Richard Lugar

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Yes, the Senator from Oregon is correct. The new provision became effective upon enactment of the FAIR Act on April 14, 1996.

Mr. LUGAR. Yes, the chairman of the Appropriations Committee is correct. In addition, given the clear statutory eligibility requirements of this particular program, I can see no reason why eligibility could not be determined in the application process.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. It is, and I look forward to working with my colleagues from Idaho and Mississippi to find appropriate ways to support development of precision agriculture. Value-Added Products

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. It is clearly not the intent of Congress to penalize supermarkets for failure to display the information. It is our intent, however, for grocery stores to serve as a conduit for the display and dissemination of this information to the greatest extent practical in a manner that will be determined by each store. In other words, we do not intend to impose an unfair burden on grocery stores that would subject them to fines or seizure of products simply because the information is not always available.

Mr. LUGAR. The Senator from Alabama is correct.

Mr. LUGAR. What clarification is the Senator seeking?

Mr. LUGAR. Yes, the legislation makes this type of information available for display.

Mr. LUGAR. Today, the Senate takes final action on the Food Quality Protection Act. The legislation before us today passed the House on July 23 by a vote of 417 to 0. I commend our colleagues in the House for this bipartisan compromise to reform the Delaney clause. Chairman Bliley, Representative Dingell, and Representative Waxman are to be commended for their efforts. I also want to thank my counterparts on the House Agriculture Committee, Chairman Roberts and Representative de la Garza. This bill represents a carefully crafted compromise. A large list of consumer groups, environmental organizations, food industry organizations, and farm groups support the bill. The administration has indicated the President will sign the bill. The bill reforms the scientifically outdated Delaney clause enacted in 1958. The Delaney clause ignores the concept of risk. As science continues to develop new means of detecting even the smallest amount of substance in food, the Delaney clause would force more and more safe products off the market. The compromise bill sets a ``safe'' standard for both raw and processed food. Safe is defined as ``a reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to pesticide chemical residue.'' The bill also allows for the consideration of benefits when setting tolerances, but limits how much additional risk is acceptable as a tradeoff for benefits. As recommended by the National Academy of Sciences in 1993, EPA is required to give special consideration to infants and children when setting pesticide residue tolerances. For pesticides with threshold effects, an additional tenfold margin of safety shall be applied for infants and children, except EPA may use a different margin of safety on the basis of reliable data. National uniformity of tolerances is maintained with some exceptions. Uniformity does not apply to warning labels like Prop 65. The bill contains provisions to encourage development of new minor use pesticides without compromising food safety or adversely affecting the environment. The bill also addresses antimicrobial registrations by expediting registration procedures for antimicrobial pesticides. The bill extends EPA authorization to collect $14 million annually in reregistration fees--a provision strongly endorsed by the Environmental Protection Agency. Finally, I want to commend Senator Pryor for his efforts to reform the Delaney clause and his strong support for the legislation we introduced. Senator Kassebaum, chairman of the Labor and Human Resources Committee, has been a strong supporter of Delaney reform as an original cosponsor of S. 1166 and is supportive of our efforts to move forward. I also want to thank Senator Leahy for his support of this compromise and his willingness to work to move this bill through the Senate. I am pleased that we have a compromise bill before us that will reform the outdated Delaney clause and help ensure the continued availability of a safe, affordable and abundant food supply in our Nation. I urge my colleagues to support this important legislation. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record three letters from Dr. Lynn Goldman, Assistant Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. I rise in opposition to this amendment. It has been almost universally opposed, first of all. The issue the Senator from Iowa wishes to strike appears in President Clinton's most recent welfare reform proposal. Likewise, the reform which we try to bring about in this bill was in the minority leader's reconciliation bill. The reason is that four out of every five low-income children attend school with a breakfast program. The program has expanded very rapidly. It is not clear that expansion funds would have a marginal effect. The amendment that we are considering reduces savings by $112 million. This means, if Senator Harkin's amendment is adopted, we will have to find the savings probably in some other nutrition programs. I find that unacceptable. Mr. President, I move to table the amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Senator Simpson raises a valid issue regarding the interpretation of section 663 of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996. Although I disagree with your statement that the statute is not clear on this point, I agree that USDA has incorrectly interpreted this section. Section 663 clearly states that a complete application to acquire inventory property must have been submitted prior to the date of enactment of the FAIR Act. The issue is whether the property in question has already come into the Government's possession. Until that time, the property should not be deemed inventory property. If a borrower had submitted an application that the Secretary would have deemed complete except that the steps necessary for the Government to acquire the property had not been fulfilled, those borrowers' applications should be considered complete so that once the property does enter the Government's inventory, the lease back-buyback agreement can be executed.

Mr. LUGAR. Yes.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of S. 704, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission Act, and I urge my colleagues to approve this important legislation. I want to express my appreciation to Chairman Stevens, Senator Glenn, and the Governmental Affairs Committee for their commitment and careful attention to this important issue. Senator Stevens and the committee have made significant improvements to the original bill, providing additional resources and appropriate authorities to allow the Commission to conduct a meaningful study of gambling. I also want to thank the author of bill, Senator Simon, for his steadfast leadership and dedication to this effort. I want to share with my colleagues some of my thoughts about this important issue and about why I believe the Nation would be served by a national study of gambling. The rapid spread of legalized gambling in the United States in recent years has raised concerns in Congress and elsewhere about the social and economic impacts of gambling on our States and communities. Throughout our Nation's history, the popularity of gambling has come and gone, and returned again. Public outcry against casinos and State lotteries during the post Civil War period led to a ban on gambling throughout the United States by 1920. During the past 20 years, however, the gambling industry in the United States has experienced unparalleled growth and expansion. In 1978 only two States allowed casinos and a handful of others sponsored lotteries. But today some form of gambling is legal in 48 States. Gambling revenues grew more than twice the rate of our Nation's manufacturing industries in 1990. Americans wager almost a half a trillion dollars a year and industry profits are estimated to have reached $40 billion annually. A major reason for this astronomical growth of gambling is that State and local governments facing budget shortfalls are desperate for revenue. State and local government officials all too often accept gambling as the silver bullet solution to balancing their budgets without raising taxes. Even if a State or community is reluctant to host a gambling establishment, it can be drawn over the edge by the threat that gambling operations may locate in a nearby town or neighboring State. For many local officials, the legalization of gambling becomes an economic survival issue rather than a question of developing sound public policy. The actions of State and local governments that hope to use gambling as a solution to financing the needs of their cities and communities are understandable. Yet, the quick-fix, ready-cash approach can be a shaky foundation upon which to base an economic development strategy. As mayor of Indianapolis during a difficult period of economic uncertainty and social unrest in the late 1960's, I learned that a community must be built in living rooms, classrooms, and churches. To strengthen the city's economy, we launched a comprehensive reorganization of local government, consolidating our city and county. We cut property taxes 5 times in 8 years, attracted businesses, and made Indianapolis the amateur sports capital of the world. Indianapolis is a dynamic and successful city, and it has reduced poverty and crime that plagues many urban areas. Long-term growth and prosperity for our communities are most often earned the old-fashioned way--through hard work, dedication and commitment to common purpose. The folks facing the toughest decisions on whether to permit gambling are leaders at the local level. These officials are frequently overwhelmed by the size and complexity