Trent Lott

Mr. LOTT

Mr. LOTT. I thank my colleagues. I yield the floor.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to consider the conference report to accompany the VA-HUD appropriations bill, it be considered as having been read, and there be 20 minutes equally divided for debate between the two managers; I further ask unanimous consent there be an additional 5 minutes under the control of Senator McCain, and 30 minutes under the control of Senator Wellstone, with the vote occurring on adoption at 9:15 a.m. on Friday, October 15, with paragraph 4 of rule XII being waived.

Mr. LOTT

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I appreciate the efforts of the senior Senator from Maine initiating this colloquy, and I concur with the statement of the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. LOTT

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LOTT

Mr. LOTT. I object at this time.

Mr. LOTT. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President, I note we do have some approximately 3 hours of time remaining on the treaty itself. We intend to yield back 54 minutes of our time so there will be an exact equal amount of time available to both sides. I believe that would be the appropriate time to have debate on this treaty, on its merits or on how to proceed. Therefore, with great respect, I would object.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I now move that the Senate resume executive session in order to resume consideration of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty as provided in the previous unanimous consent, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LOTT

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LOTT. I yield as far as my comments are concerned back to the Senator who has the time.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me to respond?

Mr. LOTT. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for the offer to yield. I think I have said enough. I appreciate what he has had to say. I appreciate the fact that he has said his piece and we will move on about our business. That is my attitude, too.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I will not object. I reiterate that we need to get to a conclusion on the debate and have the vote on this issue, so we can move to campaign finance reform, as I committed to Senator McCain, within a reasonable hour tonight. But I will not object. Also, I yield the floor because I don't want to eat up any more time in the late afternoon.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, today the United States Senate fulfilled its constitutional responsibility by voting on the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test Ban Treaty. Under the Constitution, the President and the Senate are co-equal partners when it comes to treaty-making powers. Positive action by both branches is required before a treaty can become the supreme law of the land. All Americans should know that I and my colleagues take this solemn responsibility with great pride, and we are very diligent in making sure that our advice and consent to treaties is treated with the utmost consideration and seriousness. The Senate does not often refuse to ratify treaties, as borne out by the historical record. But the fact that the Senate has rejected several significant treaties this century underscores the important ``quality control'' function that was intended by the Framers of the Constitution. The Founding Fathers never envisioned the Senate would be a rubber stamp for flawed treaties. I and my colleagues would never allow this venerable institution to be perceived as--much less actually become--a mere rubber stamp for agreements negotiated by this or any other President. Instead, the Senate must dissect and debate every treaty to ensure that it adequately protects and promotes American security interests. The American people expect no less. As has been pointed out by numerous experts before the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Intelligence Committees, and by many Senators in extended floor debate, this treaty does not meet even the minimal standards of previous arms control treaties. That is, it is ineffectual--even dangerous, in my judgment; it is unverifiable; and it is unenforceable. As one of my distinguished colleagues put it: ``the CTBT is not of the same caliber as the arms control treaties that have come before the Senate in recent decades.'' This treaty is ineffectual because it would not stop other nations from testing or developing nuclear weapons, but it could preclude the United States from taking appropriate steps to ensure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. That it is not effectively verifiable is made clear by the intelligence community's inability to state unequivocally the purpose of activities underway for some number of months at the Russian nuclear test site. Just last week, it was clear that they could not assure us that low-level testing was not taking place. The CTBT simply has no teeth. Had the President consulted with more Senators before making the decision in 1995 to pursue an unverifiable, unlimited-duration, zero- yield ban on testing, he would have known that such a treaty could not be ratified. If he had talked at that time to Senator Warner, to Senator Kyl, to Senator Lugar, to any number of Senators, and to Senator Helms, he could have been told that this was not a verifiable treaty and that it was not the safe thing to do for our country. I know some will ask, so what happens next? The first thing that must be done is to begin a process to strengthen U.S. nuclear deterrence so that no one--whether potential adversary or ally--comes away from these deliberations with doubts about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. To this end, I have written to Secretary of Defense Bill Cohen asking that he initiate a comprehensive review of the state of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, infrastructure, management, personnel, training, delivery systems, and related matters. The review would encompass activities under the purview of the Department of Defense and the new, congressionally mandated National Nuclear Security Administration. The objective of this review would be to identify ways the administration and Congress jointly can strengthen our nuclear deterrent in the coming decades, for example, by providing additional resources to the Stockpile Stewardship Program on which Senator Domenici is so diligently working, and that exists at our nuclear weapons labs and production plants. I have offered to work with Secretary Cohen on the establishment and conduct of such a review, and I hope Secretary Cohen will promptly agree to my request. Second, the Senate should undertake a major survey of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated means of delivery as we approach the new millennium. A key aspect of this review should be an assessment of whether or to what extent U.S. policies and actions (or inactions) contributed to the heightened proliferation that has occurred over the past 7 years. We know that from North Korea to Iran and Iraq, from China to Russia, and from India to Pakistan, the next President will be forced to confront a strategic landscape that in many ways is far more hostile and dangerous than that which President Clinton inherited in January, 1993. I call upon the relevant committees of jurisdiction in the Senate to properly initiate such a survey and plan to complete action within the next 180 days. Finally, I am aware that the administration claims that rejection of the CTBT could damage U.S. prestige and signal a blow to our leadership. American leadership is vital in the world today but with leadership comes responsibility. We have a responsibility to ensure that any arms control agreements presented to the Senate for advice and consent are both clearly in America's security interests and effectively verifiable. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty failed on both of these crucial tests. Today, among many other telephone conversations I had, I talked to former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, a man for whom I have the highest regard, a man who gave real leadership when he was at the Department of Defense, a man who would never advocate a position not in the best national security interests of the United States or in support of our international reputation. He told me he was convinced the treaty was fatally flawed, that it should be defeated, and in fact it would send a clear message to our treaty negotiators and people around the world that treaties that are not verifiable, that are not properly concluded, will not be ratified by the Senate. We will take our responsibility seriously and we will defeat bad treaties when it is in the best interest of our country, our allies, and more importantly for me, our children and their future. I think we have taken the right step today. I note that this vote turned out to be a rather significant vote: 51 Senators voted against this treaty. Not even a majority was for this treaty. To confirm a treaty or ratify a treaty takes, of course, a two-thirds vote, 67 votes. They were not here. They were never here. This treaty should not have been pushed for the past 2 years. It was not ready for consideration and it was unverifiable and therefore would not be ratified. I thank my colleagues on both sides of the aisle for their participation. I thought the debate was spirited. It was good on both sides of the aisle. I appreciate the advice and counsel I received on all sides as we have gone through this process. It has not been easy but it is part of the job. I take this job very seriously. I take this vote very seriously. For today, Mr. President, we did the right thing for America. I yield the floor.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I yield back all time under our control with the exception of 54 minutes, which would then put both sides with an equal amount of time. I yield the floor. Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair.

