John McCain

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I would like to draw my colleagues' attention to a report released today by a bipartisan panel of Asia specialists cochaired by Richard L. Armitage and Joseph Nye. The report, ``The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020,'' highlights major trends in Asia and provides the panel's comprehensive analysis with security and economic policy recommendations, with specific reference to our bilateral relations with Japan. Many Senators will recall that Ambassador Armitage and Dr. Nye issued a report in October 2000 titled ``The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership.'' This landmark document, which subsequently became known as the Armitage Report, aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan relationship in the areas of politics, security, Okinawa, intelligence, economics and diplomacy. This new report, which is already being called ``Armitage II,'' continues to emphasize the importance of the alliance but goes a step further, by addressing the ways in which the alliance can work to positively influence future affairs in Asia. The report, which is available on the CSIS Web site at: http:// www.csis.org/component/option,com--csis--pubs/task,view /id,3729/typ, is not a political document. It reflects the views of the study group members only. Nevertheless, it represents a serious attempt to outline a vision that would achieve a balance of power in Asia through 2020 that favors American interests and values and promotes regional stability. I encourage all Senators and their staffs to examine this serious and significant new report.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to fix a serious problem that has recently come to light with respect to the administration of the so-called Death Gratuity. The legislation is designed to ensure that a service member can designate to whom a death gratuity benefit is awarded. Today's Washington Post includes an informative yet troubling article describing the plight of the mother of Petty Officer Second Class Jaime S. Jaenke, U. S. Navy, who died in Iraq in June 2006 as a result of an IED attack. Petty Officer Jaenke was a member of the Navy Reserve and a medic assigned to a Seabee Construction Battalion. She left behind a young daughter, Kayla, who is in the care of Kayla's grandmother, Susan Jaenke. Regrettably, because of the manner in which death benefits are administered, a hardship situation has been created for Mrs. Jaenke. The article spells out that while the insurance proceeds have been set aside by the State court for the benefit of Kayla, they have not yet been made available. So in the meantime her grandmother is left trying to make ends meet because she is not allowed to receive the gratuity benefit that her daughter thought she would be providing, should the service member's unfortunate death occur. The article describes a very difficult situation for the person on who Petty Officer Jaenke depended. The financial difficulties Mrs. Jaenke is experiencing is due in part by confusion about how the death gratuity benefit--a sum of $100,000--is being administered under law. Under current law, the recipient of the $100,000 is dictated by the statute. It provides that a benefit is first awarded to an existing spouse. If there is no spouse, it then is provided to the children, and so on. It's a scheme that was set up to permit speedy resolution of what used to be a very modest benefit. In today's world, however, with the complex needs of service members, it does not comport with the realities of many of our service members and their families. It needs to be changed. The legislation I am introducing would replace the statutory order of beneficiaries with provisions identical to that used to select beneficiaries under the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance--SGLI. The bill would give service members the power to select precisely who will receive the $100,00 death gratuity. It would require the Secretary of Defense to, no later than April 1, 2007, to prepare regulations and create election forms that will enable service members to designate who will receive this benefit. I hope we can move this legislation quickly and ensure that the intentions of our service members regarding the well being of their children and families can be carried out. We owe at least that much to those who are giving their lives for our nation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, today I am introducing legislation to fix a serious problem that has recently come to light with respect to the administration of the so-called Death Gratuity. The legislation is designed to ensure that a service member can designate to whom a death gratuity benefit is awarded. Today's Washington Post includes an informative yet troubling article describing the plight of the mother of Petty Officer Second Class Jaime S. Jaenke, U. S. Navy, who died in Iraq in June 2006 as a result of an IED attack. Petty Officer Jaenke was a member of the Navy Reserve and a medic assigned to a Seabee Construction Battalion. She left behind a young daughter, Kayla, who is in the care of Kayla's grandmother, Susan Jaenke. Regrettably, because of the manner in which death benefits are administered, a hardship situation has been created for Mrs. Jaenke. The article spells out that while the insurance proceeds have been set aside by the State court for the benefit of Kayla, they have not yet been made available. So in the meantime her grandmother is left trying to make ends meet because she is not allowed to receive the gratuity benefit that her daughter thought she would be providing, should the service member's unfortunate death occur. The article describes a very difficult situation for the person on who Petty Officer Jaenke depended. The financial difficulties Mrs. Jaenke is experiencing is due in part by confusion about how the death gratuity benefit--a sum of $100,000--is being administered under law. Under current law, the recipient of the $100,000 is dictated by the statute. It provides that a benefit is first awarded to an existing spouse. If there is no spouse, it then is provided to the children, and so on. It's a scheme that was set up to permit speedy resolution of what used to be a very modest benefit. In today's world, however, with the complex needs of service members, it does not comport with the realities of many of our service members and their families. It needs to be changed. The legislation I am introducing would replace the statutory order of beneficiaries with provisions identical to that used to select beneficiaries under the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance--SGLI. The bill would give service members the power to select precisely who will receive the $100,00 death gratuity. It would require the Secretary of Defense to, no later than April 1, 2007, to prepare regulations and create election forms that will enable service members to designate who will receive this benefit. I hope we can move this legislation quickly and ensure that the intentions of our service members regarding the well being of their children and families can be carried out. We owe at least that much to those who are giving their lives for our nation. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, is the minority leader aware of the content of the measure that is proposed by myself, Senator Lieberman, Senator Graham, and others? What it is, is a proposal to set up benchmarks but also to support the surge or the change in strategy. Can the Republican leader explain to me why it is we shouldn't have a proposal that opposes the surge, with a vote on that, and a proposal that supports it and a vote on that? I have only been around here 20 years, not nearly as long as Senator Byrd has, whom Senator McConnell referred to, but aren't we allowed to have competing resolutions to debate, with time agreements, such as the minority leader proposed? Why in the world would we not agree to a resolution that would be in opposition to the resolution the majority leader insists on voting on by itself? I have never seen the Senate work this way. I have never seen the Senate only allow one proposal to be debated and voted on. We have a proposal that we think deserves debate and votes. I ask the Senator from Kentucky, who has been here longer than I have been, if he has ever seen anything quite like this on a major, compelling, overwhelming issue before the American people?

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. I thank my friend from Virginia. And let the record be clear, the Senator from Virginia supported the proposition that we would consider more than one amendment. Now, I am absolutely convinced--I hate to keep going on this aspect of it because I wish to discuss the continuing appropriations bill before us--but we could have sat down and said: OK, we will have four amendments, a certain amount of time on each amendment for debate. Time agreements would have been entered into, and then everybody could have had their say or certainly the majority of the Senate would have agreed to that. Instead, unfortunately, we ended up without addressing the issue in a comprehensive fashion, in fact at all, because of the process that went through. But equally as important--equally as important--I say to my friend from Virginia--and I would ask him, when he first came here, would he have ever seen a situation where the entire funding of the Federal Government was in a measure before this body without a single amendment being allowed to it? Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to engage in a brief colloquy with the Senator from Virginia.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Chair. I was misinformed. Madam President, I will not go on, on this issue, but I believe we need to, as a body, sit down and try to fix this unfortunate situation where we are not allowing amendments nor sufficient examination of legislation before the body. Madam President, there is one silver lining to the measure pending before us. It is largely free of wasteful earmarking and porkbarrel spending. This is the first time during my years in Congress I have witnessed such an occurrence. Compare this to the last fiscal year, 2006. According to data compiled by the Congressional Research Service, the appropriations bills and accompanying reports for the last fiscal year included $64 billion in earmarks--the largest earmarked funding in history. So again, this CR, which does not have an accompanying report where historically 95 percent of earmarks are included, is a welcomed change. I can only urge the Appropriations Committee to let this be a guide for future appropriations measures when it comes to earmarks: Do not include them and do not waste the taxpayers' dollars. I was pleased to join with several of my colleagues in writing the President last week to urge his leadership on this issue and ensure his administration understands clearly and fully that it is under absolutely no obligation to continue to fund earmarks that were included in past committee reports or urged by Members of Congress or their staff. As stated by the President in his State of the Union Address last month, when it comes to earmarking, ``The time has come to end this practice.'' Now it is up to the administration to abide by the President's directive, and I assure you, we will be watching. Also, last week, Senator Coburn and I received a response from the Department of Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman in response to our letter of the previous week stating our serious concerns about reports that the Department may be planning ``business as usual'' and would fund conference report earmarks. Fortunately, the Secretary has clarified his Department's position and will only fund programs or activities that, in his words, are ``meritorious and effective'' and ``support and advance the Department's missions and objectives . . . '' I ask unanimous consent that copies of our correspondence with the Secretary be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. McCAIN. We have time.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank my colleagues. Madam President, I understand at 4:15 we are turning to a judge. I ask unanimous consent for an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I have to insist on the regular order.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that without losing the floor, my friend from Nebraska be recognized for 3 minutes to make a statement on the issue which has been raised by the Senator from Virginia, which I heartily disagree with.

