disease research show us how much we can accomplish when we set a national priority for certain types of research. The incentives we have proposed differ from those set by the Orphan Drug Act. We need to maintain the effectiveness of the Orphan Drug Act and not undermine it by adding many other disease research targets. In addition, the tax credits for research for orphan drug research have no value for most biotechnology companies because few of them have tax liability with respect to which to claim the credit. This explains why we have not proposed to utilize tax credits to spur countermeasures research. It is also clear that the market for countermeasures is even more speculative than the market for orphan drugs and we need to enact a broader and deeper package of incentives. The government determines which research is covered by the legislation and which companies qualify for the incentives for this research. No company is entitled to utilize the incentives until the government certifies its eligibility. These decisions are vested in the Secretary, Department of Homeland Security. In S. 1764, the decisions were vested in the White House Office of Homeland Security, but it is now likely that a Department will be created. I have strongly endorsed that concept and led the effort to enact the legislation forming the new Department. The legislation confers on the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Health and Human Services, authority to set the list of agents and toxins with respect to which the legislation and incentives applies. The Secretary determines which agents and toxins present a threat and whether the countermeasures are ``more likely'' to be developed with the application of the incentives in the legislation. The Secretary may determine that an agent or toxin does not present a threat or that countermeasures are not more likely to be developed with the incentives. It may determine that the government itself should fund the research and development effort and not rely on private companies. The Department is required to consider the status of existing research, the availability of non-countermeasure markets for the research, and the most effective strategy for ensuring that the research goes forward. The legislation includes an illustrative, non-binding list of fifty- four agents and toxins that might be included on the Secretary's list. The decisions of the Secretary are final and are not subject to judicial review. The Department then must provide information to potential manufacturers of these countermeasures in sufficient detail to permit them to conduct the research and determine when they have developed the needed countermeasure. It may exempt from publication such information as it deems to be sensitive. The Department also must specify the government market that will be available when a countermeasure is successfully developed, including the minimum number of dosages that will be purchased, the minimum price per dose, and the timing and number of years projected for such purchases. Authority is provided for the Department to make advance, partial, progress, milestone, or other payments to the manufacturers. The Department is responsible for determining when a manufacturer has, in fact, successfully developed the needed countermeasure. It must provide information in sufficient detail so that manufacturers and the government may determine when the manufacturer has successfully developed the countermeasure the government needs. If and when the manufacturer has successfully developed the countermeasure, it becomes entitled to the procurement, patent, and liability incentives in the legislation. Once the list of agents and toxins is set, companies may register with the Department their intent to undertake research and development of a countermeasure to prevent or treat the agent or toxin. This registration is required only for companies that seek to be eligible for the tax, purchase, patent, and liability provisions of the legislation. The registration requirement gives the Department vital information about the research effort and the personnel involved with the research, authorizes inspections and other review of the research effort, and the filing of reports by the company. The Secretary then may certify that the company is eligible for the tax, purchase, patent, and liability incentives in the legislation. It bases this certification on the qualifications of the company to conduct the countermeasure research. Eligibility for the purchase fund, patent and liability incentives is contingent on successful development of a countermeasure according to the standards set in the legislation, as determined by the Secretary. The legislation contemplates that a company might well register and seek certification with respect to more than one research project and become eligible for the tax, purchase, patent, and liability incentives for each. There is no policy rationale for limiting a company to one registration and one certification. This process is similar to the current registration process for research on orphan, rare, diseases. In that case, companies that are certified by the FDA become eligible for both tax and market exclusivity incentives. This process gives the government complete control on the number of registrations and certifications. This gives the government control over the cost and impact of the legislation on private sector research. The registration and certification process applies to research to develop diagnostics and research tools, not just drugs and vaccines. Diagnostics are vital because healthcare professionals need to know which agent or toxin has been used in an attack. This enables them to determine which treatment strategy is likely to be most effective. We need quickly to determine which individuals have been exposed or infected, and to separate them from the ``worried well.'' It is likely in an attack that large numbers of individuals who have not been exposed or infected will flood into healthcare facilities seeking treatment. We need to be able to focus on those individuals who are at risk and reassure those who are not at risk. In terms of research tools, it is possible that we will face biological agents and chemical agents we have never seen before. As I've mentioned, the Soviet Union bioterror research focused in part on use of genetic modification technology to develop agents and toxins that currently-available antibiotics can not treat. Australian researchers accidentally created a modified mousepox virus, which does not affect humans, but it was 100 percent lethal to the mice. Their research focused on trying to make a mouse contraceptive vaccine for pest control. The surprise was that it totally suppressed the ``cell- mediated response''--the arm of the immune system that combats viral infection. To make matters worse, the engineered virus also appears unnaturally resistant to attempts to vaccinate the mice. A vaccine that would normally protect mouse strains that are susceptible to the virus only worked in half the mice exposed to the killer version. If bioterrorists created a human version of the virus, vaccination programs would be of limited use. This highlights the drawback of working on vaccines against bioweapons rather than treatments. With the advances in gene sequencing--genomics--we will know the exact genetic structure of a biological agent. This information in the wrong hands could easily be manipulated to design and possibly grow a lethal new bacterial and viral strains not found in nature. A scientist might be able to mix and match traits from different microorganisms--called recombinant technology--to take a gene that makes a deadly toxin from one strain of bacteria and introduce it into other bacterial strains. Dangerous pathogens or infectious agents could be made more deadly, and relatively benign agents could be designed as major public health problems. Bacteria that cause diseases such as anthrax could be altered in such a way that would make current vaccines or antibiotics against them ineffective. It is even possible that a scientist could develop an organism that develops resistance to antibiotics at an accelerated rate. This means we need to develop technology--research tools--that will enable us to quickly develop a tailor-made, specific countermeasure to a previously unknown organism or agent. These research tools will enable us to develop a tailor-made vaccine or drug to deploy as a countermeasure against a new threat. The legislation authorizes companies to register and receive a certification making them eligible for the incentives in the bill for this vital research. The legislation includes four tax incentives to enable biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies to form capital to fund research and development of countermeasures. Companies must irrevocably elect only one of the incentives with regard to the countermeasure research. Four different tax incentives are available so that companies have flexibility in forming capital to fund the research. Each of the options comes with advantages and limitations that may make it appropriate or inappropriate for a given company or research project. We do not now know fully how investors and capital markets will respond to the different options, but we assume that companies will consult with the investor community about which option will work best for a given research project. Capital markets are diverse and investors have different needs and expectations. Over time these markets and investor expectations evolve. If companies register for more than one research project, they may well utilize different tax incentives for the different projects. Companies are permitted to undertake a series of discrete and separate research projects and make this election with respect to each project. They may only utilize one of the options with respect to each of these research projects. The first option is for the company to establish an R&D Limited Partnership to conduct the research. The partnership passes through all business deductions and credits to the partners. For example, under this arrangement, the research and development tax credits and depreciation deductions for the company may be passed by the corporation through to its partners to be used to offset their individual tax liability. These deductions and credits are then lost to the corporation. This alternative is available only to companies with less than $750,000,000 in paid-in capital. The second option is for the company to issue a special class of stock for the entity to conduct the research. The investors would be entitled to a zero capital gains tax rate on any gains realized on the stock held for at least three years. This is a modification of the current Section 1202 where only 50 percent of the gains are not taxed. This provision is adapted from legislation I have introduced, S. 1134, and introduced in the House by Representatives Dunn and Matsui, H.R. 2383. A similar bill has been introduced by Senator Collins, S. 455. This option also is available to small companies. The third and fourth options grant special tax credits to the company for the research. The first credit is for research conducted by the company and the other for research conducted at a teaching hospital or similar institution. Tax credits are available to any company, but they only are useful to a company with tax liability against which to claim the credit. Very few biotechnology companies receive revenue from product sales and therefore have no tax liability. Companies with revenue may be able to fund the research from retained earnings rather than secure funding from investors. A company that elects to utilize one of these incentives is not eligible to receive benefits of the Orphan Drug Tax Credit. Companies that can utilize tax credits--companies with taxable income and tax liability--might find the Orphan Credit more valuable. The legislation includes an amendment to the Orphan Credit to correct a defect in the current credit. The amendment has been introduced in the Senate as S. 1341 by Senators Hatch, Kennedy and Jeffords. The amendment simply states that the Credit is available starting the day an application for orphan drug status is filed, not the date the FDA finally acts on it. The amendment was one of many initiatives championed by Lisa J. Raines, who died on September 11 in the plane that hit the Pentagon, and the amendment is named in her honor. As we go forward in the legislative process, I hope we will have an opportunity to speak in more detail about the service of Ms. Raines on behalf of medical research, particularly on rare diseases. The guaranteed purchase fund, and the patent protections, and liability provisions described below provide an additional incentive for investors and companies to fund the research. The market for countermeasures is speculative and small. This means that if a company successfully develops a countermeasure, it may not receive sufficient revenue on sales to justify the risk and expense of the research. This is why the legislation establishes a countermeasures purchase fund that will define the market for the products with some specificity before the research begins. The Secretary will set standards for which countermeasures it will purchase and define the financial terms of the purchase commitment. This will enable companies to evaluate the market potential of its research before it launches into the project. The specifications will need to be set with sufficient specificity so that the company--and its investors--can evaluate the market and with enough flexibility so that it does not inhibit the innovativeness of the researchers. This approach is akin to setting a performance standard for a new military aircraft. The legislation provides that the Secretary will determine whether the government will purchase more than one product per class. It might make sense--as an incentive--for the government to commit to purchasing more than one product so that many more than one company conducts the research. A winner-take-all system may well intimidate some companies and we may end up without a countermeasure to be purchased. It is also possible that we will find that we need more than one countermeasure because different products are useful for different patients. We may also find that the first product developed is not the most effective. The purchase commitment for countermeasures is available to any company irrespective of its paid-in capital. Intellectual property protection of research is essential to biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies for one simple reason: they need to know that if they successfully develop a medical product another company cannot expropriate it. It's a simple matter of incentives. The patent system has its basis in the U.S. Constitution where the federal government is given the mandate to ``promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts by securing for a limited