John McCain

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I along with Senators Cochran and Burns are proud to introduce the Fair Competition in Foreign Commerce Act of 1999, to address the serious problem of waste, fraud and abuse resulting from bribery and corruption in international development projects. This legislation will set conditions for U.S. funding through multilateral development banks. These conditions will require the country receiving aid to adopt substantive procurement reforms and independent third-party procurement monitoring of their international development projects. During the cold war, banks and governments often looked the other way as pro-western leaders in developing countries treated national treasuries as their personal treasury troves. Today, we cannot afford to look the other way when we see bribery and corruption running rampant in other countries because these practices undermine our goals of promoting democracy and accountability, fostering economic development and trade liberalization, and achieving a level playing field throughout the world for American businesses. The United States is increasingly called upon to lead multilateral efforts to provide much-needed economic assistance to developing nations. The American taxpayers make substantial contributions to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Investment Corporation, the North American Development Bank, and the African Development Fund. However, it is critical that we take steps to ensure that Americans' hard-earned tax dollars are being used appropriately. The Fair Competition in Foreign Commerce Act of 1999 is designed to decrease the stifling effects of bribery and corruption in international development contracts. By doing so, we will (1) enable U.S. businesses to become more competitive when bidding against foreign firms which secure government contracts through bribery and corruption; (2) encourage additional direct investment to developing nations, thus increasing their economic growth, and (3) increase opportunities for U.S. businesses to export to these nations as their economies expand and mature. Multilateral lending efforts are only effective in spurring economic development if the funds are used to further the intended development projects, not to line the pockets of foreign bureaucrats and their well-connected political allies. When used for its intended purpose, foreign aid yields both short- and long-term benefits to U.S. businesses. Direct foreign aid assists developing nations to develop their infrastructure. A developed infrastructure is vital to creating and sustaining a modern dynamic economy. Robust new economies create new markets to which U.S. businesses can export their goods and services. Exports are key to the U.S. role in the constantly expanding and increasingly competitive global economy. The current laws and procedures designed to detect and deter corruption after the fact are inadequate and meaningless. This bill seeks to ensure that U.S. taxpayers' hard-earned dollars contributed to international projects are used appropriately, by detecting and eliminating bribery and corruption before they can taint the integrity of international projects. Past experience illustrates that it is ineffective to attempt to reverse waste, fraud, and abuse in large- scale foreign infrastructure projects, once the abuse has already begun. Therefore, it is vital to detect the abuses before they occur. The Fair Competition in Foreign Commerce Act of 1999 requires the United States Government, through its participation in multilateral lending institutions and in its disbursement of non-humanitarian foreign assistance funds, to: (1) require the recipient international financial institution to adopt an anti-corruption plan that requires the aid recipient to use independent third-party procurement monitoring services, at each stage of the procurement process to ensure openness and transparency in government procurements, and (2) require the recipient nation to institute specific strategies for minimizing corruption and maximizing transparency in procurements at each stage of the procurement process. The legislation directs the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the United States Executive Directors of the various international institutions to use the voice and vote of the United States to prevent the lending institution from providing funds to nations which do not satisfy the procurement reforms criteria. This Act has two important exceptions. First, it does not apply to assistance to meet urgent humanitarian needs such as providing food, medicine, disaster, and refugee relief. Second, it also permits the President to waive the funding restrictions with respect to a particular country, if making such funds available is important to the national security interest of the United States. Independent third-party procurement monitoring is a system where an uninvolved entity conducts a program to eliminate bias, to promote transparency and open competition, and to minimize fraud and corruption, waste and inefficiency and other misuse of funds in international procurements. The system does this through an independent evaluation of the technical, financial, economic and legal aspects of each stage of a procurement, from the development and issuance of technical specifications, bidding documents, evaluation reports and contract preparation, to the delivery of goods and services. This monitoring takes place throughout the entire term of the international development project. Mr. President, this system has worked for other governments. Procurement reforms and third-party procurement monitoring resulted in the governments of Kenya, Uganda, Colombia, and Guatemala experiencing significant cost savings in recent procurements. For instance, the Government of Guatemala experienced an overall savings of 48% when it adopted a third-party procurement monitoring system and other procurement reform measures in a recent contract for