Richard Lugar

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, we will soon have a cloture vote on the Leahy substitute to Senate bill 1541, The Freedom To Farm Act, I introduced. We had a cloture vote on that legislation the other day, gaining 53 votes, a majority of the Senate but less than the 60 required to end debate on that occasion. My colleague, Senator Leahy, former chairman of the committee, a man with whom I have worked in the Senate from the time that I started on the Agriculture Committee, has made a number of constructive suggestions. The latest version we are about to vote on is the Freedom To Farm Act but with additional suggestions made by Senator Leahy in the form of a substitute. And I support those additions, Mr. President. I wish to simply recite a few of them for the benefit of Senators who are following this debate. Senator Leahy has said, why not take this occasion to let producers bid for a permanent easement in the Wetlands Reserve Program as opposed to bidding for a shorter period of time. I think that is a very constructive suggestion. He has asked that we encourage innovative range management techniques to be developed in the Southwest under grazing lands authorization. He suggested to make it possible for farmers to serve on State technical committees. So that is incorporated in the legislation. A very significant change, Mr. President, is the reauthorization of the Food Stamp Program and other nutrition programs that require authorization at this time in order to continue. Senator Leahy, furthermore, has made an important change by suggesting that we reauthorize the Conservation Reserve Program through the year 2002, allowing new signups and making water quality a high priority, that which we have considered at length in our committee with extensive hearings and many witnesses strongly in favor of continuation of the program and of the priority for high water quality, likewise for trying to save soils that are in a high erosion situation, and, of course, the preservation of wildlife, supported by conservationists and sportsmen throughout the country. Senator Leahy has asked that we create a nonprofit foundation to promote conservation, a conservation foundation. This idea has passed the Senate earlier in previous legislation. An especially important program, Mr. President, which will now be a part of this legislation, is the EQIP program, $100 million per year in additional mandatory funding for crop-oriented conservation cost sharing, similar to the Lugar-Leahy conservation bill, S. 854. Let me simply say, these are suggestions that would have come forward in other titles of the farm bill. We all appreciate the situation in which the farm bill was incorporated in the Balanced Budget Act. Regretfully, President Clinton vetoed that act and he, therefore, vetoed the farm bill. As I explained to Members the other day, literally I picked up the farm bill from the side of the road and put it back into play, and we got 53 votes to stop debate on that situation. We are hopeful of getting 60 votes to end debate by incorporating these additional suggestions of the distinguished Democratic leader of the Agriculture Committee. I will add that many other Members on the other side of the aisle have shown strong support for Senator Leahy's initiative. Mr. President, other speakers today have mentioned the importance of certainty about farm legislation. Clearly, that is the reason we return today. We are attempting to provide that certainty so that farmers will know there is a program that has passed one body and have a fairly good idea how that meshes with the farm bill that is now about to be considered on the floor of the House of Representatives, a bill very similar in terms of all of its freedom to farm aspects. I predict if we are successful today, we will be in a position to confer with the House very promptly upon their return, and farmers will have an idea, at least in framework, of what to anticipate as they try to order inputs prior to planting. If we fail to act, two things will occur, one of which has been predicted by Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman, and that is, he feels a mandate to begin thinking through the allotments for rice, and he will have to begin thinking about payments to certain wheat farmers--who were in the business in 1949--as the Texas wheat crop is harvest in the latter part of May. Those events are coming along the calendar. The other thing that will clearly occur is that many farmers will simply adopt their own freedom to farm idea. They will plant for the market. They will abandon Government programs. I have suggested that may not be a totally bad idea. It might be, in fact, revolutionary if farmers simply took their fate in their own hands and say we are going to plant for the market and not wait around for games to be played on the Senate floor, for parliamentary procedural difficulties. For those who want certainty and those who want a farm program, this is the day and this is the hour at 4:10. If we make progress, I predict we will have a sound program that has a safety net and certainty. If we do not have cloture today, I suggest to farmers all over America, you better begin thinking about taking your fate in your own hands because I do not predict success very soon along the trail. I note on the floor, Mr. President, my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Vermont. Therefore, I yield the floor.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I yield myself as much time as I may require.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LUGAR. I yield the remaining time to my distinguished colleague.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, in beginning debate on S. 1541, the farm bill, let me just say that it is very important to farmers all over the country who have been notifying Senators and Members of the House that they want, certainly, a degree of certainty before they get into the fields to plant. They would like, as a matter of fact, to see the Congress at work on this vital legislation. In response to that, the distinguished majority leader has, in fact, called us to that cause today, as Senators are aware. This is a very important day. It is extraordinarily important legislation for all of America. Farmers want to know what is going to happen now. Hopefully, the Senate will provide that guidance through constructive action to completion and passage of this legislation today. Over a year ago, at the beginning of the 1995--and now 1996--farm bill debate, I posed 53 questions about future agricultural policy in this country. The answers to those questions made it clear that a status quo farm policy was not a good idea. S. 1541, the legislation before us today, represents a bold new direction. It answers the 53 questions that I asked and that other Senators posed in a broad review of farm policy in this country. There were five basic reasons to support Senate bill 1541. First of all, a good reason to support it is its simplicity of approach. Traditional farm policy is so arcane that even many U.S. Department of Agriculture officials can barely comprehend all of its complexity. The bill we consider today offers a straightforward, commonsense policy. Second, the bill offers certainty. Farmers who sign contracts will know their future payments for the next 7 years. Taxpayers, importantly, will know precisely what money is going to be spent during the next 7 years and that the budget savings we have already debated in this Chamber are certain. That is especially important, Mr. President, because as you will recall, we debated a farm bill that has just expired, estimating that the taxpayers' expense would be about $41 billion. In fact, the final cost to the bill was close to $57 billion due to all the contingencies, including the weather and foreign trade and demand. In this particular instance it was important for those of us who favor a balanced budget approach to know precisely how much was for agriculture, and for farmers to know precisely the payments that would come to them. Third, the bill does provide very substantial savings for taxpayers. With this bill, agriculture has done its part to help balance the Federal budget in 7 years. Senate bill 1541 will reduce Federal spending by about $4.6 billion over the 7 years from a new baseline which reflects actual market prices in this country. I might add, Mr. President, that baseline recognizes that outlays, as expenditures by taxpayers, to the farm community will be $7 to $8 billion less than earlier anticipated largely because market prices for many of the farm programs are very high this year and, therefore, the normal deficiency payments do not kick in under those formulas. The fourth reason for supporting this legislation is its market orientation. Farmers' payments will be the same even if they plant alternate crops. As a matter of fact, they will make planting decisions based on market forces, on the signs of prices in the market. Today planting decisions affect eligibility for Government payments, and subsidies have driven much of the business planning of many farmers. Under Senate bill 1541, farmers will have full planting freedom, thus, the label given to this act, the ``freedom to farm,'' the ability to manage your land, to make decisions for the market. We will end, in fact, Federal Government production controls. That is an important step forward all by itself. A fifth reason for support is that farmers support Senate bill 1541. This long-term plan for U.S. agriculture has been endorsed by a wide range of farm groups. National groups such as the American Farm Bureau and the National Corn Growers and State groups such as the Kansas Wheat Growers and the