time to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.'' In exchange for full disclosure of the terms of their inventions, inventors are granted the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling their inventions for a limited period of time. This quid pro quo provides investors with the incentive to invent. In the absence of the patent law, discoverable inventions would be freely available to anyone who wanted to use them and inventors would not be able to capture the value of their inventions or secure a return on their investments. The patent system strikes a balance. Companies receive limited protection of their inventions if they are willing to publish the terms of their invention for all to see. At the end of the term of the patent, anyone can practice the invention without any threat of an infringement action. During the term of the patent, competitors can learn from the published description of the invention and may well find a new and distinct patentable invention. The legislation provides two types of intellectual property protection. The first simply provides that the term of the patent on the countermeasure will be the term of the patent granted by the Patent and Trademark Office without any erosion due to delays in approval of the product by the Food and Drug Administration. The second provides that a company that successfully develops a countermeasure will receive a bonus of two years on the term of any patent held by that company. Companies must elect one of these two protections, but only small biotechnology companies may elect the second protection. Large, profitable pharmaceutical companies may elect only the first of the two options. The first protection against erosion of the term of the patent is an issue that is partially addressed in current law, the Hatch-Waxman Patent Term Restoration Act. That act provides partial protection against erosion of the term, length, of a patent when there are delays at the FDA in approving a product. The erosion occurs when the PTO issues a patent before the product is approved by the FDA. In these cases, the term of the patent is running but the company cannot market the product. The Hatch-Waxman Act provides some protections against erosion of the term of the patent, but the protections are incomplete. As a result, many companies end up with a patent with a reduced term, sometimes substantially reduced. The issue of patent term erosion has become more serious due to changes at the PTO in the patent system. The term of a patent used to be fixed at 17 years from the date the patent was granted by the PTO. It made no difference how long it took for the PTO to process the patent application and sometimes the processing took years, even decades. Under this system, there were cases where the patent would issue before final action at the FDA, but there were other cases where the FDA acted to approve a product before the patent was issued. Erosion was an issue, but it did not occur in many cases. Since 1995 the term of a patent has been set at 20 years from the date of application for the patent. This means that the processing time by the PTO of the application all came while the term of the patent is running. This gives companies a profound incentive to rush the patent through the PTO. Under the old system, companies had the opposite incentive. With patents being issued earlier by the PTO, the issue of erosion of patent term due to delays at the FDA is becoming more serious and more common. The provision in the legislation simply states that in the case of bioterrorism countermeasures, no erosion in the term of the patent will occur. The term of the patent at the date of FDA approval will be the same as the term of the patent when it was issued by the PTO. There is no extension of the patent, simply protections against erosion. Under the new 20 year term, patents might be more or less than 17 years depending on the processing time at the PTO, and all this legislation says is that whatever term is set by the PTO will govern irrespective of the delays at the FDA. This option is available to any company that successfully develops a countermeasure eligible to be purchased by the fund. The second option, the bonus patent term, is only available to small companies with less than $750,000,000 in paid-in capital. It provides that a company that successfully develops a countermeasure is entitled to a two-year extension of any patent in its portfolio. This does not apply to any patent of another company bought or transferred in to the countermeasure research company. I am well aware that this bonus patent term provision will be controversial with some. A company would tend to utilize this option if it owned the patent on a product that still had, or might have, market value at the end of the term of the patent. Because this option is only available to small biotechnology companies, most of whom have no product on the market, in most cases they would be speculating about the value of a product at the end of its patent. The company might apply this provision to a patent that otherwise would be eroded due to FDA delays or it might apply it to a patent that was not eroded. The result might be a patent term that is no longer than the patent term issued by the PTO. It all depends on which companies elect this option and which patent they select. In some cases, the effect of this provision might be to delay the entry onto the market of lower priced generics. This would tend to shift some of the cost of the incentive to develop a countermeasure to insurance companies and patients with an unrelated disease. My rationale for including the patent bonus in the legislation is simple: I want this legislation to say emphatically that we mean business, we are serious, and we want biotechnology companies to reconfigure their research portfolios to focus in part on development of countermeasures. The other provisions in the legislation are powerful, but they may not be sufficient. This proposal protects companies willing to take the risks of producing anti-terrorism products for the American public from potential losses incurred from lawsuits alleging adverse reactions to these products. It also preserves the right for plaintiffs to seek recourse for alleged adverse reactions in Federal District Court, with procedural and monetary limitations. Under the plan, the Secretary of HHS is required to indemnify and defend entities engaged in qualified countermeasure research through execution of ``indemnification and defense agreements.'' This protection is only available for countermeasures purchased under the legislation or to use of such countermeasures as recommended by the Surgeon General in the event of a public health emergency. The legislation contains a series of provisions designed to enhance countermeasure research. The legislation provides for accelerated approval by the FDA of countermeasures developed under the legislation. In most cases, the products would clearly qualify for accelerated approval, but the legislation ensures that they will be reviewed under this process. It provides a statutory basis for the FDA approving countermeasures where human clinical trials are not appropriate or ethical. Rules regarding such products have been promulgated by the FDA. It grants a limited antitrust exemption for certain cooperative research and development of countermeasures. It provides incentives for the construction of biologics manufacturing facilities and research to increase the efficiency of current biologics manufacturing facilities. It enhances the synergy between our for-profit and not for profit biomedical research entities. The Bayh-Dole Act and Stevenson-Wydler Act form the legal framework for mutually beneficially partnerships between academia and industry. My legislation strengthens this synergy and these relationships with two provisions, one to upgrade the basic research infrastructure available to conduct research on countermeasures and the other to increase cooperation between the National Institutes of Health and private companies. Research on countermeasures necessitates the use of special facilities where biological agents can be handled safely without exposing researchers and the public to danger. Very few academic institutions or private companies can justify or capitalize the construction of these special facilities. The Federal government can facilitate research and development of countermeasures by financing the construction of these facilities for use on a fee-for-service basis. The legislation authorizes appropriations for grants to non-profit and for-profit institutions to construct, maintain, and manage up to ten Biosafety Level 3-4 facilities, or their equivalent, in different regions of the country for use in research to develop countermeasures. BSL 3-4 facilities are ones used for research on indigenous, exotic or dangerous agents with potential for aerosol transmission of disease that may have serious or lethal consequences or where the agents pose high risk of life-threatening disease, aerosol-transmitted lab infections, or related agents with unknown risk of transmission. The Director of the Office and NIH shall issue regulations regarding the qualifications of the researchers who may utilize the facilities. Companies that have registered with and been certified by the Director--to develop countermeasures under Section 5 (d) of the legislation--shall be given priority in the use of the facilities. The legislation also reauthorizes a very successful NIH-industry partnership program launched in FY 2000 in Public Law 106-113. The funding is for partnership challenge grants to promote joint ventures between NIH and its grantees and for-profit biotechnology, pharmaceutical and medical device industries with regard to the development of countermeasures, as defined in Section 3 of the bill, and research tools, as defined in Section 4(d)(3) of the bill. Such grants shall be awarded on a one-for-one matching basis. So far the matching grants have focused on development of medicines to treat malaria, tuberculosis, emerging and resistant infections, and therapeutics for emerging threats. My proposal should be matched by reauthorization of the challenge grant program for these deadly diseases. The legislation also sets incentives for the development of adjuvents to enhance the potency, and efficacy of antigens in responding to a biological agent. It requires the new Department to issue annual reports on the effectiveness of this legislation and these incentives, and directs it to host an international conference each year on countermeasure research. This legislation is carefully calibrated to provide incentives only where they are needed. This accounts for the choices in the legislation about which provisions are available to small biotechnology companies and large pharmaceutical companies. The legislation makes choices. It sets the priorities. It provides a dose of incentives and seeks a response in the private sector. We are attempting here to do something that has not been done before. This is uncharted territory. And it also an urgent mission. There may be cases where a countermeasure developed to treat a biological toxin or chemical agent will have applications beyond this use. A broad-spectrum antibiotic capable of treating many different biological agents may well have the capacity to treat naturally occurring diseases. This same issue arises with the Orphan Drug Act, which provides both tax and FDA approval incentives for companies that develop medicines to treat rare diseases. In some cases these treatments can also be used for larger disease populations. There are few who object to this situation. We have come to the judgment that the urgency of this research is worth the possible additional benefits that might accrue to a company. In the context of research to develop countermeasures, I do not consider it a problem that a company might find a broader commercial market for a countermeasure. Indeed, it may well be the combination of the incentives in this legislation and these broader markets that drives the successful development of a countermeasure. If our intense focus on developing countermeasures, and research tools, provides benefits for mankind going well beyond terror weapons, we should rejoice. If this research helps us to develop an effective vaccine or treatment for AIDS, we should give the company the Nobel Prize for Medicine. If we do not develop a vaccine or treatment for AIDS, we may see 100 million people die of AIDS. We also have 400 million people infected with malaria and more than a million annual deaths. Millions of children die of diarrhea, cholera and other deadly and disabling diseases. Countermeasures research may deepen our understanding of the immune system and speed development of treatments for cancer and autoimmune diseases. That is not the central purpose of this legislation, but it is an additional rationale for it. The issue raised by my legislation is very simple: do we want the Federal government to fund and supervise much of the research to develop countermeasures or should we also provide incentives that make it possible for the private sector, at its own expense, and at its own risk, to undertake this research for good business reasons. The Frist- Kennedy law focuses effectively on direct Federal funding and coordination issues, but it does not include sufficient incentives for the private sector to undertake this research on its own initiative. That law and my legislation are perfectly complimentary. We need to enact both to ensure that we are prepared for bioterror attacks. