Richard Lugar

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry will hold a nominations hearing on Wednesday, July 23, 1997 at 9 p.m. in SR-328A to consider the nominations of Ms. Catherine E. Woteki, of the District of Columbia, to be Under Secretary of Agriculture for Food Safety and Ms. Shirley Robinson Watkins, of Arkansas, to be Under Secretary of Agriculture for Food, Nutrition, and Consumer Services.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, as the fiscal year 1998 Defense authorization bill moves to conference to resolve differences between the Senate and House versions of the bill, I am hopeful the conferees will give careful consideration to the Senate provision addressing the issue of the disposal of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. This provision requires an additional report to Congress by the Secretary of Defense on options available to the Department of Defense for the disposal of chemical weapons and agents. Since 1985, Congress has directed the Army to conduct a number of studies and evaluations of our Nation's chemical weapons stockpile in order to determine the safest and most effective method of disposal. Regardless of the destruction timetables set forth in the recently ratified Chemical Weapons Convention, U.S. chemical agents and munitions must be disposed of by 2004 as a matter of national policy. Determining a safe and cost effective method for disposal of our Nation's chemical weapons stockpile is an issue of concern to many communities and citizens located near the Army's eight CW storage sites. In my home State more than 1,000 1-ton containers of bulk VX nerve agent are stored at the Newport Army Chemical Activity, Newport, IN. At the direction of Congress, the Army examined a range of disposal options and methods and involved significant public participation in the review process. The Army also considered the recommendations contained in an independent report on certain alternative technologies prepared by the National Academy of Sciences at the request of Congress. On December 6, 1996, the Army recommended that the Department of Defense utilize a neutralization process for disposal of bulk chemical agents stored at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and Newport, IN. On January 17, 1997, the Department of Defense authorized the Army to proceed with the necessary activities to pilot test two neutralization-based processes for the destruction of chemical agents stored at Aberdeen and Newport. As the conference meets to resolve differences between the House and Senate-passed versions of the fiscal year 1998 Defense authorization bill, I am hopeful conferees will be mindful of the important progress made by Congress and the Army since 1986 to address this issue.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry's Subcommittee on Forestry, Conservation, and Rural Revitalization will hold a hearing on Thursday, July 17, 1997, at 2:30 p.m., in SR-328A to receive testimony regarding the State and Private Forestry Programs and the Northern Forestry Stewardship Act. committee on agriculture, nutrition, and forestry

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry will hold a full committee hearing on Tuesday, July 22, 1997, at 9:30 a.m., in SR-328A to receive testimony from Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Carol Browner regarding the implementation of the newly proposed clean air regulations. committee on energy and natural resources--subcommittee on national parks, historic preservation and recreation

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. No. May I respond to the distinguished Senator. I asked the Grams amendment be laid aside and then, having gotten agreement by the Chair, I sent my amendment to the desk and asked for unanimous consent it be made in order, which the Chair granted.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to modify my amendment. On page 2 of the amendment, change line 12, which currently reads, ``$56 million'' to ``$40 million.'' I send that modification to the desk.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a strong letter of support from the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, and a strong letter of support from William Cohen, Secretary of Defense, for our amendment be printed in the Record.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, behind me are some charts that may help Members understand the issues that we are discussing today. I cited, in my opening statement, as did the distinguished Senator from Michigan, the extraordinary work that has been done with cooperative threat reduction over the years. This chart makes it graphically clear--4,500 warheads deactivated. The background of this situation was one that, at the end of the Soviet Union, the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a number of military officers came to this country from Russia, a number came from Ukraine and Belarus, Kazakhstan and other new states--but the four that I cite originally were all nuclear states, and the questions they posed to the administration of our country and Members of Congress who are interested in this, was strictly, we believe--they said, ``You have a vested interest in working with us to deactivate warheads,'' and indeed we did. Mr. President, these 4,500 warheads that have been deactivated were all aimed at us. That is the heart of the cooperative threat reduction programs--cooperation in reducing the threat to us, of warheads aimed at us. Likewise, 99 ICBM's have been destroyed. They are no longer in the picture at all, in the process of working through, especially, the nonnuclear status for Ukraine, for Kazakhstan; 140 ICBM silos have been eliminated, they are totally out of the picture, in cooperative threat reduction; 20 bombers have been destroyed, and so forth. From time to time over the 6 years of the cooperative threat Nunn- Lugar reduction program debates, Members come on this scene--perhaps new to the entire argument--and ask why are we spending money in Russia? Why are we working with Russians on nuclear matters? Mr. President, we are working with Russians to destroy ICBM's, silos, warheads that are aimed at us. In my judgment we ought to do as much of this as we can. I would simply say the thought that some moneys might be nibbled away from the program simply does not meet the security needs of our country. Clearly, we ought to have a high-priority reactivation of all projects that will lead to our security in this area. Mr. President, let me describe a process that has been discussed in each of the last 6 years. It