John McCain

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. I ask my colleague, does that mean we will be voting after the recognition of the majority leader?

Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object.

Mr. McCAIN. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. I say to my colleague that we have one individual, and we do have some 26 amendments that I think are cleared that we could get out of the way. I am working on that right now. I thank my colleague and most of all the staffs for their close cooperation.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to engage in a short colloquy with my colleague from Michigan, the distinguished chairman.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, yesterday a man whom I had the opportunity of meeting and knowing a little bit, British Army Lieutenant General Jim Lamb--General Lamb is the Deputy Commander of Multinational Forces Iraq and senior British military representative in Iraq--was asked by Jamie McIntyre of CNN about how ``the growing sentiment in our Congress to bring U.S. troops home sooner'' affected the mood of his troops deployed in Iraq, meaning the British troops. Lieutenant General Lamb responded that those troops find it ``a touch difficult.'' I think that is a very interesting phrase, ``a touch difficult,'' because while it is so clear to them that we are making progress, it is not reflected by those who are not in the fight but are sitting back and making judgment upon what they, the troops, can see with absolute clarity. Lieutenant General Lamb noted that those making such judgments and not taking note of the progress ``are not going out every day in a humvee.'' Moreover, he further noted that the progress the troops see is seldom reported. They see provincial counselors, they see water going to people who didn't have it before, they see electricity coming online, they see stability to the networks. They see all this stuff that no one portrays. I say to my friend from Michigan and the Senator from Illinois and others, I hope they pay a little attention to General Lamb's statement or reject it out of hand, of course, as apparently is being done. I have to repeat, General Lamb responded that his troops find it ``a touch difficult.'' While it is so clear to them we are making progress, it is not reflected by those who are not in the fight but are sitting back and making judgment upon what they, the troops, can see with absolute clarity. I don't think I have to editorialize anymore on General Lamb's, I think, totally accurate statements. The New York Post reported on July 10 an interview with General Petraeus. He is asked by Ralph Peters, a person for whom I have enormous respect: The current military operations in Iraq appear comprehensive and tenacious, part of a long-term, integrated plan. What can we realistically expect to achieve? Petraeus: Our primary goal is to work with our Iraqi counterparts to improve security for the Iraqi people. This is intended to give the Iraqi leaders the time to resolve the tough political issues they face and to pursue internal reconciliation. He goes on to say: As to reasonable expectations, we can expect a reduction in sectarian deaths and the gradual spread of Iraqi government authority. The level of sectarian deaths in Baghdad in June was the lowest in about a year. Nevertheless, the extremists still have been able to carry out car bomb and other attacks. Wherever we operate, we try to reconnect Iraqi ministries and local governments to meet the needs of the people. Finally, we provide opportunities for Iraqis to use their local knowledge to help root out al Qaeda. Successful operations of this nature have played out in recent months in Ramadi, Hit and Baquba. In each case, Iraqis turned against al Qaeda and sided with the Coalition. Question: Now that the surge is fully in place, what's your sense of the positives and negatives thus far? If you could have more of any one item, what would it be? Troops? Time? Iraqi unity? General Petraeus's answer: I can think of few commanders in history who wouldn't have wanted more troops, more time or more unity among their partners; however, if I could only have one at this point in Iraq, it would be more time. I repeat, General Petraeus said: . . . if I could only have one at this point in Iraq, it would be more time. This is an exceedingly tough endeavor that faces countless challenges. So what does the Levin-Reed amendment do? Deny General Petraeus exactly that. As Senator Levin points out in his statement, the announced withdrawal would force the Iraqi Government to act and, therefore, then we would see progress. What if, I say to my colleagues who support this amendment, what if instead the situation deteriorates into a chaotic situation, then what do we do? Then what do we do if the situation gets worse? Do we come back in? Do we sit on the sidelines and watch another genocide? What if, I say to my colleague who often asks me what is plan B, the surge doesn't work? What is plan B if the withdrawal doesn't work? I don't think that most people would believe that an international mediator is exactly a solution that is viable. I wish to talk a minute about the region. Finally, after our stunning military victory and shock and awe and the invasion side of the conflict was over, America was in pretty good shape in the region. The Syrians were trying to be cooperative. There were efforts on the part of the Iranians to join with us in efforts to bring about an end to terrorism in the region. Then we began to fail, and that failure has, obviously, been chronicled in many books. I recommend to my colleagues the book ``Fiasco'' or ``Cobra II'' or a number of other books that have been written that describe the failed Rumsfeld strategy. We paid a very heavy price for it. All of us know that. It has been the sacrifice of our most precious asset. What has happened since? We find the Syrians continuing to intervene in northern Lebanon. We find the Syrians, according to many experts, transporting