pharmaceuticals. Mr. President, bribery and corruption have many victims. Bribery and corruption hamper vital U.S. interests. Both harm consumers, taxpayers, and honest traders who lose contracts, production, and profits because they refuse to offer bribes to secure foreign contracts. Bribery and corruption have become a serious problem. A World Bank survey of 3,600 firms in 69 countries showed 40% of businesses paying bribes. More startling is that Germany still permits its companies to take a tax deduction for bribes. Commerce Secretary Daley summed up the serious impact of bribery and corruption upon American businesses ability to compete for foreign contracts in 1997: Since mid-1994, foreign firms have used bribery to win approximately 180 commercial contracts valued at nearly $80 billion. We estimate that over the past year, American companies have lost at least 50 of these contracts, valued at $15 billion. And since many of these contracts were for groundbreaking projects--the kind that produce exports for years to come--the ultimate cost could be much higher. Since then American companies have continued to lose international development contracts because of unfair competition from businesses paying bribes. This terrible trend must be brought to a halt. Exports will continue to play an increasing role in our economic expansion. We can ill afford to allow any artificial impediments to our ability to export. Bribery and corruption significantly hinder American businesses' ability to compete for lucrative overseas government contracts. American businesses are simply not competitive when bidding against foreign firms that have bribed government officials to secure overseas government contracts. Openness and fairness in government contracts will greatly enhance opportunities to compete in the rapidly expanding global economy. Exports equate to jobs. Jobs equate to more money in hard-working Americans' pockets. More money in Americans' pockets means more money for Americans to save and invest in their futures. Bribery and corruption also harm the country receiving the aid because bribery and corruption often inflate the cost of international development projects. For example, state sponsorship of massive infrastructure projects that are deliberately beyond the required specification needed to meet the objective is a common example of the waste, fraud, and abuse inherent in corrupt procurement practices. Here, the cost of corruption is not the amount of the bribe itself, but the inefficient use of resources that the bribes encourage. Bribery and corruption drive up costs. Companies are forced to increase prices to cover the cost of bribes they are forced to pay. A 2% bribe on a contract can raise costs by 15%. Over time, tax revenues will have to be raised or diverted from other more deserving projects to fund these excesses. Higher taxes and the inefficient use of resources both hinder growth. The World Bank and the IMF both recognize the link between bribery and corruption, and decreased economic growth. Recent studies also indicate that high levels of corruption are associated with low levels of investment and growth. Furthermore, corruption lessens the effectiveness of industrial policies and encourages businesses to operate in the unofficial sector in violation of tax and regulatory laws. More important, corruption breeds corruption and discourages legitimate investment. In short, bribery and corruption create a ``lose-lose'' situation for the U.S. and developing nations. The U.S. recognizes the damaging effects bribery and corruption have at home and abroad. The U.S. continues to combat foreign corruption, waste, and abuse on many fronts--from prohibiting U.S. firms from bribing foreign officials, to leading the anti-corruption efforts in the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (``OECD''). The U.S. was the first country to enact legislation (the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) to prohibit its nationals and corporations from bribing foreign public officials in international and business transactions. However, we must do more. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prevents U.S. nationals and corporations from bribing foreign officials, but does nothing to prevent foreign nationals and corporations from bribing foreign officials to obtain foreign contracts. Valuable resources are often diverted or squandered because of corrupt officials or the use of non-transparent specifications, contract requirements and the like in international procurements for goods and services. Such corrupt practices also minimize competition and prevent the recipient nation or agency from receiving the full value of the goods and services for which it bargained. In addition, despite the importance of international markets to U.S. goods and service providers, many U.S. companies refuse to participate in international procurements that may be corrupt. This legislation is designed to provide a mechanism to ensure, to the extent possible, the integrity of U.S. contributions to multilateral lending institutions and other non-humanitarian U.S. foreign aid. Corrupt international procurements, often funded by these multilateral banks, weaken democratic institutions and undermine the very opportunities that multilateral lending institutions were founded to promote. This will encourage and support the development of transparent government procurement systems, which are vital for emerging democracies constructing the infrastructure that can sustain market economies. Mr. President, on behalf of the millions of Americans who will benefit from increased opportunities for U.S. businesses to participate in the global economy, and the billions of people in developing nations throughout the world who are desperate for economic assistance, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and demonstrate their continued commitment to the orderly evolution of the global economy and the efficient use of American economic assistance. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I along with Senators Cochran and Burns are proud to introduce the Fair Competition in Foreign Commerce Act of 1999, to address the serious problem of waste, fraud and abuse resulting from bribery and corruption in international development projects. This legislation will set conditions for U.S. funding through multilateral development banks. These conditions will require the country receiving aid to adopt substantive procurement reforms and independent third-party procurement monitoring of their international development projects. During the cold war, banks and governments often looked the other way as pro-western leaders in developing countries treated national treasuries as their personal treasury troves. Today, we cannot afford to look the other way when we see bribery and corruption running rampant in other countries because these practices undermine our goals of promoting democracy and accountability, fostering economic development and trade liberalization, and achieving a level playing field throughout the world for American businesses. The United States is increasingly called upon to lead multilateral efforts to provide much-needed economic assistance to developing nations. The American taxpayers make substantial contributions to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Investment Corporation, the North American Development Bank, and the African Development Fund. However, it is critical that we take steps to ensure that Americans' hard-earned tax dollars are being used appropriately. The Fair Competition in Foreign Commerce Act of 1999 is designed to decrease the stifling effects of bribery and corruption in international development contracts. By doing so, we will (1) enable U.S. businesses to become more competitive when bidding against foreign firms which secure government contracts through bribery and corruption; (2) encourage additional direct investment to developing nations, thus increasing their economic growth, and (3) increase opportunities for U.S. businesses to export to these nations as their economies expand and mature. Multilateral lending efforts are only effective in spurring economic development if the funds are used to further the intended development projects, not to line the pockets of foreign bureaucrats and their well-connected political allies. When used for its intended purpose, foreign aid yields both short- and long-term benefits to U.S. businesses. Direct foreign aid assists developing nations to develop their infrastructure. A developed infrastructure is vital to creating and sustaining a modern dynamic economy. Robust new economies create new markets to which U.S. businesses can export their goods and services. Exports are key to the U.S. role in the constantly expanding and increasingly competitive global economy. The current laws and procedures designed to detect and deter corruption after the fact are inadequate and meaningless. This bill seeks to ensure that U.S. taxpayers' hard-earned dollars contributed to international projects are used appropriately, by detecting and eliminating bribery and corruption before they can taint the integrity of international projects. Past experience illustrates that it is ineffective to attempt to reverse waste, fraud, and abuse in large- scale foreign infrastructure projects, once the abuse has already begun. Therefore, it is vital to detect the abuses before they occur. The Fair Competition in Foreign Commerce Act of 1999 requires the United States Government, through its participation in multilateral lending institutions and in its disbursement of non-humanitarian foreign assistance funds, to: (1) require the recipient international financial institution to adopt an anti-corruption plan that requires the aid recipient to use independent third-party procurement monitoring services, at each stage of the procurement process to ensure openness and transparency in government procurements, and (2) require the recipient nation to institute specific strategies for minimizing corruption and maximizing transparency in procurements at each stage of the procurement process. The legislation directs the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the United States Executive Directors of the various international institutions to use the voice and vote of the United States to prevent the lending institution from providing funds to nations which do not satisfy the procurement reforms criteria. This Act has two important exceptions. First, it does not apply to assistance to meet urgent humanitarian needs such as providing food, medicine, disaster, and refugee relief. Second, it also permits the President to waive the funding restrictions with respect to a particular country, if making such funds available is important to the national security interest of the United States. Independent third-party procurement monitoring is a system where an uninvolved entity conducts a program to eliminate bias, to promote transparency and open competition, and to minimize fraud and corruption, waste and inefficiency and other misuse of funds in international procurements. The system does this through an independent evaluation of the technical, financial, economic and legal aspects of each stage of a procurement, from the development and issuance of technical specifications, bidding documents, evaluation reports and contract preparation, to the delivery of goods and services. This monitoring takes place throughout the entire term of the international development project. Mr. President, this system has worked for other governments. Procurement reforms and third-party procurement monitoring resulted in the governments of Kenya, Uganda, Colombia, and Guatemala experiencing significant cost savings in recent procurements. For instance, the Government of Guatemala experienced an overall savings of 48% when it adopted a third-party procurement monitoring system and other procurement reform measures in a recent contract for pharmaceuticals. Mr. President, bribery