John McCain

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I oppose the amendment offered by the Senator from West Virginia, which would sunset the authority Congress would grant to the President in this resolution to defend American security against the threat posed by Iraq. As the Senator has pointed out, the 12-month limit on congressional authorization for the use of force his amendment would set could be extended by presidential or congressional action. However, these requirements are onerous and infringe upon the authority of the Commander in Chief to meet his obligations to protect American security. The concept of imposing a deadline after which the President loses his authority to achieve the goals set out in the Iraq resolution strikes me as losing sight of the objective of a congressional authorization of the use of force: ending the threat to the United States and the world posed by Saddam Hussein's regime, so long as it possesses weapons of mass destruction and defies its obligations to the world. So long as that threat persists, and with Congress and the President having agreed that Saddam Hussein's regime endangers America, congressional authority for the President to use force must remain in force until he has met our common objective of disarming Saddam Hussein. To place a limit on the amount of time the President possesses this authority, once Congress has granted it to him, would only encourage Saddam Hussein to stall and temporize on his commitments, knowing that the clock is working in his favor. Such an incentive would make us less secure, not more secure. If the vast majority of Members of Congress and the American people agree upon the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq, and if we accept that the President will confront this danger within the parameters we have laid out in this congressional resolution, what about that threat would change in 12 months, assuming we have not acted against it by that time, that would somehow negate the President's need for the authority to meet it? If anything, the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime will only grow with time. Private and public estimates are that Saddam Hussein could possess nuclear weapons within six months to a year were he to acquire weapons-grade plutonium on the international market. That's why the President has requested the authority to act now. Saddam Hussein represents a grave and gathering danger. I hope he is no longer in power 1 year from now. But there is certainly a chance he could be. Congress cannot foresee the entire course of this conflict. Acting now to deprive the President 12 months from now of the authority we would grant him in this resolution would be an infringement on the authority of the Commander in Chief and a strange way to respond to the grave threat to American national security posed by Saddam Hussein's regime.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Connecticut for his thoughtful statement. I want to say in the few remaining seconds that to view the cause of the tragedy of the Vietnam war as being the Tonkin Gulf resolution is a somewhat, in my view, simplistic view. There were a lot of factors that entered into the beginning and the continuation of the Vietnam war. The Tonkin Gulf resolution was simply window dressing. At any time the Congress of the United States could have reversed that resolution and chose not to.

Mr. McCAIN. Not on our time. If the Senator from West Virginia would like to yield the Senator time, I would be more than happy.

Mr. McCAIN. I object.

Mr. McCAIN. I object.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, in deference----

Mr. McCAIN. On my time. In deference to the Senator from West Virginia, on this one occasion, given all the circumstances, I will not object to it not counting against the Senator's hour.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I wish to say very briefly that I understand people have a desire to speak. We have a number of Senators who have not spoken on this issue. It is already looking as if we may be here well into this evening. From now on, I will be adhering strictly to the rules according to postcloture. I hope my colleagues will be understanding because we have to resolve this issue. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. How much time do I have remaining?