is namely how do you get from the priority of what you want to do, to money that is available, obligated, and spent? The cooperative threat reduction programs each year have many challenges to overcome before funds can be obligated. In my opening statement I cited the fact it was April of this year before the funds the Congress appropriated last October could get into action. Why? Because, from the very beginning of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program, an extraordinary number of procedural challenges have been placed in the legislation. They were placed there by those who were, frankly, skeptical that money ought to be spent with the Russians for any purpose. But, in any event, by April of this year, we finally had gone through all the hoops of that situation. The program requires government-to-government agreement, negotiations then with Russia, with Ukraine, with Kazakhstan, with Belarus, to establish the legal framework for each of these transactions. Each of the implementing agreements has to be negotiated for each project with the ministry responsible in that country for the project. Once the agreements are in place by country, by project, by ministry, then a definition phase of the project can begin and that can be lengthy as the Department of Defense negotiates the details with the recipient country. Then a contracting process follows. The Department of Defense uses its standard Federal acquisition regulations for all CTR assistance, normally contracting with United States firms to provide that assistance. That assistance mandates free and open competition and maximum protection of taxpayer dollars, but it is lengthy, Mr. President, having gone through all the hoops of the implementing arrangements and the requirement definitions, then the contracting process, identically the same as it is with the Department of Defense for everything else in the world with U.S. firms, open competition. All of that must occur. Finally, on an annual basis, DOD must certify the recipient nations are still eligible. We have heard now that Belarus is not, for a variety of reasons, but may become eligible again as its politics and situation may change. Our security problems, with regard to Belarus and those weapons, have not changed, I might add. But once certification, again, is complete, DOD must notify Congress in considerable detail as to how it intends to obligate the appropriated funds. After that notification, and only after that notification, can new agreements of amendments to the existing implementing agreements be negotiated, and only then can DOD obligate the funds which begin the procurement cycle. Mr. President, from time to time during this 6-year period of time, this lengthy process of certification and notification and renegotiation and bidding and notification of Congress has taken so long that the whole fiscal year is complete, appropriations committees have taken the moneys off the table, and we go back through the whole process of reappropriating what already had been appropriated. I do not argue with the procedures. I simply say they are tediously careful to make sure that everybody has a very good idea of precisely what is occurring, how U.S. firms, in competition with each other, might deal with it and with full notification of the Congress of all of this. I reiterated this because I heard in the distinguished other body debate during which it was blandly asserted that there is plenty of money in the pipeline. The argument in the other body no longer centered around the validity of the program but simply said there is lots of money available, no need, really, to further appropriate any more. I am asserting there is no more money available, as a matter of fact, for a long list of priority things our country should do for our own security, and to nibble away and cut pieces here and there is not in our national interest, it is not good public policy, and that is why it is time to take time to simply reiterate, through the charts, that dollar for dollar, year for year the money is obligated, it is called for, it is spoken for, it is competed for, and it is examined. Mr. President, we ought to get on with the process so that there is no ambiguity if we want to continue to work with the Russians to destroy ICBM's, take warheads off ICBM's, if we want to contain fissile material that is dangerous, if we want to work with Chernobyl-type reactors so they don't explode, not only creating damage in the countries in which the explosion occurs, but through the fallout damage throughout the world. This is grim and serious business. For these reasons, I really ask strong support of our amendment. I thank the Chair. Mr. BINGAMAN addressed the Chair.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the Chair, I thank Members for allowing me to offer this important amendment at this time, and I reiterate my hopes that all colleagues will support this activity. I point out the debate describes the substantial achievements of the cooperative threat reduction programs. The difficulty is always getting moneys through the pipeline, but I believe the statement I have given is self-explanatory with regard to these major issues.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I send my amendment to the desk and ask unanimous consent it be made in order.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, momentarily, when the draft of my amendment arrives, I will send it to the desk. For the moment, I will simply mention that the amendment I am about to offer, I will offer on behalf of myself, Senator Bingaman, Senator Domenici, and Senator Levin. Mr. President, I indicate that additional original cosponsors will be Senators Hagel, Jeffords, Chafee, Specter, D'Amato, Frist, Gorton, Snowe, Collins, Kennedy, Biden, Kerrey of Nebraska, Lieberman, Byrd, Reed of Rhode Island, Daschle, and Robb. I want to especially recognize Senator Domenici for his contribution to our work on this amendment. Mr. President, let me state at the outset that Congress established, in 1991, with strong bipartisan support, what is known as the Nunn- Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, the CTR. Last year, the Senate, in a 96 to 0 vote, amended and enlarged this important program through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation entitled the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. The CTR program at the Department of Defense, along with its companion programs at the Department of Energy--namely, the Materials Protection Control and Accounting Program [MPC&A] and the International Nuclear Safety