Joseph Lieberman

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Then why require that the President come back a second time to seek such authorization?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend. I agree it is rare we disagree, so I do so with respect. That is my point. I believe the threat is real. The weapons of mass destruction threat is real. Whether it is imminent or not, I do not know. As I said, the analogy that comes to mind is of a bomb on a timer. I don't know whether the timer is set to go off in a day or a year. But because the danger is so real, I don't want to establish the standard of imminence before the United Nations or the President of the United States can act to eliminate the danger.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I will bring this to a close.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, what weapons, exactly, does Saddam Hussein have, and what could he do with them? When we are talking about this dangerous dictator, that is not a hypothetical question. We can see what he has done already with the chemicals he has developed. We don't have to imagine; we need only extrapolate. Saddam Hussein not only has large and growing stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. He alone among the dictators of the world has shown a willingness to use them. In the 1980s Iran-Iraq War, Iraqi troops repeatedly used poison gas, including mustard gas and the nerve agent sarin, against Iranian soldiers. And Saddam has repeatedly attacked Kurds in the north with chemical weapons, namely nerve agents and mustard gas, the most horrifying single attack coming in Halabja in 1988. It is one thing to see nations accumulate dangerous weapons for purely deterrent and defensive purposes. It is another entirely to see a dictator develop such weapons and deploy them to murder opponents of his regime and wage offensive war against a neighbor. That is why we must look with special scrutiny on Saddam's stockpiles. When the U.N. inspectors were forced out of Iraq in 1998, here is what was unaccounted for: up to 360 tons of bulk chemical warfare agents, including one and a half tons of VX nerve agent; up to 3,00 tons of precursor chemicals; growth media sufficient to produce 26,000 liters of anthrax spores; and over 30,000 special munitions for delivery of chemical and biological agents. Those are just the leftovers that we know about. Then add to that all the deadly weapons that Saddam has been cooking up over the last 11 years. We know Iraq continues to produce chemical agents for chemical weapons. We know Saddam has rebuilt previously destroyed production plants across Iraq. We know he has retained the key personnel formerly engaged in the chemical weapons program. He has mustard gas, VX nerve agent, and a range of other chemical weapons. The record repeats itself with biological weapons. Intelligence shows us that production has continued. Facilities formerly used for biological weapons have been rebuilt. Equipment has been purchased. And Saddam has retained the personnel who worked on it before the gulf war. Indeed, UNSCOM found that Iraq was working to build mobile biological weapons facilities which are easier to conceal. It appears that they now have such facilities. The biological agents we believe Iraq can produce include anthrax, botulinum, toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. Perhaps we recite the litany, ``chemical, biological, working on nuclear,'' so often that it loses some of its meaning. British Prime Minister Tony Blair has warned against us developing a kind of ``word fatigue'' when it comes to these weapons, and I take that warning to heart. ``New Yorker'' writer Jeffrey Goldberg has traveled to the region and done significant reporting on Saddam's capabilities and his intentions--on his deadly weapons and his brutal will. Let me read a piece Mr. Goldberg wrote in the online magazine Slate that puts Saddam's possession of at least one of these toxins in sharp relief. I quote: In 1995, the government of Saddam Hussein admitted to United Nations weapons inspectors that its scientists had weaponized a biological agent called aflatoxin. Charles Duelfer, the former deputy executive chairman of the now-- defunct UNSCOM, told me earlier this year that the Iraqi admission was startling because aflatoxin has no possible battlefield use. Aflatoxin, which is made from fungi that occur in moldy grains, does only one thing well: It causes liver cancer. In fact, it induces it particularly well in children. Its effects are far from immediate. The joke among weapons inspectors is that aflatoxin would stop a lieutenant from making colonel, but it would not stop soldiers from advancing across a battlefield. I quoted Duelfer, in an article that appeared in the New Yorker, saying that ``we kept pressing the Iraqis to discuss the concept of use of aflatoxin.'' They never came up with an adequate explanation, he said. They did admit, however, that they had loaded aflatoxin into two warheads capable of being fitted onto Scud missiles. Richard Spertzel, who was the chief biological weapons inspector for UNSCOM, told me that aflatoxin is ``a devilish weapon. From a moral standpoint, aflatoxin is the cruelest weapons, it means watching children die slowly of liver cancer.'' Spertzel went on to say that, to his knowledge, Iraq is the only country ever to weaponize aflatoxin. In an advertisement that appeared in the New York Times on Tuesday, a group of worthies called upon the American people to summon the courage to question the war plans