and corruption have many victims. Bribery and corruption hamper vital U.S. interests. Both harm consumers, taxpayers, and honest traders who lose contracts, production, and profits because they refuse to offer bribes to secure foreign contracts. Bribery and corruption have become a serious problem. A World Bank survey of 3,600 firms in 69 countries showed 40% of businesses paying bribes. More startling is that Germany still permits its companies to take a tax deduction for bribes. Commerce Secretary Daley summed up the serious impact of bribery and corruption upon American businesses ability to compete for foreign contracts in 1997: Since mid-1994, foreign firms have used bribery to win approximately 180 commercial contracts valued at nearly $80 billion. We estimate that over the past year, American companies have lost at least 50 of these contracts, valued at $15 billion. And since many of these contracts were for groundbreaking projects--the kind that produce exports for years to come--the ultimate cost could be much higher. Since then American companies have continued to lose international development contracts because of unfair competition from businesses paying bribes. This terrible trend must be brought to a halt. Exports will continue to play an increasing role in our economic expansion. We can ill afford to allow any artificial impediments to our ability to export. Bribery and corruption significantly hinder American businesses' ability to compete for lucrative overseas government contracts. American businesses are simply not competitive when bidding against foreign firms that have bribed government officials to secure overseas government contracts. Openness and fairness in government contracts will greatly enhance opportunities to compete in the rapidly expanding global economy. Exports equate to jobs. Jobs equate to more money in hard-working Americans' pockets. More money in Americans' pockets means more money for Americans to save and invest in their futures. Bribery and corruption also harm the country receiving the aid because bribery and corruption often inflate the cost of international development projects. For example, state sponsorship of massive infrastructure projects that are deliberately beyond the required specification needed to meet the objective is a common example of the waste, fraud, and abuse inherent in corrupt procurement practices. Here, the cost of corruption is not the amount of the bribe itself, but the inefficient use of resources that the bribes encourage. Bribery and corruption drive up costs. Companies are forced to increase prices to cover the cost of bribes they are forced to pay. A 2% bribe on a contract can raise costs by 15%. Over time, tax revenues will have to be raised or diverted from other more deserving projects to fund these excesses. Higher taxes and the inefficient use of resources both hinder growth. The World Bank and the IMF both recognize the link between bribery and corruption, and decreased economic growth. Recent studies also indicate that high levels of corruption are associated with low levels of investment and growth. Furthermore, corruption lessens the effectiveness of industrial policies and encourages businesses to operate in the unofficial sector in violation of tax and regulatory laws. More important, corruption breeds corruption and discourages legitimate investment. In short, bribery and corruption create a ``lose-lose'' situation for the U.S. and developing nations. The U.S. recognizes the damaging effects bribery and corruption have at home and abroad. The U.S. continues to combat foreign corruption, waste, and abuse on many fronts--from prohibiting U.S. firms from bribing foreign officials, to leading the anti-corruption efforts in the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (``OECD''). The U.S. was the first country to enact legislation (the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) to prohibit its nationals and corporations from bribing foreign public officials in international and business transactions. However, we must do more. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prevents U.S. nationals and corporations from bribing foreign officials, but does nothing to prevent foreign nationals and corporations from bribing foreign officials to obtain foreign contracts. Valuable resources are often diverted or squandered because of corrupt officials or the use of non-transparent specifications, contract requirements and the like in international procurements for goods and services. Such corrupt practices also minimize competition and prevent the recipient nation or agency from receiving the full value of the goods and services for which it bargained. In addition, despite the importance of international markets to U.S. goods and service providers, many U.S. companies refuse to participate in international procurements that may be corrupt. This legislation is designed to provide a mechanism to ensure, to the extent possible, the integrity of U.S. contributions to multilateral lending institutions and other non-humanitarian U.S. foreign aid. Corrupt international procurements, often funded by these multilateral banks, weaken democratic institutions and undermine the very opportunities that multilateral lending institutions were founded to promote. This will encourage and support the development of transparent government procurement systems, which are vital for emerging democracies constructing the infrastructure that can sustain market economies. Mr. President, on behalf of the millions of Americans who will benefit from increased opportunities for U.S. businesses to participate in the global economy, and the billions of people in developing nations throughout the world who are desperate for economic assistance, I urge my colleagues to support this legislation and demonstrate their continued commitment to the orderly evolution of the global economy and the efficient use of American economic assistance. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, as my colleagues in the Senate know, I make a point of going through spending bills very carefully and compiling lists of programs added at the request of individual members that were not included in the Defense Department's budget request. I should state at the outset that I believe Chairman Warner and Senator Levin, the ranking member, should be commended for their efforts at producing a bill that addresses a number of very serious readiness problems. As American pilots continue to fly missions over Yugoslavia and Iraq while maintaining commitments in virtually every part of the globe, the care and maintenance of the armed forces cannot be taken for granted--not if we wish to avoid imperiling our vital national interests. I would be remiss in my responsibilities, however, were I not to illuminate the large number of programs that were added primarily for parochial reasons. With our military stretched perilously thin after more than a decade of declining budgets and expanding commitments, we can ill afford the business-as-usual practice of adding programs not requested by the military. It is for that reason that the list of unrequested programs that I would like to submit for the record, totaling more than $4 billion, is so troubling. While I continue to have concerns about the integrity of the process by which the service unfunded priorities lists are produced, I have this year chosen to respect their legitimacy and have excluded from the compilation of unrequested projects I am submitting for the Record those items added by members that are reflected on the unfunded priority lists. To wit, while I have to question the reverse economies of scale achieved on the C-40 program--in effect, why do two aircraft cost more on a unit cost basis than did the one aircraft included in the budget submission--I have not included the second aircraft, added by the committee, on this list because of its inclusion on the Navy's unfunded priority list. Similarly, I have omitted from my list two KC-130J aircraft because they are on the Marine Corps unfunded priority list despite the incredible surplus in C-130 frames already in the U.S. inventory. I will mention these programs no more today. Let me be very clear, however, that the process by which budgets are put together is seriously flawed and both fiscal responsibility and national security dictate that we strive to improve it. After so many years of going through this exercise, though, I find it difficult to be optimistic. I am, for instance, bewildered by the continued annual addition to the budget request of $18 million for MK-19 automatic grenade launchers. The repeated addition by Congress of the MK-19 to the defense budget forces to me to wonder whether someone hasn't stockpiled these things out of some psychological need to accumulate grenade launchers as a substitute for balls of string. What on earth does someone think the Marines are doing with its automatic grenade launchers that compels this body to repeatedly add them to the budget? How do we justify continuing to allocate significant amounts of money for a program that the Corps does not even include on its unfunded priorities list? Every single year we add funding--this year, $15 million--for the NULKA anti-ship missile decoy system. An Israeli destroyer during the Six Day War, a British destroyer during the battle for the Falklands, and the USS Stark incident are all testimony to the threat of anti-ship missiles. That only one U.S. ship has been so targeted since World War II, however, and under rather unique circumstances at that, makes it difficult to understand why we spend so much money every year for decoys. I have been critical in the past about earmarking funds for the National Automotive Center, an odd member- created entity that has taken on a life of its own. The bill includes $6.5 million for development of a Smart Truck, with half of the money earmarked for the National Automotive Center. Presumably, this will be a really smart truck, inasmuch as it is taking us for over $6 million. I can only hope it will be able to change its own oil. The Administration's military construction request was a true exercise in Byzantine budgeting. Incrementally funding the entire military construction program was not somebody's better idea, and I applaud the committee's rejection of that proposal. I must condemn, however, that same committee's decision to add $923 million in projects not requested by the services. A new $3.6 million C-17 simulator building at Jackson Airport; a new $8.9 million C-130J simulator building at Keesler Air Force Base; a new $6 million visiting officers' quarters at Niagara Falls; $17 million to replace family housing at the Marine Corps Air Station at Yuma; and an addition of $10 million for a new education center and library at Ellsworth are just a few of the items added to the budget by members for parochial reasons. Let me note at this junction that many of these projects may very well be meritorious upon further review. For example, I know there is a dire need for new family housing at the Marine base in Yuma, Arizona. But is that need greater than exists at some other base? The method by which that project was added does not allow for the kind of comparative analysis that should be an integral part of the process by which these budgets are drafted. Of particular interest is the $241 million for ammunition demilitarization facilities, none of which was requested by the military. I recognize the legitimate need to expeditiously dismantle aging chemical weapons and deal with the environmental contamination resulting from their construction and storage over many years. My concern lies in the perpetually uncertain environment in which spending bills are prepared. Are each of these facilities necessary, and does each one need to be funded during a fiscal year for which funding for it was not requested? Chemical demilitarization has been an important priority for the Armed Services Committee, but the