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, America has a major flaw in its defenses against bioterrorism. Hearings I chaired in the Government Affairs Committee on bioterrorism demonstrated that America has not made a national commitment to research and development of treatments and cures for those who might be exposed to or infected by a biological agent, chemical toxin, or radiological material. Correcting this critical gap is the purpose of legislation we are introducing today. This legislation is a refined and upgraded version of legislation I introduced last year, S. 1764, December 4, 2001, and S. 3148, October 17, 2002, and I am delighted that Senator Hatch has joined me as the lead cosponsor of the new bill. Obviously, our first priority must be to attempt to prevent the use of these agents and toxins by terrorists, quickly assess when an attack has occurred, take appropriate public health steps to contain the exposure, stop the spread of contagion, and then detoxify the site. These are all critical functions, but in the end we must recognize that some individuals may be exposed or infected. Then the critical issue is whether we can treat and cure them and prevent death and disability. In short, we need a diversified portfolio of medicines. In cases where we have ample advance warning of an attack and specific information about the agent, toxin, or material, we may be able to vaccinate the vulnerable population in advance. In other cases, even if we have a vaccine, we might well prefer to use medicines that would quickly stop the progression of the disease or the toxic effects. We also need a powerful capacity quickly to develop new countermeasures where we face a new agent, toxin, or material. Unfortunately, we are woefully short of vaccines and medicines to treat individuals who are exposed or infected. We have antibiotics that seem to work for most of those infected in the current anthrax attack, but these have not prevented five deaths. We have no effective vaccines or medicines for most other biological agents and chemical toxins we might confront. We have very limited capacity to respond medically to a radiological attack. In some cases we have vaccines to prevent, but no medicines to treat, an agent. We have limited capacity to speed the development of vaccines and medicines to prevent or treat novel agents and toxins not currently known to us. We have provided, and should continue to provide, direct Federal funding for research and development of new medicines, however, this funding is unlikely to be sufficient. Even with ample Federal funding, many private companies will be reluctant to enter into agreements with government agencies to conduct this research. Other companies would be willing to conduct the research with their own capital and at their own risk but are not able to secure the funding from investors. The legislation we introduce today would provide incentives for private biotechnology companies to form capital to develop countermeasures--medicines--to prevent, treat and cure victims of bioterror, chemical and radiological attacks. This will enable this industry to become a vital part of the national defense infrastructure and do so for business reasons that make sense for their investors on the bottom line. Enactment of these incentives is necessary because most biotech companies have no approved products or revenue from product sales to fund research. They rely on investors and equity capital markets to fund the research. They must necessarily focus on research that will lead to product sales and revenue and, thus, to an end to their dependence on investor capital. There is no established or predictable market for countermeasures. These concerns are shared by pharmaceutical firms. Investors are justifiably reluctant to fund this research, which will present challenges similar in complexity to AIDS. Investors need assurances that research on countermeasures has the potential to provide a rate of return commensurate with the risk, complexity and cost of the research, a rate of return comparable to that which may arise from a treatment for cancer, MS, Cystic Fibrosis and other major diseases. It is in our national interest to enlist these companies in the development of countermeasures as biotech companies tend to be innovative and nimble and intently focused on the intractable diseases for which no effective medical treatments are available. The incentives we have proposed are innovative and some may be controversial. We invite everyone who has an interest and a stake in this research to enter into a dialogue about the issue and about the nature and terms of the appropriate incentives. We have attempted to anticipate the many complicated technical and policy issues that this legislation raises. The key focus of our debate should be how, not whether, we address this critical gap in our public health infrastructure and the role that the private sector should play. Millions of Americans will be at risk if we fail to enact legislation to meet this need. On November 26 of 2001, the Centers for Disease Control issued its interim working draft plan for responding to an outbreak of smallpox. The plan does not call for mass vaccination in advance of a smallpox outbreak because the risk of side effects from the vaccine outweighs the risks of someone actually being exposed to the smallpox virus. At the heart of the plan is a strategy sometimes called ``search and containment.'' This strategy involves identifying infected individual or individuals with confirmed smallpox, identifying and locating those people who come in contact with that person, and vaccinating those people in outward rings of contact. The goal is to produce a buffer of immune individuals and was shown to prevent smallpox and to ultimately eradicate the outbreak. Priorities would be set on who is vaccinated, perhaps focusing on the outward rings before those at the center of the outbreak. The plan assumes that the smallpox vaccination is effective for persons who have been exposed to the disease as long as the disease has not taken hold. In practice it may be necessary to set a wide perimeter for these areas because smallpox is highly contagious before it might be diagnosed. There may be many areas subject to search and containment because people in our society travel frequently and widely. Terrorists might trigger attacks in a wide range of locations to multiply the confusion and panic. The most common form of smallpox has a 30 percent mortality rate, but terrorists might be able to obtain supplies of ``flat-type'' smallpox with a mortality rate of 96 percent and hemorrhagic-type smallpox, which is almost always fatal. For these reasons, the CDC plan accepts the possibility that whole cities or other geographic areas could be cordoned off, letting no one in or out--a quarantine enforced by police or troops. The plan focuses on enforcement authority through police or National Guard, isolation and quarantine, mandatory medical examinations, and rationing of medicines. It includes a discussion of ``population-wide quarantine measures which restrict activities or limit movement of individuals [including] suspension of large public gatherings, closing of public places, restriction on travel [air, rail, water, motor vehicle, and pedestrian], and/or `cordon sanitaire' [literally a `sanitary cord' or line around a quarantined area guarded to prevent spread of disease by restricting passage into or out of the area].'' The CDC recommends that states update their laws to provide authority for ``enforcing quarantine measures'' and it recommends that States in ``pre-event planning'' identify ``personnel who can enforce these isolation and quarantine measures, if necessary.'' Guide C--Isolation and Quarantine, page 17. On October 23, 2001, the CDC published a ``Model State Emergency Health Powers Act.'' It was prepared by the Center for Law and the Public's Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities, in conjunction with the National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, National Association of City and County Health Officers, and National Association of Attorneys General. A copy of the model law is printed at www.publichealthlaw.net. The law would provide powers to enforce the ``compulsory physical separation (including the restriction of movement or confinement) of individuals and/or groups believed to have been exposed to or known to have been infected with a contagious disease from individuals who are believed not to have been exposed or infected, in order to prevent or limit the transmission of the disease to others.'' Federal law on this subject is very strong and the Administration can always rely on the President's Constitution authority as Commander in Chief. Let us try to imagine, however, what it would be like if a quarantine is imposed. Let us assume that there is not enough smallpox vaccine available for use in a large outbreak, that the priority is to vaccinate those in the outward rings of the containment area first, that the available vaccines cannot be quickly deployed inside the quarantined area, that it is not possible to quickly trace and identify all of the individuals who might have been exposed, and/or that public health workers themselves might be infected. We know that there is no medicine to treat those who do become infected. We know the mortality rates. It is not hard to imagine how much force might be necessary to enforce the quarantine. It would be quite unacceptable to permit individuals to leave the quarantined area no matter how much panic had taken hold. Think about how different this scenario would be if we had medicines that could effectively treat and cure those who become infected by smallpox. We still might implement the CDC plan but a major element of the strategy would be to persuade people to visit their local clinic or hospital to be dispenses their supply of medicine. We could trust that there would be a very high degree of voluntary compliance. This would give us more time, give us options if the containment is not successful, give us options to treat those in the containment area who are infected, and enable us to quell the public panic. Because we have no medicine to treat those infected by smallpox, we have to be prepared to implement a plan like the one CDC has proposed. Theirs is the only option because our options are so limited. We need to expand our range of options. We should not be lulled by the apparent successes with Cipro and the strains of anthrax we have seen in the recent attacks. We have not been able to prevent death in some of the patients with late-stage inhalation anthrax and Robert Stevens, Thomas Morris Jr., Joseph Curseen, Kathy Nguyen, and Ottilie Lundgren died. This legislation is named in honor of them. What we needed for them, and did not have, is a drug or vaccine that would treat late stage inhalation anthrax. As I have said, we need an effective treatment for those who become infected with smallpox. We have a vaccine that effectively prevents smallpox infection, and administering this vaccine within four days of first exposure has been shown to offer some protections against acquiring infection and significant protection against a fatal outcome. The problem is that administering the vaccine in this time frame to all those who might have been exposed may be exceedingly difficult. And once infection has occurred, we have no effective treatment options. In the last century 500 million people have died of smallpox--more than have from any other infectious diseases--as compared to 320 million deaths in all the wars of the twentieth century. Smallpox was one of the diseases that nearly wiped out the entire Native American population in this hemisphere. The last naturally acquired case of smallpox occurred in Somalia in 1977 and the last case from laboratory exposure was in 1978. Smallpox is a nasty pathogen, carried in microscopic airborne droplets inhaled by its victims. The first signs are headache, fever, nausea and backache, sometimes convulsions and delirium. Soon, the skin turns scarlet. When the fever lets up, the telltale rash appears--flat red spots that turn into pimples, then big yellow pustules, then scabs. Smallpox also affects the throat and eyes, and inflames the heart, lungs, liver, intestines and other internal organs. Death often came from internal bleeding, or from the organs simply being overwhelmed by the virus. Survivors were left covered with pockmarks--if they were lucky. The unlucky ones were left blind, their eyes permanently clouded over. Nearly one in four victims died. The infection rate is estimated to be 25-40 percent for those who are unvaccinated and a single case can cause 20 or more additional infections. During the 16th Century, 3.5 million Aztecs--more than half the population died of smallpox during a two-year span after the Spanish army brought the disease to Mexico. Two centuries later, the virus ravaged George Washington's troops at Valley Forge. And it cut a deadly path through the Crow, Dakota, Sioux, Blackfoot, Apache, Comanche and other American Indian tribes, helping to clear the way for white settlers to lay claim to the western plains. The epidemics began to subside with one of medicine's most famous discoveries: the finding by British physician Edward Jenner in 1796 that English milkmaids who were exposed to cowpox, a mild second cousin to smallpox that afflicts cattle, seemed to be protected against the more deadly disease. Jenner's work led to the development of the first vaccine in Western medicine. While later vaccines used either a killed or inactivated form of the virus they were intended to combat, the smallpox vaccine worked in a different way. It relied on a separate, albeit related virus: first cowpox and the vaccinia, a virus of mysterious origins that is believed to be a cowpox derivative. The last American was vaccinated back in the 1970s and half of the US population has never been vaccinated. It is not known how long these vaccines provide protection, but it is estimated that the term is 3 to 5 years. In an elaborate smallpox biowarfare scenario enacted in February 1999 by the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, it was projected that within two months 15,000 people had died, epidemics were out of control in fourteen countries, all supplies of smallpox vaccine were depleted, the global economy was on the verge of collapse, and military control and quarantines were in place. Within twelve months it was projected that eighty million people worldwide had died. A single case of smallpox today would become a global public health threat and it has been estimated that a single smallpox bioterror attack on a single American city would necessitate the vaccination of 30 to 40 million people. The US government is now in the process of purchasing substantial stocks of the smallpox vaccine. We then face a very difficult decision on deploying the vaccine. We know that some individuals will have an adverse reaction to this vaccine. No one in the United States has been vaccinated against smallpox in twenty-five years. Those that were vaccinated back then may not be protected against the disease today. If we had an effective treatment for those who might become infected by smallpox, we would face much less pressure regarding deploying the vaccine. If we face a smallpox epidemic from a bioterrorism attack, we will have no Cipro to reassure the public and we will be facing a highly contagious disease and epidemic. To be blunt, it will make the current anthrax attack look benign by comparison. Smallpox is not the only threat. We have seen other epidemics in this century. The 1918 influenza epidemic provides a sobering admonition about the need for research to develop medicines. In two years, a fifth of the world's population was infected. In the United States the 1918 epidemic killed more than 650,000 people in a short period of time and left 20 million seriously ill, one fourth of the entire population. The average lifespan in the US was depressed by ten years. In just one year, the epidemic killed 21 million human beings worldwide--well over twice the number of combat deaths in the whole of World War I. The flu was exceptionally virulent to begin with and it then underwent several sudden and dramatic mutations in its structure. Such mutations can turn flu