Mr. McCAIN. I would like to yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, according to the letter of the Byrd amendment, a clear threat of imminent, sudden, and direct attack upon the United States, its possessions or territories, et cetera, clearly would have, would absolutely deprive the President of the United States of what he is seeking today. It would deprive the President of the United States of the authority he has requested to compel Saddam Hussein to disarm, so let's have no doubt about the impact of this amendment. The President has spoken clearly of the threat Saddam Hussein's regime poses to America and the world today--even though Iraq today clearly does not meet the Byrd amendment's standard of threatening imminent, sudden, and direct attack upon the United States of our Armed Forces. To wait for Saddam Hussein to threaten imminent attack against America would be to acquiesce to his development of nuclear weapons, to ignore his record of aggression against his neighbors, and to disregard his continuing threats to destroy Israel. Failure now to make the choice to remove Saddam Hussein from power will leave us with choices later, when Saddam's inevitable acquisition of nuclear weapons will make it much more dangerous to defend our friends and interests in the region. It will permit Saddam to control much of the region, and to wield its resources in ways that can only weaken America's position. It will put Israel's very survival at risk, with moral consequences no American can welcome. Failure to end the danger posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq makes it more likely that the interaction we believe to have occurred between members of al-Qaida and Saddam's regime may increasingly take the form of active cooperation to target the United States. We live in a world in which international terrorists continue to this day to plot mass murder in America. Saddam Hussein unquestionably has strong incentives to cooperate with al-Qaida. Whatever they may or may not have in common, their overwhelming hostility to America and rejection of any moral code suggest that collaboration against us would be natural. It is all too imaginable. Whether or not it has yet happened, the odds favor it--and they are not odds the United States can accept. Standing by while an odious regime with a history of support for terrorism develops weapons whose use by terrorists could literally kill millions of Americans is not a choice. It is an abdication. In this new era, preventive action to target rogue regimes is not only imaginable but necessary. Who would not have attacked Osama bib Laden's network before September 11th had we realized that his intentions to bring harm to America were matched by the capability to do so? Who would not have heeded Churchill's call to stand up to Adolf Hitler in the 1930's, while Europe slept and appeasement fed the greatest threat to Western civilization the world had ever known? Who would not have supported Israel's bombing of Iraq's nuclear reactor in 1981 had we then known, as Israel knew, that Saddam was on the verge of developing the bomb? In the new era we entered last September, warning of an attack before it happens is a luxury we cannot expect. Waiting for imminence of attack could be catastrophic. Many fear we will not know of an attack until it happens--and should our enemies use weapons of mass destruction in such an attack, the deaths of thousands or millions of Americans could occur with no warning--as happened last September. In this age, to wait for our enemies to come to us is suicidal. In 1962, President Kennedy made the point that America cannot wait until we face the threat of open attack without gravely endangering our security. In President Kennedy's words, ``Neither the United States of America, nor the world community of nations can tolerate deliberate deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or small. We no longer live in a world where only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to a nation's security to constitute maximum peril.'' The Byrd amendment would overturn the doctrine announced by the President of the United States to guide his administration's conduct of American national security policy. The Byrd amendment would negate any Congressional resolution authorizing the President to use all means to protect America from the threat posed by Iraq. It would set such a high threshold for the use of military force as to render the Commander in Chief powerless to respond to the clear and present danger Saddam Hussein's regime poses to America and the world. I urge my colleagues to reject the Byrd amendment.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, how much time do I have left?

Mr. McCAIN. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Delaware.

Mr. McCAIN. How much time do I have remaining?