Mr. McCAIN. For the record, you might want to say how many years you have been here.

Mr. McCAIN. Yes.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I come to the Senate to comment on H.J. Res. 20, making continuing appropriations for fiscal year 2007 which, as I understand, is the pending business before the Senate. I think most of us agree that funding the Federal Government should be done through the regular order, not through a patchwork of continuing resolutions. The reality is that all but two Federal agencies are being funded through a measure to which no Member is being permitted to offer, debate or vote on a single amendment. That is wrong. We are not the House of Representatives. We are not the other body, I say to my colleagues. We are the Senate, a deliberative body. I hope the Senate leadership on both sides will work to ensure we do not repeat this fate. I have been in this body for a little over 20 years. I have watched, over those 20 years, an increasing use of parliamentary procedures--the so-called filling up the tree and motions for cloture filed at the same time the legislation is before the Senate increase to an ever- accelerating process. I was very disturbed about that process being exercised when my side of the aisle was in the leadership, and I am even more concerned as I watch the new majority conduct business in the Senate. I could submit for the record the fact of literally every measure before the Senate that at the same time a cloture motion is proposed, the tree is filled. The Senate is here to debate and amend. The other body, understandably, has different rules. Given the mechanisms that are being put in place by the majority side, what is the difference? It seems to me that 20 years ago--and I would ask my friend from Virginia, who has been here considerably longer than I have--the routine was a piece of legislation would be before the Senate, there would be amendments proposed, debated, with second-degree amendments, if necessary. And the process was something where literally every Member of the Senate, if a Member so chose, could come to the floor and debate and amend and improve the legislation, if that was a Member's desire. Where are we now? We file cloture. We vote on cloture. We stand around for 30 hours or so. And then we vote up or down. This is a very dangerous process we are going through. So now we are examining a bill which funds all but two Federal agencies in a measure which no Member is permitted to offer, debate or vote on a single amendment. That is not why I came here. That is not why. We are sent here--we are sent here--to express the views and ambitions and hopes and dreams of our constituents. I have been in discussion with several other Members about how this trend continues to accelerate and literally deprive this institution from being described as not the greatest deliberative body in the world but a deliberative body. And I say to the leadership, please sit down and work these things out. Have a reasonable number of amendments. Have debate. Agree to time agreements. Agree to time agreements. I had several amendments to this bill for which I would have agreed to an hour time agreement, which would have been plenty of time to debate the amendments and render the Senate's judgment, which I would have respected whether it succeeded or failed. Now, there are many of us who are very unhappy because we think we could have improved this legislation, which covers all but two--two-- Federal agencies of the entire Federal Government. And we are going to consider an up-or-down vote on it. That is not right. It is not fair to the American people. And it is not fair to the hallowed traditions of this institution. I do not know exactly what to do about it. But there are some of us who are looking for ways, perhaps, to express our dissatisfaction on this issue. In all deference to my dear friend from Virginia, all I asked for on this issue of the ``surge'' or ``change in strategy'' in Iraq was 2 hours of debate on our amendment, with a time agreement and a vote. I do not think that is a lot to ask. I do not think that is a great deal. I do not think that is a huge request. The two leaders sitting down together could have--and, by the way, I know my friend from Virginia supported that. I am not in any way denigrating----

Mr. McCAIN. I ask for the regular order and I ask to be recognized.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, what is the pending business?

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, may I inquire, how much time do I have again?

Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Chair. I ask the clerk to tell me when I have consumed 8 minutes. I come again this morning to the not particularly pleasant task of opposing the nomination of General Casey to be Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. I preface my remarks, again, with my appreciation for honorable service to the country, his family, and the sacrifices they have made for many years. This isn't a question of character because his character is outstanding; it is a question of judgment. I will try to put this in context, why I am in opposition. For several years, I and a number of others have bemoaned and complained and criticized and been saddened as we have watched this train wreck in Iraq. Not long after the initial invasion, I came back from a visit to Iraq and visited with the then-Secretary of Defense, who bears great responsibility for this debacle, and history will judge him very badly for his performance as Secretary of Defense. I told him how it was that we were not going to win, we were not going to succeed, that we didn't have enough troops over there, that Anbar Province was going to erupt-- basically all the things many of us saw were going to transpire. General Casey, for 2\1/2\ years up until recently, would come back to the Congress and say that things were going well. I quoted many quotes yesterday, from time to time, including in 2005, saying we could start withdrawing by 2006 and on and on and on, completely divorced from reality on the ground, as was the Secretary of Defense. I will state at the beginning that Presidents are responsible, but Presidents also rely on the advice and counsel of their military leaders. That is a normal thing and has happened in every conflict. President Bush said time and time again: I have said to the American people, as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. But I have also said our commanders on the ground will make that decision. We will talk to General Casey. On and on. The Army is getting on its feet. We have turned over a lot of territory to the Army. They are good fighters. I have spent a great deal of time with General Abizaid and General Casey. They are in Washington. They are generals who will be happy to tell me the way it is, not the way they think I would like to it be. Time after time, it has been clear that the President of the United States, as appropriate, has been relying on the advice and counsel of commanders in the field who did not give him appropriate information or recommendations. We are all responsible. In the military, you are responsible for the decisions you make on the battlefield, particularly when they cost our most valuable and important asset--American blood. In his opening statement at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on September 29, General Casey said: ``The capacity of Iraqi security forces has increased quantitatively and qualitatively over the past year'' and ``we have also developed with the Iraqis a readiness reporting system, not unlike the one we have in place for our own forces. So over the past 18 months we have built enough Iraqi capacity where we can begin talking seriously about transitioning this counterinsurgency mission to them.'' Did he realize at the time that statement was wrong? And when did he tell someone? At the same hearing, General Casey said: More coalition is not necessarily better. More and more capable Iraqi security forces are better. Increased coalition presence speeds the notion of occupation. It contributes to the dependency of Iraqi security forces on the coalition. It extends the amount of time it will take for Iraqi security forces to become self-reliant and exposes more coalition forces to attacks at a time when Iraqi security forces are increasingly available and increasingly capable. There has been no sign of that. Why did it take 15 months for General Casey to change that assessment and then not even agree with the new strategy of five additional brigades, which most of us pray is enough and most of us believe is a direct contravention to the Powell doctrine, which is, use overwhelming force in order to gain military victory? President Bush said General Casey will make decisions as to how many troops we have there. Why did it take 2\1/2\ years? Why did it have to take 2\1/2\ years of steady degradation for General Casey to figure out we didn't have enough troops there, and the situation is worsening in Iraq. The NIE that came out yesterday should frighten anyone, any American, because of the stark depiction in the NIE--the public document--that states that the situation is grave and deteriorating in Iraq, which is also the conclusion of the Iraq Study Group, whether you happen to agree with their recommendations or not. Mr. President, responsibility is one of the first things that is taught at our service academies. We are responsible for our decisions. When the Missouri runs aground, we relieve the captain. When four sailors are washed overboard, we relieve the captain. Now we are rewarding failure as we did during the Vietnam war when we named General Westmoreland as Chief of Staff of the Army after a failed search and destroy. There are eerie parallels here. General Westmoreland employed the search and destroy strategy which is counter to any counterinsurgency strategy. That kind of strategy is clear, hold, and build. That is what General Petraeus is trying to do now. That is not what has been done in the past under General Casey. So what are we doing? We are promoting a general who has pursued a failed policy, advocated it to the President, whom he is responsible to advise, and he is advocating it to the Congress of the United States despite the overwhelming view by many of us that it was not a successful strategy. Still, today, where he will be in place if he is confirmed by the Senate, he will be responsible for the operation, training, and doctrine that will be employed in Iraq, and he still, to this day, as far as I know, from the hearing of a short time ago, believes--and I could give the quote--that we are not failing but we are succeeding. I don't know of anyone who believes that who is in a responsible position in Government. Mr. President, it is with a bit of regret that I do this. Again, I repeat what I said yesterday. Senator Levin asked him: I am wondering whether you would agree that what we are doing in Iraq was maybe a slow failure. General Casey said: I don't actually see it as a slow failure. I actually see it as slow progress. How could you depict the situation in Baghdad today, with six helicopters being shot down in the last few weeks, with a spike in casualties that has taken place, and the continued level of sectarian violence, as a slow progress? So I want to tell my friends that people in the military, particularly our young officers, are watching what we do here. We teach them in our service schools, and we teach our noncommissioned officers and junior officers: You are responsible for success or failure. That is why we appoint you as leaders. In this case, this leader, despite his honorable character and dedication to this country, has not led, and his responsibility has not been carried out. So I hope my colleagues will turn down this nomination and that we will appoint one of the many highly qualified senior military officers we have to fulfill this position. May I finally say that I am very nervous about this new strategy. I am very doubtful that we have enough troops. I don't know if the Maliki government will be strong enough. But if General Casey is appointed to this position, my confidence will be lowered because it is not appropriate to put someone who does not support wholeheartedly the new strategy in a position where he will be responsible for a great deal of it. To this day, he doesn't admit that this present strategy has failed. Do I have any time remaining?

