John McCain

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Illinois--and this is growing a little wearisome, it really is. The fact is, 60 votes have been invoked by the minority time after time after time, whether it be a district judge or an appellate court judge, or most any other issue that is controversial. The Senator from Illinois knows that, and that is why it is very disappointing to see him using this kind of rhetoric when he is willing to have 60 votes be required for some judge but somehow feels-- which they did invoke when they were in the minority--and yet feels that it is not appropriate to have 60 votes on an issue of this importance. The Senator from Illinois talks about beginning the withdrawal in 120 days, beginning the withdrawal in 120 days. The day that is signed into law would be the day--would be the day, in the view of every military expert, that al-Qaida would sit back and wait until we left. The Senator from Illinois continues to call it a civil war. There is sectarian violence. There is very little doubt in the minds--of course, perhaps the Senator from Illinois and others know more than literally every expert I know. It has become, in the words of General Petraeus, a center for al-Qaida and a central front in the war on terror, according to our leading generals. Now, I resent a little bit this comment by the Senator from Illinois about he has heard the generals before. I heard the generals before, and I disagreed with the generals, and that is our right to do. But to denigrate their opinion I don't think is appropriate to people who spend their lives in the service of the military, defending this Nation. General Petraeus, it is my understanding, has been wounded three times in different wars fighting for this Nation. I think he deserves respect rather than being dismissed by saying: Well, I have heard the generals say that before. We should pay attention to the generals. We should have paid attention to the generals at other times in our history, including those who disagreed with the former Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld. Again, I repeat, since we seem to be going in a certain circularity, conditions in Iraq today are terrible, but they become way worse as the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, a career foreign service officer, recently told the New York Times. I am quoting from the Washington Post editorial of just a few days ago: The generals who have devised-- The generals whom the Senator from Illinois derides-- The generals who have devised a new strategy believe they are making fitful progress in calming Baghdad, training the Iraqi Army, and encouraging anti-al-Qaida coalitions. Before Congress begins managing rotation schedules and ordering withdrawals, it should at least give those generals the months they ask for to see whether their strategy can offer some new hope. Why do you think the Washington Post and literally most every national security expert feels that this ought to be given an opportunity, remembering that the last part of it has just been put in place a short time ago? Because the consequences of failure, as I have just quoted from many military experts, are a catastrophe. General Lynch says: What the Iraqis are worried about is our leaving. And our answer is: We are staying, because my order from the Corps Commander is that we don't leave the battle space until we can hand over to the Iraqi security forces. Everybody wants things to happen overnight, and that is not going to happen. So when the amendment of the Senator from Illinois and the Senator from Rhode Island and the Senator from Michigan is passed, then the word is spread and General Lynch can no longer say to the Iraqis we are staying, because we will be leaving. General Odierno says: My assessment right now is, I need more time to understand how the current offensive targeting al-Qaida and Iraq terrorists is working and how it could lead to political progress in the months ahead. Odierno said: I am seeing some progress now here in Iraq. We have really just started what the Iraqis term ``liberating'' them from al-Qaida. What I've got to determine is what do I need in order to continue that progress so that the political peace can take hold and Iraqi sources can hold this for the long term. I want to point out to my colleagues that I am not guaranteeing success. I wish it had gone better. I think there are areas, particularly as far as the government is concerned, where dramatic improvement has to take place. But I do know the consequences of failure, and that view of setting a date for withdrawal is a clear recipe for a much larger conflict with much greater involvement in the region over time. So when the Senator from Illinois and my friends on the other side of the aisle talk about how this won't be withdrawal if this is passed, I say: My friends, this is withdrawal. This is the message to those people who have to remain in the neighborhood: We are leaving and you are going to have to make adjustments to the neighborhood and the new big guys on the block. Again, I wish we could take up this issue in September. I wish we could pass the necessary legislation to care for the men and women who are wounded. I wish we could pass the necessary legislation in order to take care of the needs of the men and women in the military. If we pass this bill this week--I tell my colleagues we are going to be going into the August recess. We will be coming back in September with probably a very contentious conference with the House. The chances right now of us getting final passage and the President's signature on this bill by the first of October is not good. So the sooner we get this bill off the floor and to the President, the better off we are going to be. I certainly hope we will take into consideration the great needs that are existing in the military today. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, Madam President.

Mr. McCAIN. Passed after a cloture vote and/or other 60-vote requirement in 2005, seven; passed after a cloture vote and/or a 60- vote requirement in 2006, 10; defeated by cloture or 60-vote requirement, also in 2006, 10. It is clear that when the Senator from Illinois was in the minority, they used the 60-vote provision as well, and that is their right to do so. I don't in any way object to their having done that. I do object strenuously to somehow conveying the impression that this is a ``filibuster'' because we require 60 votes, that this is some Earth- shattering, precedent-shattering procedure. In fact, it is not. In fact, the Senator from Illinois knows very well that 60 votes is often required, whether it be a budget point of order or whether a cloture vote, and it has been used quite often by the minority as a tool to assert their rights as the minority. I understand that. The Senator from Illinois talks about the bill that this has to be on. This is either the eighth or ninth time we have brought up Iraq. He didn't need the authorization bill to do it then. It is the right of the majority to bring up whatever they want, whenever they want. I can assure my colleagues, the Defense authorization bill will probably not be on the floor in September, and one thing I am pretty confident of is that we will be taking up the issue of Iraq in September. So to somehow say that this is appropriate, it is not appropriate because it is controversial, and we know it will not be passed with a provision that requires what the Senator from Illinois wants on it. It will never become law because the President will veto it in the unlikely--in fact, highly unlikely--situation where this bill was passed by both Houses of Congress. What we are doing--have no doubt about it--is keeping the 3.5-percent pay raise from going into law. We are keeping the wounded warrior legislation from being enacted by both Houses and us acting as quickly as possible. The Senator from Illinois, I believe, and all other Senators voted on behalf of the nomination of General Petraeus in February, knowing full well what General Petraeus's strategy was. That was very well articulated. So now we find ourselves some months later saying: Well, we have to end it. The distinguished majority leader, who is no longer on the floor, declared the war lost. I was astonished. Because if we lost the war, then somebody won. Does that mean that al-Qaida has won the war? I don't think the 160,000 young men and women who are serving in Iraq, whom I visited about a week ago, think the war is lost. I don't think the majority of Americans do either. Are they frustrated by what has happened here? Of course, they are frustrated. They want to bring it to an end. But it is the obligation of people such as me to point out what happens when we withdraw in 120 days. Literally, in the view of every expert on national security, we will pay a much heavier price in the long run. Chaos, genocide will ensue. Quite often I hear from the other side: What is plan B, if the surge doesn't work? What is plan B if the withdrawal results in chaos and genocide in the region? According to most experts--including Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, General Zinni according to most people who have spent their lives on national security issues, it will be chaos and genocide. What is plan B there? I hope after the show is over tomorrow morning sometime--and it is clear to all that we will not set a 120-day withdrawal date from Iraq on this legislation--we will then be able to sit down and move forward on the bill so that we can get it passed into law. That is what we should be doing. To somehow think that we have not required, as the majority leader on many occasions required, 60 votes for passage of an amendment or legislation, of course, flies in the face of the clear record which I have just asked to be printed in the Congressional Record. America is now at a crossroads. America is now at a point where, according to Natan Sharansky: A precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces could lead to a bloodbath . . . From Anthony Zinni, who was opposed to us going into Iraq: . . . reality is that we simply cannot pull out [of Iraq], as much as we may want to. The consequences of a destabilized and chaotic Iraq, sitting in a critical region of the world, could have catastrophic implications . . . there is no short- term solution. We have a system of government where the military is subordinate to the