North Dakota Grain Growers have given strong endorsement to this legislation. Mr. President, the Senate has approved this bill once already as a part of the Balanced Budget Act. Unfortunately for our Nation, the President vetoed that act and thus vetoed the farm bill. That veto creates a problem for U.S. agriculture. Since commodity support programs were a part of the Balanced Budget Act, we are left with no workable farm program for many crops, except for the outdated 1949 and 1938 laws, which could cause price supports. For wheat, for example, for those farmers who had allotments in that period of time almost 50 years ago, those price supports could triple. Now the Clinton administration confirms that implementing these old statutes, the 1949 and the 1938 acts, could add $10 to $12 billion to the cost of running farm programs for the 1996 crops alone. That is clearly intolerable. We have talked, Mr. President, about savings as a part of the Balanced Budget Act. Failure to enact this legislation could mean that $10 to $12 billion in only 1 year alone would be added to the deficit. It is clear, Mr. President, that the Congress and the President will be ridiculed by the public for gridlock, for inactivity, for myopia, given the apparent crisis that lies immediately ahead of us. The new bill must be fiscally responsible. Proposals to raise loan rates, as some of our colleagues want to do, potentially is a very expensive option. And some of our colleagues have charged, in fact, that we have delayed writing a farm bill and that the Senate bill 1541 was written without full participation, without hearings. Mr. President, Congress did produce a farm bill. It passed two Houses and went as a part of the Balanced Budget Act to the President. President Clinton vetoed it, and only that veto has prevented timely passage of new farm laws. Second, the Senate Agriculture Committee held thorough hearings. The committee held 15 farm bill hearings in 1995 involving 157 witnesses from all over our country. Additional and lengthy hearings were held on farm legislation in the Budget Committee. Every conceivable approach to farm policy was discussed in those hearings. Much of the farm bill has, in fact, been developed in a bipartisan way. In July 1995, the Agriculture Committee of the Senate gave preliminary, but unanimous, approval to four titles of the farm bill. They cover trade, farm credit, research, and rural development. Since then, there have been further bipartisan efforts on a miscellaneous title and a conservation title. Some of our colleagues have declined to be involved in the balanced budget amendment consideration. They informed us in the Agriculture Committee that they would not vote for the cuts required by the Balanced Budget Act. We were told that we would have to pass that act with Republican votes alone in the committee, and we did so. If some colleagues feel left out at this point, it is because they chose to be left out. They were within their rights to take that option, but it is strange now to hear complaints about a process that included 15 full hearings and very thorough debate before passage of the farm bill from the Senate Agriculture Committee. I suspect the real complaint is with the substance of the bill. It calls for the end of Government planting controls. It calls for freedom to farm. It provides an entirely new outlook for American agriculture, which I find very exciting as a farmer, as somebody who has walked through this legislation not only as a legislator but as one who is subject to it. I will say, Mr. President, parenthetically, with the exception of the distinguished Senator from Iowa, Senator Grassley, I am the only farmer on the committee, the only one that might be visibly affected by this legislation and have some idea of how it actually works. So from that standpoint, I have a sense of liberation about the process, which is shared, I might say, by farmers in the State of Ohio, the State of the distinguished Chair, and Indiana, and, in large number, farmers in Iowa, whom I have been visiting the last 2 days. They want action, and that is why I am here as opposed to staying another day with friends in Iowa with whom I have been visiting. Fundamentally, a few of our colleagues do not want to reduce spending on farm programs. That is their privilege, but most of us believe they are mistaken. Most farmers know that they, as well as other Americans, will benefit from a balanced budget. They know as well that our Nation will be stronger for that, and they know that S. 1541 defines exactly what the farm commitment is, and it is an acceptable commitment to farm groups. Therefore, Mr. President, S. 1541 is a bold departure from the past. It is clearly a new direction. It will reduce Federal spending and Federal deficits with certainty. It will reform farm programs and give them both certainty and much greater simplicity, and it will prepare U.S. agriculture for what promises to be a very exciting new century. One of the great ironies of consideration of farm legislation during the past year is that initially we talked in terms of Federal programs very similar to the ones which we now have. As the Chair knows, for the large program crops--corn, wheat, cotton, and rice--target prices are established. If the market prices are below those target prices, farmers may receive deficiency payments, the difference between the two, the target price and the market price, for the crop history on the covered acreage they have in the plan for which they have signed. These are the so-called deficiency payments. Others would call them subsidies. They have mounted up to very large totals in some years. In this particular year of the farm bill, suddenly, export demand took off in a very dynamic way. The Chinese changed from becoming exporters to very strong importers. That provided new opportunities for the United States in Southeast Asia, but our traditional customers in Europe and in Japan come in for much stronger orders really across the border. Cattle feeders and hog producers throughout this country have continued to feed large herds of livestock and, despite the rising price of feed, have continued the size of those herds. Mr. President, we have a situation unlike any that I have seen in agriculture in the last generation in which clearly the price in the market went way above the target price and remains there. If a farmer were to go into the futures market this morning and he was bold enough to know exactly what his crop was going to be for this year, the planting of 1996 or 1997, a farmer could sell both crops for prices higher than the target price for corn, for example. I addressed this issue, as I mentioned to the Chair a moment ago, in Iowa in the last few days, with farmers saying, ``What should we do? How much fertilizer should we buy, or other inputs, for our crop?'' My advice has been to take a look at the markets, take a look at the futures prices. Note that we are going to have strong demand for corn, for wheat, for soybeans, and at least it would appear for cotton for some time to come. Freedom to farm means that, that you plant for the market. I would advise farmers to do that. Farmers, being prudent people, say, ``That is clearly the decision we are going to make anyway, but at the same time, we want to know what you legislators are going to do sort of postmortem, after those decisions. If you come back then and say, `We really didn't mean freedom to farm. As a matter of fact, we wanted the same old status quo legislation with all of the controls, the set-asides, the planting decisions made in Washington,' if, in fact, that is what happens weeks, months, years down the trail after gridlock finally is gone and polarization is less intense, what would be the penalties for us if, in fact, we made sound decisions for our farms and for our country, for the general export thrust of a country that exports a great deal more in agriculture than it imports and with a balance of payments that grows stronger every year?'' That is the fundamental question. It is not that farmers need market signals. They are there and abundantly clear what we ought to be doing. They are worried about being undercut by legislators who are not farmers, who really do not understand what is going on out there but purport to do so in behalf of farmers, and by a President who has apparently, through the Secretary of Agriculture, threatened to veto almost all legislation that bears some idea of freedom to farm. So this is why we are having this debate today to bring some certainty to the field. We are having it in the context, as the Chair knows, as the distinguished Senator from Mississippi has already announced, that we are going to have a cloture vote at 1:30 p.m. Why would we already understand we are going to have a cloture vote? It is because the distinguished Democratic leader, in conversations with Senators, has indicated that there is strong opposition on his side of many Senators to this legislation, such strong opposition that it might lead to extended debate, and, therefore, the cloture vote at 1:30 is very important. If cloture is established, we are going to have farm legislation, probably today, but whenever the cloture procedure runs out. If we are not successful, as the Chair knows, another cloture vote will be held on freedom to farm, plus additional amendments that have been offered by the distinguished ranking member of the Agriculture Committee, Senator Leahy. And, hopefully, we will bring debate to a conclusion in some orderly way on that proposition, in the event my legislation that I have introduced and am debating this morning should not pass. In any event, this is a very important day for agriculture and for America. It is a privilege to lay before the Senate, I believe, remarkable legislation that I hope will find favor with the Senate today. Mr. President, I yield the floor to the Senator from Mississippi, such a valued and important member of our committee and, in his own right, chairman of the Agriculture Subcommittee on Appropriations.