Richard Lugar

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Hawaii for his very important thoughts about threat reduction and about our mutual quest and support.

Mr. LUGAR. I agree with my friend. The CTR and other non- proliferation programs are making progress but face a new set of responsibilities in light of the Moscow Treaty. The Russian Federation intends to reduce, destroy, and account for various weapons systems, materials, and expertise with U.S. assistance under the CTR and other non-proliferation programs. For this reason, the Foreign Relations Committee included Condition One to the Treaty to require the President to submit to Congress an annual report and recommendations on how Cooperative Threat Reduction assistance can best help the Russian Federation implement the Treaty efficiently and maintain the security and accurate accounting of its nuclear weapons and weapons-usable components and material.

Mr. LUGAR. Yes, this report is intended to establish the rationale for all U.S. non-proliferation programs insofar as they can be used to help Russia dismantle weapons or assure the security of those weapons and of the fissile material in them. The report also will include the amount of CTR assistance that the Russian Federation will need to meet its obligations under the Treaty.

Mr. LUGAR. Yes, I agree that such information is useful. However I believe that this information already is provided as part of the overall CTR annual report to Congress by the Department of Defense and annual reports by other non-proliferation programs. Specifically, the CTR annual report contains funding levels for individual projects as well as five-year cost estimates. I understand my colleague's concern that this report does not address Treaty-specific programs. The report required in the resolution of ratification could lay the groundwork for future cost and program requirements for non-proliferation that perhaps can be addressed in the Defense authorization bill.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, let me respond to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts by reviewing, once again, the origins of the Moscow Treaty. At the time that President Putin and President Bush met in May of last year, Russia had made the decision that the distinguished Minister of Defense of Russia, Sergei Ivanov, announced that the Russians would be destroying warheads in a matter of course, dismantling them from missiles. President Bush had indicated that as a matter of fact, unilaterally, the United States was prepared to do the same. For a variety of reasons--some economic, some safety--both countries had decided upon a course of action. When the two Presidents came together to formulate their joint announcement, the Moscow Treaty was formed. As has been pointed out, first it was not clear that a treaty would be formulated, but ultimately both leaders decided that was the best course. That is why the treaty is simple. It, clearly, does not cover all of the objectives of arms control that can be covered in further negotiations, and many of us hope there will be further negotiations, not only in the nuclear area but in the biological area where in the course of this we have pointed out there is still a lack of transparency on the part of the Russians, as we perceive it at certain military facilities. In the case of the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts as a way of shoring up a treaty that he has criticized, let me say that the major verification procedure now in place is the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, very specifically. At Surovatika, Senators and Members of the House have witnessed four missiles coming into that plant each month. They are destroyed. Clearly, the warheads have been separated from the missiles prior to that destruction. That four-a-month situation is going to continue unless for reasons of our own parliamentary procedure we stop the funding. Clearly, you can verify the missiles. In my last visit to the site, I was accompanied by the governor of the territory, the mayors of various towns and radio stations in Russia. Why? Because this is a jobs issue. Russians employ people destroying missiles. Nothing very secret about it; they are swarming around. A television station from Indianapolis, channel 13, accompanied me on that occasion, took pictures of the entire process and put it on a remarkable documentary on Indianapolis television. We need to catch up with where verification is in the world. It is on the ground, with Americans working in cooperative threat reduction with Russians. The missiles that come in are interchangeable SS-17s, SS-18s, and SS- 19s. We visited with plant officials about their further planning on SS-24s and 25s. This