Richard Lugar

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. If the Senator will yield, let me respond. The President sent a copy of the letter to Senator McConnell, our leader. Both leaders got the letter.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. I agree with the chairman. I hope that, having raised that issue, Members will come to the floor promptly, amendments will be offered, and votes will be taken. It appears to me that a number of our colleagues are prepared to conclude business, including our majority leader and the Republican leader. I think that is the sentiment of the body. As a result, given the 9\1/2\ hours of open time yesterday and a number of good statements, we did not progress toward any resolution of either amendments or the treaty. I think today we must do so. I support action to accelerate that.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I am delighted to delay my remarks to listen to other Senators who have come to the floor. We are eager to try to expedite all of the statements of our Members.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, during the debate, several Senators have noted concerns about the U.S. triad of submarines, land-based missiles, and those weapons with which we will equip our heavy bombers over the duration of the treaty. Others have cited concerns with the administration's plans for ICBM modernization in the updated 1251 report. They note it could somehow constrain our flexibility and serves to meet some arms control aspirations rather than weapons modernization. Our resolution of ratification incorporated a declaration concerning the so-called triad. This was done in the committee with an amendment offered by Senator Risch. That declaration, No. 13, states: It is the sense of the Senate that United States deterrence and flexibility is assured by a robust triad of strategic delivery vehicles. To this end, the United States is committed to accomplishing the modernization and replacement of its strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and to ensuring the continued flexibility of United States conventional and nuclear delivery systems. That, as I say, was included in our committee work. Secondly, I wrote to Secretary Gates last week, our Secretary of Defense, regarding the concerns that many Senators have noted about the age and weaponry for our heavy bombers, notably the B-52 and its air- launched cruise missile, and about modernization plans for our ICBMs. I wanted assurances that over the duration of the treaty we will have a triad of systems that is credible, particularly the bomber leg of our triad. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the response I received from Secretary Gates on December 10.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I asked for an assurance that over the duration of the New START treaty the Defense Department will not permit a situation to arise where heavy bombers lack sufficient and credible nuclear standoff attack capability. Secretary Gates responded that the current air-launched cruise missile will be maintained through 2030 with multiple lifetime extensions and that ``the Administration is committed to providing a sufficient and credible nuclear standoff attack capability, and ensure that the bomber leg of the Triad remains fully capable of supporting U.S. deterrent requirements.'' I also sought assurance that the language in the 1251 update will in no way modify the basing of the ICBM leg of the triad nor constrain its future designs with respect to warhead loadings; that is, constraining it to meet some arms control goal of fewer warheads for ICBMs. Secretary Gates responded that ``The Administration is also committed to sustaining the silo-based Minuteman III force through 2030, as mandated by Congress'' and that ``[N]either the Update to the 1251 Report nor planning and guidance for a follow-on ICBM will constrain the flexibility of a follow-on design with respect to warhead loadings.'' Bombers will have sufficient nuclear weapons under New START. We are not going to constrain a future ICBM for purposes of arms control. With these commitments, and our declaration, I am assured by Secretary of Defense Gates that we will have a credible bomber leg, one that allows us sufficient and flexible responses to strategic change, and that a future ICBM will not be less effective or flexible than our present ICBMs. Moreover, regarding New START force levels, the combatant commander responsible for executing strategic deterrence operations and planning for nuclear operations, General Chilton, has said this about the New START treaty and its force structure: Under the New START Treaty, based on U.S. Strategic Command analysis, I assess that the triad of diverse and complementary delivery systems will provide sufficient capabilities to make our deterrent credible and effective. . . . Under the New START Treaty, the United States will retain the military flexibility necessary to ensure each of these for the period of the treaty. . . . U.S. Strategic Command analyzed the required nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle force structure and posture to meet current guidance and provided options for consideration by the Department of Defense . . . this rigorous appraisal rooted in both deterrence strategy and an assessment of potential adversary capabilities, validated both the agreed-upon reductions in the New START Treaty and recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review. End of quote from General Chilton. Note what he said--that this analysis take into account potential adversary capabilities. General Chilton is confident in our deterrent and that the force structure under the treaty and our triad will meet our needs. I do not think we should dispute either General Chilton or Secretary Gates--long-serving professionals who have served both Presidents Bush and Obama so very well. I would add, supplementing the excellent comments made by my colleague, the chairman, that from the beginning of our debates in the Senate on arms control treaties or even before that, the so-called Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, there have been many Senators very sincere in their viewpoints that they simply do not like arms control treaties. Furthermore, they would counsel that you cannot trust the Russians. Therefore, adding the two together, if you have an aversion to arms control treaties and agreements and you do not trust the Russians and, furthermore, you do not want to trust the Russians or have any further dealings with them quite apart from treaties on arms control, this leads to certain skepticism, if not outright opposition, to those of us who have been proposing arms control treaties for several years and arms control treaties with the Russians in particular. I would simply point out, as I tried to yesterday informally, that there are always extraordinary problems with verification of any treaty, and much of the debate on this treaty, in terms of our committee responsibilities and initial statements made by Senators on the floor, zero in on such points, as to the fact that you cannot trust the Russians, and/or there are other things in the world we ought to be paying attention to, much more important than the Russians for that matter, and, further, that somehow this treaty, in particular, will inhibit the defense of our country, specifically through missile defense. Members of administrations past and present have affirmed it is important to have arms control treaties with the Russians. It has not ever been a question of trusting the Russians. It has been a question of trying to provide verification that the provisions of the treaties that we have negotiated are, in fact, fulfilled. It is a fact, as has been suggested by some Senators, that on several occasions we have found violations or very dubious conduct on the part of the Russians. I have no idea how many times they have testified they have found something doubtful about our performance, but in any event, in the real world of deterrence and the real world of verifiability, there have been abrasions and arguments and disputes. I would simply say one of the values of the treaties we have had with the Russians, and specifically the START treaty regime, is that they have allowed many of us--the distinguished chairman has made a good number of trips to Russia and to countries that surround Russia. I have had that responsibility and opportunity for many years likewise. I testified yesterday during our debate that on one occasion, when I was invited to come to Sevmash, the submarine base, I saw things no American had ever seen before, apparently. When we talk about our intelligence facilities, there were no pictures taken by our intelligence folks, or very good dimensions of what a Typhoon submarine actually looked like or what it did. We had various suppositions. Incredibly, after my visit to Sevmash, where we were not allowed to take pictures, a Russian sent to me a picture of me standing in front of a Typhoon submarine. From our intelligence standpoint, this was the first time anyone had seen a picture of a Typhoon, quite apart from a diligent Senator standing in front of it. Furthermore, we had good opportunities with the Russians to discuss the Typhoon. I don't specialize in submarines, but I was able to take notes and to make known at least my impressions of that particular situation. Why in the world would someone invite a Senator to come see something of that variety? It came about because we literally had not only boots on the ground in terms of our military but some of us even as Senators. The relationship was such that the Russians, perceiving they needed to get rid of the Typhoon submarines and it was going to be very expensive, technically maybe even dangerous with regard to removal of all of the 200 missiles, decided it was time to do business. The opportunities that come, in other words, from a relationship of that sort sometimes move in directions no one might have anticipated--but to the good, in my judgment. I admitted yesterday only three of the six Typhoons have, in fact, been destroyed. It is a tedious, expensive, difficult process. But getting back to our debates on the floor of the Senate, I can recall not only during the initial discussion of the Nunn-Lugar Act, but almost annually as appropriations were sought to continue this work, skeptical colleagues, first of all, doubting the value of any type of arrangement with the Russians, and doubting very much whether a dime of American taxpayer money should ever be spent on the Russians in this regard. So some of us, as reasonably and calmly as possible, could say, Well, we think it is probably important that if there are, in fact, nuclear warheads, thousands of them, aimed at our cities as well as our military installations, and we have opportunities and cooperative threat reduction to work as contractors, as Senators, as military officials, whoever, with the Russians, we ought to take those warheads that are aimed at us off the missiles. We ought to physically take the missiles down. We ought to, in fact, destroy the silos in which they are located, and we think this is probably a valuable use of taxpayer money in terms of our own defense. Each year, by and large, that argument won, although rarely unanimously. On one occasion, incredible as it may be, Members of the Senate added so many qualifications, so many additional reports that had to be filed by the Defense Department or the State Department or intelligence authorities that the whole fiscal year passed without a single dollar being available for expenditure on any of this armament reduction. In other words, Senators were so involved in attempting to demonstrate their mistrust of the Russians, their demand that our bureaucracy fulfill all sorts of impossible goals, that nothing got done. Eventually over the course of the decade, we evolved to a point where by and large those sorts of debates began to taper off--and I am grateful for that--and we began to see the possibilities not only with regard to the Russians but other countries who had strange weapons that they reported to us and sought our cooperation. This is well beyond even the ability to wind up the nuclear situation in Ukraine or Kazakhstan or Belarus or what have you. I would cite one more, and that is in the year 2004, the first year in which the Senate voted that at least $50 million--just $50 million of about $500 million that year of the Nunn-Lugar program could be used outside of Russia. So strong were feelings of some in opposition to the Nunn-Lugar program that they saw the fact that it might spread outside of Russia almost as a contaminant, something that ought to be contained. They felt it was bad enough that we had ever had such a thing in Russia, quite apart that we ought to destroy weapons anywhere else. But nevertheless, a majority of the Senate did allow for $50 million. That very summer authorities in Albania notified the Pentagon that they had found some strange drums up above the capital city of Tirana in Albania, and they wanted to report that to us because they thought they needed assistance, probably for safety's sake of the Albanians who had found the drums. Our officials, having been invited by the Albanians, went in fact to the mountains and they found the drums were filled with nerve gas. Very quickly, they simply put up a modest fence and began to roll the drums in behind the fence. I was invited to come over at that stage and I did, and I had good visits to our Ambassador to Albania, with their foreign minister and their defense minister, members of their Parliament. Albania at that time was a state that was coming out of a terrible dictatorship--a dictatorship so adverse that it was even difficult for the Soviet Union or China to deal with. Where in the world the nerve gas came from is a matter of conjecture. But in any event, once we had indicated our hopes that we could work with the Albanians, they invited us to do so and to help them destroy it. As a matter of fact, as a bonus, while we were up in the mountains they took us by several sheds where there were hundreds of MANPAD missiles--not weapons of mass destruction, but missiles we had furnished, as a matter of fact, to forces in Afghanistan in an earlier war to drive out the former Soviet Union. So we were able to destroy those while we were at it. As an added bonus, the Defense Minister of Albania said, We believe we ought to set up a military academy along the same standards of your military academy at West Point. As a further gesture, we are going to have as a requirement that each of our cadets must master the English language so that we are going to be able to deal with you for some time to come. I felt that was an important gesture. I mention this because in the course of arms control, a good number of things happen that are very important. I will conclude by saying that Albania 2 years later invited all of the countries of the world to come to their capital and to celebrate the fact that Albania claimed to be the first nation state to fulfill the chemical weapons convention, that all chemical weapons in the country had been destroyed, and we celebrated with them, and it was literally a derivative of the situation we are describing today. So I ask those who are normally skeptical to continue to ask good questions but likewise to understand the history at least of the last two decades that has been very constructive for our country. I yield the floor.