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I now ask for its second reading.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, after consultation with the distinguished majority leader, Mr. Dole, I send a bill to the desk and ask for its first reading.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. I thank the Chair. I will simply say, parenthetically, this is the farm bill that has been referenced by the majority leader, and cloture will attempt to be obtained on this. I appreciate the procedure of the Senate. Mr. EXON addressed the Chair.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, given this turn of events, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order on Tuesday, January 30, 1996, for the majority leader or his designee to file a cloture motion with respect to the farm bill to be introduced this evening.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. I would also like to mention two changes from the BBA as it passed the House and Senate. Under the Livestock Environmental Assistance Program, limits are placed on the size of operations that may receive benefits. The BBA contained these limits but some felt that for dairy operations, the limits were too strict. Therefore, dairy operations of 700 or fewer cows will now be eligible. The other change deals with which crops may be planted on acres enrolled in income support contracts. The bill introduced today will treat fruit and vegetable crops in the same manner as current law--that is, they may not be planted on contract acres. Mr. President, the Agricultural Market Transition Act of 1996 represents a bold departure from the past. It is a new direction for American agriculture. It will reduce Federal spending, reform price support programs, and prepare U.S. farmers for what promises to be an exciting new century, full of opportunities for the most efficient food producers in the world.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to support the Agricultural Market Transition Act of 1996. This legislation is identical to Title I of the Balanced Budget Act, with two changes which I shall mention shortly. Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act and the President, most unfortunately for the country, vetoed it. We hope that some spending cuts can be added to legislation raising the Federal debt limit. However, the veto creates a problem for U.S. agriculture. The problem is that commodity support programs for the next 7 years were part of the BBA. Existing authority for these programs has now expired. All that remain are outdated statutes from 1938 and 1949. The Clinton administration confirms that implementing these statues could add $10 to $12 billion to the cost of running farm programs for 1996 crops alone. That is intolerable for taxpayers. Farmers do not support such an irresponsible policy. The solution is to enact a new farm bill. Farmers need to know what farm policies will be--not just for the next 12 months but for the next several years. We owe it to U.S. agriculture to enact a long-term plan, not a stopgap measure. This bill's agricultural provisions are a long-term plan endorsed by a broad spectrum of agricultural groups. From national groups like the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Corn Growers Association, to state groups like the Kansas Association of Wheat Growers and the North Dakota Grain Growers, U.S. producer and agribusiness organizations support this plan. It is simple, in contrast to the needless complexity of current programs. It offers certainty. Farmers will know what their future payments will be. Taxpayers will know how much will be spent. U.S. agriculture will have security against future budget cuts. Finally, it is market-oriented. Farmers' payments will be the same even if they plant alternate crops. Producers' planting decisions will be based on the market--as they should be. Under the BBA, there will be full planting freedom, not arbitrary government production controls. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a brief summary of this bill's provisions be printed in the Record.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. I would also like to mention two changes from the BBA as it passed the House and Senate. Under the Livestock Environmental Assistance Program, limits are placed on the size of operations that may receive benefits. The BBA contained these limits but some felt that for dairy operations, the limits were too strict. Therefore, dairy operations of 700 or fewer cows will now be eligible. The other change deals with which crops may be planted on acres enrolled in income support contracts. The bill introduced today will treat fruit and vegetable crops in the same manner as current law--that is, they may not be planted on contract acres. Mr. President, the Agricultural Market Transition Act of 1996 represents a bold departure from the past. It is a new direction for American agriculture. It will reduce Federal spending, reform price support programs, and prepare U.S. farmers for what promises to be an exciting new century, full of opportunities for the most efficient food producers in the world.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I rise to support the Agricultural Market Transition Act of 1996. This legislation is identical to Title I of the Balanced Budget Act, with two changes which I shall mention shortly. Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act and the President, most unfortunately for the country, vetoed it. We hope that some spending cuts can be added to legislation raising the Federal debt limit. However, the veto creates a problem for U.S. agriculture. The problem is that commodity support programs for the next 7 years were part of the BBA. Existing authority for these programs has now expired. All that remain are outdated statutes from 1938 and 1949. The Clinton administration confirms that implementing these statues could add $10 to $12 billion to the cost of running farm programs for 1996 crops alone. That is intolerable for taxpayers. Farmers do not support such an irresponsible policy. The solution is to enact a new farm bill. Farmers need to know what farm policies will be--not just for the next 12 months but for the next several years. We owe it to U.S. agriculture to enact a long-term plan, not a stopgap measure. This bill's agricultural provisions are a long-term plan endorsed by a broad spectrum of agricultural groups. From national groups like the American Farm Bureau Federation and the National Corn Growers Association, to state groups like the Kansas Association of Wheat Growers and the North Dakota Grain Growers, U.S. producer and agribusiness organizations support this plan. It is simple, in contrast to the needless complexity of current programs. It offers certainty. Farmers will know what their future payments will be. Taxpayers will know how much will be spent. U.S. agriculture will have security against future budget cuts. Finally, it is market-oriented. Farmers' payments will be the same even if they plant alternate crops. Producers' planting decisions will be based on the market--as they should be. Under the BBA, there will be full planting freedom, not arbitrary government production controls. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a brief summary of this bill's provisions be printed in the Record.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, when I brought the START II Treaty to the floor last month, I did so in my capacity as the manage for the Foreign Relations Committee. In my opening statement, I sought to lay out for the body the key provisions of the START II Treaty, the assessment of the treaty of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the force structure implications of the treaty for both the Russian Federation and the United States, and the reasons why this treaty is, on balance, in the national security interests of the United States. But, Mr. President, I have also approached consideration of the START II Treaty from the vantage point of my membership on the Select Committee on Intelligence. I have spent a great deal of time analyzing United States capabilities to monitor compliance with arms control treaties and the START II Treaty in particular. I want to share with my colleagues my major findings and explain each of them briefly. First, no aspects of the START II Treaty text are likely to cause compliance issues because of the manner in which they are worded. I repeat, I have found no aspects of the START II Treaty text that are likely to cause compliance issues because of the manner in which they are worded. Indeed, START II, by banning test-flights and deployment of MIRV'd ICBM's after 2003, may lessen the likelihood of compliance issues regarding the number of re-entry vehicles with which an ICBM is equipped or tested. It should generally be easier to determine the presence or absence of MIRV's than the determine--or agree upon--whether a numerical limit has been exceeded. Second, U.S. national technical means are generally sufficient to monitor compliance with both START Treaties. United States capabilities could be insufficient, however, if competition for scarce collection and analytic resources were intense and if Russian practices were to change in ways designed to impede United States monitoring. As in the case with START I monitoring, the United States will rely upon a combination of capabilities--including