Richard Lugar

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Reserving the right to object, I renew my request that Senator Domenici have 5 additional minutes and I have 5 additional minutes.

Mr. LUGAR. I object.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the ranking member.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair. Madam President, I would point out that, in consultation with Senator Gramm and others, we have agreed that general debate at 11 tomorrow is appropriate. Senators will be present. They will be able to hear the debate. And our respective conference lunches will hear more debate on this issue, and hopefully, following our hour debate, at 2:15 the issue will be clearer for all of us and perhaps we will be able to proceed tomorrow to final action on this report. I thank the Chair. I thank all Senators.

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the conference report be dispensed with.

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Texas, and I ask unanimous consent now on behalf of the majority leader, after consultation with the minority, that at 11 a.m. on Tuesday, tomorrow, the Senate proceed to the consideration of the conference report to accompany S. 1150, the agricultural research bill. I further ask unanimous consent that the time until 12:10 p.m. be divided as follows: Senator Lugar, 30 minutes; Senator Gramm of Texas, 10 minutes; Senator Roberts, 10 minutes; Senator Harkin, 10 minutes; Senator Cochran, 5 minutes. I further ask unanimous consent that, at 2:15 p.m. on Tuesday, Senator Gramm be recognized in order to move to recommit the conference report. I further ask unanimous consent that no amendments be in order to the motion and debate on the motion be limited to 1 hour equally divided in the usual form. I ask unanimous consent that following the debate, the Senate proceed to a vote on or in relation to the motion.

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, I now move to proceed to the conference report accompanying S. 1150.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, on behalf of the majority leader, after consultation with the minority leader, I ask unanimous consent that the Chair lay before the Senate the conference report accompanying S. 1150, the agriculture research bill.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to recognize the West Lafayette girls' basketball team in West Lafayette, Indiana as the 1998 Indiana Class 3A Girls' Basketball State Champion. On Saturday, March 14, 1998, the West Lafayette Red Devils rallied under coach Steve Dietrich and assistant coaches Alyson Sautter and Corissa Yasen, to defeat the Franklin Community Grizzly Cubs, 62-45, to win Indiana's first girls' Class 3A title. The Red Devils finished their season with an impressive 24-4 record. I congratulate the West Lafayette Red Devils on their season of excellence in the Hoosier tradition of basketball. I commend the players, coaches and supporters for their dedication and enthusiasm, which has fostered an outstanding girls' basketball program. Members of the State Championship team are: Rachael Anderson, Captain; Abbie Erickson, Captain; Kuleni Gebisa, Captain; Keaton Brumm; Lello Gebisa; Lea Musselman; Joni Woods; Hannah Anderson; Johanna Smith; Megan Stacker; Kristen Aaltonen; Ebba Gebisa; and Jeannine Mellish.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. I ask unanimous consent that Kevin Johnson, a fellow in my office, be permitted floor privileges for the duration of debate on the Protocols of Accession to the NATO Treaty.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Senate has begun a historical debate over NATO's future, one that surely will reverberate for many years to come. I believe we have a historical window of opportunity to take steps which will secure European peace and stability and which will lock in the freedom and independence won in the revolutions of 1989 and the collapse of communism. If the Senate ratifies enlargement, we will have set the foundation for decades of European peace and prosperity; but if we fail, historians may look back at the early post-cold-war period as a tragic loss of opportunities. The more distant we are from the days of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, the clearer it becomes that we have entered a new era. But dangers still abound in post-cold-war Europe. The revolutions of 1989 not only led to the collapse of communism but also to the end of the peace orders established after two world wars. What is at stake here and now is order and stability in Europe as a whole. And that is why American interests are involved. Mr. President, NATO cannot by itself solve all of Europe's problems, but without a stable security framework, we run the risk that reform and democracy in Eastern Europe will not persist but will instead be undercut by destructive forces of nationalism and insecurity. The failure of democracy in the east could not help but have a profound consequence for democracy in the continent's western half as well. If history teaches us anything, it is that the United States is always drawn into such European conflicts because our vital interests are ultimately engaged. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic are democratic, free-market nations with professional militaries under civilian control. In addition to contributing to NATO's core mission of collective defense, they are ready and able to support American and allied interests beyond their borders as they have demonstrated in Desert Storm, in Haiti, and in Bosnia. Accession of these three democracies to NATO will eliminate immoral and destabilizing dividing lines in Europe. I point out, Mr. President, those lines are there--not put there by us--and extend stability into a region long troubled by conflict. A stable and peaceful Europe will benefit all of Europe, including Russia and non-NATO countries. Expanding peace and stability in Europe lessens the chance of the United States again being pulled into conflicts in the region. NATO enlargement provides an opportunity for the alliance to be proactive in shaping a stable and strategic landscape in Europe. Mr. President, it has been argued that we are rushing into 1992 enlargement. I have advocated, among others, expanding the NATO alliance since 1992. I have had countless discussions on the subject with colleagues here in the Senate and in the