of President Bush. The advertisement, which was sponsored by Common Cause, asks, in reference to the Saddam regime, ``Of all the repugnant dictatorships, why this one?'' . . . . . . There are, of course, many repugnant dictators in the world; a dozen or so in the Middle East alone. But Saddam Hussein is a figure of singular repugnance, and singular danger. To review: There is no dictator in power anywhere in the world who has, so far in his career, invaded two neighboring countries; fired ballistic missiles at the civilians of two other neighboring countries; tried to have assassinated an ex-president of the United States; harbored al-Quaida fugitives; attacked civilians with chemical weapons; attacked the soldiers of an enemy country with chemical weapons; conducted biological weapons experiments on human subjects; committed genocide; and then there is, of course, the matter of the weaponized aflatoxin, a tool of mass murder and nothing else. I do not know how any thinking person could believe that Saddam Hussein is a run-of-the-mill dictator. No one else comes close . . . to matching his extraordinary and variegated record of malevolence. Earlier this year, while traveling across northern Iraq, I interviewed more than 100 survivors of Saddam's campaign of chemical genocide. I will not recite the statistics, or recount the horror stories here, except to say that I met enough barren and cancer-ridden women in Iraqi Kurdistan to last me several lifetimes. So: Saddam Hussein is uniquely evil, the only ruler in power today--and the first one since Hitler--to commit chemical genocide. Is that enough of a reason to remove him from power? I would say yes, if ``never again'' is in fact actually to mean ``never again.'' That is why every day this man remains in power is a day of danger for the American people, the Iraqi people, and, indeed, the people of the world. Let me give you one more example that is as disturbing as aflatoxin. It is botulinum toxin, the cause of botulism, which comes from bacteria found in the soil. After the gulf war, United Nations weapons inspectors found that Iraq had produced tons of botulinum toxin, some of it loaded into missiles and bombs. Let me repeat. Years ago, inspectors found tons, some of it weaponized. So we know Saddam has experience with this weapon. For smallpox, there is a vaccine. Anthrax and other bacterial agents can be treated with antibiotics. But botulism is a toxin, a poisonous chemical made by bacteria. Let than a handful of pure botulinum toxin, evenly dispersed in an aerosol, would be enough to kill more than a million people. The only treatment for botulism poisoning is an anti- toxin made from horse serum, and it only works about half the time. There is a horror story for every biological or chemical agent in this man's arsenal. I don't need to go through them all. We only need to understand that these horror stories could come true if we do not confront Saddam's devious designs. Some insist, and I don't understand this claim, that chemical and biological weapons aren't all that troubling. They say we need only really worry about nuclear weapons. Given what I have just explained, I think that is a dangerous assumption. But assume for a moment that Saddam has no chemical weapons and no biological weapons. Would there be cause for forceful United Nations action, and, failing that, American military action? I say, yes, without a doubt. There is now a consensus belief that Saddam could have an atomic weapon within months of acquiring fissile material. Based on the best estimates, his regime could manufacture the fuel itself within as little as 3 years. There is no way to measure now long it might take Saddam to acquire the fuel from an outside source. He could be attempting to do so as we speak. Indeed, it would be naive to assume otherwise. This leads to a critical question, and perhaps the threshold question in the debate. How long do my fellow Senators suggest we wait? Until we know, beyond dispute, if there is ever such evidence beyond dispute, that Saddam is 1 month away from obtaining a nuclear weapon and the means to deliver it? Until we know beyond dispute that he is a week away? Or perhaps we should wait until he has it? In 1996, the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, reported that Iraq had all the materials for a bomb except for the fissile material itself--either plutonium or highly enriched uranium. It is now 6 years later. The debate about whether Saddam is an ``imminent'' threat is an interesting one. What better defines imminence than the facts that I have just outlined? In fact, we must admit that the only conclusive proof of imminence could come in the hindsight, when innocents are sorting through the rubble and counting the injured or the dead. As National Security Advisor Condaleeza Rice said, the smoking gun could be a mushroom cloud. Or add to that a yellow cloud of mustard gas, an invisible cloud of sarin gas, or the slow and silent spread of smallpox. I know, despite all this evidence, much of which is beyond dispute, some say, ``There is no new evidence.'' I have two answers to that. One, we don't need new evidence. The existing evidence of his capabilities and intent is more than enough to paint a poisonous picture. Two, there is, in fact, new evidence. For instance, the fact that, once acquiring fissile material, Saddam will be just months of developing a nuclear weapon, is new. And it underlines the urgency of defanging this dictator immediately. In fact, here is a brief review what we know about what Saddam has