civilian leadership, and it should be. It is the most appropriate way. But to completely ignore, as apparently my friend from Illinois is, the leaders whom we have appointed to fight over there and do the dying and carry out the leadership responsibilities, to completely ignore their advice and counsel, they are on the ground. They know what is going on. General Lynch, 3rd ID commander, says: [pulling out before the mission was accomplished] would be a mess. By the way, these will be the guys who will be required to clean up the mess, if we pass this resolution and we have a mess. Continuing from General Lynch: . . . you'd find the enemy regaining ground, reestablishing sanctuaries, building more IEDs . . . and the violence would escalate. I have already quoted before from Henry Kissinger. General Lynch: [our soldiers] want to fight terrorists here, so they don't have to fight terrorists back home . . . I now have the forces I need to conduct that mission. General Lynch, the 3rd ID commander, says he has the troops and the wherewithal and the success to get the job done. The Senator from Illinois wants to say, no, you have to come home in 120 days. I don't think that is right. I don't think General Lynch is reading any polls. I think General Lynch and General Petraeus are fighting an enemy that, according to them, they will be fighting here if we have a precipitous withdrawal. General Lynch: . . . surge forces are giving us the capability we have now to take the fight to the enemy . . . the enemy only responds to force, and we now have that force. That is the force that the Senator from Illinois wants to withdraw within 120 days. We can conduct detailed kinetic strikes, we can do cordon and searches, and we can deny the enemy sanctuaries . . . If those surge forces go away that capability goes away, and the Iraqi security forces aren't ready yet to do that [mission]. Brent Scowcroft, who opposed our entry into the Iraq conflict: [reduction of American presence in Iraq] should follow success in our efforts, not the calendar or the performance of others. I hope that sometime my friends who were involved in this debate will listen to the people we have delegated to lead the best Armed Forces in the history of mankind who are doing one of the most difficult jobs in history. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I was just given information by my staff. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Nevada, the distinguished majority leader and my friend for many years, points out that in previous years, the Defense authorization bill was passed without requirements for a 60-vote majority. There is a simple answer to that. We never took up an issue such as this on the Defense authorization bill. In fact, our focus and our attention was, for 45 years, providing men and women who are serving in the military with what they needed to defend this Nation. Instead--instead, of doing what is necessary, including the 3.5-percent pay raise, including the Wounded Warriors legislation on it to take care of our veterans--we are now gridlocked in the Senate because the Senator from Nevada knows he is not going to pass a withdrawal from Iraq on this bill. If he did, the President would veto the bill, because the President has said it. We all know that in September this issue is going to come to a head, whether I happen to favor that or not. Most people believe that September is a time where we could make the kinds of judgments necessary to see whether we are making the kind of progress that will justify continued effort in this new strategy, which I, of course, would remind my colleagues again, the last part of which was put in place a few weeks ago. Of course, we did not have requirements for 60-vote majorities in the past few years because no one had the temerity to put an issue such as this on the very vital needs of the men and women in the military to do their job. So, of course, there was not a controversial necessity for a 60-vote majority. I am happy to tell my friend from Mississippi that Senator Levin and I are moving forward with clearing amendments so we can, we hope, wrap up this bill by the end of this week. I hope that once this display that is going to take place tonight, all night, is concluded, and there is not sufficient votes in order to get the Levin-Reed amendment passed, at some point we can go back to the Defense authorization bill and get them the 3.5 percent pay raise they have earned; get them that MRAP equipment that they need; get this Wounded Warrior legislation through the Senate and to the desk of the President of the United States. We never grow tired, nor should we, of praising the men and women in the military, particularly those who have sacrificed so much. All of us are embarrassed and ashamed at what happened at Walter Reed. Well, let's pass this Wounded Warrior legislation on this bill and get it done. Who is holding up passage of the Defense authorization bill? Who is requiring us to stay up all night to discuss it? My friends, this is not necessary. We all know that General Petraeus was affirmed in his position by the Senate by an overwhelming vote. General Petraeus, at the time of his hearings, said we were going to have a new strategy-- that strategy is called surge--and that it would require additional troops. He also said at that time it would take time, that it would take a period of time before we would know whether it succeeded. Here we are, literally weeks after the last part of this new strategy is in place, the last detachment of an increase in troops, and we are telling them to set a date for withdrawal. Now, you know, I share the frustration that my friend from Nevada stated about a failed policy. It was a failed policy. The Rumsfeld- Casey policy strategy was doomed to failure, and some of us recognized that and stated that at the time. We said we had to have a new strategy. It has to be the classic counterinsurgency strategy if we are going to succeed in Iraq. Well, we got a new general. We got a new strategy. There are signs of success. There are clearly some signs of progress, and those are readily apparent. Now, is the Maliki Government acting in the way we want them to? No, they are not. Is it disappointing that they are not? Absolutely, it is disappointing. But as far as Anbar Province is concerned, as far as some parts of Baghdad are concerned, yes, there is some progress which has been purchased at great and tragic cost, the sacrifice of young American's lives. I would like to again assure my friend of many years, from Nevada, I understand the frustration that he shows is shared by many Americans. Our failure and our employment of a failed strategy for more than 3 years is well articulated. But I also would plead with my colleagues to at least know that we are not going to stop this now. We are not going stop it now. Even if the majority leader got the 60 votes and got this included in the bill in some way, the President of the United States would veto it. We do not want that to happen. We do not want that to happen. We know that in September, whether I happen to like it or not--I would like to personally give it more time than September--we know that in September this whole issue is going to come to a head. Here we are in the middle of July. Can't we sit down and work out the amendments in a way that Senator Levin and I and Senator Warner and previous chairmen and ranking members have for the last 20 years, get this bill done, get it out and get it to the President's desk? Then we go into recess. We come back in September. I think that that is not an unreasonable path to follow. So, my friends, we will continue to debate this issue all night tonight. I understand that. Hopefully, when the majority sees that, the leader sees there is not the votes, maybe we could then get down to the nuts and bolts of the Defense authorization bill of which at last count there are over 100 amendments pending that Members have on both sides of the aisle, they want to be considered and voted on. I fear--I fear--that the majority leader, because of a lack of time, may feel it necessary to pull the bill from the floor. I think that would not be in any way helpful to our Nation's national security interests. My friends, if we could lower the rhetoric around here a bit, let us sit down and talk about the best way to proceed, recognizing that September will be a very important point, and pass this authorization bill and not for the first time in 45 years have us not do what we need to do for our Nation's security and the men and women who are serving. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to give that to the distinguished chairman.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if this were the first time that a 60-vote requirement were made, I would have some sympathy for the Senator from Illinois. I am having staff compile the number of times when the other side of the aisle was in the minority, they demanded 60 votes as well. You cannot do it with a straight face. You cannot say that all we are going to do here in the Senate is have us govern by 51 votes; otherwise, we may as well be unicameral because we would have the Senate and the House exactly the same. So, of course, I will object, Mr. President. I wish we would get off this horse of saying that somehow the other side never employed the 60- vote requirement in the Senate, because they did. It is a tradition in the Senate, and it is within the rules of the Senate. It may be frustrating. It certainly was to us when we were in the majority and the Democrats were in the minority and they employed it. But to somehow act as if what is being done is unprecedented--I will tell you what is unprecedented; it is taking a Defense authorization bill that is there for the training and equipping and pay raises and necessities of life for the men and women serving in the military, when we should be passing this--we all know it is going to come up in September. We should be passing this so the men and women can get what they need and deserve in order to defend the security of this Nation. Instead, Mr. President, what we are doing is having, again, for the eighth or ninth time, without having passed one appropriations bill, including the Military Construction appropriations bill, which is ready to be passed--instead, we will have this ``argument'' against the filibuster. Mr. President, it doesn't pass the smell test. I object.

Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, Mr. President.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I oppose the amendment offered by the chairman and the Senator from Rhode Island. Let's be very clear what this amendment would do. It would mandate a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. The debate that has taken place on this floor for some months now comes down to a simple choice. The sponsors of this amendment would have us legislate a withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from Iraq within 120 days of enactment, leaving in place only forces authorized to carry out specific, narrow missions. That is one choice, to force an end to the war in Iraq and accept thereby all the terrible consequences that follow. The other is to defeat this amendment, to give General Petraeus and the troops under his command the time and support they have requested to carry out their mission, to allow them to safeguard vital American interests and an Iraqi population at risk of genocide. That is the choice. Though politics and popular opinion may be pushing us in one direction, to take the easy course, we, as elected leaders, have a greater responsibility. A measure of courage is required, not the great courage exhibited by the brave men and women fighting today in Iraq and Afghanistan, but a smaller measure, the courage necessary to put our country's interests before every personal or political consideration. I wish to spend a few moments reviewing the state of affairs in Iraq today. The final reinforcements needed to implement General Petraeus's new counterinsurgency strategy arrived several weeks ago. From what I saw and heard on my recent trips and from briefings and reports since then, I believe our military, in cooperation with Iraqi security forces, is making progress in a number of areas. The areas where they are operating have not suddenly become safe, but they do illustrate the progress that our military has achieved under General Petraeus's new strategy. The most dramatic advances have been made in Anbar Province, a region that last year was widely believed to be lost to al-Qaida. After an offensive by U.S. and Iraqi troops cleaned al-Qaida fighters off of Ramadi and other areas of western Anbar Province, tribal sheikhs broke formally with the terrorists and joined the coalition side. Ramadi, which just months ago stood as Iraq's most dangerous city, is now one of its safest. In February, attacks in Ramadi averaged between 30 and 35. Now many days see no attacks at all--no gunfire, no IEDs, and no suicide bombings. In Fallujah, Iraqi police have established numerous stations and have divided the city into gated districts, leading to a decline in violence. Local intelligence tips have proliferated in the province. Thousands of men are signing up for the police and the army, and the locals are taking the fight to al-Qaida. U.S. commanders in Anbar attest that all 18 major tribes in the province are now on board with the security plan. They expect that a year from now, the Iraqi Army and police could have total control of security in Ramadi. At that point, they project, we could safely draw down American forces in the area. The Anbar model is one our military is attempting to replicate in other parts of Iraq with some real successes. A brigade of the 10th Mountain Division is operating in areas south of Baghdad, the belts around the capital which have been havens for al-Qaida and other insurgents. All soldiers in I brigades are living forward and commanders report that local sheikhs are increasingly siding with the coalition against al-Qaida, the main enemy in that area of operations. Southeast of Baghdad the military is targeting al-Qaida in safe havens they maintain along the Tigris River, and MG Rick Lynch, commander of operations there, recently reported that attacks on civilians in his area of operations were down 20 percent since April and civilian deaths have declined by 55 percent. These and other efforts are part of Operation Phantom Thunder, a military operation intended to stop insurgents present in the Baghdad belts from originating attacks in the capital itself. In Baghdad, the military, in cooperation with Iraqi security forces, continues to establish joint security stations and deploy throughout the city in order to get violence under control. These efforts have produced positive results. Sectarian violence has fallen since January. The total number of car bombings and suicide attacks declined in May and June, and the number of locals coming forward with intelligence tips has risen. Make no mistake: Violence in Baghdad remains at unacceptably high levels. Suicide bombers and other threats pose formidable challenges, and other difficulties abound. Nevertheless, there appears to be overall movement in the right direction. North of Baghdad, Iraqi and American troops have surged into Diyala Province and are fighting to deny al-Qaida sanctuary in the city of Baquba. For the first time since the war began, Americans showed up in force and did not quickly withdraw from the area. In response, locals have formed a new alliance with the coalition to counter al-Qaida. Diyala, which was the center of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's Islamic caliphate finally has a chance to turn aside the forces of extremism. I offer these observations not in order to present a rosy scenario of the challenges we continue to face in Iraq. As the horrific bombing in Salah ad-Din Province illustrates so graphically, the threats to Iraqi stability have not gone away, nor are they likely to go away in the near future. Our brave men and women in Iraq will continue to face great challenges. What I do believe, however, is that while the mission to bring a degree of security to Iraq and Baghdad and its environs in particular, in order to establish the necessary precondition for political and economic process, is still in its early stages, the progress our military has made should encourage all of us. It is also clear that the overall strategy General Petraeus has put into place, a traditional counterinsurgency strategy that emphasizes protecting the population and gets our troops off of bases and into the areas they are trying to protect, is the correct one. Some of my colleagues argue we should return troops to forward operating bases and confine their activities to training in targeted counterterrorism operations. That is precisely what we did for 3\1/2\ years, which I, time after time, said was doomed to failure. The situation in Iraq only got worse. I am, frankly, surprised that my colleagues would advocate a return to the failed Rumsfeld-Casey strategy. No one can be certain whether this new strategy, which remains in the early stages, can bring about ever greater stability. We can be sure, however, that should the Senate seek to legislate an end to the strategy as it is just commencing, then we will fail for certain. Now that the military effort in Iraq is showing some signs of progress, space is opening for political progress. Yet rather than seizing the opportunity, the government of Prime Minister Maliki is not functioning as it must. We see little evidence of reconciliation, and none of the 18 benchmarks has yet been met. Progress is not enough. We need to see results. Today. I am sorry to report the results are not there. The Iraqi Government can function. The question is whether it will. If there is to be hope of a sustainable end to the violence that so plagues that country, Iraqi political leaders must seize this opportunity. It will not come around again. To encourage political progress, I believe we can find wisdom in several suggestions put forward recently by Henry Kissinger. An intensified negotiation among the Iraqi parties could limit violence, promote reconciliation, and put the political system on a more stable footing. At the same time we should promote a dialog between the Iraqi Government and its Sunni Arab neighbors, specifically Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, in order to build broader international acceptance for the Iraqi central Government in exchange for that Government meeting specific obligations with respect to the protection and political participation of the Sunni minority. These countries should cease their efforts to handpick new Iraqi leaders and instead contribute to stabilizing Iraq, an effort that would directly serve their national interests. Finally, we should begin a broader effort to establish a basis for aid and even peacekeeping efforts by the international community key to political progress in Iraq. In taking such steps, we must recognize that no lasting political settlement can grow out of a U.S. withdrawal. On the contrary, a withdrawal must grow out of a political solution, a solution made possible by the imposition of security by coalition and Iraqi forces. Secretary Kissinger is absolutely correct when he states ``precipitate withdrawal would produce a disaster'' and one that ``would not end the war but shift it to other areas, like Lebanon or Jordan or Saudi Arabia,'' produce greater violence among Iraqi factions, and embolden radical Islamists around the world. Let us keep in the front of our minds the likely consequences of premature withdrawal from Iraq. Many of my colleagues would like to believe that should the withdrawal amendment we are currently debating become law, it would mark the end of this long effort. They are wrong. Should the Congress force a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq, it would mark a new beginning, the start of a new, more dangerous, and more arduous effort to contain the forces unleashed by our disengagement. No matter where my colleagues came down in 2003 about the centrality of Iraq to the war on terror, there can simply be no debate that our efforts in Iraq today are critical to the wider struggle against violent Islamic extremism. Already, the terrorists are emboldened, excited that America is talking about not winning in Iraq but is, rather, debating when we should lose. Last week, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al- Qaida's deputy chief, said the United States is merely delaying our inevitable defeat in Iraq and that the Mujahedin of Islam in Iraq of the caliphate and Jihad are advancing with steady steps toward victory. He called on Muslims to travel to Iraq to fight Americans and appealed for Muslims to support the Islamic State in Iraq, a group established by al-Qaida. General Petraeus has called al-Qaida ``the principal short-term threat to Iraq.'' What do the supporters of this amendment believe to be the consequences of our leaving the battlefield with al-Qaida