John McCain

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I, obviously, am not surprised at the objection of my friend from Nevada. We need to address this issue. As I mentioned, I do not think we would have to if it were not for the Federal Election Commission's failure to carry out their responsibilities. I have observed the role of money in politics for a long time. And unless these 527s are brought under control, we are going to see ever- enlarging activities and more and more money being spent through this loophole that has been carved out, unfortunately, and allowed, as I mentioned, two individuals to contribute as much as $22 million each in the 2004 campaign. I worry very much about one individual donor contributing millions of dollars that would come into a House or a Senate race in the last couple or 3 weeks of a campaign. Obviously, that would be a credible distortion of the process and undue influence. By the way, 99 out of 100 of these 527s come from outside the State or district in which the money is spent. So I hope we can move forward on this legislation. I think it is compelling that we do so I hope that we can sit down with others and get this legislation debated. As to the unanimous consent request I propounded, I would be glad to have amendments to it, other debate, depending on the will of Senators. We need to take up this issue and bring it under the control for which it cries out. I regret we were not able to do so at this time. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. The track record of the FEC and its continued stonewalling proves that the Commission is incapable of upholding its responsibilities. The time has come to put an end to its destructive tactics. The FEC has had ample and well-documented opportunities to address the issue of the 527s' illegal activities, and each time it has taken a pass, choosing instead to delay, postpone, and refuse to act. BCRA has demonstrated that, on a bipartisan basis, we care about making sure that political power in this country does not lie solely in the wealth of big corporations, labor unions, and the wealthiest of the wealthy. We need to uphold and build upon past reforms and not endorse the pursuit of ways to get around or unravel them. I again point out with this chart that the predictions, when we passed BCRA, were that it would be the end of national parties; that it would prohibit people from any way to be able to contribute to political campaigns, and the parties would suffer mightily. Well, here is the amount of money. Here is the amount of new donors that both parties got. I have to say, in fairness, the Internet had a lot to do with the encouragement of, and ability of, millions of new donors to engage in contributions. But let me also point out, for those who were worried about the destruction of the political parties and some kind of diminution of their capabilities, the Democratic Party raised $580 million as opposed to $212 million. This is hard money alone, with the elimination of soft money. And Republicans raised $632 million. So millions of new donors took part in the political process. The parties were strengthened. No longer is it legal for a powerful Member of Congress to call up a labor union leader, a trial lawyer, or a corporation head and say: I need a soft money donation in six figures. And, by the way, your legislation is up before my committee. That is no longer legal and has stopped. Do we have problems still with too much money washing around Washington in the form of campaign contributions? Yes. And do we have additional measures that need to be taken? Yes. But the first thing that needs to be done is to make the 527s fall in line with the same restrictions placed on any other organization that engages in activities to attempt to influence the outcome of an election. I want to emphasize, we are not trying to ban them. We are trying to make them subject to campaign finance contribution limits, which are clearly, clearly called for in the 1974 law. Again, the performance of the Federal Election Commission is really a great national disgrace. And how they can continue to fail to write regulation to enforce existing law that the Congress has passed since 2002 and enforce laws that were passed in 1974 is absolutely beyond comprehension. Mr. President, I note the presence of my friend, the Senator from Nevada, on the floor of the Senate at this time, so I will proceed with the unanimous consent request at this time. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at a time to be determined by the majority leader, after consultation with the Democratic leader, the Committee on Rules and Administration be discharged from further consideration of S. 2511, and the Senate proceed to its immediate consideration; I further ask that there be 4 hours of debate equally divided with no amendments in order; provided further that following the use or yielding back of time, the bill be read a third time and the Senate proceed to a vote on passage, with no intervening action or debate.

Mr. McCAIN. As the memo points out, the Supreme Court in the McConnell case spoke directly to this issue and said that such limits are constitutional. The Court specifically noted that in an earlier case, California Medical Association v. FEC, it had upheld the $5,000 limit on contributions to political committees even as to a committee's spending for ``noncoordinated expenditures.'' The constitutional rationale in the California Medical Association v. FEC, as in the case of the soft money ban upheld by the Supreme Court in McConnell, is equally applicable to S. 2511. It is designed to prevent the evasion and circumvention of Federal contribution limits and prohibitions. It is unfortunate we even need to be talking about this situation today. This legislation would not be necessary if it were not for the abject failure of the FEC to enforce existing law. As I noted earlier, some 527s raised and spent soft money to run ads attacking both President Bush and Senator Kerry. The use of soft money to finance these activities is clearly illegal under current statute, and the fact that they were allowed to continue unchecked is unconscionable. The blame for this lack of enforcement does not lie with the Congress, nor with the administration. The blame for this continuing illegal activity lies squarely with the FEC. This agency has a duty to issue regulations to properly implement and enforce the Nation's campaign finance laws; and the FEC has failed, and it has failed miserably, to carry out that responsibility. Let's consider two recent court rulings. First, in its decision upholding the constitutionality of BCRA in McConnell v. FEC, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the FEC had ``subverted''--``subverted''--the law, issued regulations that ``permitted more than Congress had ever intended,'' and ``invited widespread circumvention''--those are not my words; those are the words of the U.S. Supreme Court in a majority decision--of FECA's limits on contributions. Additionally, when Judge Kollar-Kotelly threw out 15 of the FEC's regulations implementing BCRA, among the reasons for her actions were that one provision ``severely undermines FECA'' and would ``foster corruption,'' another ``runs completely afoul'' of current law, another would ``render the statute largely meaningless,'' and, finally, that another had ``no rational basis.'' No wonder a Los Angeles Times editorial stated that: [H]er decision would make a fitting obituary for an agency that deserves to die. We cannot allow the destructive FEC to continue to undermine the Nation's campaign finance laws. An article published just yesterday in the Hill points out that the FEC ``is being accused of attempting to intimidate soft-money donors to 527s by targeting the donors for questioning.'' The article also makes note of ``the FEC decision last month not to implement new regulations for 527s this election cycle. That was widely interpreted as a green light for 527s to act without restriction.'' What is going on here? The job of the FEC is to write regulations to properly implement campaign finance laws--not to bully and intimidate those who choose to donate to groups the FEC refuses to regulate. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the article form the Hill be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, at the conclusion of my remarks, I will ask unanimous consent to move to consideration of S. 2511, legislation that requires that the law be enforced. That is, that the so-called 527s be made illegal and banned as they properly should be. I will be making that unanimous consent request after the conclusion of my remarks. I have been told the Democrat side will be objecting to moving to the legislation. I regret that very much. The legislation is pretty straightforward. It requires any organization--including the so-called 527s--that falls under campaign finance contribution limits, as is any objective observer's reading of the law, to follow the law. I regret we will be unable to move this important piece of legislation. It is simple and straightforward and designed to overcome the Federal Election Commissions's inexcusable failure to interpret properly the original Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974. I point out to my colleagues that these 527s are a violation of the original Federal Election Campaign Act, now BCRA, known by some as McCain-Feingold. The Federal Election Commission, as in many cases, inexcusably fails to properly interpret the original Federal Election Campaign Act which would halt the illegal practice that has sprung up whereby 527 groups are now spending soft money on ads and other activities to influence Federal elections. I understand fully the politics surrounding this issue, which unfortunately is going to cause some of my colleagues to oppose any reform. But the time has come to address this issue. We should put