is the comprehensive scope of what we are talking about. These are, in fact, the missiles on which the warheads were located and from which they have been separated. In a future treaty the United States and Russia may decide they wish to go much further with regard to the destruction of the warheads themselves. That point has been made by many Senators that the treaty does not call for the destruction of warheads. But, in fact, warheads are being destroyed by Russia and by the United States. In terms of both of our countries, we have decided not to have transparency to the point that both nations are inspecting that process, but we are able to verify the results. I point out that the intelligence report that perhaps the Senator is calling for may be covered in large part by the cooperative threat reduction annual report to Congress. This one is for fiscal year 2002, a detailed summary not only of nuclear dismantlement and demolition but, likewise, anything we are doing in chemical and biological, too. I admit there are areas, as I have said earlier, that we are not into yet, and we wish we were. My hope is we will be successful as two nations in seeing eye to eye on movement in that direction. When it comes, however, to the verification of this Moscow Treaty, it flows from the fact that both nations of their own will want to destroy the missiles and separate the warheads and thus reduce the viability of these situations. We have indicated at our own time, at our own speed, we will do that. And the linchpin from the beginning, it seems to me, is the fact not only of the START requirements that do expire in 2009 but the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program on the ground which has no expiration unless Congress decides to terminate it. That is a different debate and a different set of decisions. I am hopeful Senators will understand that. I appreciate the fervent plea for verifiability for all of us. As I say, I admit, I wish we had a better insight into the disposition of all of the warheads, but even here both Russians and Americans indicate in the fullness of time that these warheads have to be destroyed. In large part that is because sometimes the fuel components in them are unstable. They become a danger for the nation that is simply holding them. This is not a sporting goods situation of inert matter on shelves. These, unfortunately, are far too living, viable, dynamic instruments. This is why we have worked with Russia on the fissile material that comes from the destruction of these warheads; to provide storage for that. It is a whole new set of problems. Some arms control people have suggested that while the warhead is on the missile, you do not have the problem of fissile material that might get loose and be bought or sold. It is contained. That is still true while it is in the warhead. As it comes out of the warhead, a whole new set of problems is created-- of storage and of accountability. We are working with the Russians through our Department of Energy on these accountability projects, which are intense and vigorous. For these reasons, I oppose the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts. I hope other Senators will oppose it. It appears to me to be unnecessary. I would say, simply, other criticisms of the treaty are certainly a matter of the opinion of the Senator, but it was a modest treaty. It came from the volition and the will of both countries coming together at their own time, at their own speed, and with procedures that seem to me to offer an adequate amount of verifiability, much of it on the site and through the eyes of the Russian press, as well as our own. I thank the Chair.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote in relation to the Kerry amendment, No. 255, occur at 5:40 today, and the time until then be equally divided in the usual form, provided that no further second-degree amendment be in order to the amendment prior to the vote.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I add one final argument, and that is the actual text of the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts requires these intelligence reports on the capability of the United States to monitor the compliance of the Russian Federation to the requirements of the treaty. The treaty does not require insight into the warhead destruction. That is a desirable aim, and I have indicated in due course we may be able to negotiate that, but that is not a part of this treaty. Therefore, the report that is being asked for really asks for information that is not covered by the treaty. I repeat, the information that is covered by the treaty, it seems to me, is really adequately monitored by the cooperative threat reduction personnel. I yield the floor.