Mr. LOTT. Let me begin by saying the same thing Senator Byrd said at the beginning of his remarks. I respond without any sense of rancor. I know that sometimes in the Senate we get very intent and very passionate about issues. I know this issue is one we all are very concerned about, and passions do run high, as they should, because we have very strongly held opinions. Thank goodness, though, we still are able to do as we did last night, retire to another building and enjoy each other's friendship and company, and then we return to the issues at hand. We debate them mightily, with due respect and without rancor. As far as the amount of time that has been spent on debate on this treaty, I went back and checked recent treaties. In fact, the only one that took as much time on the floor of the Senate as this treaty in recent history was the chemical weapons treaty, in which, I remind the Senator, I was also involved. Usually treaties are debated a day or two, 6 hours or 12 hours. I think this one is going to wind up being about 15 or 16 hours. I think we have had time to have the debate that was necessary on this issue. After all, it has been pending in various ways for at least 2 years, and the treaty was actually signed, I think, way back in 1995, if I recall correctly. I understand what Senator Byrd is saying. I, too, have been around awhile. I know only Senator Thurmond can match your record. But I have been in Congress 27 years myself. I served in the House 16 years, where I was chairman of the Research Committee. I served 8 years as the whip of my party in the House. I have been in the Senate since 1989, where I served as secretary of the conference, the whip, and leader. I understand the importance of the differences between the two bodies and the precedents and the tradition and the comity and the respect for each other. I have a great deal of respect and love for this institution and, in fact, for the Senator from West Virginia. Having said all of that, this was a motion, a request. I made a motion to go back to the Executive Calendar, a nondebatable motion. Then there was a request in effect to have debate. It wasn't as if there wouldn't be debate on the substance of the treaty. There are almost 3 hours of time remaining on the treaty. But in that extra effort to be fair, so the closing debate would be equal, we have already yielded back 54 minutes so there would be 2 hours approximately on each side. I want to make sure Senators have a chance to be heard and that their voices are not muted. Yours will not be, under the time we have left. But in that case, I thought the time would have delayed getting to a conclusion on this very important matter. It was a nondebatable motion, and we had time left for debate. I believed it was the correct thing to do. I regret the Senator feels strongly to the contrary. I recognize that he has been not only not an impediment to my trying to do my job but quite often has been helpful. I appreciate that. I am sorry he feels that way. I knew he was going to make the motion. I knew there was going to be an effort to have extended debate on a nondebatable motion to go back to a treaty, which I had, frankly, made a mistake, probably, in interrupting it to go to the Agriculture appropriations conference report. I did it because we need to get to these appropriations bills, as the Senator knows. Majority leaders have to balance time schedules and views of Senators and different bills, appropriations bills, the desire to get to campaign finance reform. I gave my word to more than one Senator that we would begin today on campaign finance reform. I am still determined to keep that commitment. But if it is 8 or 9, they will say: Well, you didn't keep your word. It is too late. All of that came into play. I assure you, I would want Senator Byrd's voice to be heard, Senator Daschle's, on any nondebatable motion and on this treaty. I am sure the time will come when I will stand up. In fact, I remember one occasion-- Senator Dodd will remember this because he came to me and said: I appreciate your doing that--when there was an effort to cut you off. I stood up and said no. I asked unanimous consent that the Senator have that time. I stood up when I thought it was unfair. This time, on a nondebatable motion to go back to the Executive Calendar, I thought it was unfair, in fact, to have an extended debate on that. I appreciate your giving me a chance to respond. I hope we can work through this. We will get to a final vote. Sometimes we come up with agreements that allow things to go to another day. Sometimes we strive mightily and we can't reach that. And sometimes you just have to fulfill your constitutional responsibility and you just vote.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my time be taken out of our side and not yours.

Mr. LOTT

Mr. LOTT. So I can respond to comments of both Senators, and particularly for questions I was asked by Senator McCain, I had a fixation on trying to get started on this bill today because I had committed to do so. I realize it is late, but I am sure the Senator understands how difficult it is to juggle the schedule. We had originally thought the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty would be voted on not today but last night or certainly earlier today. I am trying to juggle the appropriations conference reports, too. I was specifically asked by a couple of Senators to have the debate in the morning and then to have the vote at 4 o'clock. Later this week, we have to have an interruption for the HUD-VA appropriations conference report. Next week, we will have to have interruptions for the Interior appropriations conference report. I have to keep bringing in the appropriations bills. I realize that it interrupts the flow of the debate. However, that is why I have learned around here the best thing to do is to get something going and just get started, get it up so it is the pending business, and we go about our business. I took particular interest in the Senator's offer that maybe we even consider doing this on the weekend or maybe a Saturday. I think it would get a lot of attention. We are getting down to the end of the session and I have a lot of people pulling on me to do the Religious Persecution Act, the nuclear waste bill, bankruptcy, and trade bills. I need to try to take advantage even of a couple of hours on Wednesday night if we possibly can. If both Senators are willing to at least get started, see if we can get an agreement, see if we can have opening statements, let's get started and we will be back on it at 10:30 in the morning. I will work with both or all sides to make sure this is fully debated and amendments are offered. Remember, we are going to have amendments and we are going to have a lot of discussion. We are going to have a lot of votes. I think it is time to go forward. I hope the Senator will cooperate with me as we try to get that done.

Mr. LOTT. I say to the Senator, we will proceed on Carroll County, MS, time. Do you understand that?

