John McCain

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Twenty minutes; followed by Senator Lieberman for 5 minutes; Senator Lott for 5 minutes; whatever time Senator Stevens would need; and then 5 minutes for me to wrap up, followed by a rollcall vote.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I don't want to take a lot of time. I wonder if we could get an agreement that perhaps Senator Inouye be recognized for--how much time would he need?

Mr. McCAIN. It only applies to TSA.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, Bob Kerrey writes: I write to reaffirm my strong support for Congressional action to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report to strengthen Congressional oversight of intelligence and homeland security. Bob Kerrey, by the way, served here for two terms, as I recall, for 12 years. He further states in his letter: This is best implemented by establishing a single committee in each House of Congress combining authorizing and appropriating authorities. Therefore, I endorse your amendment in the current bill which will ensure the single authority. Thank you for your work to ensure the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission are implemented. Sincerely, Bob Kerrey. I would like to point out just as way of background how we got to the proposal we have on the table. My understanding is both leaders appointed both whips--the Senator from Nevada and the Senator from Kentucky--as part of two 11-person committees to come up with recommendations. We met a couple times, the 11 Republicans, and discussed various issues, then there was another meeting of both, and then we were told that Senator Reid and Senator McConnell would come up with some recommendations. That is not exactly what I had in mind when I was asked to serve as part of an 11-Senator committee. Here came these recommendations. I don't want to digress but, for example, the Transportation Security Administration is left in the Commerce Committee. I am glad to have more discussions with the Senator from Kentucky about that. I asked, How could the Transportation Security Administration not be made part of the new Homeland Security Committee? The Transportation Security Administration is the heart and soul of it. His answer was-- maybe he will have a different answer--it was part of the negotiations. What does that mean? I digress. The fact is, unless we give the authorizing committee the proper appropriating capability, we will continue to have, as the 9/11 Commission said, a dysfunctional oversight of intelligence. It is a good idea to make Intelligence Committee members permanent members and not have them term limited. I think it is a good idea to have it an A committee, although that may cause significant problems if we do not give the Permanent Committee on Intelligence appropriating authority. It is sometimes nice to have a real-world example of why we need this. I am not a member of the Intelligence Committee. I have no access to classified information. Frankly, I have never sought any because of the fear that some information I might have I might speak about in a public forum. There was a very expensive and very controversial intelligence program, and the Intelligence Committee--this is a relatively short time ago--the Intelligence Committee, after many hearings, extensive scrutiny and a thorough scrubbing of this program, determined that the program should be canceled. We are talking about a multibillion-dollar program. Do you know what happened? The Appropriations Committee funded it. So if you are the bureaucrat over in Langley or at the National Security Agency or any place else, where do you go? Where do you go when you want your projects done? Do you go to the authorizing committee or do you go to the appropriating committee? The power resides in the purse. The Golden Rule prevails around here. We all know the Golden Rule. So if we are going to have a truly effective Intelligence Committee oversight that can function with strength and power, we are going to have to give them appropriations authority. I predict after the initial attractiveness of serving on the Intelligence Committee, if they do not have appropriating authority, we will have difficulty getting people to serve on the authorizing committee because, again, the power is not there. We know why many of the authorizing committees are not nearly as important or as powerful as they used to be. It is because the appropriations process is what drives not only the money but also the policy. We are going to have an Omnibus appropriations bill sometime. Usually what happens, coincidentally, it is within 24 hours of when we go out of session. It always seems to work out that way. There will be numerous policy changes. There will be numerous moneys and earmarks put in. Last year there were 14,000 earmarks put in the appropriations bills, up from 4,000 in 1994. We are going to see things that will astonish some Members. For example, I was astonished several years ago when there was a line item in an appropriations bill that called for the leasing of Boeing aircraft. We had never had a hearing in the Senate Armed Services Committee. We never looked at the issue. No one even suggested it, that I know of, and I have been on the committee for 18 years. There was a line item that appeared in an appropriations bill that said we would lease Boeing aircraft. Do you know what happened since then? The GAO and the Office of Management and Budget determined that it was a $5.7 billion additional cost to the taxpayer. We now ended up, with this long trail that began with a line in an appropriations bill, with one of the former employees of the Department of Defense pleading guilty and receiving a 9-month prison term, saying she had rigged the contract to the benefit of Boeing aircraft. Now, why do I bring up that example? Because I can tell Members right now that if that had been a subject for the Armed Services Committee, we would have had hearings on it. We would have examined the leasing idea and rejected it as the