political prerogatives aside and do what is best for the American electorate. We need to have this debate. I am committed to working with my colleagues to resolve our differences. Let's bring this bill up, have a debate, and consider amendments. As my colleagues know, a number of 527 groups raised and spent a substantial amount of soft money in a blatant effort to influence the outcome of the 2004 election. These activities are illegal under existing laws, and yet, the FEC has failed to do its job and has refused to do anything to stop these illegal activities. Therefore, it is now up to Congress to pursue all possible steps to uphold FECA and overturn the FEC's misinterpretation of the campaign finance laws, which is improperly allowing 527 groups, whose purpose is to influence Federal elections, to spend soft money on these efforts. In McConnell v. FEC, the Supreme Court noted wisely that money, like water, will look for ways to leak back into the system. With the enactment of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, BCRA, the national parties were taken out of the soft money business. It did not take long before efforts were underway by some to bring soft money back into Federal elections through the vehicle of groups that operate as ``political organizations'' under section 527 of the IRS Code, or so- called ``527s.'' The soft money game is the same with these groups; they are raising multi-million-dollar donations from wealthy individuals, as well as large contributions from corporate and union contributions, and spending that soft money on broadcast communications that promote or attack Federal candidates, and voter mobilization efforts intended to influence Federal elections. We saw, firsthand, how a number of 527 groups raised and spent huge amounts of soft money in order to influence the outcome of the last Presidential election. These activities were prohibited under longstanding campaign finance law but, again, the FEC failed to properly enforce the law. As a result, federally oriented 527s spent over $400 million on the 2004 elections. It turns out that almost half of the financing for 527 groups in the 2004 elections came from a relatively small number of very wealthy individuals who made huge soft money contributions. According to campaign finance scholar Tony Corrado, 25 wealthy individuals accounted for $126 million raised by 527 groups active in the 2004 Federal elections. This included 10 donors who gave at least $4 million each to 527s involved in the 2004 elections and two donors who each contributed over $20 million. If that doesn't make a mockery of both campaign finance laws, nothing does. Two donors, $20 million each. Over $20 million each poured into the 2004 Presidential campaign. Opponents of campaign finance reform like to point out that the activities of these 527s serve as proof that BCRA failed in its stated purpose to eliminate the corrupting influence of soft money in our political campaigns. Let me be perfectly clear: The 527 issue has nothing to do with BCRA. It has everything to do with a 1974 law and the failure of the Federal Election Commission to do its job and properly regulate the activities of these groups. The new campaign finance law, BCRA, has successfully accomplished its goals. Last year, David Broder wrote in the Washington Post: As one who has been skeptical of the claimed virtues of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law, I am happy to concede that it has, in fact, passed its first test in the 2004 campaign with flying colors. It is important to point out that this was accomplished despite all of the predictions at the time about how the national political parties would be financially undermined without soft money. That was the major source of opposition. This would destroy the national political parties. The national political parties raised more hard money in the 2004 election cycle than they raised in hard and soft money combined during the Presidential election cycle in 2000. In fact, Republican and Democratic national parties raised a record $1.2 billion for the 2004 elections. What is really good about that is the majority of that came from small donors, not large, huge, soft money contributions. They increased that donor base. Again, the Democratic National Committee has more than 2.5 million new donors; the Republican National Committee, more than 1 million new donors; Republican senatorial and congressional campaign committees, 700,000 new donors; Democratic congressional campaign committee, 230,000 new donors. That was the intent of the law. That is what happened. According to Tony Corrado, the DNC has more than 2.5 million new donors, as I pointed out; the RNC more than a million new donors. What is the problem? The problem is, the Federal Election Commission, even though directed by the Supreme Court, will still not enforce existing law. The fact that the overwhelming majority of Federal 527s were created after the enactment of BCRA is no coincidence. Of the 68 Democrat- leaning 527 committees involved in the 2004 cycle, 54 of them were organized after BCRA. Of the 26 Republican-leaning 527 groups in the 2004, 13 were organized after the enactment of legislation which banned the use of soft money in Federal elections. These groups were set up with every intention of circumventing the law. They could not circumvent the law if the Federal Election Commission would enforce the law. That is why we have to go to court again and again. For the record, in order to enforce, to write regulations to enforce the BCRA, 13 of the 15 original regulations were thrown out by a Federal court judge--a remarkable performance on their part, remarkable. S. 2511, the bill I would like to see brought before this Senate, voted on and passed, requires that 527s register as political committees and comply with Federal campaign finance laws, including Federal limits on the contributions they receive unless the money they raise is spent exclusively in connection with non-Federal candidate elections, State or local ballot initiatives, or the nomination or confirmation of individuals to nonelected offices. And it upholds the hard-fought victory of BCRA. The legislation also sets new rules for Federal political committees that spend funds on voter mobilization efforts affecting both Federal and local races and, therefore, use both the Federal and non-Federal account under FEC regulations. The new rules would prevent unlimited soft money from being channeled into Federal elections through abuse of the Commission's allocation rules. Under the legislation, at least half of the funds spent on voter mobilization activities by Federal political committees would have to be hard money from their Federal account. More importantly, the funds raised for their non-Federal account would come only from individuals and would be limited to no more than $25,000 per year per donor. Corporations and labor unions could not contribute to these non-Federal accounts. To put it in simple terms, a George Soros could give $25,000 per year to a single political action committee as opposed to the $22 million he spent to finance these activities. Let me be perfectly clear on one point. This proposal would not shut down 527s. It would simply require them to abide by the same Federal campaign finance rules that every other Federal political committee must abide by in spending money to influence Federal elections, nor is this bill intended to affect 501(c)(3) or (4) tax-exempt organizations. Under the Internal Revenue Code, a 527 group is a ``political organization,'' which is a group whose primary purpose is to influence candidate elections or the appointment of individuals to public office. In other words, the 527 groups by definition are in the business of influencing campaigns and have voluntarily sought the tax advantages conferred on such political groups. These groups cannot be allowed to shirk their responsibilities to comply with Federal campaign finance laws when they are spending money to influence Federal elections. The use of soft money by 527 groups to pay for ads attacking and promoting the 2004 Presidential candidates was not legal. This is not a matter of the new campaign finance law, BCRA; it is a requirement of longstanding Federal campaign finance laws that go back to 1974. That law, as construed by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, requires any group that has a ``major purpose'' to influence Federal elections, and spends $1,000 or more to do so, to register with the Federal Election Commission as a ``political committee'' and be subject to the contribution limits, source prohibitions, and reporting requirements that apply to all political committees. Section 527 groups need to play by the rules that candidates, political parties, and all other political committees are bound by--the rules that Congress has enacted to protect the integrity of our political process. They need to raise and spend money that complies with Federal contribution limits and source prohibitions to pay for ads that promote or attack Federal candidates or otherwise have the purpose to influence Federal elections. They need to spend Federal funds for voter mobilization activities that are conducted on a partisan basis and will influence Federal elections--just like every other political committee. Some have raised questions about whether it is constitutional to limit contributions to political committees that operate supposedly independent of parties and candidates. I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, Madam President, a detailed analysis of these constitutional questions prepared by Professor Daniel Ortiz, the John Allan Love Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law. The memo thoroughly explains the constitutional basis for the legislation we have introduced.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent the calling of the quorum be rescinded.