Mr. LOTT

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LOTT

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I will have a full statement on Tuesday. But I did want to get into the Record today some of the facts I think are very important for Senators to have access to, some views of a number of important experts. I would entitle this statement with these words, a quote from Churchill: Facts are better than dreams. And the facts in this case argue against this treaty. The underlying premise of this treaty is flawed. The argument is, if we ratify this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, then the rest of the world will be nice and follow suit. Do you really believe that is applicable to North Korea, Iraq, Iran, India, Pakistan, China, Russia? We are going to act on faith? There are those who will say we must lead, we must show the way, but that is a very dangerous thing to do when you are dealing with something of this importance. Just in the last 2 days, in hearings before the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, it has become apparent that this treaty is flawed, should not be ratified now or in the foreseeable future. When you look at yesterday's testimony of the leaders of the country's three nuclear weapons laboratories, it makes it very clear that, as far as safety and reliability are concerned, without testing at this time we do not have the ability to make sure our weapons are safe and would be reliable if there were a need for them. The headline, even in the New York Times, says, ``Experts Say Test Ban May Impair Nuclear Arms Safety.'' That is a fact. That is a scary fact. Do the American people want us to have nuclear arms that are not tested, that are not safe? I do not think so. So I think we need to be very careful about going forward with a treaty that has the problems this treaty has now, in terms of what it would do and the fact that we do not have the ability to detect or verify what other countries may be doing. Just this past week, the CIA said they could not guarantee they could detect low-level testing in Russia. Then you add to that the testimony of the labs experts. We should defeat this treaty. Let me correct the record, or remind our colleagues and the country a little bit about why we are where we are. Why is this up? Why did we get a unanimous consent agreement to bring up this treaty, debate it, and have a vote? The President has been demanding it for 2 years. In his State of the Union Addresses and on other occasions, he has been saying: Call it up, have a debate, and vote. Quote after quote I have here with me. The President said in remarks on the 50th anniversary of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 9, 1999: I ask the Senate . . . to vote for ratification as soon as possible. He has said: . . . give its advice and consent to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty this year. In his State of the Union Address in 1998, he said: . . . approve the CTBT this year. That was last year. The Vice President, Mr. Gore has said: The U.S. Congress should act now to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. ``Act now.'' That was July 23, 1998. Forty-five Democrats sent a letter to Senator Helms saying a number of things, but basically this is the upshot of it: Give the Senate the opportunity to consider ratification of the CTBT before the conference begins. That is a conference of ratifying states. That conference is underway now. They wanted to have it up. We got it up and started the debate today. They were demanding that it be called up and considered before then. The minority leader has said: [W]e are certainly willing to have a debate and have the vote. Not call it up and pass it; he said have a debate, have a vote. On September 30, 1999, he said: I still think, one way or the other, we ought to get to this treaty, get it to the floor, debate it, and vote on it. What I am saying is for 2 years there has been this agitation to get this treaty up and have a vote on it. So finally they got what they said they wanted, and then they didn't want what they said they wanted. Then they said: Wait a minute, wait a minute, no, we didn't mean ``now.'' Like this thing was just sprung on us. For 2 years we have been hearing about it. Senators are not uninformed on this treaty. There are hearings underway right now, excellent hearings by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, and the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms. What happened was they found, when they actually got what they said they wanted--that is, the treaty was going to come up--that the treaty is flawed and it is going to be defeated. This treaty is not going to be ratified. It is not going to happen. They say: Wait, wait, wait; not now; it's too quick; we need more time; it is being given short shrift. I have some interesting facts on that, too. You talk about the amount of time. When we get through with this treaty and have a vote, we will have probably somewhere around 16 to 18 hours discussing it, debating it, listening to each other, excellent statements on both sides, men and women very serious about this, treating it the way it should be treated. Today, the problem has not been to get speakers. It is that we have so many people who want to speak. We are going to have a good debate today. But let's compare it to other treaties in the past. The CFE, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, we debated for 6 hours and voted on. The START treaty, 9\1/2\ hours; START II, 6 hours; Chemical Weapons Convention--which I know a lot about and showed, during the debate on that issue and the vote, that I was willing to do what I thought was right for the country even under a lot of pressure opposing it. I still get criticized for that. But when you come to treaties of this magnitude of international import, you have to look at the substance and you have to do what is right for your country, for the world situation, and for your children. Actually, it should be in the reverse order: For your children and your grandchildren. We spent 18 hours on it, and we voted on it. The CFE flank agreement, 2 hours. As a matter of fact, we are going to have more time spent debating this issue, when it is over, than any recent treaty, with the exception of chemical weapons, which I presume would be about the same time. So that is how we got to where we are. Because it was demanded. Senators were threatening to hold up Senate floor action if we did not have a vote. Senators had resolutions they wanted to offer with regard to this treaty that were unrelated to other matters being considered on the floor, including the Labor-HHS-Education appropriations bill. So I really thought, in view of the demands and the discussion that had gone on and the overall best interests of the Senate and the country, that this treaty should come up. So we got a unanimous consent agreement. It was not one that was sprung on anybody. I suggested it on Wednesday. We did not get it finally agreed to and locked in until Friday. So the discussions went on for 2 days. Nobody was surprised. The White House knew full well what we were about to agree to. Now they say set it aside. I am very worried; should this issue not be voted on now, it might be set aside to be brought back next year and that it become much more of a political issue. And it should not be. We have for a long time worked together in this Senate on a bipartisan basis, and bicameral, and with administrations, on trying to do the right thing on arms control. We should continue to do that. This treaty should not come up next year during a Presidential campaign and be used for political purposes on either side. So I called this up, as was demanded. We got a reasonable time agreement, more than was usually granted for treaties. There have been hearings underway. The Senators are not uninformed. Senators know what is in this treaty as they get to know more and listen to experts, such as Senator Lugar yesterday who had a six-page statement about how this treaty was wrong. To my colleagues I say, we have done what was requested by the President and by Senators. Let's have this debate and, as for myself, I am ready to vote. Mr. President, proponents and opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty find themselves in agreement on the starting point for this debate: That nuclear deterrence is fundamental to the national security of the United States. In his May of 1997 report entitled ``A National Security Strategy for a New Century,'' President Clinton states, and I quote, ``The United States must continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic forces sufficient to deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to any nuclear forces and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile.'' While the United States must be prepared for the prospect that nuclear deterrence may not always work, in no way does the possibility of failure render deterrence valueless. Nuclear deterrence was crucial to U.S. security in the past, and will continue to be in the future. It was, for example, nuclear deterrence which helped guarantee the security of Western Europe from the late 1940s until the Soviet Union collapsed and the cold war ended peacefully. President Eisenhower called on the U.S. nuclear deterrent to stop Chinese attacks against the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. In 1962 it was the U.S. nuclear deterrent that enabled President Kennedy to demand that the Soviet Union peacefully withdraw its nuclear missiles from Cuba. Again, President Nixon called on the U.S. nuclear deterrent to stop Soviet armed intervention into the Middle East during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. And, most recently, the U.S. nuclear deterrent was essential in persuading Saddam Hussein not to use chemical or biological weapons during the 1991 gulf war, undoubtedly saving thousands of lives. Time and again nuclear deterrence has effectively protected U.S. security without a shot being fired, and, along with the President and many others, I expect our deterrent to continue to be vital for the indefinite future. Credibility is the key to deterrence. Our nuclear deterrent must be credible not only to would-be aggressors, but also to America's leaders. To contemplate the use of nuclear weapons, our leaders must be confident in the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal. Our adversaries must believe that U.S. leaders possess the will to use the nuclear force if need be, and must also believe that our nuclear weapons can be used--that they are safe and reliable enough for U.S. leaders to consider seriously the possibility of their use. Without these conditions American threats of retaliation become less than credible, and the contribution of nuclear deterrence to the national security strategy of the United States would be unacceptably eroded. It is the paradox of the nuclear age that ensuring nuclear weapons are never used depends on ensuring they can be used. It is through testing of the U.S. nuclear stockpile that the United States has maintained its confidence in the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons. In 1987 the Lawrence Livermore Lab produced a reported entitled Report to Congress on Stockpile Reliability, Weapon Remanufacture, and the Role of Nuclear Testing. This report, though 12 years old, remains the single best explanation of the need for nuclear testing. According to the Livermore report, and I quote, ``. . . there is no such thing as a `thoroughly tested' nuclear weapon.'' The report gives several reasons for testing, to include, and I quote, ``. . . testing is done to maintain the proper functioning of the current stockpile of weapons,'' and, ``testing is done to modernize the existing stockpile for enhanced safety, security, or effectiveness. . . .'' Moreover, on many occasions the Labs have discovered problems with weapons only because of testing. According to the Livermore report, Nuclear weapons are fabricated from chemically and radiologically active materials. Much as a piece of plastic becomes brittle when it is left in the sunlight, nuclear weapons age and their characteristics change in subtle, often unpredictable ways. Testing is sometimes required to find problems and to assess the adequacy of the fixes that are implemented. Experience has shown that testing is essential. One- third of all the weapon designs introduced into the stockpile since 1958 have required and received post-deployment nuclear tests to resolve problems related to deterioration or aging or to correct a design that is found not to work properly under various conditions. In three-fourths of these cases, the problems were discovered only because of the ongoing nuclear testing. Because we frequently have difficulty understanding fully the effects of changes, particularly seemingly small changes on the unclear performance, nuclear testing has been required to maintain the proper functioning of our nation's deterrent. Accordingly to Dr. John Nuckolls, Director Emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore Lab, in a September 2, 1999, letter to Senator Jon Kyl, ``Nuclear testing has been essential to the discovery and resolution of many problems in the stockpile.'' Testing has been important in ensuring that our weapons work and are safe. It has been important in finding problems in