case has not been made that these programs had to be added to this bill. Mr. President, I may make light of some of these programs, but the issue is deadly serious. Our armed forces are stretched perilously thin as global commitments grow and operations like those in Kosovo and the continuing operation in Bosnia continue to take their devastating toll on our ability to remain prepared for the major regional contingencies that are inarguably tied to our vital national interests. Not every program on the list that I am submitting for the Record is impractical or worthy of ridicule. But to argue their worth individually and in a vacuum is to miss the point. I do not include on these lists most programs related to defense against weapons of mass destruction, and generally give classified programs a free ride. The nature of the process, however, is such that a certain amount of skepticism is warranted. It is too much a matter of routine practice that items are added for primarily parochial reasons under headings that sound logical and yet which are low or no priority for the services. As absolutely important as areas like chemical and biological defense are, it is equally important that funds allocated to deal with those threats are not wasted on programs added to the budget solely because a contractor convinced his or her senator that they deserve $2 million to investigate that program's potential when other higher priority programs already exist to fulfill the requirement. I have respected the unfunded priority lists this year because they provide the only roadmap as to where the services would allocate additional dollars if such funding were made available. It is far from a perfect process, but it is all we have. That there are still over $4 billion in member adds in this bill is testament to the indomitable will of members of this body to force projects into a strained defense budget in defiance of fiscal prudence and operational requirements. That is not intended as a compliment; it is simple acknowledgment that there is still ample room for improvement. Finally, let me also note for the record my concerns regarding the amendment offered by Senator Lott to narrow the scope of the Pilot Program for Commercial Services. I believe the amendment will restrict the ability of the Secretary of Defense to explore all options for fair and reasonable procurement of transportation services. This will continue to artificially inflate the Defense Department's transportation cost and will directly impact the findings of the program. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this list be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment would remove from Title 29 of the bill all references to renewing the withdrawal from public use of the Barry M. Goldwater Range in Arizona. In place of the stricken language, I am proposing a ``sense of the Senate'' provision that expresses the clear desire to complete the legislative process of renewing the withdrawal of this land this year, both because of its vital importance to military readiness and the environmental and cultural resources that will be preserved and protected by its continued withdrawn status. I offer this amendment reluctantly, but in full recognition of the unintended controversy caused by its inclusion in the bill at this time. My intention in including these provisions in the Defense Authorization bill this year was to create a meaningful placeholder in the bill to ensure that legislation withdrawing the Goldwater Range could be enacted during this session of Congress. Based on repeated assurances and testimony before Congress, I believe the Administration shares that goal, and I intend to pursue inclusion of a final legislative package, developed with input from all interested parties, in the conference agreement on this legislation. Unfortunately, my attempt to craft language which remained neutral on the few controversial aspects of the proposed withdrawal appears to have been inadequate. In addition, concerns about the process by which this legislation was developed have also been raised. Therefore, in order to ensure that all interested parties have a full opportunity to participate in the drafting of the final legislation withdrawing the Goldwater Range, I am proposing this amendment to replace the existing language with a ``sense of the Senate'' provision expressing the desire to complete the withdrawal process this year. As I have said, there has been some controversy about the language of title 29. I appreciate the concerns raised by the leadership of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee and the Environment and Public Works Committee concerning their jurisdiction, respectively, over public lands management and wildlife refuges. In no way was the inclusion of this language in the bill intended to preclude the ability of those Committees to conduct oversight hearings and provide input in the final legislation to withdraw the Goldwater and other ranges covered in Title 29. In full respect, however, of these Committees' interest in ensuring this bill in no way prejudices the outcome of the legislative process, I agree that a placeholder which simply expresses the desire to the Senate to enact legislation this year is more appropriate at this time. I fully expect to work closely with all members of the Senate and interested outside parties to reach a consensus on legislation that can be re-inserted in this bill in conference. I also sympathize with the concerns raised by several organizations regarding future environmental stewardship of the Goldwater Range, just as I fully appreciate and support the need to maintain the availability of the range for essential military training. Let me reiterate what I said more fully in my additional views filed with the bill. This language was intended simply to be a placeholder to ensure that, if an Administration proposal is submitted to Congress this year for the withdrawal of these lands, it can be appropriately considered