Mr. McCAIN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. McCAIN. I ask that the remaining time on the minority side be yielded back.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs' Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce and the District of Columbia be authorized to meet on Thursday, June 29, 2006, at 9:30 a.m. for a hearing entitled, ``Enhancing Employee Performance: A Hearing on Pending Legislation.''

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts be authorized to meet to conduct a hearing on ``The Multidistrict Litigation Restoration Act'' on Thursday, July 29, 2006, at 2:30 p.m. in room 226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Witness list Panel I: The Honorable Wm. Terrell Hodges, Senior United States District Judge, United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Chairman, Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Ocala, FL and The Honorable Thomas W. Thrash, Jr., United States District Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta, GA.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs' Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security be authorized to meet on Thursday, June 29, 2006, at 2:30 p.m. for a hearing regarding ``Community Development Block Grants: the Case for Reform.''

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Select Committee on Intelligence be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on June 29, 2006, at 2:30 p.m. to hold a closed briefing.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I rise once again to oppose the amendment offered by the Senators from Michigan and Rhode Island and the amendment offered by the Senators from Massachusetts and Wisconsin. Before I speak about the problems I believe to be inherent in these amendments, I would like for a moment to discuss the nature of the debate upon which this body is engaged. The discussion over this war is perhaps the most consequential debate the Senate will engage in this year or perhaps in several years. The outcome of the war will impact the stability of the Middle East and the nature of U.S. foreign policy for a generation. It is that important. So our debate in this Chamber should be a serious weighing of the arguments. Sometimes, unfortunately, the debate seems to have deteriorated into sloganeering, but overall, I think this debate has been very helpful. I reiterate the fact that we should respect the views of those who disagree with us. I respect and have known my colleagues who are sponsors of these amendments, and I believe that a good, healthy, strong debate is what this Nation needs. In that spirit, I would like to discuss again my strong opposition to the two amendments. By calling for a withdrawal of American troops tied to arbitrary timetables rather than conditions in country, these amendments literally risk disaster for our intervention in Iraq. Madam President, the Iraqi security forces, I say to my friends, are clearly unable to maintain security on their own. All one has to do is look at every news story every morning or every evening. Even with the presence of coalition forces in Iraq today, the violence and instability remain at unacceptably high levels. To abandon the fledgling Iraqi Army and police to the insurgents, the militias and the terrorists would risk chaos in Iraq, and chaos in Iraq would mean disaster. Madam President, there is an old line about those of us who ignore the lessons and mistakes of history are doomed to repeat them. Afghanistan is the classic example of what could happen in Iraq. After years and years of incredible assistance to those who were seeking freedom from the then-Soviet Union occupation of Afghanistan, the Russians were driven out. Then, incredibly, the United States of America totally disengaged--totally disengaged--from Afghanistan. I commend to my colleagues a book called ``Ghost Wars'' by Steve Coll which won a Pulitzer prize. And in that vacuum, of course, came the Taliban, and the Taliban then obviously was not only a terribly oppressive, brutal, and cruel regime but became a hotbed of training for terrorists, al-Qaida and others. It is clear to me that if we abandon Iraq to that same chaos, there is no doubt who would come to power, at least in some parts of Iraq, and the consequences we would pay for that. We watched Afghanistan descend into chaos. There continues to be much debate about Saddam Hussein's connections to terrorists before our invasion, but there can be no doubt about the centrality of this conflict on the war on terror today. A failed state in Iraq would pose a clear, present, and enduring danger to the security of our country. Now, the sponsors of these amendments seem to base them on a premise that if we begin withdrawing, the Iraqi Government will somehow get serious and fight the insurgency on its own without our help. That makes the assumption, incredibly, that the present Government in Iraq and the military who are out there fighting all the time and their police are somehow not serious. Of course they are serious. They are just not capable. It is going to take more time and more effort and, I am sorry to say, more American sacrifice before they are capable of assuming those responsibilities. Rather than inducing the Government to crack down on the insurgency, beginning a U.S. withdrawal is more likely to induce average Iraqis to join a militia for protection rather than cast their lots with the Government. I would also ask the sponsors of the amendments what they advocate if we withdraw and the violence actually worsens and full-scale civil war ensues or terrorists then enjoy a safe haven to plan attacks against Americans and our friends. Do we then face the options only of tolerating this situation in perpetuity or reinvading the country? We have just one choice in Iraq, and that is to see our mission there through to victory. What does victory mean? It is the classic reduction and eventual elimination of any insurgency, an economy that works, a government that functions, and a military and police that are able to come back and eventually eliminate and destroy an insurgency. That is the way every insurgency in history was put down. There is no peace signing on board the USS Missouri. There are no Paris peace talks. It is an insurgency that has to be surrounded, contained, and eliminated. That is not to say this victory will be quick and easy. It is long and it is hard and it is tough, and many mistakes have been made and all of us have been frustrated by those mistakes. Many of us have been terribly frustrated by the inflated estimates and over-optimistic statements that so frustrated us and the American people when the conditions don't warrant it. It is still tough today. We can't fall prey to wishful thinking, that we can put the costs and the difficulties and the frustrations aside by ignoring our challenges and responsibilities. That is something we cannot do. Madam President, I congratulate my colleagues for their participation in this debate. The American people expect nothing less of us. I hope we are a better informed nation and a better informed body when we vote. It will probably not be the last time we address this issue, but I think it has been done in a comprehensive fashion. I would close by reminding my colleagues that it was the United States that led the invasion of Iraq, the United States led the occupation, and the United States, with our Iraqi partners, has the responsibility to see this through. It will take more time, more commitment, more support, and more brave Americans who will lose their lives in the service of this great cause. Despite our cajoling, nagging, and pleading, few other countries around the world will share much of our burden. Iraq is for us to do, for us to win or lose, for us to suffer the consequences or share in the benefits. But in the end, there is only one United States of America, and it is to us