John McCain

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I extend my very best birthday wishes to the very senior Senator from the great Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Of course, he has become even more senior now that he is entering his eighth decade. I am certain, however, that he will find that life has become even more enjoyable as it is leavened with wisdom. Senator Kennedy is also entering his fifth decade in the U.S. Senate. Through dogged work and passionate beliefs, he has truly become one of the giants in this great institution. Agree or disagree with Senator Kennedy, but appreciate his effectiveness. I am a Republican and he is a liberal Democrat. But I can attest to his dogged determination to achieve results across the barriers of ideology and party. Whether he's fighting for the rights of patients or to make our schools better, Senator Kennedy never gives up on issues he deeply cares about. I am pleased to have the opportunity to wish Ted Kennedy a hearty happy birthday and thank him on behalf of a grateful Nation for his lifelong service to our country. I am privileged to call him my colleague and, above all, my friend.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the time has come for us to have an open debate to consider the future of rail passenger service in this Nation. Given Amtrak's financial situation, which is extremely precarious, I strongly believe we must work together to pass legislation this year that will provide for a restructured, revitalized, and streamlined rail passenger network. This will be no easy task. It will take commitments by all parties, including the Administration, Congress, Amtrak, states and municipalities, and the private sector. No one can argue with the fact that Amtrak is in a financial crisis, with growing and substantial debt obligations already totaling over $3.3 billion. The Department of Transportation Inspector General, DOT- IG, issued a report just two weeks ago which found that Amtrak experienced its largest losses in history in Fiscal Year 2002. Specifically, the DOT-IG found ``Amtrak lost $1.1 billion last year'' and ``Amtrak is no closer to operating self-sufficiency now than it was in 1997.'' The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, provided Amtrak with the statutory reforms Amtrak said were needed to enable it to address its financial and operational problems existing at the time. In turn, the Act directed Amtrak to reach operational self-sufficiency five years after enactment, which is December 2, 2002. The Act also established the Amtrak Reform Council, ARC, to oversee Amtrak and notify the Congress if it found Amtrak would not be able to meet its statutory obligations. Despite repeated press statements and testimony by Amtrak officials over the past four years that Amtrak was well on its way to fulfilling its statutory directives, on November 9, 2001, the ARC issued a finding that Amtrak will not be operationally self-sufficient as required by law. The ARC found there are major inherent flaws and weaknesses in Amtrak's institutional design and that it must be restructured. The recent DOT-IG report confirmed the ARC's finding that Amtrak would not meet its statutory mandate. Finally, two weeks ago, even Amtrak officials admitted it cannot live up to the claims they had been making. At a recent press conference Amtrak's President stated, ``Everybody knows that you can't make a profit while running a network of unprofitable trains''. Unfortunately, Amtrak officials are seeking to place blame for its financial problems everywhere other than where it most justly belongs. As I mentioned, the 1997 Reform Act provided Amtrak with the tools it said it needed to reinvent itself. It was provided labor, liability, and procurement reforms. The Act even eliminated the mandated route structure established in the 1970 act that created Amtrak, and authorized Amtrak to run like a private business. Following the Senate's passage of the Act in 1997, Amtrak's President at the time, Tom Downs, sent a letter dated November 5, 1997 to Senator Hollings and myself praising the compromise legislation. He stated that, ``enactment of the Amtrak Reform and Revitalization Act of 1997 would be the single most significant action the Congress can take to aid Amtrak in achieving operating self-sufficiency by 2002.'' Mr. Downs further commended ``The legislation reforms contained in the bill will allow Amtrak to operate in a more businesslike, cost effective manner, thus allowing greater productivity and increased savings.'' Although Amtrak has received over $5 billion in Federal assistance since the reform bill's enactment, and received the authority to implement management and structural changes, little if anything has been accomplished since the Reform Act's enactment. Amtrak loses money on almost all of its 41 routes, but instead of cutting even one unprofitable route, Amtrak added routes. One such route initiated in Janesville, WI, resulted in a per passenger subsidy of over $1,000.00. Where is the rationale in such a business decision? Moreover, Amtrak's debt load has tripled since we approved the Reform Act, and now amounts to over $3.3 billion. Clearly, Amtrak officials did not take the statutory mandates seriously. Today, I am introducing legislation to fundamentally transform rail passenger transportation in America. The bill offers a new approach to reform Amtrak's 30-year subsidy program that has funded rail passenger service. It is designed to promote rail passenger service on viable routes or where States will provide support when it is considered a necessary form of public transportation. That does not equate to a route in every Congressional district and may not even equate to a route in every State, but nor, it should be noted, does the present ``national system.'' The legislation I am offering today is one approach for how our Nation's rail passenger system can be permitted to evolve. I recognize that it may not garner the support of every member, but I encourage my colleagues to approach the debate on the future of rail passenger service with an open mind. The American public demands more than the status quo. We should as well. The public's expectations must be balanced with the level of financial commitment that the Nation can afford. I ask that a summary of the Rail Passenger Improvement Act of 2002 be printed in the Record immediately following my remarks. I don't believe that the measure I am introducing could be the only approach that Congress considers. There are many proposals and ideas that merit our consideration. For example, on February 7th, the Amtrak Reform Council submitted its report on a restructuring and rationalization plan. I hope the Congress will give careful consideration to the ARC's proposal. Other ideas to restructure Amtrak's route system include the creation of a Route Closure Commission modeled after the Department of Defense's Base Realignment and Closure Commission. This is an idea that has been raised in recent years and should not be disregarded. Above all, we must get to work now and determine how best to address Amtrak's financial and operational crisis. While it might seem easier to simply throw more money at Amtrak instead of making tough policy decisions, we would be failing in our Congressional responsibilities if we were to do this. To put rail passenger service back on track in this country, we need to address a number of tough questions. For example, what is the future for intercity rail passenger transportation? Where does it attract passengers and where doesn't it? Does rail passenger service have to equate to ``Amtrak'' or can we accept the fact that after 30 years, it is time to find a new approach? Where might high-speed rail service actually attract enough passengers to be economically viable? How does it fit into our national transportation system? What financial obligation will we be imposing on American taxpayers to pay for rail passenger service and what can they realistically expect for their payments? I have continually doubted Amtrak could live up to the promises it has made over the years. I reached this conclusion after years of listening to promises from Amtrak officials about what it could deliver if Congress gave it more money. Those promises have been broken time after time. There has been an endless flow of subsidy requests from Amtrak since its creation 30 years ago, even though it was to be free of all Federal assistance two years after it was established. Instead, Amtrak has received over $25 billion in direct subsidies. The ARC, the DOT-IG, the General Accounting Office (GAO), and others warned us that Amtrak was not going to live up to the rosy scenarios it had been painting over the past several years. Ironically, while we are criticizing private auditors for failing to ensure disclosure of the true financial picture of Enron, Congress has had clear indication from public auditors that Amtrak was not financially solvent but chose to ignore those warnings. Shouldn't we halt the double standard with respect to our reaction to public and private audit findings? We all need to face the fact that Amtrak is in dire financial straits and action must be taken once and for all to address the underlying problems with Amtrak. The findings presented by the ARC and the DOT-IG make it clear that Amtrak's Board and management have been unable to execute the changes that need to be taken to turn Amtrak's finances around. As the DOT-IG recently stated: ``Amtrak is no closer to operating self-sufficiency now than it was in 1997.'' Amtrak's management has recently started to question publicly the statutory requirement