into a killer because its victims' immune systems have no antibodies to fight off the altered virus. Fatal pneumonia can rapidly develop. Another deadly toxin, ricin toxin, was of interest to the al-Qaeda terrorist network. At an al-Qaeda safehouse in Saraq Panza, Kabul reporters found instructions for making ricin. The instructions make chilling reading. ``A certain amount, equal to a strong dose, will be able to kill an adult, and a dose equal to seven seeds will kill a child,'' one page reads. Another page says: ``Gloves and face mask are essential for the preparation of ricin. Period of death varies from 3 to 5 days minimum, 4 to 14 days maximum.'' The instructions listed the symptoms of ricin as vomiting, stomach cramps, extreme thirst, bloody diarrhea, throat irritation, respiratory collapse and death. No specific treatment or vaccine for ricin toxin exists. Ricin is produced easily and inexpensively, highly toxic, and stable in aerosolized form. A large amount of ricin is necessary to infect whole populations--the amount of ricin necessary to cover a 100-km\2\ area and cause 50 percent lethality, assuming aerosol toxicity of 3 mcg/kg and optimum dispersal conditions, is approximately 4 metric tons, whereas only 1 kg of Bacillus anthracis is required. But it can be used to terrorize a large population with great effect because it is so lethal. Use of ricin as a terror weapon is not theoretical. In 1991 in Minnesota, 4 members of the Patriots Council, an extremist group that held antigovernment and antitax ideals and advocated the overthrow of the US government, were arrested for plotting to kill a US marshal with ricin. The ricin was produced in a home laboratory. They planned to mix the ricin with the solvent dimethyl sulfoxide, DMSO, and then smear it on the door handles of the marshal's vehicle. The plan was discovered, and the 4 men were convicted. In 1995, a man entered Canada from Alaska on his way to North Carolina. Canadian custom officials stopped the man and found him in possession of several guns, $98,000, and a container of white powder, which was identified as ricin. In 1997, a man shot his stepson in the face. Investigators discovered a makeshift laboratory in his basement and found agents such as ricin and nicotine sulfate. And, ricin was used by the Bulgarian secret police when they killed Georgi Markov by stabbing him with a poison umbrella as he crossed Waterloo Bridge in 1978. Going beyond smallpox, influenza, and ricin, we do not have an effective vaccine or treatment for dozens of other deadly and disabling agents and toxins. Here is a partial list of some of the other biological agents and chemical toxins for which we have no effective treatments: clostridium botulinum toxin, botulism, francisella tularensis, tularaemia, Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Marbug hemorrhagic fever, Lassa fever, Julin, Argentine hemorrhagic fever, Coxiella burnetti, Q fever, brucella species, brucellosis, burkholderia mallei, glanders, Venezuelan encephalomyelitis, eastern and western equine encephalomyelitis, epsilon toxin of clostridium perfringens, staphylococcus entretoxin B, salmonella species, shigella dysenteriae, escherichia coli O157:H7, vibrio cholerae, cryptosporidium parvum, nipah virus, hantaviruses, tickborne hemorrhagic fever viruses, tickborne encephalitis virus, yellow fever, nerve agents, tabun, sarin, soman, GF, and VX, blood agents, hydrogen cyanide and cyanogens chloride, blister agents, lewisite, nitrogenadn sulfur mustards, and phosgene oxime, heavy metals, arsenic, lead, and mercury, and volatile toxins, benzene, chloroform, trihalomethanes, pulmonary agents, Phosgene, chlorine, vinly chloride, and incapacitating agents, BZ. The naturally occurring forms of these agents and toxins are enough to cause concern, but we also know that during the 1980s and 1990s the Soviet Union conducted bioweapons research at forty-seven laboratories and testing sites, employed nearly fifty thousand scientists in the work, and that they developed genetically modified versions of some of these agents and toxins. The goal was to develop an agent or toxin that was particularly virulent or not vulnerable to available antibiotics. The United States has publicly stated that five countries are developing biological weapons in violation of the Biological Weapons convention, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya, and stated that additional countries not yet named, possibly including Russia, China, Israel, Sudan and Egypt, are also doing so as well. What is so insidious about biological weapons is that in many cases the symptoms resulting from a biological weapons attack would likely take time to develop, so an act of bioterrorism may go undetected for days or weeks. Affected individuals would seek medical attention not from special emergency response teams but in a variety of civilian settings at scattered locations. This means we will need medicines that can treat a late stage of the disease, long after the infection has taken hold. We must recognize that the distinctive characteristic of biological weapons is that they are living micro-organisms and are thus the only weapons that can continue to proliferate without further assistance once released in a suitable environment. The lethality of these agents and toxins, and the panic they can cause, is quite frightening. The capacity for terror is nearly beyond comprehension. We do not believe it is necessary to describe the facts here. Our point is simple: we need more than military intelligence, surveillance, and public health capacity. We also need effective medicines. We also need more powerful research tools that will enable us to quickly develop treatments for agents and toxins not on this or any other list. We need to do whatever it takes to be able to reassure the American people that hospitals and doctors have powerful medicines to treat them if they are exposed to biological agents or toxins, that we can contain an outbreak of an infectious agent, and that there is little to fear. To achieve this objective, we need to rely on the entrepreneurship of the biotechnology industry. In the summer of 200_, the Defense Science Board completed a study of the countermeasures we have available. It focused on countermeasures-- diagnostics, vaccines, and drugs--for the top nineteen bioterror threats, and estimated what we have available today, what we might have available in five years and what we might have available in ten years. If one assumes that we need diagnostics, vaccines, and drugs for all nineteen of these bioterror threats, we need fifty-seven countermeasures (19 times 3). It found that today we have only one of these fifty-seven countermeasures, a drug for Chlamydia psittaci. It found that in five years we might have twenty of the fifty-seven countermeasures and in ten years we might have thirty-four of the fifty-seven. These are optimistic assessments. It set reasonable criteria for what constitutes an effective countermeasure. For diagnostics, it said that we are unprepared if our diagnostic takes more than 24 hours, requires confirmatory testing and the patient must be symptomatic. If said we are somewhat prepared if the diagnostic takes 12 to 24 hours, requires confirmatory testing, and works in some cases where the patient is asymptomatic. It said we are only truly prepared if the test takes less than 12 hours, requires no confirmatory testing, and detects the disease when the patient is asymptomatic. It found that we have no diagnostics today that meet the top standard and might have diagnostics for seventeen of the nineteen terror threats in five years and eighteen of the nineteen in ten years. For vaccines it found that we are unprepared if we have no vaccine. We are partially prepared if we have a vaccine but have production or use limitations. And we are fully prepared if we have a vaccine generally available. It found that we have no vaccines today that meet the top standard and might have vaccines for two of the terror threats in five years and nine in ten years. For therapeutics it found that we are unprepared if we have no approved treatment. We are partially prepared if we have a treatment available but have production or use limitations. And we are fully prepared if we have a treatment available. It found that we have one treatment that meets the top standard and might have treatments for the same agent in five years and seven treatments in ten years. Obviously, we are woefully unprepared. The Defense Science Board only focused on the top nineteen threats, and there are many others for which we are also unprepared. My proposal would supplement direct Federal Government funding of research with incentives that make it possible for private companies to form the capital to conduct this research on their own initiative, utilizing their own capital, and at their own risk--all for good business reasons going to their bottom line. The U.S. biotechnology industry, approximately 1,300 companies, spent $13.8 billion on research last year. Only 350 of these companies have managed to go public. The industry employs 124,000, Ernest & Young data, people. The top five companies spent an average of $89,000 per employee on research, making it the most research-intensive industry in the world. The industry has 350 products in human clinical trials targeting more than 200 diseases. Losses for the industry were $5.8 billion in 2001, $5.6 billion in 2000, $4.4 billion in 1999, $4.1 billion in 1998, $4.5 billion in 1997, $4.6 billion in 1996, and similar amounts before that. In 2000 fully 38 percent of the public biotech companies had less than 2 years of funding for their research. Only one quarter of the biotech companies in the United States are publicly traded and they tend to be the best funded. There is a broad range of research that could be undertaken under this legislation. Vaccines could be developed to prevent infection or treat an infection from a bioterror attack. Broad-spectrum antibiotics are needed. Also, promising research has been undertaken on antitoxins that could neutralize the toxins that are released, for example, by anthrax. With anthrax it is the toxins, not the bacteria itself, that cause death. An antitoxin could act like a decoy, attaching itself to sites on cells where active anthrax toxin binds and then combining with normal active forms of the toxin and inactivating them. An antitoxin could block the production of the toxin. We can rely on the innovativeness of the biotech industry, working in collaboration with academic medical centers, to explore a broad range of innovative approaches. This mobilizes the entire biotechnology industry as a vital component of our national defense against bioterror weapons. The legislation takes a comprehensive approach to the challenges the biotechnology industry faces in forming capital to conduct research on countermeasures. It includes capital formation tax incentives, guaranteed purchase funds, patent protections, and liability protections. We believe we will have to include each of these types of incentives to ensure that we mobilize the biotechnology industry for this urgent national defense research. Some of the tax incentives in this legislation, and both of the two patent incentives I have proposed, may be controversial. In our view, we can debate tax or patent policy as long as you want, but let's not lose track of the issue here--development of countermeasures to treat people infected or exposed to lethal and disabling bioterror weapons. We know that incentives can spur research. In 1983 we enacted the Orphan Drug Act to provide incentives for companies to develop treatments for rare diseases with small potential markets deemed to be unprofitable by the industry. In the decade before this legislation was enacted, fewer than 10 drugs for orphan diseases were developed and these were mostly chance discoveries. Since the Act became law, 218 orphan drugs have been approved and 800 more are in the pipeline. The Act provides 7 years of market exclusivity and a tax credit covering some research costs. The effectiveness of the incentives we have enacted for orphan disease research show us how much we can accomplish when we set a national priority for certain types of research. The incentives we have proposed differ from those set by the Orphan Drug Act. We need to maintain the effectiveness of the Orphan Drug Act and not undermine it by adding many other disease research targets. In addition, the tax credits for research for orphan drug research have no value for most biotechnology companies because few of them have tax liability with respect to which to claim the credit. This explains why we have not proposed to utilize tax credits to spur countermeasures research. It is also clear that the market for countermeasures is even more speculative than the market for orphan drugs and we need to enact a broader and deeper package of incentives. The government determines which research is covered by the legislation and which companies qualify for the incentives for this research. No company is entitled to utilize the incentives until the government certifies its eligibility. These decisions are vested in the Secretary, Department of Homeland Security. In S. 1764, the decisions were vested in the White House Office of Homeland Security, but it is now likely that a Department will be created. I have strongly endorsed that concept and led the effort to enact the legislation forming the new Department. The legislation confers on the Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Health and Human Services, authority to set the list of agents and toxins with respect to which the legislation and incentives applies. The Secretary determines which agents and toxins present a threat and whether the countermeasures are ``more likely'' to be developed with the application of the incentives in the legislation. The Secretary may determine that an agent or toxin does not present a threat or that countermeasures are not more likely to be developed with the incentives. It may determine that the government itself should fund the research and development effort and not rely on private companies. The Department is required to consider the status of existing research, the availability of non-countermeasure markets for the research, and the most effective strategy for ensuring that the research goes forward. The legislation includes an illustrative, non-binding list of fifty- four agents and toxins that might be included on the Secretary's list. The decisions of the Secretary are final and are not subject to judicial review. The Department then must provide information to potential manufacturers of these countermeasures in sufficient detail to permit them to conduct the research and determine when they have developed the needed countermeasure. It may exempt from publication such information as it deems to be sensitive. The Department also must specify the government market that will be available when a