Mr. LUGAR. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Delaware.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I am pleased to respond to the distinguished Senator from Michigan. Our report does not require information on those warheads that are not operationally deployed. We would urge the administration to provide this information.

Mr. LUGAR. During our hearings on the treaty, a number of witnesses expressed concern about the alert status of U.S. strategic nuclear warheads. As the United States and Russia enter a new era of friendship and cooperation, we must take a close look at what we can do, in a safe and effective manner, to take nuclear weapons off alert status and prevent an accidental nuclear launch due to a false alarm or a miscalculation. I know our friend and former colleague Senator Sam Nunn expressed hope in our hearings that we might address the cold war-era nuclear postures of the United States and Russia as a critical next step following ratification of the Moscow Treaty.

Mr. LUGAR. The Senator from Delaware is correct, and while we have not determined precisely how to proceed, I expect that we will want to encourage action by the President before we move on our own. Such a measure could be offered as an amendment to major legislation such as the Department of State authorization bill. I can say with confidence that Senator Biden and I are agreed that we should continue to pursue this initiative in ways that will provide productive results.

Mr. LUGAR. I share the concern voiced by the senior Senator from North Dakota on the potential proliferation threats posed by non- strategic nuclear weapons in Russia. As the Senator knows, the United States has voiced serious concerns about the safety and security of these dangerous weapons stored at multiple locations around Russia. I believe the Russian tactical nuclear weapons arsenal represents an area of concern and needs attention.

Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator from North Dakota for his work on this important issue and his thoughtful invitation. I would ask that the Senator from North Dakota withhold his amendment with the understanding that the Foreign Relations Committee will make a serious effort to elevate the matter of Russian tactical nuclear weapons to a top priority on our Nation's arms control and threat reduction agenda.

Mr. LUGAR. The ranking member and I have plans to hold hearings on the continued proliferation challenges in Russia. Clearly the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons would be an important topic to be discussed and investigated in that forum. I believe that tactical nuclear warhead reductions should be a top United States priority in our new relationship with Russia.

Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Senator for his thoughts. This issue was raised repeatedly during our hearings on the Treaty. I am confident of the administration's efforts to engage Russia on this issue. I would be happy to reinforce the committee's views on these issues with the appropriate Administration officials.

Mr. LUGAR. My understanding is the distinguished majority leader has a statement.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the Resolution of Ratification.