our weapons. It has been important in certifying the solutions to the problems that have been found. It is because of this testing that the United States has been able to maintain its confidence in the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile, which is a fundamental requirement of nuclear deterrence. In promoting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Clinton administration asserts it can assure the requisite level of confidence in the safety and reliability of America's nuclear stockpile--that is, of the weapons comprising our deterrent, upon which nuclear deterrence is based--without testing. To do this the administration has embarked upon the ``Stockpile Stewardship Program.'' According to the Fiscal Year 2000 Stockpile Stewardship Plan Executive Overview, released by the Department of Energy in March of 1999, and I quote, ``The overall goal of the Stockpile Stewardship program is to have in place by 2010 * * * the capabilities that are necessary to provide continuing high confidence in the annual certification of the stockpile without the necessity for nuclear testing.'' The Stockpile Stewardship Program is an excellent program, and my comments should not be misunderstood as criticism of the program, per se. In fact, the United States has always had some form of stockpile stewardship even while testing. The fundamental question with respect to this program, however, is whether and when it will provide the requisite confidence in the safety and reliability of the stockpile even if it meets all of its design goals. As stated by the Department of Energy in the FY 2000 Stockpile Stewardship Plan Executive Overview, ``At the heart of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is the issue of confidence.'' To their credit, senior officials at the Department of Energy and the nuclear labs are generally careful in how they couch their remarks about the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The usual formulation is to state the belief in Stockpile Stewardship as the ``best approach'' in the absence of testing. That is a responsible reply, as it would be unreasonable to argue that the Department of Energy or our labs should be able to guarantee the success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. The scientists and engineers at the heart of stockpile stewardship are, in many cases, engaged in activities that are at the cutting edge of the science and technology of nuclear weapons. They can't guarantee success. According to the administration's estimates, it won't even be completely in place until the year 2010. But proponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are willing to put the Stockpile Stewardship cart before the nuclear horse, willing to gamble that the United States can give up nuclear testing now in the hope that Stockpile Stewardship will work in the future. Proponents try to reassure us by saying that if the Stockpile Stewardship Program ends up being insufficient, the United States can exercise the ``supreme national interest'' clause in the treaty to resume testing. Given the unwillingness of administrations to make use of this standard clause in other arms control agreements even when compelling facts exist, there is little reason to believe it would be used with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It may surprise some that we cannot be certain of the future success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. But we should all understand that this lack of certainty comes from a lack of detailed knowledge of many of the key processes in our nuclear weapons, even after all these years of studying, designing, building, and testing nuclear weapons. Accordingly to the FY 2000 Stockpile Stewardship Plan Executive Overview, ``The science and engineering of nuclear weapons are extremely complex, requiring the integration of over 6,000 components. There are many parameters and unknowns that greatly influence the performance of nuclear warheads.'' This report goes on to state, ``There are many areas of warhead operation that cannot be adequately addressed with existing tools and the current knowledge base of the weapons scientists and engineers.'' Thus the need for the several components of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, each of which is, in its own right, a major program. The importance of major components of Stockpile Stewardship being on schedule and on budget is made clear in the administration's FY 2000 Stockpile Stewardship Plan Executive Overview. This report states that the success of the Stockpile Stewardship plan is, ``dependent on a highly integrated and interdependent program of experimentation, simulation, and modeling. . . .'' The report also states, ``The success of this strategy depends on the effective integration of every major activity described in this Executive Overview . . .'' and, ``Full implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is required to sustain a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. . . .'' Simply put, this means that each of the major parts of the Stockpile Stewardship Program must work if, as stated by the administration, our country can do without nuclear testing while ensuring the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent. I will not go through each part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, but I will take a moment to discuss the National Ignition Facility, which has been described by senior Department of Energy officials as one of the key elements of Stockpile Stewardship. In fact, a senior Energy Department official has briefed Senate staff that the Stockpile Stewardship Program cannon succeed if the National Ignition Facility does not succeed. The purpose of the National Ignition Facility, being built by the Lawrence Livermore National Lab, is to achieve a better understanding of the part of the nuclear weapon known as the ``primary.'' The primary is the first and most critical stage in a nuclear explosion, and also happens to be the least understood part of our nuclear weapons. While other problems can affect the reliability of our nuclear weapons, we know that a nonfunctioning or deficient primary means that the weapon will either not work or not work as planned. In either case, this would be a major problem for our nuclear deterrent, and, hence, for our strategy of nuclear deterrence. Senate staff were briefed at length on the National Ignition Facility during a visit to the Livermore Lab last January. During this briefing they were told explicitly that the National Ignition Facility was on schedule for completion in October of 2003 and on budget. This program at that time was estimated to cost $1.2 billion. We have recently learned that the National Ignition Facility is not on schedule and budget, contrary to the representations that were made last January to staff. The same representation was made in testimony in March of 1999 to the Senate Armed Services Committee by Dr. C. Bruce Tarter, Director of the Lawrence Livermore Lab, when he stated, ``I am pleased to report that NIF [National Ignition Facility] construction is on budget and on schedule.'' In fact, however, the Washington Post reported on September 6, 1999, that, ``Energy Department officials said mismanagement may cause the project's cost to soar as much as $350 million above the originally projected $.2 billion and delay completion by as much as two years,'' Dr. Tarter's statement demonstrates that each part of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is a complex undertaking, the success of which cannot be assured, whether for reasons of technological or managerial deficiencies. It shouldn't be a surprise that the Stockpile Stewardship Program is having difficulties. After all, nearly every aspect of this program is attempting to push the borders of our scientific and engineering knowledge of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the Department of Energy's record of successful completion of major programs leaves much to be desired. According to the General Accounting Office, ``From 1980 through 1996, DOE terminated 9 of 18 major Defense Program projects after spending $1.9 billion and completed only 2 projects--one behind schedule and over budget with the other behind schedule but under budget. `Schedule slippages' and cost overruns had occurred on many of the remaining 7 projects ongoing in 1996.'' In the FY 2000 Stockpile Stewardship Plan Executive Overview Dr. Vic Reis states, ``Maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile without nuclear testing will continue to challenge DOE's best capabilities.'' Mr. President, there are many other reasons to be concerned about whether the Stockpile Stewardship Program is a sufficient alternative to testing. I will not address these questions in detail, but hope other Senators will. First, even if Stockpile Stewardship works as planned, and on time, and is affordable, is it good enough? Second, will Stockpile Stewardship accurately tell us about the effects of aging on nuclear weapons, which is one of the key challenges in stockpile whose weapons are being extended far beyond their design life? Will it tell us for example, what happens to plutonium as it ages? The issue of aging and its effects on the nuclear stockpile is particularly important, and is recognized as such in the FY 2000 Stockpile Stewardship Plan Executive Overview, which makes the following important statements about aging, 1. ``The DOE has never before had large numbers of 30 to 50 year-old warheads in the stockpile. Until last year, the average age of a stockpile warhead had always been less than 13 years. As a result, new types of aging-related changes and problems in these older warheads are expected to be encountered.'' 2. ``Some changes may have little or no effect, whereas others could make a major difference.'' 3. ``Nuclear warheads are not static objects. Materials change over time (e.g., radioactive decay, embrittlement, corrosion). Some of these changes do not adversely affect warhead safety or reliability, but others may. In addition, not all changes have reached current detection thresholds, but nonetheless may potentially impact safety or reliability.'' 4. ``* * * warheads will remain in the stockpile well beyond their anticipated design life and beyond DOE's base of experience.'' Third, will Stockpile Stewardship be good enough to certify the many new manufacturing processes, to include those for new plutonium pit production? And how will we know that the Stockpile Stewardship certifications of new manufacturing processes are accurate? Fourth, will Stockpile Stewardship enable the United States to make its weapons as safe as the technology allows, which used to be the standard against which nuclear weapons safety was measured? We have already received testimony, for example, that insensitive high explosives--an important safety measure--cannot be put in all of our deployed nuclear weapons without testing. Fifth, how will we know the answers to any of these questions without calibrating the finished Stockpile Stewardship product, if or whenever we get to that point, against actual tests of aged weapons currently in the stockpile? Though the United States performed 1,030 nuclear tests, much of the data is of such low quality or on weapons no longer in the stockpile that it can't be used in Stockpile Stewardship. The Advanced Strategic Computing Initiative, one of the major parts of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, has made impressive advances in supercomputing capability. But it still must improve the capabilities of its supercomputers by many orders of magnitude above what it has already attained. If this can be affordably accomplished--something that has not yet been determined--the United States will still be in the position of then having to rely upon computer simulations to integrate all the data being produced out of the other pieces of Stockpile Stewardship. As we all know, computer simulations can always be made to work; the question is whether they faithfully model reality. And without calibrating these models against actual tests of weapons currently in the stockpile, the United States will be forced into the position of hoping its models and simulations are accurate. Sixth, will Stockpile Stewardship incorporate and replace the experience base in Department of Energy and Lab personnel as most of the scientists and engineers with design, manufacturing, and test experience retire in the next 10 years? According to the FY 2000 Stockpile Stewardship Plan Executive Overview, ``Many of the scientists and engineers with actual weapons design, production, and test experience have already retired, and most of those remaining will likely retire within the next decade. A new generation of weapons scientists and engineers must be trained and their competence validated before the current generation leaves the workforce.'' Seventh, is Stockpile Stewardship's funding sufficient and sustainable? This question is asked because the lab directors originally told the administration they needed $4.8 billion per year, but were told to design a $4.5 billion per year program. After doing so they were then told the $4.5 billion per year would be in current dollars, and would therefore not be adjusted over time for inflation. And most recently, the labs were told that the cost of producing tritium would have to be accommodated