of proposals made for casinos and other establishments promising jobs and solutions to local financial dilemmas. They are often forced to make decisions about gambling in a vacuum of reliable, unbiased information--information desperately needed to make sound choices that will affect both the social and economic future of their communities. This is one area where the resources of the Federal Government can help communities by providing them objective, unbiased information they can use to make their own informed decisions about gambling. Mr. President, while history is replete with examples of communal difficulties associated with gambling, it is difficult to determine the costs--especially in certain human factors related to problem gambling that include alcoholism, divorce, suicide, family dysfunction, and criminal activity. A number of studies have attempted to address the social costs of gambling; however, they are often regional in focus, limited in scope or funded by subjective interests. A Federal study commission will provide a broad-based, authoritative report on this important aspect of the gambling issue that deserves closer examination. As a society we appear to have made a piecemeal decision to legalize a wide variety of gambling activities. But this does not obviate the need to be mindful of the underlying problems associated with gambling that lead most of the country to keep it illegal for decades. We know that the presence of legalized gambling can exacerbate numerous social problems, including crime, alcoholism, corruption, suicide, bankruptcy, family dysfunction, and compulsive or addictive behavior. These side effects can represent an enormous moral and financial cost to communities. The gambling industry does not choose to confront these moral questions. The gambling industry frequently asserts that what it is providing is an adult entertainment option. Undoubtedly, many adults can gamble responsibly, have a good time, and sustain the financial losses that they incur. But we should not deceive ourselves that gambling is no different than any other entertainment option. Gambling is a complex and problematic activity both in terms of its economic and social impact on communities and its economic and psychological impact on individuals and families. Gambling-related employment is not comparable to other forms of employment such as manufacturing. Gambling does not produce a value- added product or reinvestment in the market economy. Although gambling operations can contribute lower-paying jobs to a local economy, other businesses in the region often lose as a consumer spending for goods and services shifts to a small number of casinos and casino-related activities. One does not have to be a gambling prohibitionist to conclude that our Nation needs to know more about where we are headed. Mr. President, this legislation creates a 2-year, 9-member commission appointed by Congress and the President to conduct a comprehensive legal and factual study of the social and economic impacts of gambling on States and communities. S. 704 does not propose to further tax, regulate or limit gambling activities. The Commission will be charged with compiling all Federal, State and local laws pertaining to gambling. The Commission also will assess the impact of gambling on local businesses; the relationship between gambling and levels of crime; and the impact of problem and pathological gambling on individuals, families, and the economy. The Commission will examine electronic gambling involving use of the Internet. Internet gambling is a new and rapidly growing activity in the United States and elsewhere. It allows people using personal computers and credit card accounts to gamble across State lines and national borders. Internet gambling could have serious international policy implications for the United States. Very little is known about the risks associated with citizens who gamble in ``virtual'' casinos located outside U.S. jurisdiction. We need to learn more about the Internet. After 2 years, the Commission will submit a comprehensive report to the President, the Congress, Governors, and Native American Tribal governments on its findings. This report will provide objective, unbiased data and analysis that States and communities can use to make their own informed decisions about gambling. Providing the Commission with adequate resources and authority to perform its duties is essential to developing an authoritative report. Allowing the Commission to conduct hearings, provide recommendations and have a limited, but effective level of subpoena power are essential to achieving this goal. To reduce the cost of the Commission, S. 704 uses existing Government entities--the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences--to assist in the Commission's efforts to compile existing laws and conduct research on problem and pathological gambling. Senator Stevens and the Governmental Affairs Committee have worked to establish a balanced and effective commission that will conduct a thorough review of the social and economic impacts of gambling. At the same time, the committee worked to ensure that information gathered by the Commission would not be misused nor exceed the common sense bounds of our Federal system. The bill incorporates existing privacy laws under title 18 to ensure protection for individual privacy and for business trade secrets. The bill allows the Commission to subpoena certain documentation necessary to carry out its duties as outlined in the bill. The Commission is allowed subpoena authority to gather additional information to help the Commission understand documentation received under subpoena. I have worked with Senator Simon, Senator Stevens, the Governmental Affairs Committee and Representative Frank Wolf to gain approval of this legislation in the Congress because I believe the country would be served by a Federal study. The House of Representatives approved similar legislation this year, and the President has indicated his support for establishing a commission to study gambling. It is my hope the Senate will give swift approval to this important measure to examine this pressing national issue. I believe the Commission's work will be helpful to State and local leaders as they make their own informed decisions about whether or not to allow gambling in their communities. Information is the goal of this Commission. Information will strengthen the democratic decision-making process. I urge my colleagues to join me to support passage of S. 704.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry will meet on Wednesday, July 24, 1996 at 9:30 a.m. in SR-328A to markup S. 1166, the Food Quality Protection Act. committee on rules and administration

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, prior to the Fourth of July recess, the Senate passed an amendment to the DOD authorization bill offered by Senators Nunn and Domenici and myself that was entitled the ``Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996.'' The vote on that amendment was 96 to 0. Last week, the Senate voted final passage of the Defense authorization bill, that contained our amendment. The amendment we are offering to the DOD appropriations bill is designed to appropriate the resources to implement the programs outlined in our amendment to the DOD authorization bill, and to provide offsetting reductions in other appropriation amounts. To refresh the memories of my colleagues, our amendment to the authorizing legislation dealt with one of the most urgent national security problems America faces. That is, the threat of attack on American cities and towns by terrorists or representatives of hostile powers using radiological, chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The current state of our domestic readiness to deal with these kind of attacks is woefully inadequate. Our amendment sought to begin today to prepare for what surely threatens us already. There were three basic elements or components to our amendment to the DOD authorization bill. The first component stemmed from the recognition that the United States cannot afford to rely on a policy of prevention and deterrence alone, and therefore must prudently move forward with mechanisms to enhance preparedness domestically not only for nuclear but chemical and biological incidents as well. Our hearings over the past year demonstrated that the United States is woefully unprepared for domestic terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Although recent Presidential decision directives address the coordination of both crisis and consequence management of a WMD incident, the Federal Government has done too little to prepare for a nuclear threat or nuclear detonation on American soil, and even less for a biological or chemical threat or incident. This is particularly true with regard to the training and equipping of the local first responders--the firemen, police, emergency management teams, and medical personnel who will be on the frontlines if deterrence and prevention of such incidents fail. Our amendment sets forth several common-sense measures that could greatly improve our readiness to cope with a domestic incident involving weapons of mass destruction. Almost all of the expertise in defending against and acting in response to such chemical and biological threats and their execution resides in the Department of Defense which has worked to protect our Armed Forces against chemical and biological attack. It is our belief that this expertise must be utilized and can be utilized without infringing on DOD's major missions or on our civil liberties. The second component addressed the supply side of these materials, weapons, and know-how in the states of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Building on our prior Nunn-Lugar/CTR experience, and recognizing that it is far more effective, and less expensive, to prevent proliferation in the first place than to face such weapons on the battlefield or the school playground, our amendment included