for Amtrak to achieve operational self- sufficiency. At a press conference held last week when Amtrak admitted it was not living up to its repeated claims of success, Amtrak's President referred to the self-sufficiency deadline as an ``impractical, inappropriate and destructive concept to move forward with.'' I find this statement shockingly untimely. In the four years that have passed since the Reform Act became law, Amtrak officials have repeatedly said they were on the ``glide-path to operational self-sufficiency.'' Not once in testimony before Congress did Amtrak officials raise concerns now held by Amtrak's President that the once highly regarded Reform Act was no more than an ``impractical, inappropriate and destructive concept'' that would hamper Amtrak's ability to produce results and turn Amtrak around. So I have to ask, why now? Were these same views held by Amtrak officials during the reform bill's enactment? That would not appear to be the case given the November 1997 letter I quoted from earlier. Why haven't we heard Mr. Warrington's critical views until now? Again, the Reform Act provided the statutory reforms that Amtrak requested so it could operate more like a private business. Why has its President suddenly decided to call its mandates into question? Maybe it's because management has made no progress towards meeting the requirements mandated by the law, requirements that Amtrak agreed to in exchange for the reforms it requested and was granted? Requirements, that until now, Amtrak said it would meet. Since we now know Amtrak officials cannot make the tough decisions necessary to improve Amtrak's operating and financial condition, the legislation I am proposing creates an Amtrak Control Board, modeled after the D.C. Control Board that was so successful in turning around the financial crisis of the Government of the District of Columbia. The Amtrak Control Board would be directed to help address Amtrak's financial crisis and facilitate Amtrak's privatization. Moreover, I believe we need to allow the States to take a greater role in determining where rail passenger service should be provided. Perhaps it is only in the Northeast, or maybe just on State-supported corridors. To help States retain passenger rail service where they believe it is needed, I also think that we should allow the States to spend their Federal transportation dollars on rail passenger service. In some areas of the country, such as the Northeast and on the West Coast where service is supported by State contributions, rail passenger service seems to be working. We cannot ignore the fact, however, that all but two of Amtrak's intercity lines operate at a substantial financial loss. And while Amtrak has experienced an increase in its ridership, the actual ridership numbers are dismal compared to other passenger modes, including intercity bus transportation and air travel. After 30 years and over $25 billion of taxpayers' investment, Amtrak is used by less than 1 percent of the traveling public. Our urban areas are facing ever-increasing transportation congestion. Americans are spending more and more time sitting in traffic as they try to get to and from work. And each and every one of us has experienced first hand the frustrations of flight delays due to new security measures and capacity limitations in our aviation system. It is our responsibility to work to remedy these problems by developing and enacting sound federal transportation policies. Amtrak is a failed experiment. While the legislation I am offering may not be the approach the majority of the members will support, I assure my colleagues that I will do everything in my power to halt the historical authorization pattern that has taken place for 30 years. I will strongly oppose any measure simply to reauthorize Amtrak in exchange for Amtrak promises. If we do that again, in a few years Amtrak will be back again explaining why it was unable to fulfill its promises and Amtrak will be seeking yet even more money and making even more promises. This same pattern has continued for 30 years. The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, which created the National Rail Passenger Corporation, also known as Amtrak, to free the freight industry from the burden of running passenger trains, was enacted with the intent to provide Amtrak Federal support for only two years. Clearly, that did not occur. After receiving appropriations for $40 million in direct grants, $100 million in loan guarantees, in addition to capital acquired from participating railroads, Amtrak was unable to fulfill the intent of the authorizing legislation. Two years later, Amtrak was back before Congress asking for more money in exchange for more promises. By 1978, after four trips to Congress to ask for more Federal money, Amtrak had received $2.5 billion in federal funding. But that level of funding was still not enough. When Amtrak came back seeking more Federal assistance, Congress responded like it always had. It passed legislation authorizing millions for operating, capital and debt reduction expenses. In exchange for this funding, Amtrak agreed to be operated and managed as a for-profit corporation and to turn around its money losing ways. Again, Amtrak failed to fulfill its promises. This pattern has continued during the past 30 years. Amtrak has come to Congress year after year seeking a handout. Each time, Amtrak has made promises in return for more federal assistance. Each time, Amtrak has failed to achieve what was expected. Enough is enough. It is interesting to note that before the 1978 law was enacted, the GAO warned that Amtrak would have to make serious cuts in its route structure if it was to avoid continual dependence on Federal subsidies. And here we are nearly 25 years later and the GAO and the DOT-IG are repeating these same realities. Is the Congress finally going to give credence to these auditors' findings? If rail passenger service is ever going to be successful, we must take action to provide for a restructured and rationalized system. We need to hear from the Administration, the States, and the American public in order to develop sound Federal policy to permit safe, efficient, and cost-effective rail passenger service in areas that can attract riders. Now is the time for all interested parties to come together and chart a new course for intercity rail passenger transportation. The summary follows. The Rail Passenger Service Improvement Act--Summary of Major Provisions Purpose: to enable the emergence of a new rail passenger system that would be overseen by the Department of Transportation, but operated by competing franchises, including Amtrak; to require Amtrak's restructuring, financial stabilization and privatization through the creation of an Amtrak Control Board; and to require States to play a bigger role with regard to routing decisions and financial responsibilities. Specifically the legislation: Directs the Secretary of Transportation to establish a Rail Passenger Development and Franchising Office within the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). Beginning October 1, 2003, the Secretary would be authorized to contract out rail passenger service to franchises that meet specified safety and liability requirements, provided such operations would not result in a significant downgrade in rail freight service. Franchises would be required to demonstrate efforts to reach mutual agreements with freight carriers to obtain trackage access prior to being awarded a contract. Directs Amtrak to restructure into three separate subsidiaries to be managed as for-profit businesses with transparent accounting systems: Amtrak Operations, Amtrak Maintenance, and Intercity Rail Reservations. Each subsidiary would be privatized no later than four years after enactment. Establishes an Amtrak Control Board, modeled after the DC Control Board, to help address Amtrak's financial crisis. The Amtrak Control Board would direct Amtrak's operational restructuring, approve budgets and financial plans, and oversee privatization. Requires States to play a greater role, both in route decisions and financial contributions, to allow for a more utilized route system to evolve, with service provided on viable routes or where States contribute to cover operating losses. Beginning October 1, 2003, Amtrak would halt service over any route where revenues do not cover expenses unless states contribute financial support to cover losses. Gives States flexibility to use highway trust fund dollars on rail passenger service at each state's discretion. Authorizes funding to address rail passenger security and tunnel life-safety needs. Authorizes funding for Amtrak operating and Railroad Retirement obligations on a reduced sliding scale. Authorizes funding for the Secretary of Transportation to address rail passenger capital costs and the backlog of infrastructure investment identified by the DOT-Inspector General to bring the Northeast Corridor up to a ``state of good repair.'' Other users and states along the corridor would also contribute to capital costs, much like States must contribute toward highway and airport infrastructure. In exchange for eliminating financial obligations, Amtrak must give up rights and ownership to the Northeast Corridor for which the Secretary already holds a 999-year mortgage.