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Tennessee.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, in summary, this amendment regarding the preservation of Congress's constitutional authority is unnecessary. A portion of the amendment that would limit the authority of the President to wage war is arguably unconstitutional. The Congress can declare war, but it cannot dictate to the President how to wage war. No law passed by Congress could alter the constitutional separation of powers. I urge my colleagues to defeat this amendment. I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. McCAIN. I understand I have 15 minutes.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, very briefly, I thank the Senator from Nevada. As I understand it, I ask the Senator from Nevada, we have Senator Gordon Smith, Senator Shelby, Senator Fitzgerald, Senator Santorum, Senator Sarbanes, Senator Dayton, Senator Murkowski, and Senator Mikulski who are still scheduled to speak after that. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I want to make a very brief comment. I thought Senator Collins' and Senator DeWine's statements were outstanding. They are to be congratulated. I think it added a great deal to this debate and discussion. I do not object to the change in the lineup.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, at the outset, let me state that I agree with the distinguished Chairman of the Armed Services Committee: U.S. policy would be stronger if we received the unequivocal support of the United Nations Security Council. Of that, there is no doubt. But that does not mean that our country must delegate our national security decisionmaking to the United Nations. It is neither morally necessary nor wise to give the U.N. Security Council veto power over our security. I am a supporter of the United Nations. I have supported efforts to pay U.S. arrears to the organization. The U.N. does many good deeds around the world. However, we should not kid ourselves: the Security Council is not a repository of moral goodness. It is not some supranational authority on international law, world peace or transnational justice. It is a collection of nation-states, each of whom makes decisions based on their national interests. Five nations have veto power. Ten more can vote up or down, or abstain on a given matter. Individual states may cloak their decisions in grand rhetoric of global interest, but they are driven by cool calculations of self-interest. As my friend from Michigan knows, the atmosphere before a Security Council vote often resembles a Middle Eastern bazaar more than it does a somber courtroom. Deals are cut, resolutions are watered down, and statements are made based on the national interests of the five permanent Security Council members. That is as it should be, but we should not fool ourselves that there is some innate moral authority once 15 nations negotiate a deal. Russia is engaged in vicious human rights abuses in Chechnya. Russia continues to undermine the sovereignty of the Republic of Georgia. Russia is owed billions of dollars from its ill-advised arms deals with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Russia has long advocated easing and even lifting of sanctions against Iraq. Russia abstained on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1284 in December 1999, creating the current weapons inspections regime in Iraq--apparently because it believed the regime was too tough. China also abstained from supporting U.N. Security Council Resolution 1284. China has good reason to be concerned about international opinion. China has engaged in serious proliferation activities. China severely represses its own people. Gaining the diplomatic acquiescence of the People's Republic of China may be desirable but it does not add any moral stature to our position. And then there is France. France has armed Saddam Hussein for years. French President Chirac was Prime Minister when France sold a nuclear reactor to Iraq. In the words of the former head of Iraq's nuclear program, Khidhir Hamza, Saddam ``knew Chirac would eat old tires from the Tigris if it got him our nuclear deal, worth hundreds of millions of dollars, along with the prospect of cheap oil.'' For years, French businessmen have been regular visitors to Baghdad, seeking commercial advantage despite U.N. sanctions. No one in this body should be under any illusions about French motivations. If President Bush and his team can gain French, Chinese and Russian support for a strong U.N. Security Council resolution, I applaud them. Recent signs are promising. Their support will help in the political and diplomatic realms. But their support will not make our case more just, or more right. In fact, the U.S. position in making progress at the U.N. precisely because of our determination. If this body were to pass the Levin amendment, we would set our cause back in New York. We would send a signal of indecision that would embolden those who oppose a tough resolution. They would see that the U.S. Senate is deferring judgment to them, virtually inviting them to harden their opposition to the U.S. position. Let me address some real concerns I have about the amendment offered by my distinguished colleague. It urges the U.N. Security Council to adopt a particular resolution--one limited solely to inspectors' access to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs. I don't think we should try to put the U.S. Senate in the role of drafting the parameters of U.N. Security Council resolutions. Such a unilateral position by one legislative body in one U.N. member state seems a little bit out of keeping with his oft-stated desire for multilateralism. The U.N. Security Council resolution urged by the Levin amendment is silent on the real issues facing the U.S. government in New York right now. Does the amendment accept or reject the U.N. Secretary General's 1998 deal with Saddam Hussein to leave huge swaths of Iraqi territory under separate rules? Does the amendment take a position on the need to interview Iraqi scientists outside of Saddam's control--and with their families so the regime cannot hold them hostage? The Levin amendment is silent about many issues raised in U.N. Security Council resolutions--issues that the U.N. Security Council may see fit to address in the future as they have in the past: support for terrorism; threatening conventional military moves against Kuwait, and protection of the Iraqi people from Saddam's tyranny. Each of these has been addressed by U.N. Security Council resolutions in the past. Each of these has been addressed by the United States in the past. Why are they ignored in the Levin amendment. Even more troubling is the narrow authorization for the use of force in the Levin amendment. Right now, American and British pilots are risking their lives enforcing the northern and southern no fly zones in Iraq. They are being shot at. They are defending themselves by attacking Iraqi radar and SAM sites that target them. These zones were erected to prevent Saddam from continuing to slaughter the Iraqi people--not to engage in search and destroy mission for weapons of mass destruction. They are authorized by U.N. Security Council Resolution 688, passed on April 5, 1991. By omitting any reference to the ongoing Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch, one could construe the Levin amendment to not authorizing no fly zone enforcement. I am sure that is not its intent, but it could be its effect. The same is true of U.N. Security Council Resolution 949, passed on October 15, 1994, which