Zoe Lofgren

Ms. LOFGREN

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for his kind comments. Point of Order

Ms. LOFGREN. Yes, it is.

Ms. LOFGREN. I have yielded to the gentleman from Michigan.

Ms. LOFGREN. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan, the ranking member.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the amendment offered by myself and by the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. McCarthy) and the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey) adequately addresses the germaneness issue that was the subject of the point of order on the prior amendment we offered. There are a series of cases that relate to the interplay between alcohol laws of the States and firearms. I would note for the Record and will include for the Record two cases: first, the case of Davis versus State of Alabama Alcohol Beverage Control Board wherein the court found that the ABC Board in Alabama was able to refuse the renewal of liquor licenses for good cause including the discharge of firearms in the parking lot of the facility in question. Second, a case from Illinois, Sip and Save Liquors versus Richard M. Daley, Mayor, cited at 657 N.E.2d. 1, provides that the Commission may take notice of gun law violations of the State in the proceedings instituted pursuant to the Illinois liquor laws. This amendment would allow State AGs to utilize the Federal courts to enforce the State gun laws relative to liquor law violations. Let me give an example where this might be pertinent. For example, as I mentioned earlier, in California, TEC-DC9s are no longer a legal weapon. It would be possible for a State AG, Mr. Lockyer, to go into Federal Court and to seek removal of the liquor license or the license of a winery when the violation of the winery owner related to the violation of the State weapons laws. This may be a niche, and it is a niche I propose only because of the germaneness issue, given the prior ruling of the Chair, and given the unwillingness of those who raised the germaneness issue to waive or withdraw it. But, once again, as I argued earlier, if we are able to do something, anything to enhance the Nation's gun safety laws, we should do it. As I mentioned before, school will commence all across America before our recess has ended. This is one of the last opportunities the House of Representatives will have before our recess to do something, to do something reasonable, to do something responsible to enhance gun safety laws. I would hope that we could come together across the aisle on a bipartisan basis to do even this modest thing to help guarantee the safety of the children of this country and the children of the high schools in California, even if it is only some modicum of increased safety when they return to school in September. (Cite as: 657 N.E.2d 1, 212 Ill.Dec. 306) SIP & SAVE LIQUORS, INC., an Illinois corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard M. DALEY, mayor and local liquor control commissioner of the city of Chicago, and William D. O'Donaghue, chairman of the License Appeal Commission, Defendants-Appellees No. 1-93-0760 Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division, Sept. 6, 1995, Rehearing Denied Nov. 9, 1995 Liquor retailer sought review of revocation of retailer's license by mayor and city liquor control commissioner. The Circuit Court, Cook County, Edward C. Hofert, J., denied relief, and retailer appealed. The Appellate Court, Cerda, J., held that: (1) municipal code section placing time limit on issuance of revocation applied to liquor licenses; (2) state's five-day time limit, not code's 60-day limit, was applicable to revocation of liquor license; (3) failure to issue revocation within five days did not deprive commission of jurisdiction; (4) retailer was not deprived of due process; and (5) revocation was warranted. Affirmed. [1] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--106(1)--223k106(1) City code section allowing mayor to suspend or revoke any license issued under code and state reasons for any revocation or suspension within 60 days was applicable to liquor licenses. Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code Sec. Sec. 4-4- 280, 4-60-070. [1] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--108.1--223k108.1 City code section allowing mayor to suspend or revoke any license issued under code and state reasons for any revocation or suspension within 60 days was applicable to liquor licenses. Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code Sec. Sec. 4-4- 280, 4-60-070. [2] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--10(2)--223k10(2) Liquor control is subject to concurrent jurisdiction of state and local government; home-rule municipalities may legislate in area of liquor control, except as restricted by state, pursuant to home-rule provisions of state constitution. S.H.A. Const. Art. 7, Sec. 6. [2] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--11--223k11 Liquor control is subject to concurrent jurisdiction of state and local government; home-rule municipalities may legislate in area of liquor control, except as restricted by state, pursuant to home-rule provisions of state constitution. S.H.A. Const. Art. 7, Sec. 6. [3] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--11--223k11 State statute requiring that revocation of liquor license be issued within five days of hearing prevailed over municipal code section imposing 60-day time limitation for issuing revocation, as code expanded state's time limit and was thus inconsistent with state law. S.H.A. 235 ILCS 5/7-5; Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code Sec. 4-4-280. [3] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--15--223k15 State statute requiring that revocation of liquor license be issued within five days of hearing prevailed over municipal code section imposing 60-day time limitation for issuing revocation, as code expanded state's time limit and was thus inconsistent with state law. S.H.A. 235 ILCS 5/7-5; Chicago, Ill., Municipal Code Sec. 4-4-280. [4] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE--489.1--15Ak489.1 City liquor control commission's failure to issue reasons for revocation within five-day period prescribed by state law did not deprive commission of jurisdiction to revoke license, as statute setting forth five-day period was directory, not mandatory, Liquor Act was to be liberally