Richard Lugar

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk that has been cleared on both sides of the aisle.

Mr. LUGAR. I urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote and to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the Senator from New Mexico. This is a killer condition because it requires the President to make two determinations prior to the U.S.-India agreement being implemented that are at odds with the purpose of the pact. First, under the Bingaman amendment a determination must be made that both India and the United States have taken specific steps to conclude a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, or FMCT, before the U.S. can export nuclear equipment and technology. The amendment requires that a second determination be made that India has stopped the production of fissile material for weapons before the U.S. can export nuclear materials. While I agree that an Indian commitment to abandon its nuclear weapons program would have been optimal, even in its absence this agreement serves U.S. national security interests. Members must consider whether this amendment and others like it advance U.S. national security. I believe that U.S. interests are served by greater IAEA oversight of India's nuclear program and I reject amendments that make the perfect the enemy of the good. I support this agreement and oppose amendments, like this one, that would derail its implementation. By linking American exports of nuclear equipment and technology to U.S. and Indian progress on a multilateral FMCT holds New Delhi to a different and higher standard than any other country we have nuclear trade with, higher standards for example than we require of Beijing. A successful FMCT will only be concluded and implemented when every nation with fissile material production capabilities agrees and abides by its commitment. I worry that this amendment may provide countries who oppose this bilateral agreement with a backdoor veto. In other words, if another nation stymies progress on a FMCT, will India and the U.S. be penalized? I share the strong support of the Senator from New Mexico for an FMCT. But a successful FMCT negotiation will require the assent of all nations, in particular China. Unlike the U.S., the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, China is assumed to have ceased fissile material production but has not made a public statement confirming this as the others have. The report that accompanies the Lugar-Biden legislation, S. 3709, highlights the potential trouble with these kind of linkages. The Conference on Disarmament, the host of talks on a FMCT, has been unable to agree on a work program, in part because some countries--notably China--have refused to approve the beginning of FMCT negotiations unless the Conference on Disarmament also approves discussions of other issues, such as nuclear disarmament and banning weapons in outer space. For its part India has long supported conclusion of an effectively verifiable FMCT. This position reflects India's concern regarding fissile material production by its nuclear-armed neighbors, and it would be unrealistic to expect a precipitous change in India's position. It would be difficult to determine that the U.S. and India have taken specific steps to conclude an FMCT if Chinese interference didn't permit the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament to start. In testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, former Secretary of Defense William Perry addressed the danger of conditioning passage of the U.S.-India agreement on FMCT-related issues. In fact, Bill Perry stated that there were many things by which we could condition nuclear trade with India on, including ``India tak[ing] a leadership position in promoting an international cutoff in the production of fissile material.'' But Dr. Perry concluded: I do not recommend that the Senate try to modify the agreement to include them. Instead, I recommend that the Senate task the Administration to vigorously pursue continuing diplomacy to facilitate these actions, and that should be as a follow-on to the agreement. Secretary Perry's advice was good counsel and we adopted it in the Lugar-Biden bill. In our opinion, S. 3709 strikes the right balance in conditioning nuclear trade with India in areas consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement. India reiterated its support for an FMCT in that statement and our bill applies pressure and requires continue monitoring of future Indian and U.S. administrations to ensure full implementation of the decision by India to support such a treaty. Section 105(5) of the Lugar-Biden bill requires an annual determination that India continues its support for an FMCT and is not preventing adoption of a negotiating mandate that leaves the issue of verification to be decided in the negotiations. If India is working with the United States to conclude an FMCT or a similar treaty, that would justify a presidential determination under this provision. We reinforce these requirements with report language that reads that: the United States must now use the influence it has gained through efforts in both India and Pakistan, and with India in particular through its nuclear trade with that nation, to help them transition from nuclear build-ups to stability and arms reductions. This is nowhere more relevant than in the area of fissile material production. In addition, this amendment requires the President to determine that India has ceased the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons before the agreement can be implemented. India has long rejected calls for the cessation of fissile material production, pointing to rival nuclear weapons programs as justification. India maintains that it cannot agree to a unilateral cap on fissile material production at this time. Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons-related purposes, and China has not yet committed to a moratorium on such production. It is not in U.S. national security interests to threaten the significant nonproliferation gains afforded by this Initiative with India in order to seek a fissile material cap that India indicates it cannot agree to, absent a similar commitment by Pakistan and China. As Secretary Rice testified on April 6, 2006, before the Committee on Foreign Relations: India would never accept a unilateral freeze or cap on its nuclear arsenal. We raised this with the Indians, but the Indians said that its plans and policies must take into account regional realities. No one can credibly assert that India would accept what would amount to an arms control agreement that did not include other key countries, like China and Pakistan. In addition, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Policy, Bob Joseph, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, stated on March 29, 2006: The curtailment of the production of fissile material for weapons was discussed as part of the Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, but India maintained that it could not agree to a unilateral cap at this time. The U.S. has achieved an important objective by obtaining India's commitment to work toward the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Moreover, we remain willing to explore other intermediate options that might also serve such an objective. We also continue to call on all states that produce fissile material for weapons purposes to observe a voluntary production moratorium, as the United States has done for many years. Senator Biden and I took a number of steps to address concerns about continued Indian fissile material production but we sought to do so in a manner that did not threaten the efficacy of the U.S.-India Agreement. In section 103(1) of our bill we make it the policy of the United States ``to achieve as quickly as possible a cessation of the production by India and Pakistan of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.'' Section 108(a)(1)(A) requires an annual reporting requirement on Indian implementation and compliance with ``the nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of India.'' Other subsections within section 108 of our legislation require: (1) annual reports on ``significant changes in the production by India of nuclear weapons or in the types of amounts of fissile materials produced''; (2) whether India ``is in full compliance with the commitments and obligations contained in the [U.S.-India] agreements and other documents''; and (3) a requirement to identify and assess all compliance issues arising on India's commitments and obligations. These reporting requirements will ensure that Congress remains fully informed on developments related to the implementation of this agreement. As we all know, it is the prerogative of Congress to review these treaties and take action should we ever determine that Indian activities put the benefits of the agreement on U.S. national security interests in doubt. In addition, the committee adopted an amendment offered by Senator Chafee during markup of S. 3709 making it the policy of the United States that peaceful atomic cooperation and ``exports of nuclear fuel to India should not contribute to, or in any way encourage, increases in the production by India of fissile material for non-civilian purposes.'' The administration is in the midst of negotiations with India on a 123 Agreement, and New Delhi is also negotiating a new safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The Nuclear Suppliers Group has yet to make a decision to embrace the U.S.-India Agreement and approve its 45 member states to engage in nuclear trade with India. If we accede to conditions such as the one contained in the Bingaman amendment, conditions that India has already rejected, we will severely limit our ability to influence India's nuclear program. Moreover, the IAEA's ability to monitor India's activities will be further circumscribed and we will return to a time when India was a hindrance rather than a partner in international, multilateral nonproliferation and arms control efforts. Senator Biden and I believe we have addressed this matter in a manner that does not threaten the viability of the agreement. The determinations I described above were carefully drafted to balance, and not upset, the ongoing negotiations in Vienna or those in the U.S. and India. We must not forget that Congress will have a chance to vote on the 123 Agreement. S. 3709 provides Congress with an up or down vote on this important agreement and fully protects Congress' role in the process and ensures congressional views will be taken into consideration. In conclusion, the Bingaman amendment imposes an unacceptable precondition on civil nuclear cooperation with India. India will regard this as ``moving the goalposts,'' an unacceptable renegotiation of the deal, and a bad-faith effort on our part. As a consequence, this is a deal-killer that wrecks the balance that we sought between executive and legislative power, nonproliferation responsibilities, and the U.S.-India relationship. Killer conditions such as these forfeit the U.S. ability to influence Indian behavior. While I understand that this was not the intent of the Senator from New Mexico, in my view it is the practical effect. In sum, the Lugar-Biden bill addresses the issues raised by this amendment without undercutting the agreement. Unfortunately, the Bingaman amendment is a killer amendment and I urge Senators to oppose it. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LUGAR. Let me respond to the Senator. I appreciate his willingness to offer the amendments in a timely fashion. We are in the process of debating one amendment, but I will ask unanimous consent it be temporarily laid aside so the Senator can offer his amendments to expedite this consideration.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send two amendments to the desk that have been cleared on both sides.