within the $4.5 billion per year, though it was not included by the labs in their $4.5 billion per year budget. In testimony before the Senate Assistant Secretary of Energy Vic Reis stated, ``A production source of tritium would be in addition to'' the $4.5 billion per year for Stockpile Stewardship. Dr. Reis, however, is directly contradicted by the FY 2000 Stockpile Stewardship Plan Executive Overview, which states, ``FY '00 funding for the tritium source is included within this level'' of $4.5 billion. Thus, the labs are getting less than they said they needed for the Stockpile Stewardship Program; they're sustaining funding reductions because of inflation; and, their program is being further reduced by having additional requirements levied upon Stockpile Stewardship without the provision of additional resources. Finally, and most important, since Stockpile Stewardship is supposed to tell us about problems, many of which we've never seen before--such as those caused by aging--how will we know if Stockpile Stewardship ``works''? How will we know we're finding problems that we've never seen before? According to the President's statement of August 11, 1995, ``I am assured by the Secretary of Energy and directors of our nuclear labs that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent under a CTB through a science-based stockpile stewardship program without nuclear testing.'' The directors of the labs have not ``assured'' the President that the Stockpile Stewardship Program will maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent, in the President's words, ``without nuclear testing.'' What the lab directors actually have said in quite different: that Stockpile Stewardship represents the best chance to maintain the deterrent without testing. But there was absolutely no assurance given the President by the lab directors concerning Stockpile Stewardship. They have never said, individually or collectively, ``we can maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons without testing.'' In a letter to Senator Jon Kyl of September 24, 1997, the director of the Los Alamos Lab, Dr. Sigfried Hecker, stated, ``We agreed with the Department of Energy that without nuclear testing, the SSMP [Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program] provides the most logical approach for certifying the stockpile today and decades from now. We said that we could not guarantee that the SSMP would work, although we had reasonable confidence that it would * * *.'' That certainly doesn't sound like an ``assurance'' to me. Recognizing that the eventual success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program is not a self-evident fact, during a visit to the Los Alamos National Lab on February 3rd, 1998, President Clinton said, ``* * * I don't think we can get the Treaty ratified unless we can convince the Senate that the Stockpile Stewardship Program works * * *.'' As good as this program is, we do not know if Stockpile Stewardship will be good enough. We do not know when, if ever, the Stockpile Stewardship Program will be good enough, particularly as its promised completion is still over a decade away. And until we know, it would be irresponsible to foreswear nuclear testing. Stockpile Stewardship is simply not a proven alternative to nuclear testing. Nuclear deterrence is too important to the security of the United States for our nuclear deterrent to be propped up by hopes instead of set in a foundation of facts. The CTBT purports to ban an activity it does not define. My opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not derived solely from the questions emanating from the unfinished Stockpile Stewardship Program, though these uncertainties constitute more than sufficient grounds to object to the treaty. The CTBT is itself seriously flawed in many ways, four of which I will discuss. First, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty purports to ban an activity it does not define. Nowhere in the treaty can the definition of ``test'' be found. That is not to say that negotiators didn't spend a significant amount of time trying to define this most fundamental of terms. They did, but left the word undefined purposely because they simply found it too difficult to reach consensus on its meaning. So, the Senate is being asked to render advice and consent to ratification of a treaty that not only bans an activity, but does so comprehensively. We just don't quite know what activity is being banned. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty does state in Article I, ``Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion * * *.'' The Clinton administration has interpreted this to mean the CTBT is a ``zero- yield'' treaty, so one could expect that the treaty bans nuclear explosions from which a nuclear yield is derived. Unfortunately, the truth is not that simple, which is why the word ``test'' in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is undefined. In fact, for the first two-and-a-half years of the Clinton administration, negotiators pursued a comprehensive test ban treaty that would allow some level of yield from tests; that is, the Clinton administration's position was to negotiate a comprehensive test ban that would allow low-yield testing. Until August 11, 1995, when President Clinton decided to pursue a zero-yield CTBT, the Defense Department position was that it could agree to a comprehensive test ban treaty only if it permitted tests with nuclear yields of up to 500 tons. Other parts of the administration resisted a zero-yield treaty because they knew such a treaty couldn't be verified. But the nuclear weapon states couldn't agree on how much yield should be allowed, and the non-nuclear weapon states viewed this approach as an attempt by members of the nuclear club to enjoy the rhetorical benefits of being part of a nuclear test ban treaty while continuing to have the ability to improve their nuclear arsenals. So ultimately, in large part because some believed the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty hung in the balance, the United States endorsed a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty while leaving the meaning of ``test'' undefined and ``zero-yield'' ambiguous. In fact, the phrase ``zero-yield'' is not even in the treaty. Hydro nuclear testing is a perfect example of this problem. Hydronuclear testing is very low-yield testing, and is particularly useful in assessing nuclear weapon safety issues. Until the Clinton administration adopted its ``zero-yield'' position, it held that hydronuclear tests would be permissible under a comprehensive test ban treaty. After the administration adopted zero-yield as its position, though, American representatives declared hydronuclear testing to be contrary to this standard. Other countries, such as Russia, however, have declared hydronuclear testing to be consistent with its understanding of the treaty. Victor Mikhailov, formerly the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy and currently the First Deputy Minister at that ministry, stated on April 23, 1999, that the Russian nuclear program has to focus on, in his words, ``three basic directions'' in a CTBT environment: ``new computer equipment, non-test-site `simulation' experiments, and so-called test-site hydronuclear experiments, where there is practically no release of nuclear energy.'' Neither Russia nor, for that matter, China, has agreed even to the U.S. definition of what constitutes a hydronuclear test. After Russia signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, Arzamas-16, one of Russia's two nuclear weapons labs, published a book in 1997 entitled Nuclear Tests of the USSR. According to this book, ``Explosive experiments with nuclear charges in which the amount of nuclear energy released is comparable to energy of the HE [high explosive] charge, belong to the category of hydronuclear tests, and they also are not nuclear tests * * *.'' In plain English this means that one of Russia's two nuclear design labs does not consider low- yield testing to be a violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Russian position is not without merit, as the treaty's failure to define the meaning of the word ``test'' or even to include the phrase ``zero-yield'' gives rise to these kinds of fundamental ambiguities. Indeed, in testimony to the Senate, Mr. Spurgeon Keeny, President of the Arms Control Association, stated that during President Eisenhower's nuclear testing moratorium of 1958-1961, the President authorized a number of hydronuclear tests, ``. . . related to some very specific safety problems that existed at the time.'' So during President Eisenhower's zero-yield nuclear testing moratorium he authorized the conduct of tests which this administration says would violate today's zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It's not hard to see why other nations could think hydronuclear tests are permissible. This ambiguity will lead to greater tensions as some accuse others of violating the treaty. It will enable some countries to improve their weapons and cloak the activities of other nations as they pursue acquisition of nuclear weapons, while the United States abides strictly by the treaty. While arms control proponents suggest that arms control treaties enhance relations between nations, the failure to define the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's most fundamental term can hardly be expected to build confidence between nations; instead, it's likely to create discord. There is no evidence that the CTBT will reduce proliferation. The second key problem with the treaty is that, contrary to assertions by treaty proponents, there is no evidence that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will reduce proliferation. Nations acquire nuclear weapons to enhance their national security. Will America's failure to test change that? The evidence indicates not. Indeed, though the United States hasn't tested since 1992--and didn't resume testing even after France and China conducted their tests in the mid-1990s--India and Pakistan chose to conduct nuclear tests in the spring of 1998. Each country did this for the simple reason that they found such conduct to be consistent with their national security interests. The idea that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will be an effective nonproliferation barrier should be examined in the context of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, or NPT. Except for the United States, Britain, France, Russia and China--the so-called ``P-5''--the NPT establishes a norm against the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons. Yet, despite the establishment of this norm more than 30 years ago, nations other than the P-5 have continued to seek and acquire nuclear weapons. This pursuit and acquisition of nuclear weapons has occurred by both members and non-members of the NPT. Thus, while some of these nations, by virtue of their NPT membership, have explicitly violated the terms of that treaty--North Korea and Iraq immediately come to mind--the rest, though not NPT members, have flouted the NPT- established international norm. So, the CTBT-established ``norm'' against testing is essentially superfluous. To violate this norm, nations, except for the P-5, must first violate the NPT-established norm against acquiring nuclear weapons. And if they are willing to violate the first norm, why not the second, and lesser, CTBT-established norm? Nations willing to violate the NPT norm to acquire the weapon in the first place can hardly be expected not to violate the CTBT norm of testing their ill- gotten weapon. Mr. Spurgeon Kenny, President of the Arms Control Association, even testified to the Senate that the NPT, ``is the principal constraint on testing by non-nuclear weapon states.'' Which would seem to make the CTBT extraneous. Nonetheless, CTBT proponents contend the treaty will be an effective tool against ``horizontal proliferation''--that is, against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by nations that don't already have them--and also against ``vertical proliferation,'' or the improvement of nuclear arsenals by those nations already possessing these weapons. According to Dr. Kathleen Bailey, the former Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and now retired from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, in testimony before the Senate, ``It is quite feasible for a nation to develop a device that will work as long as it does not matter if the yield is exactly known and there are no exacting specifications which must be met.'' Nations that do not now have nuclear weapons can build relatively unsophisticated nuclear weapons. The knowledge necessary to build these weapons is readily available, in textbooks, classrooms, libraries, and on the Internet. Treaty proponents do not dispute this; in testimony before the Senate, Mr. Keeny of the Arms Control Association, said, ``. . . a rogue state could develop a first generation nuclear weapon without testing.'' For proliferating nations seeking a nuclear weapon capability, first generation nuclear weapons need not be tested for the user to have adequate confidence in their utility. The United States would not have sufficient confidence in an untested or marginally tested weapon because of its requirements for weapon safety and reliability, but other nations will not necessarily have the same stringent requirements. Even if a country has low confidence that its relatively unsophisticated nuclear weapon will work if used militarily, in a crisis the United States cannot take the chance that another country's weapon, however unsophisticated, won't work. In this respect, mere possession of a nuclear weapon could be enough to dissuade the United States from acting. As a minimum, this possession will be enough to constrain America's options in time of crisis. With respect to ``vertical'' proliferation, were the CTBT to receive consent to ratification by the Senate I am confident it would constrain the ability of the United States to modernize its nuclear arsenal. But other nations that already possess nuclear weapons will improve their arsenals--by exploiting the ambiguity inherent in the treaty's failure to define ``test,'' or embarking upon testing which we can't detect though it provides militarily useful data, or by espionage, as we have already seen in the case of China. China's acquisition of information on our most modern nuclear warhead, the W-88, demonstrates that some nuclear powers can improve their arsenals without extensive testing. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty could also have the perverse effect of engendering proliferation. There are several advanced nations, most of which are U.S. allies, that decided to forego their own nuclear arsenals for the explicit reason that their safety would be guaranteed under the American nuclear umbrella. If these allies lose their confidence in the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, then they could also lose faith in the idea of finding their own protections within America's extended deterrent. These nations could then decide it to be in their own national security interests to acquire nuclear weapons; at a minimum, U.S. participation in the CTBT would require them to examine the question of whether they need their own nuclear deterrent. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty's supposed nonproliferation benefits are based on hope, not fact. The CTBT adds nothing to the NPT. The evidence simply does not support the assertion that the CTBT would be an effective nonproliferation tool. The CTBT verification scheme will have little effect. The third significant deficiency of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is its verification provisions. As the treaty is supposed to be a ``zero yield'' test ban, this is particularly troubling. While it is reasonable to hope that a nation's assumption of treaty obligations is sufficient to bind it by the treaty's terms and conditions, it is an unfortunate fact that some nations violate arms control treaties when convenient. The Senate recognized this problem, for example, when it provided advice and consent to ratification of the START II agreement, declaring its concern about, ``. . . the clear past pattern of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements and continued cases of noncompliance by the Russian Federation. . . .'' This is why effective verification of arms control treaties is so important, and I will explain three of the ways the CTBT's verification regime is deficient. First, treaty supporters hope that the International Monitoring System set up under the CTBT will enable detection with high confidence of very low yield nuclear tests. We know, however, that it is possible to conduct a nuclear test with the intention of evading systems designed to detect the explosion's telltale seismic signature. This can be done through a technique known as ``decoupling,'' whereby a nuclear test is conducted in a large underground cavity, thus muffling the test's seismic evidence. In a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations last year, Dr. Larry Turnbull, Chief Scientist of the Intelligence Community's Arms Control Intelligence Staff, said, The decoupling scenario is credible for many countries for at least two reasons: First, the worldwide mining and petroleum literature indicates that construction of large cavities in both hard rock and salt is feasible, with costs that would be relatively small compared to those required for the production of materials for a nuclear device; second, literature and symposia indicate that containment of particulate and gaseous debris is feasible in both salt and hard rock. So not only is this ``decoupling'' judged to be ``credible'' by the Intelligence Community, but, according to Dr. Turnbull, the technique can reduce a nuclear test's seismic signature by up to a factor of 70. This means a 70-kiloton test can be made to look like a 1-kiloton test, which the CTBT monitoring system will not be able to detect. And a 70- kiloton test, even much less than a 70-kiloton test, can be extraordinarily useful both to nations with nuclear weapons and to nations seeking nuclear weapons. Bear in mind that the first atomic bomb used in combat had a yield of only 15 kilotons. The final verification problems I will discuss is one that is present in, though not particular to, this treaty, and has to do with the ability of proliferators to utilize information gained from the verification system. In short, the verifications regime could serve as a training ground for those who wish to use the treaty to mask their continued pursuit of new or improved nuclear weapons. We have seen this problem in the past, and the aftermath of the Gulf War provides an excellent example. Dr. David Kay, the first head of the UNSCOM inspection team in Iraq, has recounted on various occasions his experiences in searching for the Iraqi missile and weapons of mass destruction programs. One such experience involves UNSCOM's search for Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The UNSCOM inspectors searched long and hard, knowing the evidence was well hidden, and over many months, despite the best efforts of Iraq to frustrate UNSCOM's efforts, gradually uncovered much information about the broad scope of the Iraqi nuclear program. The UNSCOM inspectors were particularly interested in learning how Iraq had managed to fool the International Atomic Energy Agency for so long. According to Dr. Kay, the response they received from the director of Iraq's Atomic Energy Commission ``Nuclear Safeguards Department''--someone who had repeatedly lied to UNSCOM inspectors until he was confronted with incontrovertible evidence--was that he had learned how to beat the IAEA system of inspections from his experience as an IAEA inspector. After all, Iraq is a member of the NPT, and Iraqis therefore have every right to work at the IAEA. Mr. President, we must expect that the same will happen under the CTBT. The treaty's own implementation mechanisms could teach some countries how to appear to be adhering to this treaty while actually using it to shield the advancement of their clandestine nuclear programs. It is important to understand that our ability to verify a treaty is confined to the limits and fallibility of intelligence collection and analysis. In a 1998 speech to the National Defense University Foundation, Dr. Kay, stated, ``We ought to remember in the case of Iraq, we [UNSCOM] found in the nuclear area a program that had sucked up $10 billion in the 1980s; 15,000 people working on it; 25 sites of production of various components, 12 really major ones; elaborate deception and denial operations . . . Can you imagine, if you had the DCI in here and asked him, `Is there a country that can engage over ten years in a program to build nuclear weapons, spend $10 billion, have 15,000 people working in it, five major avenues of enriching uranium, and get within 18 months of building the program and you will not have detected it?' '' Sometimes, unfortunately, our Intelligence Community will miss even very large clandestine programs. The CTBT verification problem is compounded by the fact that it is supposed to be a ``zero-yield'' treaty. Commenting on this in testimony this year before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, James Woolsey, President Clinton's first Director of Central Intelligence, stated, ``I do not believe that the zero level is verifiable. Not only because it is so low, but partially because of the capability a country has that is willing to cheat on such a treaty, of decoupling its nuclear tests by setting them off in caverns or caves and the like. . . . And to my mind, that makes it a worse than a weak reed on which to rely.'' Mr. Woolsey is correct; the false assurance of the CTBT's verification system is in many ways worse than no assurance at all. The treaty's verification flaws alone are sufficient reason to vote against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The CTBT prevents the United States from making our weapons safer and from adapting our nuclear stockpile to new threats. The fourth major deficiency of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is that it will prevent the United States from both improving its current arsenal and building new types of weapons, should the need arise. Though treaty proponents view this as a positive development, I will briefly explain why it is in fact a problem. Dr. Robert Barker recently retired from the Lawrence Livermore National Lab after spending his entire professional life as part of the U.S. nuclear complex, as a weapon designer, tester, and as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy for three different secretaries. According to Dr. Barker, the safety standard for U.S. nuclear weapons has always been to make these weapons as safe as our technology will permit. This means that as technology improves, so too should the safety features of our nuclear weapons. But some safety features, such as insensitive high explosives, cannot be added to some of the weapons in our stockpile without testing. Therefore, the effect of the CTBT on the U.S. nuclear stockpile is to make it less safe than it otherwise would be. According to Dr. Barker in testimony to the Senate, ``The history of U.S. nuclear weapon development is that with the design of each new weapon, efforts were made to incorporate the latest safety features in a steadily evolving technology of safety. When weapons remained in the stockpile so long that their safety features were too deficient with respect to then current standards, these systems were retired solely because of this deficiency.'' So because the CTBT does not allow testing for safety or for any other reason, the United States will face the dilemma of fielding weapons that aren't as safe as they should be or doing without the weapons. For those whose ultimate objective is the denuclearization of the United States, this is a good reason to support the treaty. But it is not a good reason for those of us who understand the continuing necessity of nuclear deterrence to the national security of the United States. It is also risky to insist that the United States will not have a future need for new types of nuclear weapons. Our nuclear deterrent must be configured such that it contains weapons to meet all conceivable needs. Over the years, in fact, one of the reasons the United States has continued to produce new types of weapons has been to respond to new requirements. Assuming the immutability of the current U.S. nuclear weapon requirements is, in my view, an unacceptable gamble. According to an unclassified March 1999 report by the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory entitled The U.S. Nuclear Stockpile: Looking Ahead, ``[The] CTBT has reduced our flexibility and options to meet future nuclear deterrent requirements.'' The major problem with an outmoded nuclear stockpile is that it reduces the credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and, hence, undermines America's strategy of nuclear deterrence. As new threats develop for which the United States has no weapon that can be used, our adversaries will grow to view U.S. deterrent threats as less than credible. Obviously no one wants to use our nuclear weapons; but ensuring nuclear weapons are never used depends on ensuring they can be used. When they become unusable, or when we are faced with a situation for which we don't have the proper weapon, the American nuclear deterrent will have lost its relevance. This is good news for those who view the CTBT as an important step on the path to denuclearization, but bad news for everyone who understands the continuing importance of nuclear deterrence to America's national security. The four deficiencies I have just discussed are by no means the only faults of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but I will leave it to others to examine additional treaty shortcomings. While I'm sure some will take issue with my characterization of the CTBT as replete with problems, the simple fact of the matter is that even President Clinton recognizes that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is brimming with serious deficiencies. This is why the President announced that the United States would sign the CTBT subject to the establishment of so- called ``safeguards,'' and this is why the administration and treaty supporters are asking that these safeguards be made part of the resolution of ratification. What these safeguards tell us is that the administration does not want the Senate to consider the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on its own; that the administration does not believe