countermeasure is successfully developed, including the minimum number of dosages that will be purchased, the minimum price per dose, and the timing and number of years projected for such purchases. Authority is provided for the Department to make advance, partial, progress, milestone, or other payments to the manufacturers. The Department is responsible for determining when a manufacturer has, in fact, successfully developed the needed countermeasure. It must provide information in sufficient detail so that manufacturers and the government may determine when the manufacturer has successfully developed the countermeasure the government needs. If and when the manufacturer has successfully developed the countermeasure, it becomes entitled to the procurement, patent, and liability incentives in the legislation. Once the list of agents and toxins is set, companies may register with the Department their intent to undertake research and development of a countermeasure to prevent or treat the agent or toxin. This registration is required only for companies that seek to be eligible for the tax, purchase, patent, and liability provisions of the legislation. The registration requirement gives the Department vital information about the research effort and the personnel involved with the research, authorizes inspections and other review of the research effort, and the filing of reports by the company. The Secretary then may certify that the company is eligible for the tax, purchase, patent, and liability incentives in the legislation. It bases this certification on the qualifications of the company to conduct the countermeasure research. Eligibility for the purchase fund, patent and liability incentives is contingent on successful development of a countermeasure according to the standards set in the legislation, as determined by the Secretary. The legislation contemplates that a company might well register and seek certification with respect to more than one research project and become eligible for the tax, purchase, patent, and liability incentives for each. There is no policy rationale for limiting a company to one registration and one certification. This process is similar to the current registration process for research on orphan, rare, diseases. In that case, companies that are certified by the FDA become eligible for both tax and market exclusivity incentives. This process gives the government complete control on the number of registrations and certifications. This gives the government control over the cost and impact of the legislation on private sector research. The registration and certification process applies to research to develop diagnostics and research tools, not just drugs and vaccines. Diagnostics are vital because healthcare professionals need to know which agent or toxin has been used in an attack. This enables them to determine which treatment strategy is likely to be most effective. We need quickly to determine which individuals have been exposed or infected, and to separate them from the ``worried well.'' It is likely in an attack that large numbers of individuals who have not been exposed or infected will flood into healthcare facilities seeking treatment. We need to be able to focus on those individuals who are at risk and reassure those who are not at risk. In terms of research tools, it is possible that we will face biological agents and chemical agents we have never seen before. As I've mentioned, the Soviet Union bioterror research focused in part on use of genetic modification technology to develop agents and toxins that currently-available antibiotics can not treat. Australian researchers accidentally created a modified mousepox virus, which does not affect humans, but it was 100 percent lethal to the mice. Their research focused on trying to make a mouse contraceptive vaccine for pest control. The surprise was that it totally suppressed the ``cell- mediated response''--the arm of the immune system that combats viral infection. To make matters worse, the engineered virus also appears unnaturally resistant to attempts to vaccinate the mice. A vaccine that would normally protect mouse strains that are susceptible to the virus only worked in half the mice exposed to the killer version. If bioterrorists created a human version of the virus, vaccination programs would be of limited use. This highlights the drawback of working on vaccines against bioweapons rather than treatments. With the advances in gene sequencing--genomics--we will know the exact genetic structure of a biological agent. This information in the wrong hands could easily be manipulated to design and possibly grow a lethal new bacterial and viral strains not found in nature. A scientist might be able to mix and match traits from different microorganisms--called recombinant technology--to take a gene that makes a deadly toxin from one strain of bacteria and introduce it into other bacterial strains. Dangerous pathogens or infectious agents could be made more deadly, and relatively benign agents could be designed as major public health problems. Bacteria that cause diseases such as anthrax could be altered in such a way that would make current vaccines or antibiotics against them ineffective. It is even possible that a scientist could develop an organism that develops resistance to antibiotics at an accelerated rate. This means we need to develop technology--research tools--that will enable us to quickly develop a tailor-made, specific countermeasure to a previously unknown organism or agent. These research tools will enable us to develop a tailor-made vaccine or drug to deploy as a countermeasure against a new threat. The legislation authorizes companies to register and receive a certification making them eligible for the incentives in the bill for this vital research. The legislation includes four tax incentives to enable biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies to form capital to fund research and development of countermeasures. Companies must irrevocably elect only one of the incentives with regard to the countermeasure research. Four different tax incentives are available so that companies have flexibility in forming capital to fund the research. Each of the options comes with advantages and limitations that may make it appropriate or inappropriate for a given company or research project. We do not now know fully how investors and capital markets will respond to the different options, but we assume that companies will consult with the investor community about which option will work best for a given research project. Capital markets are diverse and investors have different needs and expectations. Over time these markets and investor expectations evolve. If companies register for more than one research project, they may well utilize different tax incentives for the different projects. Companies are permitted to undertake a series of discrete and separate research projects and make this election with respect to each project. They may only utilize one of the options with respect to each of these research projects. The first option is for the company to establish an R&D Limited Partnership to conduct the research. The partnership passes through all business deductions and credits to the partners. For example, under this arrangement, the research and development tax credits and depreciation deductions for the company may be passed by the corporation through to its partners to be used to offset their individual tax liability. These deductions and credits are then lost to the corporation. This alternative is available only to companies with less than $750,000,000 in paid-in capital. The second option is for the company to issue a special class of stock for the entity to conduct the research. The investors would be entitled to a zero capital gains tax rate on any gains realized on the stock held for at least three years. This is a modification of the current Section 1202 where only 50 percent of the gains are not taxed. This provision is adapted from legislation I have introduced, S. 1134, and introduced in the House by Representatives Dunn and Matsui, H.R. 2383. A similar bill has been introduced by Senator Collins, S. 455. This option also is available to small companies. The third and fourth options grant special tax credits to the company for the research. The first credit is for research conducted by the company and the other for research conducted at a teaching hospital or similar institution. Tax credits are available to any company, but they only are useful to a company with tax liability against which to claim the credit. Very few biotechnology companies receive revenue from product sales and therefore have no tax liability. Companies with revenue may be able to fund the research from retained earnings rather than secure funding from investors. A company that elects to utilize one of these incentives is not eligible to receive benefits of the Orphan Drug Tax Credit. Companies that can utilize tax credits--companies with taxable income and tax liability--might find the Orphan Credit more valuable. The legislation includes an amendment to the Orphan Credit to correct a defect in the current credit. The amendment has been introduced in the Senate as S. 1341 by Senators Hatch, Kennedy and Jeffords. The amendment simply states that the Credit is available starting the day an application for orphan drug status is filed, not the date the FDA finally acts on it. The amendment was one of many initiatives championed by Lisa J. Raines, who died on September 11 in the plane that hit the Pentagon, and the amendment is named in her honor. As we go forward in the legislative process, I hope we will have an opportunity to speak in more detail about the service of Ms. Raines on behalf of medical research, particularly on rare diseases. The guaranteed purchase fund, and the patent protections, and liability provisions described below provide an additional incentive for investors and companies to fund the research. The market for countermeasures is speculative and small. This means that if a company successfully develops a countermeasure, it may not receive sufficient revenue on sales to justify the risk and expense of the research. This is why the legislation establishes a countermeasures purchase fund that will define the market for the products with some specificity before the research begins. The Secretary will set standards for which countermeasures it will purchase and define the financial terms of the purchase commitment. This will enable companies to evaluate the market potential of its research before it launches into the project. The specifications will need to be set with sufficient specificity so that the company--and its investors--can evaluate the market and with enough flexibility so that it does not inhibit the innovativeness of the researchers. This approach is akin to setting a performance standard for a new military aircraft. The legislation provides that the Secretary will determine whether the government will purchase more than one product per class. It might make sense--as an incentive--for the government to commit to purchasing more than one product so that many more than one company conducts the research. A winner-take-all system may well intimidate some companies and we may end up without a countermeasure to be purchased. It is also possible that we will find that we need more than one countermeasure because different products are useful for different patients. We may also find that the first product developed is not the most effective. The purchase commitment for countermeasures is available to any company irrespective of its paid-in capital. Intellectual property protection of research is essential to biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies for one simple reason: they need to know that if they successfully develop a medical product another company cannot expropriate it. It's a simple matter of incentives. The patent system has its basis in the U.S. Constitution where the federal government is given the mandate to ``promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts by securing for a limited time to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.'' In exchange for full disclosure of the terms of their inventions, inventors are granted the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling their inventions for a limited period of time. This quid pro quo provides investors with the incentive to invent. In the absence of the patent law, discoverable inventions would be freely available to anyone who wanted to use them and inventors would not be able to capture the value of their inventions or secure a return on their investments. The patent system strikes a balance. Companies receive limited protection of their inventions if they are willing to publish the terms of their invention for all to see. At the end of the term of the patent, anyone can practice the invention without any threat of an infringement action. During the term of the patent, competitors can learn from the published description of the invention and may well find a new and distinct patentable invention. The legislation provides two types of intellectual property protection. The first simply provides that the term of the patent on the countermeasure will be the term of the patent granted by the Patent and Trademark Office without any erosion due to delays in approval of the product by the Food and Drug Administration. The second provides that a company that successfully develops a countermeasure will receive a bonus of two years on the term of any patent held by that company. Companies must elect one of these two protections, but only small biotechnology companies may elect the second protection. Large, profitable pharmaceutical companies may elect only the first of the two options. The first protection against erosion of the term of the patent is an issue that is partially addressed in current law, the Hatch-Waxman Patent Term Restoration Act. That act provides partial protection against erosion of the term, length, of a patent when there are delays at the FDA in approving a product. The erosion occurs when the PTO issues a patent before the product is approved by the FDA. In these cases, the term of the patent is running but the company cannot market the product. The Hatch-Waxman Act provides some protections against erosion of the term of the patent, but the protections are incomplete. As a result, many companies end up with a patent with a reduced term, sometimes substantially reduced. The issue of patent term erosion has become more serious due to changes at the PTO in the patent system. The term of a patent used to be fixed at 17 years from the date the patent was granted by the PTO. It made no difference how long it took for the PTO to process the patent application and sometimes the processing took years, even decades. Under this system, there were cases where the patent would issue before final action at the FDA, but there were