in place? If we leave Iraq prematurely, jihadists around the world will interpret the withdrawal as their great victory against our great power. Their movement thrives in an atmosphere of perceived victory. We saw this in the surge of men and money flowing to al-Qaida following the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan. If they defeat the United States in Iraq, they will believe that anything is possible, that history is on their side, that they can bring their terrible rule to lands the world over. Recall the plan laid out in a letter from Zawahiri to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi before his death. That plan is to take shape in four stages: Establish a caliphate in Iraq, extend the ``jihad wave'' to the secular countries neighboring Iraq, clash with Israel--none of which will commence until the completion of stage one: Expel the Americans from Iraq. The terrorists are in this war to win it. The question is, Are we? The supporters of this amendment respond that they do not, by any means, intend to cede the battlefield to al-Qaida. On the contrary, the legislation would allow U.S. forces, presumably holed up in forward- operating bases, to carry out targeted counterterrorism operations. But our own military commanders say this approach will not succeed and that moving in with search and destroy missions to kill and capture terrorists, only to immediately cede the territory to the enemy, is the failed strategy of the last 3\1/2\ years. MG Rick Lynch, who is directing a major part of the Baghdad offensive, said over the weekend that an early American withdrawal would clear the way for the enemy to come back to areas now being cleared of insurgents. ``When we go out there,'' he said, ``the first question they ask is: `Are you staying?' And the second is: `How can we help?' '' General Lynch added that should U.S. forces pull back before the job is complete, we risk ``an environment where the enemy could come back and fill the void.'' On Monday, last Monday, Lieutenant General Odierno, the No. 2 commander in Iraq said: My assessment right now is I need more time. I'm seeing some progress now here in Iraq. We have really just started what the Iraqis term ``liberating'' them from al-Qaida. Withdrawing before there is a stable and legitimate Iraqi authority would turn Iraq into a failed State and a terrorist sanctuary in the heart of the Middle East. We have seen a failed State emerge after U.S. disengagement once before, and it cost us terribly. In pre-9/11 Afghanistan, terrorists found sanctuary to train and plan attacks with impunity. We know that today there are terrorists in Iraq who are planning attacks against Americans. We cannot make this fatal mistake twice. As my friend, GEN Brent Scowcroft, has said recently, one of the men I respect more than most any in America: The costs of staying are visible. The costs of getting out are almost never discussed. If we get out before Iraq is stable, the entire Middle East region might start to resemble Iraq today. Getting out is not a solution. Natan Sharansky has recently written: A precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces could lead to a bloodbath that would make the current carnage pale by comparison. Should we leave Iraq before there is a basic level of stability, we will invite further Iranian influence at a time when Iranian operatives are already moving weapons, training fighters, providing resources, and helping plan operations to kill American soldiers and damage our efforts to bring stability to Iraq. Iran will comfortably step into the power vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal, and such an aggrandizement of fundamentalist power has great potential to spark greater Sunni-Shia conflicts across the region. Leaving prematurely would induce Iraq's neighbors, including Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Egypt to Israel, Turkey and others, to feel their own security eroding and may well induce them to act in ways that prompt wider instability. The potential for genocide, wider war, spiraling oil prices, and the perception of strategic American defeat is real, and no vote on this floor will change that. Don't take my word for it. Consult, perhaps, the Iraq Study Group, which says: A chaotic Iraq could provide a still stronger base of operations for terrorists who seek to act regionally or even globally. Al-Qaida will portray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a sinificant victory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and in the world. The report goes on to say that: A premature American departure from Iraq would almost certainly produce greater sectarian violence and further deterioration of conditions. The near-term results would be a significant power vacuum, greater human suffering, regional destabilization, and a threat to the global economy. Al-Qaida would depict our withdrawal as a historic victory. Or perhaps ask the Iraqis. BG Qassim Attam, the chief Iraqi spokesman for the Baghdad security plan, said last Sunday the Iraqi military and police force need more time before they are capable of assuming control of the country's security. Or maybe our intelligence agencies which in the January National Intelligence Estimate concluded: If coalition forces were withdrawn rapidly during the term of this estimate, we judge this almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq, intensify Sunni resistance to the Iraqi government, and have adverse consequences for national reconciliation. The ISF would be unlikely to survive as a nonsectarian national institution; neighboring countries might intervene openly in the conflict; massive civilian casualties and forced population displacement would be probable; AQI outside Iraq would attempt to use parts of the country to plan increased attacks in and out of Iraq, and spiraling violence and political disarray in Iraq, along with Kurdish moves to control Kirkuk and strengthen autonomy, could prompt Turkey to launch a military incursion. These are the likely consequences of a precipitous withdrawal. I hope the supporters of such a move will tell us what they believe to be the likely consequences of this course of action. Should their amendment become law and U.S. troops begin withdrawing, do they believe that Iraq will become more or less stable? That al-Qaida will find it easier to gather, plan, and carry out attacks from Iraqi soil or that our withdrawal will somehow make this less likely? That the Iraqi people become more or less safe? That genocide becomes a more remote possibility or ever likelier? This fight is about Iraq but not about Iraq alone. It is greater than that and, more important still, about whether America still has the political courage to fight for victory or whether we will settle for defeat with all the terrible things that accompany it. We cannot walk away gracefully from defeat in this war. How we leave Iraq is very important. As the Iraq Study Group found: If we leave and Iraq descends into chaos, the long-range consequences could eventually require the United States to return. General Petraeus and his commanders believe they have a strategy that can, over time, lead to success in Iraq. General Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker will come to Washington in September to report on the status of their efforts and those of the Iraqis. They request two things of us: the time necessary to see whether their efforts can succeed and the political courage to support them in their work. I believe we must give them both. Right now, as we continue our debate on the war in Iraq, American soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen are fighting bravely and tenaciously in battles that are as dangerous, difficult, and consequential as the great battles of our armed forces' storied past. Americans who fought in France's hedgerow country; those who bled in the sands and jungles of the Pacific Islands, who braved the onslaught of the Chinese Army in the frozen terrain of Korea and who fought a desperate battle to retake Hue from the enemy during the Tet Offensive and against numerically superior forces in an isolated Marine base at Khe San, will recognize and honor the sacrifice of Americans who now fight with such valor, determination, and skill to defend the security interests and the honor of our country in desperate battles in Iraq. The hour is indeed late in Iraq. How we have arrived at this critical and desperate moment has been well chronicled, and history's judgment about the long catalog of mistakes in the prosecution of this war will be stern and unforgiving. But history will revere the honor and the sacrifice of those Americans who, despite the mistakes and the failures of both civilian and military leaders, shouldered a rifle and risked everything--everything--so the country they love so well might not suffer the many dangerous consequences of defeat. We read in our leading newspapers about those veterans of the Iraq war who have organized to oppose its continuation. They have fought for America's freedom, and they have every right to exercise their freedom, to oppose their Government's policies. I wish, though, that the press would pay at least equal attention to the many veterans--many more veterans, many more veterans--who have fought, suffered, and witnessed the ultimate sacrifice, the loss of their dearest friends, and yet are still committed to America's success in Iraq, and to those who have served multiple tours in this terrible war and yet reenlist because they remain steadfast in the belief that they can achieve the mission they have already risked so much to achieve. The American public, those who still support our effort in Iraq and those who desire a quick end to it, should be daily reminded that although our country is deeply divided about this war, most of the many thousands of Americans who have suffered its worst miseries are still resolved--still resolved-- that it not end in an American defeat. Our new counterinsurgency strategy is succeeding where our previous tactics failed us. We are taking from the enemy and holding territory that was once given up for lost. Those who have falsely described General Petraeus's efforts as ``staying the course'' are the real advocates of continuing on the course of failure. Many of those who decry the way we got into this war and the way we fought it are now advocating a way out of it that suffers from more willful refusal to face facts than they accuse the administration of exhibiting. Although we all seem to be united in recognizing the mistakes and failures of the past, the proponents of reducing our forces in Iraq and keeping them