construed, licensee was not injured by late decision, and Liquor Act did not provide that jurisdiction was lost. S.H.A. 235 ILCS 5/1-2, 7- 5. [4] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--108.9--223K108.9 City liquor control commission's failure to issue reasons for revocation within five-day period prescribed by state law did not deprive commission of jurisdiction to revoke license, as statute setting forth five-day period was directory, not mandatory, Liquor Act was to be liberally construed, licensee was not injured by late decision, and Liquor Act did not provide that jurisdiction was lost. S.H.A. 235 ILCS 5/1-2, 7- 5. [5] STATUTES--227--361k227 Word ``shall'' generally is mandatory and not directory, but it can be construed as meaning ``may'' depending on legislative intent. [6] STATUTES--227--361k227 Generally, statutory regulations designed to secure order, system and dispatch in proceedings, and by disregard of which rights of interested parties cannot be injuriously affected, are not mandatory unless they are accompanied by negative language that imports that acts required shall not be done in any other manner or time than designated. [7] STATUTES--227--361k227 If statute is mandatory, it prescribes result that will follow if required acts are not done; if statute is directory then its terms are limited to what is required to be done. [8] STATUTES--227--361k227 Failure to comply with mandatory provision will render void proceeding to which provision relates, but strict observance of directory provision is not essential to validity of proceedings. [9] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE--670--15Ak670 Liquor retailer waived issued that he was denied due process because shotgun which retailer was charged with possessing in license revocation proceeding was destroyed and police officer was allowed to testify to its measurement, where retailer did not object to testimony, and did not make motion in limine at hearing, and did not raise issue until penalty hearing. [9] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--108.10(4)--223k108.10(4) Liquor retailer waived issue that he was denied due process because shotgun which retailer was charged with possessing in license revocation proceeding was destroyed and police officer was allowed to testify to its measurement, where retailer did not object to testimony, did not make motion in limine at hearing, and did not raise issue until penalty hearing. [10] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW--287.2(3)--92k287.2(3) Liquor retailer received sufficient notice of charge of possessing sawed-off shotgun, thus, retailer was not denied due process in license revocation proceeding. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14. [10] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--108.2--223k108.2 Liquor retailer received sufficient notice of charge of possessing sawed-off shotgun, thus, retailer was not denied due process in license revocation proceeding. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14. [11] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--106(4)--223k106(4) Presence of sawed-off shotgun on premises of liquor retailer warranted revocation of liquor license; retailer was not improperly found guilty of failing to register gun which was not registerable, location of shotgun permitted inference that retailer had control of gun, and factors both in favor of and against revocation existed. [12] INTOXICATING LIQUORS--108.10(8)--223k108.10(8) Appellate court may reverse licensing decision of liquor control commission only if manifest weight of evidence supports opposite conclusion. *2 **307 Lamendella & Daniel, Chicago (Joseph A. Lamendella, Kris Daniel, of counsel), for appellant. Corp. Counsel, Chicago (Susan S. Sher, Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, Mardell Nereim, of cousel), for appellees. Justice CERDA delivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff, Sip & Save Liquors, Inc., an Illinois corporation, appeals from the revocation of its retail liquor license. It argues on appeal that: (1) the City of Chicago Local Liquor Control Commission (the commission) lost jurisdiction when it did not timely issue a decision; (2) plaintiff was denied due process; and (3) revocation was an unreasonable penalty. One of the issues in this case is whether the City of Chicago Local Liquor Control Commission lost jurisdiction to impose any sanction when it failed to render a decision within the mandatory 15-day period prescribed by section 4-4- 280 of the Chicago Municipal Code (the Code) (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 4-4-280 (1990)) and the holding in Puss N Boots, Inc. v. Mayor's License Commission (1992), 232 Ill. App. 3d 984, 173 Ill. Dec. 676, 597 N.E. 2d 650 or whether instead the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (235 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 1992)) (the Liquor Act) of the State of Illinois was applicable. The commission charged in a notice of hearing to plaintiff that on August 19, 1990, the Code was violated when Thomas Shubalis, plaintiff's president, possessed an unregistered Winchester .22-caliber rifle, a Harlin 20-gauge shotgun, a Ruger .357 Magnum firearm, and a .25-caliber automatic firearm. It was also charged that Shubailis violated State law by possessing firearms without possessing an Illinois firearm owner's identification card. The notice also charged that on August 29, 1990, plaintiff sold or gave alcoholic beverages on the licensed premises to a person under the age of 21 years. The notice stated that the city would present evidence of previous acts of misconduct. Attached as exhibits were orders of dispositions of previous charges: (1) sale to a minor on November 4, 1983, resulting in a warning on July 18, 1984; (2) sale to a minor on January 11, 1985, resulting in a warning on July 17, 1985; and (3) sale to a minor on August 31, 1985, resulting in a $300 voluntary fine on April 29, 1986. A hearing was held before the commission on January 17, February 14, and April 4, 1991. Chicago police officer Anthony Wilczak testified at the hearing that he responded to a burglary alarm on August 19, 1990, at plaintiff's liquor store. He searched the premises and found a .357 Magnum revolver and a .25-caliber automatic pistol below the cash register on the shelf. He asked Shubalis *3**308 about the guns, and Shubalis said that