Program--have played significant roles in our efforts to reduce the risk to the United States from loose nukes and the dangers inherent in the operations of Soviet-designed nuclear reactors. Each of these programs plays a key role in enhancing stability around the world and contributes to circumscribing the threats that emanate from weapons and materials of mass destruction. The defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1998, as reported out of the Committee on Armed Services, cut the funding for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and the Materials Protection, Control and Accounting Program and totally eliminated all funding for the International Nuclear Safety Program. Our amendment is designed to restore the funding cuts in these three programs. reduction in the ctr request Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee has recommended a cut of $60 million in the President's request of $382.2 million for the fiscal year 1998 for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The sponsors of this amendment believe that this is a mistake. The Nunn-Lugar program's impact on the threat posed by former Soviet weapons of mass destruction can be measured in the 81 ICBM's destroyed, 125 ICBM silos eliminated, 20 bombers destroyed, 64 SLBM launchers eliminated, 58 nuclear test tunnels sealed, and the 4,500 warheads taken off strategic systems aimed at us--Mr. President, let me repeat that, 4,500 former Soviet warheads which were pointed at the United States have been removed by the Nunn-Lugar program--all at a cost of less than one-third of 1 percent of the Department of Defense's annual budget. Without our Cooperation Threat Reduction Program, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus would still have thousands of nuclear weapons. Instead, all three countries are nuclear-weapons-free. Although the CTR Program has accomplished much, much work essential to U.S. national security interests remains to be done. This includes: The elimination of ICBM's, SLBM's, and heavy bombers as required under the START I Treaty, followed by START II and perhaps START III; increase safety and security for the transport and storage of remaining Russian nuclear warheads; an end to production of weapons-grade plutonium; chemical weapons reduction; and other efforts to reduce weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union and the threat of proliferation. The President's fiscal year 1998 budget request of $382.2 million was a bare-bones request based on a difficult prioritization of potential projects. Stated simply, Mr. President, there are tens of things which need to be done, a long list prioritized and squeezed into the $382.2 million bare bones request. Many programs that the Congress supported in the past failed to make the list. Indeed, there are several key projects that cannot be funded even at the $382.2 million level which would accelerate our strategic arms elimination programs in Russia and Ukraine. I am told that the committee reduction in the President's request was motivated in part because: Unobligated moneys remain for Belarus, which cannot be spent as long as that country has not been recertified for the CTR program; the Government of Japan has suggested it might purchase fissile material containers for a major CTR project at Mayak in Russia, thereby freeing up some CTR funds previously planned for that project; and finally, unobligated funds for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs. In fact, Mr. President, there are no extra funds available. There are no unobligated funds that have not been designated for specific projects and specific countries. Belarus Decertification The decision by the President not to recertify Belarus for the time being resulted in $37.2 million that cannot be obligated until Belarus is certified. The Department of Defense plans to use $15 million of this sum to partially fund a classified project that has been briefed to Members and notified to the Congress. A copy of that notification is available in S-407 for any Member to read. The remainder of the Belarus funds are intended to remain in reserve to implement previously notified projects in Belarus in the event that Belarus is recertified in fiscal year 1998. Mr. President, I support the maintenance of these funds in a reserve to implement previously notified projects. Even though the SS-25's have left Belarus for Russia, much remains to be done in the area of strategic system infrastructure elimination. SS-25's are mobile; they could be returned under certain circumstances. Thus, while Belarus is currently nuclear weapons free, much remains to be done to insure that it remains in that status. Japanese Container Purchase The Japanese are negotiating with the United States manufacturer, Westinghouse, to purchase some fissile material storage containers for a storage facility at Mayak, Russia. This project is a major component of the CTR program. While the Department of Defense is not yet certain how many, if any, the Japanese will purchase, it could be that a Japanese purchase would decrease the DOD requirements for container purchases by as much as $15 million. Accordingly, the Department of Defense plans to use this $15 million to augment some of the funds from the Belarus account for the classified project. The remaining fiscal year 1997 container funding in the amount of $23.5 million are being notified to Congress to enable purchase of containers to complete the 50,000 container requirement. In short, Mr. President, the Congress has been notified on a new, classified nonproliferation project which will use all of the CTR funds no longer needed for fissile material container, and many of the obligated funds previously planned for Belarus in the event Belarus is not recertified. This project is important and time-sensitive and deserves our support. Unobligated CTR Funds Mr. President, the issue of unobligated CTR funds is an annual one. Inevitable delays in obligating funds in a given fiscal year result from the annual certification process, a very complicated process from the beginning of the nonnuclear legislative efforts in 1991. For example, the Department of Defense did not have authority to spend fiscal year 1997 CTR funds until April 1997, following completion of the certification process and notification to Congress of intent to obligate the fiscal year 1997 funds. Mr. President, this means simply that well over half of the year was consumed due to the legislative requirements of the certification process and the notification of intent to Congress. Over the life of