Mr. LUGAR. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I express my appreciation to Senator Biden for his leadership and management of this treaty and to all Members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, including the distinguished occupant of the Chair, and also Senators who contributed constructively to, I believe, a very important achievement. I specifically mention staff Members who were most supportive and helpful: Tom Moore, Ed Levine, Jofi Joseph, Brian McKenan, Jason Hamm, Ken Myers, Sr., and Kenny Myers, Jr. We are appreciative of staff on both sides of the aisle for a remarkable piece of work. I yield the floor.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I am advised there will not be speakers offering amendments for some time, therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess until 2 p.m.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, by request, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to establish the Millennium Challenge Account and the Millennium Challenge Corporation in order to reduce global poverty through increased economic growth by supporting a new compact for global development. This proposed legislation has been requested by the President of the United States, George W. Bush, and I am introducing it in order that there may be a specific bill to which Members of the Senate and the public may direct their attention and comments. I reserve my right to support or oppose this bill, as well as to make any suggested amendments to it, as this important initiative of the President continues to be considered by the Committee on Foreign Relations. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record together with a section-by-section analysis of the bill and the letter from the President of the United States to the Congress of the United States dated February 5, 2003.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, by request, I introduce for appropriate reference a bill to establish the Millennium Challenge Account and the Millennium Challenge Corporation in order to reduce global poverty through increased economic growth by supporting a new compact for global development. This proposed legislation has been requested by the President of the United States, George W. Bush, and I am introducing it in order that there may be a specific bill to which Members of the Senate and the public may direct their attention and comments. I reserve my right to support or oppose this bill, as well as to make any suggested amendments to it, as this important initiative of the President continues to be considered by the Committee on Foreign Relations. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record together with a section-by-section analysis of the bill and the letter from the President of the United States to the Congress of the United States dated February 5, 2003.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I thank the distinguished majority leader for his thoughtful commendation of the work of our committee. I appreciate especially the strong endorsement he has given to the treaty and to the procedures that have brought us to this day. On behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I am honored to bring the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, better known as the Moscow Treaty, to the floor for Senate consideration and ratification. The treaty was signed on May 24, 2002, and was transmitted by President Bush to the Senate on June 20, 2002. It reduces operational deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a level of between 1,700 and 2,200 by December 31, 2012. This is truly a tremendous accomplishment and deserves the full support of the Senate and the Russian Duma. I believe this treaty is an important step toward a safer world. The Foreign Relations Committee held four hearings and numerous briefings on the treaty, starting in July of last year, under the chairmanship of Senator Joe Biden. I thank Senator Biden and his staff for the timely consideration the treaty received and for the many opportunities provided to members of the committee to hear testimony and to engage in conversation with experts from the administration and from the private sector. Moreover, during the last 2 months, Senator Biden has been an indispensable partner in constructing this resolution of ratification. Its provisions reflect our mutual efforts to construct a bipartisan resolution that could be broadly supported by the Senate. The resolution, in fact, was approved unanimously by the Foreign Relations Committee. We are hopeful of a very strong vote on the Senate floor. During the course of the committee's consideration of the Moscow Treaty, we received testimony from Secretary of State Colin Powell, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Myers. Each expressed a strong desire for an overwhelming vote of approval. In addition to administration witnesses, we heard from the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Ken Adelman; from the former commander in chief of U.S. Strategic Command, GEN Gene Habiger; and our former colleague, Sam Nunn; as well as numerous representatives of think tanks and interest groups. In addition to efforts undertaken in the Foreign Relations Committee, Senators Levin and Warner and the Committee on Armed Services conducted two hearings examining the military implications of the treaty and shared analysis of their findings with us. These letters have been made a part of the record and our committee report. Furthermore, the Intelligence Committee conducted a thorough review of the treaty's verification procedures through numerous members only and staff briefings. The Committee on Foreign Relations appreciates the expertise of our colleagues on the Intelligence Committee and what they have lent to this process. President Bush and President Putin have assigned a high priority to the timely ratification of the Moscow Treaty. Both point to the treaty as evidence that the U.S.