the guns were his brother's. Shubalis also said that the did not know where the .22-caliber rifle came from and that the sawed-off shotgun belonged to friend of his brother. He did not find a firearm owner's identification card when he searched Shubalis nor did he find a city registration for any of the weapons. Chicago police officer Sharon Gaynor testified at the hearing that she recovered in the search a sawed-off 20-gauge shotgun and a Winchester rifle, which were found in a large safe in a back storage area. The safe was open, and the guns were lying in the safe. On April 26, 1991, Richard M. Daley, mayor and local liquor control commissioner of the city of Chicago, revoked plaintiff's city of Chicago retail liquor license. The order stated that the proceedings were instituted pursuant to the Liquor Act (Ill. Reve. Stat. 1989, ch. 43, pars. 93.9 through 195). The order made the following findings: (1) on or about August 19, 1990, the licensee possessed unregistered firearms (Harlin 20-gauge shotgun, Ruger .357 Magnum firearm, and .25- caliber automatic firearm) on the licensed premises in violation of former section 11.1-13 of chapter 11.1 of the code (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 11.1-13 (1983) (now codified as Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 8-20-150 (1995))); (2) on or about August 19, 1990, the licensee possessed firearms on the licensed premises without possessing a firearm owner's identification card issued by the State of Illinois in violation of State law; and (3) on or about August 29, 1990, plaintiff sold or gave alcoholic beverages on the licensed premises to a person under 21 years of age in violation of former section 147-14(a) of chapter 147 of the Code (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 147-14(a) (1983) (now codified as Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 4-60-140(a) (1993))). Plaintiff appealed to the City of Chicago License Appeal Commission (the appeal commission), which affirmed Daley's action on September 30, 1991. Plaintiff's petition for rehearing was denied by the appeal commission on November 6, 1991. On December 6, 1991, plaintiff filed a complaint in administrative review against defendants Daley and William D. O'Donaghue, chairman of the appeal commission. On May 6, 1992, the trial court found the following: (1) finding charge number one (Harlin 20-gauge shotgun) was sustained; (2) the other findings were not sustained; (3) the matter was remanded to the commission to consider its order of revocation with respect to finding against the plaintiff on charge number one. On June 6, 1992, the commission reconfirmed the revocation of the license based on the finding that the owner possessed an unregistered Harlin 20-gauge shotgun. On August 14, 1992, the trial court reversed the order reconfirming revocation and remanded the matter for a hearing by the commission on the penalty in view of the fact that the charges were modified. The commission was ordered not to consider the charges that were not sustained by the trial court. It was also ordered that both parties would have a full hearing in aggravation and mitigation. A hearing on the penalty was held on October 8, 1992, before the commission. During Chicago police officer Lawrence Seidler's testimony, plaintiff made an oral motion in limine based on the following: (1) the charge was the failure to exhibit a registration certificate and not the possession of a sawed off shotgun; and (2) the shotgun was destroyed by the police. The motion was denied. Officer Seidler testified that the barrel of the shotgun was 14 inches long and that a portion of the stock was sawed off. Thomas Shubalis testified at the hearing that the liquor store had been in business at the same location for 17 years. He recognized the shotgun and had seen it once before on the premises. He did not believe that the shotgun was on the premises on August 19, 1990. The shotgun had been brought in by a neighbor who was moving and who was going to pick up the gun in a *4 **309 couple of days. The shotgun had been on the premises in a storeroom safe for a number of years but he thought it had long been removed and never even thought of it. The safe was not used, and it was hardly visible because there were liquor boxes in front of it. He never had occasion to open the safe between the time he saw the shotgun and the time of the burglary. He had no registration for the shotgun. On October 14, 1992, plaintiff moved in the trial court to reverse all orders of the commission and the appeal commission on the basis that the mayor lost jurisdiction to revoke the liquor license. The hearings had terminated on April 4, 1991, and the decision was rendered on April 26, 1991, which was later than the mandatory 15-day period. On October 16, 1992, the commission sustained ``charge one'' and revoked the license. The following findings of fact were made. Shubalis admitted that he first saw the sawed-off shotgun eight or nine years before the burglary and that he did nothing to assure that the shotgun was removed from the premises. Shubalis's testimony that the gun was hidden in the old safe and that he did not even think about it after first seeing it was not credible. The licensee had a history of three prior violations, one of which resulted in a fine of $300. The weapon was an extremely dangerous type of weapon. In light of the serious nature of the offense, revocation was appropriate. On January 22, 1993, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion to reverse and to reinstate the license, denied plaintiff's motion to reverse the post-remand order of revocation, and affirmed the order of revocation. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on February 19, 1993. i. jurisdiction Plaintiff first argues that the commission lost jurisdiction to impose any sanction when it failed to render a decision within the 15 days following the hearing as prescribed by section 4-4-280 of the Code (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 4-4-280 (1990)), which was amended in 1992 to expand the time period to 60 days (Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, July 29, 1992, at 20041-42). If the proceedings were initiated exclusively under the Liquor Act, then the procedural requirements of section 7-5 of the Liquor Act were not met (235 ILCS 5/7-5 (West 1995)). The term ``shall'' was mandatory and not directory. [1] The first issue is whether section 4-4-280 of the Code applied to the revocation of plaintiff's liquor license. It states in part: ``The mayor shall have the power to * * * suspend or revoke any license issued under the provisions of this code * * *. If the mayor shall determine after [a] hearing that the license should be revoked or suspended, within 60 days he shall state the reason or reasons for such determination in a written order or revocation or suspension * * *.'' According to the Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, the ordinance was: ``intended to ratify prior actions of the Mayor in revoking licenses and * * * shall apply to all cases in which licenses have been revoked * * * within 60 days of the conclusion of a hearing required by Section 4-4-280 * * *.'' Journal of the Proceedings of the City Council of the City of Chicago, July 29, 1992, at p. 20042. Section 4-4-280 states that it is applicable to the revocation of any license, and it does not exempt liquor licenses. Section 4-60-070 of the Code states that a liquor license shall be issued subject to chapter 4-4, the chapter in which section 4-4-280 appears. [FN1] (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 4-60-070 (1994).) We find that section 4-4-280 covers liquor licenses. ``FN1. Section 4-60-070(a) of title four of the Code states in part that ``[a] city retailer's license for the sale of alcoholic liquor shall be issued by the local liquor control commissioner, subject to the provisions of an act entitled `An Act relating to alcoholic liquor,' approved January 31, 1934, as amended, and subject to the provisions of this chapter and Chapter 4-4 relating to licenses in general not inconsistent with the law relating to alcoholic liquor.'' (Emphasis added.) Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 4-60-070 (1994).'' *5 **310 The next issue is whether section 7-5 of the Liquor Act states with its requirement that a statement of reasons for revocation be given within five days of hearing controls over Code section 4-4-280's time frame of 60 days. Section 7-5 of the Liquor Act states in part: ``The local liquor control commissioner shall within 5 days after [a] hearing, if he determines after such hearing that the license should be revoked or suspended or that the licensee should be fined, state the reason or reasons for such determination in a written order * * *.'' 235 ILCS 5/7-5 (West 1995). [2] Liquor control is subject to concurrent jurisdiction of the State and local government. (Easter Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission (1983), 114 Ill. App. 3d 855, 858-59, 70 Ill. Dec. 666, 449 N.E. 2d 1013.) Home-rule municipalities such as Chicago may legislate in the area of liquor control, except as restricted by the State, pursuant to the home-rule provisions of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Cont. 1970, art. VII, Sec. 6). (Easter, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 858-59, 70 Ill. Dec. 666, 449 N.E. 2d 1013.) Courts have approved local liquor ordinances in home-rule municipalities that were either more restrictive than State statutes on the same subject matter or that placed additional requirements on licenses not found in State statutes. Easter, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 859, 60 Ill. Dec. 666, 449 N.E. 2d 1013. [3] Section 4-60-070 states that provisions of the Code chapter relating to licenses in general would govern liquor licenses except when they are inconsistent with ``the law relating to alcoholic liquor.'' (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 4-60-070 (1994).) The ordinance also states that the license was subject to the provisions of the Liquor Act. The Liquor Act enumerates in section 4-1 certain powers of municipalities including the power ``to establish * * * regulations and restrictions upon the issuance of an operations under local licenses not inconsistent with law as the public good and convenience may require.'' 235 ILCS 5/4-1 (West 1993). The Code's time limit is not just different than State law but expands a time limit established by State law. The longer time period is not a further restriction or an additional requirement. (Easter, 114 Ill. App. 3d at 859, 70 Ill. Dec. 666, 449 N.E. 2d 1013.) The Code's longer time for the issuance of the penalty decision is inconsistent with the five-day time limit in the Liquor Act. Under the terms of the Code and the Liquor Act, the inconsistent 15- and 60-day limits cannot stand. (Village of Mundelein v. Hartnett (1983), 117 Ill. App. 3d 1011, 1015, 73 I11.Dec. 285, 454 N.E.2d 29 (where there is a conflict between a statute and an ordinance, the ordinance must give way).) The State five-day limitation for issuing a revocation decision prevails over the Code. The case of Puss N Boots, Inc. v. Mayor's License Commission (1992), 232 I11.App.3d 984, 173 I11.Dec. 676, 597 N.E.2d 650, was an appeal from an order of the mayor of the city of Chicago revoking the public place of amusement license of the plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that this court should follow the decision in Puss N Boots. One of the issues in that case was whether the mayor had lost jurisdiction to revoke the public place of amusement license because of failure to act within a 15-day time period prescribed by ordinance section 4-4-280. The court pointed out that the Code section providing for ``interpretation of language'' expressly stated that ``[t]he word `shall' as used in this code is mandatory.'' (Puss N Boots, 232 I11.App.3d at 987, 173 I11.Dec. 676, 597 N.E.2d 650.) The court concluded that ``shall'' in section 4- 4-280 was mandatory and therefore the failure to render a decision within the mandatory time deprived the mayor of jurisdiction. Puss N Boots, 232 I11.App.3d at 987-89, 173 I11.Dec.676, 597 N.E.2d 650. We agree with the decision rendered in the Puss N Boots case. The word ``shall'' in section 4-4-280 of the Municipal Code of Chicago is mandatory rather than directory, and the commission would have lost jurisdiction when the mayor failed to act within the 15-day period in this case if only the local code were involved. However, liquor control is subject to concurrent jurisdiction of the State and the city of Chicago. (Easter Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission (1983), 114 I11.App.3d 855, 858-59, 70 I11.Dec. 666, 449 N.E.2d 1013.) In this *6 **311 case, the