the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to be capable of standing on its own merits. These so-called ``safeguards'' are themselves deficient. On August 11, 1995, President Clinton released a statement which said, ``The United States will now insist on a test ban that prohibits any nuclear weapons test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion. I am convinced this decision will speed the negotiations so that we can achieve our goal of signing a comprehensive test ban next year. As a central part of this decision, I am establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a comprehensive test ban.'' This announcement marked President Clinton's decision to seek a zero- yield test ban treaty, and part of what the President said is worth repeating, ``As a central part of this decision, I am establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a comprehensive test ban.'' The six conditions that President Clinton announced are not part of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, but entirely separate from the treaty. The safeguards were announced for the simple reason that the treaty is itself inadequate, or there would have been no need for the so-called safeguards. Indeed, the support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is conditioned on these safeguards. As stated in their Posture Statement of February 2, 1999, ``The Joint Chiefs of Staff support the ratification of this Treaty, with the safeguards package, that establishes conditions under which the United States would adhere to the Treaty,'' So the Joint Chiefs support the ratification of the treaty only with the safeguards package. And the President supports U.S. entry into the CTBT with the safeguards package. But the fact of the matter is that the safeguards package, upon which the President and the Joint Chiefs have invested so much importance, is not part of the treaty. The secret of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is that it does not stand on its own merits, but is propped up by this ``safeguards package'' which has been accepted by no other nation that has signed or ratified the CTBT. So the Senate is being asked, essentially, to provide advice and consent to ratification of this treaty because of words that are not in the treaty. The Senate is being asked to provide its consent to something that no other nation understands to be the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Even worse, the so-called ``safeguards package'' is itself inadequate in several ways, three of which I will now describe. Safeguard A calls for, ``The conduct of a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship Program to insure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile. . . .'' I have already explained why this safeguard is inadequate. Safeguard C calls for, ``The maintenance of the basic capability to resume nuclear test activities prohibited by the CTBT should the United States cease to be bound to adhere to this treaty.'' But when Senate staff visited the Nevada Test Site earlier this year they found funding and personnel problems which call into question the sincerity of this safeguard. Safeguard F calls for, The understanding that if the President of the United States is informed by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy (DOE)--advised by the Nuclear Weapons Council, the Directors of DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command--that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapon type which the two Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard ``supreme national interests'' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required. This safeguard is particularly important. Each of the nuclear weapons lab directors has testified that this safeguard is of critical importance to them because it reassured them that President Clinton was not eliminating the possibility of resuming testing despite agreeing to a comprehensive, and in his interpretation zero-yield, test ban treaty. According to Dr. C. Bruce Tarter, the director of the Lawrence Livermore National Lab, in a letter to Senator Jon Kyl of September 29, 1997, ``I regard of utmost importance the ability to exercise the `supreme national interest' clause of the CTBT to address concerns that I have outlined here in my answers. This option mitigates the risks in pursuing a no-nuclear-testing strategy. We must be prepared for the possibility that a significant problem could arise in the stockpile that we will be unable to resolve. The fact that the President's Safeguard F specifically cites this provision reinforces its importance.'' In essence, the lab directors rendered their technical judgment on entering into the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty based upon a political commitment. But the fact is that Safeguard F isn't even a commitment; it doesn't say the United States will resume testing if the lab directors can't certify a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a weapon in our nuclear stockpile. It doesn't say the ``supreme national interest'' clause will be invoked to resume testing if a problem is found which requires testing. Rather, it says that several different levels of interested parties all have to agree that there is a problem, and that they have to agree that the problem is in a weapon that the United States can't do without. So this opens the door for responding to a problem in our nuclear stockpile by deciding to eliminate from our stockpile entire types of our nuclear weapons. Removing weapons types with problems is a convenient way, after all, of eliminating problems from the stockpile. But it ignores the fact that we have these weapons in the stockpile because we need them. Furthermore, Safeguard F is of little, if any, value because it doesn't commit to resume testing even if a problem is found in a weapon that it is determined the United States cannot do without. Safeguard F only makes this commitment: That, ``. . . the President, in consultation with Congress, would be prepared to withdraw from the CTBT under the standard `supreme national interests' clause in order to conduct whatever testing might be required.'' To my knowledge, the United States has never made use of this clause in any treaty. But more importantly, we must recognize that neither the lab directors nor the United States Senate has received a commitment under this safeguard that testing will be resume if necessary. The only commitment here is that the President will consult with Congress and be prepared to leave the treaty to test. This safeguard should reassure no one. It is a falsehood to say that this CTBT is ``The longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history.'' President Clinton has said that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is, ``The longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history.'' The phrase has a nice ring to it; unfortunately, it is not true. President Eisenhower, who imposed a testing moratorium from 1958 to 1961, supported the idea of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Except that the test ban he proposed was of limited duration (four to five years), and would have allowed low-yield testing. And during the 1958- 1961 moratorium President Eisenhower authorized Hydro nuclear low-yield tests for safety reasons, which the Clinton administration maintains would violate the CTBT now before the Senate. During the Kennedy administration the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, space, or underwater, was negotiated. No serious attempt was made to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty; this was also the case during the Johnson administration. President Nixon's administration negotiated the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, but also didn't make any serious attempt to negotiate a comprehensive test ban treaty. There was no activity on this subject during the Ford administration. During the Carter administration, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty was signed. Serious consideration was given to a comprehensive test ban treaty, though, in Senate testimony in 1997, Dr. James Schlesinger, President Carter's Secretary of Energy, stated, ``[when] President Carter dealt with the issue of the CTBT, it was at a time when we were seeking a 10-year treaty and the yields of up to two kilotons would be permissible.'' In other words, President Carter favored a limited-term treaty that allowed for low-yield testing. Neither President Reagan nor President Bush pursued a comprehensive test ban treaty. In fact, responding to the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell amendment on testing in the Fiscal Year 1993 Energy and Water Appropriations Act, President Bush stated in a report to Congress, . . . the administration has concluded that it is not possible to develop a test program within the constraints of Public Law 102-377 [the FY '93 Energy and Water Appropriations Act] that would be fiscally, militarily, and technically responsible. The requirement to maintain and improve the safety of our nuclear stockpile and to evaluate and maintain the reliability of U.S. forces necessitates continued nuclear testing for those purposes, albeit at a modest level, for the foreseeable future. The administration strongly urges the Congress to modify this legislation urgently in order to permit the minimum number and kind of underground nuclear tests that the United States requires, regardless of the action of other States, to retain safe, reliable, although dramatically reduced deterrent forces. Only the Clinton administration has actively sought an unlimited duration comprehensive test ban treaty. And only the Clinton administration has sought a zero-yield test ban treaty, though until August of 1995--two and a half years into President Clinton's first term--even his administration's proposals in the Conference on Disarmament allowed for low-yield testing. President Clinton's statement that ``The CTBT is the longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history'' is false. I hope my colleagues will not be misled by the administration's transparent attempt to imbue this treaty with historical legitimacy it does not deserve. Mr. President, we all agree that nuclear deterrence continues to be essential to the national security strategy of the United States. Where proponents and opponents of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty begin to diverge is over the question of whether nuclear testing continues to be vital to ensure the safety and reliability of America's nuclear deterrent. The administration says that Stockpile Stewardship will provide us with the requisite confidence in our nuclear deterrent, and that this confidence will therefore be sufficient for our deterrent to continue to form the foundation of deterrence. It is my judgement that the Stockpile Stewardship is a well conceived and an important program, but we don't yet know whether it will become an adequate replacement for testing. And until we know this, it would be dangerous to bind our nation to a treaty that prohibits testings. I have pointed out some of the more significant shortcomings in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to explain that the Stockpile Stewardship Program's uncertainty, while itself sufficient justification to oppose the treaty, is not the only reason for such opposition. In failing to define the word ``test'' the treaty leaves ambiguous its most fundamental terms. There is no factual basis upon which to determine that the CTBT will be an effective nonproliferation tool. The CTBT is not verifiable. And it constrains the United States from maintaining high safety standards for the nuclear stockpile and from ensuring that our stockpile, in its configuration, is credible, a necessary condition for nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, the so-called ``safeguards'' announced by the President are nothing but a crutch, demonstrating that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty cannot stand on its own merits. Finally, I have taken the time to dispel the myth that this treaty before us is the ``longest sought, hardest fought prize in arms control history.'' This zero-yield test ban treaty is unlike any treaty attempted by any previous administration. While a few sporadic and mostly half-hearted attempts have been made to attain some form of a comprehensive test ban treaty in the past none of these efforts was in pursuit of a zero-yield, indefinite duration treaty. There is not an unbroken lineage, extending back some 40 years, for this treaty, and it is factually incorrect to suggest otherwise. Mr. President, arms control treaties must be judged by the straightforward standard of whether or not they enhance the national security of the United States. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty fails to attain this standard. Given the limitations of current technology, it is simply not possible to be simultaneously for nuclear deterrence and for this Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The two positions are mutually exclusive. In his book The Gathering Storm, Winston Churchill observed, ``Facts are better than dreams.'' ``Facts are better than dreams.'' Applying this observation to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty leaves one no choice but to oppose this treaty. Mr. BIDEN addressed the Chair.