that history will look for courage and commitment. I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration. This amendment would name the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 after the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, our distinguished friend and colleague from Virginia, John Warner. I am pleased to be joined in this effort by Senators Frist, Levin, Inhofe, Kennedy, Roberts, Byrd, Sessions, Lieberman, Collins, Jack Reed, Ensign, Akaka, Talent, Bill Nelson, Chambliss, Ben Nelson, Graham, Dayton, Dole, Bayh, Cornyn, Clinton, Thune, Allard, and Allen. I am certain that there is not a Senator in this Chamber who would not agree that Senator Warner, with his grace, courtliness, bipartisan attitude: and kindness to all, represents the finest traditions of the Senate. All Senators know that the Defense Authorization bill occupies a major place in the annual legislative calendar and takes substantial time to complete. Those Senators who do not have the privilege of serving on the Committee on Armed Services may not realize the tremendous amount of work that goes into hearings, formulation of legislative proposals, preparation for markup, and actual markup of this bill--the largest annually recurring piece of legislation in Congress. When one adds to this the oversight of the largest department in the government, and the processing of thousands of military and civilian nominations each year, the demands on the chairman of the committee and the need for leadership are obvious. For 6 years, John Warner has provided that leadership, and done it in a manner that has gained him universal respect. John Warner is, first and foremost, a Virginian--a native of that Old Dominion that has stood at the center of American history for over two centuries and has given the Nation so many of its eminent men, from Washington forward. John Warner has continued that tradition of service to country from his youth. The son of a decorated Army physician in World War I, John Warner left high school to enlist in the Navy late in World War II. He served until 1946, when he was discharged as a petty officer 3rd class. Like millions of other young Americans, he then attended college on the GI bill, graduating from Washington and Lee University in 1949. He then entered the University of Virginia Law School. He interrupted his education to serve in the Korean war, volunteering for active duty and accepting a commission in the Marine Corps. He served in combat as a ground officer in the First Marine Air Wing, and remained in the Marine Corps Reserve for several years. Upon returning from the Korean war, he resumed his legal education, graduating from the University of Virginia Law School in 1953. Upon graduation, John Warner's outstanding qualities were recognized when he was selected to serve as the law clerk to the late Judge E. Barrett Prettyman of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, one of the most outstanding jurists of the period. Many years later, Senator Warner would be instrumental in naming the U.S. Court House in Washington, DC, for his old mentor. After his clerkship, John Warner became an assistant U.S. attorney in the District of Columbia, and later was engaged in the private practice of law. In 1969, President Nixon nominated John Warner to serve as Under Secretary of the Navy. The Senate confirmed the nomination, and he served as Under Secretary until he was confirmed and appointed as the 61st Secretary of the Navy in 1972. During his tenure as Secretary, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Incidents at Sea Executive Agreement, for which he was the principal United States negotiator and signatory. This agreement remains in effect today and has served as a model for similar agreements governing naval vessels and aircraft around the world. After leaving the Department of the Navy in 1974, John Warner's next public service was as chairman of the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission. He oversaw the celebration of the Nation's founding, directing the Federal Government's role in a commemoration that embraced all 50 States and over 20 foreign nations. In 1978, the voters of Virginia elected John Warner to a full term in the U.S. Senate. Upon beginning his service in 1979, he was elected a member of the Committee on Armed Services. Upon leaving the chairmanship next year, he will have served on the committee for 28 years, almost half of the committee's existence. Senator Warner served as chairman of the committee from 1999 to 2001, and again since 2003. He also served as ranking member from 1987 to 1993, and again from 2001 to 2003. For 14 years of American history, years that saw the end of the Cold War, the first gulf war, the attacks on September 11, 2001, and the global war on terror, John Warner has served in a leadership role on the committee. No Member of this body has done more for our national security than John Warner. As sailor, Marine officer, Under Secretary, and Secretary of the Navy, and U.S. Senator, he has always answered his country's call. The dignified and evenhanded way in which he has presided over the business of the committee has enabled it to continue its noble tradition of being an island of bipartisanship in an increasingly unpleasant political era. I submit, Mr. President, that it is exceedingly appropriate that this year's Defense Authorization Act, the last which John Warner will manage as chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, be named in his honor.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield myself such time as I may use. I think we ought to try to go back to what this amendment is about. This amendment is not to cure any delay. The fact is, we have in this authorization 20 F-22s, with $1.4 billion over what was in the budget-- 20 of them. And then, next year, I would imagine we will authorize another 20; and the year after that, another 20. This is not about any delay. This is about congressional oversight. This is whether we should go to multiyear funding and lock us into a weapons system which has not been proven yet. I say to my friend from Georgia, no matter how this amendment comes out because of the differences of opinion we have within the committee, in July I would like to schedule a hearing, and we will get all the players over again. Whether this amendment goes up or down, in July we will schedule a hearing in the subcommittee and have another look at the pluses and minuses. The Senator from Oklahoma mentioned that several studies have come in. The IDAs came in on the 20th. The GAO one came in yesterday or the day before. So I will be glad--no matter how the vote ends up--to have another hearing on this issue because we are talking about, obviously, really large sums of money. So this Senator does not want to delay the procurement of the F-22. But I certainly want to maintain our ability to oversight the program rather than locking us in. So it is not about whether we delay or not. Finally, on the issue of saving $225 million: from what? Because the Air Force, on May 16, 2006, stated that an additional $674 million is needed to fully fund the multiyear program being proposed. So is that savings of $225 million out of the $674 million of additional costs or does it mean there really isn't an additional $674 million, that they sent over, that they need? So that has to be sorted out as well. So again, I restate to my colleagues that literally every outside organization--CRS, CBO, GAO--all of them believe not that this weapons system needs to be canceled, not that it needs to be delayed, but we do not need to embark on a multiyear lock-in acquisition of this weapons system, which no doubt has very great value. I hope my colleagues will agree with the distinguished chairman and me that this amendment should be rejected at this time. Mr. President, does the Senator from Michigan wish to speak on this?