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, in 2004, General Casey said: My view of winning is that we are broadly on track to accomplishing our objectives . . . with Iraqi security forces that are capable of maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror, and I believe we are on track to get there by December of 2005. In September of 2005, General Casey said: We have a strategy and a plan for success in Iraq, and we are broadly on track in achieving our goals. Time after time, the American people were told that things were going fine, and they were not. I wish to emphasize again that I believe General Casey has served this Nation honorably. I think he and his family have made great sacrifices for this country. I have nothing but respect. But to reward failure is going to send a message all around the military that I don't think is a healthy one. I don't support promotion and I don't support medals for failure. I support people being held responsible, and I regret that those who are responsible on the civilian side have not been held more responsible, although, as we speak today, the American people, by their opinions as reflected in the polls, are certainly reflecting their judgment about the performance and responsibility of our civilian leaders. I hope we can move forward and obtain successes in Iraq under this new strategy. I am not sure right now that General Casey completely supports it, and I don't think that it enhances our chance for succeeding in Iraq. I urge my colleagues to vote against this nomination and select a leader, of which there are many, who is far more capable, in my view, of carrying out the new strategy in Iraq. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time, as I see the majority leader here on the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask further unanimous consent--and I tell my colleagues that I will not seek further unanimous consent after this; I will object to a further unanimous consent request--that an additional 2 minutes be given to the Senator from Alabama to speak on this issue.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Virginia be allowed 3 minutes to speak on this issue, not to be taken from the time remaining.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, let me make it clear, I don't support medals for failure. I don't support promotion to a higher position for failure. I believe that the awards and accolades Senator Levin alluded to that have been provided to those who have committed egregious failures was not only inappropriate, it was absolutely insulting. I also, though, point out that history will judge many of these people who have been given medals of various types, and already that judgment has been harsh. All of us are more concerned about our place in history than we are medals. History and the American people are already judging the failures and the misleading statements, such as ``stuff happens'' and ``mission accomplished'' and a few ``dead- enders'' and ``last throes'' and all of those statements which have been made over the past 3\1/2\ years which led the American people to believe we were succeeding in Iraq when many of us knew we weren't because we violated a fundamental principle called the Powell doctrine: If you want to win, you go in with overwhelming force. The reason I am very concerned today, even though we have a very outstanding general in Petraeus, is that I am not sure we have enough troops still. Throughout our history, military commanders have been held responsible. Abraham Lincoln held General McClellan responsible and fired him. In World War II, those who were in command who were responsible for December 7, 1941, were held responsible. In the Korean war, General MacArthur was held responsible. The fact is that military leaders are held responsible as well as civilian leaders. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the number of times President Bush said that he relied on the judgment of the military commanders. Those military commanders did not exercise good judgment and therefore are responsible for the rosy scenario and the inaccurate depiction of facts on the ground in Iraq as they came before our committee, the Armed Services Committee, and spoke to the President of the United States and the American people.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce legislation that would repeal section 10(f) of Public Law 93-531, commonly known as the ``Bennett Freeze.'' Passage of this legislation would officially mark the end of roughly 40 years of litigation and land-lock between the Navajo Nation and the Hopi Tribe. Congressman Rick Renzi has introduced an identical version today in the House of Representatives. For decades the Navajo and the Hopi have been engrossed in a bitter dispute over land rights in the Black Mesa area just south of Kayenta, AZ. The conflict extends as far back as 1882 when the boundaries of the Hopi and Navajo reservations were initially defined, resulting in a tragic saga of litigation and damaging Federal Indian policy. By 1966, relations