other cases where the FDA acted to approve a product before the patent was issued. Erosion was an issue, but it did not occur in many cases. Since 1995 the term of a patent has been set at 20 years from the date of application for the patent. This means that the processing time by the PTO of the application all came while the term of the patent is running. This gives companies a profound incentive to rush the patent through the PTO. Under the old system, companies had the opposite incentive. With patents being issued earlier by the PTO, the issue of erosion of patent term due to delays at the FDA is becoming more serious and more common. The provision in the legislation simply states that in the case of bioterrorism countermeasures, no erosion in the term of the patent will occur. The term of the patent at the date of FDA approval will be the same as the term of the patent when it was issued by the PTO. There is no extension of the patent, simply protections against erosion. Under the new 20 year term, patents might be more or less than 17 years depending on the processing time at the PTO, and all this legislation says is that whatever term is set by the PTO will govern irrespective of the delays at the FDA. This option is available to any company that successfully develops a countermeasure eligible to be purchased by the fund. The second option, the bonus patent term, is only available to small companies with less than $750,000,000 in paid-in capital. It provides that a company that successfully develops a countermeasure is entitled to a two-year extension of any patent in its portfolio. This does not apply to any patent of another company bought or transferred in to the countermeasure research company. I am well aware that this bonus patent term provision will be controversial with some. A company would tend to utilize this option if it owned the patent on a product that still had, or might have, market value at the end of the term of the patent. Because this option is only available to small biotechnology companies, most of whom have no product on the market, in most cases they would be speculating about the value of a product at the end of its patent. The company might apply this provision to a patent that otherwise would be eroded due to FDA delays or it might apply it to a patent that was not eroded. The result might be a patent term that is no longer than the patent term issued by the PTO. It all depends on which companies elect this option and which patent they select. In some cases, the effect of this provision might be to delay the entry onto the market of lower priced generics. This would tend to shift some of the cost of the incentive to develop a countermeasure to insurance companies and patients with an unrelated disease. My rationale for including the patent bonus in the legislation is simple: I want this legislation to say emphatically that we mean business, we are serious, and we want biotechnology companies to reconfigure their research portfolios to focus in part on development of countermeasures. The other provisions in the legislation are powerful, but they may not be sufficient. This proposal protects companies willing to take the risks of producing anti-terrorism products for the American public from potential losses incurred from lawsuits alleging adverse reactions to these products. It also preserves the right for plaintiffs to seek recourse for alleged adverse reactions in Federal District Court, with procedural and monetary limitations. Under the plan, the Secretary of HHS is required to indemnify and defend entities engaged in qualified countermeasure research through execution of ``indemnification and defense agreements.'' This protection is only available for countermeasures purchased under the legislation or to use of such countermeasures as recommended by the Surgeon General in the event of a public health emergency. The legislation contains a series of provisions designed to enhance countermeasure research. The legislation provides for accelerated approval by the FDA of countermeasures developed under the legislation. In most cases, the products would clearly qualify for accelerated approval, but the legislation ensures that they will be reviewed under this process. It provides a statutory basis for the FDA approving countermeasures where human clinical trials are not appropriate or ethical. Rules regarding such products have been promulgated by the FDA. It grants a limited antitrust exemption for certain cooperative research and development of countermeasures. It provides incentives for the construction of biologics manufacturing facilities and research to increase the efficiency of current biologics manufacturing facilities. It enhances the synergy between our for-profit and not for profit biomedical research entities. The Bayh-Dole Act and Stevenson-Wydler Act form the legal framework for mutually beneficially partnerships between academia and industry. My legislation strengthens this synergy and these relationships with two provisions, one to upgrade the basic research infrastructure available to conduct research on countermeasures and the other to increase cooperation between the National Institutes of Health and private companies. Research on countermeasures necessitates the use of special facilities where biological agents can be handled safely without exposing researchers and the public to danger. Very few academic institutions or private companies can justify or capitalize the construction of these special facilities. The Federal government can facilitate research and development of countermeasures by financing the construction of these facilities for use on a fee-for-service basis. The legislation authorizes appropriations for grants to non-profit and for-profit institutions to construct, maintain, and manage up to ten Biosafety Level 3-4 facilities, or their equivalent, in different regions of the country for use in research to develop countermeasures. BSL 3-4 facilities are ones used for research on indigenous, exotic or dangerous agents with potential for aerosol transmission of disease that may have serious or lethal consequences or where the agents pose high risk of life-threatening disease, aerosol-transmitted lab infections, or related agents with unknown risk of transmission. The Director of the Office and NIH shall issue regulations regarding the qualifications of the researchers who may utilize the facilities. Companies that have registered with and been certified by the Director--to develop countermeasures under Section 5 (d) of the legislation--shall be given priority in the use of the facilities. The legislation also reauthorizes a very successful NIH-industry partnership program launched in FY 2000 in Public Law 106-113. The funding is for partnership challenge grants to promote joint ventures between NIH and its grantees and for-profit biotechnology, pharmaceutical and medical device industries with regard to the development of countermeasures, as defined in Section 3 of the bill, and research tools, as defined in Section 4(d)(3) of the bill. Such grants shall be awarded on a one-for-one matching basis. So far the matching grants have focused on development of medicines to treat malaria, tuberculosis, emerging and resistant infections, and therapeutics for emerging threats. My proposal should be matched by reauthorization of the challenge grant program for these deadly diseases. The legislation also sets incentives for the development of adjuvents to enhance the potency, and efficacy of antigens in responding to a biological agent. It requires the new Department to issue annual reports on the effectiveness of this legislation and these incentives, and directs it to host an international conference each year on countermeasure research. This legislation is carefully calibrated to provide incentives only where they are needed. This accounts for the choices in the legislation about which provisions are available to small biotechnology companies and large pharmaceutical companies. The legislation makes choices. It sets the priorities. It provides a dose of incentives and seeks a response in the private sector. We are attempting here to do something that has not been done before. This is uncharted territory. And it also an urgent mission. There may be cases where a countermeasure developed to treat a biological toxin or chemical agent will have applications beyond this use. A broad-spectrum antibiotic capable of treating many different biological agents may well have the capacity to treat naturally occurring diseases. This same issue arises with the Orphan Drug Act, which provides both tax and FDA approval incentives for companies that develop medicines to treat rare diseases. In some cases these treatments can also be used for larger disease populations. There are few who object to this situation. We have come to the judgment that the urgency of this research is worth the possible additional benefits that might accrue to a company. In the context of research to develop countermeasures, I do not consider it a problem that a company might find a broader commercial market for a countermeasure. Indeed, it may well be the combination of the incentives in this legislation and these broader markets that drives the successful development of a countermeasure. If our intense focus on developing countermeasures, and research tools, provides benefits for mankind going well beyond terror weapons, we should rejoice. If this research helps us to develop an effective vaccine or treatment for AIDS, we should give the company the Nobel Prize for Medicine. If we do not develop a vaccine or treatment for AIDS, we may see 100 million people die of AIDS. We also have 400 million people infected with malaria and more than a million annual deaths. Millions of children die of diarrhea, cholera and other deadly and disabling diseases. Countermeasures research may deepen our understanding of the immune system and speed development of treatments for cancer and autoimmune diseases. That is not the central purpose of this legislation, but it is an additional rationale for it. The issue raised by my legislation is very simple: do we want the Federal government to fund and supervise much of the research to develop countermeasures or should we also provide incentives that make it possible for the private sector, at its own expense, and at its own risk, to undertake this research for good business reasons. The Frist- Kennedy law focuses effectively on direct Federal funding and coordination issues, but it does not include sufficient incentives for the private sector to undertake this research on its own initiative. That law and my legislation are perfectly complimentary. We need to enact both to ensure that we are prepared for bioterror attacks. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I thank my friend from California for the steadfast and spirited advocacy she has made of this amendment. We come in about half an hour to another moment of truth. President Bush said earlier in the week that we were at a moment of truth with regard to Iraq and Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction. I agreed with him. In half an hour we come to a different kind of moment of truth in the long, ongoing battle about whether we will preserve the magnificent natural gift we received from our Creator in the Arctic Refuge known as the American Serengeti and inhabited by so many magnificent species of wildlife, for a very small amount of oil. This question, this moment of truth also raises the question about whether we will accept a contention of the Bush administration that somehow, by doing this, we are solving America's energy problem. With all respect, there could not be a more ridiculous contention. The facts are clear. If drilling occurs by the year 2020, our dependence on foreign oil, as a result of the oil from the Arctic Refuge, will be reduced from 62 percent to 60 percent. That is not the road to energy independence. Those of us on both sides of the aisle, Republicans and Democrats, who oppose drilling in the Arctic Refuge support new domestic energy production, including new fossil fuel energy production. In fact, it is worth pointing out that the previous administration leased more land for energy development than either of the preceding two. But it opposed drilling for oil in the Arctic Refuge. Those decisions need not be hazardous to our environment. They need not destroy precious places. Each must be evaluated in light of the specific environmental consequences of the exploration, and our most important shared environmental treasures must be placed off limits. The Arctic Refuge, in my opinion, is one such place. We simply would not gain enough in oil or energy independence to justify long-term harm to this place. The facts in that regard are clear. Setting up the intricate infrastructure required to pump oil out of the refuge will despoil the land and its ecosystems forever. After hundreds of pin pricks, the refuge will be in that sense bleeding, its wildlife will be reeling. We will never be able to get it back to where it was. Supporters of drilling insist on numbers that grossly overestimate the benefits and underestimate the cost. Could the drilling in the refuge coexist with wildlife? Not by a long shot. The USGS, part of the administration, confirmed that development of the refuge would result in substantial environmental destruction. Do we want to tear up this magnificent piece of America for such a tiny reward, when harnessing American technology to improve conservation and efficiency and developing alternative energy sources could reap many times the benefit? To me, the answer is clear. Oil drilling in the refuge is not a path to energy independence. It is not a path to economic security. It is, in fact, a road to ruin, environmental ruin of this wildlife refuge. The oil that would be gained will come and go in almost no time. But the destruction will last forever. This is an unsettled time in our Nation's history. People feel insecure about so much--about the war in Iraq, about terrorism, about economic insecurity. It does seem to me that the decision we make today relates to that. There have to be some places, some things, some values, some natural treasures that do not change, that we have to protect, particularly at this moment. This is a place from which we gain strength, from which we gain purpose, from which we gain tranquility. Let us not, in the pressures of the moment, let it be destroyed forever. I quote, finally, the words of Theodore Roosevelt, who may be considered in his time to be an extreme environmentalist. In 1916 TR said: The greatest good for the greatest number applies to the number within the womb of time, compared to which those now alive form but an insignificant fraction. Our duty to the whole, including the unborn generations, bids us to restrain an unprincipled present-day minority from wasting the heritage of these unborn generations. The final sentence from TR, President