done since the departure of the U.N. weapons inspections in 1998. British Prime Minister Tony Blair laid this out to the Parliament last month. Since 1998, we know that Saddam has sought or attempted to buy: specialized vacuum pumps, the type needed for the gas centrifuge to enrich uranium; an entire magnet production lien of the type for use in the motors and top bearings of gas centrifuges; dual use products such as Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride and fluoride gas; a filament winding machine, which can be used to manufacture carbon fiber gas centrifuge rotors; 60,000 or more specialized aluminum tubes, which are subject to strict controls due to their potential use in the construction of gas centrifuges. And Saddam has been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium, though we do not know whether he has been successful. Key personnel from his old nuclear weapons program are at work again. Iraq claims that this is for a civil nuclear power program but it has no nuclear powerplants. We can search for the most innocuous possible explanation, of each and every disturbing piece of evidence, or we can look realistically at the totality of the evidence. And what about delivery systems? Iraq is supposed to only have limited missile capability for conventional weaponry. But we know that a significant number of longer- range missiles were concealed from the previous inspectors, including up to 20 extended range Scud missiles. We know that 2001, Iraq's plans entered a new stage and that now, the regime's development of weapons with a range over 600 miles. Hundreds of key personnel are working on the delivery systems. The danger will not abate unless we make it abate. it will only grow. And we will be forced to simply wait and see how, when, and against whom Saddam will use these weapons. What more do we need to know? Some say that removing Saddam Hussein from power would compromise the wider war against terrorism. But to me, the two are inextricably linked. First, remember that Iraq under Saddam is one of only seven nations in the world to be designated by our State Department as a state sponsor of terrorism. He provides aid, funding, and training to terrorists who have killed Americans and others. He hosted the Abu Nidal Organization, whose leader was found dead in Baghdad in August. He gives money to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. Second, Saddam himself meets the definition of a terrorist, someone who attacks civilians to achieve a political purpose. He has done so repeatedly against the Kurds in the north of Iraq, as well as against the Shi'a in the south. If he is willing to kill thousands of Iraqis, how many Americans or Europeans do we think he considers expendable? Third, though the relationship between al-Qaida and Saddam's regime is a subject of intense debate within the intelligence community, we do have evidence of meetings between Iraqi officials and leaders of al- Qaida, and some testimony that Iraqi agents helped train al-Qaida operatives to use chemical and biological weapons. We also know that senior leaders of al-Qaida have been and are now harbored in Iraq. It is not speculation to suggest that Iraq might pass chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorists. It is realism. There are other state sponsors of terrorism, all of which pose serious dangers to the security of America and the world. But Saddam's is the only regime that combines a record of supporting terrorists with a history of killing and torturing dissidents, ambitions to dominate his region, growing stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons and a willingness to use them. That is why the danger he poses rises above the rest on the topography of terror. In my view, if we remove his pernicious influence from the Middle East and free the Iraqi people to determine their own destiny, we will transform the politics of the region, and advance the war against terrorism, not set it back as some have suggested. In April 1917, in requesting a congressional declaration to enter what was then known as the Great War, Woodrow Wilson said, ``We act without animus, not in enmity toward a people or with the desire to bring any injury or disadvantage upon them, but only in armed opposition to an irresponsible government which has thrown aside all considerations of humanity and of right and is running amuck.'' The same can be said if and when we must confront Saddam's brutal regime. We will not be fighting the Iraqi people. Our goal, to the contrary, will be to liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny even as we remove the threat from this rabid regime. But we must prove that good and decent intent not only on the day we commit arms, if we must, on the day we win. We must prove our commitment to building a better nation for the Iraqi people on the day after the day after, and the day after that, when we will face, and help the Iraqi people to face, the broad range of humanitarian, economic, diplomatic, and political problems that will no doubt present themselves. The wars we wage are measured by the quality of the peace that follows. I know that some fear the future of Iraq post-Saddam. They fear the risks, the responsibilities, and the costs, so much that those fears of tomorrow lead them to justify inaction today. To me, post-Saddam Iraq is not a burden to be shunned but an opportunity to be seized. It must become a signal to the world, particularly the Islamic world, of our Nation's best intentions. Indeed, post-Suddam Iraq will be a