between the tribes became so strained over development and access to sacred religious sites in the disputed area that the Federal Government imposed a construction freeze on the disputed reservation land. The freeze prohibited any additional housing development in the Black Mesa area and restricted repairs on existing dwellings. This injunction became known as the ``Bennett Freeze,'' named after former BIA Commissioner Robert Bennett who imposed the ban. The Bennett Freeze was intended to be a temporary measure to prevent one tribe taking advantage of another until the land dispute could be settled. Unfortunately, the conflict was nowhere near resolution, and the construction freeze ultimately devastated economic development in northern Arizona for years to come. By some accounts, nearly 8,000 people currently living in the Bennett Freeze area reside in conditions that haven't changed in half a century. While the population of the area has increased 65 percent, generations of families have been forced to live together in homes that have been declared unfit for human habitation. Only 3 percent of the families affected by the Bennett Freeze have electricity. Only 10 percent have running water. Almost none have natural gas. In September 2005, the Navajo and Hopi peoples' desire to live together in mutual respect prevailed when both tribes approved intergovernmental agreement that resolved all outstanding litigation in the Bennett Freeze area. This landmark agreement also clarifies the boundaries of the Navajo and Hopi reservations in Arizona, and ensures that access to religious sites of both tribes is protected. As such, the Navajo Nation, the Hopi Tribe, and the Department of Interior all support congressional legislation to lift the freeze. The bill I'm introducing today would repeal the Bennett Freeze. The intergovernmental compact approved last year by both tribes, the Department of Interior, and signed by the U.S. District Court for Arizona, marks a new era in Navajo-Hopi relations. Lifting the Bennett Freeze gives us an opportunity to put decades of conflict between the Navajo and Hopi behind us. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to introduce legislation that would repeal section 10(f) of Public Law 93-531, commonly known as the ``Bennett Freeze.'' Passage of this legislation would officially mark the end of roughly 40 years of litigation and land-lock between the Navajo Nation and the Hopi Tribe. Congressman Rick Renzi has introduced an identical version today in the House of Representatives. For decades the Navajo and the Hopi have been engrossed in a bitter dispute over land rights in the Black Mesa area just south of Kayenta, AZ. The conflict extends as far back as 1882 when the boundaries of the Hopi and Navajo reservations were initially defined, resulting in a tragic saga of litigation and damaging Federal Indian policy. By 1966, relations between the tribes became so strained over development and access to sacred religious sites in the disputed area that the Federal Government imposed a construction freeze on the disputed reservation land. The freeze prohibited any additional housing development in the Black Mesa area and restricted repairs on existing dwellings. This injunction became known as the ``Bennett Freeze,'' named after former BIA Commissioner Robert Bennett who imposed the ban. The Bennett Freeze was intended to be a temporary measure to prevent one tribe taking advantage of another until the land dispute could be settled. Unfortunately, the conflict was nowhere near resolution, and the construction freeze ultimately devastated economic development in northern Arizona for years to come. By some accounts, nearly 8,000 people currently living in the Bennett Freeze area reside in conditions that haven't changed in half a century. While the population of the area has increased 65 percent, generations of families have been forced to live together in homes that have been declared unfit for human habitation. Only 3 percent of the families affected by the Bennett Freeze have electricity. Only 10 percent have running water. Almost none have natural gas. In September 2005, the Navajo and Hopi peoples' desire to live together in mutual respect prevailed when both tribes approved intergovernmental agreement that resolved all outstanding litigation in the Bennett Freeze area. This landmark agreement also clarifies the boundaries of the Navajo and Hopi reservations in Arizona, and ensures that access to religious sites of both tribes is protected. As such, the Navajo Nation, the Hopi Tribe, and the Department of Interior all support congressional legislation to lift the freeze. The bill I'm introducing today would repeal the Bennett Freeze. The intergovernmental compact approved last year by both tribes, the Department of Interior, and signed by the U.S. District Court for Arizona, marks a new era in Navajo-Hopi relations. Lifting the Bennett Freeze gives us an opportunity to put decades of conflict between the Navajo and Hopi behind us. I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.