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I don't oppose the F-22 program. In fact, the Armed Services subcommittee provided and the Senate Armed Services Committee marked down an additional $1.4 billion for 20 F-22s. The issue is not, frankly, whether we support the F-22. Rightly or wrongly, we all do--and every member of the committee does. The question is, Are we going to act responsibly? The question is, Are we going to authorize a multiyear procurement of an aircraft that has--and it is not unusual--experienced time after time dramatic delays and cost overruns? Are we ready to do that? Not according to the GAO, not according to the OMB, not according to the Congressional Research Service, and not according to every outside observer of this program. Let me give a small example. The F-22 experienced an initial operational capability delay of 9 years 9 months; initial operational test and evaluation delayed 5 years 3 months; full rate production delay of 5 years 3 months; low rate initial production, 4 years 9 months; first delivery of operational aircraft delayed 4 years 7 months; first flight delayed 2 years; and completion of critical design review delayed 1 year 4 months. The record is not good. In fact, the record is terrible. In 1991, the estimated cost, according to the U.S. Air Force, for the aircraft was going to be $114 million--in then-year dollars; now, $354 million per copy. This program--not atypically--has experienced significant delays and cost overruns, which, by the way, maybe we will get into at some point. Then they received incentive bonuses, even for violations of Nunn- McCurdy. We are not talking about the purchase of F-22s. What we are talking about is, are we going to violate the basic principles and the law which requires certain criteria to be met before multiyear acquisition of these aircraft? The report prepared by the Comptroller General of the United States clearly states that four of the six criteria set forth in the law have not been met by the Air Force. They have not been met. Yet here we are debating a measure that would effectively permit the Air Force to be held unaccountable, to end run a good Government provision in Federal law that is specifically designed to ensure accountability in our Government. There have been two Nunn-McCurdy violations, according to the Comptroller General. Since its inception, this program has been subject to 2 Nunn-McCurdy violations and has been rebaselined 14 times just to avoid additional breaches. Fourteen times they have rebaselined the cost of this weapons system. We all know the game. They come and they say: This weapons system is going to cost X. They get it authorized, then we get it, and guess what happens. It ends up costing dramatically more money--in the case of this aircraft, from $114 million each to $354 million each, and it is still in a relatively embryonic stage. The Air Force, I am sorry to say, has misrepresented several things, including the termination cost of the C-130J. The Air Force--a September 28, 2005, Defense Contract Audit Agency report points out that Lockheed-Martin earned a profit of almost 27 percent--$643 million--on a $2.4 billion, 60-aircraft, multiprocurement for C-130 aircraft. The estimate on the actual multiyear procurement cost savings for the F-22--the Air Force acquisition officers misrepresented the F-22 program as a stably funded program. Last year, Congress authorized and appropriated enough money for 24 F-22 aircraft. The Air Force bought 22. We have been asking them: What happened to the other two airplanes? We still haven't gotten a response. How we buy the F-22 is not subject to unfettered discretion. If we choose to buy them under a multiyear contract, we must do so in compliance with the law. This amendment does not. The Congressional Research Service points out the many ongoing technical problems with the F-22--avionics problems, airframe problems, engine problems. The F-119 engine fuel consumption has been unsatisfactory, and problems were experienced with the engine's core combustor, which did not demonstrate desired temperature levels. The F- 22's cockpit canopy experienced ongoing challenges, including cracking and reliability. It goes on and on. Many of these things are associated with the development of a new weapons system. By the way, I have never met a pilot who didn't like to fly a new weapons system, but the fact is that it is not ready for multiyear procurement. That was the subject of extensive hearings in the subcommittee and consideration in the full committee. I don't expect this body to rubberstamp everything the committee does, but I can tell you that extensive analysis and study was done on it. I also point out that literally every outside group, including the IDA, had concerns about it, even though they alleged that there would be significant cost savings. But the fact is that even the IDA, which my friend from Georgia points out--this form of contracting bears significant risks. Multiyear procurement reduces Congressional budgetary flexibility, both for the instant program and across other programs within the Defense portfolio. I urge my colleagues who consider supporting this amendment--and we know very well that there will be reductions in defense spending. It happens historically as wars wind down. Already on the House side, there has been a proposal for significant reductions in defense spending, which I do not support but apparently may be the final product for next year from the House Appropriations Committee. We are going to lock in multiyear procurement for a weapons system that has experienced dramatic cost overruns. And I am not saying we shouldn't procure this aircraft. I am saying we should. I am not totally convinced that it would actually meet the challenges of the war on terrorism, but I strongly support it. But before we give them a blank check, I think we should regard what we are doing here--locking in, in a multiyear fashion, the procurement of a weapons system that has gone from $100-and-some million per copy to over $300 million per copy which still has very significant technical problems associated with it. I would caution and urge my colleagues to understand this in the larger context. Finally, we have a responsibility of oversight in the committee and as a body. If we allow multiyear procurement, we basically give up those oversight responsibilities. And when we talk about a couple hundred million dollars, which is big money, and cost savings, look at the overruns, the billions in cost overruns they have already experienced, and we still haven't got a fully tested, completed, and operational product. I understand the desire of my friend from Georgia to make sure this program is basically locked in, which is what this amendment will do. I don't think we are ready for it. Every outfit outside of the U.S. Air Force--and even the IDA, with a qualified endorsement--the Congressional Research Service, OMB, GAO, and all the others concur in that conclusion. I hope we will reject this amendment, but I certainly understand and respect the position of my friend from Georgia.

Mr. McCAIN. No problem.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, if the chairman will yield just for a second, we don't need an hour on this amendment, I say to my friend from Virginia. I think 40 minutes equally divided would be sufficient for my purposes. I don't know about the author of the amendment; he might want more time.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank you. And I express my appreciation for the courtesy of the Senator from Texas who was on the floor before I was, and I appreciate his courtesy very much. I intend to take about 12 minutes, if that is agreeable to the Senator.