imagery, signals intelligence, human intelligence, open-source information and the verification provisions of the START I and START II Treaties--to monitor compliance with the provisions of START II. Despite the strapped resources as well as systems and personnel reductions thus far in the post-cold-war era, the intelligence community assesses a high probability of detecting questionable activity that might be contrary to the treaty. I agree with the intelligence community that U.S. national technical means are generally sufficient to monitor compliance with both START Treaties. I have concerns, however, that U.S. capabilities could be insufficient if competition for scarce collection and analytic resources were to intensify and if Russian practices were to change in ways designed to impeded U.S. monitoring. I support the recommendation that the President be required to certify the sufficiency of U.S. monitoring capabilities regarding those START II provisions relating to ICBM and SLBM capabilities and to report to Congress on how such sufficiency will be assured. I would also urge the executive branch to pursue a firm policy regarding Russian actions that may violate the terms of START I or START II, including the verification provisions of those treaties. Third, I have recommended that the resolution of ratification be conditioned on a requirement that the President certify and, within 90 days of exchanging the instruments of ratification, submit to the Congress a plan for ensuring continued, adequate monitoring of Russian ICBM and SLBM capabilities. This condition has been included in the manager's package of amendments to the resolution of ratification, accepted by the Senate last month. The intelligence community's monitoring confidences reflect a vastly changed world from that of a decade ago. The end of the cold war has brought a substantial refocusing of United States intelligence from the old Soviet Union to a much wider variety of threats to the national security. Indicative of this change is the fact that in the fiscal year 1996 budget process, the Department of Defense opposed funding the COBRA DANE radar. In order to protect that important arms control monitoring system, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA] stepped in and took responsibility for its funding. The Congress, instead, restored full funding for the COBRA DANE platform in the fiscal year 1996 Intelligence Authorization Act, an action that was sustained in the Defense appropriations bill. Some other systems that monitor Russian missile tests face uncertain funding futures or are increasingly diverted to other intelligence priorities, like Bosnia and North Korea, or even to nonintelligence functions. Although intelligence officials remain confident of overall U.S. monitoring capabilities, they have acknowledged that these actions affect those capabilities. I find it totally unacceptable that coverage by National Technical Means of Russian strategic missiles--still the systems with by far the greatest capability to effect the nuclear destruction of United States territory--should be available only at the expense of other important intelligence priorities. That is why I recommend that the resolution of advice and consent to ratification of the START II Treaty be conditioned on a requirement that the President certify and, within 90 days of exchanging instruments of ratification, submit to the Congress a plan for ensuring, continued adequate monitoring of Russian ICBM and SLBM capabilities. Fourth, it is imperative that the executive branch exercise its START II Treaty right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each Russian SS-18 silo that is to be converted. The intelligence community judges that it can monitor with virtual certainty the elimination or conversion of declared items and the number of deployed silo-based ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy bombers that remain in the Russian force. Treaty provisions designed to enhance verification play important roles in augmenting U.S. National Technical Means in this regard. The 10 annual reentry vehicle inspections permitted under START I will help assure, over time, that those silos are not being used for MIRV'ed missiles, and the 4 extra reentry vehicle inspections at converted SS-18 silos that are provided for in START II will add assurance regarding heavy ICBM's. One particularly important aspect of START II verification would be the on-site inspection of SS-18 heavy ICBM silo conversions, to guard against a breakout scenario involving speedy reconversion of SS-18 silos. U.S. inspectors can either physically witness the pouring of the 5 meters of concrete in the bottom of the silo or measure silo depth before and after the concrete was poured. In order to guard against improper implementation of the conversion procedures, it is imperative that the executive branch exercise its START II Treaty right to observe the entire process of pouring concrete into each SS-18 silo that is to be converted, and to measure the diameter of the restrictive ring. Fifth, I urge the firmest practicable policy regarding compliance with START I provisions on the transmission and provision of missile flight test telemetry and interpretive data. The intelligence community generally expects to be able to monitor the ban on flight-testing of MIRV'd ICBM's after 2003, assuming it receives the good telemetry data mandated by START I. The importance of the START I provisions regarding the transmission and provision of missile flight-test telemetry and interpretative data cannot be overestimated, and the executive branch must adopt the firmest practicable policy regarding Russian compliance with those provisions. Sixth, monitoring missile production and storage and, consequently, the number of nondeployed missiles is inherently difficult. As the Director of Central Intelligence has stated, it is possible that some undeclared missiles have been stored at unidentified facilities. In other words, the possible existence of covert, nondeployed mobile missiles must remain an important U.S. intelligence target. Monitoring missile production and storage and, consequently, the number of nondeployed missiles is inherently difficult. At facilities where the United States conducts continuous perimeter and portal monitoring, the intelligence community's uncertainties are low. Uncertainties are higher, however, in estimates of missiles production at facilities not subject to continuous monitoring or on-site inspection. A cheating scenario involving covert production and deployment of mobile ICBM's--and especially of MIRV'ed ICBM's--and their launchers would be particularly worrisome. For that reason, the possible existence of covert, nondeployed mobile missiles must remain an important U.S. intelligence target. Uncertainties in the estimates of numbers of nondeployed missiles will make it difficult for the intelligence community to determine whether all SS-18 airframes have been declared and eliminated as required by START II. On the other hand, SS-18 missiles and canisters are not mobile, are the largest ballistic missile system in the Russian force, and require substantial equipment for handling and transport. Storing and maintaining a covert force of any significant size would be a major undertaking and would increase the risk of detection. As SS-18 silos are destroyed or coverted, moreover, the military utility of any undeclared missiles should steadily diminish. The intelligence community is quite confident of its ability to monitor the essentially irreversible conversion of SS-18 silos. Seventh, it will be difficult to determine whether Russian heavy bombers are equipped with more than the number of nuclear weapons they are declared to carry. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff believes that cheating scenarios that involve heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles generally pose little risk of militarily significant violations. Mr. President, because heavy bomber weapon loadings can easily be changed, the intelligence community will find it difficult to determine whether Russian heavy bombers are equipped with more than the number of nuclear weapons they are declared to carry. When this matter was considered in the START I context, the executive branch emphasized that heavy bombers are inherently stabilizing, and play a more important role in the U.S. strategic force structure than in the Russian. General Curtin of the Joint Staff noted at the time that cheating scenarios that involve heavy bombers and air-launched cruise missiles generally pose little risk of militarily significant violations. He noted that heavy bombers and air-launch cruise missiles are slow flyers which offer little potential for a surprise attack. Eighth, the disincentives for Russia to cheat are substantial. I urge the intelligence community, however, to base its collection and analysis priorities upon a cautious appreciation of the record of Soviet and Russian compliance with arms control agreements. The disincentives for Russia to cheat on START II are substantial. Many cheating scenarios, such as the reconversion of converted SS-18 silos, would risk U.S. detection. The most feasible cheating scenarios would yield only small gains. Thus, covertly reMIRVing all the 105 single-RV SS-19's allowed under START II would increase the number of Russian reentry vehicles by only about 15 percent. And such scenarios as the covert production of large numbers of ICBM's and their launchers would require a considerable investment of scarce resources. Despite these disincentives, however, I repeat that the intelligence community needs to base its collection and analysis priorities upon a more cautious appreciation of the record of Soviet and Russian compliance with arms control agreements. Last, the counterintelligence challenges inherent in START II will be no greater than those of past treaties, and U.S. agencies are capable of handling these challenges. conclusion Mr. President, let me close by reaffirming the conclusion I set forth last month when I introduced the START II Treaty on this floor. The START II Treaty is the result of a bipartisan effort, negotiated by a Republican administration and submitted by a Democratic one. Three Secretaries of State and Defense have supported it. START II represents a substantial step forward in attempting to codify strategic stability at greatly reduced levels of armaments. Final reductions must be completed by January 1, 2003--namely, to levels of 3,000 to 3,500 total warheads, of which no more than 1,750 can be based on submarines. It has been the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, with the 3,500 warheads allowed under this treaty, the United States would remain capable of holding at risk a broad enough range of high value political and military targets to deter any rational adversary from launching a nuclear attack against the United States or against its allies. START II removes the most destabilizing segment of nuclear inventories--namely MIRV warheads and heavy ICBM's. Elimination also includes all deployed heavy ICBM silos and all test and training launchers. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the verification procedures are adequate to ensure that the United States will be able to detect any significant violations. Conversely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also believe that the verification provisions are sufficiently restrictive to protect the United States against unnecessary intrusion by Russian inspectors. It is my belief that, on balance, the START II Treaty is in the national security interests of the United States, and I would hope that the Senate, having expressed its concerns and advice in the Resolution of Ratification, would consent to the treaty by an overwhelming margin.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Highway Rail Grade Crossing Safety Formula Enhancement Act. This important legislation will provide a more effective method of targeting available Federal funds to enhance safety at our Nation's most dangerous highway rail grade crossings. In America today, several hundred people are killed and thousands more injured every year as a result of vehicle-train collisions at highway rail grade crossings. A significant number of these accidents occur in rail-intensive States such as Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, California, and Texas. One quarter of the Nation's 168,000 public highway rail grade crossings are located in these five States. They accounted for 38 percent of deaths and 32 percent of injuries caused by vehicle-train collisions nationwide during 1991-93. My home State of Indiana ranks sixth in the Nation for number of total grade crossings with 6,788, third in the Nation for grade crossing accidents with 263, and fifth for fatalities with 27. Last year, I traveled across northern Indiana aboard a QSX-500 locomotive and witnessed what engineers see every day--motorists darting across the railroad tracks before an oncoming train. From this experience, and from my work to improve safety at highway-rail grade crossings, I learned that engineering solutions, along with education and awareness about grade crossing safety are key strategies that can effectively prevent grade crossing accidents. Responding to this disturbing national trend, I began working with Transportation Secretary Federico Pena and with the Indiana Department of Transportation to address this serious safety problem. We worked to find solutions that would help Indiana and other States make better use of available funds to target the Nation's most dangerous rail crossings. The Federal Government has played an important role in helping States reduce accidents and fatalities at public rail-highway intersections since passage of the Highway Safety Act by Congress in 1973. This act created the Rail-Highway Crossing Program--also known as the section 130 program. Since the program's inception, more than 28,000 improvement projects have been undertaken--from installation of warning gates, lights, and bells, to pavement improvements and grade separation construction projects. During the 103d Congress, I introduced grade crossing safety legislation to restore States' discretion over millions of Federal highway dollars lost as a result of noncompliance with the Federal motorcycle helmet law. Indiana and other States affected by this law were prohibited from using a portion of their highway construction dollars to improve safety at highway rail grade crossings. While the Senate did not approve this legislation during the 103d Congress, I am pleased the Congress repealed the helmet law penalty this year as part of the National Highway System Designation legislation. Repeal of this Federal sanction allows States greater flexibility to use their Federal highway dollars for improvements at rail crossings, and for other transportation priorities. In March, 1994, Senator Coats and I asked the General Accounting Office to conduct a survey of rail safety programs in Indiana and other rail intensive States experiencing a high number of accidents at highway-rail grade crossings. Released this summer, the report-- ``Railroad Safety: Status of Efforts to Improve Railroad Crossing Safety''--evaluated the best uses of limited Federal funds for rail crossing safety, reviewed policy changes that help State and local governments address rail safety issues, and recommended strategies to encourage interagency and intergovernmental cooperation. The report found that in addition to States' efforts to reduce accidents and fatalities through emphasis on education programs and engineering solutions, changes to the funding formulas to apportion highway funds among States would target Federal funds to areas of greatest risk. Under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 [ISTEA], the section 130 program was continued as part of the Surface Transportation Program [STP]. Under ISTEA, 10 percent of a State's apportioned STP funds are allocated to States for highway rail crossing improvement and hazard elimination projects. The GAO reported that key indicators of risk factors used to assess rail grade crossing safety in a State are not considered during the apportionment process. The GAO outlined the Federal Highway Administration's ongoing efforts to review options for STP formula changes that will adjust the current flat percentage allocation from a State's apportioned amount to account for these risk factors. Applying these factors to the funding formula creates a more targeted and focused process that maximizes the effectiveness of Federal funds. The risk factors criteria considered includes a State's share of the national total for number of public crossings, number of public crossings with passive warning devices, total number of accidents and total number of fatalities occurring as a result of vehicle-train collisions at highways rail grade crossings. For example, while Indiana received 3.4 percent of section 130 funds in fiscal year 1995, the Hoosier State experienced 6.1 percent of the Nation's accidents and 5.9 percent of the fatalities as a result of vehicle-train collisions from 1991-93. In addition, Indiana has 4 percent of the Nation's public rail crossings: 6,788. Preliminary estimates of STP apportionments under this legislation indicate Indiana's share of section 130 funds could increase by 33 percent, from the fiscal year 1995 level of $4.9 million to $6.6 million. Overall, about 24 States would receive an increase in section 130 funds for grade crossing improvements. The GAO cited similar statistical comparisons for Illinois, Ohio, and Texas. While the Indiana Department of transportation [INDOT] spent more than $10 million last year on improvements to highway rail grade crossings, a one-third increase in section 130 funds would allow INDOT and other State departments of transportation additional flexibility and resources to improve safety at dangerous rail crossings. The Formula Enhancement Act addresses the allocation problem by adjusting the funding formula for the STP to include a 5-percent apportionment of funds to States for the section 130 program based on a 3-year average of these risk factors. The FHWA has been helpful in preparing this legislation, and I want to express my appreciation to them for their assistance. This legislation will help improve the way the Federal Government targets existing resources to enhance safety on our Nation's highways and along our rail corridors. This legislation does not call for new Federal spending, but rather for a more equitable and effective distribution of existing highway funds to States to enhance safety at dangerous highway rail grade crossings. I am introducing this measure today anticipating congressional consideration next year of a reauthorization bill to succeed the ISTEA which expires after fiscal year 1997. With the many changes occurring in the 104th Congress, it is unclear what direction the next highway authorization bill will take or what the Federal role will be in maintaining the national transportation infrastructure. I wanted to share with my colleagues my interest in ensuring that highway rail grade crossing safety will be a part of these deliberations. I am hopeful highway rail grade crossing safety improvement efforts will continue in rail intensive States and in other States where accidents and fatalities continue to occur a result of vehicle-train collisions. I am hopeful this legislation will reinforce the importance of highway rail grade crossing safety issues as the Congress moves forward with the national discussion of U.S. transportation policy for the 21st century. I believe continued emphasis on finding new and better ways to maximize existing resources that enhance safety at highway rail grade crossings will contribute to the overall effort in Congress and in the States to prevent accidents, save lives and sustain a balanced and effective transportation network for the Nation.