order of April 26, 1991, was issued by Richard M. Daley as mayor and local liquor control commissioner. The order also stated that the proceedings were instituted pursuant to the Liquor Act. In the Puss N Boots case the State of Illinois had no involvement in the revocation of a Chicago public place of amusement license whereas in this case the proceedings were conducted subject to the Liquor Act. We find that the Puss N Boots case is distinguishable from the case sub judice and is not controlling. [4] The next issue is whether the failure to issue the reasons for revocation within the five-day period provided by State law deprived the commission of jurisdiction. If the five-day requirement of the Liquor Act was mandatory and not directory, then the failure to act within the required time meant the commission did not have jurisdiction to act beyond the time limit. See Johnkol, Inc. v. License Appeal Commission (1969), 42 I11.2d 377, 383- 84, 247 N.E.2d 901 (failure of liquor license appeal commission to render a decision within 20 days of filing the appeal as required by State law resulted in loss of jurisdiction for noncompliance). [5][6][7][8] Section 7-5 of the Liquor Act states that the local liquor control commissioner ``shall'' within five days of the hearing state the reasons for revocation. (235 ILCS 5/ 7-5 (West 1995).) The word ``shall'' generally is mandatory and not directory, but it can be construed as meaning ``may'' depending on the legislative intent. (Village of Mundelein v. Hartnett (1983), 117 I11.App.3d 1011, 1016, 73 I11.Dec. 285, 454 N.E.2d 29.) Generally, statutory regulations designed ``to secure order, system and dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of which the rights interested parties cannot be injuriously affected'' are not mandatory unless they are accompanied by negative language that imports that the acts required shall not be done in any other manner or time than designated. (Village of Mundelein, 117 I11.App.3d at 1016, 73 I11.Dec. 285, 454 N.E.2d 29.) If a statute is mandatory, it prescribes the result that will follow if the required acts are not done; if the statute is directory then its terms are limited to what is required to be done. (Village of Mundelein, 117 I11.App.3d at 1016, 73 I11.Dec. 285, 454 N.E.2d 29.) The failure to comply with a mandatory provision will render void the proceeding to which the provision relates, but strict observance of a directory provision is not essential to the validity of the proceedings. Village of Mundelein, 117 I11.App.3d at 1016, 73 I11.Dec. 285, 454 N.E.2d 29. Alpern v. License Appeal Commission (1976), 38 I11.App.3d 565, 567, 348 N.E.2d 271, was the first decision that held that the Liquor Act's five-day requirement was directory so that a revocation issued beyond that time was valid and the commissioner did not lose jurisdiction. The court adopted the reason that ordinarily a statute that specifies the time for the performance of an official duty will be considered directory only where the rights of the parties cannot be injuriously affected by the failure to act within the time indicated. (Alpern, 38 Ill. App. 3d at 567, 348 N.E. 2d 271.) The court also noted that the Liquor Act provided that it was to be liberally construed to protect the welfare of the people. (Alpern, 38 Ill. App. 3d at 567, 348 N.E. 2d 271.) The five-day provision did not contain language denying the exercise of the power after the time named and no right of plaintiff would be injuriously affected by a failure to serve the revocation order timely. Alpern, 38 Ill. App. 3d at 568, 348 N.E. 2d 271. Several first district cases have followed Alpern; Dugan's Bistro, Inc. v. Daley (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 463, 475, 14 Ill. Dec. 63, 371 N.E. 2d 1116; Rincon v. License Appeal Commission (1978), 62 Ill. App. 3d 600, 606, 19 Ill. Dec. 406, 378 N.E. 2d 1281; Watra, Inc. v. License Appeal Commission (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 596, 600, 28 Ill Dec. 120, 390, N.E. 2d. 102; and Cox v. Daley (1981), 93 Ill. App. 3d 593, 595-96, 49 Ill. Dec. 55, 417 N.E. 2d 745. Miller v. Daley (1973), 14 Ill. App. 3d 394, 397, 302 N.E. 2d 347, stated that the five-day limit was mandatory but found that the order was served within the period prescribed by the statute so that the conclusion that it was mandatory was dictum. (See Alpern, 38 Ill. App. 3d at 568, 348 N.E. 2d 271 (the interpretation in Miller was dictum).) The weight of the authority is that the five-day period is directory. *7 **312 We concur with the cases finding that the failure to act in five days does not result in the loss of jurisdiction because even though the word ``shall'' is used (1) the Liquor Act is to be liberally construed to protect the welfare of the people (235 ILCS 5/1-2 (West 1993)), and a construction voiding a late revocation order would not serve the welfare of the people; (2) the license was not injured by a late decision as he continued to run his business until the license was revoked; and (3) the Liquor Act does not provide that jurisdiction is lost after the five-day period. ii. due process Plaintiff next argues that the plaintiff was denied due process because the shotgun was destroyed and a police officer was permitted to testify about the measurements of one barrel of the shotgun. Plaintiff was also denied due process because he did not receive notice of the charge of possession of a sawed-off shotgun. The penalty was based on possession of a sawed-off shotgun, which was a separate offense from the charge of possession of an unregistered shotgun. [9] Plaintiff did not object to the testimony concerning the shotgun at the first hearing, which was when the charges were tried. A motion in limine was not made at the first hearing. Plaintiff did not raise the issue of the denial of due process based on destruction of the shotgun until the penalty hearing. Therefore, that issue was waived. Harbor Insurance C. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 235, 240, 102 Ill. Dec. 814, 500 N.E. 2d 707. [10] The charge of possessing an unregistered shotgun was stated in the notice of hearing to be a violation of former section 11.1-13 of chapter 11.1 of the Code, which is now codified as section 8-20-150. Section 8-20-150 of the Code requires one to exhibit a valid registration certificate. (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 8-20-150 (1995).) Section 8-20- 040 of the Code states in part that no person shall within the city possess or have under his control any firearm unless he holds a valid registration certificate for that firearm. (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 8-20-040(a) (1990).) A sawed-off shotgun is unregisterable. (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 8-20- 050(a) (1995).) Although the predecessor of section 8-2-150 was cited in the notice of hearing instead of the predecessor of section 8-20-040, plaintiff received adequate notice that he was charged with possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun. From the beginning of the proceedings plaintiff knew that possession of a shotgun was the issue. iii. revocation [11] Plaintiff next argues that the revocation was unreasonable. Plaintiff had no duty to register a firearm and display a registration certificate for a firearm that was unregisterable, that the licensee did not own, and that the licensee did not constructively possess. The revocation order states that the ordinance violated was section 8-20-150 requiring a registration certificate (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 8-20-150 (1995)), but the conduct was described as possession of an unregistered firearm, which was prohibited by section 8-20-040 Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 8-20-040 (1990)). Plaintiff further argues that the finding of possession was erroneously based on the fact that the licensee had knowledge of the presence of the shotgun on the premises eight or nine years earlier. Plaintiff operated the business for 17 years. In a two-year period plaintiff was charged with three separate sales of alcohol to minors, but there was no other record of wrongful conduct. Failure to display a certificate was the most venial of the firearms offenses and should have resulted in a more lenient sanction of either fine or suspension. There was no evidence that the shotgun was functional. The second revocation order issued does not refer to the specific ordinance violated as plaintiff contends but merely states that ``charge one'' was sustained. The order should have referred to the first ``finding'' of the revocation order, which was that plaintiff possessed an unregistered shotgun, because the first charge in the notice of hearing was possession of a rifle. Plaintiff was informed as to the basis for the revocation. Furthermore, the findings of the commission were given, and they emphasized the possession of the shotgun. *8 **313 The licensee was found to have possessed an unregistered gun and was not found guilty of the offense of failing to register the unregisterable shotgun. Therefore the licensee was not punished for failing to perform an impossible act, and United States v. Dalton (10th Cir. 1992), 960 F.2d 121, is distinguishable. The Dalton court held that due process barred a conviction under a statute that required registration of a firearm where the subject firearm could not be legally registered. (Dalton, 960 F.2d at 124.) Section 8- 20-040 does not only state that one cannot possese an unregistered gun (which would imply that the gun was registerable); the ordinance precludes possession of any firearm that is unregisterable. Chicago Municipal Ordinance Sec. 8-20-040 (1995). The next issue is whether the licensee possessed the shotgun within the meaning of section 8-20-040(a), which states that no person shall ``possess, harbor, have under his control, * * * or accept'' Any unregisterable firearm. (Chicago Municipal Code Sec. 8-20-040(a) (1999).) Although there were employees who had access to the room where the shotgun was located, the shotgun was at the licensee's place of business so that it can be inferred that the licensee had control over the area where the shotgun was found. [12] The appellate court may reverse the commission's decision only if the manifest weight of the evidence supports the opposite conclusion. (Lopez v. Illinois Liquor Control Commission (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 756, 762-63, 76 Ill.Dec. 199, 458 N.E.2d 599.) Section 7-5 of the Liquor Act permits revocation if the licensee violated any provisions of the act or any ordinance of the municipality or any rule of the local liquor control commission (235 ILCS 5/7-5 (West 1995)), but the violation must fairly relate to the control of liquor. Lopez, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 761, 765, 76 Ill.Dec. 199, 458 N.E.2d 599. That shotgun was deemed to be especially dangerous because it was unregisterable. The presence of this firearm on the premises jeopardized the safety of the public because employees of the licensee would have access to it. On the other hand, the business had been operated for 17 years with only three other charges. There were factors going in favor and against revocation. A less severe penalty could have been imposed, but under the abuse of discretion standard, the revocation must be upheld. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed. RIZZI and TULLY, JJ., concur.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Ms. LOFGREN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the amendment is germane. I would ask, clearly even if there is a question as to germaneness, it does not need to be raised if all Members agree that the underlying measure should be supported by us all. I was glad to hear the comments of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) that none of us support the illegal transport of firearms across State laws. The question is whose laws? In California, it is now, because of what the State legislature has done, it is illegal. TEC-9s are covered. TEC DC-9s are covered. That is not the case under Federal law. So this would allow those States' Attorneys General, the State of California, to go to Federal court to enforce California State laws vis-a-vis firearms. I hope that we might be able to come together, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) and I, to allow this amendment to be offered and adopted; and that if he would withdraw his point of order, we need not discuss the germaneness issue any further. I would hope that he would do that since, if I understood him correctly, he agrees or says he agrees with the intention of the amendment. Therefore, I would hope, and I do not know if he wishes to respond, but I would hope that he might withdraw his objection on this point.