in secure bases from which they could occasionally launch search and destroy missions are proposing to return to the very tactics that have brought us to the point of trying to salvage from the wreckage of those mistakes a last best hope for success. That is what General Petraeus and the Americans he has the honor to command are trying to do--to fight smarter and better, in a way that addresses and doesn't strengthen the tactics of the enemy and to give the Iraqis the security and opportunity to make the necessary political decisions to save their country from the abyss of genocide and a permanent and spreading war. So far, the Maliki Government has not risen to that challenge, and it must do so. It is obvious that America is losing our resolve to continue sacrificing its sons and daughters, while the Iraqi Government will not take the political risks to do what is plainly in the best interests of the Iraqi people. But we do not fight only for the interest of Iraqis, Mr. President, we fight for ours as well. We, too, we Members of Congress, must face our responsibilities honestly and bravely. What is asked of us is so less onerous than what we have asked from our servicemen and women, but no less consequential. We need not risk our lives, nor our health, but only our political advantages so that General Petraeus has the time and resources he has asked for to follow up on his recent successes and help save Iraq and America from the catastrophe that would be an American defeat. That is not much to risk compared to the sacrifices made by Americans fighting in Iraq or the terrible consequences of our defeat. For if we withdraw from Iraq, if we choose to lose there, there is no doubt in my mind, no doubt at all, that we will be back--in Iraq and elsewhere--in many more desperate fights to protect our security and at an even greater cost in American lives and treasure. Little is asked of us to help prevent this catastrophe, but so much depends on our willingness to do so, on the sincerity of our pledge to serve America's interests before our own. The Americans who must make the greatest sacrifices have earned the right to insist that we do our duty, as best as we can see it, and accept willingly and graciously whatever small sacrifice we must make with our own personal and partisan ambitions. Ours is a noisy, restive, and contentious profession. It has always been thus, and it always will be. But in this moment of serious peril for America, we must all of us remember to whom and what we owe our first allegiance--to the security of the American people and to the ideals upon which we our Nation was founded. That responsibility is our dearest privilege and to be judged by history to have discharged it honorably will, in the end, matter so much more to all of us than any fleeting glory of popular acclaim, electoral advantage or office. The history of this country, after all, is not merely a chronicle of political winners and losers, it is a judgment of who has and who has not contributed to the continued success of America, the greatest political experiment in human history. It is my sincere wish that all of us, Republicans and Democrats, should know in our hearts whatever mistakes we have made in our lives, personally or politically, whatever acclaim we have achieved or disappointment we have suffered, that we have, in the end, earned history's favor. I hope we might all have good reason to expect a kinder judgment of our flaws and follies because when it mattered most we chose to put the interests of this great and good Nation before our own, and helped, in our own small way, preserve for all humanity the magnificent and inspiring example of an assured, successful and ever advancing America and the ideals that make us still the greatest Nation on Earth. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. Finally, I thank Senator Levin for all the great work we have been able to do together and the wounded warrior legislation, which Senator Levin, under his leadership, we have now adopted as part of the bill. There is another compelling argument to complete the bill. If we are going to take care of our wounded veterans and we are going to take care of the men and women who have served, I think it is a compelling argument that we get this legislation passed. Finally, we have been back and forth on this issue. I do not like to get into the process and go back and forth. But 60 votes was not invented on this side, nor was it invented on the other side. The 60- vote procedure has been employed by the minority in recent years--in my view, all too often. But the fact is, to somehow say it was invented here on this side of the aisle obviously is not the case. There were many times, when the Democratic Party was in the minority in this body, where I saw 60 votes invoked, the procedure invoked, because it was felt, appropriately, because that is the way the Senate works, as the criteria for moving forward because of the urgency or the importance of the pending legislation. So what is missing here, I would say to my friend from Michigan--and I think he agrees with me--is what we have seen is the erosion, over the past 20 years I have been here, of an ability to sit down and discuss and agree and move forward. That is what is the missing ingredient here, and it has been missing for some years. I regret it. I may be a little optimistic, but I think if it were only between the Senator from Michigan and me, we could dispose of most of these issues rather readily and establish a procedure for moving forward. We are now at the point--let's have some straight talk--that this entire bill is in jeopardy because of the imbroglio of the war in Iraq being added to an authorization bill which was not intended to be a national security piece of legislation. It was intended to be a bill to authorize the necessary funding, training, and equipping of the men and women in the military, and care for our wounded veterans has been added. I regret the situation as it is, but that is the way it is. We will spend today debating this issue and discussing it. I hope at some point we will realize the war is going to be going on. This bill, if it is passed with the Reed-Levin amendment on it, would be vetoed by the President. That would be a bad thing to happen. The war will be discussed in September again--we all know that--when General Petraeus is ready to report to the Senate. At some point I would hope we could move forward on the authorization bill and do the things that are necessary to help equip and train and ready the men and women serving in the military and preserving our national security. Again, I appreciate the efforts the Senator from Michigan, distinguished chairman of the committee, is making in this direction.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, we have nearly finished this little exhibition, which was staged, I assume, for the benefit of a briefly amused press corps and in deference to political activists who oppose the war who have come to expect from Congress such gestures, empty though they may be, as proof that the majority in the Senate has heard their demands for action to end the war in Iraq. The outcome of this debate, the vote we are about to take, has never been in doubt to a single Member of this body and, to state the obvious, nothing we have done for the last 24 hours will have changed any facts on the ground in Iraq or made the outcome of the war any more or less important to the security of our country. The stakes in this war remain as high today as they were yesterday. The consequences of an American defeat are just as great, the cost of success just as dear. No battle will have been won or lost, no enemy captured or killed, no ground will have been taken or surrendered, no soldier will have survived or been wounded, died, or come home because we spent an entire night delivering our poll-tested message points, spinning our sound bites, arguing with each other, and substituting our amateur theatrics for statesmanship. All we have achieved is remarkably similar newspaper accounts of our inflated sense of the drama of this display and our own temporary physical fatigue. Tomorrow, the press will move on to other things and we will be better rested. But nothing else has changed. In Iraq, the American soldiers--marines, sailors, and airmen--are still fighting bravely and tenaciously in battles that are as dangerous, difficult, and consequential as the great battles of our Armed Forces' storied past. Our enemies will still be intent on defeating us and using our defeat to encourage their followers in the jihad they wage against us, a war which will become a greater threat to us should we quit the central battlefield in defeat. The Middle East will still be a tinderbox which our defeat could ignite in a regional war that will imperil our vital interests at risk there and draw us into a longer and far more costly war. The prospect of genocide in Iraq, in which we will be morally complicit, is still as real a consequence of our withdrawal today as it was yesterday. During our extended debate over the last few days, I have heard Senators repeat certain arguments over and over. My friends on the other side of this argument accuse those of us who oppose this amendment with advocating ``staying the course,'' which is intended to suggest that we are intent on continuing the mistakes that have put the outcome of the war in doubt. Yet we all know that with the arrival of General Petraeus, we have changed course. We are now fighting with a counterinsurgency strategy, which some of us have argued we should have been following from the beginning and which makes the most effective use of our strength and does not strengthen the tactics of our enemy. The new battle plan is succeeding where our previous tactics have failed, although the outcome remains far from certain. The tactics proposed in the amendment offered by my friends, Senators Levin and Reed--a smaller force confined to bases distant from the battlefield, from where they will launch occasional search-and-destroy missions and train the Iraqi military--are precisely the tactics employed for most of the war, which have, by anyone's account, failed miserably. Now, that, Mr. President, is staying the course, and it is a course that inevitably leads to our defeat and the catastrophic consequences for Iraq, the region, and the security of the United States that our defeat would entail. Yes, we have heard quite a bit about the folly of staying the course, though the real outcome, should this amendment prevail and be signed into law, would be to deny our generals and the Americans they have the honor to command the