countermeasures intended to firm up border and export controls, measures to promote and support counterproliferation research and development, and enhanced efforts to prevent the brain-drain of lethal know-how to rogue states and terrorist groups. We seek to capitalize on the progress achieved in dismantling nuclear weapons of the former Soviet states and in preventing the flight of weapons scientists over the past 5 years and to expand the core mission of the program so as to address strategically the emerging threats that compromise our domestic security. The resources that will be required to implement programs proposed in the amendment are not intended to supplant, but rather to supplement, current Nunn-Lugar funding levels. In addition to enhanced efforts to secure the weapons and materials of mass destruction, we must recognize that the combination of organized crime, porous borders, severe economic dislocation, and corruption in the states of the former Soviet Union has greatly increased the risk that lethal materials of mass destruction as well as the know-how for producing them can pass rather easily through the borders of the former Soviet Union. While much of the risk still resides in the four nuclear states of the former Soviet Union, there is also great risk in the states of the southern tier and the Caucasus. This region shares common borders with nations in the Middle East and poses a substantial smuggling threat. Although Nunn-Lugar programs have begun to offer training and equipment to establish controls on borders and exports throughout the former Soviet Union, much more needs to be done. The last and major component of our amendment to the Department of Defense authorization bill stemmed from the recognition much of the current effort to deal with the NBC threat crosscuts numerous Federal departments and agencies and highlights the need for the creation of a national coordinator for nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy in order to provide a more strategic and coordinated vision and response. This portion of our amendment addressed three serious deficiencies in planning for contingencies at home occasioned by the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. First is the lack of coordination of activities across the many Federal agencies who have some responsibility for some portions of the overall problem. Second is the lack of coordination of Federal agencies and activities with those of the States and local governments who will be the first to bear the brunt of any attacks. Third, is the lack of national security funding in many of the Federal agencies whose actions must ultimately be integrated with those of the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. To support a comprehensive approach to nonproliferation, our amendment provided that a national coordinator should chair a new Committee on Proliferation, Crime, and Terrorism, to be established within the National Security Council. That committee should include the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, the Attorney General, the Director for Central Intelligence, and other department and agency heads the President deems necessary. This committee within the National Security Council should serve as the focal point for all government nonproliferation, counterproliferation, law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism, and other efforts to combat threats to the United States posed by weapons of mass destruction. Mr. President, our colleagues in the Senate gave overwhelming support last month to our amendment by a vote of 96 to 0. This amendment to the Department of Defense appropriations bill provides the resources to carry out the critically important programs established in our amendment to the authorization bill. We hope for an equally overwhelming vote in support of this amendment to fully fund these programs. I thank the Chair.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent, under the conditions stipulated by the distinguished Senator from Nevada, that the Senate stand in recess for 5 minutes.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. It is, indeed, a privilege to have this delegation with us, and I appreciate the time taken by the Chair and by the Senators so that we may have an opportunity to greet this distinguished delegation. I encourage all of us to do so before we proceed with our debate. I thank the Chair.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Nevada for his cooperation. Likewise, I'd like to thank all Senators who are with us, and staff. It is my privilege and honor to have the opportunity to welcome on behalf of the entire Senate a distinguished delegation from the European Parliamentary Group who are here for the 44th European Parliament and U.S. Congress Interparliamentary Meeting. This delegation, which is led by Mr. Alan Donnelly, from the United Kingdom, and Mrs. Karla Peijs, from the Netherlands, is here to meet with Members of the Congress and other American officials to discuss a wide range of issues of mutual concern. The European Parliament plays an increasingly important role in shaping the new Europe. Parliament's authority has been expanded recently. It will continue to play a central role in the many challenges and opportunities facing Europe as European nations build upon free market economics, as they deepen the roots of democracy, as they define their relationships with Russia and the former Warsaw Pact countries and reach out to the rest of the world to forge viable economic, political, and security linkages. Continued contact with and strong relations between the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress are essential in developing better economic relations with Europe and in reinforcing the many common goals which bring us together. I ask all of my colleagues to join me in welcoming individually, by greeting them by hand, each of the distinguished parliamentarians who are here today from the European Parliament. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a list of all of the delegation be printed in the Record.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the Indianapolis Indians professional baseball team has been an important institution in my life from the time that my dad, Marvin Lugar, took me to Indians' games in the 1940s. Those of us in Indiana who revere the Indianapolis Indians will celebrate two significant events in July when the final Indians' game is played at Bush Stadium on July 3 and the opening game at the new Victory Field takes place on July 11. I thank the Indianapolis Athletic Club Sports Foundation for honoring the Indianapolis Indians at a breakfast on July 2, a great opportunity to assemble so many of the renowned Indians players that are still alive and active in support of baseball in our State. The Indianapolis Athletic Club Sports Foundation has performed a vital role in bringing together and recognizing the important contributions to the Indianapolis community of the Indianapolis Indians and bringing together the people and much of the history that has meant so much to our community. I can remember vividly, a home run hit by third baseman Joe Bestudik, the first time I had ever seen a baseball hit over the wall of a baseball park. I can remember the thrill of attending baseball clinics given by professional players that allowed us to run the bases and gain some idea of the dimensions of the stadium. One of my closest friends at Shortridge High School, Max Schumacher, was captain of our high school's baseball team. Following his graduation from Butler University in Indianapolis, Max joined the Indianapolis Indians' organization as ticket manager, became president in 1969, and has presided over one of the truly outstanding success stories of minor league baseball in America. I congratulate Max, the remarkable board of directors he has assembled over the years, the Indian Hall of Fame members, and hundreds of thousands of baseball fans who have made the Indianapolis Indians such a remarkable pillar of strength. At the time that I was elected mayor of Indianapolis in 1967, I gained a much better insight of how much the Indians mean to our city when so many civic leaders came to me and asked that the city of Indianapolis take over the ballpark and provide the funds for proper restoration and maintenance. It was a personal thrill to see the stature of the stadium rise again and a personal challenge each year to throw the first ball of the season from the pitcher's mound with hopes that it would not fly over the catcher's head or into the dirt. Along with a large majority of Indians' fans, I will deeply miss the cool breezes and the great view of the city skyline that were a part of the summer evening at Bush Stadium, but I look forward to remarkable new opportunities for enjoyment of the Indianapolis Indians at a new stadium in the heart of a vital inner city of Indianapolis. I thank all Hoosiers who are endeavoring to make both celebrations an important part of our Hoosier historical heritage.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I commend to the Senate this morning an amendment that I believe will make a historic difference in American security, and it is our security we are talking about, the security of Americans, who would like relief from the possibilities of an ICBM attack in nuclear, chemical, or biological terms coming out of the former Soviet Union--or out of any country, for that matter--which might jeopardize it and who want some assurance that we here in the United States are prepared to coordinate the remarkable work of our Department of Defense in historic research efforts to combat potential difficulties for American personnel from biological, chemical, or nuclear attack that might be transferred to local officials who will work with these people. All of these objectives are approached. They will never be fully achieved, but clearly the passage of this amendment will bring a greater sense of security to all Americans that our Government works, that we have talented people in our military and in our civilian components of government at all levels that will make a difference in the safety of Americans. For these reasons, I commend this amendment. I am hopeful it will have very strong support in the Senate this morning. I thank the Chair.