administration since that time. I have traveled to Europe and to the former Soviet Union many times in recent years, and the issue of NATO enlargement has been one of the most debated and talked about issues throughout that period of time. As an early advocate of enlargement, I do not agree that the Senate is rushing to expand NATO. Rather, I suggest that supporters and critics of enlargement have been engaged in a debate and discussion of this topic for at least 6 years--hardly a hurried process. NATO enlargement has been endorsed by Congress each year since 1994. NATO enlargement was endorsed in the Contract With America as part of the 1996 Republican Presidential platform. Mr. President, the Foreign Relations Committee held 12 hearings over the past 4 years to hear from nearly 50 supporters and opponents of the policy of enlargement. In fact, I held the first hearing on the subject as chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Foreign Relations Committee. Not only has the Foreign Relations Committee held hearings and studied the subject, but so has the Armed Services Committee, Intelligence Committee, and Budget and Appropriations Committees. These committee hearings have thoroughly examined concerns about NATO expansion, including projected cost, how we deal with Russia, and the future mission of NATO. The committee's resolution addresses all of these points and was reported by a vote of 16-2. Our chairman, Senator Helms, and distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden, have done an excellent job in constructing a very thoughtful and balanced resolution of ratification. If Senate committee hearings and deliberations are not enough, Senators Lott and Daschle organized a Senate NATO observer group, which had 28 members and met 17 times to study and discuss this important foreign policy initiative. NATO enlargement has received endorsements from every living U.S. Secretary of State, numerous former Secretaries of Defense and National Security Advisers, and more than 60 flag and general officers, including 5 distinguished former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This has been a long, serious debate among Members of Congress, the administration, and our allies regarding the benefits and possible pitfalls of enlargement. There has been no rush to judgment. We are now entering the final stage of the process; namely, Senate debate and a vote on the merits of NATO enlargement. I have listened carefully to critics who suggest that there is no threat at the present time and thus we should not expand NATO now. They suggest there will be plenty of time to expand the alliance should a new enemy or threat appear on the horizon. I strongly disagree with that point of view. We have learned that the weapons used in Desert Storm were envisioned, planned, and produced in the 1970s. Thus, the systems which allowed us to triumph in the Persian Gulf are 20 to 25 years old. The organization and infrastructure to meet future threats must have a similar root structure. We must begin to construct an alliance which can meet the future and undetermined threats. Our military experts and top strategic thinkers believe an alliance which includes Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will be better able to meet those challenges. What might those challenges be? Perhaps the emergence of a hostile regional power, a threat from the Middle East or from North Africa, a resurgent imperialist Russia, nationalist or religious instability, or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The systems needed to deter or defeat such future threats must begin to be constructed long before they can be expected to operate effectively. One cannot expect an alliance to be shelved during times of peace and simply dusted off when the threats emerge. The alliance must begin to lay the foundation which will prepare us to meet an uncertain future. In my mind, expanding the zone of peace and security in Europe and adding three new willing, enthusiastic members will contribute to that preparedness. Four of our NATO allies--Canada, Denmark, Norway, and Germany--have already ratified the protocols of enlargement. It is time for the Senate to act and to show leadership on this issue. NATO's open-door entrance policy established by article 10 of the Washington treaty--which should not be misunderstood as an open-ended policy--has given countries of Central and Eastern Europe the incentive to accelerate reforms, to settle disputes with neighbors, and to increase regional cooperation. They have done so magnificently. To retract the open-door policy, as some have suggested, would risk undermining tremendous gains that have been made for peace throughout the region. The result of a ``closed-door'' policy would be the creation of new dividing lines across Europe. Those nations outside might become disillusioned and insecure and, thus, inclined to adopt the competitive and destabilizing security policies of Europe's past. NATO's decision to enlarge in stages recognizes that all new democracies and applicants in Europe are not equally ready or willing to be security allies. Some states may never be ready. At the same time, NATO must not prejudge the future or draw new lines in Europe by pre-emptively excluding or setting time lines for future cooperation or membership. The selection of future NATO members should depend on: (1) a determination by NATO members of their strategic interests; (2) NATO's perception of threats to security and stability; and (3) actions taken by prospective members to complete their democratic transitions and to harmonize their policies with NATO's political aims and security policies. This would clarify the security expectations of non-NATO members. It would make clear that it is the intention of the United States that NATO remain a serious defensive military alliance and not slip into a loose collective security society. It suggests that enlargement will be a careful, deliberate process, with consideration of all security interests. Finally, it draws again on the principle of reciprocity, both to encourage prospective members to align themselves with NATO's values and policies and to signal that threats will be counterproductive. Intellectually, I can understand the concern that we must not allow the NATO Alliance to collapse under the strains, produced by multitudes of new members. But, neither can we seek a