Teddy Roosevelt: The movement for the conservation of wildlife and the larger movement for the conservation of all of our natural resources are essentially democratic in spirit, purpose, and method. Those are timeless words which come home to us almost a century later as we face the moment of truth for today and for tomorrow in this vote. I urge my colleagues, please support the best of America. Vote for this amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my friend and colleague from California, Senator Boxer, for introducing this amendment and taking the lead role on it. It is characteristic of the way in which, ever since she came to the Senate, she has been a great champion for environmental protection, for natural resource conservation, and for the protection of the American people from the assaults on their health that are so often represented by environmental pollution. I rise to support the amendment and to say, once again, the issue is joined here about the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Will we allow oil companies to drill for oil on this extraordinary piece of America, one of God's great gifts to this country? The pictures speak much more than 1,000 words about the beauty and magnificence, the tranquility, the sense that you are looking at a piece of Earth the way it looked around the time of creation, if I may take some liberties with the description. Is it worth desecrating--and I use that word advisedly--this magnificent part of America for oil, 6 months' worth of oil, to ruin the natural beauty of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge forever for 6 months' worth of oil which will reduce our dependency on foreign oil by the year 2020, if, God forbid, drilling is allowed, from 62 percent to 60 percent? This question before us invokes the extent to which we value and wish to protect in the spirit not only of Eisenhower but in the spirit of the seminal figure in American government for the conservation ethic, which is another great Republican President, Teddy Roosevelt. Do we value this land and are we prepared to protect it or are we going to desecrate it, diminish it, change it forever for a small amount of oil? Is that really what our energy policy should be about? Does it really offer us any hope of more energy independence which we strive for? The answer of course is, no, it is not worth it. This is a battle that has gone on now in Congress for more than a quarter of a century. It is one of the reasons why I sought to come to the Senate of the United States in my campaign in 1988, because the incumbent Senator I declared against had voted in favor of drilling for oil in the Arctic Refuge. It is a battle I have been proud to continue to wage with colleagues on both sides of the aisle over the 14-plus years I have been here. I feel sometimes as if we are guards at the borders protecting the beauty that those pictures illuminate. Here the issue is joined again and joined, if I may say so, in a way that is a backdoor method. It is kind of an abuse of process, if I can use a term from my old law practice and attorney general days. It is an abuse of practice because it attempts to allow for the drilling for oil in the Arctic Refuge by including the permission and authorization in a budget bill. It does it, of course, for one reason, which is to overcome and avoid the Senate's proud tradition of unlimited debate. Senator Byrd is in the Chamber. I have heard him speak so eloquently about this, and about the extent to which the Senate honors this tradition. Of course, this goes back to the very way in which our Founders and Framers conceived of the Senate, the famous saucer and cup metaphor. I have heard the Senator say, and have been moved by it, the rule of unlimited debate--filibuster, if you will--is there to protect the Nation, its values--in this case its resources, unmatched natural beauty and resources--from falling to the passions of the moment that destroy something timeless, our values, or in this case, again, the natural beauty of a part of America. For what? That is exactly why we ought not as a matter of process allow this end run to occur. I would like to think that even those who favor drilling in the Arctic Refuge would consider voting for this amendment Senator Boxer has introduced just on the principle of it, the process principle of it. If we allow this controversy to be settled in a backdoor method with far less than 60 votes, which would be required on cloture, we are opening the door for this to happen on more and more issues that are of concern to our colleagues. That is the fundamental question that is raised as a matter of process, the substance I have spoken to, a 62- to 60-percent reduction in dependence on foreign oil. This is of course the wrong policy. But we need to invest our resources in alternative, renewable, clean sources of energy. We have so many. We need to depend on sources of energy that are within our possession, not dispersed in unsettled areas of the world that compromise our international security and international independence. We need to require vehicles to be more fuel efficient. That would save much more energy and make us a much stronger country than the drilling for oil in this most beautiful place. The coastal plain of the Arctic Refuge has been called the American Serengeti. It is inhabited by 135 species of birds and 45 species of land mammals. The plain crosses all five different eco-regions of the Arctic. It is breathtakingly beautiful. Some will argue in this debate, as they have off the floor, that you can somehow put oil wells and pipelines into this area, and it is just going to be kind of a small blemish on the landscape of the refuge--a little brown mark on a red apple. But, believe me, this apple will soon be rotten to the core. If we allow these pipelines to go on there and this drilling to occur, there will be a series of blemishes--dozens of holes that will be connected together by roads, pipelines, and other infrastructure. Spidering out of these blemishes would be an elaborate additional infrastructure of roads and pipelines and airstrips and processing plants. The effect of all this has been documented over and over again, most recently in an independent study authorized and requested by the National Academy of Sciences, which documented the impact of the drilling that has gone on in other areas in this part of America, and documented it in a very discouraging and upsetting way. This is going to be a close vote. We have had many close calls in this long-term, very worthy effort to protect the Arctic Refuge. I was with a group of people the other day, advocates who are concerned about the refuge. We were commenting that this battle has been going on for more than a quarter century here in the Senate. I mentioned I had been fighting it for my 15 years in the Senate. There was a lady, a very distinguished woman from the Gwich'in Native American people who inhabit this area, and she said: We have been living here and working to protect and preserve this sacred ground for more than 10,000 years. That is what is on the line here: whether not just the Gwich'in people but all the American people are going to be able to enjoy the tranquility, the perspective, for another 10,000 years, and another 10,000 years beyond that, that comes from the natural magnificence that is dramatized in the pictures Senator Boxer has shown us. This is not a time to ignore the basic conservationist--I would add, conservative--values of our country that teach us we ought not to look at every available natural resource area in our country as something more to exploit. Our values are stronger than that and longer term than that. We owe the Earth that God has given us more respect than that. Nature, after all, reminds us of our humanity. And that is what conservation and this battle on this amendment are all about. So I thank my colleagues of both parties for standing with us. I thank Senator Boxer again for being such a leader, a battler, a champion for what is right. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the No Taxation Without Representation Act of 2003 legislation that will right an ongoing injustice experienced by 600,000 American citizens--the citizens of the District of Columbia--who have historically been denied voting representation in Congress. This injustice is felt directly by District residents, but it is also a stain on the fabric of our democracy for the Nation as a whole. By now, we should all understand that the vote is a civic entitlement of every American citizen. It is democracy's most essential right, our most useful tool. I am proud to be the chief Senate sponsor of this bill, which Congresswoman Norton is also today introducing in the House. I am delighted that Senator Feingold, who has worked with me for two years on this legislation, is joining me again as an original sponsor, as are Senators Daschle, Durbin, Mikulski, Schumer, Kennedy, Dodd, Landrieu and Kerry. The aim of the legislation is simple: It would provide full voting representation in Congress--through two senators and a member of the House--to citizens of the District, providing to them the same rights to participate in our democracy as citizens in the 50 States. Despite this bill's title, it would not exempt residents of the District from paying income taxes. Last year, the Governmental Affairs Committee, which I then chaired, held a hearing on this issue in May. It was the first time since 1994 that Congress had held a hearing on the issue. Five months later, in October, the Committee reported out legislation identical to the bill we introduce today. I am proud that we progressed as far as we did last year. Unfortunately it was not far enough. Today, I think it is particularly ironic--though painfully so--that we are introducing this legislation as the Nation stands on the brink of a decision about war with Iraq to protect our national security. If war does come, citizens of Washington D.C. will serve their fellow Americans with pride, as they have in every previous war. In fact, the District suffered more casualties in Vietnam than the citizens of 10 states. Furthermore, over 1,000 Army and Air National Guardsmen and women from the District have already been called upon to help in the war on terrorism. Yet--to our shame--D.C. citizens cannot choose representatives to the legislature that governs them. There is something wrong with this picture. The people of this city have also been the direct target of terrorists, and yet citizens of the District have no one who can cast a vote in Congress on policies to protect their homeland security. Citizens of Washington, D.C., pay income taxes just like everyone else. Actually, they pay more. Per capita, District residents have the second highest Federal tax obligation. And yet they have no say in how high those taxes will be or how their tax dollars will be spent. They fight and die and pay for our democracy, but they cannot participate fully in it. How can we countenance this? How can we promote democracy abroad effectively while denying it to hundreds of thousands of citizens in our Nation's Capital? The citizens who live in our Nation's Capital deserve more than a nonvoting delegate in the House. Notwithstanding the strong service of the Honorable Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton and her ability to vote in committee, a representative without the power to vote on the floor of the House simply isn't good enough. Prior to the District's establishment in 1790, residents of the area who were eligible to vote had full representation in Congress. When the framers of the Constitution placed our Capital under the jurisdiction of the Congress, they placed with Congress the responsibility of ensuring that D.C. citizens' rights would be protected in the future, just as Congress should protect the rights of all citizens throughout the land. For more than 200 years, Congress has failed to meet this obligation. And I, for one, am not prepared to make D.C. citizens wait another 200 years. Today, no other democratic nation denies the residents of its capital representation in the national legislature. What must visitors from around the world think when they come to see our beautiful landmarks, our monuments, and our Capitol dome--proud symbols of the world's leading democracy--only to learn that the citizens of this city have no voice in Congress? What would we do if the residents of Boston, Nashville, Denver, Seattle, or El Paso had no voting rights? All those cities are roughly the same size as Washington, D.C.--and I know we as a Nation wouldn't let their citizens go voiceless in the Congress. Incredibly, the vast majority of Americans already believe that D.C. residents have voting representation in the Congress. When they are informed that they don't, 80 percent of Americans, according to one poll, say that they should. That is overwhelming support and by righting this wrong, we will be following the will of the American people. The people of the District of Columbia have been without this key right for far too long. I urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the No Taxation Without Representation Act of 2003 legislation that will right an ongoing injustice experienced by 600,000 American citizens--the citizens of the District of Columbia--who have historically been denied voting representation in Congress. This injustice is felt directly by District residents, but it is also a stain on the fabric of our democracy for the Nation as a whole. By now, we should all understand that the vote is a civic entitlement of every American citizen. It is democracy's most essential right, our most useful tool. I am proud to be the chief Senate sponsor of this bill, which Congresswoman Norton is also today introducing in the House. I am delighted that Senator Feingold, who has worked with me for two years on this legislation, is joining me again as an original sponsor, as are Senators Daschle, Durbin, Mikulski, Schumer, Kennedy, Dodd, Landrieu and Kerry. The aim of the legislation is simple: It would provide full voting representation in Congress--through two senators and a member of the House--to citizens of the District, providing to them the same rights to participate in our democracy as citizens in the 50 States. Despite this bill's title, it would not exempt residents of the District from paying income taxes. Last year, the Governmental Affairs Committee, which I then chaired, held a hearing on this issue in May. It was the first time since 1994 that Congress had held a hearing on the issue. Five months later, in October, the Committee reported out legislation identical to the bill we introduce today. I am proud that we progressed as far as we did last year. Unfortunately it was not far enough. Today, I think it is particularly ironic--though painfully so--that we are introducing this legislation as the Nation stands on the brink of a decision about war with Iraq to protect our national