suicide bombers through the airport in Damascus into Iraq. We find the Iranians not only orchestrating attacks and providing intelligence and even money and funding, in some cases, but there is clear and compelling evidence that the IEDs, the most lethal IEDs are exported from Iran into Iraq, those that have the lethality even of going through the armor of a tank. We find the Iranians more aggressive in the region with Iranian support for Hezbollah and Hamas. The Syrians continue to try to unsettle the Government of Lebanon, and the Government of Lebanon is having great difficulties. There is a U.N. Security Council resolution that calls for the disarmament of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. There has been no effort whatsoever to achieve the goals set forth in that U.N. Security Council resolution. In fact, there is strong evidence that Hezbollah in southern Lebanon is being resupplied with the rockets they expended in their latest attack on Israel which provoked an attack on Israel. We find the Saudis becoming more and more uneasy. We once had a report-- that fortunately turned out to be false--that the Turks had crossed over into the Kurdish areas because of Kurdish insurgents who are operating out of the Turkish areas, at least according to the Turks. So we have seen, because of our failure in Iraq, more strife, more conflict, and more threats to the State of Israel. Meanwhile, the Iranians continue on the path to develop nuclear weapons. A great fear of many of us is not a nuclear weapon aimed at Israel from Iran. One of our great fears is a nuclear weapon passed to a terrorist organization by the Iranian Government, which has stated through its President and its policies their dedication to the extinction of the State of Israel. I could argue that the State of Israel is probably in more jeopardy from a national security standpoint than at any time in its history, since that very young nation achieved its independence. So what happens in the region when we adopt the Levin-Reed resolution, and the signal is sent throughout the region ``don't worry, the Americans are leaving.'' I think the consequences are fairly obvious. So we are not just talking about Iraq, as serious and consequential as that situation is. We are talking about the region. It is hard for me to believe the Sunnis would not intervene to protect Sunnis if there is a bloodletting in Baghdad, where 2 million Sunni reside and 4 million Shia. But according to the premise of the Levin- Reed amendment, this will force the Iraqi Government to act and to control their own destiny. My question is: What do we do if they can't? What do we do if they can't? Some of my colleagues have talked about this ``gradual withdrawal.'' A gradual withdrawal. I think most military experts would tell you that the most difficult operation in military tactics and strategy is a ``gradual withdrawal.'' It is fraught with difficulty. When an army is defeated, and an army tries to come home, it is the most difficult of all military operations. So I think that as we discuss this specific amendment and the issue of whether we stay or go in Iraq, whether we allow the new strategy of General Petraeus and the Joint Chiefs of Staff a chance to succeed, which calls for a surge in Iraq, while we debate this, I don't think we should ignore the larger implications for the region. I believe, and I cannot absolutely predict the future, but a failure in Iraq, according to most experts, would lead to a chaotic and unsettled situation in the region. So I would at least ask for my colleagues' consideration of an article by Stephen Biddle in the Washington Post on July 11, entitled ``Iraq: Go Deep or Get Out.'' I think perhaps we ought to start looking at this situation from that respect. Mr. Biddle, in his piece, says: The result has been a search for some kind of politically moderate ``Plan B'' that would split the difference between surge and withdrawal. I think that adequately describes the Reed-Levin amendment. The problem is that these politics do not fit the military reality of Iraq. Many would like to reduce the U.S. commitment to something like half of today's troop presence there. But it is much harder to find a mission for the remaining 60,000 to 80,000 soldiers that makes any sense militarily. Perhaps the most popular centrist option today is drawn from the Baker-Hamilton commission recommendations of last December. This would withdraw U.S. combat brigades, shift the American mission from one of training and supporting the Iraqi security forces, and cut total U.S. troop levels in the country by about half. This idea is at the heart of the proposed legislative effort that Domenici threw his support behind last week, and support is growing on both sides of the aisle on Capitol Hill. The politics make sense, but the compromise leaves us with an untenable military mission. Without a major U.S. combat effort to keep the violence down, the American training effort would face challenges even bigger than those our troops are confronting today. An ineffective training effort would leave tens of thousands of American trainers, advisers, and supporting troops exposed to that violence in the meantime. The net result is likely to be continued U.S. casualties with little positive effect on Iraq's ongoing civil war. It is unrealistic to expect that we can pull back to some safe yet productive mission of training but not fighting-- this would be neither safe nor productive. So, Madam President, I think we ought to look at what we are discussing here not only from the standpoint of Iraq but the implications for our presence in the region. And I will say something that is very seldom stated on the floor of the Senate: as long as we are dependent on oil in the region, our greater national security interests are at stake in what happens with the outcome of Iraq. The possibility of success in Iraq, of seeing the world's third largest oil reserves being modernized and used, and those revenues used for the betterment of the American people, also