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, two major arguments have been made against the New START Treaty. They revolve around a missile defense issue that we have been discussing, and verification issues. There may be others, but those two have some importance. The amendment before us now is to strike a part of the preamble. Let me just say, first of all--and I will conclude with this argument after a reasonable discussion of it. If, in fact, we were to adopt the amendment that is before us, we will kill the treaty. I think Members need to understand that fundamental proposition. We will kill the treaty. Maybe many colleagues did not like the treaty to begin with. As a matter of fact, maybe they have not liked any treaties with the Russians. There may be colleagues who, as a matter of fact, would not be opposed to a treaty with the Russians on occasion, but not at this particular time and even have stressed that other foreign policy issues are more important and that this is almost a diversion of our attention. I am one who believes the treaty is important, and I think fundamentally we have to understand this amendment kills the treaty. As we vote yea or nay, we are deciding whether we are going to, in fact, continue to have a debate on this treaty. Some critics of the New START treaty have argued that it impedes U.S. missile defense plans. Nothing in the treaty changes the bottom line that we control our own missile defense destiny, not Russia. Defense Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and General Patrick O'Reilly, who is in charge of our missile defense programs, have all testified that the treaty does nothing to impede our missile defense plans. The Resolution of Ratification has explicitly reemphasized this in multiple ways. Some commentators have expressed concern that the treaty's preamble notes the interrelationship between strategic offense and strategic defense. But preambular language does not permit rights nor impose obligations, and it cannot be used to create an obligation under the treaty. The text in question is stating a truism of strategic planning that an interrelationship exists between strategic offense and strategic defense. As a matter of fact, it always has existed and does exist. We have argued that among ourselves in terms of our own defense, and so have the Russians, as well, in our colloquy with them. Critics have also worried that the treaty's prohibition on converting ICBM and SLBM launchers to defensive missile silos reduces our missile defense options. But as we have heard, General O'Reilly has stated flatly it would not be in our own interest to pursue such conversions because converting a silo costs an estimated $19 million more than building a modern, tailormade new one. We would say simply that the Bush administration converted the five ICBM test silos at Vandenberg for missile defense interceptors, and these have been grandfathered under the New START treaty. But beyond this, every single program advocated during the Bush and Obama administrations has involved construction of new silos dedicated to defense on land, exactly what the New START treaty permits. General O'Reilly has said a U.S. embrace of silo conversions would be ``a tragic setback,'' for our missile defense program. Addressing whether there would be utility in converting any existing SLBM launch tube to a launcher of defensive missiles, GEN Kevin Chilton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, says: The missile tubes that we have are valuable in the sense that they provide the strategic deterrent. I would not want to trade an SLBM, and how powerful it is and its ability to deter, for a single missile defense interceptor. Essentially, our military commanders are saying that converting silos to missile defense purposes would never make sense for our efforts to build the best missile defense possible. Another argument concerning missile defense centers on Russia's unilateral statement upon signature of New START, which expressed its rights to withdraw from the treaty if there is an expansion of U.S. missile defense programs. Unilateral statements are routine to arms control treaties and do not alter the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the treaty. Indeed, Moscow issued a similar statement concerning the START I treaty, implying that its obligations were conditioned upon U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty. Yet Russia did not, in fact, withdraw from START I when the United States did withdraw from the ABM Treaty in 2001, nor did it withdraw when we subsequently deployed missile defense interceptors in California and Alaska, nor did it withdraw when we announced plans for missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia's unilateral statement does nothing to contribute to its right to withdraw from the treaty. That right, which we also possess, is standard in all recent arms control treaties and most treaties considered throughout U.S. history. Some Senators have not fully understood this history, at least in my judgment, when dwelling on the ramifications of deploying the final phases of the European phased adaptive approach to missile defense. In particular, some Senators appear to argue that phase four would involve the use of the Standard Missile-3 Block IIB, a missile of two stages, which Senators presume could have the capability to threaten Russian missiles. Consequently, they worry Russia may threaten withdrawal over deployment of this defensive missile which is being developed to meet the threat of a more capable Iranian missile. They claim such a threat might delay or inhibit the new defensive missile's deployment. In fact, we have learned, in scores of hearings and classified briefings, that our military went to great lengths to show that no missile interceptor under deployment could neutralize Russian strategic forces. Lieutenant General O'Reilly stated in June, before our Foreign Relations Committee: I have briefed Russian officials in Moscow. I went through the details of all four phases of the Phased Adaptive Approach, especially Phase Four. And while the missiles that we have selected as interceptors in Phase Four provide a very effective defense for a regional-type threat, they are not of the size or have the long range to be able to reach Russian strategic missile fields. And it is a very verifiable property of these missiles, given their size and the Russian expertise and understanding what the missiles' capabilities will be, that they could not reach their strategic fields. No witness has argued that the United States, under this or any future administration that will come to power under the duration of the treaty, will be capable of deploying missile defenses of the kind that could reliably, economically, and persuasively defeat massive, strategic missile attacks on the United States of America wherein thousands of warheads were rained down upon us. This is a technical reality and not a political choice. The resolution of ratification approved by the Foreign Relations Committee reaffirms the New START treaty will in no way inhibit other missile defenses. It contains an understanding to be included in the instrument of ratification that the New START treaty imposes no limitations on the deployment of U.S. missile defenses other than the requirement to refrain from converting offensive missile launchers. It also states that Russia's April 2010 unilateral statement on missile defense does not impose any legal obligations on the United States and that any further limitations would require treaty amendment subject to Senate advice and consent. Consistent with the Missile Defense Act of 1999, it also declares it is U.S. policy to deploy an effective national missile defense system as soon as technologically possible and that it is the paramount obligation of the United States to defend its people, its Armed Forces, and allies against nuclear attack, to the best of our ability. The committee's resolution also states the Senate expects the executive branch to provide regular briefings on missile defense issues related to the treaty and on United States-Russian missile defense dialogue and cooperation. The resolution also calls for briefings before and after each meeting of the Bilateral Consultive Commission. The executive branch has committed to holding these briefings. In a revealing moment before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the treaty, Secretary Gates testified: The Russians have hated missile defense ever since the strategic arms talks began, in 1969 . . . because we can afford it and they can't. And we're going to be able to build a good one . . . and they probably aren't. And they don't want to devote the resources to it, so they try and stop us from doing it. . . . This treaty doesn't accomplish that for them. There are no limits on us. Again, that was a quote from Secretary Gates, and I would paraphrase the Secretary's blunt comments by saying simply that our negotiators won on missile defense. If, indeed, a Russian objective in this treaty was to limit U.S. Missile defense, the Russians failed, as the Defense Secretary asserts. Does anyone believe that Russian negotiating ambitions were fulfilled by nonbinding preamble language on the relationship between offense and defensive capabilities or by a unilateral Russian statement with no legal force or by a prohibition on converting silos, which cost more than building new ones? These are toothless, figleaf provisions that do nothing to constrain us. Moreover, as outlined, our resolution of ratification states explicitly, in multiple ways, we have no intention of being constrained. Our government is involved heavily in missile defense. Strong bipartisan majorities in Congress favor pursuing current missile defense plans. There is no reason to assume this will change. What the Russians are left with on missile defense is unrealized ambitions. At the end of any treaty negotiation between any two countries there are always unrelated ambitions left on the table by both sides. This has been true throughout diplomatic history. The Russians might want all sorts of things from us, but that does not mean they are going to get them. If we constrain ourselves from signing a treaty that is in our own interest on the basis of unrealized Russian ambitions, we are showing no confidence in the ability of our own democracy to make critical decisions in the future. We would be saying we have to live with the diminished security environment that would result from the end of START inspections because we fear the Russians might try in the future to limit missile defense. Let us be absolutely clear. The President of the United States, the Congress, and the executive branch agencies, on behalf of the American people, control our destiny on missile defense. The Russians can continue to argue and maneuver all they want on this issue, but there is nothing in the treaty that says we have to pay any attention to them. Therefore, I would say, first and foremost, fundamentally, if we amend the treaty text, the treaty is gone. That does relate to a second argument we may have later on with regard to verification. We have all pointed out that for over a year, since December 5, 2009, we have not had verification in Russia. Many of us feel that is very important. There may be arguments on what the treaty provides as verification, but if there is no treaty and there is no verification, those arguments are not particularly germane today. Instead, the best course for the United States is to make clear we will pursue our missile defense plans, whether Russia decides now or in the future not to be a party to the New START treaty, and that Russian threats to withdraw from the treaty will, accordingly, have no impact on our missile defense plans. Just as we were not deterred from withdrawing from the ABM Treaty by Russian threats that such a withdrawal might prompt them to pull out of START I, Russia's threats regarding New START should not deter us from pursuing our missile defense plans. The ratification of the New START treaty recommits the United States to this course. It contains an understanding to be included in the instrument of ratification that the New START treaty imposes no limitations on deployment of U.S. missile defenses, other than the requirement to refrain from converting the offensive missile launchers. It also states that Russia's April 2010 unilateral statement on missile defense does not impose any legal obligations on the United States, and any further limitations would require treaty amendment subject to the Senate's advice and consent. Consistent with the Missile Defense Act of 1999, it also declares it is U.S. policy to deploy an effective national missile defense system as soon as technologically possible, and it is a paramount obligation of the United States to defend its people, its Armed Forces, and its allies against nuclear attack to the best of our ability. For all these reasons, I urge Senators to reject the amendment before us because it would kill the treaty, it would kill the opportunities the treaty provides for us, and the reasons for doing so, it seems to me--those that have been stated--are very inadequate. I thank the Chair.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. What is the business before the Senate?

Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair. I wish to work with my colleague, the chairman of our committee, to make time available to Senators. I see the distinguished Senator on the floor. Are you prepared, sir, to make a statement?

Mr. LUGAR. I yield to the Senator from Wyoming.