quick, painless remedy for serious debate and oversight of American foreign policy through ``strategic pauses'' or ``NATO linkages''. The best way to ensure the continued vitality of NATO is for the United States to consider and debate the qualifications and potential ramifications of new members on a country-by-country or a stage-by-stage basis. NATO's open-door policy has served the Alliance well for fifty years. The Senate has always and will retain its prerogatives and powers in the area of the North Atlantic Treaty and the Alliance. A two-thirds Senate majority is the best form of balance and oversight we can produce without treading on executive privilege. In the weeks leading up to the Alliance's Madrid summit in July 1997, many of our current European allies pushed for a larger initial number of states to join NATO. The President decided to keep the initial round to three members. This was not a popular decision with some of our allies, who had championed the cause of Slovenia and Romania. And while neither the Administration nor the Senate can prevent other current members of the Alliance from promoting the membership of additional states, both have the ability to prevent the accession of other candidates--the Administration through its predominant voice in the North Atlantic Council and the Senate through its role in approving modifications to the North Atlantic Treaty. Consequently, I do not believe a legislatively mandated pause is in the interest of this country, this institution, or the NATO Alliance. Some propose that NATO enlargement be bound to the expansion of the European Union (EU). EU enlargement is highly desirable in its own right, but must not be a condition to NATO membership. It would restrict a trans-Atlantic Alliance led by the U.S. to the political exigencies of a strictly European organization. I point out again, Mr. President, that NATO is the organization in which the United States is involved and in which we offer leadership, not the European union. The transfer of security decision-making power to an institution which has been unable to develop a common security policy and failed to stop the fighting in the former Yugoslavia would not bode well for the future of European security. The EU's decision-making procedures are notorious for being cumbersome and slow. Moreover, the consensus- building process they serve to tend to produce outcomes expressing the lowest common denominator. All of these traits are antithetical to the demands of a military alliance which places a premium on timely, decisive action rather than first meeting the test of political acceptability to a diverse relationship. Finally, subordinating NATO to the EU in this manner would make the Alliance, not a cornerstone of European security, but an appendage. The role of the U.S., Canada, and Turkey, none of whom are members of the EU, would be significantly diminished in the enlargement process. This potential ``back-door'' approach to enlargement is fraught with dangers; I prefer the ``front-door'', the ``open-door''. Critics assert that NATO enlargement repeats the mistake of the Versailles Treaty by mistreating Russia. One should be careful with historical analogies. NATO enlargement is not a punishment or isolation of Russia. During the period that NATO enlargement has proceeded, President Yeltsin was re-elected; reformers were elevated in government; President Yeltsin pledged to press for ratification of START II and then to pursue deeper nuclear arms reductions in START III; the Russian Duma approved the Chemical Weapons Convention; Russian troops continue their participation in Bosnia; the West has extended some $100 billion since 1991 to assist Russian democratic and economic reforms, and over $2 billion in weapons dismantlement and security. NATOP members will continue to have both common and divergent interests with Russia, whether NATO enlarges or not. It is a mistake to view Russia solely as a reactive power and to blame its actions on Western behavior alone. There will be areas of collaboration and areas of discord in the relationship, and those distinctions will be determined by differences in geography, history, and economic standing, not by ideology as during the Cold War and not by NATO enlargement in the post-Cold War world. The only way to manage both areas of coincident and conflicting interests is by building bridges where possible and drawing lines where necessary. Many reject NATO enlargement out of a desire to preserve a Russian sphere of influence. If Russia cannot accept the legitimate right of its neighbors to choose their security arrangements, a policy they embraced in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, then NATO's role in the region will prove even more important. Some critics believe that NATO enlargement is somehow condemning the START II Treaty and cooperative U.S.-Russian nuclear dismantlement activities to the dustbin of history. I do not believe this is the case. Russia's recent ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention would indicate that the linkage between NATO enlargement and arms control is more political than strategic. Many Russians, including liberal Duma members, simply do not like the START II Treaty. They believe the Russian side was out-negotiated by the Americans, and oppose it whether NATO expands or not. What is at issue among Russian arms control specialists is whether the United States can be convinced to pay some additional price for mutual strategic nuclear arms control reductions that the Russians themselves will have to undertake with or without a treaty. Continued statements about the dire consequences that will accompany NATO enlargement become the means by which they hope to induce the U.S. to go to a START III agreement sooner rather than later. Perceived START II inequities constitute by far the primary reason for the reluctance of many Duma members and defense specialists to ratify the START II Treaty, not continuing, deep-seated resentment of NATO enlargement. It is not simply the nationalists but the so-called liberals in the Russian foreign policy elite who believe that START II, as currently written, is not in Russia's national interest. The latter would also propose to substantially modify the START III elements of the Helsinki joint statement agreed to by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, arguing that the March 1997 