ability to try, in this late hour, to address the calamity these tried and failed tactics produced and salvage from the wreckage of our previous failures a measure of stability for Iraq and the Middle East and a more secure future for the American people. I have also listened to my colleagues on the other side repeatedly remind us that the American people have spoken in the last election. They have demanded we withdraw from Iraq and it is our responsibility to do, as quickly as possible, what they have bid us to do. Is that our primary responsibility? Really? Is that how we construe our role, to follow without question popular opinion even if we believe it to be in error and likely to endanger the security of the country we have sworn to defend? Surely we must be responsive to the people who have elected us to office and who, if it is their wish, will remove us when they become unsatisfied with our failure to heed their demands. I understand that, of course. And I understand why so many Americans have become sick and tired of this war, given the many mistakes made by civilian and military leaders in its prosecution. I, too, have been made sick at heart by these mistakes and the terrible price we have paid for them. But I cannot react to these mistakes by embracing a course of action that I know will be an even greater mistake, a mistake of colossal historical proportions, which will--and I am as sure of this as I am of anything--seriously endanger the people I represent and the country I have served all my adult life. I have many responsibilities to the people of Arizona and to all Americans. I take them all seriously, or I try to. But I have one responsibility that outweighs all the others, and that is to do everything in my power to use whatever meager talents I possess and every resource God has granted me to protect the security of this great and good Nation from all enemies foreign and domestic. And that I intend to do, even if I must stand to thwart popular public opinion. I will explain my reasons to the American people, I will attempt to convince as many of my countrymen as I can that we must show even greater patience--though our patience is nearly exhausted--and that as long as there is a prospect for not losing this war, then we must not choose to lose it. That is how I construe my responsibility to my constituency and my country. That is how I construed it yesterday, that is how I construe it today, and that is how I will construe it tomorrow. I do not know how I could choose any other course. I cannot be certain that I possess the skills to be persuasive. I cannot be certain that even if I could convince Americans to give General Petraeus the time he needs to determine whether we can prevail that we will prevail in Iraq. All I am certain of is that our defeat there would be catastrophic, not just for Iraq but for us, and that I cannot be complicit in it. I must do whatever I can, whether I am effective or not, to help us try to avert it. That, Mr. President, is all I can possibly offer my country at this time. It is not much compared to the sacrifices made by Americans who have volunteered to shoulder a rifle and fight this war for us. I know that. And I am humbled by it, as we all are. But though my duty is neither dangerous nor onerous, it compels me nonetheless to say to my colleagues, and to all Americans who disagree with me, that as long as we have a chance to succeed, we must try to succeed. I am privileged, as we all are, to be subject to the judgment of the American people and history. But, my friends, they are not always the same judgment. The verdict of the people will arrive long before history's. I am unlikely to ever know how history has judged us in this hour. The public's judgment of me I will know soon enough. I will accept it, as I must. But whether it is favorable or unforgiving, I will stand where I stand and take comfort from my confidence that I took my responsibilities to my country seriously, and despite the mistakes I have made as a public servant and the flaws I have as an advocate, I tried as best I could to help the country we all love remain as safe as she could be in an hour of serious peril. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, and I will not object, may the Senator from Florida also have 1 minute and the vote be delayed by the appropriate time taken by the three speakers?

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, on this side, I ask unanimous consent to add to that unanimous consent request that 10 minutes each be allocated to Senators Craig, Chambliss, and Cornyn. I think given the spillover, that probably will take up the remaining time.

Mr. McCAIN. Given the number of speakers, if I could say, I think maybe 10 minutes maximum, and I would add to that unanimous consent request that Senator Craig and Senator Chambliss be added on this side in rotation. I think up to 10 minutes.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the chairman, and reserving the right to object, I would hope my colleagues would recognize that gives us an hour and 10 minutes until the unanimous consent agreement kicks in. I know there are additional speakers on both sides to take up that time. So I hope they would be economical with their views.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, finally, could I point out, during the entire night we have been basically going back and forth on both sides of the issue. I think all Senators who sought recognition were able to speak sometime during the night. I hope we would be able to continue going back and forth, unless there is a lack of speakers on this side.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the Senator from Michigan and I wish to take a couple minutes while we make a unanimous consent request: that at least the majority leader's time will be from 10:50 to 11 a.m.; from 10:40 to 10:50 will be for the Republican leader; 10:30 to 10:40 will be for the chairman of the committee; and 10:20 to 10:30 will be allocated to me. I ask unanimous consent that be agreed to.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Minnesota, he is exactly right. The fact is the people there are sick of al-Qaida, as he well points out. The sheiks are on our side. Al-Qaida has reacted, predictably, very violently. They have assassinated some of these sheiks. They have assassinated their families. Their lives are threatened every day. But the fact is, they are sick and tired of al-Qaida. They are turning out in large numbers to join the local police. And they are doing, frankly, a job that surprises many of us. I wish also to comment in my remarks that this is a long way--a long way--from the security situation we want. But somehow to stand on the floor of the Senate and say we have not had some signs of success I think flies in the face of the assessment of the generals and those we placed in charge and the facts on the ground. South of Baghdad, as I was saying, in this area, as shown on the map, Operation Phantom Thunder is intended to stop insurgents present in the Baghdad belts from originating attacks in the capital itself. A brigade of the 10th Mountain Division, which I visited, is operating in Baghdad belts that have been havens for al-Qaida. And the slog is tough. It is very tough in that part, south of Baghdad, since many of the al-Qaida and other insurgents have migrated out of Baghdad into that area. But the soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division are moving forward, all of them. Commanders report that the local sheiks there are increasingly siding with the coalition against al-Qaida. Southeast of Baghdad, the military is targeting al-Qaida in safe havens that they maintain along the Tigris River. In Baghdad itself--the key to all of this--the military, in cooperation with Iraqi security forces, continues to establish joint security stations and deploy throughout the city. These efforts have produced positive results, according to General Petraeus and others. Sectarian violence has fallen since January. The total number of car bombings and suicide attacks declined in May and June. The number of locals coming forward with intelligence tips has risen. Make no mistake, violence in Baghdad remains at unacceptably high levels. Suicide bombers and other threats pose formidable challenges, and other difficulties abound. Nevertheless, there appears to be overall movement in the right direction. North of Baghdad, the Diyala area--up here--Iraqi and American troops have surged and are fighting to deny al-Qaida sanctuary in the city of Bakuba. For the first time since the war began, America showed up in force and did not quickly withdraw from the area as had been the case in the previous failed strategy. In response, locals have formed a new alliance with the coalition to counter al-Qaida. Diyala, which was the center of Abu Mus'ab al Zarqawi's proposed Islamic caliphate, finally has a chance to turn aside the forces of extremism. I offer these observations not in order to present a rosy scenario of the challenges we continue to face in Iraq. As last week's horrific bombing in Salah ad Din Province illustrates so graphically, the threats to Iraq's stability have not gone away, nor are they likely to go away in the near future, and our brave men and women in Iraq will continue to face great challenges. What I do believe is that while the mission to bring a degree of security to Iraq, into Baghdad and its environs in particular, in order to establish the necessary precondition for political and economic progress, while that mission is still in its early stages, the progress our military has made should encourage all of us. It is also clear that the overall strategy General Petraeus has put into place, a traditional counterinsurgency strategy which emphasizes protecting the population and which gets our troops off the bases and into the areas they are trying to protect, is the correct one. Some of my colleagues argue that we should return troops to the forward operating bases--that is basically what would happen if we passed the Levin-Reed amendment--and confine their activities to training and targeted counterterrorism operations. That is basically what this resolution says. That is precisely what we did for 3\1/2\ years, and the situation in Iraq got worse--precisely. I am surprised my colleagues would advocate a return to the failed Rumsfeld-Casey strategy. No one can be certain whether this new strategy, which remains in the early stages, can bring about greater stability. We can be sure that should the United States seek to legislate an end to this strategy as it is just beginning, then we will fail for certain. Mr. President, I