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, when Chechen rebels placed a 30-pound package of radioactive material in a Moscow park last November, it marked the first act of nuclear terrorism in the post-cold-war era. Although the container was not equipped with the explosives needed to disperse the cesium, the Chechens demonstrated a credible terrorist threat to employ nuclear material attached to explosives as radiological dispersion devices in Russia. The act crossed a new threshold in terrorism. Demonstrating on Russian television the ability to penetrate Moscow's increased security, Chechen rebels were now in a position to panic the Russian public by issuing similar threats of radiological contaminants. Terrorism was alive and well in another part of the world at roughly the same time. The worldwide activities of the Japanese Dooms-Day Cult, the Aum Shrinkiyo were not on the radar screen of United States law enforcement and intelligence agencies before the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway last March. This is alarming, considering the cult accumulated over $1 billion in assets and established offices in six countries on four continents. Cult members actively recruited scientists and technical experts in Japan, Russia, and elsewhere in order to develop weapons of mass destruction. They succeeded in producing chemical weapons, including toxic chemical agents such as sarin, VX, and sodium cyanide; and they were in the process of developing biological weapons, including anthrax, botulism, and ``Q'' fever. We have since learned how much more devastating the attacks in Tokyo could have been if the cult had simply perfected their delivery systems. The arrest and subsequent interrogation of members of the Japanese cult has shed more light on the activities of the group, particularly with respect to the extent and nature of its efforts in the area of offensive biological agents. The Japanese cult conducted extensive research on the manufacture of offensive biological agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin, and tested their dispersal against specific targets on at least three occasions between 1990 and 1995. The dispersal incidents were attempts to test the effectiveness on humans of Aum-produced toxins and to judge whether they could be used as weapons. Although the cult's tests caused no known casualties, the relative ease with which the botulinum bacteria and anthrax spores were obtained and the need for only basic scientific knowledge to conduct research on biological agents suggests either Aum members still at large or other terrorist groups may be more successful in the future. We have also learned how close we have come to witnessing acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction directed toward the United States. Listen to the words of Judge Duffy in his sentencing statement before the perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing: The harm actually caused by the World Trade Center bombing was enormous, but what is even more frightening is what was intended by you and your cohorts . . . The bomb was big and that's what you intended, but that's not quite all that was intended . . . The evidence clearly indicated that you attempted to enhance the destructive force of the (device) . . . If the bomb had the explosive force that you envisioned, placed as it was at the base of the north tower next to a diagonal brace, you might have succeeded in your nefarious plot to topple over the north tower into the south tower just like a pair of dominoes. Had that happened, we'd be dealing with tens of thousands of deaths and billions of dollars of damage, but death is what you sought to cause. You had sodium cyanide around, and I'm sure it was in the bomb. Thank God the sodium cyanide burned instead of vaporizing. If the sodium cyanide had vaporized, it is clear that what would have happened is the cyanide gas would have been sucked into the north tower and everybody in the north tower would have been killed. I say to my colleagues: Here we have three incidents involving materials and weapons of mass destruction--in Russia, in Japan, and in the United States. The fact that the destruction wrought by the attempted use of these materials was not more massive owes more to luck or accident than to prevention, deterrence, or consequence management. The threat of weapons of mass destruction is real, and it is now. As a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet totalitarian command and control society, a vast potential supermarket of weapons and materials of mass destruction is becoming increasingly accessible. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent decay of the custodial system guarding the Soviet nuclear, chemical, and biological legacy has eliminated this proliferation chokepoint, since states and possibly even sub-state groups can now buy or steal what they previously had to produce on their own. This central fact has transformed the nature of the proliferation problem for the United States as well as the rest of the world. If this is a fair description of the nature of this threat, the prevailing view that there is today no direct threat to U.S. national security is dead wrong. It is my view that the risk of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon detonation on American soil has increased. While the probability of large-scale nuclear war between the United States and Russia has mercifully decreased dramatically, the probability that one, or two, or a dozen weapons of mass destruction detonate in Russia, or Japan, or Europe, or the Middle East, or even the United States has increased. However, because this new threat comes in a form so unfamiliar, indeed, so radically different from prior experience, and because the instruments and policies to address it are so unlike the business our White House and national security establishments have pursued for decades, the American political leadership, the Congress, and the American people have great difficulty in awakening to this fact. But, let us be clear. Absent a U.S. response to this threat of leakage of weapons and materials of mass destruction that is as focused, serious, and vigorous as America's cold war strategy, Americans may have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorism against American targets before this decade is out. To oversimplify, there are three main lines of defense against these emerging threats: The first is prevention and this must entail activities at the source. The second is deterrence and interdiction and involve efforts to stem the flow of illicit trade in these weapons and materials of death. The third line of defense is crisis and consequence management and involves greater efforts at domestic preparedness. As we have explored the weapons material leakage and proliferation problem, one point has become increasingly clear. If the United States is to have any chance of stopping the detonation of a weapon of mass destruction on our soil, prevention must start at the source, the weapons and materials depots and research institutions in the former Soviet Union. We have found that the former Soviet storage facilities are unsafe and insecure. We have learned that there are people and organizations in the world who are attempting to acquire these weapons and materials for terrorist purposes. The most direct line of defense against these dangers is negotiated, verified reductions in nuclear, chemical, and biological forces. It makes no sense to be for missile defenses and against the START treaties and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Likewise, defense spending that facilitates threat reduction in the former Soviet Union is a wise investment. This is the essence of the Nunn-Lugar or Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. I favor a prudent approach to strengthening our third line of defense--namely crisis and consequence management, including defense against ballistic missiles--but not at the expense of shoring up the front lines of defense--namely, prevention and deterrence. It is important to point out that a ballistic or cruise missile is not the likely delivery vehicle a terrorist or rogue nation will use to attack the United States. Rather, a Ryder truck, an already proven form of delivery, or a minivan, is much more likely. Many refuse to believe that this type of drive-up nuclear, chemical, or biological attack is likely. I say it is the most likely. We must protect ourselves from missile attack, but at the same time, we must also be willing to expend the resources necessary to prevent, deter, and interdict this much simpler and more likely form of attack. In my view, the potential costs of ignoring the threats and problems associated with the spread of weapons of mass destruction are so enormous that they demand a national mission on par with the Manhattan Project--Manhattan II. We need to assemble the best minds, with massive resources, to come up with, in a relatively short period of time, the kinds of technical tools that will allow our policymakers to develop truly credible responses and plans in the areas of nonproliferation and counterproliferation. It will take time. But we can jump start that effort here in the Congress today. And that is the purpose of the amendment being offered by Senator Nunn, Senator Domenici, and myself. There are three basic elements or components to our amendment. The first component stems from the recognition that the United States cannot afford to rely on a policy of prevention and deterrence alone, and therefore must prudently move forward with mechanisms to enhance preparedness domestically not only for nuclear but chemical and biological incidents as well. The second component addresses