START III principles do not go far enough to guarantee that Russia's smaller strategic forces of the future will be able to reliably deter the United States. At the very time that prominent Russian ``arms controllers'' are publicly laying the blame for lack of Duma ratification of START II at the feet of an expanding NATO, they are privately probing to determine how far the United States would be willing to go in further lowering warhead ceilings through START III, realizing that Russia cannot realistically afford to maintain the proposed START II strategic force levels. They want to drive the warhead ceiling down to a figure that Russia can afford! They are urging the beginning of START III negotiations as soon as possible, in part, they say, to improve the prospects for Russian ratification of START II. They are arguing, in short, that the entire strategic arms control dialogue is foundering, not because of NATO enlargement, but because the U.S. insists on waiting for START II ratification before beginning formal negotiations on START III. It is not so much NATO expansion that is eating away at the U.S.- Russia strategic relationship. Rather, it is Russian weakness and the desire of some Russians either to stop the strategic nuclear arms reduction process at START I levels, or to convince American statesmen and political leaders, in part through a ``guilt trip'' over NATO enlargement, that a better deal needs to be offered to the Russian side--either in order to secure ratification of the START II Treaty or to supersede it with a START III agreement. There is nothing inherently inconsistent between a strong, healthy U.S.-Russian relationship and an expanding NATO. Too many Americans critics of NATO enlargement who posit this as an either/or choice fail to understand the nature of the debate within the Russian Federation.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry will meet on Thursday, April 23, 1998 at 9:00 a.m. in SR-328A. The purpose of this meeting will be to examine fraud and abuse in the federal food stamp program.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. I welcome the Chairman's remarks. Promotion of energy efficiency and renewable energy programs can increase our energy security, address a variety of air pollution problems and lead to a stronger economy. I am pleased to learn that the Budget Resolution accommodates federal initiatives to enhance energy security and renewable energy provided that these initiatives can be funded within overall budget constraints.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry will meet on Thursday, April 2, 1998 at 9:00 a.m. in SR-328A. The purpose of this meeting will be to examine recently proposed legislation aimed at managing animal waste. committee on labor and human resources

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished manager.

Mr. LUGAR. Of course.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I appreciate the spirit of the distinguished Senator from Montana, a distinguished member of the Agriculture Committee. I pledge for my part the resources of the committee to work with the Senator from this day hence to see if we can increase wheat exports specifically, and exports generally from our country. I have outlined a number of areas for work, and the distinguished Senator from Kansas has mentioned others, as has the Senator from Montana. There is urgency to our work. That ought to be clear from this debate. I pledge to work with the Senator. I hope that our committee will be successful, and we will try to establish benchmarks to see if we make headway. I look forward to working with the Senator on a report of how we did.

Mr. LUGAR. I yield time to the distinguished Senator from Kansas.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the amendment of the Senator from Montana, Senator Baucus. I do so because 2 years ago the Freedom to Farm legislation that the Senator mentioned was passed. That bill has offered, in my judgment, a great deal of opportunity to farmers manage their own land, to make their own marketing decisions. But the Senator is correct: There are rules of the game that were negotiated at that time. This amendment reopens the farm bill and is primarily aimed at helping one crop, wheat, and the various States in the country's northern tier. The issue before Senators is marketing assistance loans. They allow a farmer to use the year's crop of grain or cotton as collateral for a loan from the Federal Government. The term of the loan is 9 months. At the end of that period, the farmer can either repay the loan or, if the market price of the crop is less than the amount owed on the loan, he can repay the loan at the lower price or forfeit the commodity. Because the loan is a nonrecourse loan, the Government cannot seek any further payment on the loan. Simply stated, a wheat farmer at the time of harvest could have sold the grain for the market price at that time. He could have priced the grain before the time of harvest, and in this particular case, if the farmer in Montana had done so, he would have done well. The futures price was high. Even the price at the time of harvest was higher than it is presently. In any event, farmers could place the grain under loan--that is, they store it and they take out a loan. If they have good luck within that 9-month period and the price goes up, they can take the higher price. If the price goes down or does not show any appreciation, they can simply take the loan money and the Government is out that money. That is the nature of this business. The loan is a marketing tool. I do not want to overemphasize the gravity of this particular instance. The Senator from Montana has pointed out correctly, this is not going to break the bank, and, as a matter of fact, scoring for the amendment shows its effect is estimated at zero. But, in fact, the amendment as I see it does not do a great deal for a wheat farmer in Montana or any other State at this point. Each one of us here can estimate what the price of wheat may be between now and the end of September, but as a new crop comes on, it is unlikely that that price is going to show great appreciation. In short, extending the period of difficulty by a few more months probably does not make a whole lot of difference in the price farmers will ultimately receive. It does make a difference, I believe, in setting a precedent with regard to the Freedom to