presents a goal that I think is worth striving for. I would like to again return to the fact that I am deeply disappointed in the Maliki government. Their failure to act unhinges the very important aspect of the military, political, social, and economic aspects of any successful counterinsurgency operation. But I also believe that nothing would embolden the Iranians more, nothing would embolden the Syrians more, nothing would frighten the Jordanians and the Saudis more, not to mention the Egyptians, than the passage of legislation which would require the withdrawal of the United States. So I urge my colleagues not only to look at how this legislation and this debate affects America vis-a-vis Iraq but affects our western and national interests and values in the entire Middle East. Madam President, I note the patience of my friend from Rhode Island, who is a thoughtful and valued member of the Armed Services Committee whose friendship I appreciate a great deal. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I will respond very briefly to the comments of the Senator from Massachusetts on several points in his thoughtful statement. He talks about indefinite--indefinitely the United States Armed Forces in Iraq. I think that is a far cry from what we are seeking here. What we are seeking here is an opportunity for the surge strategy to have a chance to succeed, the last part of which was put in place a few weeks ago. In fact, as the Washington Post points out: Generals have devised a new strategy, believing they are making fitful progress in calming Baghdad, training the Iraqi army, and encouraging anti-al-Qaeda coalitions. Before Congress begins managing rotation schedules and ordering withdrawals, it should at least give those generals the months they asked for to see whether their strategy can offer some new hope. It is not about indefinite presence, it is about giving a new strategy a chance to succeed. I find it ironic, in a way, that I was one of the greatest critics of the Rumsfeld-Casey strategy--which was doomed to failure--which was a replica of the old search and destroy, where we went in and tried to kill people and left. This new strategy, this new general, I think, is showing some signs of success, and--not leaving our forces there ``indefinitely''--allowing this strategy a chance to succeed is important. There are very few people in the world I admire more than Natan Sharansky, a man who knows the meaning of oppression, imprisonment, and suffering, and he lives in the region. Natan Sharansky says: A precipitous withdrawal-- Which is what we are talking about here, Mr. President, not an indefinite U.S. presence. A precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces could lead to a bloodbath that would make the current carnage pale by comparison. Without U.S. troops in place to quell some of the violence, Iranian-backed Shiite militias would dramatically increase their attacks on Sunnis. Sunni militias backed by the Saudis or others would retaliate in kind, drawing Iraq more and more into a vicious cycle of violence. If Iraq descended into a full-blown civil war, the chaos could trigger similar clashes throughout the region as Sunni-Shiite tensions spill across Iraq's borders. The death toll and displacement of civilians could climb exponentially. I am quoting from a piece Natan Sharansky wrote entitled ``Leave Iraq and Brace for a Bigger Bloodbath.'' We are not seeking an indefinite presence of the United States of America in Iraq. We are seeking the opportunity for this surge to have a chance to succeed. As General Lynch was quoted as saying: Surge forces are giving us the capability we have now to take the fight to the enemy. The enemy only responds to force, and we now have that force. We can conduct detailed kinetic strikes, we can do coordinate searches, and deny the enemy sanctuaries. If those surge forces go away, that capability goes away, and the security forces aren't ready yet to do that mission. I am not asking us to blindly follow the lead of our military leaders, but I am asking us to give the person whom we unanimously voted to confirm as our military commander in Iraq, knowing full well what his strategy and surge was, a chance to succeed. Time after time we hear General Lynch, the 3rd ID commander, say: Pulling out before the mission was accomplished would be a mess. You would find the enemy regularly gaining ground, reestablishing sanctuaries, building more IEDs, and the violence would escalate. I share the frustration that all Americans do. This war has been mishandled. We have paid an enormous sacrifice, both the sacrifice of American blood and treasure, but I believe, as the Washington Post said: Before Congress begins managing rotation schedules and ordering withdrawals, it should at least give these generals the months they asked for to see whether their strategy can offer some new hope. I hope we understand what this debate is about, whether we will set a timetable for troop withdrawals within 120 days or whether we will give General Petraeus and his able commanders and the brave young men and women who are serving an opportunity to see if this new strategy can succeed. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank Senator Levin. This is the second week, as we know, we are on this bill. We have not gotten to many of the amendments that have anything to do with other aspects of defending this Nation besides the issue of Iraq. I look forward to working with him as we can try to not break a 45-year custom here that we provide the much needed authorization for the men and women in our defense establishment and provide for our Nation's security, which I think we all agree is our highest priority. So, if I may continue the colloquy for just one moment, I know that there are--now we will be beginning, and I will give a statement after the chairman, if it is his desire, and then we will have speakers coming all day long on either side of this issue. I know many want to speak, and I hope they will be prepared to do so.