the CTR Program, DOD has notified to the Congress intent to obligate approximately $1.8 billion. Of this amount, $1.3 billion has been obligated, and an additional $38.5 million soon will be notified. Therefore, DOD has $513 million--not $700 million--in currently unobligated CTR funds. For fiscal year 1997, DOD has so far obligated $208 million, with plans to obligate another $200 million by the end of the fiscal year. As defined in the CTR Multi-year Program Plan reported to Congress earlier this month, the remaining $313 million in unobligated funds have been committed to specific countries by signed agreement and are earmarked for specific CTR projects. For example, we have agreements and have earmarked funds for SS-18 ICBM elimination in Russia and SS-24 elimination in Ukraine. The bottom line, Mr. President, is that execution of these funds has been thoroughly planned, and agreements with recipient nations have been signed to allow this assistance for eliminating these strategic systems to proceed per the DOD plan. the material protection, control, and accounting program Mr. President, let me turn to the second program for which we seek to restore full funding through this amendment--this is, the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program. Mr. President, most Members can appreciate the direct benefits to our security from assisting in the elimination of strategic weapons systems targeted on the United States. Perhaps more difficult to comprehend is the threat posed by the potential leakage of weapons-grade nuclear materials. The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Program seeks to secure hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere which are inadequately secured and are at risk of falling into the hands of criminal elements, terrorist organizations and rogue states. In sort, this programs works to prevent the theft or diversion of weapons-usable materials--plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The Department of Energy, in cooperation with Russia, the newly independent states, and the Baltic States, has put in place equipment at 18 sites to safeguard plutonium and weapons-usable uranium, and agreements are in place to enhance safety and security at over 30 additional sites, including research laboratories and storage sites. If this program is reduced by the $25 million recommended by the committee, there would be delays of at least 2 years in securing these sites and an estimated increased cost of $70 million. In short, Mr. President, after a slow start in the early 1990's, MPC&A improvements are now underway at over 50 sites in Russia, the new independent states, and the Baltic States. Let me give some specific examples: MPC&A upgrades at Obninsk and Kurchatov in Russia have radically improved security for several tons of weapons-usable material; upgraded MPC&A systems for all weapons-usable nuclear materials in Latvia, Lithuania, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Belarus are complete; nuclear material detectors have been installed at all pedestrian pathways at the Siberian Chemical Combine (Tomsk-7) and the Chelyabinsk-70 nuclear weapons design institute. These monitors provide a major improvement to the security of many tons of weapons-usable nuclear material at these sites; a national MPC&A training center has been established at Obninsk, Russia, with support from DOE and the European Union; by the end of this month, more than 1,000 nuclear specialists from the former Soviet Union will have participated in MPC&A training courses and technical exchanges under the auspices of the program; work is underway to strengthen Russia's nuclear regulatory system; and MPC&A upgrades for the Russian Navy, some 8 to 10 facilities in 1998, the icebreaker fleet, and for nuclear materials during transportation are underway at several sites. Mr. President, it is noteworthy that the National Research Council recently completed an independent external assessment of this MPC&A program, and the National Research Council concluded; and I quote: U.S. commitment to the program should be sustained and funding should be continued at least at the level of FY 1996 (funding) for several more years, and increased if high- impact opportunities arise. In short, the Energy Department through this program has enhanced the security surrounding hundreds of tons of nuclear weapons material, but the vast majority of material remains poorly secured. Mr. President, fiscal year 1998 is one of the peak-activity years for the program, with work in progress at all large Russian nuclear sites compromising many hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. If we reduce the fiscal year 1998 budget by $25 million, it would kill program momentum, a momentum based on years of negotiations, confidence building, and windows of opportunity. Mr. President, if we do not restore these program cuts, then I fear that work that has already been done to secure U.S. security interests and establish project foundations would need to be done again at considerable financial, time, and political costs. These costs would be especially great for the high-priority dismantlement and navy sites that we are attempting to secure. For example, security of fresh highly enriched uranium naval fuels is at a crucial stage. It is the largest project with the Russian Ministry of Defense--a key player in the overall nuclear-material security picture. It is crucial to maintain the program momentum. Security upgrades at the first facility are underway, and 6 to 12 additional facilities will be targeted in the 1998-2002 timeframe. Mr. President, the bottom line is that, in my judgment, the MPC&A Program is one of the two most critical programs the U.S. Government conducts for ensuring the strategic national security of this country. It ranks alongside the equally critical Stockpile Stewardship Program for maintaining the credibility and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. International Nuclear Safety Program Last, Mr. President, our amendment seeks to restore funds to the International Nuclear Safety Program. The Department of Energy is working with the international community to increase nuclear safety worldwide, particularly in those countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union that operate Soviet-design nuclear reactors. The program's focus is on projects that improve the operation, physical condition, and safety culture at nuclear power plants; the establishment of nuclear safety centers in the United States and countries of the former Soviet Union; and technical leadership