Mr. LUGAR. I urge adoption of the amendments.

Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LUGAR. I would mention, Mr. President, the author of the amendments is Senator Bingaman, and one of the amendments is also in conjunction with Senator Domenici. Amendment No. 5178 Mr. President, I want to respond to the distinguished Senator from North Dakota briefly. I oppose his amendment. While the amendment would merely state that it is U.S. policy to continue to support implementation of the Security Council resolution that was passed in June 1998 in response to the nuclear weapons tests in South Asia--a resolution we voted for--I believe the amendment casts us back to a very different time, well before the miraculous changes in India's relations with the United States and with the world that occurred as a result of the July 2005 Joint Statement and India's decision to turn the corner on nonproliferation policy generally. I do not believe this bill is the right place to address ourselves to the past. This bill is about the future. We have taken adequate account in the bill of the concerns the Senator's amendment would address. Section 1033 of the Lugar-Biden bill makes it the policy of the United States that: India remains in full compliance with its non- proliferation, arms control, and disarmament agreements, obligations, and commitments. Section 108(b) of our legislation requires annual reporting, including a detailed description of ``United States efforts to promote national or regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, securing, capping, and reducing their fissile material stockpiles, pending creation of a world-wide fissile material cut-off regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material Cut-Off treaty; the reactions of India and Pakistan to such efforts; and assistance that the United States is providing, or would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan'' to promote such objectives. In the context of this bill, I do not believe it is appropriate to return to the past in a way the Senator's amendment would, and I urge defeat of the amendment.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, may I respond briefly to my colleague?

Mr. LUGAR. It would be my hope--and let me discuss this quickly--that the debate on the first amendment of Senator Dorgan is completed. Secondly, I want a short time for Senator Domenici of New Mexico to make a statement. And then thirdly, we will proceed to the introduction of Senator Dorgan's second amendment. My hope would be that a unanimous consent will be formulated--I know staff from both sides are working on that--that will provide for rollcall votes on both Dorgan amendments and then, at the conclusion of the debate of the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, on the Bingaman amendment, perhaps a stack of three votes for the convenience of Senators. I am broaching that, not asking for everybody to agree, but I am hopeful that would be a general agreement of those who are around at this point. It is my hope that the distinguished Senator from New Mexico might be recognized.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, Mr. Domenici, for his very strong statement, and I simply want to mention again how much I appreciate working with him over the years. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation was extremely important throughout a good part of the last decade, and on the nonproliferation efforts he has been a champion in the Senate. We appreciate his contribution to this debate today.

Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I note the presence of the distinguished Senator from North Dakota. We indicated that he would continue by offering his second amendment, and I would advise him to do so, if he is prepared. Amendment No. 5182