read this earlier, this resolution. This resolution incredibly says that we can only--the mission is restricted to only fighting al-Qaida. I guess al-Qaida will have to wear T-shirts that say they are al-Qaida. I guess our troops are expected, if someone is planting an IED, to say: Excuse me, sir. Are you al-Qaida or Shiite? If you are Shiite, go ahead and plant it. Please. Now that the military effort is showing some signs of progress, the space is opening for political progress. Yet, rather than seize the opportunity, the Government, under Prime Minister Maliki, is not functioning as it must. We see little evidence of reconciliation and little progress toward meeting the benchmarks laid out by the President. The Iraqi Government can function; the question is whether it will. I would like to urge my colleagues to take a look at one more chart. I appreciate the indulgence of my colleagues, but I think we ought to look at the region. I think we ought to have a look at this region today. With Iraq obviously in the center of an area of the world from which comes the world's supply of oil, from which comes the recruits for al-Qaida, from which comes the primary source--not the only source, as we have found, but the primary source--of suicide bombers and people who would rather commit suicide and take others' lives along with their own, what happens when Iraq evolves into chaos and genocide? Iranians are already exporting the most lethal IEDs into Iraq, IEDs that are capable of even penetrating the armor of our tanks. They are exporting into Iraq not only terrorists and those who have orchestrated attacks, including the kidnapping of American soldiers--there is very compelling evidence that they were paid to do that--but they are also increasing their influence in all of southern Iraq. Religious leaders have gone into southern Iraq, into the small towns as well as Basra. Basra has become, unfortunately, a very dangerous city, thanks to Iranian influence. In the meantime, the Iranians, emboldened by our failure in Iraq, continue to do other things as well, including developing nuclear weapons, including providing support for Hezbollah and Hamas. We see the Saudis now becoming more and more concerned about the fate of the Sunnis. In fact, a few weeks ago, the King of Saudi Arabia made comments very critical about the United States of America for the first time in anyone's recorded memory. Why would he do such a thing? One, our failure; two, they live in the neighborhood and they can't leave. When we talk about telling them we are leaving, then they have to adjust to it. There is very little doubt that the Saudis, with their support of madrasas and other extremist training grounds, are responsible for many of the problems. Jordan now has--see how small Jordan is--Jordan now has 750,000 Iraqi refugees. How many more do you think will pour into Jordan if this instability and chaos ensues, which the majority leader of the Senate has stated, as short a time ago as yesterday, as hypothetical. I think there is very little doubt that the destabilization of Jordan would be at least increased. What about our friends the Syrians who continue to export people who are suicide bombers into Iraq? The majority of suicide bombers, according to experts, aren't Iraqis; they come from other parts of the Middle East, from Saudi Arabia, from Pakistan, from Afghanistan, and other places. What about the Syrians? If you might remember, after our initial victory in Iraq and the assassination of the former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Hariri, Mr. Assad, Bashar Assad, a former optometrist in London, when his father died, was on his heels. There was supposed to be an investigation going on of the Syrian involvement in the assassination of Hariri, and there have been other assassinations as well. Meanwhile, in southern Lebanon, despite a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for the disarmament of Hezbollah, Hezbollah is now being rearmed by the Syrians, and their rockets are being resupplied-- Katyusha rockets and other weapons are being supplied to the Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Some believe it is a matter of time before there is a reignition of rocket attacks and conflicts in southern Lebanon. What about on the other side? What about the Palestinian area? We now see a situation in the Palestinian areas where Gaza is now controlled by Hamas, an organization dedicated to the extinction of the State of Israel. My friends, here is a stark fact: We pull out of Iraq, Iraq devolves into chaos, and the pressures and the danger to the State of Israel is greater than at any time in its history. I don't say that is my opinion; that is the opinion of the military and political leaders of Israel today. One other aspect that I wish to point out. We know the Kurdish area is probably the most stable part of Iraq for a variety of reasons, including their experience in self-governance. But the Turks have made it very clear that if the Kurds attempt to establish an independent state, they will not stand for it; they will take action militarily. I am not saying that; they have said it. So we have a deterioration in Baghdad, in Iraq, the Kurds declare their independence, and the Turks then feel they are required to take military action because of the insurgency of Kurds who have launched attacks out of the Kurdish areas into Turkey. So I think it is important for us to recognize there is a lot at stake here. It isn't just Iraq. Certainly, Iraq is part of it, but it is not just Iraq; it is certainly other parts of the region as well. I hope when my colleagues say, as the majority leader said, ``It is only a hypothetical'' if chaos evolves in the region, that we are required to consider the situation in the entire region and what happens right here where the world's supply of oil--the majority of the world's supply of oil--comes from as well, that we consider the consequences of our actions. I thank my colleagues for their indulgence, and I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am glad to yield for a question.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, in response to the Senator's question, I would say a couple things have happened. One is obviously, as the Senator has pointed out, the bravery and courage of our Marines and Army personnel who are there. But in addition to that, al-Qaida has been so cruel, so disruptive, and causing so many difficulties that the sheiks, the Sunni sheiks have come over on our side. About a year ago, they were recruiting about 20 to 25 people a month to join the local police. The last time they had a recruitment drive, some 1,200 young Sunnis showed up. Now, I will freely admit to my friend from Alabama, you will never see this probably in much of the media reporting today. That is why you have to go over there and get feet on the ground, as I know the Senator from Alabama has, the Senator from Minnesota and others, as well as the Senator from New York. But you have to see it, and you have to talk to these people. It brings up another point. These soldiers, marines, airmen, others, men and women, pay attention to what is going on here on the floor of the Senate. They pay attention when the majority leader of the Senate says the war is ``lost.'' They pay attention when people, previous speakers have said nothing has changed, no improvement. They pay attention to that. General Petraeus said in response to a question I asked him a long time ago--I said: Suppose we send you additional troops, and we tell those troops we support you, but we are convinced you cannot accomplish your mission, and we do not support the mission we are sending you on. What effect does that have on the morale of your troops? That is a question I asked General Petraeus back in January. General Petraeus said: Well, it would not be a beneficial effect, sir. Obviously, a commander would like to go forward with as much flexibility as he can achieve. I was assured yesterday by the Secretary of Defense, if we need additional assets, my job is to ask for them. Of course, Lieutenant General, British Army General Lamb was much more frank in his response, where he said: While it is clear to them that we're making progress, it is not reflected by those who are not in the fight but are sitting back and making judgment upon what they, the troops, can see with absolute clarity. So my answer to the Senator from Alabama is--and I will go through some more areas where we made progress--it is very unfortunate that more Americans do not know not only about the success but of the incredible difficulty of this kind of combat, and yet these young people are doing such a magnificent job.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am glad to yield for a question.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the Senator from Minnesota has been waiting patiently for, I believe, an hour or so. I note the Senator from New York is on the floor. So I will speak for a few minutes and then yield the floor. I want to point out that again, yesterday, British Army Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, Deputy Commander of Multinational Force, Iraq, and senior British military representative in Iraq, was asked by Jamie McIntyre of CNN about how ``the growing sentiment in our Congress to bring U.S. troops home sooner affected the mood of troops deployed in Iraq.'' Lieutenant General Lamb responded that those troops find it ``a touch difficult because while it is so clear to them that we are making progress, it is not reflected by those who are not in the fight but are sitting back and making judgment upon what they, the troops, can see with absolute clarity.'' Lieutenant General Lamb noted that those making such judgments and not taking note of the progress ``are not going out every day in a humvee.'' Moreover, he further noted that the progress the troops see is ``seldom reported.'' They see provincial councils. They see water going to people who did not have it before. They see electricity coming on line. They see stability to the networks. They see all the stuff that no one portrays. That is the view of our deputy to General Petraeus over in Iraq. Yet I hear on the floor here--I hear again there has been no progress made, that the status quo remains, that there has been no progress. And as we get into the debate, we find that those who are supportive of this particular amendment, which requires after 120 days a departure from the conflict, have no plan B themselves. I have been asked continuously what plan B is. And plan B, after the surge, I believe details a set of difficult options. But I think it is important that we point out what has been happening in Iraq as a result of the surge, even though it has been a very short period of time. In Anbar Province--which we all know is over here, as shown on the map. Here is Fallujah. Here is Ramadi. The fact is that last year Anbar Province we believed was lost to al-Qaida. The U.S. and Iraqi troops cleaned al-Qaida fighters out of Ramadi, which I visited last week, and other areas of western Anbar Province. Tribal sheiks broke with the terrorists and joined the coalition side. Ramadi, months ago, was Iraq's most dangerous city. It is now one of its safest. Attacks are down from 30 to 35 a day in February to zero on most days now. Fallujah. The Iraqi police center established numerous stations and divided the city into gated districts. Violence has declined. Local intelligence tips have proliferated. Throughout Anbar Province--this area shown right here on the map-- thousands of men are signing up for the police and army, and the locals are taking the fight to al-Qaida. All 18 major tribes in that province are now on board with the security plan. A year from now, the Iraqi Army and police could have total control of security in Ramadi, allowing American forces to safely draw down.