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, the time has come for us to have an open debate to consider the future of rail passenger service in this Nation. Given Amtrak's financial situation, which is extremely precarious, I strongly believe we must work together to pass legislation this year that will provide for a restructured, revitalized, and streamlined rail passenger network. This will be no easy task. It will take commitments by all parties, including the Administration, Congress, Amtrak, states and municipalities, and the private sector. No one can argue with the fact that Amtrak is in a financial crisis, with growing and substantial debt obligations already totaling over $3.3 billion. The Department of Transportation Inspector General, DOT- IG, issued a report just two weeks ago which found that Amtrak experienced its largest losses in history in Fiscal Year 2002. Specifically, the DOT-IG found ``Amtrak lost $1.1 billion last year'' and ``Amtrak is no closer to operating self-sufficiency now than it was in 1997.'' The Amtrak Reform and Accountability Act of 1997, provided Amtrak with the statutory reforms Amtrak said were needed to enable it to address its financial and operational problems existing at the time. In turn, the Act directed Amtrak to reach operational self-sufficiency five years after enactment, which is December 2, 2002. The Act also established the Amtrak Reform Council, ARC, to oversee Amtrak and notify the Congress if it found Amtrak would not be able to meet its statutory obligations. Despite repeated press statements and testimony by Amtrak officials over the past four years that Amtrak was well on its way to fulfilling its statutory directives, on November 9, 2001, the ARC issued a finding that Amtrak will not be operationally self-sufficient as required by law. The ARC found there are major inherent flaws and weaknesses in Amtrak's institutional design and that it must be restructured. The recent DOT-IG report confirmed the ARC's finding that Amtrak would not meet its statutory mandate. Finally, two weeks ago, even Amtrak officials admitted it cannot live up to the claims they had been making. At a recent press conference Amtrak's President stated, ``Everybody knows that you can't make a profit while running a network of unprofitable trains''. Unfortunately, Amtrak officials are seeking to place blame for its financial problems everywhere other than where it most justly belongs. As I mentioned, the 1997 Reform Act provided Amtrak with the tools it said it needed to reinvent itself. It was provided labor, liability, and procurement reforms. The Act even eliminated the mandated route structure established in the 1970 act that created Amtrak, and authorized Amtrak to run like a private business. Following the Senate's passage of the Act in 1997, Amtrak's President at the time, Tom Downs, sent a letter dated November 5, 1997 to Senator Hollings and myself praising the compromise legislation. He stated that, ``enactment of the Amtrak Reform and Revitalization Act of 1997 would be the single most significant action the Congress can take to aid Amtrak in achieving operating self-sufficiency by 2002.'' Mr. Downs further commended ``The legislation reforms contained in the bill will allow Amtrak to operate in a more businesslike, cost effective manner, thus allowing greater productivity and increased savings.'' Although Amtrak has received over $5 billion in Federal assistance since the reform bill's enactment, and received the authority to implement management and structural changes, little if anything has been accomplished since the Reform Act's enactment. Amtrak loses money on almost all of its 41 routes, but instead of cutting even one unprofitable route, Amtrak added routes. One such route initiated in Janesville, WI, resulted in a per passenger subsidy of over $1,000.00. Where is the rationale in such a business decision? Moreover, Amtrak's debt load has tripled since we approved the Reform Act, and now amounts to over $3.3 billion. Clearly, Amtrak officials did not take the statutory mandates seriously. Today, I am introducing legislation to fundamentally transform rail passenger transportation in America. The bill offers a new approach to reform Amtrak's 30-year subsidy program that has funded rail passenger service. It is designed to promote rail passenger service on viable routes or where States will provide support when it is considered a necessary form of public transportation. That does not equate to a route in every Congressional district and may not even equate to a route in every State, but nor, it should be noted, does the present ``national system.'' The legislation I am offering today is one approach for how our Nation's rail passenger system can be permitted to evolve. I recognize that it may not garner the support of every member, but I encourage my colleagues to approach the debate on the future of rail passenger service with an open mind. The American public demands more than the status quo. We should as well. The public's expectations must be balanced with the level of financial commitment that the Nation can afford. I ask that a summary of the Rail Passenger Improvement Act of 2002 be printed in the Record immediately following my remarks. I don't believe that the measure I am introducing could be the only approach that Congress considers. There are many proposals and ideas that merit our consideration. For example, on February 7th, the Amtrak Reform Council submitted its report on a restructuring and rationalization plan. I hope the Congress will give careful consideration to the ARC's proposal. Other ideas to restructure Amtrak's route system include the creation of a Route Closure Commission modeled after the Department of Defense's Base Realignment and Closure Commission. This is an idea that has been raised in recent years and should not be disregarded. Above all, we must get to work now and determine how best to address Amtrak's financial and operational crisis. While it might seem easier to simply throw more money at Amtrak instead of making tough policy decisions, we would be failing in our Congressional responsibilities if we were to do this. To put rail passenger service back on track in this country, we need to address a number of tough questions. For example, what is the future for intercity rail passenger transportation? Where does it attract passengers and where doesn't it? Does rail passenger service have to equate to ``Amtrak'' or can we accept the fact that after 30 years, it is time to find a new approach? Where might high-speed rail service actually attract enough passengers to be economically viable? How does it fit into our national transportation system? What financial obligation will we be imposing on American taxpayers to pay for rail passenger service and what can they realistically expect for their payments? I have continually doubted Amtrak could live up to the promises it has made over the years. I reached this conclusion after years of listening to promises from Amtrak officials about what it could deliver if Congress gave it more money. Those promises have been broken time after time. There has been an endless flow of subsidy requests from Amtrak since its creation 30 years ago, even though it was to be free of all Federal assistance two years after it was established. Instead, Amtrak has received over $25 billion in direct subsidies. The ARC, the DOT-IG, the General Accounting Office (GAO), and others warned us that Amtrak was not going to live up to the rosy scenarios it had been painting over the past several years. Ironically, while we are criticizing private auditors for failing to ensure disclosure of the true financial picture of Enron, Congress has had clear indication from public auditors that Amtrak was not financially solvent but chose to ignore those warnings. Shouldn't we halt the double standard with respect to our reaction to public and private audit findings? We all need to face the fact that Amtrak is in dire financial straits and action must be taken once and for all to address the underlying problems with Amtrak. The findings presented by the ARC and the DOT-IG make it clear that Amtrak's Board and management have been unable to execute the changes that need to be taken to turn Amtrak's finances around. As the DOT-IG recently stated: ``Amtrak is no closer to operating self-sufficiency now than it was in 1997.'' Amtrak's management has recently started to question publicly the statutory requirement for Amtrak to achieve operational self- sufficiency. At a press conference held last week when Amtrak admitted it was not living up to its repeated claims of success, Amtrak's President referred to the self-sufficiency deadline as an ``impractical, inappropriate and destructive concept to move forward with.'' I find this statement shockingly untimely. In the four years that have passed since the Reform Act became law, Amtrak officials have repeatedly said they were on the ``glide-path to operational self-sufficiency.'' Not once in testimony before Congress did Amtrak officials raise concerns now held by Amtrak's President that the once highly regarded Reform Act was no more than an ``impractical, inappropriate and destructive concept'' that would hamper Amtrak's ability to produce results and turn Amtrak around. So I have to ask, why now? Were these same views held by Amtrak officials during the reform bill's enactment? That would not appear to be the case given the November 1997 letter I quoted from earlier. Why haven't we heard Mr. Warrington's critical views until now? Again, the Reform Act provided the statutory reforms that Amtrak requested so it could operate more like a private business. Why has its President suddenly decided to call its mandates into question? Maybe it's because management has made no progress towards meeting the requirements mandated by the law, requirements that Amtrak agreed to in exchange for the reforms it requested and was granted? Requirements, that until now, Amtrak said it would