in the normal legislative process. I have been and will remain committed to ensuring that all viewpoints are heard and respected in crafting the final language of the withdrawal legislation, both because of the importance of the Goldwater Range as a military training facility, and to preserve and protect the unique environmental and cultural resources in this 2.7 million acre area. The placeholder language in Title 29 of the Committee-reported bill is generally based on Public Law 99-606, which is the law that currently governs the status of these lands and which expires in 2001. However, the language is intentionally silent on many of the difficult issues that must be resolved before this legislation can be enacted. For example, the Committee-approved provision does not specify a length of time for the withdrawal of the Goldwater Range. The provision is deliberately ambiguous, as is the language of Public Law 99-606 which currently governs these lands, about whether the Cabeza Prieta is withdrawn or not, and it is silent on the issue of which federal agency manages all or part of the land. At the same time, through the Committee process, the language was amended to include several additional provisions, not in the current law, to improve environmental protection and resource management of the lands. It mandates at least the same level of resource management and preservation be maintained at the range, and requires the Secretary of the Interior to provide a report on any additional recommended management measures. It precludes changes in the memorandum of understanding between the Department of Defense and Department of the Interior that governs the management of the Cabeza Prieta without notifying Congress 90 days in advance. It also includes a provision requiring a study and recommendation, to be submitted to Congress within two years, on the proposal to designate the Goldwater Range as part of a Sonoran Desert National Park. The language would have been subject to further negotiation and amendment, pending submission of the Administration's legislative proposal to Congress. However, respecting the concerns raised by others about the content of the placeholder legislation, I am proposing that it be stricken. Mr. President, it is vitally important that the Administration complete the process for renewing the withdrawal of these lands and provide a final legislative proposal to Congress this year. Delaying this issue unnecessarily puts at risk both the tremendous efforts to protect the natural and cultural resources on these lands and the critical need to conduct military training, both of which would end with the expiration of the current law. The Administration has stated their desire to complete the legislative process for withdrawal of these lands during this session of the Congress--a goal which I and the Committee fully support--and has now committed to send a final legislative proposal to Congress by approximately June 9, 1999. I urge the Administration to finalize and submit a legislative proposal as early as possible so that all interested parties may review it carefully and efforts can be undertaken quickly to achieve a consensus on legislation that can be enacted this year in this bill. Mr. President, I hope this amendment can be accepted. I believe I have the support of the able Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Warner, to try to work out acceptable language on the Goldwater Range withdrawal, as well as the Chairmen of the Environment and Energy Committees. I look forward to working with the relevant committees and interested parties to reach a consensus on a final legislative package regarding the Goldwater Range that can be included in the conference agreement on this bill. amendment no. 517 (Purpose: To increase by $2,000,000 the amount authorized for the Navy for procurement of MJU-52/B air expendable countermeasures and to offset the increase by a decrease by $2,000,000 of the amount authorized for the Army for UH-1 helicopter modifications) On page 16, line 17, strike ``$1,500,188,000'' and insert ``$1,498,188,000''. On page 17, line 18, strike ``$540,700,000'' and insert ``$542,700,000''.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate has adopted my amendment to S. 1059, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, to authorize special compensation for severely disabled military retirees who suffer under an existing law regarding ``concurrent receipt.'' As many of my colleagues know, current law requires military retirees who are rated as disabled to offset their military retired pay by the amount they receive in veterans' disability compensation. This requirement is discriminatory and wrong. Today, America's disabled military retirees--those individuals who dedicated their careers to military service, and who suffered disabling injuries in the course of that service--cannot receive concurrently their military retirement pay, which they have earned through at least 20 years of service in the Armed Forces, and their veterans' disability compensation, which they are owed due to pain and suffering incurred from military service. In other words, the law penalizes the very men and women who have sacrificed their physical or psychological well- being in uniformed service to their country. My amendment does not provide for full payment to eligible veterans of both the disability compensation and the retired pay they have earned. I regret that such a proposal, which I support in principle, would be far more expensive than many of my colleagues could accept. I learned that lesson the hard way in the course of sponsoring more ambitious concurrent receipt proposals in previous Congresses. The amendment instead authorizes special compensation for the most severely disabled retired veterans--those who have served for at least 20 years, and who have disability ratings of between 70 and 100 percent. More specifically, it would authorize monthly payments of $300 for totally disabled retired veterans; $200 