the supply side of these materials, weapons and know-how in the states of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Building on our prior Nunn-Lugar/CTR experience, and recognizing that it is far more effective, and less expensive, to prevent WMD proliferation in the first place than to face such weapons on the battlefield or the school playground, our amendment includes countermeasures intended to firm up border and export controls, measures to promote and support counterproliferation research and development, and enhanced efforts to prevent the brain-drain of lethal know-how to rogue states and terrorist groups. The third and last major component stems from the recognition much of the current effort to deal with the NBC threat crosscuts numerous Federal departments and agencies and highlights the need for the creation of a national coordinator for nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy in order to provide a more strategic and coordinated vision and response. Let me deal briefly with each of these components. The first component of our amendment concerns domestic preparedness for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. Senator Nunn has described this part of the amendment and I will not repeat his explanation. Let me simply say that our hearings have demonstrated that the United States is woefully unprepared for domestic terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Although recent Presidential decision directives address the coordination of both crisis and consequence management of a WMD incident, the Federal Government has done too little to prepare for a nuclear threat or nuclear detonation on American soil, and even less for a biological or chemical threat or incident. The second component of our amendment focuses on further constricting the supply side of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Nunn-Lugar or cooperative threat reduction program and related initiatives has sought to address the threat to United States security posed by the nuclear weapons, scientists, and materials of the former Soviet Union. The mission to secure these nuclear assets, as well as their chemical and biological equivalents, is unfinished. We week to capitalize on the progress achieved in dismantling nuclear weapons of the former Soviet states and in preventing the flight of weapons scientists over the past 5 years and to expand the core mission of the program so as to address strategically the emerging WMD threats that compromise our domestic security. The resources that will be required to implement programs proposed in the amendment are not intended to supplant, but rather to supplement, current Nunn-Lugar funding levels. More specifically: First, cooperative programs to improve the protection, control, and accounting of nuclear materials must be accelerated and expanded to encompass all of the nuclear facilities that handle sensitive nuclear materials and components. Second, the security of nuclear materials during transportation between nuclear facilities must receive greater attention. Transportation risks will grow as more nuclear warheads are disassembled and their materials are shipped to interim or permanent storage sites. Third, greater programmatic emphasis needs to be placed on safeguarding highly enriched uranium fuel used in Russian naval propulsion. We need to accelerate and expand our programs with the Russian Navy to encompass all unirradiated enriched uranium fuels used for ship propulsion. Fourth, we need to get on with the business of closing down plutonium production facilities in Russia. Russia agreed to a United States proposal to cease plutonium production for weapons but action has been stymied by the fact that the three reactors in question also produce heat and electricity. These reactors can be converted so that they can no longer produce weapons-grade plutonium while permitting them to continue to produce heat and electricity. Fifth, in order to expand our transparency program efforts with the Russians, we need to undertake new efforts to evaluate technologies and techniques to verify that weapons are being dismantled and to verify the quantities of nuclear materials from disassembled warheads. Sixth, in the area of securing weapons and materials, it is time to make a concerted effort at chemical and biological threat reduction. Opportunities do exist to secure materials that can be used to make chemical and biological weapons, and we need to determine the feasibility and priority of moving beyond nuclear threat reduction and beyond chemical-weapons demilitarization efforts to explore possibilities for improving security for chemical and biological weapons materials. Seventh and last, in addition to enhanced efforts to secure the weapons and materials of mass destruction, we must recognize that the combination of organized crime, porous borders, severe economic dislocation and corruption in the states of the former Soviet Union has greatly increased the risk that lethal materials of mass destruction as well as the know-how for producing them can pass rather easily through the borders of the former Soviet Union. Although Nunn-Lugar programs have begun to offer training and equipment to establish controls on borders and exports throughout the former Soviet Union, much more needs to be done. Much of the training that is done by the U.S. Customs Service will lapse this year. The third component of the amendment focuses on the need for a national nonproliferation coordinator. There is a broad consensus that WMD proliferation is now, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the top threat to U.S. national security interests. Yet the American response to this proliferation threat remains scattered and unfocused. The present nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts include dozens of departments and agencies that have responsibilities in one way or another to protect the United States from such threats. This patchwork effort suffers from lack of coordination, overlap, and duplication. The very nature of the WMD threat demands not just the attention of our armed services and diplomatic corps, but also our law enforcement community, our scientific community, and our intelligence community. In my view, our Nation's nonproliferation effort is in need of a strategic and coordinated government-wide plan. In order to best address the crosscutting nature of the proliferation challenge, we propose to establish the position of the national nonproliferation coordinator who will be charged with coordinating policies and activities to combat the threat posed by WMD both domestically and internationally. The coordinator should have the authority to review the budgets of all agencies with programs in nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and related areas of intelligence and law enforcement. The office of the coordinator should be augmented with nonproliferation and counterproliferation experts from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, Commerce, the intelligence community, and such other agencies as may contribute to the mission of the national coordinator. To support a comprehensive approach to nonproliferation, the national coordinator should chair a new committee on proliferation, crime, and terrorism, to be established within the National Security Council. That committee should include the Secretaries of State, Defense, Justice, Energy, the DCI, and other department and agency heads the President deems necessary. This committee within the National Security Council should serve as the focal point for all government nonproliferation, counterproliferation, law enforcement, intelligence, counterterrorism, and other efforts to combat threats to the United States posed by weapons of mass destruction. Mr. President, it is time to go beyond a recitation of the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to start developing an appropriate strategic, coordinated response. We know what the threats and the problems are. We even have the knowledge and expertise to deal constructively with these threats. Difficult as it is, identifying a new challenge is the easier part of the problem. Summoning the political leadership, the political will and resources, and the support of the American people to act is harder still. Despite the threat of loose weapons of mass destruction and weapons-usable materials, will the political leadership of this country, including this Congress, step up to the plate? Or will this new threat be given the priority it deserves only on the morning after the first act of nuclear, chemical, or biological terrorism takes place on American soil? What will we wish we had done? This amendment represents our considered judgment as to the appropriate starting points for a national effort to deal with the threats posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We have held over 20 hearings during the course of the last year. We have worked with experts in the executive branch--in the law enforcement area, in the Energy Department, in our national laboratories. And we have consulted with officials at the State and local levels--with first responders who will be on the firing line if our efforts at prevention and deterrence should fail. Senator Nunn, Senator Domenici and I are convinced that the programs and measures outlined in the amendment are doable. And we ask for the support of our colleagues in agreeing to this amendment. I yield the floor. Mr. DOMENICI addressed the Chair.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry will meet on Wednesday, June 19, 1996, at 9:30 a.m. in SR-328A to mark up the committee's budget reconciliation instructions.