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I intend to offer a short statement opposing the amendment. I would ask Members to be alert to the possibility that following my statement, Senator Biden has indicated he would put his statement in the Record if this plan can then be accepted, and we would then proceed to three rollcall votes: an amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from New Mexico, Mr. Bingaman, and two amendments offered by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota, Mr. Dorgan. For the convenience of our colleagues, those three votes would come without pause, thus minimizing the dislocation of Members' schedules and accelerating our consideration of this debate. I am certain the Chair has heard that Senator Biden and I, for many of our colleagues who were hopeful that we could proceed in a responsible way but conclude the debate today, on Thursday, are attempting to do that, and we appreciate the cooperation of our colleagues. Having said that, Mr. President, let me state my opposition to the second amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from North Dakota. His amendment would, in fact, undo the entire effort we have achieved with India over the past year. Not only would he revise India's civilian military separation plan with his amendment, but he would require India to assume the obligations of a nuclear weapons state under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the NPT. This is, in effect, a perfect killer amendment. It should be strongly opposed by every Member of this body who supports an improved relationship with India. The Senator's amendment adds two new determination requirements to our bill: first, that India's separation plan result in a situation wherein all reactors that supply civilian power are declared to the IAEA and under safeguards; and second, that India assume certain NPT obligations. This is unnecessary and would do us great harm. It adds a new element in the separation plan that the President did not negotiate and would undo the deal we have reached. India's separation plan is credible and sound, according to criteria developed by the administration in its negotiations with India. As Secretary Rice stated last April: For the plan to be transparent, it had to be articulated publicly. It has been. For it to be credible and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint, it had to capture more than just a token number of Indian nuclear facilities-- Which it did---- by encompassing nearly two-thirds of India's current and planned thermal power reactors, as well as all future civil, thermal, and breeder reactors. Importantly, for the safeguards to be meaningful, India had to commit to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity. It did so. Once a reactor is under IAEA safeguards, those safeguards will remain there permanently and on an unconditional basis. Further, in our view, the plan also needed to include upstream and downstream facilities associated with the safeguarded reactors to provide a true separation of civil and military programs. India committed to these steps, and we have concluded that its separation plan meets the criteria established: it is credible, transparent, and defensible from a nonproliferation standpoint. The amendment changes the metrics for a credible and defensible separation plan by including that such a plan must mean that any reactor supplying power must be declared. As Secretary Rice stated before the committee: Regardless of whether they might be used to generate electric power or not, reactors that are not declared civil, and thus are not under IAEA safeguards, cannot legitimately receive nuclear fuel or other nuclear cooperation from any State party to the NPT. The second element in the Senator's amendment would require India to assume the obligations of a nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. The administration was careful not to term India a ``nuclear weapon state'' with similar rights and obligations as those five nations in the NPT with status as lawful weapon states--France, Russia, China, the U.K., and the U.S.--and instead termed India in the July 2005 joint statement a ``responsible state with advanced nuclear technology.'' This was necessary to do no harm to U.S. and other weapons states' status under the treaty. The Senator's amendment would create obligations similar to those of weapon states for India through creating a determination requirement that the President must make wherein India has assumed the obligations of a nuclear weapon state under the NPT. I would argue that this is not necessary, since it could well provoke India to walk away from the obligations they would assume under our 123 Agreement with them and leave the restraint we might get through that deal on their weapons program on the negotiating table. India has stated they have no intention to sign or become a party to the NPT, as a weapon state or otherwise. India's July 2005 joint statement commitments are significant, but they do not include NPT membership. I urge defeat of the amendment; it is a killer.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to a series of stacked votes in relation to the following amendments: the Bingaman amendment No. 5174, the Dorgan amendment No. 5178, as modified and the Dorgan amendment No. 5182; further, that there be no second degrees in order to any of the amendments prior to the votes, that there be 2 minutes of debate equally divided before the second and third votes.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I will oppose this amendment as it goes significantly beyond the commitments India made in the joint statement. India will regard this particular requirement that India stop producing fissile materials for weapons as moving the goalposts and an unacceptable renegotiation of the deal--a bad-faith effort on our part. India maintains that they cannot agree to a unilateral cap at this time. We should not hold up the significant nonproliferation gains afforded by the initiative in order to seek a fissile material cap that India indicates it cannot agree to absent a similar commitment by Pakistan and China. Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons-related purposes and China has not committed to a moratorium on such production. Unfortunately, in my judgment, this is truly a killer amendment. I strongly encourage that amendment be defeated. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the next two amendments.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, my impression was that the call was for the vote and then a 2-minute debate.

Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask that Members oppose the Dorgan amendment on the basis that the resolution he talks about is an important one, but it talks about a time in which our relationship with India was very different. It talks about the past. We have been very fortunate in this country to move into a better relationship with India, to a point where we are now going to be in India. The IAEA is going to be in India. We are going to be able to observe a bulk of the nuclear reactors and programs there and to work with India in peaceful development. There was a time when we did not have that relationship. By ``we,'' I mean the United States and the international community. The situation in India is constructive. This is a time to celebrate and to move on that momentum. I ask that the Dorgan amendment be defeated.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote, and I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to indicate that the distinguished Senator from Nevada will offer an amendment. We will then proceed to the Old Senate Chamber for a debate on that amendment. I think we have an agreement that the extent of the debate will be no more than 60 minutes. We would return to this Chamber for the actual vote on the Ensign amendment, following the debate in the Old Senate Chamber. Therefore, the Senator from Nevada should be recognized so that he can start that process. Amendment No. 5181

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I understand that the Senator from Delaware, as the ranking member, will offer the official motion sending us over to the Chamber.

Richard Lugar

Speeches

Manage analytics