prohibits Saddam from reinforcing his conventional forces in southern Iraq. This resolution was necessitated by Saddam's massing of thousands of troops--including at least two Republican Guard divisions--near the Iraq-Kuwait border. By limiting the authorization to only weapons of mass destruction, the Levin amendment's silence on the conventional threat to Kuwait could send the wrong signal to Iraq and undermine existing U.N. Security Council resolutions. Again, I am sure that is not its intent but it may be the effect. Finally, there is the issue of what to do if the U.N. Security Council does not act. It may be, at the end of the day, that the individual nations making decisions in the U.N. Security Council do not agree with the compelling case that President Bush has laid out. It may be that they will decide that U.N. Security Council resolutions are not to be enforced, that the worst violator of U.N. Security Council resolutions should not be confronted. It may be that other nations choose to appease, accommodate, or ignore the clear and present danger posed by Iraq. Under the Levin amendment, what is the United States to do if the U.N. proves to be as unable to deal with Iraq as it was to deal with genocide in Rwanda and mass murder in Bosnia committed under the nose of U.N. peacekeepers? Under the Levin amendment, Congress would reconvene to ``consider promptly proposals relative to Iraq if in the judgment of the President, the U.N. Security Council fails to adopt or enforce the resolution'' called for in the amendment. It is not sufficient to claim the Levin amendment affirms the U.S. right of self-defense and, therefore, there is not U.N. veto. If the U.N. vetoes action on Iraq, Congress will come back to ``consider proposals.'' Why? Why should we not decide now about the issue? Why should we wait and see? Does the Senator believe the administration is pursuing the wrong resolution in New York? If he does, he should say so. Does the Senator believe the administration is not seriously committed to pursuing a resolution? If he does he should say so. But if he believes the U.S. is seriously pursuing a serious resolution in New York, there is no need for this amendment. Unless he wants to grant bargaining power to those who oppose the U.S. position in the U.N. or unless he disagrees with the U.S. position, there is not need for his amendment. The diplomatic process will continue. We may succeed. We may fail. But I believe we have enough information to act now. I believe we do not need to wait for the U.N. to act. I believe that even if the U.N. does not act, America should--as we did in Kosovo in 1999. The case of NATO's preventive attack in Kosovo is instructive. I supported the NATO intervention. It was an intervention designed to stop ethnic cleansing and mass murder by a government against its own people. Milosevic had no weapons of mass destruction. The threat he posed was to citizens in his country, not his neighbors. In Kosovo, the U.N. Security Council could not pass a resolution because of Russian opposition. Yet NATO, under U.S. leadership acted. Indeed, in 1998, Senator Levin noted with approval the Administration's position ``that the Security Council's authorization was desirable but not required for NATO action to intervene in Kosovo.'' Remarks on the Senate floor, July 8, 1998. This was 8 months before hostilities began. This was before any serious effort had been made at the U.N. This was before any veto was cast. It seems to me that if my distinguished colleague from Michigan could reach that kind of judgment that far in advance concerning the use of force against a far less threatening adversary, he should be able to do the same today. In summary, the Levin amendment sends the wrong signal at the wrong time. It could give a green light to Saddam to repress his own people or use conventional forces to Kuwait while giving a red light to our diplomatic efforts at the U.N. This body should allow the executive branch the leeway to conduct diplomacy at the U.N.--not try to micromange it from the Senate floor. I urge the rejection of the amendment. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I believe I have 3 minutes remaining. In all due respect to the Senator from Michigan, as Paul Harvey would say, ``Let's hear the rest of the story.'' The reason I said in 1991 that the U.N. Security Council should approve it is because the U.N. Security Council had already acted and approved. Never, at any time in my entire history, would I believe we are dependent upon the good will or the approval or disapproval of the U.N. Security Council. So I resent, slightly, the Senator from Michigan taking me out of context there. The fact is, in Kosovo, if we took the same course of action the Senator from Michigan is contemplating now, when butchery and genocide was going on there, we would have waited until the Security Council acted, or didn't act, and then we would have gone back into session to determine what we should do about Kosovo. How many thousands of people would have been murdered, butchered, and ethnically cleansed had we taken the same route that the Senator from Michigan is advocating on this issue, as far as Iraq is concerned? All I have to say about this amendment is--well, you can just read it: . . . will not adjourn sine die and will return to session at any time before the next Congress convenes-- Et cetera, et cetera. If that isn't a dictate by the action of the U.N. Security Council, nothing is. We have come a long way. John F. Kennedy, on October 22, 1962, said this: This Nation is prepared to present its case against the Soviet threat to peace and our own proposals for a peaceful world at any time, and in any forum, in the Organization of American States, in the United Nations, or in any other meeting that could be useful, without limiting our freedom of action. The Levin amendment limits our freedom of action and contradicts the words of John F. Kennedy at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I may be in the debate on the Durbin amendment. We can discuss the comparison between this situation and Kosovo. The United Nations Security Council never acted in Kosovo. The United States of America was not imminently threatened--was not threatened--but genocide was going on in Kosovo where thousands of people were being ethnically cleansed. If we had passed the Levin amendment at the time of Kosovo, when those of us supported then- President Clinton, we would have waited to find out whether the Security Council acted or not and then we would have come back and considered whether Kosovo was a threat to the United States of America. Kosovo is not today, was not then, and will not be tomorrow a threat, but the United States of America had an obligation, and because the United Nations Security Council did not act did not hamstring us. The reading of this amendment says the Congress will come back into session in case of certain Security Council actions. There is no other way to read it. This amendment should be resoundingly defeated. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCAIN. Along with the Senator from Virginia, the Senator from West Virginia, and other Senators, negotiations were conducted in good faith, in fairness, with full consultation. Many, many Senators are unhappy that they were unable to perhaps propose more amendments or perhaps do other things. I attest to the fact that the Senator from Nevada, fulfilling his duties of getting this legislation achieved with the consideration due every Senator, in my view, did a fair and unbiased job. I thank the Senator.