Farm Act. The precedent is that, under other circumstances, other Senators from other States with other crops will come in and point out that things have not gone well for them. They may claim it was a foreign country, or the weather, or whatever, but, in any event, they will ask for a change in the loan or some other policy in the farm bill. In essence, they will attempt disaster relief under the guise of technical changes in the farm bill. In my judgment, that is not a good way to proceed. In fairness to Senators from all States, all crops have come together for some rules of the game that are working well. It seems to me very important we work together to make certain that they work better. In due course, we may discuss other remedies that may be more effective. I would like to suggest, for example, to the distinguished Senator from Montana that it is important to all Senators that wheat exports from this country grow. As a matter of fact, it is important that corn exports and soybean exports and rice and cotton and a number of other crops all increase. I suggest that we might work with the President on fast-track authority. That would be very, very helpful. I suggest we work with the President to think through our World Trade Organization stance for next year, when multilateral reductions in tariff and nontariff barriers might occur and should occur, and that the emphasis we place on agriculture in negotiations now with the European Union be enhanced substantially, and that the President's pledge in the Miami summit to move toward free trade in the hemisphere be given a boost as the President prepares to travel to the South American continent. In short, there are a lot of things we must do as a country to boost our exports. But specifically regarding the problem in wheat--and it is a substantial one for the States that have been stressed, as the Senator from Montana has pointed out--we could work with the President in terms of allocations for Public Law 480. That is an act which is on the books. We can work to increase export credit guarantees for overseas purchases of U.S. wheat. We can work together with the President, the Secretary of Agriculture, and Senators who are engaged in this, and I would like to be one of them, because I believe an increase in wheat exports is tremendously important and it is timely that we do it now as opposed to hereafter. I suggest USDA comply with the FAIR Act's requirements that high- value U.S. products such as wheat flour be a higher proportion of export programs. We could be helpful in that respect. And, finally, as I have suggested already, we must work now on our export goals with the Trade Representative and the WTO, as well as for each of the bilateral negotiations we must engage in because we do not have fast-track authority. These efforts are likely to be much more powerful in raising the price of wheat without doing violence to the farm bill--as a matter of fact, utilizing the farm bill and all its resources. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time and yield to others.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, along with Senators Biden, Chafee and Leahy, I am today introducing the Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998, a bill to protect outstanding tropical forests in developing countries through Debt for Nature Swaps. We are joined in this effort by Senators Abraham, Akaka, Allard, Cochran, Craig, DeWine, Glenn, Harkin, Inhofe, Jeffords, Johnson, Kempthorne, Kerrey, Kerry, Levin, Moynihan, and Murkowski. The Tropical Forest Conservation Act builds upon the success of President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) and extends the debt reduction portion of that initiative to the protection of tropical forests in lower and middle income developing countries outside of Latin America and the Caribbean. Under the EAI, $154 million has been devoted to environmental protection and child survival in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Uruguay. One of the novel features of the EAI has been the linkage between debt reduction and the generation of local funds for the environmental protection and child survival. Whereas the U.S. receives dollar payments for the remaining principal payments after debt reduction, interest streams on the remaining debt are channeled into these local funds. The first Debt for Nature bill enacted into law was the ``Debt for Nature Exchange'' provision of the International Finance and Development Act of 1989. Under the authority of the Biden Lugar bill, the U.S. Agency for International Development has established environmental endowment funds in Costa Rica, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mexico, Panama, and the Philippines. By committing $ 95 million of its own funds, US AID has leveraged an additional $51 million. This is an effective use of scarce federal conservation dollars. The Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998 is a companion bill to H.R. 2870, coauthored by Representatives Rob Portman (R.-Ohio), John Kasich (R- Ohio) and Lee Hamilton (R.-Indiana), which was recently ordered to be reported by the House International Relations Committee. The Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998 would authorize the use of three ``debt for nature'' mechanisms to protect outstanding tropical forests in lower and middle income developing countries. Under the Buy Back option, an eligible country would be able to buy back its debt at its asset value in exchange for its willingness to place an additional forty percent of this value in local currency in a tropical forest fund. Suppose, for example, that the asset value of the country's debt was fifty cents on the dollar. In return for being allowed to buy back its debt at its asset value, the developing country would have to agree to place forty percent of that value, or twenty cents, into a fund to protect its tropical forests. Under this option, there would be no cost to the United States Government since the debt is being bought back at its value as determined under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990. Second, the bill authorizes a Debt Swap option under which a nonfederal individual or organization would be able to engage in Debt for Nature Swaps with lower income developing nations. These purchasers would work with the United States government, but would use their own funds to assist