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I understand the distinguished Senator on the floor wishes to speak. I yield for Senator Udall.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, as we are waiting for other Senators coming to the floor, hopefully, to offer amendments to the new START Treaty, I have some interesting information that I think is relevant to our discussion today. As has been suggested by other Senators, the so-called Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program, in operation for the last 19 years, has made possible, through operations of U.S. military and U.S. contractors, working with their counterparts in Russia, the destruction of very sizable amounts of nuclear weapons--threats that we took very seriously in 1991, and that I hope Americans take very seriously currently. I have just received a report that, since October--and that is specifically during the month of November--we have eliminated eight more SLBMs in Russia. We have secured 10 more nuclear weapon transport trains and neutralized 100-plus more metric tons of chemical weapons agent. I mention this because I have been fortunate enough to receive monthly, at least for the last 15 years, similar reports. I have a scoreboard in my office that, in fact, illustrates, first of all, that 7,599 strategic nuclear warheads aimed at the United States have been deactivated through the cooperative threat reduction program. Each one of those warheads, as I have pointed out, without being melodramatic, may have been sufficient to completely eliminate my home city of Indianapolis. I take seriously the treaty we are looking at now, not so much in terms of the numbers of reductions the treaty calls for, but simply even if 1,550 warheads are left on both sides, it is an existential problem to both of our countries that we need to take seriously. In any event, in addition to the 7,599 strategic nuclear warheads deactivated, 791 ICBMs have been destroyed. These were the missiles on which the strategic nuclear warheads were located. So by taking the warheads off of the missiles, then taking down the 791 intercontinental ballistic missiles and destroying them--and then 498 ICBM silos in which these missiles were located were destroyed; 180 ICBM mobile launchers were destroyed; 659 submarine launched ballistic missiles were eliminated, SLBMs; 492 SLBM launchers were eliminated; 32 nuclear submarines capable of carrying and launching ballistic missiles have been destroyed; and 155 bombers were eliminated. We are talking about so-called carriers. We talk in the treaty about maybe 1,550 warheads left, 700 carriers on both sides. For those who have not followed closely these arguments over the years, these are the elements that have been aimed at us, and these are the vehicles that would have made possible what they were doing. Anecdotally, without taking the time of other Senators, I will say that during one of my visits with former Senator Sam Nunn, from Georgia, we went to a site in Siberia where, in fact, a missile had been taken out of the ground. This was a missile that we were told had 10 warheads--the multiple reentry vehicle, where you could put multiple missiles on one vehicle. We were in the silo. It was like a large tube that had an elevator going down. I don't know on which floor we finally arrived, but it was a floor in the silo where the Russians stayed as guards or as watch officers. What authority they had was not clear in terms of actually launching the missile or following the orders, wherever they may have come from. But the impression I had from that visit to the silo, before it was destroyed that very day--and we have pictures of it being destroyed in the office. I explain that this is not a nuclear weapon being destroyed, it was just a silo in the ground. But around a table at which the Russians who were on duty sat were pictures of American cities. These were ostensibly the targets of the 10 warheads. It has a chilling effect as you go around to discover which cities they are. Are they cities that I represent on the chart? The fact is, that was the intent. It was made known to us in the United States that our total population--not the occasional nuclear terrorist attack--was at risk. I mention all of this once again not as a melodramatic presentation on a very serious treaty, but we are talking about something that is very fundamental. During the course of the debate I have heard several of my colleagues say--and I think they are mistaken--that right now the American people are focused, as we all are, on how to create jobs, how to make a difference in the economy, and how to bring new hope into the lives of people whose confidence has been destroyed or badly shaken. That is our paramount objective. But at the same time, these problems occur in a world that does not necessarily wish us well and is prepared to leave us in our domestic economy to work our problems out while the rest of the world necessarily takes time out. I am not one who envisions, after all of this time, a nuclear attack using ICBMs and the carriers that we are talking about. I accept the fact, as a practical matter, that by and large these weapons are maintained for the security of the countries involved. But at the same time, it seems to me to have been prudent throughout the years to have taken the steps we could to take the warheads off of the missiles, destroy the missiles, destroy the silos, and take up the cable in the fields around them and, in essence, to eliminate a lot of the threat. My scoreboard starts out with 13,300 nuclear warheads. Whether that was the precise number, we are not sure. How did we arrive at that number? We literally had boots on the ground. The subject was discussed frequently today. The dilemma I foresee, and I am not trying to borrow trouble, is that the boots on the ground, in terms of specifics of the START treaty, ended, as we now know, December 5, 2009. Most of us in the Senate knew of that date. We lamented the fact that was occurring. But the fact is, we have not been able to take action until today's debate to remedy that. We must do so. This is not a question of a discretionary treaty that somehow might be held over to a more convenient time. The facts of life are that even the program I have discovered, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, has diminishing results because the Russians are waiting for work on this fundamental treaty. In due course, even though we may appropriate in our Defense budget, as I hope we will, substantial moneys for the Nunn-Lugar program next year, our ability to continue to work with the Russian military, Russian contractors outside a situation in which there is no START treaty, and which the Russians may feel there is no expectation of a new START treaty, could mean the monthly reports I have cited today, and most specifically the one for November of this year, may cease coming to my office. The number of warheads removed, the number of missiles destroyed and so forth may simply either stop or we may have no idea what, in fact, the Russians have decided to do. I appreciate in past debates some of my colleagues have said--and I think they were mistaken, but I understand their point of view--this is Russia's problem. Why were American taxpayer funds ever involved in helping Russians take warheads off missiles, destroying missiles, destroying submarines, in other words to destroy weapons that were aimed at us? Phrased in those terms, that does not seem to be a sensible bargain; that if you have cooperative threat reduction, and Russians now for 19 years have allowed us to work in their country on their sites where these weapons were located, with not only transparency, an actual feel of the hardware--the silo I was in was real. It was not by electronic means that we found it or surveillance of leaks from diplomacy. It was very real. So was the submarine base I was invited to visit at Sevmash entirely out of the blue during one occasion in a visit to Russia. Why was I asked to go there? Because they had a feeling, and correctly, that if they presented to me the fact that there were in existence then six Typhoon submarines, that each one of them had 200 missiles, small missiles on them, that even though Tom Clancy finally discovered the Typhoons in the ``Hunt for Red October'' story, the Russians may have been operating these submarines up and down our eastern coast for as long as 20 years, whether we knew about it or not--if you saw the submarines, the largest ever produced by any country, and with the 200 warheads, there were chip shots into New York or Philadelphia or any of our large eastern coast metropolitan areas-- whether citizens there ever knew there was a threat or not is immaterial. There was--and a very substantial one. Yet the Russians were inviting us to consider the destruction of these huge submarines because the work is very complex, extraordinarily expensive, and it was beyond their abilities at that point. We could take a choice, to leave six Typhoons in the world that might begin to cruise again, maybe someplace else, or work with them to destroy them. I am here to say that even after several years, only three of the six have been destroyed. It is an extremely complex operation. This is why we need to have treaty arrangements with the Russians. So there are formal reasons why their government and our government might be prepared to send our military personnel, our civilian contractors, others who might wish to work with us on projects that we believe mutually are important because--and I will give just one more illustration--this is very subjective. But on one occasion, I was surprised, although I should not have been, that many nuclear warheads, when they are removed from missiles, are not destroyed. It is difficult to destroy a warhead, very expensive and complex, dangerous for the personnel involved in it. The Russians did not have very many facilities to do this. So they put many of these warheads into caves or caverns. I was invited into one of these caverns on one occasion. I saw warheads lying there almost like corpses in a morgue, which is what it reminded me of. There were small captions at the top of each of those corpses, in essence, which at least gave--and the Russians told me in translating what was on there--a history of that warhead: when it had been created, what sort of servicing it had received over the years. I mention this because these particular warheads were not inert matter like sporting goods material. For the safety of the Russians who were involved, they require servicing, apparently, from time to time. One of the reasons why Russians always ask U.S. military and contractors to remove the oldest warheads first was that none of us have had that much of a history as to how long these warheads survive without potential ``accidents,'' something that could make a huge difference in this particular case for those who were in proximity to that particular cave. It is a crucial matter for them and for us that we find solutions to this. This is why, I believe, there is urgency in considering the New START treaty, urgency in doing so right now, as a matter of fact, as rapidly as possible, and reentering Americans onto the scene in Russia and, in reciprocal manner, accepting Russians who will be interested in our situation. Because this is important for our two countries, and it is important for many innocent people who were never a part of the designs of these weapons but could, in fact, be vastly affected in the event that we make a mistake. We will make a mistake if we fail to act promptly, knowing what we do about the situation. I yield the floor.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to speak in support of the new START treaty. We undertake this debate at a time when almost 100,000 American military personnel are fighting a difficult war in Afghanistan. More than 1,300 of our troops have been killed in Afghanistan, with almost 10,000 wounded. Meanwhile, we are in our seventh year in Iraq--a deployment that has cost more than 4,400 American lives and wounded roughly 32,000 persons. We still have more than 47,000 troops deployed in that country. Tensions on the Korean peninsula are extremely high, with no resolution to the problems in North Korea's nuclear program. We continue to pursue international support for steps that could prevent Iran's nuclear program from producing a nuclear weapon. We remain concerned about stability in Pakistan and the security of that country's nuclear arsenal. We are attempting to counter terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan, Pakistan, east Africa, Yemen, and many other locations. We are concerned about terrorist cells in allied countries, and even in the United States. We remain highly vulnerable to disruptions in oil supplies due to national disasters, terrorist attacks, political instability, or manipulation of the markets by unfriendly oil-producing nations. Even as we attempt to respond to these and other national security imperatives, we are facing severe resource constraints. Since September 11, 2001, we have spent almost $1.1 trillion in Iraq and Afghanistan. We are spending roughly twice as many dollars on defense today as we were before 9/11. These heavy defense burdens have occurred in the context of a financial and budgetary crisis that has raised the U.S. Government's total debt to almost $14 trillion. The fiscal year 2010 budget deficit registered about $1.3 trillion, or 9 percent of GDP. All Senators here are familiar with the challenges I have just enumerated. But as we begin this debate, we should keep this larger national security context firmly in mind. As we contend with the enormous security challenges of the 21st century, the last thing we need to is to reject a process that has mitigated the threat posed by Russia's nuclear arsenal. For 15 years, the START treaty has helped us to keep a lid on the U.S.