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Maine. I know she has thought long and hard about this issue, and I appreciate her thoughtful remarks. We are respectfully in disagreement. I wish to make a few points, and then I know the Senator from Michigan and others are waiting. I intend to, I tell my colleagues, exercise my right of recognition as we go from speaker to speaker, as we are at 10 minutes of 3 in the morning. The Senator from Maine and others have described this amendment in ways I don't quite agree with, including, among other things, some confidence in the United States permanent representative to use the voice vote and influence the United States and the United Nations to seek the appointment of an international mediator in Iraq under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council. I am not prepared to put the future of Iraq under an international mediator of the United Nations Security Council. The United Nations Security Council's record has not been very good, whether it be Iran, North Korea, or other crises, including Bosnia where we had to go in basically and bail them out. In this resolution, I would call to the attention of my colleagues that it says: After the conclusion of reduction in transition, the United States forces to a limited presence as required by this section, the Secretary of Defense may deploy or maintain members of the Armed Forces in Iraq only for the following missions, and the third one is engaging in targeted counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida, al- Qaida-affiliated groups, and other international terrorist organizations. How do you do that? How do you do that? There are some people planting IEDs who are going to kill our troops, and you say: Excuse me, sir. Are you al-Qaida or are you a Shiite militia? Oh, you are a Shiite militia? Excuse me. What is that all about? That is one of the most unrealistic scenarios I have encountered in warfare. There is a degree of naivete associated with this resolution which is a disconnect between the reality of how warfare is conducted and the utopian United Nations Security Council international mediator. Our troops can be there in Iraq in diminished numbers, but they can only engage in targeted counterterrorism operations against al-Qaida. So I guess al-Qaida would be required to wear T-shirts that say ``al-Qaida.'' In that way, we would know, and it would be OK--it would be OK: You are al-Qaida? OK. A Shiite militia? Do whatever you think. It was al-Qaida that blew up the Golden Dome mosque in Samara. Following that was horrendous sectarian strife. We are finally getting around--finally, belatedly--to asking those who want this withdrawal and who support this resolution to tell us what happens if this strategy fails, if the pullout fails. I quote from today's Los Angeles Times. It says: Many lawmakers who have pushed President Bush to bring troops home from Iraq have not developed plans to deal with the violence that could follow a pullout, interviews with more than two dozen Democrats and Republicans show. Many of them acknowledge that Iraq might plunge into vicious sectarian fighting, much like the ethnic cleansing that consumed Bosnia a decade ago. They acknowledge that Iraq might plunge into sectarian violence that consumed Bosnia, which was so offensive that we went into Bosnia to stop it, but if it is in another part of the world, then we won't go in. In fact, the article goes on to say: ``I wouldn't be surprised if it is horrendous,'' said House Appropriations Committee Chairman David Obey, Democrat, Wisconsin, who has helped lead the drive against the war. 'The only hope for the Iraqis is their own damned government, and there is slim hope for that.'' More incredibly, the article goes on to say: Some proponents of a withdrawal decline to discuss what the United States should do if the violence increases. ``That's a hypothetical. I'm not going to get into it,'' said Senate majority leader Harry Reid. Senator Reid is the one who announced on the floor of the Senate that the war was lost. If the war is lost and we are going to pull out, what is hypothetical? What is hypothetical about assessing the consequences of this withdrawal? Many Democrats, however, believe that any increase in violence would be short-term and argue that a troop drawdown eventually would lead to a more stable Iraq and Middle East. I know of no expert who agrees with that statement. I know of no one. In fact, the Secretary General of the United Nations, not exactly known as a strong supporter of the war in Iraq, said: I would like to tell you that great caution should be taken for the sake of the Iraqi people. The international community cannot and should not abandon them. Any abrupt withdrawal or decision may lead to a further deterioration of the situation in Iraq. That is a statement by the Secretary General of the United Nations. I know my colleagues are waiting, but I wish to point out again another fact. General Petraeus came before the Senate Armed Services Committee on January 23, 2007. General Petraeus at that time articulated the strategy which would be employed and needed to be employed and needed to be given time to succeed. In fact, General Petraeus was asked at his confirmation hearings, which was later ratified by this body by a vote--without a dissenting vote: General Petraeus, in your view, since you have been intimately involved in Iraq from the beginning, suppose we announced tomorrow that we would withdraw within 4 months to 6 months. That happens to coincide with the 120 day withdrawal that we are talking about here. What are the results there in Iraq and in the region? GEN Petraeus: Well, sir, I think that sectarian groups would obviously begin to stake out their turf, try to expand their turf. They would do that by greatly increased ethnic cleansing. There is a very real possibility of involvement of countries from elsewhere in the region entering Iraq to take sides with one or the other groups. There is a possibility certainly of an international terrorist organization truly getting a grip on some substantial piece of Iraq. There is the possibility of problems in the global economy should in fact this cause a disruption in the flow of oil and a number of other potential outcomes, none of which are positive. That is what General Petraeus said at his confirmation hearings. Everybody confirmed him. Everybody knew in this body what the mission was, what they intended to do, what the strategy was, and here we are a few months later pulling the plug, or attempting to pull the plug, on what General Petraeus wants to do. I am proud of the United States of America that we went to Bosnia and stopped the ethnic cleansing. I am proud the United States of America went to Kosovo and stopped ethnic cleansing. I am ashamed we haven't gone to Darfur in some way and effected the stop of ethnic cleansing there. I am ashamed we didn't stop the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people in Rwanda, and so are all of us. That is a majority opinion in this country and in this body. But now--but now, in the case of Iraq: I wouldn't be surprised if it is horrendous. ``I wouldn't be surprised if it is horrendous.'' That is what we are condemning the people of Iraq to. And on the other side, the majority leader of the Senate--and I apologize, because I will ask him about it again on this floor: That's a hypothetical. I'm not going to get into it. Now, I don't know of anybody who believes that is a hypothetical. The fact is, when we leave there is going to be a vacuum, there is going to be chaos, and there is going to be genocide. I can quote on the floor Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft, General Lynch, General Petraeus, literally--General Zinni, those who oppose our presence in Iraq opposed the initial invasion, and yet believe that at least we should face up to and begin to address the consequences of withdrawal. It is not hypothetical. It is not hypothetical. I appreciate the courtesy of my colleagues, and I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, we have to observe the regular order here in the Senate. The Senator from Virginia is clearly not observing the regular order.

Mr. McCAIN. The Senator and I also went together and saw at that time how Ramadi and Fallujah were basically battlegrounds of enormous proportions. Isn't it true that recently both Ramadi--particularly Ramadi, but also Fallujah is a basically secure area. The last time there has been an attack at Ramadi--they have gone many days. Yet somehow that escapes the notice of some of our colleagues. In fact, I don't know if my friend from South Dakota is, is aware of what Lieutenant General Lamb, the British lieutenant general, the deputy commander of Multi-National Force, said the other day when the growing sentiment in our Congress to bring U.S. troops home sooner affected the mood of troops deployed in Iraq. He said: I find it a touch difficult because it was so clear to them that we are making progress. It is not reflected by those who are not in the fight but are sitting back and making judgment upon what they, the troops, can see with absolute clarity. I guess my question for the Senator from South Dakota is, Is there a disconnect between the rhetoric we hear and all of this stuff about how we are losing--and the majority leader of the Senate said we had lost-- and the realities on the ground as reflected by the men and who are fighting?