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Highway Rail Grade Crossing Safety Formula Enhancement Act. This important legislation will provide a more effective method of targeting available Federal funds to enhance safety at our Nation's most dangerous highway rail grade crossings. In America today, several hundred people are killed and thousands more injured every year as a result of vehicle-train collisions at highway rail grade crossings. A significant number of these accidents occur in rail-intensive States such as Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, California, and Texas. One quarter of the Nation's 168,000 public highway rail grade crossings are located in these five States. They accounted for 38 percent of deaths and 32 percent of injuries caused by vehicle-train collisions nationwide during 1991-93. My home State of Indiana ranks sixth in the Nation for number of total grade crossings with 6,788, third in the Nation for grade crossing accidents with 263, and fifth for fatalities with 27. Last year, I traveled across northern Indiana aboard a QSX-500 locomotive and witnessed what engineers see every day--motorists darting across the railroad tracks before an oncoming train. From this experience, and from my work to improve safety at highway-rail grade crossings, I learned that engineering solutions, along with education and awareness about grade crossing safety are key strategies that can effectively prevent grade crossing accidents. Responding to this disturbing national trend, I began working with Transportation Secretary Federico Pena and with the Indiana Department of Transportation to address this serious safety problem. We worked to find solutions that would help Indiana and other States make better use of available funds to target the Nation's most dangerous rail crossings. The Federal Government has played an important role in helping States reduce accidents and fatalities at public rail-highway intersections since passage of the Highway Safety Act by Congress in 1973. This act created the Rail-Highway Crossing Program--also known as the section 130 program. Since the program's inception, more than 28,000 improvement projects have been undertaken--from installation of warning gates, lights, and bells, to pavement improvements and grade separation construction projects. During the 103d Congress, I introduced grade crossing safety legislation to restore States' discretion over millions of Federal highway dollars lost as a result of noncompliance with the Federal motorcycle helmet law. Indiana and other States affected by this law were prohibited from using a portion of their highway construction dollars to improve safety at highway rail grade crossings. While the Senate did not approve this legislation during the 103d Congress, I am pleased the Congress repealed the helmet law penalty this year as part of the National Highway System Designation legislation. Repeal of this Federal sanction allows States greater flexibility to use their Federal highway dollars for improvements at rail crossings, and for other transportation priorities. In March, 1994, Senator Coats and I asked the General Accounting Office to conduct a survey of rail safety programs in Indiana and other rail intensive States experiencing a high number of accidents at highway-rail grade crossings. Released this summer, the report-- ``Railroad Safety: Status of Efforts to Improve Railroad Crossing Safety''--evaluated the best uses of limited Federal funds for rail crossing safety, reviewed policy changes that help State and local governments address rail safety issues, and recommended strategies to encourage interagency and intergovernmental cooperation. The report found that in addition to States' efforts to reduce accidents and fatalities through emphasis on education programs and engineering solutions, changes to the funding formulas to apportion highway funds among States would target Federal funds to areas of greatest risk. Under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 [ISTEA], the section 130 program was continued as part of the Surface Transportation Program [STP]. Under ISTEA, 10 percent of a State's apportioned STP funds are allocated to States for highway rail crossing improvement and hazard elimination projects. The GAO reported that key indicators of risk factors used to assess rail grade crossing safety in a State are not considered during the apportionment process. The GAO outlined the Federal Highway Administration's ongoing efforts to review options for STP formula changes that will adjust the current flat percentage allocation from a State's apportioned amount to account for these risk factors. Applying these factors to the funding formula creates a more targeted and focused process that maximizes the effectiveness of Federal funds. The risk factors criteria considered includes a State's share of the national total for number of public crossings, number of public crossings with passive warning devices, total number of accidents and total number of fatalities occurring as a result of vehicle-train collisions at highways rail grade crossings. For example, while Indiana received 3.4 percent of section 130 funds in fiscal year 1995, the Hoosier State experienced 6.1 percent of the Nation's accidents and 5.9 percent of the fatalities as a result of vehicle-train collisions from 1991-93. In addition, Indiana has 4 percent of the Nation's public rail crossings: 6,788. Preliminary estimates of STP apportionments under this legislation indicate Indiana's share of section 130 funds could increase by 33 percent, from the fiscal year 1995 level of $4.9 million to $6.6 million. Overall, about 24 States would receive an increase in section 130 funds for grade crossing improvements. The GAO cited similar statistical comparisons for Illinois, Ohio, and Texas. While the Indiana Department of transportation [INDOT] spent more than $10 million last year on improvements to highway rail grade crossings, a one-third increase in section 130 funds would allow INDOT and other State departments of transportation additional flexibility and resources to improve safety at dangerous rail crossings. The Formula Enhancement Act addresses the allocation problem by adjusting the funding formula for the STP to include a 5-percent apportionment of funds to States for the section 130 program based on a 3-year average of these risk factors. The FHWA has been helpful in preparing this legislation, and I want to express my appreciation to them for their assistance. This legislation will help improve the way the Federal Government targets existing resources to enhance safety on our Nation's highways and along our rail corridors. This legislation does not call for new Federal spending, but rather for a more equitable and effective distribution of existing highway funds to States to enhance safety at dangerous highway rail grade crossings. I am introducing this measure today anticipating congressional consideration next year of a reauthorization bill to succeed the ISTEA which expires after fiscal year 1997. With the many changes occurring in the 104th Congress, it is unclear what direction the next highway authorization bill will take or what the Federal role will be in maintaining the national transportation infrastructure. I wanted to share with my colleagues my interest in ensuring that highway rail grade crossing safety will be a part of these deliberations. I am hopeful highway rail grade crossing safety improvement efforts will continue in rail intensive States and in other States where accidents and fatalities continue to occur a result of vehicle-train collisions. I am hopeful this legislation will reinforce the importance of highway rail grade crossing safety issues as the Congress moves forward with the national discussion of U.S. transportation policy for the 21st century. I believe continued emphasis on finding new and better ways to maximize existing resources that enhance safety at highway rail grade crossings will contribute to the overall effort in Congress and in the States to prevent accidents, save lives and sustain a balanced and effective transportation network for the Nation.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, one more point of parliamentary inquiry. Is the status now of the START II Treaty proceedings at a point at which no further amendments are in order and the next stage of activity will be when the Senate is next in executive session and this is called forward, that 6 hours of debate plus potential unlimited time allotted to Senator Thurmond would be in order at that time?

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. LUGAR. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, we have checked with both sides of the aisle to make certain that all parties are in agreement, and after that, I ask unanimous consent that the START II Treaty be advanced through its various parliamentary procedure stages up to and including the presentation of the resolution of ratification, and the managers' amendments which I will offer after consultation with Senator Pell be deemed agreed to, and that no further amendments be in order to the resolution of ratification.