-Russian nuclear rivalry. It established a working relationship on nuclear arms with a country that was our mortal enemy for 4\1/2\ decades. START's transparency features assured both countries about the nuclear capabilities of the other. For us, that meant having American experts on the ground in Russia conducting inspections of nuclear weaponry. Because START expired on December 5, 2009, we have had no American inspectors in Russia for more than a year. New START will enable American teams to return to Russia to collect data on the Russian arsenal and verify Russian compliance. These inspections greatly reduce the possibility that we will be surprised by Russian nuclear deployments or advancements. Before we even get to the text of the new START treaty and the resolution of ratification, Members should recognize what a Senate rejection of new START would mean for our broader national security. Failure of the Senate to approve the treaty would result in an expansion of arms competition with Russia. It would guarantee a reduction in transparency and confidence-building procedures, and it would diminish between cooperation and Russian defense establishments. It would complicate our military planning. A rejection of new START would be greeted with delight in Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Burma. These nations want to shield their weapons programs from outside scrutiny and they want to be able to acquire sensitive weapons technologies. They want to block international efforts to make them comply with their legal obligations. Rogue nations fear any nuclear cooperation between the United States and Russia because they know it limits their options. They want to call into question our own nonproliferation credentials and they want Russia to resist tough economic measures against them. If we reject this treaty, it will be harder to get Russia's cooperation in stopping nuclear proliferation. It could create obstacles on some issues in the United Nations Security Council, where Russia has a veto. It might also reduce incentives for Russia to cooperate in providing supply routes for our troops in Afghanistan. It would give more weight to the arguments of Russian nationalists who seek to undermine cooperation with the United States and its allies. It would require additional satellite coverage of Russia at the expense of their use against terrorists. With all that we need to achieve, why would we add to our problems by separating ourselves from Russia over a treaty that our own military wants ratified? Our military commanders are anxious to avoid the added burden and uncertainties of an intensified arms competition with Russia. They know such competition would detract from other national security priorities and missions. That is one reason they are telling us unequivocally to ratify this agreement. They also have asserted that the modest reductions in warheads and delivery systems embodied in the treaty in no way threaten our nuclear deterrent. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM Mike Mullen have testified that they have no doubts the new START treaty should be ratified. GEN Kevin Chilton, who is in charge of our strategic nuclear forces, has said the treaty `` will enhance the security of the United States.'' GEN Patrick O'Reilly, who is in charge of our missile defenses, endorsed the treaty saying flatly that it'' does not constrain our plans to execute the United States missile defense program.'' Moreover, seven former commanders of Strategic Command--the military command in charge of our strategic nuclear weapons--have backed the new START treaty. Members of the Senate--Republicans and Democrats alike-- have taken pride in supporting the military and respecting military views about steps necessary to protect our Nation. Rejecting an unequivocal military opinion on a treaty involving nuclear deterrence would be an extraordinary position for the Senate to take. The military is supported in this view by the top national security officials from past administrations. To date, every Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense who has expressed a public opinion about the new START treaty has counseled in favor of ratification. This has included 10 Republicans and 5 Democrats. All five living Americans who served Ronald Reagan as Defense Secretary, Secretary of State, or White House Chief of Staff have endorsed the new START treaty. The list of endorsers includes: President George H. W. Bush, George Shultz, Jim Baker, Jim Schlessinger, Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice, Steven Hadley, Howard Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger, and Frank Carlucci. Many of these officials served at a time when the stakes related to Russian nuclear arms were even higher than they are today. During the Cold War uncertainty over Russia's intentions and weapons advances--and this cost us tens if not hundreds of billions of dollars--an academic industry developed that was devoted to parsing Soviet military capabilities. This was one of the biggest, if not the biggest, expenses of our intelligence budget each year. The fact that we could not accurately judge Soviet military capabilities led us to elevate our spending on weaponry out of a sense of caution. These times were dominated by contradictory risk assessments and rumors about dangerous new Soviet weapon systems. We were constantly worried about missile gaps, destabilizing arms deployments, or Soviet technology breakthroughs. And all of this came at a tremendous cost to the American taxpayer and the psyche of a nation which lived under the threat of mutual assured destruction. I firmly believe our staunch opposition to an aggressive Soviet state was absolutely necessary and led directly to the achievement of freedom for tens of millions of people in Eastern Europe. It also set the stage for dramatic breakthroughs in international cooperation. But that does not mean the Cold War was a benign experience or that we want to revive nuclear competition, carried out in an environment without verification or basic limits on weapons. I am not suggesting that we are on the brink of returning to the Cold War. Reality is far more complicated than that. But we should not be cavalier about allowing our relationship with Moscow to drift or about letting our knowledge of Russian weaponry atrophy. Few Americans today give much thought to the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union. Americans have not had to be concerned in the same way as they were during the Cold War years. But large elements of that arsenal still exist and still threaten the United States. Whether through accident, miscalculation, proliferation, or any number of other scenarios, Russian nuclear weapons, materiels, and technology still have the capability to obliterate American cities. That is a core national security problem that commands the attention of our government and this body. I relate these thoughts about where we have been in part because most Senators entered national public service after the Cold War ended, and even fewer were serving in this body when we were called upon to make decisions on arms treaties. Only 21 current Members were here in 1988 to debate the INF Treaty. Only 15 current Members were serving in the Senate during the Geneva Summit between President Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985. Only 11 Members were here in March 1983 when President Reagan delivered his so-called ``evil empire'' speech. And only 7 of us were here when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. In a few weeks, these numbers will decline even further. The fundamental question remains as to how we manage our relationship with a former enemy and current rival that still possesses enormous capacity for nuclear destruction. What the START process has done, since it was initiated by President Reagan, is manage an adversarial relationship that previously had been cloaked in volatile uncertainty and accompanied by enormous financial costs to our own society. One can take the view, I suppose, that unrestrained competition with Russia is the best way to ensure our security in relation to that country. But that has not been the view of the American people and there is no indication that this is what Americans were voting for in November. It certainly was not Ronald Reagan's view. It was President Reagan who began the START process. His team coined the term ``START,'' standing for ``Strategic Arms Reduction Talks,'' to reflect President Reagan's intent to shift the goal of nuclear arms control from limiting weapons build-ups to making substantial, verifiable cuts in existing arsenals. On May 8, 1982, President Reagan made the first START proposal during a speech at Eureka College in Illinois, calling for a one-third reduction in nuclear warheads. For the rest of his Presidency, he engaged the Russians on numerous arms control proposals that reduced weaponry an established tough verification measures to prevent cheating. He personally conducted five summits with Russian leaders, which primarily focused on arms control. He produced the INF treaty, signed in 1988, which greatly reduced nuclear weapons in Europe. His efforts also led to the original START Treaty which was signed during the first President Bush's term in 1991. The cornerstone of President Reagan's arms control agenda was verification. His interest in verification is frequently summed up by his oft-quoted line ``trust but verify.'' But what the United States and Russia have done through the START process is far more than just verification. START has provided the structure and transparency upon which unprecedented arms control and nonproliferation initiatives have been built, most notably, the Nunn-Lugar program. The stability that came with a long-term agreement and the commitment implicit in a treaty approved by both the Russians an American legislatures, has been indispensable to the success of Nunn-Lugar and other nonproliferation endeavors with Russia. Over the course of almost two decades, the Nunn-Lugar program has joined Americans and Russians in a sustained effort to safeguard and ultimately destroy weapons and materials of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and beyond. The destruction of thousands of weapons is a monumental achievement for our countries, but the process surrounding this joint effort is as important as the numbers of weapons eliminated. The U.S.-Russian relationship has been through numerous highs and lows in the post-Cold War era. Throughout this period, START inspections and consultations and the corresponding threat reduction' activities of the Nunn-Lugar program have been a constant that has reduced miscalculation and has built respect. This has not prevented highly contentious disagreements with Moscow, but it has meant that we have not had to wonder about the make-up and disposition of Russian nuclear forces during periods of tension. It also has reduced, though not eliminated, the proliferation threat posed by the nuclear arsenal of the former Soviet Union, This process must continue if we are to answer the existential threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Every missile destroyed, every warhead deactivated, and every inspection implemented makes us safer. Russia and the United States have the choice whether or not to continue this effort, and that choice is embodied in the New START Treaty before us. The Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees held 18 hearings on the treaty with national security leaders who have served in the Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations. These hearings were supplemented by dozens of staff and Member briefings, as well as nearly 1,000 questions for the record. We know, however, that bilateral treaties are not neat instruments, because they involve merging the will of two nations with distinct and often conflicting interests. Treaties come with inherent imperfections and questions. As Secretary Gates testified in May, even successful agreements routinely are accompanied by differences of opinion by the parties. The ratification process, therefore, is intended to produce a Resolution of Ratification for consideration by the whole Senate. The resolution should clarify the meaning and effect of treaty provisions for the United States and resolve areas of concern or ambiguity. On September 16, 2010, the Foreign Relations Committee approved a Resolution of Ratification for the New START treaty by a vote of 14-4 with important contributions from both Democratic and Republican members. This resolution incorporates the concerns and criticisms expressed over the last several months by committee witnesses, members of the committee, and other Senators. It will be further strengthened through our debate in the coming days. With this in mind, I would turn to specific concerns addressed in the Resolution of Ratification. First of all, missile defense. Some critics of the New START treaty have argued that it impedes U.S. missile defense plans. But nothing in the treaty changes the bottom line that we control our own missile destiny, not Russia. Defense Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and GEN Patrick O'Reilly, who is in charge of our missile defense programs, have all testified that the treaty does nothing to impede our missile defense plans. The Resolution of Ratification has explicitly reemphasized this in multiple ways. Some commentators have expressed concern that the treaty's preamble notes the interrelationship between strategic offense and strategic defense. But preamble language does not permit rights nor impose obligations, and it cannot be used to create au obligation under the treaty. The text in question is stating a truism of strategic planning that an interrelationship exists between strategic offense and strategic defense. Critics have also worried that the treaty's prohibition on converting ICBM and SLBM launchers to defensive missile silos reduces our missile defense options. But General O'Reilly has stated flatly that it would not be in our own interest to pursue such conversions because converting a silo costs an estimated $19 million more than building a modern, tailor-made missile defense interceptor silo. The Bush administration converted five ICBM test silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base for missile defense interceptors, and these have been grandfathered under the New START treaty. Beyond this, every single program advocated during the Bush and Obama administrations has involved construction of new silos dedicated to defense on land-- exactly what the New START treaty permits. General O'Reilly said a U.S. embrace of silo conversions would be ``a major setback'' for our missile defense program. Addressing whether there would be utility in converting any existing SLBM launch-tubes to a launcher of defensive missiles, GEN Kevin P. Chilton, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, stated ``[T]he missile tubes that we have are valuable, in the sense that they provide the strategic deterrent. I would not want to trade [an SLBM] and how powerful it is and its ability to deter, for a single missile defense interceptor.'' Essentially, our military commanders are saying that converting silos to missile defense purposes would never make sense for our efforts to build the best missile defense possible. A third argument concerning missile defense centers on Russia's unilateral statement upon signature of New START, which expressed its right to withdraw from the treaty if there is an expansion of U.S. missile defense programs. Unilateral statements are routine to