Mr. LOTT

Mr. LOTT. I will be brief because I know we need to go to final passage. I must say that, amazingly, in a moment we are going to be voting on final passage of the Labor-HHS appropriations bill. I think this is the first time in 3 years that we have done that. I know we did not have one last year. I cannot recall for sure about 1997. I know we did in 1996. Regardless, this is the 13th and last of the appropriations bills. We are going to get to final passage. I hope it will pass. I have to extend my congratulations to the chairman of the subcommittee, the Senator from Pennsylvania, and the Senator from Iowa. A lot of people thought we could not get it done, but here we are. I want to say a special thanks to Paul Coverdell, who acted as one of my assistants on this matter, working with the whip on our side, and Harry Reid, who did a great job. In fact, I had asked Senator Coverdell if he would do this every week, and he has respectfully declined. Having said that, following this bill--the last appropriations bill-- there will be no further votes this evening, and no votes will occur on Friday of this week. In addition, the Senate will not be in session on Monday, in light of the Columbus Day holiday. On Friday, the Senate will begin consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at 9:30 a.m. Obviously, this is a very important treaty, a very important matter, so I urge my colleagues to participate in the debate tomorrow. I think we have somewhere between 10 and 20 speakers who are going to speak on this tomorrow. I hope the Senators will watch it from their offices or review the debate that occurs on Friday. This evening, the Senate will shortly begin the Agriculture appropriations conference report. Additional debate on that issue will occur this evening. Several votes will occur on Tuesday, October 12, beginning at 5:30. There could be one vote or more. I think it is very possible there could be a couple votes at that time on Tuesday dealing with the Agriculture appropriations conference report and possibly with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. So I thank all my colleagues for their cooperation. We have had a very successful week. We passed the FAA reauthorization, confirmed two judicial nominations, passed the foreign operations conference report. Now we are hopefully fixed to pass the Labor-HHS appropriations bill, and we will file cloture tonight, since it seems it is necessary, on the Agriculture appropriations conference report. The bottom line: No further votes tonight; the next vote, 5:30 on Tuesday. I yield the floor. Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.

Mr. LOTT. It is my understanding that movement to the House level is not an increase in the NIH budget, is that correct? As I understand it, this would reallocate money within the NIH budget and that this would not be additional funding. This would set aside a portion of NIH research money for those states, Mississippi included, to more fully exploit the opportunities to develop a competitive biomedical research base.

Mr. LOTT

Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, in view of the time that has been spent discussing this very important issue, and also the fact there have been several attempts to find ways to limit the debate, and now in view of the vote on the motion to table which was unanimous against tabling it, putting the Senate back to exactly the position we were in before, I think the thing to do at this time is to withdraw this amendment and move forward. I think that is a mistake. I want to say to one and all, this issue will be joined further, and we will find a way for the content of this amendment to be in some legislation and passed through the Congress this year.