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I strongly oppose the amendment offered by the Senators from Michigan and Rhode Island and the amendment offered by the Senator from Massachusetts. These amendments share the same problem: calling for a withdrawal of American troops tied to arbitrary timetables rather than conditions in-country. The amendment we are debating now states the sense of Congress that the President should begin the phased redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq this year and that he should submit to Congress a plan with dates for this redeployment. I believe such a move would be a significant step on the road to disaster. There is an understandable desire, 3 years after our invasion, to seek a quick and easy end to our intervention in Iraq. We face real difficulties there, we have made serious mistakes, and the costs have been very high. But these would pale in comparison to what is likely to unfold should we follow the course advocated by this resolution. The violence we see on Iraqi streets today illustrates one fundamental fact: Iraqi forces are not yet capable of securing the country on their own. On the contrary, even with current troop levels, a level of violence in Iraq remains unacceptably high. To withdraw our forces would have one, all-too-predictable outcome--the violence currently constrained by our security operations around the country would rise commensurately. If the main enforcer of Government authority--coalition troops--draws down prematurely, the only questions will be the degree to which the increased violence engulfs the country and whether full-scale civil war erupts. Much has been said about the effect of an American withdrawal on the Iraqi Government, and the sponsors of this amendment argue that a withdrawal would somehow force the Government to take on responsibilities it currently evades. But consider for a moment the effect of a withdrawal timetable on individual Iraqis outside the Government. An Iraqi Shi'a living in Baghdad or perhaps a Sunni living in Kirkuk learns that the Congress has called on our President to begin withdrawing troops this year and to present a timetable by which they will all return home. This knowledge changes the calculation made by individuals like these, decisions critical to the eventual security of Iraq. It makes joining the police forces or the Iraqi Government look like an increasingly bad bet. Participation in a militia appears better by comparison. And by changing these calculations across the country, we have made the goal of stability in Iraq more difficult to achieve. By signaling that an end to the American intervention is near, we will alienate our friends, who fear an insurgent victory, and tempt undecideds to join the antigovernment ranks. Not every Member of this body agreed with the decision to topple Saddam Hussein, but when our country went to war, we incurred a moral duty to not abandon the people of Iraq to terrorists and killers. If we withdraw prematurely, risking all-out civil war, we will have done precisely that. I can hardly imagine that any U.S. Senator would want our Nation to suffer that moral stain. But the implications of premature withdrawal from Iraq are not moral alone; they directly involve our national security. Greater instability in Iraq would invite further Syrian and Iranian interference, bolstering the influence of two terror-sponsoring states firmly opposed to America's policy. Iraq's neighbors--from Saudi Arabia to Israel to Turkey--would feel their own security eroding and might be induced to act. This uncertain swirl of events would have a damaging impact on our ability to promote positive change in the Middle East, to say the least. Withdrawing before Iraqis can bring stability to the country on their own would turn that land into a failed state in the heart of the Middle East. We have seen once before a failed state emerge after U.S. disengagement, and it cost us terribly. In pre-9/11 Afghanistan, terrorists found sanctuary to train and plan attacks with impunity. We know that there are today in Iraq terrorists who are planning attacks against Americans. We cannot make this fatal mistake twice. Whether or not Members of this body believe that Iraq was part of the war on terror in 2003, it is simply incontrovertible that the war on terror is being fought there today. Al-Qaida is present in Iraq. Jihadists continue to cross the borders. Suicide bombers target American troops, Government personnel, and civilians. If we leave Iraq prematurely, the jihadists will interpret the withdrawal as a triumph of their brutal tactics against our power. And I do not believe they will stop with Iraq. The letter released last year from Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's lieutenant, to Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi draws out the implications. The Zawahiri letter is predicated on the assumption that the United States will leave Iraq and that al-Qaida's real game begins as soon as we abandon the country. In his missive, Zawahiri lays out a four-stage plan--establish a caliphate in Iraq, extend the ``jihad wave'' to the secular countries neighboring Iraq, clash with Israel--none of which shall commence until the completion of stage one: expel the Americans from Iraq. Zawahiri observes that the collapse of American power in Vietnam, ``and how they ran and left their agents,'' suggests that ``we must be ready starting now.'' We cannot let them start, now or ever. We must stay in Iraq until the Government there has fully functioning security forces that can keep the insurgents at bay and ultimately defeat them. Some argue that it is our very presence in Iraq that has created the insurgency and that if we end the occupation, we end the insurgency. But, in fact, by ending military operations, we are likely to empower the insurgency. The fighting is not simply against coalition forces; rather, the insurgents target the Iraqi Government, opposing militias, and various sects and ethnicities. There is no reason to think that an American drawdown would discourage these fights. Those who support a withdrawal might wish to examine the assumptions that lie behind their suggestion. What if we withdraw and the violence actually worsens, full-scale civil war ensues, or terrorists enjoy safe-haven to plan attacks against America and our friends? Do we then face the options only of tolerating this situation in perpetuity or reinvading the country? A few observers have argued that the United States has an option of somehow pulling our troops from Iraq but still managing things from afar. This is nonsense. The United States will have no leverage to manage things once we have left the country. The battle in Iraq, which is likely to remain counterinsurgency in character, is ill-suited to the extensive use of air power, which would be the foremost instrument available to us from outside. We could no more prevail in Iraq from outside than we could win the war in Vietnam by continuing to bomb the North. As tempting as it is to seek a solution that would let us both draw down our troops and preserve our military options in Iraq, that solution does not exist. The options on the table have been there from the beginning: withdraw and fail or commit and succeed. Don't take my word for it. Ask those whose security is at stake every day. The Iraqi Government does not want us to set an arbitrary timeline for withdrawal. As the Iraqi Minister for National Security wrote in yesterday's Washington Post, more important than some series of dates is the achievement of set objectives for restoring security. Similarly, our friends in the neighborhood fear a precipitous American withdrawal. Allies in Europe and Asia encourage us to see this war through to its end. Because we cannot pull out and hope for the best, because we cannot withdraw and manage things from afar, because morality and our security compel it, we have to see this mission through to completion. Drawdowns must be based on conditions in-country, not an arbitrary deadline rooted in our domestic politics. Our domestic politics do have an effect on the war in Iraq, and again I fear that this amendment would have a deleterious effect. Anyone reading it gets the sense that the Senate's foremost objective is the drawdown of American troops. The sense they should get is that America's first goal in Iraq is to win the war--that is what they should get--and that all other policy decisions support and are subordinate to the successful completion of our mission. Like the sponsors of this legislation, I hope we bring home American troops as soon as possible. But suggesting to the American people that withdrawal is at hand, we risk once again raising unrealistic expectations that can only cost domestic support for America's role in this conflict, a war we must win. None of this is to say that success in Iraq will be quick or easy. On the contrary, this war is long and it is hard and it is tough. We will see significant achievements, like the killing of Zarqawi and the completion of the Iraqi Cabinet, but we will see steps backward as well, like the continuing violence in Baghdad and the insurgency in Ramadi. No one should have any illusions about the costs of this conflict as it has been waged thus far or as it will be waged as we move ahead, but neither should anyone have illusions about the role of Iraq in the war on terror today. It has become a central battleground in our fight against those who wish us grave harm, and we cannot wish away this fundamental truth. We cannot fall prey to wishful thinking that we can put the costs and the difficulties and the frustrations aside by ignoring our challenges and responsibilities. I urge my colleagues to vote against this amendment.