Ms. LOFGREN. I thank the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the ranking member. I would note, as to the issue of germaneness, noting that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Scarborough) has reserved a point of order, that it is my contention that the amendment is germane. As we know, the underlying bill deals with issues that are governed by the Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Bureau, as is the issue of guns. It seems to me, if we are going to give a tool to States to use the Federal courts for an item that is regulated by ATF, to wit, bottles of cabernet, that we ought to provide that same remedy and tool to States to deal with another item which is within the jurisdiction of ATF, to wit, firearms, as defined in title 18 of the U.S. Code. I would hope that we might move apace to adopt this resolution. I have two teenage children. They will be starting high school again this fall. They will be starting school, before this House finishes our annual recess. I would like to be able to tell them and to tell their classmates that the House of Representatives has done something, anything rational, to preserve and to enhance gun safety in America. I think we owe that to the mothers and fathers across the United States. Although we have not been able previously to come together, although we have not been able to support the gun safety measures that have passed the United States Senate, although we have not been able to deliver that level of safety to the American people, we could act today and at least do this much. So I am hopeful that we can approve this amendment. It is so important to me that I believe I would vote for the underlying bill, despite the reservations I have, in order to get this important new enforcement tool for State Attorneys General. Point of Order

Ms. LOFGREN. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I offer this amendment on behalf of myself, as well as the gentlewomen from New York, Mrs. McCarthy and Mrs. Lowey. As I mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, in a discussion on the Cox amendment, I do have concerns about the underlying amendment and its ability to constrain interstate commerce unreasonably. However, if this House is insistent upon pursuing the remedies outlined in the Scarborough bill, I would suggest that we ought to provide those tools equally to the chief law enforcement officers of our States in the enforcement of gun laws. As many of my colleagues know, the State of California has recently passed, by wide margins in the assembly and the State Senate, and these measures have been signed into law by the Governor, a whole series of gun safety measures that I believe put California on the cutting edge of gun safety measures among the 50 States. It seems to me that, if we are going to give the Attorneys General of the 50 States the ability to go into Federal court to protect their citizens from $20 bottles of cabernet, we ought to be at least as willing to give the attorney general of the State of California the ability to go into Federal court to protect his citizens against the Tech-DC9, the AK-47, and other weapons of mass destruction. Mr. Chairman, as we know, we failed to come together across the aisle on a bipartisan basis to adopt gun safety measures earlier in this Congress, but we have an opportunity here to at least allow those States that have been more progressive and more receptive to the people of the country than has the United States Congress to have an additional tool to protect the citizens of the States who have forward- thinking State legislatures and forward-thinking Governors.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, I do want to comment briefly on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox). I will support this amendment. It does clarify issues relative to Internet service providers and to the Net itself. However, I do want Members to know that, although this amendment should be supported and I intend to vote for it, it does not cure other problems that we find troubling in the underlying bill. The issues relate to the commerce clause and to the conflict between that clause and the 21st amendment. This conflict continues to be problematic. As we discussed at some length in the Committee on the Judiciary when the bill was considered, the 21st amendment did not repeal the commerce clause. So even though this amendment does accommodate the Internet--and I credit the gentleman from California (Mr. Cox) for bringing this forward and commend the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) for their considerable effort on Internet issues--the problem in the underlying bill persists. If this bill becomes law, State AG's shall be able to burden impermissibly interstate commerce using the cover of the 21st amendment. Thus, even with this fine amendment, the underlying bill continues to be overbroad. We can't seem to agree to limit it to the one issue that we all agree is significant, namely that we should not permit or facilitate underage drinking. By contrast, this bill would allow a variety of arcane blue laws that have nothing whatsoever to do with underage drinking or any other legitimate concern of the Federal Government to be enforced by a State attorney general in a Federal court. I will wholeheartedly support this amendment, and I sincerely hope it is approved, but I intend, even if it is adopted, to oppose the underlying bill because of the other problems I've enumerated.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, that was on the germaneness issue. This is on the 5 minutes.