Mr. LUGAR

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I would be happy to yield in just a moment. I want to yield first to my distinguished colleague, Senator Pell, for his opening statement.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I am pleased to join once again with my colleague, Senator Claiborne Pell, in bringing before the Senate a strategic arms reduction agreement negotiated between the Russian Federation and the United States--the START II Treaty. Senator Pell and I collaborated on the ratification process attendant to the START I Treaty, and it is only fitting that Senator Pell will be handling the manager's task for the Democratic side on the START II Treaty. The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Helms, has asked me to manage these treaty deliberations on the Republican side, and I am pleased to do so. For the benefit of our colleagues who may be curious as to the schedule on a Friday afternoon before Christmas, let me outline how we will proceed in these deliberations on the START II Treaty. Following opening statements by the two managers, we will entertain similar statements by other Members. We will then move to consideration of any amendments to the text of the treaty itself. Senator Pell and I are aware of no proposed amendments to alter the treaty text. Then the Senate will move to consideration of the resolution of ratification that will reflect the terms by which the Senate is providing its advice and its decision to the President regarding ratification of the START II Treaty. In reporting the START II Treaty to the full Senate by a unanimous vote of 18-0, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a resolution of ratification that contained a number of conditions and declarations. Subsequent to the filing of the Committee's report on the START II Treaty, interested Senators from other committees came together in a bipartisan spirit to try to develop some consensus on other conditions and declarations that would either modify or be added to the resolution of ratification approved by the Foreign Relations Committee. That effort at consensus-building has been successful, and I want to thank Senator Stevens, Senator Kyl, Senator Cochran, Senator Pell, Senator Levin, and Senator Nunn for the constructive manner in which they approached the resolution of ratification. As a result of their efforts, we have arrived at a package of amendments that enjoys the support of Members participating in those negotiations. That package will be offered in the form of manager's amendments as modifications or additions to the original resolution reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. That resolution of ratification, as amended, will then be open to further debate and amendment. Mr. President, I have elaborated somewhat on the process we will employ in considering this treaty so that Members might plan their schedules accordingly. Unfortunately, we have not been able to arrive at a time agreement for considering the treaty, but I hope these remarks will give Members some sense as to how the Senate will proceed in carrying out its duties in the treaty-making process. Mr. President, the START II Treaty has been awaiting action by the Senate for over 2 years. The opportunity has now arrived for the Senate to play its role in the treaty-making process, and I am grateful to those of my colleagues who have worked so diligently to provide the conditions under which the Senate can consent to the ratification of this treaty. The START I Treaty was the first arms control agreement that actually reduced the number of strategic offensive weapons. It mandated an overall strategic nuclear force reduction of about one-third, and a reduction of up to 50 percent in one of the most dangerous and destabilizing categories of nuclear weapons--heavy ICBM's. START I also broke new ground in establishing effective verification regimes by providing levels of visibility and confidence that exceeded any previous nuclear arms control effort. Thus, the START I Treaty was a vigorous step toward a more stable nuclear balance because it resulted in a reduction in the numbers of destabilizing first strike systems; it fostered greater reliance on more survivable nuclear systems; and it provided increased certainty about the other side's strategic posture. In December 1994, these gains were formalized with the entry into force of the START I Treaty. The disintegration of the Soviet Union offered the opportunity to build on the gains of START I and to go even further in reducing the nuclear dangers to our Nation. The START II Treaty accomplishes just this purpose. When enacted, this treaty will dramatically reduce the numbers of weapons in the two most destabilizing and dangerous categories of nuclear arsenals--ICBM's with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles [MIRV's] and the last of the heavy ICBM's, the SS-18's; and it will enable each party to reduce its strategic arsenal on the basis of an effective verification regime built upon both confidence building measures and intrusive inspections. Both parties will be left at rough equivalence in strategic forces, but the result will be smaller, more stable strategic nuclear forces for both the United States and Russia. The START I Treaty was signed as a bilateral agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on July 31, 1991, after 9 years of negotiation. The treaty was transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on November 25, 1991, but the Soviet Union dissolved formally on December 25, 1991, before the Senate could take action or the treaty could enter into force. The breakup of the Soviet Union created a number of complex state succession issues with respect to the treaty. The most important of these issues was that strategic offensive nuclear weapons were left deployed in four former Soviet republics. In order to resolve this key succession problem, the START I Treaty was converted into a multilateral treaty among the United States, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan by means of the May 23, 1992, Lisbon Protocol (Treaty Doc. 102-32). The Protocol constituted an amendment to, and integral part of, the START I Treaty. It provided that the four former Soviet republics would together assume the legal obligations of the U.S.S.R. for the START I Treaty. It further obligated the four states to make arrangements among themselves as necessary to implement the treaty's limitations, to permit verification of the treaty's provisions on their territory, and to allocate costs. The Lisbon Protocol also obligated Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to accede to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty NPT as nonnuclear weapons states as soon as possible. In letters submitted with the Protocol, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan pledged to eliminate all nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms on their respective territory within 7 years after entry into force of the START I Treaty. To date, all tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from the three states and transferred to Russia. While Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan were under no legal obligation to transfer any nuclear weapons to Russia, and could have, at least in theory, eliminated such weapons on their own territories, those remaining strategic nuclear weapons are, in fact, being transferred and eliminated in Russia. Based on the clarifications and obligations associated with the Lisbon Protocol, the Senate provided its advice and consent to ratification of the START I Treaty in a 93 to 6 vote on October 1, 1992. The treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, or the START II Treaty, was signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on January 3, 1993, and was transmitted by President Bush to the Senate on January 15, 1993. The START II Treaty builds upon and goes even further than the START I Treaty. START II's central limits require the parties to reduce their strategic offensive arms so that specified limits are reached by the year 2003. The START II Treaty, together with the START I Treaty, will reduce both nations' deployed strategic offensive arms by more than two-thirds, and will completely eliminate land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's] deployed with multiple warheads. Strict, lower limits will be imposed on all deployed strategic offensive arms, including warheads carried on ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM's], and heavy bombers. Stabilized sea-based forces will be retained but will carry significantly lower numbers of warheads. In contrast to the START I Treaty, all heavy bombers will be attributed with warheads based on the number of nuclear weapons for which they are actually equipped. There are five parties to the START I Treaty; in contrast, the START II Treaty is bilateral: the United States and the Russian Federation are its only parties. According to the Lisbon Protocol, no nuclear warheads or deployed strategic offensive arms will be located on former Soviet territories other than Russia, at the time the first phase of the reductions in this treaty are required to be completed. Nevertheless, the START II Treaty draws upon the START I Treaty for definitions, counting rules, prohibitions, and verification provisions and only modifies those as necessary to meet unique requirements of the START II Treaty. The terms of the START II Treaty are based on the joint understanding signed between the United States and Russia on June 17, 1992. Its impetus was the desire to strengthen stability by eliminating the most destabilizing systems remaining under the START I Treaty. The joint understanding established the START II Treaty guidelines. The START II Treaty, unlike START I, is relatively brief and straightforward. The START II Treaty calls for reductions, in two phases, in ICBM's, ICBM launchers, ICBM warheads, SLBM's, SLBM launchers, SLBM warheads, heavy bombers, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments. Seven years after entry into force of the START I Treaty, the aggregate number for each party shall not exceed 4,250 deployed strategic warheads. By the same date the following sublimits are to be reached as well: between 3,800 and 4,250, for the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBM's, deployed SLBM's, and deployed heavy bombers; 2,160, for warheads on deployed SLBM's; 1,200, for warheads on deployed multiple-warhead ICBM's; and 650, for warheads on deployed Russian heavy ICBM's (SS-18s). Upon the completion of the above reductions during the second and final phase, the parties shall further reduce their strategic offensive arms so that no later than January 1, 2003, and thereafter, the aggregate number for each party shall not exceed 3,500 deployed strategic warheads. By the same date the following sublimits would also apply: between 3,000 and 3,500, for the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBM's, and deployed heavy bombers; between 1,700 and 1,750, for warheads on deployed SLBM's; Zero, for warheads on deployed multiple-warhead ICBM's; and Zero, for warheads on deployed heavy ICBM's. The START II Treaty provides that after January 1, 2003, neither party may deploy land-based missiles with more than one warhead and all heavy ICBM's must be destroyed. Specifically, all launchers of