to promote sound management of nuclear materials and facilities. Mr. President, by way of background, it should be noted that the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster highlighted the dangers associated with all operating Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors, particularly those of the older, Chernobyl-type design. The safety of these reactors is very much in the interest of the United States. Another nuclear accident could well destabilize political and economic conditions in the nascent democracies of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and cost the United States vast sums in relief assistance. This International Nuclear Safety initiative is designed to address, through cooperative and technical innovation, the serious global problems in the interrelated fields of nuclear safety and nonproliferation. This activity involves engineers, manufacturers, and scientists from many countries, and upon the DOE expertise in nuclear matters and our national laboratories to conduct this cooperation. Thus far, Mr. President, the Department of Energy has implemented under this program more than 150 plant-specific safety projects, involving 17 plant sites throughout the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe, eight design and scientific institutes, and 21 United States commercial companies. Already, under this program, a number of key activities have been completed, including: Establishing nuclear safety training centers in Russia and Ukraine; transferring United States-style emergency operating procedures to a major Russian plant; completing nuclear safety system improvements at three Russian plants; and establishing the Ukraine International Research Center on Nuclear Safety, Radioactive Waste, and Radioecology. Mr. President, this last program activity is particularly important. The objectives of the Ukraine Center, located near the Chernobyl plant, include: Providing support for safety improvements for all nuclear power plants in Ukraine; to providing a focal point for international cooperation in addressing the environmental, health and safety issues created by the Chernobyl accident; and reducing the socioeconomic impacts of closing the Chernobyl plant. Mr. President, the Department of Energy also implements the United States program to assist Ukraine in shutting down the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, including measures for dealing with the deteriorating sarcophagus covering the damaged unit. These activities, however, are funded through another program. Mr. President, unless we restore the moneys to this program as this amendment seeks to do, we will be unable to proceed with some priority activities in 1998, that include: Management and operational safety improvements at Soviet-designed nuclear power sites; engineering and technology upgrades at Soviet- designed nuclear power sites; additional detailed plant-specific safety assessments; assistance in the development of an independent nuclear regulator; and support for international nuclear safety data exchanges and cooperative research and development between the Russian International Nuclear Safety Center and the United States Center at Argonne National Laboratory in Idaho. This program is part of a larger international effort designed to reduce the risks inherent in these Soviet-designed reactors in the near term and to assist Russia and the newly independent states to implement self-sustaining nuclear safety programs and to achieve international nuclear reactor safety norms. Mr. President, I cannot assure this body that if we fully restore the funding for this program, another Chernobyl will never take place. But I can say that this program request is one of the best policy instruments available to reduce the risk that the world will face another Chernobyl-like disaster. In summary, our proposed amendment would restore the cuts made by the committee to these programs: $60 million in the cooperative threat reduction programs; $25 million to the MPC&A Program; and $50 million to the International Nuclear Safety Program. In my view, failure to restore these funds to these important programs could have severe consequences. It could diminish our ability to further reduce the prospect that terrorist or rogue states would acquire weapons-grade material; it could diminish our ability to assist in the permanent removal of missiles, launchers, and other delivery vehicles from the former Soviet strategic arsenal; and it could handcuff our ability, in cooperation with others, to improve operating safety at high-risk nuclear reactor sites in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere, and thus dramatically reduce the risk of further Chernobyls. I am most hopeful that all of my colleagues will support this amendment. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to lay aside the Grams amendment.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Yes.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask that Senators support my amendment because it is the right thing to do. It is the right thing to pay our debts and to meet our contractual obligations in support of the United Nations, a vigorous vehicle for the conduct of our foreign policy. The dispute that we have today is over two different tacks on which the Senators differ in terms of our effectiveness. I believe that the Lugar amendment is not only the right thing to do but I believe it is the most effective way to bring about reform, and to bring about cooperation with our allies, not only at the United Nations but in a host of international trade issues, in NATO and NATO-related concerns, and all of the planning that is vital to our foreign policy. It makes no sense, Mr. President, to deny our allies funds that we owe them and to expect that they are going to be generous or thoughtful in negotiating settlements with us in a range of agreements around the globe. So in terms of both the principle as well as its practicality, I believe the best course is to pay our debt and to do so promptly in a straightforward way and to negotiate firmly for reform of the United Nations, as we are doing, and as we will continue to do, after recognizing that 183 other countries are involved. There must finally be agreement with them, too. I thank the Chair.

Mr. LUGAR. I will respond to the Senator by saying the money paid to our allies is our assumption of how much we owe. It is based upon the $1.021 billion that the administration and the Foreign Relations Committee has agreed is the sum we owe. Many of our allies believe we owe a lot more.