meet. Since we now know Amtrak officials cannot make the tough decisions necessary to improve Amtrak's operating and financial condition, the legislation I am proposing creates an Amtrak Control Board, modeled after the D.C. Control Board that was so successful in turning around the financial crisis of the Government of the District of Columbia. The Amtrak Control Board would be directed to help address Amtrak's financial crisis and facilitate Amtrak's privatization. Moreover, I believe we need to allow the States to take a greater role in determining where rail passenger service should be provided. Perhaps it is only in the Northeast, or maybe just on State-supported corridors. To help States retain passenger rail service where they believe it is needed, I also think that we should allow the States to spend their Federal transportation dollars on rail passenger service. In some areas of the country, such as the Northeast and on the West Coast where service is supported by State contributions, rail passenger service seems to be working. We cannot ignore the fact, however, that all but two of Amtrak's intercity lines operate at a substantial financial loss. And while Amtrak has experienced an increase in its ridership, the actual ridership numbers are dismal compared to other passenger modes, including intercity bus transportation and air travel. After 30 years and over $25 billion of taxpayers' investment, Amtrak is used by less than 1 percent of the traveling public. Our urban areas are facing ever-increasing transportation congestion. Americans are spending more and more time sitting in traffic as they try to get to and from work. And each and every one of us has experienced first hand the frustrations of flight delays due to new security measures and capacity limitations in our aviation system. It is our responsibility to work to remedy these problems by developing and enacting sound federal transportation policies. Amtrak is a failed experiment. While the legislation I am offering may not be the approach the majority of the members will support, I assure my colleagues that I will do everything in my power to halt the historical authorization pattern that has taken place for 30 years. I will strongly oppose any measure simply to reauthorize Amtrak in exchange for Amtrak promises. If we do that again, in a few years Amtrak will be back again explaining why it was unable to fulfill its promises and Amtrak will be seeking yet even more money and making even more promises. This same pattern has continued for 30 years. The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, which created the National Rail Passenger Corporation, also known as Amtrak, to free the freight industry from the burden of running passenger trains, was enacted with the intent to provide Amtrak Federal support for only two years. Clearly, that did not occur. After receiving appropriations for $40 million in direct grants, $100 million in loan guarantees, in addition to capital acquired from participating railroads, Amtrak was unable to fulfill the intent of the authorizing legislation. Two years later, Amtrak was back before Congress asking for more money in exchange for more promises. By 1978, after four trips to Congress to ask for more Federal money, Amtrak had received $2.5 billion in federal funding. But that level of funding was still not enough. When Amtrak came back seeking more Federal assistance, Congress responded like it always had. It passed legislation authorizing millions for operating, capital and debt reduction expenses. In exchange for this funding, Amtrak agreed to be operated and managed as a for-profit corporation and to turn around its money losing ways. Again, Amtrak failed to fulfill its promises. This pattern has continued during the past 30 years. Amtrak has come to Congress year after year seeking a handout. Each time, Amtrak has made promises in return for more federal assistance. Each time, Amtrak has failed to achieve what was expected. Enough is enough. It is interesting to note that before the 1978 law was enacted, the GAO warned that Amtrak would have to make serious cuts in its route structure if it was to avoid continual dependence on Federal subsidies. And here we are nearly 25 years later and the GAO and the DOT-IG are repeating these same realities. Is the Congress finally going to give credence to these auditors' findings? If rail passenger service is ever going to be successful, we must take action to provide for a restructured and rationalized system. We need to hear from the Administration, the States, and the American public in order to develop sound Federal policy to permit safe, efficient, and cost-effective rail passenger service in areas that can attract riders. Now is the time for all interested parties to come together and chart a new course for intercity rail passenger transportation. The summary follows. The Rail Passenger Service Improvement Act--Summary of Major Provisions Purpose: to enable the emergence of a new rail passenger system that would be overseen by the Department of Transportation, but operated by competing franchises, including Amtrak; to require Amtrak's restructuring, financial stabilization and privatization through the creation of an Amtrak Control Board; and to require States to play a bigger role with regard to routing decisions and financial responsibilities. Specifically the legislation: Directs the Secretary of Transportation to establish a Rail Passenger Development and Franchising Office within the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). Beginning October 1, 2003, the Secretary would be authorized to contract out rail passenger service to franchises that meet specified safety and liability requirements, provided such operations would not result in a significant downgrade in rail freight service. Franchises would be required to demonstrate efforts to reach mutual agreements with freight carriers to obtain trackage access prior to being awarded a contract. Directs Amtrak to restructure into three separate subsidiaries to be managed as for-profit businesses with transparent accounting systems: Amtrak Operations, Amtrak Maintenance, and Intercity Rail Reservations. Each subsidiary would be privatized no later than four years after enactment. Establishes an Amtrak Control Board, modeled after the DC Control Board, to help address Amtrak's financial crisis. The Amtrak Control Board would direct Amtrak's operational restructuring, approve budgets and financial plans, and oversee privatization. Requires States to play a greater role, both in route decisions and financial contributions, to allow for a more utilized route system to evolve, with service provided on viable routes or where States contribute to cover operating losses. Beginning October 1, 2003, Amtrak would halt service over any route where revenues do not cover expenses unless states contribute financial support to cover losses. Gives States flexibility to use highway trust fund dollars on rail passenger service at each state's discretion. Authorizes funding to address rail passenger security and tunnel life-safety needs. Authorizes funding for Amtrak operating and Railroad Retirement obligations on a reduced sliding scale. Authorizes funding for the Secretary of Transportation to address rail passenger capital costs and the backlog of infrastructure investment identified by the DOT-Inspector General to bring the Northeast Corridor up to a ``state of good repair.'' Other users and states along the corridor would also contribute to capital costs, much like States must contribute toward highway and airport infrastructure. In exchange for eliminating financial obligations, Amtrak must give up rights and ownership to the Northeast Corridor for which the Secretary already holds a 999-year mortgage.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Kentucky and comment again that he has fought a good fight. The opponents of this bill have fought tenaciously, honorably, and I believe they certainly have a right to examine legislation that was passed as late as 3 o'clock in the morning. I want to point out also that, of the 140 bills that have become law during the 107th Congress, only 19 necessitated conference committees between the 2 Houses of Congress. Eighty-six percent of the bills that became law during the 107th Congress did not require a conference committee between the Houses. Some of these bills, obviously, are not of great importance. Some are of great importance, such as the Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act and the Railroad Retirement and Survivors Act. There are many very important pieces of legislation that did not require a conference. I believe that, upon examination, my colleagues will see that the bill is basically the same as the one that was passed by the Senate, with the exception of the Torricelli amendment, which had to do with the lowest unit rate requirement for the purchase of television ads. Frankly, in the interest of straight talk, I have never seen any way you can emerge victorious over the broadcasters. The broadcasters have $70 billion worth of spectrum. They win no matter what. If anybody thinks we can beat the broadcasters, I would like to interest you in some desert land in Arizona. Aside from that amendment, the bill is really in its original form as passed by the Senate. Again, I want to say not only to my colleagues in the Senate but to those in the other body, this has been a very emotional, spirited debate. A great deal is at stake. As the Senator from Kentucky said, we are shooting with real bullets here. The President's spokesperson said the President would sign this bill if it was passed by both Houses. It has been passed by both Houses, and I look forward to the opportunity of seeing it pass. We did have several weeks of debate and amendments on the floor of the Senate. So I am not sure it would show any particular improvement by further debate and votes because we have been over this ground pretty thoroughly. Again, I thank the majority leader for his attention and priority of this issue. I will point out, I think the Senator from Kentucky knows the effective date is November 6, rather than the date of enactment as passed through the Senate. There are a number of reasons for that, but primarily we are so late in the campaign season, it would be very difficult to sort out moneys that are spent and obligated. There would be a lot of court challenges and questions as to the whole financing structure of the campaign of 2002. So I thank the majority leader. I yield to my colleague from Kentucky.