ICBM's to which more than one warhead is attributed under article III of this Treaty, including test and training launchers, must either by destroyed or be converted to launchers of ICBM's to which no more than one warhead is attributed. This will require the United States to eliminate or convert Peacekeeper ICBM's and their launchers. The Russians will have to eliminate or convert SS-19 and SS-24 ICBM launchers, except those that contain the permitted number of SS-19's downloaded to a single-warhead configuration. Also exempt from this provision are launchers of non-heavy ICBM's located at space launch facilities that are permitted under the START I Treaty. For the United States, this means the Peacekeeper can be used as a vehicle for space launch. All SS-18 ICBM launchers, including all those at space launch facilities, must be physically destroyed. There is one exception--90 deployed launchers may be converted, under agreed provisions, to single-warhead SS-25 type ICBM launchers with canisters no more than 2.5 meters in diameter, such that rapid reconversion is effectively precluded. All United States Minuteman III ICBM's, and 105 of the 170 Russian SS-19 ICBM's, may be retained and downloaded to one warhead pursuant to article III of this Treaty. Any number of SLBM's with multiple warheads may also be downloaded by up to four warheads per missile. Thus, the United States could theoretically meet the numerical constraints of the START II Treaty on SLBM warheads by downloading and retaining up to 18 Trident submarines with missile warhead loads reduced from eight warheads to four. The START I Treaty requires that 154 of the 308 former Soviet heavy ICBM launchers must be destroyed by the end of the 7-year reduction period. The START II Treaty goes further and requires the elimination or physical conversion of all heavy ICBM launchers. The Russian Federation will be allowed to convert, under agreed constraints and subject to inspection, 90 of these deployed missile launchers within which only SS-25 single-warhead ICBM's may be deployed. The remaining 64 heavy ICBM launchers must be destroyed by the end of the second phase of reductions in accordance with START II Treaty procedures. The constraints on SS-18 silo conversion require that the Russians pour concrete to a height of five meters above the silo base and mount in the upper portion of the silo a restrictive ring that is smaller in diameter than the diameter of the SS-18. These modifications preclude an SS-18 from being launched from these silos, and would be extremely difficult and time-consuming to reverse. The constraints also require the destruction of all deployed and nondeployed SS-18 missiles and their launch canisters. In the START II Treaty, all deployed heavy bomber nuclear armaments will be counted according to how the bombers are actually equipped. Each deployed heavy bomber--except for 100 bombers reoriented to a conventional role--will be attributed with the aggregate number of long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles, nuclear-armed air-to- surface missiles with ranges of less than 600 kilometers, and nuclear gravity bombs for which it is actually equipped. Under this agreement, heavy bombers will be attributed with a realistic number of warheads that reflects operational considerations; in many cases, this number may be lower than the maximum number of weapons that could be physically loaded on the aircraft using all available attachment points. In addition, each party may reorient 100 of its heavy bombers to a conventional role; these bombers were never accountable under the START I Treaty as heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCM's. Such bombers would not count toward START II warhead ceilings, but would continue to count against the START I Treaty limits. Each party may, on a one-time basis, return such bombers back to a nuclear role, if it wishes. If some, but not all, bombers within a specific type or variant, under the START I Treaty, are reoriented to a conventional role, they must be given a difference observable by national technical means from the bombers within that type or variant that remain in a nuclear role. Likewise, if a bomber that has been reoriented to a conventional role is subsequently returned to a nuclear role, it must receive an observable difference from other heavy bombers of the same type and variant. The START I Treaty provisions will be used to verify the START II Treaty's limits, except as otherwise provided. The START II Treaty provides for additional inspections to confirm the elimination of heavy ICBM's and their launch canisters, as well as additional inspections to confirm the conversions of heavy ICBM silo launchers. In addition, the START II Treaty provides for exhibitions and inspections to observe the number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers are actually equipped and their relevant observable differences. The START II Treaty requires the elimination or conversion of launchers of deployed ICBM's with multiple warheads. To reinforce this limitation, the acquisition of such weapons from another state is prohibited after the second phase of reductions. After that date, the START II Treaty also prohibits the production, flight-testing--except from space launch facilities--or deployment of ICBM's to which more than one warhead is attributed. The parties are obligated under the treaty not to produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more warheads than it has been attributed under the START II Treaty. Also, the parties are obligated not to transfer heavy ICBM's to any other state, including any other party to the START I Treaty. The START II Treaty provides that this last prohibition is to be applied provisionally from the date of signature of the START II Treaty. This has no effect on the United States since there are no U.S. heavy ICBM's. To provide a forum for discussion of implementation of the START II Treaty, the treaty establishes the bilateral implementation commission [BIC]. Through the BIC, the parties can resolve questions of compliance and agree upon additional measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the treaty. The START II Treaty will enter into force upon the exchange of instruments or ratification by the parties. However, since the START II Treaty is built upon the START I Treaty, it could not have entered into force prior to the START I Treaty's entry into force in December 1994. It will remain in force as long as the START I Treaty remains in force. The START II Treaty consists of the main treaty text and three documents which are integral parts thereof: The Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy ICBM's and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBM's Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms--the Elimination and Conversion Protocol; The Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms--the Exhibitions and Inspections Protocol; and The Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms--the Memorandum on Attribution. Also submitted to the Senate for its information are documents that are associated with, but not integral parts of, the START II Treaty. These include three exchanges of letters by the sides addressing SS-18 missiles on the territory of Kazakhstan, heavy bomber armaments, and heavy ICBM silo conversion. Although not submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, these documents are relevant to the consideration of the START II Treaty. The first exchange of letters relates to the negotiation of an agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan regarding SS-18 missiles and launchers on the territory of Kazakhstan. In his December 29, 1992, response to Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev's commitment of December 29, 1992, to spare no effort to conclude such an agreement, Secretary of State Eagleburger confirmed that the START II Treaty would be submitted to the United States Senate for its advice and consent on the understanding that the agreement referred to by Minister Kozyrev-- providing for the movement to Russia and elimination of heavy ICBM's from Kazakhstan--would be signed and implemented, and that, not later than 7 years after entry into force of the START I Treaty, all deployed and nondeployed heavy ICBM's now located on the territory of Kazakhstan will have been moved to Russia where they and their launch canisters will have been destroyed. The second exchange of letters of December 29, 1992, and December 31, 1992, between Secretary of State Eagleburger and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev relates to heavy bombers, and constitutes the assurance of the United States, during the duration of the START II Treaty, never to have more nuclear weapons deployed on any heavy bomber than the number specified in the memorandum on attribution for that type or variant. This letter creates no new legal obligation for the United States but merely reiterates the obligation already assumed under paragraph 3 of article IV of the START II Treaty. The third exchange of letters of December 29, 1992, and January 3, 1993, between Russian Minister of Defense Grachev and Secretary of Defense Cheney, sets forth a number of assurances on Russian intent regarding the conversion and retention of 90 silo launchers of RS-20-- referred to by the U.S. as SS-18--heavy ICBM's. In his letter, which is politically binding on Russia, Minister Grachev reaffirms the steps that Russia will take to convert these silos and assures the Secretary of Defense that missiles of the SS-25 type will be deployed in these converted silos. In January 1992, President Bush proposed to ban land-based MIRVed ICBM's and to cap actual warheads at 4,700, while cutting U.S. Trident warheads by one-third. President Yeltsin agreed with the ban, but wanted deeper cuts to 2,000 to 2,500 warheads. President Yeltsin considered the Bush proposal too inequitable because it cut the Russians where they were the strongest, the land-based MIRVed systems, while letting the U.S. retain its supremacy in bombers and submarines. In addition, the Russians would lose considerable forces in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The breakthrough came when the United States agreed to reductions in its submarine-based ballistic missile warheads. On June 17, 1992, Presidents Bush and Yeltsin signed a joint understanding in Washington that called for a treaty on deep cuts. The joint understanding paved the way for the conclusion of the START II Treaty.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator for his comments and his question. I simply indicate that I share his enthusiasm for the package of amendments. Senator Stevens has been our leader on the arms control observation group in which the distinguished Senator from Virginia and others have participated, and it will be my hope that in the event there is no controversy surrounding those amendments, they might all be adopted as a managers amendment. That would be the procedure that we hope to follow. But as soon as the resolution of ratification is before us, those amendments will be in order.

Mr. LUGAR. Mr. President, I thank especially the Senator from Arizona who has had many concerns about the treaty and has expressed those in a very articulate, constructive way. And his views, I believe, are represented substantially in the amendments that will be offered.