-Russian relationship has turned the corner. Areas of disagreement clearly remain, but we are attempting to develop a partnership in the war against terrorism, and both Russians and Americans believe that political and economic cooperation can increase dramatically in the coming decade. On May 1, 2001, in a speech at the National Defense University, President Bush called for a new strategic framework to transform our relationship with Russia ``from one based on a nuclear balance of terror to one based on common responsibilities and common interests.'' Less than 8 months later, President Bush announced his intention to reduce our nuclear levels unilaterally and invited President Putin to implement similar reductions. This was the beginning of a process that led to a treaty signing during the summit in Moscow last year. The Moscow Treaty is unlike arms control agreements we have considered in the past. I remember vividly, as do many of our colleagues, visiting the START I and START II treaty negotiations. The United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other, against conference tables. They met for years. These negotiations produced extensive treaties and verification annexes that described in detail the requirements mandated by the treaties. To be sure, the treaty before us today could have been more expansive, rigid, and demanding. The negotiators could have followed the cold war template for arms control negotiations and entered into a multiyear discussion process. That procedure did not serve the best interest of either side. Both sides, Americans and Russians, wanted to move quickly to capitalize on the opportunity to sharply reduce strategic weaponry. The agreement benefits not only the cause of arms control, but also the broader United States-Russia relationship. In my opinion, President Bush was wise to conclude the treaty quickly in this form rather than enter into a more lengthy and uncertain negotiation process. Russian strategic and nuclear forces are declining. Russian leaders have indicated they would prefer warhead levels to be less than 2,200 by 2012. In fact, Moscow pushed for a limit of 1,500 nuclear warheads and settled for a range of 1,700 to 2,200. It would appear that Moscow is reluctant to accept the resource tradeoffs necessary to maintain a larger force. President Putin inherited a force structure that already was moving toward the deep reductions necessary for START II implementation. Faced with continued resource constraints, he decided to limit further spending on strategic forces while seeking a new treaty to limit the United States and Russian forces in a predictable manner. In the past, most critics of strategic arms control treaties objected to the constraints these treaties placed on U.S. forces. They often alleged the treaties would expose U.S. security to unnecessary risk. Critics of the Moscow Treaty, however, have made the opposite complaint. They have said the treaty's constraints do not go far enough. Various analysts have suggested the treaty should include a verification system requirement to dismantle warheads, a specific reduction schedule, and provisions dealing with tactical nuclear weapons. I share some of the concerns expressed by these critics, but the treaty is an important step forward because it maintains the momentum of an arms control process that has been successful. The treaty provides a mutual framework for continuing the destruction of offensive nuclear weapons whose purpose was to target the United States of America. It also underscores the importance of the United States-Russia relationship at a time when we are depending on Russian support for the war on terrorism. Nevertheless, important questions remain and will be discussed during this debate. What happens to the nuclear warheads taken from dismantled Russian delivery systems? I have confidence in the United States storage procedures and appreciate the flexibility the treaty permits in our strategic systems, but I am concerned with the parallel Russian process. We must work with Russia to make certain that these dangerous weapons do not fall into the wrong hands. However, there are readily available means to address these deficiencies. The primary vehicle for cooperation in reducing warheads to levels set by the Moscow Treaty and addressing the threat posed by warhead security is the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program. Without Nunn-Lugar, it is unlikely that the benefits of the treaty will be realized. During consideration of the treaty, the committee heard testimony from Secretary Powell asserting that increased Nunn-Lugar assistance would serve as a foundation for the cooperation necessary to meet Russian obligations under the treaty and as additional means of verifying that those obligations are met. My concerns about treaty implementation are compounded by the impasse we experienced over the Nunn-Lugar certification process last year. Each year, our President is required by law to certify that Russia is ``committed to the goals of arms control.'' In 2002, the administration requested a waiver to this condition, pointing out that unresolved concerns in the chemical and biological arenas made this difficult. Meanwhile, existing Nunn-Lugar activities and projects were permitted to continue, but no new projects were initiated and no new contracts were finalized. President Bush requested a permanent annual waiver to the Nunn-Lugar legislation so we could continue with important work. But some in Congress preferred just a 1-year waiver or no waiver at all. Without a permanent waiver, the President would be forced to suspend dismantling assistance each year pending congressional action to waive the requirement. This could lead to delays of up to 6 months or more, just as we experienced last year. Let me assure my colleagues, this is not a hypothetical situation. It just happened to us. For more than 6 months, submarines on the Kola Peninsula awaited destruction. Regiments of SS-18 missiles loaded with 10 nuclear warheads apiece were left standing in Siberia, and almost 2 million rounds of chemical weapons in relatively transportable shells awaited elimination at Shchuch'ye. But the Nunn-Lugar program was powerless to address these threats because of congressional conditions drafted over a decade ago. American dismantlement experts in Russia were forced to wait and watch as these dangerous weapons systems sat in their silos, docks, or warehouses while the conference committee process between the two Houses of Congress dragged on through the summer. Without the changing of congressional conditions on the legislation or the granting of a permanent Presidential waiver, the current situation could reoccur in the years ahead. To say the least, this would delay full implementation of the Moscow Treaty far beyond the envisioned 10-year time period; namely, 2012. Let me be clear. The Moscow Treaty alone is insufficient to meet our security needs. The treaty