test of America and our values. We have barely earned a passing grade on our first test, in post-Taliban Afghanistan. We cannot afford to scrape and slip by again, because this time the stakes are higher, the stage larger, and the consequences of failure even more dire. How do we lay the foundation for a civil and open society after the fighting stops and the likely celebrations in the streets subside? First, we must we invest in Iraq's security. Some will be tempted to shortchange our post-Saddam commitment by whittling down a security presence to the smallest possible size we think we can get away with, or by pulling our forces out the first open window. But we must learn from Afghanistan, where, despite a brilliant military victory and early movements toward a stable and civil society, some big mistakes have been made. Perhaps due to the Bush administration's stated aversion to nation building, we failed to establish a peacekeeping presence strong enough or geographically wide enough to tame the factionalism and ethnic conflict that have plagued Afghanistan for years. We failed to get ready to deal with the decrepit state of the nation's infrastructure caused by the long civil war that preceded our involvement. And, though our nations assisted us in our military victory, we did not leverage their investment to give them sufficient stake in a responsibility in a long-term peace. As a result, the situation on the ground in Afghanistan is tenuous today. Warlords control the countryside. Hamid Karzai's rule in Kabul is uncertain. His ministers have been assassinated. Karzai himself came within a hair's breath of assassination. Have we lost the peace? No. But the current instability can, if left to fester, give rise to terrorism. oppression, and civil war. It is not too late to correct our course. That is why Senator Hagel and I have sponsored the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, currently before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The bill would commit to the country's stability, security, and democratic development by investing $2.5 billion over 4 years in economic, political, and humanitarian assistance, including a half billion dollars toward an enterprise fund for business development and job creation and $300 million in military and security assistance for police training and crime control. It would also urge President Bush to expand the international security force beyond Kabul, and, if that decision were made, would authorize $1 billion over the next two years to make that possible. This is extremely important legislation that deserves broad legislative and public support. Now we must hear from the administration that they are ready with specific plans for Iraq that will not repeat the mistakes of Afghanistan. In fact, we have to face the fact that the best-case military scenario--the rapid collapse of the Iraqi military and the swift capture or elimination of Saddam--would also present the most challenging security scenario. The three most immediate security objectives will be securing all chemical, biological and nuclear weapons sites and relevant personnel, tracking down Saddam's remaining secret police, and preventing potential Iranian military interference. Simultaneously, among the Iraqi people at large, U.S. forces must be ready immediately to shift gears to post-conflict operations, helping to restore order and handling humanitarian emergencies. Despite its tremendous training and talent, our military needs more specialized teams to take on this crucial job. The administration should also work with non-governmental organizations to recruit Iraqi-American and other Arab-American volunteers who can help peacekeepers and humanitarian organizations communicate with the Iraqi people, distribute supplies, assist in healthcare delivery, and do other critical jobs. A similar volunteer program worked in the Balkans and can work again in Iraq. Like the military campaign itself, stabilizing post-Saddam Iraq and tending to the Iraqi people will be aided dramatically if the United States is part of a international coalition, especially one that includes Muslim and Arab nations. That will make clear to Iraqis and the world that our enemy is Saddam and not the Iraqi people, and just as Saddam is a threat to the world, securing and rebuilding Iraq is the duty of the world. The bottom line is this: While Afghanistan's growing instability is deeply troubling, allowing post-Saddam Iraq, which abuts Syria and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Kuwait and Turkey, to fall into civil war or into the hands of another dictator would be disastrous. If post- Saddam Iraq unravels, as Afghanistan is at risk of doing, so will the credibility and the effectiveness of our wider war against terrorism. And we will be that much closer to a global civilization war. Once security and stability are established in post-Saddam Iraq, we must begin to establish the foundation for democratic governance and the rule of law. I am pleased that the Bush administration has begun bringing key opposition groups together to lay what a foundation for an honest, effective, and representative government. Iraq is a divided nation, with at least three key regions and three key religious, ethnic, and political factions. But let's be clear. Post-Saddam Iraqi governance will take more than a couple of conference calls to get right. And we must be very careful here. Our goal is not replacing Baghdad with New York on the Tigris. We do not want an American client state, and we can't expect a democracy that overnight looks exactly like ours. We must be realistic. This process will require the sustained guidance, partnership, and investment of our nation and our allies, working with the Iraqi people. The war against terrorism, including this effort to disarm Iraq, is like no other war we have waged. If we are true to our principles, we can again make the world a safer and better place, not only for us Americans but for people in Iraq and throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, who deserve the freedom and opportunity that we declared at the birth of our Nation 226 years ago: the endowment each human being receives at birth from our Creator.