security. If war does come, citizens of Washington D.C. will serve their fellow Americans with pride, as they have in every previous war. In fact, the District suffered more casualties in Vietnam than the citizens of 10 states. Furthermore, over 1,000 Army and Air National Guardsmen and women from the District have already been called upon to help in the war on terrorism. Yet--to our shame--D.C. citizens cannot choose representatives to the legislature that governs them. There is something wrong with this picture. The people of this city have also been the direct target of terrorists, and yet citizens of the District have no one who can cast a vote in Congress on policies to protect their homeland security. Citizens of Washington, D.C., pay income taxes just like everyone else. Actually, they pay more. Per capita, District residents have the second highest Federal tax obligation. And yet they have no say in how high those taxes will be or how their tax dollars will be spent. They fight and die and pay for our democracy, but they cannot participate fully in it. How can we countenance this? How can we promote democracy abroad effectively while denying it to hundreds of thousands of citizens in our Nation's Capital? The citizens who live in our Nation's Capital deserve more than a nonvoting delegate in the House. Notwithstanding the strong service of the Honorable Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton and her ability to vote in committee, a representative without the power to vote on the floor of the House simply isn't good enough. Prior to the District's establishment in 1790, residents of the area who were eligible to vote had full representation in Congress. When the framers of the Constitution placed our Capital under the jurisdiction of the Congress, they placed with Congress the responsibility of ensuring that D.C. citizens' rights would be protected in the future, just as Congress should protect the rights of all citizens throughout the land. For more than 200 years, Congress has failed to meet this obligation. And I, for one, am not prepared to make D.C. citizens wait another 200 years. Today, no other democratic nation denies the residents of its capital representation in the national legislature. What must visitors from around the world think when they come to see our beautiful landmarks, our monuments, and our Capitol dome--proud symbols of the world's leading democracy--only to learn that the citizens of this city have no voice in Congress? What would we do if the residents of Boston, Nashville, Denver, Seattle, or El Paso had no voting rights? All those cities are roughly the same size as Washington, D.C.--and I know we as a Nation wouldn't let their citizens go voiceless in the Congress. Incredibly, the vast majority of Americans already believe that D.C. residents have voting representation in the Congress. When they are informed that they don't, 80 percent of Americans, according to one poll, say that they should. That is overwhelming support and by righting this wrong, we will be following the will of the American people. The people of the District of Columbia have been without this key right for far too long. I urge all of my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation to designate the coastal plain of the Arctic Refuge as wilderness. America's dependence on foreign oil is an urgent and stubborn problem. But the answer isn't in the ground. It's in our heads. We have to apply the genius of America to engineer a solution to energy independence, not hope that we will magically find one in the deposits under Alaska. The facts on this are clear. Alaska has at a most 6 month supply of oil--not a drop of which will be available for a decade. The United States Energy Information Administration--part of the Bush administration--itself concluded that full development of the Refuge would reduce our projected dependence on foreign oil from 62 to 60 percent at the very most, and not until 2020. For that, is it worth forever losing a national treasure, one of our last great wild places? I say no. Instead, I say yes to a smart, forward-looking strategy to wean our economy off its addiction to foreign oil without sacrificing our natural treasures. Despite my colleagues arguments to the contrary, I believe it is finally established that there is no way--no way--to drill in the Arctic without disrupting and essentially destroying that precious place. For too long, drilling advocates have attempted to raise questions about the impacts of drilling. It is time for the facts to carry the day. In fact, just today, the National Academies of Science released a report detailing the cumulative impacts of oil development on Alaska's North Slope. The NAS not only found that Arctic oil development has adversely impacted populations of caribou, birds and bowhead whales-- more importantly, they said that future drilling would pose grave threats to the Arctic's environmental health. As the report stated in a section entitled ``The Essential Trade-Off,'' the question for Congress is whether the available oil is worth the ``inevitable accumulated undesirable effects.'' With so little impact on our oil dependence predicted, the answer is clearly no. In every poll, we see that the majority of Americans oppose ruining the Arctic for oil. And, as we established last year, the majority of the U.S. Senate agrees with them. Once and for all, let's respect that desire, and let's protect this precious place. Let's pass this bill. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, if I may paraphrase Winston Churchill, the ``only thing worse than this treaty would be not having this treaty at all.'' So I rise this afternoon in support of this treaty--a good but ultimately insufficient treaty--and in support of my colleagues' amendments to it. I rise also to lend my voice to a related resolution that I drafted with the minority leader and several of my colleagues, which enunciates the beginnings of a coherent non-proliferation strategy. A little over one decade ago we awoke to the sound of freedom. The Berlin Wall had fallen; brothers and sisters who had been kept forcibly apart were able, once more, to take up the rights which are enshrined in our own Declaration of Independence, rights which we all too often take for granted. The Soviet empire was no more. It was the beginning of a new era. The threat of nuclear war, at least between two great superpowers, had lifted. It soon became clear that the newest threat to our security, the increased chance of proliferation wrought by the fall of the Soviet empire, was perhaps an even greater challenge. The sword had slipped from the giant's hand. We knew then and we know now, that we had no choice but to take action and prevent those who would do us harm by picking the sword up again. We in the Congress and our President acted with resolve. We moved to strengthen international institutions and systems designed to prevent the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. And we were successful. The nuclear capable states of the former Soviet Union, one by one, renounced the use and possession of nuclear weapons and returned them to Russia. We had a few setbacks along the way, but overall we have managed to contain proliferation. But now I fear that this President has lost his way, and is undoing the good progress of previous administrations. The fact is, the events of September 11, 2001 should be a rallying cry for non-proliferation--we can imagine all too well the results if those who masterminded the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, had access to weapons of mass destruction. Yet since then, the Bush administration has unwisely led our Nation and the international community down a meandering path of policy choices with only one clear outcome: the increase of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In doing so, their choices have raised more questions instead of settling them. Why has the administration failed to engage North Korea, the prime proliferator of missiles and the greatest threat for immediate nuclear proliferation in direct talks? Why has the President chosen to ignore the advice of General John Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and instead actively pursued new uses for, and types of, nuclear weapons, when such action will erode the nuclear firebreak? Why has the administration failed to meet the Baker-Cutler funding benchmarks for nonproliferation and arms control programs? Why has the administration failed to fully invest in the Nunn-Lugar program? Where is the long-term strategy to diplomatically engage proliferating nations? I agree with President Bush that ``history will judge harshly those who saw this coming and failed to act.'' However, at a time when the international community needs leadership and guidance on this issue, the administration is virtually silent. Too often on arms control and non-proliferation, America has become a colossus that oscillates between pouting and shouting. In contrast, the resolution that my colleagues and I are introducing today gives this nation a strong, clear, and constructive voice on these critical issues. Here and now we call for the administration to rebuild the broad international coalition against proliferation that it has permitted, and even encouraged, to deteriorate over the past two years. We call for the full funding of all Federal non-proliferation and arms control programs to the levels prescribed by the Baker-Cutler report. We call for engaging North Korea in direct and full talks. We call for the expansion of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to include additional states willing to engage in bilateral efforts to reduce their nuclear stockpiles. These would be acts of strength by the strongest nation in the history of the world and they would be acts of wisdom because these acts would increase our security. The bottom line: the United States must start now to rebuild the international community's consensus on stopping proliferation in its tracks. The measures outlined in our resolution will begin to do just that. On September 11, 2001, in a single fell blow, we learned just how vulnerable we may be if we do not act with foresight and urgency on containing weapons of mass destruction. Today, I believe everyone in this chamber understands that we cannot speak of homeland security without addressing non-proliferation. We cannot debate national security without including arms control. This Nation requires a coherent non-proliferation policy, and a clear voice on the matter in the international community. This resolution is the start.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to pay tribute to the life and career of Connecticut State Senator Alvin Penn, who died an untimely death on Friday, February 14, at the age of 54. Alvin was a passionate and principled fighter who sought to give people of all races and backgrounds the equal opportunity that is every American's birthright. Through difficult times, he never wavered in serving his beloved city of Bridgeport. And those of us who were blessed to know him will always remember him as a larger than life human being with a generous spirit and sharp and unsinkable sense of humor. As chairman of the State senate's public safety committee, Senator Penn banned the insidious practice of racial profiling and improved the State's witness protection program. Thanks to Senator Penn's work on this committee and others, Bridgeport has better schools, safer streets, and more prosperous neighborhoods than it did a decade ago. The city of Bridgeport and the state of Connecticut, of course, still have their share of troubles--but Alvin never gave up, never let the steepness of the hill stop him from trying to climb. He understood that to get to the mountaintop, you must keep going up. That is what he did. State Senator Penn did not take orders from special interests or party bosses. He listened to, and did what was right for, the people he served. Eight years ago, Alvin met with Gov. John Rowland, and told the Governor, ``You're a Republican from Waterbury and I'm a Democrat from Bridgeport. We understand the issues of our urban communities.'' He pledged to work together--and his word was good. The city of Bridgeport will always hold State Senator Penn close to its heart. He is a part of its history, its present, and will be a part of its future. There is not yet an Alvin Penn memorial in Bridgeport-- though there may someday be. For now, his legacy, and his memorial, is in every school and business and church, and every citizen on every street corner in the city he loved to serve.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation to designate the coastal plain of the Arctic Refuge as wilderness. America's dependence on foreign oil is an urgent and stubborn problem. But the answer isn't in the ground. It's in our heads. We have to apply the genius of America to engineer a solution to energy independence, not hope that we will magically find one in the deposits under Alaska. The facts on this are clear. Alaska has at a most 6 month supply of oil--not a drop of which will be available for a decade. The United States Energy Information Administration--part of the Bush administration--itself concluded that full development of the Refuge would reduce our projected dependence on foreign oil from 62 to 60 percent at the very most, and not until 2020. For that, is it worth forever losing a national treasure, one of our last great wild places? I say no. Instead, I say yes to a smart, forward-looking strategy to wean our economy off its addiction to foreign oil without sacrificing our natural treasures. Despite my colleagues arguments to the contrary, I believe it is finally established that there is no way--no way--to drill in the Arctic without disrupting and essentially destroying that precious place. For too long, drilling advocates have attempted to raise questions about the impacts of drilling. It is time for the facts to carry the day. In fact, just today, the National Academies of Science released a report detailing the cumulative impacts of oil development on Alaska's North Slope. The NAS not only found that Arctic oil development has adversely impacted populations of caribou, birds and bowhead whales-- more importantly, they said that future drilling would pose grave threats to the Arctic's environmental health. As the report stated in a section entitled ``The Essential Trade-Off,'' the question for Congress is whether the available oil is worth the ``inevitable accumulated undesirable effects.'' With so little impact on our oil dependence predicted, the answer is clearly no. In every poll, we see that the majority of Americans oppose ruining the Arctic for oil. And, as we established last year, the majority of the U.S. Senate agrees with them. Once and for all, let's respect that desire, and let's protect this precious place. Let's pass this bill. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record.