is part of the answer, but without cooperative threat reduction, dismantlement, and warhead security projects, the agreement will not reach its potential in a timely manner. Critics of the Moscow Treaty suggest this lack of a new verification regime is a weakness that must be rectified. Some have gone so far as to suggest the treaty be shelved until verification is strengthened. But this point of view sees the treaty through a cold war prism when cooperative threat reduction programs did not exist and both sides were trying to maximize strategic nuclear force levels. The Bush administration has been forthright in its recognition of the lack of a verification provision in the Moscow Treaty, including statements in the President's letter of transmittal and the testimony of Secretary Powell before the Foreign Relations Committee. The administration's views on verification of the treaty are based upon three basic assumptions: First, the United States and Russia have moved beyond cold war tensions, and the United States would have undertaken these reductions of nuclear warheads regardless of Russia's view--unilateral disarmament. Second, the national security interests of the United States are better served through the flexibility of the Moscow Treaty. And third, Russia is unlikely to have the means or the incentives to violate or withdraw from this agreement. I believe the level of verification of the Moscow Treaty is sufficient. American verification experts will have the START I treaty verification procedures in place throughout at least 2009. But perhaps more importantly, the Nunn-Lugar program has placed American dismantlement teams and equipment on the ground in Russia now. These teams work on a daily basis with their Russian counterparts to safely dismantle weapons systems. For example, at Surovatika, U.S.-provided equipment is routinely dismantling four ICBMs per month. It is hard to imagine a more complete means by which to verify the dismantlement of weapons than the systematic work occurring under cooperative threat reduction at Surovatika. Senator Biden and I met with President Bush last June to discuss Senate consideration of the treaty, just after the President returned from his visit at the Moscow Summit. We committed to moving the treaty forward in a responsible, bi-partisan, and expeditious manner. The resolution before us today is a product of close cooperation and consultation. I am pleased to report that it enjoys the strong support of the administration. The resolution of ratification contains two conditions and six declarations. I would like to describe each of these provisions for the Senate. The first condition requires the President to submit to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees an annual report on the amount of Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction assistance that Russia will need to meet its obligations under the Treaty. As I mentioned earlier, without U.S. assistance, Russia cannot meet the timetable of its obligations under this treaty. Without the Nunn-Lugar program, it is likely the benefits of this treaty will be postponed or never realized. The second condition requires the President to report to the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on important items related to the treaty, including: 1, Strategic force levels; 2, planned offensive reductions; 3, treaty implementation plans; 4, efforts to improve verification and transparency; 5, status of START I treaty verification extension; 6, information regarding the ability of either side to fully implement the treaty; and 7, any efforts proposed to improve the effectiveness of the treaty. The report contained in this condition must be submitted within 60 days of the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty and by April 15 of each following year. The extensive nature of this report protects our critical Senate role in oversight of implementation and ensures that this body will remain an integral part of the process throughout the treaty's life. The first declaration has been in each resolution of ratification for arms control treaties since the INF Treaty's resolution of ratification in 1988. It is known to colleagues here as the Byrd-Biden Condition. The condition articulates the Constitutional principles on which the common understanding of the terms of a treaty will be based. The second declaration encourages the President to continue efforts to eliminate the threats posed by strategic offensive nuclear weapons to the lowest level possible while not jeopardizing our country's national security or alliance obligations. Secretary Powell stated in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee that ``the Moscow Treaty represents significant progress in meeting the obligations set forth in Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty.'' This treaty takes another step in meeting the U.S. and Russian commitments under the Nonproliferation Treaty. The treaty establishes a Bilateral Implementation Commission, as a diplomatic consultative forum to discuss issues related to implementation of the Treaty. The resolution's third declaration calls on the Executive Branch to provide briefings before and after meetings of the commission concerning: 1, issues raised during meetings; 2, any issues the United States is pursuing through other channels; and 3, Presidential determinations with regard to these issues. This provision has been included to ensure that we remain fully aware of the activities of the Bilateral Implementation Commission. During the hearings on the treaty, Secretary Powell and Secretary Rumsfeld testified that non-strategic nuclear weapons remain an important issue and expressed a strong interest in working closely with Russia to reduce associated threats. The resolution's fourth declaration is meant to underscore the threat posed by tactical nuclear weapons. It urges the President to work closely with Russia and to provide assistance on the full accounting, safety, and security of the Russian tactical nuclear weapon stockpile. In 1991, President George H. W. Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev announced the removal of their deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons. In Helsinki in 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to begin talks on these weapons, but negotiations have failed to materialize. Secretary Powell has reported that the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons was not possible in the Moscow Treaty. Thus far, Russia has declined to engage in discussions on the future of non-strategic systems. This declaration is meant to communicate the Senate's concerns about the threats associated with non-strategic weapons. It is our hope that there will be further dialogue and, if possible, greater efforts to secure these systems. The fifth declaration encourages the President to accelerate U.S. reductions where feasible and consistent with U.S. national security requirements so that reductions may be achieved prior to December 31, 2012. The final declaration has been included in an attempt to address concerns put forward by some Senators regarding the treaty's withdrawal clause in Article IV. This text follows up on Secretary Powell's commitment to consult with the Senate should the President consider the utilization of the withdrawal provision. The Foreign Relations Committee asked the Secretary: ``What role will the Congress have in any decision to withdraw from this treaty?''; and ``Will the administration agree to at least consult closely with this committee before making any such decision?'' The Secretary responded that: ``While it is the President who withdraws from treaties, the administration intends to discuss any need to withdraw from the treaty with the Congress, to include the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, prior to announcing any such action.'' While I am sympathetic to arguments from Senators regarding the need to maintain Senate prerogatives, the process governing termination and withdrawal is a point of Constitutional debate. Although the Constitution assigns a specific role for the Senate in the treaty ratification process, it is silent on the is due of treaty termination. Furthermore, nothing in the Constitution restricts the President from terminating or withdrawing from a treaty on his own authority. Presidents have consistently terminated advice and consent treaties on their own authority since 1980. Twenty-three of the thirty treaties terminated during this period were bilateral; seven were multilateral. Prior to 1980, Senator Barry Goldwater challenged Presidents Carter's termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Senator Goldwater's challenge failed and the treaty was terminated. Since that time, objections have been raised only with respect to Presidents Bush's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The White House Legal Advisor has long argued that the President is the principle spokesman of the nation in foreign affairs and restrictions on the power have been strictly construed. Given the absence of a textual basis conferring the termination power on another branch or an established practice derogating from the President's termination power, it is difficult to envisage such a role for the Senate. Proponents of a Senatorial role in this process will often respond by suggesting that the President cannot on his own authority terminate a treaty because it is the ``law of the land.'' Again, the White House suggests this is a fallacy. A terminated treaty no longer has effect in much the same way that a provision of a law or treaty found by the courts to be unconstitutional no longer has effect. However, in neither case is the law repealed. Historically there is evidence of only one instance in which the Senate sought by a resolution of advice and consent to limit the President's constitutional power to terminate a treaty. The first condition to the 1919 proposed resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the Versailles Treaty would have provided: ``notice of withdrawal by the United States may be given by a concurrent resolution of the Congress of the United States.'' Vice President Thomas Marshall, addressing the Senate before the vote, called the condition an unconstitutional limitation on the President's powers--a view with which a number of leading scholars of the day concurred. However, the resolution failed to receive the required two-thirds vote and the question has remained moot for the better part of a century. Beyond the legal issues which underlie this debate, some have expressed concern that Article IV differs from previous arms control agreements in that it only requires three months notice and permits withdrawal based upon issues related to national sovereignty. Critics point out that the START Treaty allows a Party to withdraw, after giving 6 months' notice and only ``if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.'' I do not view the withdrawal provisions as a weakness in the treaty. Instead, I believe it is another manifestation of the improved U.S.- Russian relationship. It should also be pointed out that our bilateral relationship provides us with some confidence that the time and reasons for withdrawal would not necessarily relate to the agreement. As the Secretary of State told the Committee: ``The Moscow Treaty's formulation for withdrawal reflects the likelihood that a decision to withdraw would be prompted by causes unrelated either to the Treaty or to our bilateral relationship. We believe this formulation more appropriately reflects our much-improved strategic relationship with Russia.'' Mr. President, in performing its constitutional responsibilities with respect to treaties and international agreements, the Senate has to reach a judgment as to whether, on balance, U.S. acceptance of the obligations contained in the treaty serves the national interests of the United States. The Moscow Treaty is not without blemishes. The Senate should not be surprised that the treaty is not perfect or that it does not cover every desired area of bilateral arms control. But that is not the point. The proper question is whether on balance, the Moscow Treaty serves the national security of our nation. For some, no arms control treaty is good enough. Indeed, the very high stakes of the cold war and the fact that arms control cheating by the Soviet Union represented a potential threat to the survival of the United States led to a legitimate focus on treaties with high standards, especially for verification and the ability to detect even minor violations. The cold war is over, and treaty requirements must suit U.S. national interests as they exist today. The Moscow Treaty charts a course towards greater security for both the United States and Russia. I urge my colleagues to ratify this treaty and approve the resolution of ratification without amendment. I suggest the absence of a quorum.