Mr. LUGAR. My amendment would not provide more money. It simply provides certainty that payment is received at all. Let me just continue--

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, my amendment calls for payment of our obligations to the United Nations to the extent of $819 million over 2 years without conditions; $658 million of that is owed to our friends and our allies for peacekeeping operations and expenses they undertook and for which we voted. We have a contractual obligation to pay. Our effectiveness in bringing about reforms in dealing with NATO expansion, in dealing with a host of international trade issues depends upon our credibility with our friends. It is not an argument in favor of reform that unilaterally we decide not to pay or send our payments to other nations but insist on some with 38 conditions in 18 pages of agate type before we allocate the money. We have a straightforward vote, Mr. President. I believe it is the right thing to do. I think it is the most effective thing to do in terms of American diplomacy.

Mr. LUGAR. The distinguished Senator from Delaware yesterday, in responding to a similar argument that I have made today, made the point that, all things considered, he agrees that we ought to pay our debts, that we ought to respond to our contractual obligations, that, in the best of all worlds, this is a principled stand, as I recall his description of it. But the Senator from Delaware said the trail that I am following leads to no payment. Now, if I were to ask with some incredulity why a fairly straightforward amendment adopted by the Senate--obviously the House must act and the President must sign the bill--why my course will lead to zero, as the Senator from Delaware characterized it. It is because, as the Senator from Delaware pointed out, he has been negotiating with the chairman of the committee and the chairman of the committee has said, in essence, we are not going anywhere without accommodation of these conditions--at least that was the characterization. Essentially, he was saying that we have gone nowhere for several years, and that we have accumulated debts and will continue to accumulate debts. In short, the distinguished Senator from Delaware said, and he described, very candidly, the negotiations that he came to the chairman suggesting a sum of money the administration felt we owed, and the chairman took a very adverse view to that. The Senator from Delaware has been negotiating for quite a long while in trying to get that figure up. The Senator from Delaware finally comes to the body yesterday and says essentially, ``This is the best I can do. In essence, hopefully, these conditions will be met. Countries, in fact, will meet them and the money will flow, $100 million in the first year fairly easily,'' as the Senator characterized, ``and it gets tougher in the second and third years. But, nevertheless, somehow this is going to occur.'' That is the judgment Senators have to make. I will just say very frankly, Mr. President, that we ought to face the situation in a much more straightforward way, because this debate has not occurred in private, nor have our failures to pay our debts occurred in private. It is a very public embarrassment in which the United States of America is stiff-arming our friends, quite apart from whatever damage we are doing to the United Nations. If, in fact, we want to get out of the United Nations, withdraw from it, saying essentially this is a group of people constantly preying upon us and we are tired of that, that is one basic decision Senators might want to make. I am suggesting, Mr. President, this bill veers very close to making that decision for us. What if the rest of the world, 183 nations, decides that our arbitrary decision here in the Senate is not really where they want to go? What if the United Nations goes bankrupt? What if our allies no longer trust us with regard to peacekeeping, fearing they will not be paid any more than they have been in the past? What if, as a matter of fact, other nations begin to doubt our word and our ability to follow through on contractual obligations we undertake? There is a lot at stake, Mr. President. It could very well be that there are some Senators who would say, ``We ought to take advantage of our size and weight in the world now. There's no point in worrying about the sensitivities of other nations. We're paying 25 percent of the dues. Our share of the world's wealth right now is about 27 percent, but we don't want to pay that, we want to pay 20 percent. We're not going to take any fuss from any other nation about that.'' We're going to pay 20 percent of the U.N. dues arbitrarily. Not only that, we are going to take our peacekeeping from 31 percent to 25 percent of the budget. It is too high to begin with. We are tired of paying that. We will pay that, take it or leave it. In essence there are two ``take it or leave its,'' Mr. President, as the Senator from Delaware characterized the debate yesterday. In essence he has said to the Senate that we either take it or leave it or there will not be any payment at all. The chairman will not agree to it. Second, after we get through this process, we say to the rest of the world, ``Take it or leave it, because there won't be any payment unless you take our word for what we want to pay and under the conditions that we want to pay it.'' In essence, Mr. President, this is not very good foreign policy. It is not really a very good stance for the United States at all. I will simply say, what will be the predicaments if we get our way and arbitrarily reduce our dues, and countries either get their moneys or they don't. I predict, Mr. President, the ramifications of this are likely to be very expensive for the United States. Not only is it the right thing to do to pay our debts, it is in fact the most effective way of being persuasive at the United Nations to bring about reforms that we want there. Mr. President, I appreciate that not all Senators have followed all of the debate as extensively as those who have been debating this yesterday and today. But let me say already there is some doubt as to precisely what this bill has to say. For example, the Washington Post of Saturday, June 14, 1997, suggested that Ambassador Richardson and our own colleague, Senator Grams of Minnesota, went to the United Nations on Saturday, after our markup on Thursday, and, according to John Goshko of the Post: They denied that Congress wants to ``micromanage the United Nations,'' and they insisted that the plan is ``not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition.'' Instead, they said it is a set of ``suggestions'' aimed at helping the United Nations become, as Grams said, ``the best United Nations it can be.''