Ms. LOFGREN. I will yield for a parliamentary inquiry which has been stated. May I yield time to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers), the ranking member, under regular order?

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

Ms. LOFGREN

Ms. LOFGREN. Until convinced about the changes made, yes.

Ms. LOFGREN. I believe the Chair has ruled.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, if I may, I have reservations about the changes made today. I hope that I can be convinced that they are adequately made by the time the debate is over.

Ms. LOFGREN. I will claim opposition and the time.

Ms. LOFGREN. Then I will claim opposition.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, the gentlewoman from Ohio is not a member of the committee of jurisdiction and is not, therefore, eligible to manage our time. I would ask for a ruling.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio (Ms. Kaptur), and I ask unanimous consent that she be permitted to further yield time.

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I plan to expansively yield time to the gentlewoman from Ohio.

Ms. LOFGREN

Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express my opposition to House Joint Resolution 57 disapproving the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment (or normal trade relations) to the People's Republic of China. The continued extension of normal trade relations (NTR) to China will do much to benefit the United States domestically, while engagement with China remains the most powerful means of advancing our interests abroad. I share the concerns of many of my colleagues over China's record on human rights. In particular, the plight of the people of Tibet is one that we must not ignore. As we engage China economically, we should work to engage China in a policy that allows Tibetan peoples, cultures, and beliefs to flourish. As President Clinton has repeatedly emphasized, engagement with China is one path by which to encourage reform. The Clinton administration and Congress will continue to press China for human rights' reform and democratization of its political process. Approximately 400,000 American jobs depend on trade with China. Nearly all of China's other major trading partners, including Japan and Europe, currently grant normal trade status to the People's Republic of China. Were China to retaliate with trade restrictions against the United States, these nations would gain a competitive trade edge against the United States that would jeopardize vast numbers of American jobs. Additionally, the revocation of China's NTR status would likely simply replace Chinese imports with goods imported from its neighboring nations, harming only the American consumer. Let us also remember that over the past decade, American exports to China have quadrupled to $14.3 billion, a large portion of which is made up by high-technology imports produced in locations such as my district in Silicon Valley. It is also possible that China might soon gain entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO), an action that might result in the critical and historic acceptance by Chinese markets of American agricultural and industrial products. The chances of opening these Chinese markets would be severely diminished if the United States were to revoke NTR status at this point. China also plays an extremely important role in guaranteeing regional security and stability from the Korean Peninsular to the Indian Subcontinent. China's constructive efforts for peace between North and South Korea, and its push for restraint by India and Pakistan in the wake of their nuclear tests, highlight the positive role China is capable of playing in the international arena. And our policy of engagement has exhibited some meaningful success; as a result of our policy China has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and joined the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. China clearly must take substantial steps to improve its record on human rights and democratize its government if it wishes to be fully accepted by the international community. Yet only further engagement with China will allow the United States the opportunity to advocate on behalf of its own interests and those of the Chinese people. I urge you vote against House Joint Resolution 57.