Mr. McCAIN. What is the parliamentary procedure, I would ask?

Mr. McCAIN. I thank Senator Levin. As I understand it, we will be debating the amendment of the chairman and the Senator from Rhode Island throughout the day and through tonight, and perhaps a cloture vote sometime tomorrow. Is that your understanding?

Mr. McCAIN. If I could ask my colleague further, I understand we also have well over 100 pending amendments on the bill as well. I would hope that at some point, Senator Levin and I can sit down and maybe start sorting through those if we have any hope whatsoever of completing this bill. I would remind all of my colleagues that this body has passed--and has been signed into law--a Defense authorization bill for the last 45 years. There are aspects of this bill, as the Senator well knows as the distinguished chairman, that we worked very hard on, such as pay raises and other authorizations for much needed equipment, training, et cetera. I would hope the Senator from Michigan and I can start working on those aspects of the bill, if we have any hopes of passing an authorization bill this year.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I do not object, but I ask unanimous consent to engage in a colloquy with the Senator from Michigan about our plans for the day. For example, I understand there is a Cornyn amendment which may be voted on as well?

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I will not object, I would ask Senator Levin, for the benefit of all, what our plans for the day are and what we can expect. I understand that the Senate intends to stay in throughout the evening and debate this issue. I will not object, but I reserve the right to object. Perhaps the Senator from Michigan would illuminate me and the other Members as to what we can expect throughout the day and the evening.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. I object. My understanding is that at 11 a.m., we were supposed to go to the bill. We are now, at 11:15, going to go to the bill, and then we want the regular procedure as we consider legislation, which would be whoever has the right of recognition and any unanimous consent agreements. So I object to the second unanimous consent request.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading be dispensed with.

Mr. McCAIN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2154, as Modified, to Amendment No. 2011

Mr. McCAIN. So 3 minutes after 4 o'clock.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the amendment has been cleared.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, may I say this is one time I am glad I am not in the majority.

Mr. McCAIN. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2159, as Modified, to Amendment No. 2019

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent, if it is agreeable with Senator Levin, that Senator Stabenow be allowed 10 minutes.

Mr. McCAIN. Yes. Senator Craig is here. I know of no additional speakers. I think it is legitimate, since the Senator from Massachusetts is on the floor. I would agree that following Senator Craig, Senator Lincoln and then Senator Kerry proceed.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, before the Senator from Vermont speaks, I assure the Senator from Texas that there is no intention of depriving him of a side by side; that the intention is to frame the UC such that there is a side by side, but there is a little parliamentary side of it. I hate to take the time of all of our colleagues, but that is the intent and the agreement between the two of us to get it done. I will have the next amendment after the Dorgan amendment, and I will recognize him at that time. Then we will work out the modalities.