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I rise to oppose, respectfully, the amendment introduced by the Senator from Illinois. The underlying resolution, building on 11 years in which the world community has tried every way imaginable, except war, to get Saddam Hussein to keep the promises he made at the end the gulf war to disarm, is a strong resolution. This amendment would diminish it, and in that sense it would also diminish its effectiveness to convince the United Nations to act so we do not have to form our own international coalition. In two regards, it also diminishes the authority of the Commander in Chief, as granted by our resolution, and does so in a way that is far more restrictive than most any authorizing resolution for war or military action that I have seen before. First, it introduces the word ``imminent'' in place of the words ``continuing threat.'' We say in our resolution that the President may use the Armed Forces of the United States in order to defend the national security of our country against the continuing threat posed by Iraq. The Durbin amendment would change that to the imminent threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. In changing it to ``imminent,'' which is a temporal term--it suggests time, that something is about to happen soon--it adds a qualification that I think is unwarranted. In the totality of Saddam Hussein's evil administration, weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, there is a threat that is real to us, and I am convinced will be used against the American people unless we act, hopefully through the United Nations, to disarm him. So while it might not be imminent in the sense that he is about to use it against us, in my opinion it is a ticking time bomb. We do not know exactly how many seconds or minutes or hours are left on that timer. I don't want the President to be limited to an imminent threat to use the power we are giving him here. Second, it limits that authority for the President to act only in regard to an imminent threat of weapons of mass destruction. The resolution we have introduced provides two conditions under which the President may use the Armed Forces to defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. This harkens back to a colloquy I had with Senator Specter of Pennsylvania yesterday. It seems to me these two parts have to be read in totality as modifying each other. The resolutions that are relevant in the U.N. Security Council are to be enforced particularly in relationship to the extent to which they threaten the national security of the United States. In doing this, we are expressing our understanding that the President is unlikely to go to war to enforce a resolution of the United Nations that does not significantly affect the national security of the United States. We want to do what the Constitution invites us to do. Congress is given the authority under article I to declare war. The President under article II is the Commander in Chief. There is a healthy tension there. It is up to Congress to authorize and to the President to act as Commander in Chief with the latitude that authority gives him but also with the accountability and responsibility that authority gives him. I have spent time looking at authorizing resolutions for war or military action from the past. The one that we put together--although some of our colleagues have described it, I think, erroneously as a blank check--is quite limited compared to the declaration of war authorizing and directing the President to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war--this was in the case of World War I--and to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States. We have only one Commander in Chief; 535 Members of Congress cannot effectively conduct a war. We set the parameters, as this resolution does. We authorize. But it is the President ultimately who carries out and serves as our Commander in Chief. That is what our resolution does. That purpose would be significantly altered and, I say respectfully, weakened by the language of the Senator from Illinois, which is why I respectfully oppose his amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I ask that the Chair notify me when a minute remains so I may terminate my remarks.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. If he determines the threat is not imminent, then he cannot take action against those weapons without the U.N. resolution, unless he returns to the Senate.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. This comes directly from my experience as an attorney and attorney general. If you are saying ``pursuant,'' how else--I ask the Senator from Michigan, do you believe, under your amendment, and if there is no resolution of the United Nations regarding destruction of weapons of mass destruction of Iraq, that the President could authorize the use of force?