Mr. McCAIN. I think Senator Cornyn was.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill to amend various provisions of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, ILCA. Some of these amendments are of a technical or clarifying nature; others have the effect of delaying the effective date of certain provisions of the Indian Probate Code set forth in ILCA section 207. Section 1 of the bill clarifies the meaning of certain defined terms used in ILCA--``trust or restricted interest land'' and ``land''--and also delays the application of the act's probate code to permanent improvements located on Indian trust lands until after July 20, 2007. This delay will provide additional time to analyze how the probate code should apply to permanent improvements and determine whether further amendments are needed. The definition of land is amended to clarify that a decedent's interest in such improvements is included in the term ``land'' only for purposes of intestate succession under ILCA section 207(a) and even then only when the improvements are located on a parcel of trust or restricted land that is itself included in the decedent's estate. Thus, ``land'' would not include a decedent's interest in permanent improvements located on tribal trust land or for that matter on individually owned trust land if the underlying parcel of land is not itself part of the decedent's estate. Section 2 of the bill also amends the ``single heir rule'' of ILCA section 207(a)(2)(D)--which governs the inheritance of interests that are less than 5 percent of the total undivided interest in a parcel of land--by making it inapplicable to any interest in the estate of a decedent who dies during the period beginning on the enactment date of the clause and ending on July 20, 2007, and authorizing the Secretary of Interior to extend this period for up to 1 year. The bill would also delay until July 21, 2007, the application of the presumption in ILCA section 207(c) that a devise of a trust interest to more than 1 person creates a joint tenancy absent clear language in the will to the contrary. It would amend ILCA section 207(o), which authorizes purchase of interests during probate, in various ways, but most significantly limiting nonconsensual purchases to the Secretary and the Indian tribe; clarifying that the 5 percent threshold applies to the decedent's interest rather than to the interest passing to an heir; and holding the rule allowing nonconsensual purchase at probate of small interests inapplicable to interests in the estate of any decedent who dies on or before July 20, 2007. This section would also authorize the Secretary to extend this period for up to 1 additional year. The amendments delaying the application of these provisions will give Indian landowners more time to understand how these provisions work and plan their estates accordingly. The delays of the single heir rule and nonconsensual purchase option at probate will also allow the Department more time to have procedures and systems in place to determine whether a given interest is above or below the 5 percent threshold that triggers the application of the rules. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am introducing today a bill to amend various provisions of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, ILCA. Some of these amendments are of a technical or clarifying nature; others have the effect of delaying the effective date of certain provisions of the Indian Probate Code set forth in ILCA section 207. Section 1 of the bill clarifies the meaning of certain defined terms used in ILCA--``trust or restricted interest land'' and ``land''--and also delays the application of the act's probate code to permanent improvements located on Indian trust lands until after July 20, 2007. This delay will provide additional time to analyze how the probate code should apply to permanent improvements and determine whether further amendments are needed. The definition of land is amended to clarify that a decedent's interest in such improvements is included in the term ``land'' only for purposes of intestate succession under ILCA section 207(a) and even then only when the improvements are located on a parcel of trust or restricted land that is itself included in the decedent's estate. Thus, ``land'' would not include a decedent's interest in permanent improvements located on tribal trust land or for that matter on individually owned trust land if the underlying parcel of land is not itself part of the decedent's estate. Section 2 of the bill also amends the ``single heir rule'' of ILCA section 207(a)(2)(D)--which governs the inheritance of interests that are less than 5 percent of the total undivided interest in a parcel of land--by making it inapplicable to any interest in the estate of a decedent who dies during the period beginning on the enactment date of the clause and ending on July 20, 2007, and authorizing the Secretary of Interior to extend this period for up to 1 year. The bill would also delay until July 21, 2007, the application of the presumption in ILCA section 207(c) that a devise of a trust interest to more than 1 person creates a joint tenancy absent clear language in the will to the contrary. It would amend ILCA section 207(o), which authorizes purchase of interests during probate, in various ways, but most significantly limiting nonconsensual purchases to the Secretary and the Indian tribe; clarifying that the 5 percent threshold applies to the decedent's interest rather than to the interest passing to an heir; and holding the rule allowing nonconsensual purchase at probate of small interests inapplicable to interests in the estate of any decedent who dies on or before July 20, 2007. This section would also authorize the Secretary to extend this period for up to 1 additional year. The amendments delaying the application of these provisions will give Indian landowners more time to understand how these provisions work and plan their estates accordingly. The delays of the single heir rule and nonconsensual purchase option at probate will also allow the Department more time to have procedures and systems in place to determine whether a given interest is above or below the 5 percent threshold that triggers the application of the rules. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the conference report we have before us contains $94.5 billion in funding for the war on terror, hurricane recovery in the gulf coast, pandemic flu preparation, and border security. We have to fund our troops. Therefore, I will support passage of this conference report. But I do so with reservations, mainly because resources for the training and equipping of the Iraqi army have been funded well below the level requested by the President. As all of my colleagues know, training and equipping the Iraqi army is imperative to the ultimate success of our mission there. The security of the Iraqi people, ensured by a properly trained and equipped Iraqi army, is our exit strategy. Unfortunately, the must-pass nature of this bill has led to the inclusion of hundreds of millions of dollars in unrequested, nonemergency spending and typical run-of-the-mill earmarks. Examples of unrequested and nonemergency additions to this emergency spending bill include three Marine Corps V-22 tilt rotor aircraft, two KC-130J tanker aircraft, four C-130J cargo aircraft, the advance procurement of seven C-17 cargo aircraft, and one Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, UAV. It also includes $975 million for SINCGARS tactical radios, $675 million in Army tank and Bradley Fighting Vehicle upgrades, $130 million for Army STRYKER vehicles above combat losses, and $567 million for Army trucks. None of these were requested by the administration, and they are not critically needed to aid in the war on terror. Let's take a closer look at just one of these add-ons. The conference report includes $230 million to buy three Marine Corps V-22s. The President did not request any money for the V-22 Osprey, which is still in the development and testing stage. In fact, the V-22 has not even been deployed to an operational squadron yet. If continued development and testing goes well, the Marine Corps will send the V-22 to an operational squadron in the summer or fall of 2007. I have to question why funding for a nonoperational aircraft that is still in the development stages is considered to be an emergency in this bill. The answer is that there is no emergency need for this aircraft--if there was, I am more than confident that the President would have requested the appropriate funding in the emergency supplemental submitted last February. Additionally, the conference report contains a provision which authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to reimburse shipbuilding contractors for ``business disruptions'' that were incurred during and after Hurricane Katrina. This provision may increase Navy shipbuilding costs by $140 million over what the administration had requested. The provision is expected to primarily benefit Northrop Grumman's shipyard in Pascagoula, MS. This language substitutes Government funding for what insurers would pay to shipbuilders. Northrop Grumman is suing its insurer, Factory Mutual, for those costs associated with Hurricane Katrina. However, in the near term, the appropriators have decided the best course is to arrange a giveaway to an insurance company and a shipbuilder. Furthermore, the explanatory statement accompanying this conference report contains language stating that the conferees agree with House and Senate language delaying the Department of Transportation, DOT, rulemaking which proposes to give domestic air carriers with foreign investors more control over business matters. Yet this legislative language does not include any related provisions, and rightly so, in my view. This greater control would only be granted for