these developing countries to reduce or buy back their bilateral debt owed to the United States Government in return for their placing local currencies in a tropical forest fund. Under this second option, there would also be no cost to the United States Government because the financial assistance involved would come from nongovernmental or private entities. Third, the bill authorizes a debt reduction mechanism based upon the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. Under the EAI Model, the developing country is allowed to place the interest on the reduced debt instrument in a tropical forest fund to be administered by a tropical forest board within that country. When the third option is exercised, the bill authorizes appropriations to compensate the United States Treasury for the reduction in the revenue stream which occurs. However, as in the case of the EAI, these funds would be effectively leveraged because the amounts placed by a eligible country in its tropical forest fund would exceed the amount of revenues foregone by the United States Treasury. For example, in the case of the EAI, $90 million in U.S. funds resulted in $154 million being placed by the Latin American and Caribbean countries in these local funds. The Tropical Forest Conservation Act applies to concessional loans made under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and credits granted under the Agricultural Trade and Assistance Act of 1954. It is consistent with established Treasury Department debt reduction practices as well as with the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990. The bill authorizes $50 million in FY 99, $125 million in FY 2000 and $225 million in FY 2001, subject to appropriations. Within each developing country, the tropical forest fund would be administered by a commission representing a majority of local nongovernmental, community development and scientific and academic organizations, representatives of the host government and a representative of the United States Government. The tropical forest fund could be used to provide grants for the following purposes: (1) to preserve, maintain or restore the tropical forest of the beneficiary country through establishing parks and reserves; (2) to develop and implement scientifically sound systems of natural resource management; (3) to provide training programs to strengthen conservation institutions and the scientific, technical and managerial capacities of individuals and organizations involved in conservation; (4) to provide for restoration, protection and sustainable use of diverse animal and plant species; (5) to mitigate greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; (6) to develop and support individuals living in or near a tropical forest, including the cultures of such individuals. Oversight of this program would be accomplished through expanding the existing Enterprise for the Americas Board by two federal and two nongovernmental representatives so that the Board would be composed of fifteen members, eight of whom would represent federal agencies involved in the protection, restoration and sustainable use of tropical forests and seven of whom would represent nongovernmental organizations and experts engaged in these activities. This legislation provides an incentive for the lower income developing nations to repay their debt owed to the United States. Government. It protects outstanding tropical forests throughout the world. And it stretches the limited federal dollars which are available to assist in this effort, therefor making an effective use of international environmental assistance. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the bill be printed in the Record. I urge my colleagues to join in this effort.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, along with Senators Biden, Chafee and Leahy, I am today introducing the Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998, a bill to protect outstanding tropical forests in developing countries through Debt for Nature Swaps. We are joined in this effort by Senators Abraham, Akaka, Allard, Cochran, Craig, DeWine, Glenn, Harkin, Inhofe, Jeffords, Johnson, Kempthorne, Kerrey, Kerry, Levin, Moynihan, and Murkowski. The Tropical Forest Conservation Act builds upon the success of President Bush's Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) and extends the debt reduction portion of that initiative to the protection of tropical forests in lower and middle income developing countries outside of Latin America and the Caribbean. Under the EAI, $154 million has been devoted to environmental protection and child survival in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Uruguay. One of the novel features of the EAI has been the linkage between debt reduction and the generation of local funds for the environmental protection and child survival. Whereas the U.S. receives dollar payments for the remaining principal payments after debt reduction, interest streams on the remaining debt are channeled into these local funds. The first Debt for Nature bill enacted into law was the ``Debt for Nature Exchange'' provision of the International Finance and Development Act of 1989. Under the authority of the Biden Lugar bill, the U.S. Agency for International Development has established environmental endowment funds in Costa Rica, Honduras, Indonesia, Jamaica, Madagascar, Mexico, Panama, and the Philippines. By committing $ 95 million of its own funds, US AID has leveraged an additional $51 million. This is an effective use of scarce federal conservation dollars. The Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998 is a companion bill to H.R. 2870, coauthored by Representatives Rob Portman (R.-Ohio), John Kasich (R- Ohio) and Lee Hamilton (R.