arms control treaties and do not alter the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the treaty. Indeed, Moscow issued a similar statement concerning the START I treaty, implying that its obligations were conditioned upon U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty. Yet, Russia did not in fact withdraw from START I when the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2001. Nor did it withdraw when we subsequently deployed missile defense interceptors in California and Alaska. Nor did it withdraw when we announced plans for missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia's unilateral statement does nothing to contribute to its right to withdraw from the treaty. That right, which we also possess, is standard in all recent arms control treaties and most treaties considered throughout U.S. history. The Resolution of Ratification approved by the Foreign Relations Committee reaffirms that the New START treaty will in no way inhibit our missile defenses. It contains an understanding that the New START treaty imposes no limitations on the deployment of U.S. missile defenses other than the requirement to refrain from converting offensive missile launchers. It also states that Russia's April 2010 unilateral statement on missile defense does not impose any legal obligations on the United States and that any further limitations would require treaty amendment subject to the Senate's advice and consent. Consistent with the Missile Defense Act of 1999, it also declares that it is U.S. policy to deploy an effective national missile defense system as soon as technologically possible and that it is the paramount obligation of the United States to defend its people, armed forces, and allies against nuclear attack to the best of its ability. In a revealing moment during Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the Treaty, Secretary Gates testified: The Russians have hated missile defense ever since the strategic arms talks began, in 1969 . . . because we can afford it and they can't. And we're going to be able to build a good one . . . and they probably aren't. And they don't want to devote the resources to it, so they try and stop us from doing it. . . This treaty doesn't accomplish that for them. There are no limits on us. I would paraphrase the Secretary's blunt comments by saying simply, that our negotiators won on missile defense. If, indeed, a Russian objective in this treaty was to limit U.S. missile defense, they failed, as the Defense Secretary asserts. Does anyone really believe that Russian negotiating ambitions were fulfilled by nonbinding language in the Preamble? Or by a unilateral Russian statement with no legal force? Or by a prohibition on converting silos, which costs more than building new ones? These are toothless, figleaf provisions that do nothing to constrain us. Moreover, as outlined, our resolution of ratification states explicitly in multiple ways that we have no intention of being constrained. Our government is investing heavily in missile defense. Strong bipartisan majorities in Congress favor pursuing current missile defense plans. What the Russians are left with on missile defense is unrealized ambitions. At the end of any treaty negotiation between any two countries, there are always unrealized ambitions left on the table by both sides. This has been true throughout diplomatic history. The Russians might want all sorts of things from us, but that does not mean they are going to get them. If we constrain ourselves from signing a treaty that is in our own interest on the basis of unrealized Russian ambitions, we are showing no confidence in the ability of our own democracy to make critical decisions. We would be saying that we have to live with the end of START inspections and other negative consequences of rejecting this treaty to prevent a U.S. Government in the future from bowing to Russian pressure on missile defense. If one buys into this logic, it becomes almost impossible to seek cooperation with Russia on anything. Let us be absolutely clear, the President of the United States, the U.S. Congress, and the executive branch agencies on behalf of the American people control our own destiny on missile defense. The Russians can continue to argue all they want on the issue, but there is nothing in the treaty that says we have to pay any attention to them. The New START treaty's verification regime has also been the subject of considerable debate. The important point is that, today, we have zero on-the-ground verification capability given that START I expired on December 5, 2009, more than 1 year ago. Under START, the United States conducted inspections of weapons, their facilities, their delivery vehicles and warheads, in Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. These inspections fulfilled a crucial national security interest by greatly reducing the possibility that we would be surprised by future advancements in Russian weapons technology or deployment. Only through ratification of New START will U.S. technicians return to Russia to resume verification. Under New START, the United States and Russia each will deploy no more than 1,550 warheads for strategic deterrence. Seven years from its entry into force, the Russian Federation is likely to have only about 350 deployed missiles. This smaller number of strategic nuclear systems will be deployed at fewer bases. It is likely that Russia will close down even more bases over the life of the treaty. Both sides agreed at the outset that each would be free to structure its forces as it sees fit, a view consistent with that of the Bush administration. As a practical economic matter, conditions in Russia preclude a massive restructuring of its strategic forces. The treaty, protocol and annexes contain a detailed set of rules and procedures for verification of the New START treaty, many of them drawn from START I. The inspection regime contained in New START is designed to provide each party confidence that the other is upholding its obligations, while also being simpler and safer for the inspectors to implement, less operationally disruptive for our strategic forces, and less costly than START's regime. Secretary Gates recently wrote to Congress that ``The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Chiefs, the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, and I assess that Russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant cheating or breakout under New START, due to both the New START verification regime and the inherent survivability and flexibility of the planned U.S. strategic force structure.'' We should not expect that New START will eliminate friction, but the treaty will provide for a means to deal with such differences constructively, as under START I. The Resolution of Ratification approved by the Foreign Relations Committee requires further assurances by conditioning ratification on Presidential certification, prior to the treaty's entry into force, of our ability to monitor Russian compliance and on immediate consultations should a Russian breakout from the treaty be detected. For the first time in any strategic arms control treaty, a condition requires a plan for New START monitoring. Some have asserted that there are too few inspections in New START. The treaty does provide for fewer inspections compared to START I. But this is because fewer facilities will require inspection under New START. START I covered 70 facilities in four Soviet successor states, whereas New START only applies to Russia and its 35 remaining facilities. Therefore we need fewer inspections to achieve a comparable level of oversight. New START also maintains the same number of ``re- entry vehicle on-site inspections'' as START I, 10 per year. Baseline inspections that were phased out in New START are no longer needed because we have 15 years of START I Treaty implementation and data on which to rely. Of course, if New START is not ratified for a lengthy period, the efficacy of our baseline data would eventually deteriorate. New START includes the innovation that unique identifiers or ``UIDs'' be affixed to all Russian missiles and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. UIDs were applied only to Russian road-mobile missiles in START I. Regular exchanges of UID data will provide confidence and transparency regarding the existence and location of 700 deployed missiles, even when they are on non-deployed status, something that START I did not do. The New START treaty also codifies and continues important verification enhancements related to warhead loading on Russian ICBMs and SLBMs. These enhancements, originally agreed to during START I implementation, allow for greater transparency in confirming the number of warheads on each missile. Under START I and the INF Treaty, the United States maintained a continuous, on-site presence of up to 30 technicians at Votkinsk, Russia to conduct monitoring of final assembly of Russian strategic systems using solid rocket motors. While this portal monitoring is not continued under New START, the decision to phase out this arrangement was made by the Bush administration in anticipation of START I's expiration. With vastly lower rates of Russian missile production, continuous monitoring is not crucial, as it was during the Cold War. For the United States, the New START treaty will allow for flexible modernization and operation of U.S. strategic forces, while facilitating transparency regarding the development and deployment of Russian strategic forces. With regard to warhead counting, New START improves on the rules used in both START I and the Moscow Treaty. Under START I, each deployed missile or bomber was attributed a maximum number of weapons, for which it always counted. Each launcher of a missile or weapon also counted regardless of whether it still performed nuclear missions or contained missiles. This resulted in inaccurate counts of warheads, missiles, and launchers. Under the Moscow Treaty, there was never agreement on what constituted an operationally deployed strategic nuclear warhead. Consequently, the parties used their own methodology for counting which warheads fell under the Treaty's limits. Under New START, one common set of counting rules will be used by both parties regarding deployed and non-deployed IBCMs, SLBMs and bombers, and deployed warheads on missiles and bomber weapons, so that the data exchanged under this treaty will more accurately reflect modern deployment of the parties' strategic forces. New START's bomber counting rules are also different from START I. Under New START, each heavy bomber is attributed one nuclear weapon, despite the aircraft's ability to carry more, which reflects the modern fact that neither party maintains bombers loaded with nuclear weapons on a continual basis. This rule is not an invention of New START. It is consistent with President Reagan's negotiating position. He proposed that bombers not be counted at all because they are not first-strike weapons and, thus, not destabilizing. It was a concession to Moscow to include heavy bombers as strategic offensive arms in START I, but President Reagan never agreed to count their maximum capacity, as the Soviets sought. Those who have inexplicably criticized New START's bomber counting rules are advocating the historic position of the Soviet Union, not our own. The Department of Defense plans to maintain up to 60 nuclear-capable bombers under the New START treaty, including a large number of B-52s, each capable of carrying up to 20 ALCMs. Maintaining this standoff delivery capability will enable the United States to field a substantial number of penetrating weapons in the bomber leg of our triad. Flexible counting of one weapon per each B-52 gives us immediate and powerful deployment flexibility, something President Reagan protected, as does New START. Some opponents of New START also contend that the treaty should not be ratified because tactical nuclear weapons are not covered. But rejection of this treaty would make future limitations on Russian tactical nuclear arms far less likely. Some critics have overvalued the utility of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons and undervalued our deterrent to them. Only a fraction of these weapons could be delivered significantly beyond Russia's borders. Pursuant to the INF Treaty, the United States and Soviet Union long ago destroyed intermediate range and shorter range nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, which have a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. In fact, most of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons have very short ranges, are used for homeland air defense, are devoted to the Chinese border, or are in storage. A Russian nuclear attack on NATO countries is effectively deterred by NATO conventional superiority, our own tactical nuclear forces, French and British nuclear arsenals, and U.S. strategic forces. In short, Russian tactical nuclear weapons do not threaten our strategic deterrent. Our NATO allies that flank Russia in Eastern and Northern Europe understand this and have strongly endorsed the New START treaty. It is important to recognize that the size differential between Russian and American tactical nuclear arsenals did not come to pass because of American inattention to this point. During the first Bush administration, our national command authority, with full participation by the military, deliberately made a decision to reduce the number of tactical nuclear weapons we deployed. They did this irrespective of Russian actions, because the threat of massive ground invasion in Europe had largely evaporated due to the breakup of the former Soviet Union. In addition, our conventional capabilities had improved to the extent that battlefield nuclear weapons were no longer needed to defend Western Europe. In this atmosphere, maintaining large arsenals of nuclear artillery shells, landmines, and short range missile warheads was a bad bargain for us in terms of cost, safety, alliance cohesion, and proliferation risks. In my judgment Russia should make a similar decision. The risks to Russia of maintaining their tactical nuclear arsenal in its current form are greater than the potential security benefits that those weapons might provide. They have not done this, in part because of their threat perceptions about their borders, particularly their border with China. An agreement with Russia that reduced, accounted for, and improved security around tactical nuclear arsenals is in the interest of both nations. Rejection of New START makes it unlikely that a subsequent agreement concerning tactical nuclear weapons will ever be reached. The Resolution of Ratification encourages the President to engage the Russian Federation on establishing measures to improve