. . . The two officials' assertions that the conditions or so-called benchmarks in the plan are only suggestions ran counter, according to the article, and also according to remarks by Chairman Helms on Thursday. Quoting Senator Helms: This bill will prohibit the payment by the American taxpayers of any so-called U.N. arrears until these congressionally mandated benchmarks have been met by the U.N. Then another quote from Senator Helms: The message to the U.N. is simple but clear: no reform, no American taxpayer money for arrears. Now, Mr. President, in the Washington Times, Senator Grams is quoted as saying: ``These are broad suggestions,'' said Sen. Rod Grams, Minnesota Republican, architect of the reform package and U.S. delegate to the United Nations. ``We're not going to micromanage the U.N. by any means.'' At a press conference yesterday, both [Ambassador Richardson and Mr. Grams] took pains to soften the edges of a bill most here see as an imperious ``take it or leave it'' offer. Mr. Grams plans to spend time at the United Nations this summer, selling the package to foreign envoys [according to the Washington Times of June 14, 1997]. So already, Mr. President, while we are debating the bill, our Ambassador and a distinguished colleague are at the United Nations saying we are making some helpful suggestions that we do not want to micromanage. But back here at the Congress, the word is no reform, and according to the 18 pages of conditions in this legislation, no money. Senators will have to make up their minds. The suggestion has been two ``take it or leave its,'' in my own view. This is the reason I presented the amendment. We have obligations. In a straightforward way we ought to meet them. As the Senator from Delaware suggested in his question this morning, the amounts of money in this bill are clearly in dispute. But I accept the fact that the U.S. Government, both in its legislative and administrative branches, estimates we owe $1.021 billion. After various deductions, $819 million is on the table to be disbursed in both the Foreign Relations Committee bill and in my amendment. But there is a large difference in how the dispersal occurs, a very large difference in our attitude to other countries, our friends in the rest of the world, and a very large difference in our presumptions about the United Nations and its usefulness to us. Finally, Mr. President, word came yesterday in a debate that the United States of America has loaned countries a lot of money. We have spent a lot of money helping them defend themselves. And indeed we have. Our foreign policy frequently--frequently--tries to make sure the frontiers of conflict are as far away from our country as possible. We have given a lot of military aid to others who we hoped would fight our battles as our allies or as front lines for us. And that was prudent for us to do. But now we come to a situation, Mr. President, in which the United States said we do not want to be involved in these front line activities, or certain peacekeeping chores that were controversial, but which we think ought to be done. We voted for them. We sent others forward. We said we would pay. And now we have not paid nor will we pay unless the United Nations and the members in it reduce our dues, and unless they go through the hoops of even such suggestions that international conferences of the United Nations could be held in only four cities. We even dictate the cities in which the conference might occur. Members will be astonished, as they read through all the conditions, what is involved. But Members should read soon because we will have a vote shortly this afternoon on this amendment. I believe it is a critical vote for American foreign policy. I hope the Senators will support my amendment. I thank the Chair.

Mr. LUGAR. That's correct.

Mr. LUGAR. I will be happy to yield.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, Members who have followed this debate will recall that yesterday afternoon I offered an amendment to the division C of this bill, that portion dealing with the United Nations. Essentially, the task before the Senate, and before our Government as a whole, is how do we relate the United Nations as an organization we have supported, and one important to our foreign policy. It is an international organization that has been under attack in this country. And, we have not paid our bills. As I pointed out yesterday, the legislation before us attempts to remedy the situation over a 3-year period of time with 18 pages of very substantial conditions that must be met by the United Nations in order for the United States debt repayment money to flow to that body. Mr. President, my amendment is very straightforward. It substitutes for the 18 pages of conditions in the bill my amendment which says there are no conditions for our payment and we will, in fact, make the payment of $819 million in two installments in 2-years' time. The $819 million has been a sum the administration and the Foreign Relations Committee has agreed that we owe. In addition, we would be receiving approximately $107 million back from the United Nations for peacekeeping services we have offered. The two ideas before the Senate are important because this is a turning point of some significance in our foreign policy. In order to understand the amendment today and the bill that it amends, I think it is necessary to go back to square one and ask, why are we in such a predicament? How could the United States fail to pay the United Nations over $1 billion over the course of several years? I think the answer, quite frankly, is that there has been a pervasive feeling in the U.S. Senate which we, as Senators, thought were reflecting the country's antipathy to the United Nations, antipathy to bureaucracies and organizational inefficiencies. Many