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, as Bob Dole leaves the U.S. Senate today, we are participating in a celebration unlike anything we have witnessed in the Senate for many years, and are unlikely to see again in this century. The abundant flow of affection in the midst of applause and tears are testimony to our recognition of Bob Dole's investment in the Senate, our recognition of the hold his leadership has on our perceptions of the Senate, and the meaning of statesmanship, public service, and patriotism. Senator Bob Dole of Kansas was easily reelected to a fifth term in the U.S. Senate. After 8 years of service in the U.S. House of Representatives, he is in his 28th year of Senate service. On most days in the U.S. Senate and in most battles, Bob Dole has been the voice and the very visible, energetic leader of the Republican Party. Bob Dole is the personification of hard work, constructive intelligence, personal loyalty and the determination to succeed against all odds. His life has been filled with honors and recognition for significant achievements. But perhaps the defining moments of his life were those he spent on a mountainous Italian battlefield. The troops he led as an Army infantry lieutenant were exposed to deadly enemy machine gun fire. He led the charge to eliminate the enemy emplacement. He absorbed withering fire which tore his body and almost ended his life. His heroism was recognized promptly. But his ability to force feeling and movement into his wounded body, to restore some hope that he could feed himself, dress himself, and function as a working, contributing man, took years of agonizing treatment, therapy, and persistence beyond comprehension. Bob Dole is intellectually and physically tough because his very life and being have depended upon that toughness. But those same fateful experiences have undergirded his compassionate championship of all handicapped Americans who have counted upon him to extend a strong hand back to pull them into the fullness of life in America. From his early days in Russell, KS, Bob Dole has understood the struggle of many families to keep food on the table. He has been the Senate champion for thoughtful nutrition programs, including comprehensive knowledge about food stamp distribution and a host of food programs for the working poor of our country. I first met Bob Dole when he was Chairman of our national party, and later as our Vice Presidential nominee in 1976. In the days following that election, I called Bob Dole to thank him for his leadership and to ask for his help in fulfilling my first Senate campaign pledge, namely, to seek a seat on the Agriculture Committee. Even at a time of his own personal discouragement, he was characteristically helpful to me. I was seated at the end of the minority side of the table as the most junior member. I have witnessed for 20 years the mastery of Bob Dole as a farm legislator. His energy level is astonishing. His capacity to entertain new ideas and his generous ability to boost other people have strengthened my enthusiasm for this remarkable Kansan. He deserves the opportunity to serve our Nation as its President. The Nation deserves his Presidency, which could be a term of remarkable achievement based on his innate courage and wisdom, and his universal experience with public persons and public issues. I will be one who strives to help him realize new dimensions of leadership, because I have witnessed his integrity and I have confidence in his judgment. For the moment, I believe it is most important simply to recognize that to applaud Bob Dole is to applaud the vitally important concept that good people arise in America to assume great responsibilities. Our country is stronger because this Senator always saw his duty and inspired so many Americans to follow him.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, the visit to Washington of Lech Walesa, the former President of Poland, and the introduction of the NATO Participation Act on the floor of the Senate, suggests that it is time for the Senate to begin to seriously consider the future of the Atlantic Alliance. It is a particularly important time to take stock of where we stand in the Alliance. Over the past 2 years, the Alliance has discussed and studied many issues ranging from enlargement to command reform to the broader structural reform of the Alliance in order to enable it to carry out new missions. The time for discussing and studying is now coming to an end. Over the next 12 months, NATO must make decisions in three key areas which will cast the die for European security and the transatlantic relationship for the next decade. Starting with last week's Ministerial meeting in Berlin, Alliance leaders must decide: First, will NATO enlarge its membership, and what policies, recognition, and certainty should it give to countries which will not be included in the first selection? Second, how will NATO reform itself internally to be able to carry out new missions? This includes article 5 defense commitments as well as other non-article 5 missions such as crisis management beyond Alliance borders. Third, what should be the NATO relationship with Russia during the enlargement process? Should NATO build a parallel cooperative partnership with Moscow? The ramifications of how well or poorly NATO does its job on these issues are far reaching. We are talking about the laying of the cornerstones of a new European peace order and building a new NATO which deserves that name not only in theory but in reality. If we succeed, we will have set the foundation for decades of European peace and prosperity. If we fail, historians may look back at the early post- cold-war period as a tragic loss of opportunities. It is in this context that we must weigh the utility of legislative efforts such as the NATO Participation Act. Above all, we must realize that we are headed into a historical debate over NATO's future, one that will reverberate for many years to come. It is a debate that will be public and which will undoubtedly be controversial--as befits an alliance of democracies wrestling with such important issues. Much of the discussion about the pros and cons of enlargement and other issues have been limited to elites and experts-- along with the occasional Senator or Minister. That, too, is going to change. I look forward to this public debate. I believe that we have an historical window of opportunity to take steps that will secure European peace and stability and which will lock in the freedom and independence won in the revolutions of 1989 and the collapse of communism. I believe that we will win this debate, both in the U.S. Senate and elsewhere in the Alliance, provided that we follow some simple, common-sense guidelines. Before charting those guidelines, I want to review the basic questions we will undoubtedly face in the U.S. Senate, as well as in the parliaments of both NATO allies as well as candidate countries. The Vision Thing In the United States, our political leaders are often asked about what we call the vision thing. What is it you want to achieve and why? What is your vision and how will individual policies fit together with an overall set of objectives? As a U.S. Senator, I am often asked, by some of my colleagues and constituents, why I am still so concerned about NATO and issues such as NATO enlargement now that the cold war is over. The more distant we get from the heady days of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, it is more clear that we entered a new era. Dangers still abound in post-cold-war Europe. The revolutions of 1989 not only led to the collapse of communism but also to the end of the peace orders established after two world wars. What is at stake here is order and stability in Europe as a whole. And that is why American interests are involved. NATO cannot by itself solve all of Europe's problems. But without a stable security framework, we run the risk that the reform and democracy in the East of Europe will not persist but will instead be undercut by destructive forces of nationalism and insecurity. The failure of democracy in the East could not help but have profound consequences for democracy in the continent's western half as well. If history teaches us anything, it is that the United States is always drawn into such European conflicts because our vital interests are ultimately, albeit somewhat belatedly, engaged. That, in a nutshell, is one reason why I have always been in favor of NATO enlargement. But this is only one reason and one part of my vision, which consists of what I want to prevent, and also what I want to build. I want to build a new transatlantic bargain of a unified and integrated Europe--whole and free--in permanent alliance with the United States. It is a vision of the United States and Europe in a partnership of equals devoted to managing the security of Europe as well as to the pursuit of common interests beyond Europe. The old transatlantic bargain which offered the Europeans a form of American protection in return for American influence must be replaced by a new transatlantic accord. This is a vision for the Alliance that is no longer necessarily focused on or limited to Europe. This is also a vision for the Alliance that transcends the old cold-war rationale, namely--to deter and, if needed, defend Western Europe against a Soviet attack. It is a vision for a new covenant between the United States and Europe as a force for promoting Western values and interests in Europe and beyond. We need a new and much broader transatlantic agenda and dialog, one that focuses on where and how the United States and Europe can and should act together. I was one of the earliest proponents in the Congress of NATO enlargement. But I always spoke of enlargement not in isolation but rather as part of a new security partnership between the United States and a unified Europe. The United States is a global power, a country with interests in Europe and beyond. It is also a country that increasingly requires like-minded allies and partners to manage that international security agenda. And as Americans look around, they see no better candidates than our European allies in NATO as that partner. If this is the vision, then how do we get there? I like the phrase ``double enlargement'' to capture the twin processes of reform that I believe must take place. NATO must enlarge eastward to