mutual confidence regarding the accounting and security of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Finally, I would like to turn to the nuclear modernization issue. The New START treaty will not directly affect the modernization or the missions of our nuclear weapons laboratories. The treaty explicitly states that ``modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.'' Yet Senate consideration of New START has intensified a debate on modernization and the stockpile stewardship programs. Near the end of the Bush administration, a consensus developed that our nuclear weapons complex was at risk due to years of underfunding. In 2010, the Senate approved an amendment to the Defense authorization bill requiring a report to Congress, known as the 1251 report, for a plan to modernize our nuclear weapons stockpile. The 1251 report submitted by the administration committed to an investment of approximately $80 billion over a 10-year period to sustain and modernize the United States nuclear weapons complex, which according to Secretary Gates, was a ``credible'' program for stockpile modernization. Pursuant to this report, the administration submitted a fiscal year 2011 request for $7 billion, a nearly 10 percent increase over fiscal year 2010 levels. The 1251 plan was recently augmented by an additional $5 billion in funding. The directors of our National Laboratories wrote on December 1 that they were ``very pleased'' with the updated plan, which provides ``adequate support to sustain the safety, security, reliability, and effectiveness of America's nuclear deterrent'' under New START's central limits. The resolution of ratification passed by the Foreign Relations Committee declares a commitment to ensure the safety, reliability, and performance of our nuclear forces through a robust stockpile stewardship program. The resolution includes a requirement for the President to submit to Congress a plan for overcoming any future resource shortfall associated with his 10-year 1251 modernization plan. The resolution also declares a commitment to modernizing and replacing nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. In closing, it is imperative that we vote to provide our advice and consent to the New START treaty. Most of the basic strategic concerns that motivated Republican and Democratic administrations to pursue nuclear arms control with Moscow during the last several decades still exist today. We are seeking mutual reductions in nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles that contribute to stability and reduce the costs of maintaining the weapons. We are pursuing transparency of our nuclear arsenals, backed up by strong verification measures and formal consultation methods. We are attempting to maximize the safety of our nuclear arsenals and encourage global cooperation toward nonproliferation goals. And we are hoping to solidify U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear security matters, while sustaining our knowledge of Russian nuclear capabilities and intentions. Rejecting New START would permanently inhibit our understanding of Russian nuclear forces, weaken our nonproliferation diplomacy worldwide, and potentially reignite expensive arms competition that would further strain our national budget. Bipartisan support for arms control treaties has been reflected in overwhelming votes in favor of the INF Treaty, START I, START II, and the Moscow Treaty. I believe the merits of New START should command similar bipartisan support. I thank the Chair and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, as we remember the life of our friend, Ted Stevens, and celebrate his remarkable service to our country, each of us must surely remember a number of personal experiences which have helped us appreciate how much his friendship meant to us. I first met Senator Stevens during the Senate election campaign of 1976. He was serving as chairman of the National Republican senatorial committee, and I had just won the Republican nomination to be a candidate for the U.S. Senate in Indiana. The senatorial committee was not as affluent in 1976 as presently, but Ted Stevens was able to steer a contribution into my campaign and to offer words of encouragement which included my first knowledge that he had been born in my hometown of Indianapolis, IN, on November 18, 1923. In the days to come, I discovered, additionally, that he had attended School No. 84 and Shortridge High School. I began my elementary school education at School No. 84 and graduated from Shortridge High School in 1950. Later, I learned of the early struggles that Ted Stevens had in supporting relatives in Indianapolis and the challenging family circumstances that caused him to leave Indiana prior to graduation from Shortridge, but I always pointed out to Hoosiers that Ted Stevens was truly one of us. The 1976 Senatorial Republican Campaign brought eight new Republican Senators to the U.S. Senate. Although we were only a total of 38 in that session, Ted Stevens became the Republican whip in January of 1977 and continued to serve in that capacity through 4 years of a distinct Republican minority and 4 more years of a glorious Republican majority during the first term of President Ronald Reagan. Following the Presidential and congressional elections of 1984, a successor to Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee was elected by the Republican caucus. Senator Baker had elected to retire after a most successful tenure as majority leader of the Senate, and five candidates appeared to seek the Republican majority leader position. The Republican caucus rules did not encompass such a large field, and I remember a meeting of the five candidates--Senator Robert Dole, Senator Ted Stevens, Senator James McClure, Senator Pete Domenici, and myself--to agree upon how the balloting would progress. At an informal afternoon session, we agreed that after the first ballot the candidate with the lowest vote would drop out and such a procedure would follow after each of the ballots until a majority occurred with the deciding ballot between the final two candidates. The voting was held in the Old Senate Chamber, and after the first two ballots, Senator McClure and Senator Domenici had left the field. I lost out on the third ballot, and Bob Dole defeated Ted Stevens in a close vote for majority leader. Ted was undaunted and preceded to chair the Appropriations Committee with essential vigor and comprehensive activity. His chairmanship lasted from 1997 to 2005 with a short break of 18 months during which Democrats controlled the U.S. Senate. His efforts on behalf of Alaska are legendary, and it was not surprising that Alaskans named Ted Stevens the Alaskan of the Century in the year 2000. At Republican Tuesday luncheons, Ted Stevens often gave comprehensive reports about legislation before the Appropriations Committee, which he felt vital to Alaska and the United States, and we all became much better acquainted with Alaska through his comprehensive tutorials. I admired the vision which he had for Alaska and for the position of Alaska as a part of vital foreign policy consideration with Russia, China, Japan, and the entirety of the Pacific Ocean Basin. He understood the important role which the Arctic Circle area would play in world history and the importance of giving proper and timely attention to a part of the world that was not normally the subject of our Senate debate. As President pro tempore of the U.S. Senate from January 2003 to January 2007, Ted Stevens was extraordinarily conscientious not only in the opening ceremonies of the Senate each day but in managing the appearance of that office with attention to detail and commendable diplomacy. Although he sometimes displayed a choice of sharp words and even some short public displays of temper, I appreciated that each conversation I enjoyed with him was businesslike, friendly, and educational. I did not have the privilege of serving on the major committees which Ted chaired, but I did enjoy, especially, our work on the Arms Control Observer Group. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan, anticipating intensive negotiations with the Soviet Union over potential reductions of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, appointed a bipartisan Arms Control Observer Group to proceed to Geneva, Switzerland, and monitor what were anticipated to be spirited and productive negotiations. The Arms Control Observer Group would then be in a position to lead the debate on the Senate floor to obtain the two- thirds majority needed for a historical arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Senator Robert Byrd and Senator Robert Dole were appointed to the group along with other Senators such as Ted Kennedy, Al Gore, and Sam Nunn, who made substantial contributions to consideration of the negotiations with the Soviets over many years. Ted and his wife Catherine took the assignment so seriously that they rented an apartment in Geneva anticipating that they would stay and continue to monitor the negotiations even after the Senators had returned to their normal debates on the Senate floor. Unfortunately, negotiations did not proceed rapidly and, as a matter of fact, took several years to reach maturity. But Ted Stevens remained a thoughtful and vigilant observer in Geneva, in Washington, and in other places on Earth where his acute observations and comments were especially important. As former Senator Sam Nunn and I formulated the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program which was adopted by the Congress in 1991, Ted Stevens was a strong supporter of our efforts, and many of my conversations with him centered upon the methods of verifying all aspects of the treaty and further steps we could take with the Soviet Union, and then later, Russia, to provide increasing safety for all American cities and military installations. I was visiting South Bend, IN, on the day that news of the tragic death of Ted Stevens flashed around the world. That night, I told all of the local correspondents that were following my activities that Ted Stevens was a son of Indiana, a student in two of the public schools in Indianapolis that had meant so much to both of us, and a remarkable champion both for his adopted state of Alaska and for our country. I will always be grateful for the friendship we enjoyed and the wonderful memories of that friendship that remain so vivid at this moment.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the attached editorial by Bono for the September 19, 2010, New York Times be printed in the Record. The editorial notes the language that I championed with Senator Cardin on requiring U.S.-listed extractive companies to reveal their payments which was incorporated in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the following letter be printed in the Record.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to introduce legislation that will lead to the establishment of the Pakistan-American Enterprise Fund on behalf of myself and Senator Kerry. The Pakistan-American Enterprise Fund bill authorizes the Administration to allocate, from existing funds granted under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, such sums as required to create the Fund. The mission of the Fund will be to help empower Pakistan's private sector to create jobs, which will contribute towards achieving long-term social stability and economic growth. The failed attack that occurred on May 1, 2010 in Times Square reinforces the need for our governments to work together to neutralize the imminent threats posed by terrorist waiting to strike, while simultaneously preventing the cancer of extremism from spreading and corrupting local communities in both our countries. It was to help undergird such cooperation that President Obama last year signed the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act authorizing $7.5 billion over 5 years. This non-military aid package is intended to help reverse Pakistan's converging crises of a growing al-Qaeda sanctuary, an expanding Taliban insurgency, a failing economy and deteriorating human development indicators. These conditions were intensifying turmoil and violence in the country, helping to incubate extremism and putting in question the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal, as well as our own domestic security. In order to directly address Pakistan's troubling economic trajectory, the Pakistan-American Enterprise Fund will work with the private sector to catalyze indigenous job creation, which will empower the people of Pakistan to help themselves. Entrepreneurial innovation is the engine that fuels sustainable economic growth and development. Pakistan currently enjoys a vibrant private sector, especially among small and medium size enterprises, but more must be done to encourage business formation and expansion. According to the World Bank, small and medium size enterprises, SMEs, in Pakistan account for nearly 90 percent of all businesses, 80 percent of all non-agricultural employees, and 40 percent of annual GDP. If the country is to emerge as a commercial partner and regional leader, SMEs must receive a strong transfusion of investment capital so that gainful employment exists as an alternative to the financial incentives offered by radical groups in Pakistan. In addition to providing much needed capital to aspiring and established Pakistani entrepreneurs, the Fund will provide a vehicle through which we might also export the entrepreneurial instincts and experience that are widely dispersed, but largely untapped, among US financial experts. Sustainable entrepreneurial activity requires a combination of financial and intellectual capital. Delivering both of these ingredients effectively is essential. USAID has demonstrated a limited capacity to deliver this type of relevant, usable assistance when needed. Currently under-resourced for and over-stretched by the task of rebuilding the infrastructures and economies of Iraq, Afghanistan and now Haiti--while simultaneously rebuilding the agency itself--USAID's efforts would be enhanced by the expertise the Fund could bring to bear. The creation of a Fund for Pakistan, like many of its predecessors, could couple financial and intellectual capital in a framework that is uniquely suited to addressing the financial and technical assistance needs in distressed economies like Pakistan. Appointed by the president, the Board of Directors, comprised of 4 private citizens of the United States and 3 private citizens of Pakistan who serve without compensation, will leverage their experience and expertise operating in international and emerging markets to oversee the Fund, which will be based in Pakistan. In turn, the Board would hire and direct a group of American and Pakistani bankers, who would be dispatched, using existing funds granted under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, to provide technical assistance and traditional financial products, like working capital loans and 3 to 5 year cash flow term loans for expansion capital, to the private sector. While the enterprise fund model is not perfect, it is a tested mechanism for promoting economic growth and reinvigorating fledgling economies. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Congress, through enactment of the Support for East European Development Act, SEED, and the Freedom Support Act, FSA, authorized nearly $1.2 billion for USAID to establish ten new investment funds, collectively known as the ``Enterprise Funds'', throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. These funds channeled funding into over 500 enterprises in 19 countries, leveraged an additional $5 billion in private investment capital from outside the U.S. Government, provided substantial development capital where supply was limited, created or sustained over 260,000 jobs through investment and development activities, funded $74 million in technical assistance to strengthen the private sector and is expected to recoup 137 percent of the original USAID funding. Pakistan's economy has shown resilience in the face of many challenges since the 1960s. However, today the country stands at a crossroads. If Pakistan is to repress extremist voices and emerge as a more reliable partner in the 21st century, we must empower the private sector to create jobs and contribute towards a sustainable future. The creation of the Pakistan-American Enterprise Fund would help to achieve this positive outcome. I ask for your support on passage of this bill.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to introduce legislation that will lead to the establishment of the Pakistan-American Enterprise Fund on behalf of myself and Senator Kerry. The Pakistan-American Enterprise Fund bill authorizes the Administration to allocate, from existing funds granted under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, such sums as required to create the Fund. The mission of the Fund will be to help empower Pakistan's private sector to create jobs, which will contribute towards achieving long-term social stability and economic growth. The failed attack that occurred on May 1, 2010 in Times Square reinforces the need for our governments to work together to neutralize the imminent threats posed by terrorist waiting to strike, while simultaneously preventing the cancer of extremism from spreading and corrupting local communities in both our countries. It was to help undergird such cooperation that President Obama last year signed the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act authorizing $7.5 billion over 5 years. This non-military aid package is intended to help reverse Pakistan's converging crises of a growing al-Qaeda sanctuary, an expanding Taliban insurgency, a failing economy and deteriorating human development indicators. These conditions were intensifying turmoil and violence in the country, helping to incubate extremism and putting in question the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal, as well as our own domestic security. In order to directly address Pakistan's troubling economic trajectory, the Pakistan-American Enterprise Fund will work with the private sector to catalyze indigenous job creation, which will empower the people of Pakistan to help themselves. Entrepreneurial innovation is the engine that fuels sustainable economic growth and development. Pakistan currently enjoys a vibrant private sector, especially among small and medium size enterprises, but more must be done to encourage business formation and expansion. According to the World Bank, small and medium size enterprises, SMEs, in Pakistan account for nearly 90 percent of all businesses, 80 percent of all non-agricultural employees, and 40 percent of annual GDP. If the country is to emerge as a commercial partner and regional leader, SMEs must receive a strong transfusion of investment capital so that gainful employment exists as an alternative to the financial incentives offered by radical groups in Pakistan. In addition to providing much needed capital to aspiring and established Pakistani entrepreneurs, the Fund will provide a vehicle through which we might also export the entrepreneurial instincts and experience that are widely dispersed, but largely untapped, among US financial experts. Sustainable entrepreneurial activity requires a combination of financial and intellectual capital. Delivering both of these ingredients effectively is essential. USAID has demonstrated a limited capacity to deliver this type of relevant, usable assistance when needed. Currently under-resourced for and over-stretched by the task of rebuilding the infrastructures and economies of Iraq, Afghanistan and now Haiti--while simultaneously rebuilding the agency itself--USAID's efforts would be enhanced by the expertise the Fund could bring to bear. The creation of a Fund for Pakistan, like many of its predecessors, could couple financial and intellectual capital in a framework that is uniquely suited to addressing the financial and technical assistance needs in distressed economies like Pakistan. Appointed by the president, the Board of Directors, comprised of 4 private citizens of the United States and 3 private citizens of Pakistan who serve without compensation, will leverage their experience and expertise operating in international and emerging markets to oversee the Fund, which will be based in Pakistan. In turn, the Board would hire and direct a group of American and Pakistani bankers, who would be dispatched, using existing funds granted under the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, to provide technical assistance and traditional financial products, like working capital loans and 3 to 5 year cash flow term loans for expansion capital, to the private sector. While the enterprise fund model is not perfect, it is a tested mechanism for promoting economic growth and reinvigorating fledgling economies. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Congress, through enactment of the Support for East European Development Act, SEED, and the Freedom Support Act, FSA, authorized nearly $1.2 billion for USAID to establish ten new investment funds, collectively known as the ``Enterprise Funds'', throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. These funds channeled funding into over 500 enterprises in 19 countries, leveraged an additional $5 billion in private investment capital from outside the U.S. Government, provided substantial development capital where supply was limited, created or sustained over 260,000 jobs through investment and development activities, funded $74 million in technical assistance to strengthen the private sector and is expected to recoup 137 percent of the original USAID funding. Pakistan's economy has shown resilience in the face of many challenges since the 1960s. However, today the country stands at a crossroads. If Pakistan is to repress extremist voices and emerge as a more reliable partner in the 21st century, we must empower the private sector to create jobs and contribute towards a sustainable future. The creation of the Pakistan-American Enterprise Fund would help to achieve this positive outcome. I ask for your support on passage of this bill.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Defense Trade Treaty Implementation Act of 2010. The purpose of this bill is to provide authority to implement two treaties on defense trade cooperation currently pending before the Senate--one with the United Kingdom and one with Australia. These treaties would facilitate defense cooperation with two close allies by eliminating licensing requirements for certain categories of defense articles. I have long supported the objectives of these treaties. Indeed, in 2003--before the treaties were negotiated--I introduced legislation that would have provided the President the authority to waive licensing requirements for similar defense trade with the United Kingdom and Australia. Subsequently, the Bush administration negotiated these treaties, and they were submitted to the Senate in 2007. To date, the Senate has not been able to act on the treaties, in significant part because of confusion and uncertainty about how they would be implemented and enforced in U.S. law. This legislation would address the problem by providing clear legislative authority under the Arms Export Control Act to implement and enforce the treaties. In particular, it would provide authority to exempt from licensing requirements under the Arms Export Control Act exports of defense articles made in connection with the treaties. It would provide authority for the President to issue regulations pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act to implement and enforce the treaties. It would provide authority to allow violations or abuses of the treaty to be prosecuted under enforcement provisions of the Arms Export Control Act. It would provide for notification to the Congress of significant exports of defense articles made pursuant to the treaties. Previous efforts by both the Bush and Obama administrations to develop a viable approach for implementing and enforcing the treaties without new legislation have been unsuccessful to date, and have created unfortunate delays in bringing these treaties into force. I believe that this legislation will put the implementation and enforcement of the treaties on a far sounder and more certain footing, and eliminate the confusion that has led to these delays. I look forward to working with other members and with the administration on this legislation. It is my hope that passage of this legislation, together with a resolution of advice and consent to the treaties containing appropriate protections for the Senate's role in overseeing arms exports and approving significant future changes to the treaty regime, may allow the treaties to enter into force this year. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce the Defense Trade Treaty Implementation Act of 2010. The purpose of this bill is to provide authority to implement two treaties on defense trade cooperation currently pending before the Senate--one with the United Kingdom and one with Australia. These treaties would facilitate defense cooperation with two close allies by eliminating licensing requirements for certain categories of defense articles. I have long supported the objectives of these treaties. Indeed, in 2003--before the treaties were negotiated--I introduced legislation that would have provided the President the authority to waive licensing requirements for similar defense trade with the United Kingdom and Australia. Subsequently, the Bush administration negotiated these treaties, and they were submitted to the Senate in 2007. To date, the Senate has not been able to act on the treaties, in significant part because of confusion and uncertainty about how they would be implemented and enforced in U.S. law. This legislation would address the problem by providing clear legislative authority under the Arms Export Control Act to implement and enforce the treaties. In particular, it would provide authority to exempt from licensing requirements under the Arms Export Control Act exports of defense articles made in connection with the treaties. It would provide authority for the President to issue regulations pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act to implement and enforce the treaties. It would provide authority to allow violations or abuses of the treaty to be prosecuted under enforcement provisions of the Arms Export Control Act. It would provide for notification to the Congress of significant exports of defense articles made pursuant to the treaties. Previous efforts by both the Bush and Obama administrations to develop a viable approach for implementing and enforcing the treaties without new legislation have been unsuccessful to date, and have created unfortunate delays in bringing these treaties into force. I believe that this legislation will put the implementation and enforcement of the treaties on a far sounder and more certain footing, and eliminate the confusion that has led to these delays. I look forward to working with other members and with the administration on this legislation. It is my hope that passage of this legislation, together with a resolution of advice and consent to the treaties containing appropriate protections for the Senate's role in overseeing arms exports and approving significant future changes to the treaty regime, may allow the treaties to enter into force this year. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I wish today to take the opportunity to express my congratulations to the winners of the 2009- 2010 Dick Lugar/Indiana Farm Bureau/Indiana Farm Bureau Insurance Companies Youth Essay Contest. In 1985, I joined with the Indiana Farm Bureau to sponsor an essay contest for eighth grade students in my home State. The purpose of this contest is to encourage young Hoosiers to recognize and appreciate the importance of Indiana agriculture in their lives and subsequently craft an essay responding to the assigned theme. The theme chosen for this year was ``Farmers Looking at a Bright Future.'' Along with my friends at the Indiana Farm Bureau and Indiana Farm Bureau Insurance Companies, I am pleased with the annual response to this contest and the quality of the essays received over the years. I applaud each of this year's participants on their thoughtful work and wish, especially, to highlight the submissions of the 2009-2010 contest winners--Jordan Cadle of Orleans, Indiana, and Layne Sanders of Greensburg, Indiana. I submit for the Record the complete text of Jordan's and Layne's respective essays. I am pleased, also, to include the names of the many district and county winners of the contest. The winning essays follow: Untitled (By Jordan Cadle) With world population skyrocketing, farmers need to step off the treadmill of slow incremental growth and jump into using new revolutionary thoughts. The three main ideas for future generations of farmers meeting this challenge are: perennial crops, multistoried planting beds, and hover robotic machinery. Putting the knowledge of the crop geneticist to use, I believe the world can create new perennial crops to plant in more evenly balanced climates year around and in greenhouses. If we had corn and soybeans that could survive the winter and keep producing like a tomato plant (in proper growing conditions) this would allow farmers to rarely buy seeds. Also, this would maintain yield throughout the year for consumption. These plants would be bred to have multiple ears, pods, or heads in order to sustain a sufficient yield at all times. Helping to produce more of these perennial crops, they could be raised on multistoried planting beds. Imagine these being like large parking garages where each layer is a field. Artificial lighting would be used for stories that are not exposed to sunlight. Going upward with fields leaves more room for people to live and natural trees to grow since we will be exhausting our supply of cultivatable land on earth. Tending to these crops, hover robotic machinery will be used. Utilizing this machinery will allow farmers to plant and tend to crops, while the ground may still be too wet for standard machinery. Also, the line of machinery will be equipped with laser sensors to care for each plants' individual needs. This will minimize input costs. Just like robots in general, one farmer will be able to control several at a time. I believe hover robotic machinery, multistoried planting beds, and perennial crops will guide farmers running to a brighter future.