Americans have been told, at least in our Senate debates, that the United Nations preys upon the United States and that we are not in control. But, of course, the leadership the United States has exerted to obtain control of that body is certainly suspect. Mr. President, to set the record straight at the outset, a number of national polls have been taken that reflect a 2-to-1 majority of Americans believing the United Nations is very important and that we ought to pay our bills. The polling data goes for many years, but I found especially instructive a poll that indicated on the question: ``Do you believe that U.N. member states should always pay their full dues to the U.N. on schedule, or should a state hold back its dues to pressure other members to agree to changes it believes are needed?'', Americans, in a Wirthlin Group poll in 1989 conducted for the United Nations Association, 60% of Americans responded that we should always pay the United Nations, pay other countries, whoever. Only 14 percent said you ought to hold back. In April 1996 jumping about 7 years ahead, 78 percent of Americans believe that a nation should always pay; 13 percent believe you ought to be able to hold back. The American public understands what is fair. They understand what a contract is, what our obligations are as a nation. Furthermore, Mr. President, they understand the work the United Nations does, and by an overwhelming majority, the public believes we should not only stay in the United Nations but, as a matter of fact, in a polling item of a Times Mirror poll, the question was, ``Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The United States should cooperate fully with the United Nations?,'' 65 percent of Americans agree, 29 percent disagree--well over two-thirds. I make that point because I believe we have come to this particular pass because public servants believe somehow it is popular to withhold money from the United Nations; to, in essence, say to the United Nations, ``Reform, repent or we will not pay our dues.'' This is understandable, and the amount of reform needed by the United Nations is sizable. The new Secretary General Kofi Annan, who has supported the United States, who has come to visit with our own Foreign Relations Committee, has not only pledged to make reforms, he is doing that job. Our Ambassador, Mr. Richardson, will have a full-time job working with him to make certain that occurs. There are 184 nations involved. We are one of them, ostensibly the most powerful of those nations. Essentially, we are going to have to work with that bureaucracy to pare it down, to pare the budget down. The signs of progress are promising. Let me make a major point I hope Members will follow. Of the more than $1 billion the United States agrees that we owe, only 5 percent has anything to do with the bureaucracy, the Secretariat of the United Nations, only 5 percent, some $54 million. Now, if Members ask, ``Well, then, what is the argument about?'' The argument is about $650 million or so of peacekeeping expenses that were assumed by our allies for which the United Nations is simply a passthrough for money that we, the United States of America, said we would pay and now we owe to friendly countries. Let me cite, so it is not obscure, who we owe money to. We owe money to France, $60.1 million; we owe Great Britain $41 million; the Netherlands $21.3 million; Pakistan $20.1 million; Germany $18.3 million we owe; Belgium $17.3 million; Italy $17.2 million; India $16.1 million; Canada our near neighbor, $14.2 million. This is money we owe to them, not to Kofi Annan, the Secretary General, or the U.N. Secretariat or the organization so frequently criticized on the floor of this body. We owe more than $650 million to other countries who sent their troops out to do work that we wanted them to do. We voted for the peacekeeping resolutions. We said we would send money if they would send men and if they would take on the fighting obligations, or at least the dangers that were involved in often hazardous duty that went beyond simple peacekeeping. That is the money, Mr. President, that is at risk. I am not certain Senators understand that we are, in essence, saying to our allies, we will not pay you unless you change the dues structure for us, for the United States. In essence, we not only have failed to pay our allies, but we have said, as a matter of fact, we are not going to pay you. This bill says we won't pay you unless you reduce our U.N. dues to only 20 percent of the budget, as opposed to 25 percent, and unless you reduce our peacekeeping dues to 25 percent as opposed to around 31 percent. Unilaterally, arbitrarily, take it or leave it. That is what is proposed in the legislation in front of us. In addition, the legislation, Members will note if they read through the 18 pages of agate type, has at least 38 conditions and hoops other countries and the United Nations must go through in order for us to pay our debts. Mr. President, it is strange that we came to this situation through, I think, a misperception of who ought to be paid. Most Americans who understand we owe Great Britain, France, Canada, and Italy, will say, ``Why haven't we paid?'' And most Americans would understand that our failure to pay will have consequences because we are dealing with these same nations in NATO reform and NATO expansion in trying to determine what the fair shares will be. We are dealing with most of these countries every day in terms of agricultural exports which are very difficult bread-and-butter issues for America. Yet, we take an arbitrary position with regard to the United Nations that we simply will not pay until they go through the hoops of implementing the reforms we insist upon in this bill.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LUGAR. I respond to the distinguished Senator by pointing out, I have doubts under the bill we are about to pass that very much money get through the United Nations to our allies. The money will most certainly get to our allies through my amendment. I suspect, if the other conditions that are in title XXII are imposed, the odds are slim that the money will get through.

Mr. LUGAR. I am happy to yield such time as I have.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. I renew my request.