integrate the new democracies and it must expand its functional missions beyond border defense to include crisis management and perhaps peacekeeping beyond Alliance borders. In both cases, the Alliance must decide how far it wants to go, both in terms of new members and in terms of new missions. There is no escaping the fact that NATO must simultaneously reform in both areas if it is to successfully meet the challenges we are likely to face in the years ahead. It is a basic American interest that the Alliance not only enlarge to help stabilize Eastern Europe, but that enlargement be part and parcel of a broader transformation that turns Europe into an increasingly effective strategic partner of the United States in and beyond the continent. Conditions for Senate Ratification One of the key questions for the NATO Alliance is whether NATO enlargement can be ratified in the U.S. Senate. Nearly every visitor I have in my office from Europe asks me this question. And it is a question about which I have thought a great deal in recent years. The easy answer is that, of course, enlargement is ratifiable--provided a number of preconditions are met. I am going to list my six commandments on what must be done to ensure successful ratification in the U.S. Senate. But first I want to lay out several broader factors which I believe will help shape the debate in the U.S. Senate. First, the debate about NATO enlargement in the U.S. Senate will not only be about enlargement. It will be about the U.S. role in post-cold-war Europe. It will be about NATO--why we still need it, who should be in it, what it should do, and how it should be reformed. This will be the first time that this set of issues will be debated at the national level since the end of the cold war. Although many voices in the United States, myself included, have been calling for such a national debate for some time, it simply has not happened. But the NATO enlargement issue is likely to be the catalyst for precisely such a debate. This makes some of my colleagues in Congress nervous. They fear that the isolationists of the left and the right will band together in some kind of unholy alliance to defeat the internationalist center in U.S. politics. In short, they fear that the NATO enlargement debate will kill NATO. But I think they are wrong. Such a debate can have a very healthy and positive impact in terms of reaffirming the U.S. role in, and consolidating the American commitment to, the new post-cold-war Europe. And, equally important, it is an opportunity to initiate the broader transformation and revitalization of the alliance which is now clearly overdue. Second, this debate will also be about Eastern and Central Europe and our moral, political, economic, and strategic stake in this part of the world. Several years ago there was a cartoon in an American magazine which showed a young boy pointing to a map and saying to his father: ``Eastern Europe, isn't that where the wars start?'' Eastern Europe is where two world wars, as well as the cold war, originated in this century. It is a part of Europe that has seen great injustices and enormous cruelty. It is a part of Europe that has had a disproportionate impact on the course of European and world history. For some Americans, these are reasons to keep the United States out of future instability and possible conflicts--as if a policy of isolation would insulate and protect us from such instability. The lesson I draw is exactly the opposite. The best way to ensure that the United States must never fight a war again over Eastern Europe is to anchor and integrate Eastern Europe into the West once and for all. We must do for Eastern Europe what we did together for Western Europe in the early post-war period--make it secure and integrate it into a broader trans-Atlantic community. How important is Eastern Europe to the United States? A growing number of Europeans are trying to analyze the size of the Polish ethnic vote, or the political clout of the Baltic-American community and what role they will play in the United States Senate debate. Will the NATO enlargement issue, it is sometimes asked, be the swing issue in key battleground States in the U.S. Presidential race? While interesting, I think all these questions miss the real point. Eastern Europe is important to the United States because it is here that the future destiny of the European Continent will be decided. Eastern Europe, in many ways, holds the key to the future stability of the continent. That is why it is a vital U.S. interest. The third reason I believe that Senate ratification will happen is that the arguments of the opponents of enlargement can be met and subdued. But let's take a closer look at them, for they will be part of the debate. Critics insist, first and foremost, that the U.S. Senate will not be willing to extend a security guarantee to Eastern Europe. They cite the divisive debates we have seen on Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia as proof that Americans are tired of foreign commitments. What these critics overlook is the basic difference between Bosnia and Poland as well as the lesson we should learn from the Bosnia experience. Poland's future stability is seen as central to that of Europe as a whole. Rightly or wrongly, Bosnia's was not. I wish it had been otherwise. But one simply cannot compare the issue of extending a security guarantee to a pro-Western democracy like Poland with the confusing debate we had about what to do as Yugoslavia broke up. This was a conflict whose causes were poorly understood, where the stakes for the United States were not always comprehended, where the United Nations was involved with a confusing mandate and a morally ambiguous set of policies and where the military, political, and humanitarian options of the West were extremely difficult. The lesson from Bosnia is not that we should reject NATO enlargement. It is that the West needs to take steps to prevent the rise of such destructive nationalism and ethnic hatred and we must enlarge NATO to stabilize Eastern Europe before other disasters are imminent. Moreover, in many ways the West already has an implicit security guarantee to a country like Poland. Can we really imagine the West today not coming to Poland's defense if it were ever to be threatened again? I, for one, cannot. And because I cannot, I think that we must codify that commitment through NATO in order to make sure that it is credible and that deterrence works. If ever confronted with the question of whether the West will stand by Poland or once again betray it to those who seek to do it harm, I believe that the United States, including my colleagues in the Senate, will do the right thing. The second major reason critics cite against enlargement is cost. Of course NATO enlargement will cost money and resources. But the costs of enlargement may not pose as large an obstacle as some assume. Let us not forget that there are also costs in not enlarging. And alliances save money. By pooling our resources together, we are able to collectively defend our common interests less expensively. How much NATO enlargement will cost will depend in large part upon how the alliance decides to defend and reassure new members. Because there is no immediate threat to these countries, the alliance can afford to adopt a light defense posture backed up by the ability to reinforce in the region during a crisis. Moreover, the costs of building such a posture can be spread over an extended period. A recent study conducted by the Rand Corp. clearly shows that the costs of enlargement can be kept manageable and spread across the alliance. The package proposed in the Rand study, for example, could cost an estimated $30 to $40 billion for the alliance as a whole--both new and old members spread over a 10- to 15-year period. While these numbers may seem large, bear in mind, for example, that the cost of building and operating one U.S. Army division for a 10-year period is estimated at $60 billion. In any event, the alliance will be spending a considerable amount of money for defense over the next 10 to 15 years, and the costs of enlargement are unlikely to amount to more than 1 to 2 percent of planned defense spending. The point here is that enlargement is affordable if handled properly, done in a step-by-step fashion and if the costs are spread fairly among both old and new members. The third reason critics cite against enlargement is the claim that enlargement will only draw new lines in Europe and alienate Moscow. But let us not pretend that lines don't already exist in Europe. What I have never understood about this argument is why these critics are so attached to and nostalgic about the old artificial cold war lines, lines drawn by the acts of Hitler and Stalin over 50 years ago. Expanding and consolidating democracy in the East is not drawing new lines. If allowing new democracies in the East to seek entry into the alliance of their choice is an exercise in line drawing, it is also an exercise in erasing the old artificial lines of Yalta and the cold war. And I look forward to erasing more lines. There is something odd about people in the West who already enjoy a NATO security guarantee telling those who do not have one that extending the guarantee would somehow create a new security problem. In short, I am not especially impressed by the arguments of the opponents of enlargement. Their prescriptions are really a recipe for doing nothing, for postponing all key decisions. We must demand of them what their future vision of the alliance and the trans-Atlantic relationship is. But this does underscore that we are going to have a debate in the Senate. How can we win this debate and ensure successful ratification in the U.S. Senate? I'd like to share with you six commandments on NATO enlargement which, if followed, should help to ensure ratification. First, show leadership. Leadership is key, above all, Presidential leadership. There is no substitute. This will be a national debate and the President must lead. He must also work