ridiculous, expensive idea that it was. I can go with many other examples. Cruise ships that cost the taxpayers $200 million in loan guarantees that were half built at Pascagoula, MS. I can tell Members of line items in appropriations bills that say when the broadcasters reach 85 percent of high- definition television in 85 percent of the homes in America, which the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission says will never happen--I could go over a long list of items that are not only money but also policy. What will happen if we do not give the authorizing Intelligence Committee the appropriations power? Exactly what has happened in the past. Projects that cost a great deal of money that the Intelligence Committee either approves or disapproves of are overridden in the appropriations process. It happens time after time after time. I usually pride myself in straight talk. I would be surprised if I win on this amendment. One of the Commissioners called me and told me, ``I'm under intense pressure''--those are his words--``not to support your amendment but I will go ahead and do so.'' There are Members of this Senate who are under intense pressure, as well. If we want to tell the American people with the justified pride that we take in the actions we have achieved in the Senate in the last few days, which is remarkable--at least from my standpoint, one of the prouder moments I have experienced in the number of years I have spent here as we have gone through an incredible process, beginning with hearings before Senator Collins's committee back in August, which culminated in a tremendous achievement and the most significant governmental reform since 1947--then we have done about half to three- quarters of the job. If we do not give the authorizing committee either appropriating power or some kind of power, some kind of authority, then we will see a basically dysfunctional and toothless Intelligence Committee. The Senator from Nevada came to me and said he was going to move to table. I tell the Senator from Nevada, one, I want everyone to be able to talk, so we will just reintroduce the amendment if it is tabled, unless everyone gets to talk. But I also say to the Senator from Nevada that I would be glad to enter into a time agreement for passage of this legislation. I intend to get an up-or-down vote. I will reintroduce it unless the Senator from Nevada allows an up-or-down vote on the amendment. I think it is that important.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, one of the Commission's two options which the Commission recommended for how best Congress can improve congressional structure over intelligence--the underlying resolution does not propose either of the Commission's two options creating either a joint committee modeled after the Joint Atomic Energy Committee or House and Senate committees with combined authorizing and appropriating powers. Let me tell you what this is all about. The Commission report was clear that along with the need to reform the executive branch, congressional reform is needed. And I quote from the report: The other reforms we have suggested for a national counterterrorism center and national intelligence director will not work if congressional oversight does not change too. I want to repeat that: The other reforms . . . will not work if congressional oversight does not change too. Unity of effort in executive management can be lost if it is fractured by divided congressional oversight. We can't leave this week with our job incomplete. We have to address the Commission's recommendations regarding the urgent need to reform congressional oversight, intelligence and homeland security. To do this in a meaningful way to carry out the important institutional reforms recommended by the Commission, each of us in Congress must sacrifice our own self-interest. We do not serve the American public well with shortsighted, parochial turf battles. The Commission acknowledges that this won't be an easy task. The report states: Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable and capable congressional committee structure to give America's national intelligence agencies oversight, support and leadership. The Commission also stated: Tinkering with the existing structure is not sufficient. It calls the congressional oversight ``dysfunctional.'' Their recommendations clearly state that we must have a committee with both authorizing and appropriating authority. It is not any simpler nor more complicated than that. I have a letter from the 9/11 Commission which states: If Senator McCain offers an amendment in support of Commission recommendations on Congressional oversight, we will support it. We urge the Senate to adopt provisions for the strongest possible reform of Congressional oversight. I ask unanimous consent that three letters be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I don't expect that this amendment should require a lot of debate. It is an issue that we have all talked about a lot. It is all a question of turf and jurisdiction. It is something that would never be seriously considered by this body under any other circumstances except that we are talking about the war on terrorism and the overwhelming issue of how we are going to defend this Nation. I will be more than happy to agree to a time agreement with the appropriators who will lead the fight against this amendment which would be agreeable to them. This Chamber can be very proud of its bipartisan work that resulted in the overwhelming passage of S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004. That bill addressed 38 of the 9/11 Commission's 41 recommendations to further secure our homeland. Not only the two managers of that bill--Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman--deserve our gratitude but the two leaders, as well, worked together to ensure the Senate acted on this important reform legislation prior to adjourning before the elections. I ask unanimous consent that Senators Lieberman, Lott, Snowe, Roberts, and Bayh be added as cosponsors.