business matters that do not relate to safety or security and only when the investors' home countries provide our airlines with investment and market access. I assure my colleagues this statement was not included by accident, and its intent seems to be to signal to DOT that Congress does not approve of its proposed rulemaking. Here are some other notable projects funded as ``emergencies'' in this measure: $16 million for hurricane repair in the State of Pennsylvania; $40 million for sugar and sugarcane disaster assistance in Florida, which was not requested; $40 million for sugar and sugarcane disaster assistance in Louisiana, which was not requested by the President; $400,000 for disaster assistance to sugar cooperatives in Texas, which was not requested by the President. $400,000 to the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal Demonstration barrier, which was not requested by the President; $9 million in drought emergency assistance to communities in Nevada and New Mexico; $225,000 to the Missouri Soybean Association for the purchase of a building for use as an incubation center in the Kansas City metropolitan statistical area; $100,000 to the Boys and Girls Club of Greater Washington in Silver Spring, MD for renovation of Boys and Girls Clubs of Greater Washington Clubhouse No. 2, Clubhouse No. 4, Clubhouse No. 10, Clubhouse No. 11, and Clubhouse No. 14 in the District of Columbia; $100,000 to Wesleyan College in Macon, GA, for facility renovation, buildout, and construction; $125,000 to Craig County, VA, for purchase, renovation, buildout, and upgrade of a library. I think we can fund this war--and indeed win this war--while also budgeting for this war. We know the war is going to cost more than the over $400 billion we will have appropriated to date upon enactment of this conference report, and we know that the war is not going to end as quickly as most of us would prefer. But we need to continue our military operations until the job is done. Withdrawing our military presence prematurely is not an option in my view, the view of many of my colleagues, nor the view of the President or his advisers. We are in it to win. Instead of fixing the problem, and fixing it will not be easy, we have only succeeded in making it bigger, more unstable, more complicated, and much more expensive. And adding hundreds of billions of dollars that are more conveniently designated as emergency expenditures--so that they don't have to be budgeted for along with other national priorities--is only making the fiscal problem that much greater. Again, Mr. President, it is unfortunate that, at a time of war and with such a huge deficit and burgeoning debt, we continue to fund unnecessary projects and load up emergency supplemental appropriations bills with nonemergency items. We need to concentrate on providing the resources necessary for our young men and women swerving in Iraq to successfully complete their mission, so that they can return safely to their families, and a grateful Nation.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank you for the recognition, and I thank the distinguished chairman for his explanation of what just transpired. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the pending Nelson amendment. I think it is very important that, first of all, we try not to react on the floor of the Senate to the headlines that appear in the morning paper--whether they happen to be totally accurate or not. The second thing I want to point out is that all of us--all of us-- are pained when a brave American is killed in this terrible, long, drawn-out conflict which has divided America and cost us so much in American blood and treasure. All of us--no matter where we stand on this conflict--feel the utmost sorrow and regret at the loss or wounding of a single brave, young American man or woman. So this debate is certainly not about the enormous sacrifice that has already been made and probably will be made in the course of this conflict. But I think we have to be realistic about the way out of this conflict, the way out we have seen time after time throughout history of other conflicts, especially those that in many respects are civil wars. Nelson Mandela probably had the greatest reason to seek revenge and full accounting not only for the years of imprisonment and mistreatment he personally received but also because of the hundreds if not thousands of his countrymen who were brutalized, mistreated, kept in inferior status, and, in some cases, even massacred by the minority government that ruled his country. When Nelson Mandela was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, it was not only because of his bravery and courage while he underwent unspeakable unpleasantries and indignities as a prisoner--I believe the number was 27 years--but primarily because Nelson Mandela realized he had to knit and heal the wounds that had so badly scarred his nation. Nelson Mandela, in the spirit of forgiveness, for the good of his country, put his personal injuries aside because he realized the only way his nation could move forward is to put those terrible things that happened behind him. We also saw terrible things happen in El Salvador's civil war. Jose Napoleon Duarte, a name that some of us have forgotten, was elected President of the country. And he did two things. He vigorously prosecuted the insurgency, and then he reached out his hand to the insurgents because he knew if they did not forgive and even try to forget, that nation would continue a bloodletting that had afflicted it for a long period of time. In Colombia, the President of Colombia has just attested that 40,000 people--paramilitaries and guerrillas who, again, have carried out these same kinds of attacks and murder and mayhem in their country-- have laid down their arms because of an amnesty program that he has extended to them. I could go on about many of the conflicts in our history. But the fact is that wars end when enemies stop killing each other. After Pearl Harbor we talked with the Japanese. After years of war in Vietnam, we talked to the North Vietnamese in Paris. Time and again, there reaches a point where enemies must if not be forgiven at least be included, as hostilities come to an end and peace begins. Our brave men and women are working with Iraqis to build a new country, and by co-opting the insurgents, perhaps we can save the lives and fortunes of our own and those who we support. Things are very difficult in Iraq. And we are angered when we hear of an IED that blows up and kills and maims innocent Americans. We are sometimes driven to frustration and incredible--incredible--sorrow when we hear of the loss of these precious young men and women. But we also know that the insurgency does not end until the insurgents stop fighting. And the sooner the new Prime Minister, freely elected--freely elected--Mr. Maliki, is able to bring his country back together, the sooner we will find peace, and the sooner Americans can be withdrawn, and the sooner American casualties will end. I am confident the amendment by the Senator from Florida amendment is well-meaning, and I understand the intentions behind it. But I think it is important we look back and recognize that not only do times change, as in the case of Vietnam--our Secretary of Defense just in the last week visited Vietnam, as we have renewed our relationships, as we have healed the wounds of the Vietnam war, and moved forward in partnership with the Vietnamese. Mr. President, from a personal standpoint, there are a few Vietnamese I would very much like to see again, people I may not have the most peaceful intentions toward. But the reality is--the reality is--we must heal the wounds of war if we are going to unite a nation and move forward. And that is the case with Iraq, as it has been with almost every other nation in history. I finally add, as a footnote, I am not sure we here in the U.S. Senate should be dictating to the leaders of Iraq how they should conduct their affairs as they, the freely elected leaders of that nation, attempt to bring about peace and reconciliation in their nation. But the larger issue here is, I believe, that our goal is to bring an end to the conflict as quickly as possible in Iraq. If that means, in return for laying down their arms, that some are allowed an amnesty or allowed to reenter the society of Iraq, in a peaceful manner, in a productive manner, as has happened in South Africa, El Salvador--and is happening in Colombia--and many other insurgencies throughout history, then I think we should welcome it. And as we place our confidence in the new Government of Iraq, perhaps we should give them some latitude. I would also like to add, by the way, that that quote in the press may not have been exactly right as to who might be eligible for amnesty and who might not. At least that should be cleared up. But it doesn't obscure the fact that the freely elected government, that we support, of the country of Iraq is now reaching out to attempt to end the fighting and the conflict. I do not think we should be micro managing that from the floor of the U.S. Senate. I am sure that the enemies we faced in World War II--who the distinguished chairman of the committee fought against in that great war--that there was a time where we had reconciliation with our enemies on both sides of the Atlantic. Now, were people who were guilty of specific war crimes brought to trial? Absolutely, and punished, in some cases, to the point of execution. But those who fought against us are clearly now our friends. So I hope that we would understand that this amendment would not be helpful to the process of peace, would not be an endorsement of the freely elected leaders of the country of Iraq, and might even serve, in an unintended fashion, as an impediment to a process of peaceful reconciliation in Iraq rather than helping it. Mr. President, I yield the floor.