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank my friend from Kentucky for his kind words. I do want to say, I may not miss it at all. (Laughter.) My friend from Wisconsin is here. We shared the very wonderful moment last night with our colleagues in the House and Congressman Meehan and Congressman Shays. It was quite a remarkable time. I am glad to have been able to be a part of this process. I say again, the opposition has been principled, honorable, and ferocious. That is in the tradition of the Senate. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator from Nevada. I appreciate his comments on this issue. I say to the Senator from Iowa that I would like to trust everything that goes through this body. I can tell you too many stories of things that went through without my knowledge that cost the taxpayers a whole lot of money. I will tell you about one. Put into an appropriations bill was a provision that two ships would be built in Pascagoula, MS, in return for which there would be exclusive rights for those ships to sail to the Hawaiian Islands. I never saw that amendment until after it was done. Associated with that was over $1 billion in loan guarantees from the Maritime Administration. I never saw the amendment. The outfit just went bankrupt. The taxpayers have already spent some $300 million-plus which they lost from those loan guarantees, and they stand to lose over $1 billion. I am sure it was a well-meant and a well-intentioned amendment to help both Mississippi and the Hawaiian Islands. I knew it would fail because I know enough about shipbuilding in the United States of America. Those are the kinds of things that happen time after time--maybe not of that magnitude--because of amendments, which are well-intentioned and probably good in many respects but don't undergo the scrutiny and the hearings and the authorizations necessary to prevent that from happening put into these pieces of legislation. That proposal I told you about would have never cleared either the Commerce Committee or the Armed Services Committee. It never would have gotten through. It was stuck in an appropriations bill, which we do time after time. The night I was here, I asked: Does anybody know what is in the managers' package? No. It was late at night. So I said: OK. I don't object. There were 15 earmarks of millions of dollars for specific States. That is my taxpayers' money, too. I say to the Senator that this system is broken. We are now up to 8,000 earmarks on appropriations bills. That is up from less than 2,000 3 years ago. It is wrong. It is just wrong. It is wrong from the standpoint of fiscal discipline and budgetary reasons, but it is also wrong in the respect that these matters need to go through the proper authorizing and appropriations process. At least this is an authorization bill. I thank the Senator from Nevada for his comments. I am very grateful for the courtesy that he has shown me, not only now but for many years. I withdraw my requirement to object and to seek to strike these three amendments, and I will agree to go to final passage. But I say to the Senator from Iowa one more time that this is unprecedented with 396 pages of technical amendments in the managers' package. It is wrong and 1,130-plus technical amendments is wrong. It is not the right way for us to do business. I hope we can do better in the future. I yield the floor. I am prepared to move to final passage.

Mr. McCAIN. Let me repeat. It's a technical amendment that adds some $400 million. Here is another one, authorized to be appropriated, $7 million for each of the fiscal years 2000 through 2006. That is another ``technical amendment.'' But the larger issue here is--the larger issue is why do we need 396 pages of technical corrections to a bill which is larger than the entire House bill and has 130-some technical corrections? There is something wrong here. There is something fundamentally wrong. I say to the Senator from Iowa, I have been here almost as long as he has--not as long. I have never seen bills that required trust of 396 pages and 130 technical amendments. I have never seen any other farm bill that did, nor has the Senator from Kansas, who used to shepherd these bills through the House. I am supposed to trust a managers' amendment of 396 pages? I am glad to trust, but in the words of a former President of the United States, ``trust but verify'' because time after time after time, I have seen amendments put in that are earmarks, specifically for specific areas, specific States, specific congressional districts. I have seen them time after time. It is not only me who is objecting to that. The Citizens Against Government Waste and the Taxpayers Union and every other watchdog organization condemn this practice, and so do I. I say to the Senator from Iowa, again, I don't know what is done with Agriculture Committee members or Agriculture Committee staff. I know I have had a longstanding request to see any amendments, and particularly any technical amendments. Either the Senator from Iowa or his staff did not show us those amendments until last night. And there were a number of amendments that were added as short a time as a half hour before the final vote. Your staff can deny it, but it is a fact. So I will not sit still for that kind of procedure. That is why we will have these votes. I am sorry the Senator does not like the fact that I don't trust 130-some amendments I have never seen that cover 396 pages. I think my constituents deserve better than me ``trusting''--particularly given all the earmarking and pork-barreling I have seen going on, on the increase over the past several years. I cannot debate these amendments very well because, as I said, I have not seen them because they were not shown to me or other Members of the Senate. That is pretty much the situation. I am sure many of them are virtuous, but the fact is there is all kinds of money and programs in here. There are interesting things in here. There is one, No. 110: Adds ``gender'' to the list of socially disadvantaged groups covered by section 2501, the outreach program for socially disadvantaged farmers. Could the Senator, just out of curiosity, tell me what a socially disadvantaged farmer is? Madam President, will the Senator from Iowa yield for a question? What is a ``socially disadvantaged farmer''?

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I will be glad to address the first amendment. We will have short debate and discussion. As I said, I would like to debate it at length, but I don't know anything about it. That is the reason I am forcing a vote. Maybe we will know something about these various amendments. I say again to my colleagues, this is not the right way to do the people's business. It is not the right way to do the people's business, a 396-page package of managers' amendments that are supposed to be technical in nature. I am glad to vote on whichever amendment the distinguished managers choose to bring forward. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. If the Senator will yield further, we did not see 30 of the amendments until this morning. They were not available to anyone. It is a fact. Just as no one had seen the 15 amendments that were earmarked in the appropriations bill I complained about. No one had seen them. It is a fact.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, let me first express my appreciation and respect for the work of the Chairman, Senator Harkin, and the ranking member, Senator Lugar, for their dedication to address the challenging issues facing American farmers. In addition to funding commodity programs, this farm bill addresses the country's trade policy commitments, goals to improve farming practices through conservation measures, establishes energy and forestry initiatives, and reauthorizes food and nutrition programs. Every few years we debate a new farm policy, attempting to reach that elusive goal of economic sustainability in the agriculture sector. Yet little seems to change from farm bill to farm bill except the title of the bill. We're always taking one step forward and two steps back. Payments are more generous, new subsidies are created, and the Federal Government's role is expanding, not shrinking, hurting small farmers, compromising agricultural exports, and penalizing American consumers and taxpayers. In 1996, we passed a farm bill that was intended to implement a more market-oriented farm policy and wean farmers off government assistance. Instead, five years later, farm subsidies have ballooned by 400 percent. In the year 2000 alone, farm subsidies reached a record level of $22 billion. Just a few days ago, the Senate approved an amendment to implement a stricter limit on payments to farmers. While certainly laudable, I was disappointed that this amendment does not save the taxpayers any money--the savings are simply redistributed to other federal programs. Even with this change, it's quite obvious that farm spending is still undeniably generous, with an additional $73.4 billion dedicated to commodity and other farm programs over the next ten years, which is new spending over and above the CBO baseline. Although the Senate bill includes a five-year authorization, and the House bill proposes ten years, both bills propose to spend, in one way or another, the full $73.5 billion in additional spending included in last year's budget resolution. That means, irregardless of a five-year or ten-year bill, the budget commitment for taxpayers could still tab up to $170 billion in total to pay for current programs and cover the costs for new ones proposed in this farm bill. That is an enormous federal commitment. Just this past December, the Administration proposed to spend $26 billion for its new education bill, a relatively meager amount to be spent on school programs in comparison to farm programs. What is more incredible is that we are asking American taxpayers to foot this $170 billion bill when other compelling priorities remain backlogged or unfunded. For example: Indian schools on Native American reservations, suffering from the worst dilapidated school conditions in the country, need $1.2 billion to fix the deferred maintenance backlog at 185 schools. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, which has never been fully funded, would require $10 billion. And, about $5-6 million a year for Special Subsistence Allowance payments to military households would help get service members off food stamps. Unfortunately, these will remain low priorities and underfunded as long as farm spending increasingly consumes the federal treasury. Yesterday, the Senate also voted to suspend budget rules to include an additional $2.4 billion in crop and livestock disaster assistance for 2001 crops in this farm bill. This $2.4 billion is, of course, not subject to budget limitations. This is spending in addition to the $5.5 billion already allocated by the Congress for 2001 crops and $33 billion in ad-hoc or emergency farm assistance provided over the last four years. So, that makes a grand total of $35.4 billion in additional farm spending over and above the $70 billion authorized in the 1996 farm bill. Where's the reform? Where does this unlimited spending end? Unfortunately, at the end of the debate, special interests win once again. Let's take a look at the grab-bag for special interests in this farm bill: This bill restores counter-cyclical target price payments that were eliminated in the 1996 farm bill, potentially spending up to $70 billion for commodity programs for the life of this bill. A new direct payment program is created for dairy farmers at a cost of $2 billion over a 3-4 year period, with one-quarter of these funds earmarked to the northeast States. Establishment of a new peanut direct payment program, costing $2.6 billion over 5 years. Honey, and wool and mohair subsidy programs are reinstated, programs which were either phased out or eliminated in the 1996 farm bill. Higher loan rates are provided for specific crops such as wheat, corn, cotton, and others. The Federal sugar subsidy program receives additional props in this bill, not only penalizing consumers with artificially high sugar prices but costing taxpayers $254 million to support the program. New authorization for payments and loans available to producers of dry peas, lentils, and large and small chickpeas. Addition of new benefits for soybeans and minor oilseeds farmers. Mandatory country-of-origin labeling requirements for wild fish--a provision that has not been debated or reviewed, but simply included in the manager's package. $100 million in emergency assistance for apple producers. Farm spending has gone unchecked for decades. Only until the GAO and other independent taxpayer groups singled out the disparity of farm payments has some light been shed on this unlimited spending. The GAO's report, which highlighted the egregious disparity in farm benefits, demonstrated that over 80 percent of farm payments have been distributed to large and medium sized farms, leaving small farmers in the cold. Even with changes in this bill for payment limitations, there simply is nothing to prevent farm groups from seeking future disaster relief and emergency spending when their commodity payments are limited as proposed in this Senate bill. It would be nothing short of miraculous if this payment limitation provision survived conference negotiations given the expected resistance from entrenched farm interests. The bottom line is that taxpayers face the threat of a return to basic status quo farm policy, lavishing government payouts to large farming operations and conglomerates. We had an opportunity to implement a real reform proposal, as presented by my distinguished colleague, Senator Lugar, and I applaud him for his efforts. Senator Lugar fought a brave fight to force the Senate to debate a more sensible reform of farm policies, fighting against a tide of pressure from his colleagues, the distinguished chairman, and many agriculture groups. He offered a proposal to substantially reduce federal farm payments and focus assistance on a needs-based approach. He boldly proposed to phase out cherished sugar, peanuts and dairy subsidies. He also suggested that federal assistance is more appropriately focused to those farmers that genuinely need assistance. Sadly, his proposal will never see the light of day beyond this chamber because too many are willing to adhere to the status quo rather than accept progressive policies. This bill is a great disappointment. While not all of my colleagues are equally budget conscious when passing such comprehensive legislation, more than a few should be concerned about how this bill could potentially impact U.S. trade commitments. Today, agricultural exports account for approximately one-fourth of U.S. farm income. Because of this, removing trader barriers to U.S. agricultural goods is more important now than ever. But as we travel around the world, championing the cause of free trade, we must practice what we preach. We cannot possibly expect foreign governments to reduce barriers to entry for U.S. agricultural products, while the United States Congress continues to build up greater barriers domestically, to reduce competition from foreign products. I am a supporter of free trade. I want American farmers to be able to sell their goods around the world. This bill continues protectionist policies that raise barriers to foreign goods. These efforts will jeopardize the ability of America's farmers to continue to export goods abroad and profit from expanded exports. Passage of this legislation could very well lead to violations of international trade rules and will no doubt complicate the position of the United States in future trade negotiations. For example, a current one-year ban on catfish imports in effect right now because of a last-minute rider to the agriculture appropriations bill we passed last year. I opposed this ban, but, unfortunately, special interests have also secured a ten-year ban on catfish imports in the House farm bill. Also included in the managers' package of amendments is a provision that requires country of origin labeling for ``wild fish.'' Not many of my colleagues realize how difficult this provision will be to implement because so many different fish from different sources are often processed within the same fish processing plant. Fish processors will have to completely change the way they operate their business in order to comply with this protectionist measure. Other such trade distorting programs such as dairy and sugar price support programs remain a constant in farm bills. Farm policy is among the most volatile and complicated matters we deal with in the Congress. But what seems clear to me is that the farm economy seems unable to operate unless the Congress infuses billions of dollars in the form of direct federal payments, mandates government fixed prices, and imposes distorted quotas. We continue to spend and spend on farm subsidies, despite the projections from CBO, which indicate that if current tax and spending policies remain in place, the total unified budget will show a deficit of $21 billion in 2002 and $14 billion in 2003, and net surpluses every year thereafter through 2012. According to CBO, the on-budget accounts are projected to post deficits of $181 billion in 2002, $193 billion in 2003, and declining amounts through 2009. On-budget surpluses do not appear again until 2010. And, let's face it, medium- and long-term budget projections are worth little more than the paper they're printed on. At this time of economic uncertainty, this farm bill is an appalling breach of our federal spending responsibility and our national integrity, while continuing the heavy burden long placed on taxpayers. I regret that I cannot support this bill. I realize that many agricultural producers in Arizona have relied on some of these farm subsidies and other agriculture programs, particularly from rural development initiatives. Unfortunately, this farm bill, like most other farm bills in years past, tilts benefits toward the bigger farm producing States while Arizona, like many other States, will lose out over the long term. Sadly this bill fails by all accounts to provide a sound and defensible national farm policy.

Mr. McCAIN. One hundred were mailed out last night at 6 o'clock, and then 30 more came in this morning. That is a little bit different version of the facts.

Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCAIN. The fact is, we didn't see 30 of these amendments until 10 minutes before the vote. So how can the Senator say they are out there when we did not see them? We have asked to see them. We have told him we want to see them. It is well known we want to see them. How in the world can the Senator from Iowa say they have been out there when we didn't see them until this morning, and we didn't see the other hundred until last night? The Senator from Iowa is simply not stating the facts as they are.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I apologize to my colleagues for holding up the proceedings of the Senate on this very important legislation, but at some point someone has to say ``enough.'' When I first came to the Senate, which was not as long ago as a number of the other Members, a package of technical amendments was sometimes two, three, four, five amendments that were purely technical in nature. We now have a new Senate record. This package of technical amendments, the managers' package which has been subject to neither debate nor discussion by any Member of this body, is now 396 pages long. It has 137 amendments. Billions of dollars are in the managers' package. I want to repeat, it is longer than the original House bill. There are authorizations from nutrient reduction pilot programs to a technical correction to the wildlife incentive program changes from $350,000 to $50 million a year in fiscal year 2007. None of these has been debated and discussed, that I know of. I have selected three that are particularly egregious, on which we will have votes. I would like to say I am familiar with the details of these three amendments on which I am seeking votes, but I am not, because they are technical amendments in a package. In fact, I am interested to see the Senator from Wisconsin in the Chamber because he has sort of been a triggering mechanism to what I am doing right now. When we had an appropriations bill and I said, ``Who has seen the managers' package?'' no one said a word, and because it was late at night, I let it go. There were 15 amendments in a managers' package which was millions of dollars earmarked for specific States. I said I would not let that happen again. Now we have a bill, as I say, a managers' package, which is 396 pages long with 137 amendments. We have been working on this bill for months, as the majority leader pointed out to me. We saw 100 of the amendments last night. We did not see the additional 30 technical amendments until 10 minutes before we were supposed to vote. We cannot operate this way. We cannot operate this way with the taxpayers' money. If anyone has ever seen a package of technical amendments that exceeds this, I would like to hear from them. I do know what a managers' package is supposed to be, and that is some technical amendments that make technical corrections, not amendments such as No. 127, which adds a section authorizing a technical assistance program for geographically disadvantaged farmers. Do you have that? This is a technical assistance program for geographically disadvantaged farmers, $10 million a year between 2002 and 2006. This is in a managers' package. There are Delta regional economic development grants, additional nutrition technology in the delta region, of $7 million a year. And a pilot program for the Chesapeake Bay until 2006, $70 million. I am sure these may be good programs. They may be very beneficial. Particularly in the case of the Chesapeake Bay, they may be very important. What is it doing in a managers' package? What is it doing with 130 other amendments in a managers' package? I will ask for votes on these three amendments. They will, I am sure, be resoundingly carried. I tell my colleagues, the next time we do this, we will have extended debate and discussion and second-degree amendments. It has to stop. My constituents deserve the right to know what is in these amendments. When they are talking about $10, $20, $70 million in an amendment, they should not be in a so-called managers' package. I don't want to impede the progress of the Senate too long, but I cannot allow this practice to continue. The Senator from Kansas is here. He was the manager of major legislation. I ask if the Senator from Kansas has ever seen a bill with this kind of a managers' package in it? I ask unanimous consent for the Senator from Kansas to respond.

Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to discuss that with the Senator from Iowa. No. 18 is changed from $375,000 to $355 million, and change $50,000 to $50 million. That is just amendment No. 18.

Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent to engage in a dialog with the Senator, if that is agreeable? I just want to make sure we observe the rules of the Senate. I ask unanimous consent to engage in a dialog with the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. McCAIN. It says technical correction in the Wildlife Habitat Incentive Program, technical correction, mandatory funding language, change it from $375,000 to $355 million, in fiscal year 2006; and change $50,000 to $50 million in fiscal year 2007. Obviously, this is a technical change. Obviously, it is a change of many millions of dollars.

Mr. McCAIN. Then you don't need the technical correction. I ask unanimous consent to eliminate technical amendment No. 18.

Mr. McCAIN. You are still correcting in the underlying bill some $400 million.

Mr. McCAIN. Plus $50 million. I don't care if it has been scored by CBO or not, it is not in the underlying bill.

Mr. McCAIN. I will be glad to get a list of those we were given this morning. There are 30 that we were given shortly before the vote, the final vote on the bill that we were apprised of that we had asked for.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the compromise amendment in the nature of a substitute to S. 565, the Equal Protection of Voting Rights Act of 2001. I am proud to join Senators Dodd, McConnell, Schumer, Bond, and Torricelli in co-sponsoring this historic piece of legislation designed to improve our Nation's voting practices and procedures. I am glad that we are addressing this issue now, and hope that legislation is enacted soon. In many states, voters will go to the polls this year using much of the same equipment as was used in 2000, which will result in many of the same problems. Our purpose here today is to prevent the problems of the Year 2000 election from occurring in the future. While we all remember the ``butterfly ballots'' and ``hanging chads'' of Florida, we must also consider the facts that show the problems of Election 2000 were nationwide. In Chicago and Cook County, Illinois, nearly 123,000 presidential votes went uncounted, and in Fulton County, Georgia, one of every 16 ballots for president was invalidated. The General Accounting Office found that 57 percent of jurisdictions nationwide had major problems in Election 2000. The MIT/Caltech Voting Project estimates that 4 to 6 million votes were lost. During two hearings by the Senate Commerce Committee, our witnesses testified that many of these problems were caused by outdated and inaccurate lever and punch card voting machines, distinct inadequacies in poll worker and voter education, and confusion over election administration and voting registration procedures. I believe that the mandatory standards and federal grant programs found in the compromise amendment I am cosponsoring will play an important role in resolving these problems in the future. However, I am concerned that this bill will not address the concerns of disabled voters, who time and again confront physical barriers when they attempt to vote. Disabled voters should not be forced to bring their own ramps to polling places, go through alternative entrances, and put up with numerous other barriers and humiliations when they attempt to vote. According to a 2001 General Accounting Office report, 84 percent of all polling places in the contiguous United States have one or more potential impediments to disabled voters. While many of these polling places use curbside voting, many disabled voters complain that curbside voting infringes on their privacy, when they cast a ballot. So instead of voting, many disabled Americans simply stay home. According to the National Organization on Disability, 21 million voting age citizens with disabilities did not vote. President Alan Reich of the National Organization on Disability summed it up best, when he stated that ``there is great irony that a person in a wheelchair can't get into some polling places, whereas a person using a guide dog can get inside, only to find out there is no accessible voting machine.'' I intend to offer a minor technical amendment to this legislation that I hope will resolve many of these concerns. I urge my colleagues to join me in addressing this issue. I look forward to working with my colleagues on this historic legislation. This legislation should be addressed in a timely manner by the Senate, and I hope that the conference with the House can also be resolved soon, so that we can send a bill to the President for his signature. I am afraid that it is already too late to do much to help voters for the 2002 election, but we can and must make sure that the problems of Election 2000 are not repeated in 2004. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation with Senators Levin, Fitzgerald, and Durbin, entitled Ending the Double Standard for Stock Options Act. This legislation requires companies to treat stock options for employees as an expense for bookkeeping purposes if they want to claim this expense as a deduction for tax purposes. We introduced similar legislation in 1997 during the 105h Congress but unfortunately, the special interest with a vested stake in the status quo prevented this legislation from seeing the light of day. Currently, corporations can hide these multimillion-dollar compensation plans from their stockholders or other investors because these plans are not counted as an expense when calculating company earnings. Even the Federal Accounting Standards Board, FASB, recognized that stock options should be treated as an expense for accounting purposes. Accounting disclosure rules issued by FASB require that companies include in their annual reports a footnote disclosing what the company's net earnings would have been if stock option plans were treated as an expense. The latest scandals involving the collapse of Enron highlight the problem of misleading annual statements and financial statements. According to a recent analysis, from 1996 to 2000, Enron issued nearly $600 million in stock options, collecting tax deductions which allowed the corporation to severely reduce their payment in taxes. Whether or not Enron took advantage of current disclosure rules to hide their financial problems remains a question. The fact remains that current rules allow companies such as Enron to discuss as little as possible. And this prevents investors, Wall Street analyst, corporate executives, and auditors from properly understanding the bottom line of corporations. One might reasonably ask how an arcane accounting rule could have such a large impact on the bottom line of corporations. The answer lies in the growth and value of stock options as a means of executive compensation. We have heard the reports of executives making multimillion-dollar salaries, while average worker salaries stagnate or fall. According to one recent report, almost half of the earnings of the typical chief executive officer of a top company reflects stock options. Why shouldn't the value of this compensation package be included in calculating a company's earnings? How can stockowners evaluate the true value of employee compensation if the value is just buried in a footnote somewhere the annual report? No other type of compensation gets treated as an expense for tax purposes, without also being treated as an expense on the company books. This double standard is exactly the kind of inequitable corporate benefit that makes the American people irate and must be eliminated. If companies do not want to fully disclose on their books how much they are compensating their employees, then they should not be able to claim a tax benefit for it. This legislation does not require a particular accounting treatment; the accounting decision is left to the company. This legislation simply requires companies to treat stock options the same way for both accounting and tax purposes. I hope my colleagues will join us in cosponsoring this important legislation that will end the double standard for stock option compensation.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce legislation with Senators Levin, Fitzgerald, and Durbin, entitled Ending the Double Standard for Stock Options Act. This legislation requires companies to treat stock options for employees as an expense for bookkeeping purposes if they want to claim this expense as a deduction for tax purposes. We introduced similar legislation in 1997 during the 105h Congress but unfortunately, the special interest with a vested stake in the status quo prevented this legislation from seeing the light of day. Currently, corporations can hide these multimillion-dollar compensation plans from their stockholders or other investors because these plans are not counted as an expense when calculating company earnings. Even the Federal Accounting Standards Board, FASB, recognized that stock options should be treated as an expense for accounting purposes. Accounting disclosure rules issued by FASB require that companies include in their annual reports a footnote disclosing what the company's net earnings would have been if stock option plans were treated as an expense. The latest scandals involving the collapse of Enron highlight the problem of misleading annual statements and financial statements. According to a recent analysis, from 1996 to 2000, Enron issued nearly $600 million in stock options, collecting tax deductions which allowed the corporation to severely reduce their payment in taxes. Whether or not Enron took advantage of current disclosure rules to hide their financial problems remains a question. The fact remains that current rules allow companies such as Enron to discuss as little as possible. And this prevents investors, Wall Street analyst, corporate executives, and auditors from properly understanding the bottom line of corporations. One might reasonably ask how an arcane accounting rule could have such a large impact on the bottom line of corporations. The answer lies in the growth and value of stock options as a means of executive compensation. We have heard the reports of executives making multimillion-dollar salaries, while average worker salaries stagnate or fall. According to one recent report, almost half of the earnings of the typical chief executive officer of a top company reflects stock options. Why shouldn't the value of this compensation package be included in calculating a company's earnings? How can stockowners evaluate the true value of employee compensation if the value is just buried in a footnote somewhere the annual report? No other type of compensation gets treated as an expense for tax purposes, without also being treated as an expense on the company books. This double standard is exactly the kind of inequitable corporate benefit that makes the American people irate and must be eliminated. If companies do not want to fully disclose on their books how much they are compensating their employees, then they should not be able to claim a tax benefit for it. This legislation does not require a particular accounting treatment; the accounting decision is left to the company. This legislation simply requires companies to treat stock options the same way for both accounting and tax purposes. I hope my colleagues will join us in cosponsoring this important legislation that will end the double standard for stock option compensation.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, one year ago today, the Senate passed S. 235, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2001. This bill, overwhelmingly approved by a vote of 98-0, is the product of many months of hearings, bipartisan compromise, and cooperation that began during the last Congress. It is designed to promote both public and environmental safety by reauthorizing and strengthening our federal pipeline safety programs which expired in September, 2000. Since the Senate began debating pipeline safety improvement legislation in 1999, the House has taken little action. Various pipeline safety improvement measures are available for consideration by the House, including a bill introduced December 20, 2001 by the Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. I encourage the House Members to act swiftly and help prevent not only needless deaths and injuries, but also environmental and economic disasters. Legislative action is necessary as demonstrated by the number of tragic accidents in recent years. For example, on June 10, 1999, 277,000 gallons of gasoline leaked from a 16 inch underground pipeline into the Hannah Creek near Bellingham, WA. The gasoline migrated into the Whatcom Creek, where it was subsequently ignited. The ignition set off an explosion and fire, burning along both sides of the creek, for approximately 1.5 miles, killing two 10 year old boys and an 18 year old young man who was fishing in the creek. In addition to the three deaths, there were eight injuries and environmental damage to the area. Also, the fire damaged the Bellingham Water Treatment Plant and other industrial structures, as well as a private residence. Interstate 5 was closed for a period of time because of the thick smoke, and the Coast Guard closed Bellingham Bay for a one mile radius from the mouth of the Whatcom Creek. Other tragedies have occurred. On August 19, 2000, a natural gas transmission line ruptured in Carlsbad, NM, killing 12 members of two families. On September 7, 2000, a bulldozer in Lubbock, TX, ruptured a propane pipeline. The ensuing cloud was ignited by a passing vehicle, creating a fireball which killed a police officer. Congress was called on to act after the first accident in Washington. I introduced S. 2438, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2000, on April 13, 2000. With the assistance of a bipartisan group of Senators, including Senators Slade Gorton and Patty Murray, the Commerce Committee reported the measure favorably later that July. The Senate took swift action upon return from the August recess, during which the accident in New Mexico had occurred. We passed S. 2438 by unanimous consent on September 7, 2000, on the same day as the rupture in Texas. The Senate's accomplishment that year stemmed from several months of hearings and countless meetings. Unfortunately, the House failed to approve a pipeline safety measure so we were never able to go to conference or send a measure to the President. Our collective inaction was a black mark on the 106th Congress. After the opening of the 107th Congress, I introduced nearly identical legislation, S. 235, the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2001. The Senate acted swiftly and passed S. 235 on this date last year, one of the first legislative actions of the 107th Congress. The House now has the opportunity to remove the black mark by acting on pipeline safety legislation. Including the tragedies I mentioned earlier, a total of 71 fatalities have occurred as a result of a pipeline accident over the past three years. It should be noted, however, that despite these horrible accidents, the pipeline industry has a good safety record relative to other forms of transportation. According to the Department of Transportation, pipeline related incidents dropped nearly 80 percent between 1975 and 1998, and the loss of product due to accidental ruptures has been cut in half. From 1989 through 1998, pipeline accidents resulted in about 22 fatalities per year--far fewer than the number of fatal accidents experienced among other modes of transportation. But this record should not be used as an excuse for inaction on legislation to strengthen pipeline safety. The Office of Pipeline Safety, OPS, within the Department of Transportation's, DOT, Research and Special Programs Administration, RSPA, oversees the transportation of about 65 percent of the petroleum and most of the natural gas transported in the United States. OPS regulates the day-to-day safety of 3,000 gas pipeline operators with more than 1.6 million miles of pipeline. It also regulates more than 200 hazardous liquid operators with 155,000 miles of pipelines. Given the immense array of pipelines that traverse our nation, reauthorization of our pipeline safety programs is critical to the safety and security of thousands of communities and millions of Americans nationwide. Early attention by the Senate demonstrates our firm commitment to improving pipeline safety. I will continue to do all I can to advance pipeline safety legislation this year. When the Senate considers an Energy bill in the upcoming days or weeks, I intend to offer S. 235 as an amendment to it. I hope my colleagues will join with me in demonstrating their strong support for addressing identified pipeline safety lapses and will vote for this amendment. I remain hopeful that Congress as a whole will finally act before we receive another call to action by yet another tragic accident. Action is needed. It is needed now.