Mr. McCAIN. I pretty well described this amendment just as we were discussing in this colloquy. Basically, it moves the Transportation Security Administration from the Commerce Committee to the new committee on homeland security and governmental affairs. I pretty well described it. I think it is clear, given the responsibilities of the Transportation Security Administration which I read a few minutes ago. They all have to do with transportation security. Obviously, homeland security is the appropriate place for it to be. I ask consideration of the amendment. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. McCAIN. No, I didn't make a request. I said I have an amendment at the desk. I ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I perhaps foolishly have an amendment at the desk. I ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. McCAIN. I ask the Senator from Maine, I am sure she is aware but I think our colleagues should know, that the legislation creating the Transportation Security Administration, under the title ``Functions,'' reads: The Under Secretary shall be responsible for security in all modes of transportation including carrying out chapter 449 relating to civil aviation security, related research and development activities, security responsibilities over other modes of transportation, be responsible for day-to-day Federal security screen operations, for passenger air transportation, interstate transportation. . . . It goes on and on. It is all security. That is the job of the Transportation Security Administration. That is one of the reasons why it is so named. So rather than take the Transportation Security Administration and put it under the committee on homeland security and governmental affairs, we leave it in the Commerce Committee.

Mr. McCAIN. If the Senator will yield for another question, I would like to mention as part of this colloquy a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission: Congress should create a single principal point of oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over the Department's duties, but we believe that Congress does have the obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate. Now, is it true that under an amendment that has just been adopted by voice vote earlier, more responsibilities have been taken from the Senator's committee?

Mr. McCAIN. Under this proposal that we are contemplating, where does the Coast Guard remain?

Mr. McCAIN. What is the view of the Senator as to the primary role of the U.S. Coast Guard today?

Mr. McCAIN. Would the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCAIN. The Senator is welcome to join in the colloquy. I thought the colloquy was an exchange of views, ideas, and thoughts. I certainly would look forward to engaging in any colloquy with the Senator from Alaska. I have the greatest respect for him and the power and authority that we just saw exercised in the last vote.

Mr. McCAIN. If the Senator will yield for a further question, if Secretary Ridge or Deputy Secretary Hutchinson had to testify before Congress as far as the activities of the TSA, to whom would they testify?

Mr. McCAIN. But what about now?

Mr. McCAIN. Sure.

Mr. McCAIN. Secretary Ridge----

Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Alaska is probably correct that I asserted jurisdiction over transportation at the time that TSA was created. That was before the 9/11 Commission was formed and made their recommendations and their decision was made. At least we told the American people that we would give those responsibilities to that committee. Now, maybe Ridge only testified before us twice; Hutchinson, many times. There were a multitude of hearings where we called upon TSA, exercising our oversight responsibilities, to provide us with information, briefings, and hearings. The TSA belongs under homeland security, I say to the Senator from Alaska, whether they go by bicycle, skateboard, or bus. The fact is that this is a joke when we leave the heart and soul of homeland security in the Commerce Committee, of which I am proud, and I know, according to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, must be consolidated. I do not know what budget the Senator is looking at, but the facts that the Senator from Maine and I have is that it is 38 percent of the homeland security budget and 8 percent of the Department's employees. My response is, fine, if the Senator from Alaska feels that it belongs in the Commerce Committee, he is entitled to that opinion. Let us just not tell people we are consolidating. Let us tell them the truth. Let us tell them it is business as usual in the Senate, as the last vote just proved. It is business as usual, and let us not waste the time of our colleagues and try to fool the American people that somehow we are making any significant changes when as it stands 8 percent of the Department's employees fall under the committee on homeland security and 38 percent of the budget.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. McCAIN. Followed by a rollcall vote?

Mr. McCAIN. Reserving the right to object, and I will not object, the Senator from Florida, with all due respect, is not speaking on the amendment. Usually we go back and forth for and against the amendment.

Mr. McCAIN. I yield the floor.