-Indiana), which was recently ordered to be reported by the House International Relations Committee. The Tropical Forest Conservation Act of 1998 would authorize the use of three ``debt for nature'' mechanisms to protect outstanding tropical forests in lower and middle income developing countries. Under the Buy Back option, an eligible country would be able to buy back its debt at its asset value in exchange for its willingness to place an additional forty percent of this value in local currency in a tropical forest fund. Suppose, for example, that the asset value of the country's debt was fifty cents on the dollar. In return for being allowed to buy back its debt at its asset value, the developing country would have to agree to place forty percent of that value, or twenty cents, into a fund to protect its tropical forests. Under this option, there would be no cost to the United States Government since the debt is being bought back at its value as determined under the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990. Second, the bill authorizes a Debt Swap option under which a nonfederal individual or organization would be able to engage in Debt for Nature Swaps with lower income developing nations. These purchasers would work with the United States government, but would use their own funds to assist these developing countries to reduce or buy back their bilateral debt owed to the United States Government in return for their placing local currencies in a tropical forest fund. Under this second option, there would also be no cost to the United States Government because the financial assistance involved would come from nongovernmental or private entities. Third, the bill authorizes a debt reduction mechanism based upon the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative. Under the EAI Model, the developing country is allowed to place the interest on the reduced debt instrument in a tropical forest fund to be administered by a tropical forest board within that country. When the third option is exercised, the bill authorizes appropriations to compensate the United States Treasury for the reduction in the revenue stream which occurs. However, as in the case of the EAI, these funds would be effectively leveraged because the amounts placed by a eligible country in its tropical forest fund would exceed the amount of revenues foregone by the United States Treasury. For example, in the case of the EAI, $90 million in U.S. funds resulted in $154 million being placed by the Latin American and Caribbean countries in these local funds. The Tropical Forest Conservation Act applies to concessional loans made under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and credits granted under the Agricultural Trade and Assistance Act of 1954. It is consistent with established Treasury Department debt reduction practices as well as with the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990. The bill authorizes $50 million in FY 99, $125 million in FY 2000 and $225 million in FY 2001, subject to appropriations. Within each developing country, the tropical forest fund would be administered by a commission representing a majority of local nongovernmental, community development and scientific and academic organizations, representatives of the host government and a representative of the United States Government. The tropical forest fund could be used to provide grants for the following purposes: (1) to preserve, maintain or restore the tropical forest of the beneficiary country through establishing parks and reserves; (2) to develop and implement scientifically sound systems of natural resource management; (3) to provide training programs to strengthen conservation institutions and the scientific, technical and managerial capacities of individuals and organizations involved in conservation; (4) to provide for restoration, protection and sustainable use of diverse animal and plant species; (5) to mitigate greenhouse gases in the atmosphere; (6) to develop and support individuals living in or near a tropical forest, including the cultures of such individuals. Oversight of this program would be accomplished through expanding the existing Enterprise for the Americas Board by two federal and two nongovernmental representatives so that the Board would be composed of fifteen members, eight of whom would represent federal agencies involved in the protection, restoration and sustainable use of tropical forests and seven of whom would represent nongovernmental organizations and experts engaged in these activities. This legislation provides an incentive for the lower income developing nations to repay their debt owed to the United States. Government. It protects outstanding tropical forests throughout the world. And it stretches the limited federal dollars which are available to assist in this effort, therefor making an effective use of international environmental assistance. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the bill be printed in the Record. I urge my colleagues to join in this effort.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill to combat fraud and waste in the food stamp program--in this case, the fraud and waste results from deceased individuals being counted as food stamp recipients. At my request, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has recently completed an inquiry into groups of ineligible persons being counted as food stamp recipients. In the report being released today, GAO reported that 26,000 deceased individuals in four states were on the food stamp rolls. My bill will require the Social Security Administration to share information from its Death Master file with state food stamp agencies to verify that no deceased individuals are counted as members of food stamp households, either increasing a households' benefits or allowing an individual to illegally receive benefits in the deceased person's name. Last year, GAO reported to the Agriculture Committee that over $3 million in food stamp benefits were being overpaid to prisoners' households. In response, we passed legislation to stop prisoners from receiving payments. In follow-up to the prisoner study and legislation, I requested that GAO determine if other ineligible individuals were similarly being counted as members of food stamp households. Today GAO will release the details of their study showing that, over a 2-year period, about 26,000 deceased individuals in the four states examined (California, Texas, New York, and Florida) were counted as members of food stamp households. According to GAO, this resulted in overpayments of food stamp benefits of an estimated $8.6 million in four states alone. Current law requires that households notify their local welfare office of any changes in the makeup of the household within ten days. The GAO report showed that the deceased individuals were counted in food stamp households for an average of four months; and, in a few instances, the deceased individuals were counted as beneficiaries for the full two years the review was conducted. This is unacceptable particularly since this type of fraud can easily be prevented. Mr. President, one federal agency has the information to prevent this fraud and abuse, but is not sharing it with other agencies issuing federal benefits. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has a Death Master File that compiles death information from a wide variety of sources and is considered the most comprehensive list of death information available in the federal government. According to the GAO, a match using SSA's Death Master File information could be a cost- effective method for identifying such individuals in food stamp households and eliminating these overpayments. States already rely on the SSA to verify the social security numbers of food stamp applicants. Therefore, a system already exists in one branch of the federal government that, with some modifications, could stop these overpayments. Although the Social Security Administration agrees that a portion of their death information can be shared with the states and the Department of Agriculture for food stamp program purposes, in SSA's comments to GAO it does not believe it has the authority, under current law, to share all of the death information. Therefore, I am introducing legislation that will require the Commissioner of SSA to establish cooperative arrangements with each state agency that administers the food stamp program that will allow the sharing of all death data. My bill then requires the food stamp program to provide the information necessary for the Commissioner to verify that no deceased individual is being counted as part of a food stamp household. The Food Stamp program provides a safety net for millions of people. We cannot allow fraud and abuse to undermine the food stamp program. Integrity is essential to ensure a program that can serve those in need. It is Congress' responsibility to play a role in ending fraud and abuse in all federally funded programs. This legislation is an important step in ending fraud and abuse in the Food Stamp program. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a bill to combat fraud and waste in the food stamp program--in this case, the fraud and waste results from deceased individuals being counted as food stamp recipients. At my request, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has recently completed an inquiry into groups of ineligible persons being counted as food stamp recipients. In the report being released today, GAO reported that 26,000 deceased individuals in four states were on the food stamp rolls. My bill will require the Social Security Administration to share information from its Death Master file with state food stamp agencies to verify that no deceased individuals are counted as members of food stamp households, either increasing a households' benefits or allowing an individual to illegally receive benefits in the deceased person's name. Last year, GAO reported to the Agriculture Committee that over $3 million in food stamp benefits were being overpaid to prisoners' households. In response, we passed legislation to stop prisoners from receiving payments. In follow-up to the prisoner study and legislation, I requested that GAO determine if other ineligible individuals were similarly being counted as members of food stamp households. Today GAO will release the details of their study showing that, over a 2-year period, about 26,000 deceased individuals in the four states examined (California, Texas, New York, and Florida) were counted as members of food stamp households. According to GAO, this resulted in overpayments of food stamp benefits of an estimated $8.6 million in four states alone. Current law requires that households notify their local welfare office of any changes in the makeup of the household within ten days. The GAO report showed that the deceased individuals were counted in food stamp households for an average of four months; and, in a few instances, the deceased individuals were counted as beneficiaries for the full two years the review was conducted. This is unacceptable particularly since this type of fraud can easily be prevented. Mr. President, one federal agency has the information to prevent this fraud and abuse, but is not sharing it with other agencies issuing federal benefits. The Social Security Administration (SSA) has a Death Master File that compiles death information from a wide variety of sources and is considered the most comprehensive list of death information available in the federal government. According to the GAO, a match using SSA's Death Master File information could be a cost- effective method for identifying such individuals in food stamp households and eliminating these overpayments. States already rely on the SSA to verify the social security numbers of food stamp applicants. Therefore, a system already exists in one branch of the federal government that, with some modifications, could stop these overpayments. Although the Social Security Administration agrees that a portion of their death information can be shared with the states and the Department of Agriculture for food stamp program purposes, in SSA's comments to GAO it does not believe it has the authority, under current law, to share all of the death information. Therefore, I am introducing legislation that will require the Commissioner of SSA to establish cooperative arrangements with each state agency that administers the food stamp program that will allow the sharing of all death data. My bill then requires the food stamp program to provide the information necessary for the Commissioner to verify that no deceased individual is being counted as part of a food stamp household. The Food Stamp program provides a safety net for millions of people. We cannot allow fraud and abuse to undermine the food stamp program. Integrity is essential to ensure a program that can serve those in need. It is Congress' responsibility to play a role in ending fraud and abuse in all federally funded programs. This legislation is an important step in ending fraud and abuse in the Food Stamp program. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry will meet on the following days: Thursday, March 12, 1998 at 9:00 a.m. in SR-328A, Tuesday, March 17, 1998 at 9:00 a.m. in SR-328A. The purpose of these meetings will be to examine reauthorization of expiring child nutrition programs. committee on energy and natural resources