closely with the leadership of the U.S. Senate. The sooner he starts this process, the better. Leadership must not only come from the United States. It must come from Europe too and Germany in particular. And such leadership must be visible both within NATO and beyond. Let me give you one example. If the European Union falters in terms of its own plans for enlargement, it will make NATO enlargement more difficult to sell in the United States because it will be seen by Americans as a European failure to pull its fair share of the bargain. Second, have a clear moral and political vision and rationale. Enlargement must be seen as the right thing to do. While NATO bureaucrats and diplomats may be consumed by the details of tactics and compromise communique language, what will be crucial in the public debate will be occupying the moral and political high ground. We will ask the opponents of enlargement to lay out their alternative vision-- and we will see whose vision is more convincing. Third, start with the strongest candidates and keep the door open. The enlargement of NATO will start with the strongest candidates for membership. But this does not mean that the alliance is drawing new lines or forgetting about those who, for whatever reasons, cannot be included in the first tranche. Those who are first have an obligation to ensure that stability be extended beyond their borders as well. Fourth, know the costs and commitments--and who will bear them--in advance. This must be clear and known in advance. We need to understand the burdensharing arrangements before we assume the new commitments. The U.S. Senate will not ratify enlargement until it knows the costs and consequences for both the U.S. Armed Forces and the American taxpayer. Talking about important details of defense planning issues should not be seen as militarizing the debate. Instead, it is simply prudent and responsible to sort out among ourselves just what these new commitments mean in practice and to develop plans and programs to ensure that NATO has the capabilities to carry them out. This is what alliances are all about. Fifth, have a strategy for dealing with the have nots. The initial selection of members may be small. When another round of enlargement will take place may be uncertain. Thus, the need to have a clear strategy to underscore that enlargement will not produce a new Yalta. In some cases, the United States has a special relationship with countries that, at that moment, seem unlikely to be included in the first tranche. The United States and Germany have a special responsibility toward the Baltic States. No U.S. President can enlarge NATO without having an adequate set of policies to sustain Baltic independence. The Baltic States may not be included in the first round of NATO enlargement. This underscores the need for an active policy of engagement with them. It is important that we make it clear that they will be full members if they meet the qualifications; that the door for eventual NATO membership for these countries remains open and that we will expand our cooperation with them in the interim period. Non-NATO countries such as Finland and Sweden should also be encouraged to expand their involvement in the region. Countries such as Germany should take the lead in trying to bring the Baltic countries into the European Union as soon as possible and, if they qualify, in the first tranche. Sixth, realize the U.S. need for partners beyond Europe. While many Europeans do not want to acknowledge it, the reality is that there is a linkage between burdensharing arrangements within Europe and outside of it. As a U.S. Senator, it is easier for me to argue the case for NATO's double enlargement to the American people than it is for NATO's eastward enlargement alone. Americans understand that we have vital interests in Europe and they are willing to do their share to ensure that the new Europe which is emerging remains stable. They understand a strategy that posits that we and the Europeans are in this together and that we will work together to defend shared interests--both in Europe and beyond. What they will not understand is an arrangement where the United States is asked to do more in terms of extending new security guarantees, and more in terms of budgetary commitments, in order to extend stability to Europe's eastern half--and at the same time be expected to carry, more or less on its own, the responsibility for defending common Western interests outside of Europe. Russia This brings us to a discussion of Russia. We all know how important Russia's future is for the future of European and international security. But where does Russia fit into the vision of the trans- Atlantic relationship I have laid out? My vision of the alliance does not depend on the existence or possible emergence of a new Russian threat in the East. We do not want an alliance whose vitality and success depends on failure in Russia. Instead, we want a Russia that will successfully reform--and whose success at reform make it a more interesting and useful strategic partner for the alliance. The United States and Europe have an enormous stake in the success of the reform process in Russia. A stable and reformed Russia can be an active partner in maintaining security in Europe, in resolving regional conflicts, and in fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We wish to establish a strategic partnership with Russia that takes account of Russia's position in Europe, a partnership that could and should, lead to formalized relationship with the alliance. Russia's place, in my vision, is clear. I do not see Russia as a candidate member of the alliance. Russia is simply too big, too different. No member of the alliance today or in the foreseeable future would be willing to extend an article 5 guarantee to the Russo-Chinese border. And the Russians--unlike the East Europeans--are not really interested in assuming the obligations and responsibilities that NATO membership entails. At the same time, Russia will inevitably be more than a mere neighbor of this new and enlarged alliance. We hope it will become a partner, indeed a country with which we have a privileged partnership. The NATO I envision is one which guarantees stability in Central Europe, a stability which is just as much in Russia's interest as our own. The Russians should realize that enlargement is not directed against anyone, certainly not against them. Stabilizing democracy in Eastern Europe does not threaten democracy in Russia. Russia will be better off with Poland in NATO than outside of NATO. A Poland that is secure within NATO will be less anti-Russian and more interested in cooperation and bridge building. We cannot save reform in Russia by postponing or retarding reform in Eastern Europe. The Alliance can and should have close strategic relations with Russia. NATO and Russia are allies in IFOR in Bosnia. We hope that this is not a one time affair but the start of a longer and more stable relationship. I hope to see the day when the border between an enlarged NATO and its Eastern neighbors, including Russia, are just as stable and secure as any others in Europe. But it takes two to tango. Moscow has increasingly spoken out against enlargement, with some Russian commentators already bringing out their list of real or imagined countermeasures that they claim Moscow will have to take. Such talk is counterproductive. I belong to those who not only supported NATO enlargement from the outset, but who believed that the Alliance should have moved sooner and more resolutely in enlarging. The Clinton administration, as well as the Alliance as a whole, opted for a slower approach than I would have preferred. And they did so in the hope that dealing with Moscow on the NATO enlargement issue would get easier over time as Russia came to understand the Alliance's true motivations. But by now I think it is crystal clear that a policy of postponing key decisions has not made our lives easier. Some in Russia have misinterpreted Western patience as a sign of Alliance weakness and lack of resolve. Some Russians still believe that they can stop enlargement--and some of them are still tempted to try. As it has become increasingly clear that Russians do not support NATO enlargement, our policy increasingly looks to them like a kind of Chinese water torture. For several years, NATO has issued every couple of months a statement saying that it will enlarge, to which Moscow feels obliged to say that it opposes enlargement. When nothing happens, some observers in Moscow think that they have slowed or even stopped the NATO train. It is too late now to go back and undo the policy decisions on timing. What is important now is that NATO not waver, that it stick to the agreed-upon timetable and move ahead with the initial decision on enlargement--irrespective of the outcome of the Russian elections. Conclusions Let me sum up. There are many other factors that could yet shape the U.S. politics of NATO enlargement. If democratic reforms in the candidate states were to stall, the entire enlargement plan might be put on hold. It also makes some difference whom the next President appoints to key posts such as Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. Overall, however, while ratification of new NATO members faces many obstacles and pitfalls, there is little evidence for the claim that it is politically infeasible. The real tragedy would be if the Senate, in successfully encouraging the administration through legislation to proceed with the inclusion of new members in the Alliance, jeopardized or neglected the development of a bipartisan consensus and public support necessary to secure the 67 votes it will take in the Senate to ratify NATO enlargement. Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader, I ask unanimous consent that the previous consent agreement regarding controlled time be amended as follows: Senator Coverdell, or his designee, be in control from 4 p.m. to 5 p.m.; Senator Daschle, or his designee, be in control of 60 minutes.