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I am pleased to take the opportunity today to congratulate the Class of 2010 at Howe Military School upon this weekend's commencement ceremonies. This class has achieved the remarkable result of having each cadet gain acceptance to college an achievement in which all cadets and their families can take great pride. The Class of 2010 also has the distinction of being the final class to graduate as alumni of the Howe Military School. The board of trustees has chosen to change the school's name to The Howe School beginning in the fall. Throughout the school's distinguished 126 year history it has prepared young men, and since 1988 young women, for academic excellence and leadership. This tradition will continue in the years to come as the school embarks upon a new chapter as The Howe School. I am privileged to recognize the faculty and staff of the Howe Military School and the cadets who are graduating to pursue new challenges in college and beyond. I look forward to opportunities to learn about the many achievements of the Howe Military School Class of 2010 in the years ahead.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I join my distinguished colleague in commending the work of Senator Dodd and Senator Shelby and the privilege of offering this amendment now with Senator Cardin. I rise to support the transparency amendment, No. 4050, introduced by Senator Cardin on behalf of myself, Senator Durbin, Senator Schumer, Senator Feingold, Senator Merkley, Senator Johnson, and Senator Whitehouse. This amendment builds on language introduced in the Energy Security Through Transparency Act of 2009. If passed, the amendment would help to reverse the ``resource curse'' by revealing payments made here and abroad to governments for oil, gas, and minerals. The Senate debate on financial regulatory reform has included a great deal of debate on transparency. Transparency empowers citizens, investors, regulators, and other watchdogs and is a necessary ingredient of good governance for countries and companies alike. Adoption of the Cardin-Lugar amendment would bring a major step in favor of increased transparency at home and abroad. Its passage would empower investors to have a more complete view of the value of their holdings. It would bring more information to global commodity markets, which would benefit price stability. More importantly, it would help empower citizens to hold their governments to account for the decisions made by their governments in the management of valuable oil, gas, and mineral resources and revenues. In countries abundant in natural resources, corruption and authoritarianism, transparency is a vital tool. Yet in recent weeks we have also been reminded of the need for greater transparency in management at home. The amendment builds on the findings of a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations staff report entitled the ``Petroleum and Poverty Paradox: Assessing U.S. and International Community Efforts to Fight the Resource Curse,'' which noted that many resource-rich countries that should be well off are, in fact, terribly poor. History shows that oil, gas reserves, and minerals frequently can be a bane, not a blessing, for poor countries, leading to corruption, wasteful spending, military adventurism, and instability. Too often, oil money intended for a nation's poor ends up lining the pockets of the rich or is squandered on showcase projects instead of productive investments. A classic case is Nigeria, the eighth largest oil exporter. Despite $\1/2\ trillion in revenues since the 1960s, poverty has increased, corruption is rife, and violence roils the oil-rich Niger Delta. This ``resource curse'' affects us as well as producing countries. It exacerbates global poverty which can be a seedbed for terrorism, it empowers autocrats and dictators, and it can crimp world petroleum supplies by breeding instability. The essential issue at stake is a citizen's right to hold its government to account. Americans would not tolerate the Congress denying them access to revenues our Treasury collects. We cannot force foreign governments to treat their citizens as we would hope, but this amendment would make it much more difficult to hide the truth. Transparency also will benefit Americans at home. Improved governance of extractive industries will improve investment climates for our companies abroad, it will increase the reliability of commodity supplies upon which businesses and people in the United States rely, and it will promote greater energy security. This amendment requires foreign and domestic companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges and exchanging American depository receipts to disclose in their regular SEC filings their extractive payments to governments for oil, gas, and mining. Nothing in this amendment accuses companies of malfeasance. Quite the contrary. Several oil, gas, and minerals companies have taken important steps in this arena. The aforementioned Foreign Relations Committee minority staff report details several examples of individuals going the extra mile to convince governments of the importance of transparency and to provide training to meet international standards. Yet the value of companies themselves can be negatively impacted when there is not transparency. As noted in the findings of this amendment: Companies in the extractive sector face unique tax and reputational risks in the form of country-specific taxes and regulations. Exposure to these risks is heightened by the substantial capital employed in the extractive industries, and the often opaque and unaccountable management of natural resource revenues by foreign governments, which in turn creates unstable and high-cost operating environments for multinational companies. The effects of these risks are material to investors. Many analysts say among the root causes of the current financial crisis was a failure by investors to have access to sufficient information about their investments and an excessive reliance on the judgments of the ratings agencies, which proved to be highly faulty. That experience argues strongly for more disclosure and information. Considering the well-established link between oil payments and the business climate, many investors might be interested in this information--particularly socially responsible investors. This domestic action will complement multilateral transparency efforts such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative--the EITI--under which some countries are beginning to require all extractive companies operating in their territories to publicly report their payments. We encourage the President to work with members of the G8 and the G20 to promote similar disclosures through their exchanges and their jurisdictions. As Secretary Clinton noted in her questions for the record on January 12, 2009: President-Elect Obama has put a high priority on promoting transparency in government more broadly. I look forward to working with the President-Elect and the Treasury Department to promote greater transparency at the G-8 and now the G-20 as well. In developing this amendment, our staffs consulted with the Secretary, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Treasury Department, the Department of the Interior, energy companies, mining companies, the industry representatives, and nongovernmental organizations. When financial markets see stable economic growth and political organization in resource-rich countries, supplies are more reliable and risk premiums factored into the process at the gas pump are diminished. Information is critical to maintaining healthy economies and healthy political systems. I ask for your support on passage of this important amendment. I thank the Chair.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to honor the lives of President Lech Kaczynski, his wife, and 94 others who perished in a plane crash on April 10, 2010. President Kaczynski was a steadfast supporter of advancing freedom and prosperity in Poland and throughout Central and Eastern Europe and was a close friend of the United States. It is with tragic irony that this devastation has occurred at a time of solemn remembrance of the massacre of Polish officers and civilians in the Katyn Forest and elsewhere 70 years ago. Together with the Polish nation and friends of Poland worldwide, I mourn this unbelievably tragic loss. With these sentiments in mind, I am introducing this resolution honoring the lives of President of Poland Lech Kaczynski, his wife, and 94 others who perished on April 10, 2010 in a plane crash while en route to memorialize those Polish officers, officials, and civilians who were massacred by the Soviet Union 70 years ago.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, as my colleagues are aware, the Library of Congress, LOC, diligently works to keep the Congress fully informed on a plethora of issues. Today I would like to highlight the important work of a component of the LOC that is less known to colleagues, and that is its operation in Southeast Asia. The work of this regional operation immensely contributes to U.S. understanding of Southeast Asia, the Pacific Islands, China and India, thereby facilitating our foreign policy objectives. The LOC office is one of six overseas offices operated by the Overseas Operations Division of the LOC. Staff to the overseas offices ``acquire, catalog, preserve and distribute library and research materials . . . and provide assistance to the U.S. Congress.'' For too many Americans, Southeast Asia is a distant unknown. In reality, the region is of significant economic importance to the American people. The approximately 580-million citizens--and consumers--of the 10 nations comprising the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, represent the fourth largest market for American exports. Based in Jakarta, the mission of the LOC regional operation is diverse. Primary among its responsibilities is to provide research and information services to the U.S. Congress and the Congressional Research Service. Jakarta LOC staff also manage the Cooperative Acquisitions Program, CAPSEA, whereby they acquire materials from countries in the region on behalf of the LOC and member institutions, which include 30 U.S. research libraries and 10 international research libraries. It is important to note the ongoing, extensive assistance the Senate Foreign Relations Committee receives from the Jakarta LOC office. Research and preparation for committee projects on issues ranging from global food security, to international trade, nonproliferation, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, EITI, counterterrorism and human trafficking, have been augmented by the diligent efforts of LOC staff in Jakarta and elsewhere in the region. The Jakarta LOC office ensures that the U.S. Congress and the Congressional Research Service have up-to-date legal and legislative regional information, and it assists other U.S. Government agencies in providing and sharing open source information as well as acquiring publications. The Jakarta LOC office has also worked with the House Democracy Partnership, HDP, and The Asia Foundation to create a legislative library for the National Parliament of Timor-Leste and to train the library staff, and is cooperating with the HDP to develop a parliamentary research service and an improved information technology system there. Indonesia is a young democracy. Its Parliament is confronted with many challenges, including the development of its own operational and staff infrastructure. The LOC office in Jakarta serves as a bridge facilitating communications and meetings between the staff of the U.S. Congress and the Indonesian Parliament. Our counterparts in the Indonesian Parliament have expressed appreciation for this initiative. In conclusion, I am grateful for the assistance provided to the U.S. Senate by the Southeast Asia LOC office, and wanted to take this opportunity to openly convey my appreciation.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to recognize the important progress made by the people of Ukraine in the establishment of democratic institutions following the presidential runoff election on February 7, 2010. Voters recently elected Viktor Yanukovych as President of Ukraine in a process that international monitors declared to have generally comported with international election standards. This represents important progress towards the consolidation of democratic institutions that the U.S. has worked diligently to foster. Serving as President George W. Bush's envoy to the 2004 run-off election that resulted in what is now widely known as the ``Orange revolution,'' I had the opportunity to witness firsthand the great aspirations of the Ukrainian people for a government that responds to their needs. Given Ukraine's location on the periphery of NATO and the Russian Federation, as well as its role as the primary energy conduit to Europe, Ukraine's political development and external orientation greatly impact European security and U.S. policies in the region. A continuing partnership with the people of Ukraine and U.S. technical assistance programs on a range of issues, including nuclear security, non-proliferation, energy security, institution-building, and others, will serve to advance our vital national security interests. This U.S. engagement should also support ongoing progress by Ukraine in addressing the remaining challenges in the electoral processes as identified by international election monitoring entities. In recognition of the profound successes of U.S.-Ukrainian partnership, I am pleased to submit this resolution concerning the important progress made by the people of Ukraine in the establishment of democratic institutions.