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I ask for an additional 2 minutes.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from Pennsylvania for his thoughtful question. The intent is the same, although we may have a different understanding of what that intent is. I will say that the operative language here may be somewhat different because the circumstances that engendered the resolution of Congress in 1991 are different than now. Then, we had a specific act, which was the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. Resolutions have been passed by the U.N. so that there was specifically reference in the authorizing resolution that Senator Warner and I were privileged to cosponsor in 1991. Now we have a totality of circumstances, including the repeated violation of some of those same resolutions, but others calling for inspections, calling for the destruction of weapons of mass destruction that Saddam Hussein has. In fact, in the initial suggestion of a resolution drafted by the White House, there was an enumeration of specific U.N. resolutions, and Members of Congress negotiating--I believe from the other body--preferred to have the term that we have in there now, giving the President the power to use the Armed Forces to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. In either case, I think what is involved here is an understanding both in the 1991 resolution and in this one that Congress, using its authority under article I of the Constitution to declare war, authorize military action, does so and sets the parameters, but that ultimately, according to article II, it is the President who is the Commander in Chief of the Army, Navy, United States militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. Implicit in that has to be the understanding that the President will use the force that he determines to be necessary and appropriate. As I said yesterday, with the authority to give the President comes accountability. So, bottom line: There are two different circumstances that engender slightly different resolutions. In each case, Congress is fulfilling its responsibility to authorize military action, ultimately, within the parameters set forth in both resolutions. You have to give the President, as Commander in Chief, the authority to make decisions that he deems to be necessary and appropriate in the defense of our national security, and then be held accountable for those decisions.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I probably should let the Senator from Arizona respond because he will do it much more quickly than I.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I will try to do this within a minute and perhaps give time for Senator Specter to clarify this. The whereas clauses, the preamble, speak for themselves. It suggests a totality of circumstances that lead the sponsors of the resolution to want to authorize the President, if all else fails, to take military action against Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Clearly--and what the President has said and what the sponsors of the resolution have said--the focus of our concern is the weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. As we said yesterday, this resolution is intended to send a message to Saddam: Disarm, as you promised to do 11 years ago at the end of the gulf war, or we will use force to disarm you with our allies and the international community. Nonetheless, the other conditions describing the totality of Saddam's brutality--violation of international law, invasion of his neighbors, et cetera--are stated in the preamble and consistent with what I said in response to the earlier question. The President, as Commander in Chief, is given the authority, the responsibility, and accountability to enforce all relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. I do not think anyone expects the President to take military action against Iraq if, hopefully, and in some sense miraculously, Saddam disarms, destroys his ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, allows inspections without any restrictions. Under those circumstances, it is hard to imagine the President would authorize military action, for instance, in regard to some of the lesser U.N. resolutions as generally understood by this body.

Mr. LIEBERMAN

Mr. LIEBERMAN. In Afghanistan?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. First, I want to say I agree with the Senator totally concerning his comments about Afghanistan, and I hope if the time comes, as I hope and pray it will, that there is a post-Saddam Iraq, we will learn from the mistakes that were made in post-Taliban Afghanistan and devote ourselves to broad peacekeeping which will be necessary in the economic and political redevelopment of the country internationally. But my question----

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. In that case, is it not true the Senator from Michigan is adding a word, which is the word ``imminent''?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Now we have joined the issue. Then I ask the Senator this final question: Would it be the Senator's opinion that enforcement of outstanding U.N. Security Council resolutions would amount to an act of self-defense and, therefore, the President of the United States could do that without an authorizing resolution from the United Nations?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I will read it: Pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Security Council described in section 3(2) that is adopted after the enactment of this joint resolution . . . the President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States. . . .

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I do not think we will ever go it alone because we are going to the United Nations. But how then does the Senator read section 4(a) of his amendment, which says clearly that the President can only use the Armed Forces of the United States to destroy, disarm Iraq's weapons of mass destruction if there is U.N. permission?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator from Michigan is quite correct. The difference, I want to respectfully suggest, is in the context--in the historical context. There was an invasion by Iraq of Kuwait. There had already been a United Nations Security Council resolution. That is why the authority was as described. Here, this resolution by Senators Warner, McCain, Bayh, and I have introduced is based on a record now of 11 years in which everything else has been tried to get Iraq to comply with those resolutions, and they haven't. I think the difference here--I ask the Senator if he would react--is that the Senator has acknowledged the obvious inherent right of the United States to act in self-defense. That is a higher standard than the question of acting to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions. In other words, it may be I might argue that is not in self-defense because I believe if we do not disarm Saddam Hussein, he will eventually strike us and our allies. But, in any case, in affirming a right of self-defense, the Senator has set a standard that is not carried out in a later section which makes our ability to enforce those resolutions pursuant to United Nations authorization. So to that extent, your amendment would give the United Nations a veto over whether the President of the United States could take action against Iraq to enforce outstanding U.N. resolutions.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Senator. My friend from Michigan knows one of the reasons I cosponsored the resolution underlying it is I believe the best way for us to get the United Nations to act to enforce its own resolutions is if we make clear we are prepared to do so ourselves, although that is not our preference. Here is my question: In section 3(3) of the Senator's amendment, you do affirm under international law the U.S. has at all times the inherent right to use military force itself. You argued tonight that is an indication that those who have said your amendment gives a veto to U.N. over U.S. actions are not correct. But isn't it true the section just below, section 4(a) of your amendment, says the President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the U.S. to destroy, remove, or render harmless Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons material, ballistic missiles, et cetera, only pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations Security Council as described above? So while you recognize the inherent right of the U.S. to defend itself, to take military action in self-defense, isn't it true your amendment does give the United Nations a veto over the authority of the United States to take action to enforce the resolutions of the United Nations?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank my friend from Michigan. Let me ask this question. The Senator's amendment provides the Senate not adjourn this year and return to session at any time before the next Congress convenes to consider promptly proposals relative to Iraq if, in the judgment of the President, the United Nations Security Council fails to adopt or enforce the resolution described in paragraph 2. My question to the Senator from Michigan is whether he has decided under those circumstances whether he would support a resolution authorizing the President to use force and the Armed Forces of the United States to enforce the United Nations resolutions.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. The Senator makes a good series of points about the pending amendment introduced by the Senator from West Virginia. We have language in our resolution that authorizes the President to take action to protect the national security of the United States against the continuing threat from Iraq. I must say that in my opinion, and I ask the Senator for his reaction, the terms that the Senator from West Virginia has stated are literally being met now for this reason: As my friend from Arizona well knows, the Armed Forces of the United States are under direct attack from Iraq as they fly along with their British colleagues to enforce the no-fly zone. Approximately 7,500 American men and women in uniform are dispatched there, costing the American taxpayer a billion or more dollars a year. This year alone, there have been more than 400 occasions on which Iraqi forces have fired at the Armed Forces of the United States. Of course, I am opposed to this amendment, but I ask the Senator from Arizona if he would agree with me that there is a direct attack by Iraq going on right now, not on the United States or its possessions or territories but on the Armed Forces of our country?