for retirees rated as 90 percent disabled; and $100 for retirees with disability ratings of 70- 80 percent. These men and women suffer from disabilities that have kept them from pursuing second careers. If we cannot muster the votes to provide them with their disability pay and retired pay concurrently, the least we can do is authorize a modest special compensation package to demonstrate that we have not forgotten their sacrifices. The Military Coalition, an organization of 30 prominent veterans' and retires' advocacy groups, supports this legislation, as do many other veterans' service organizations, including the American Legion and Disabled American Veterans. These highly respected organizations recognize, as I do, that severely disabled military retirees deserve, at a minimum, special compensation for the honorable service they have rendered the United States. The existing requirement that military retired pay be offset dollar- for-dollar by veterans' disability compensation is inequitable. I firmly believe that non-disability military retired pay is post-service compensation for services rendered in the United States military. Veterans' disability pay, on the other hand, is compensation for a physical or mental disability incurred from the performance of such service. In my view, the two pays are for very different purposes: one for service rendered and the other for physical or mental ``pain and suffering.'' This is an important distinction evident to any military retiree currently forced to offset his retirement pay with disability compensation. Concurrent receipt is, at its core, a fairness issue, and present law simply discriminates against career military people. Retired veterans are the only group of federal retirees who are required to waive their retirement pay in order to receive VA disability. This inequity needs to be corrected. The Senate has made important progress toward that end with the adoption of this amendment. I continue to hope that the Pentagon, once it finally understands our message that it cannot continue to unfairly penalize disabled military retirees, will provide Congress with a fair and equitable plan to properly compensate retired service members with disabilities. It is hard to disagree with the simple logic that disabled veterans both need and deserve our full support after the untold sacrifices they made in defense of this country. I look forward to the day when our disabled retirees are no longer unduly penalized by existing limitations on concurrent receipt of the benefits they deserve. And I thank Senators Warner and Levin, the managers of S. 1059, for accepting my amendment to provide special compensation for severely disabled retired veterans, who deserve our ongoing support and gratitude.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, yesterday, I introduced two bills, S. 1130, the Motor Vehicle Rental Fairness Act and S. 1125, the Telecommunications Merger Review Act of 1999. Later in the day, I asked that Senator Connie Mack be added as an original cosponsor to the Motor Vehicle Rental Fairness Act. Despite the fact that my request specifically stated ``the Motor Vehicle Rental Fairness Act'', the Bill Clerk's office inadvertently added Senator Mack as a cosponsor to the Telecommunications Merger Review Act. It is my understanding that this error has been corrected. I want the record to reflect that Senator Mack was an original Cosponsor of the Motor Vehicle Rental Fairness Act.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise this morning to introduce The Telecommunications Merger Review Act of 1999, which will make the government's review of telecommunications industry mergers more coherent and effective. It seems like hardly a week goes by without the announcement of yet another precedent-setting merger in the telecommunications industry. Consumers are right to be concerned about the possible effects of these mergers, and the Congress is right to be concerned that government review of these mergers is careful and consistent in keeping consumer interests uppermost. The urgent need for competence and clarity in reviewing telecom industry mergers highlights a glaring problem in the current system. That problem, Mr. President, arises from the fact that different agencies sequentially go over the same issues, and, after considerable delay, can make radically different decisions on the same sets of facts. Two of these agencies, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, have extensive expertise in analyzing the competition-related issues that are involved in mergers, and they approach the merger review process with a great deal of professionalism and efficiency. The third agency, the Federal Communications Commission, has comparatively little expertise in these issues, and only limited authority under the law. Nevertheless, the FCC has bootstrapped itself into the unintended role of official federal dealbreaker. How? By using its authority to impose conditions on the FCC licenses that are being transferred as part and parcel of the overall merger deal. Because the FCC must pre- approve all license transfers, its ability to pass on the underlying licenses gives it a chokehold on the parties to the merger. And it uses that chokehold to prolong the process and extract concessions from the merging parties that oftentimes have very little, if anything, to do with the merger itself. Mr. President, many people might ask, what's so bad about that? Won't the FCC's conditions make sure that consumer interests are served? The short answer is, the FCC is simply duplicating the review and that the Department of Justice performs with much more competence and efficiency. About the best you can say is that the FCC is wasting valuable resources that could more productively be spent elsewhere. But the real harm lies in the fact that the FCC is foisting needless burdens and restrictions on the merging companies that translate into higher costs for consumers. The FCC tries to defend its efforts by arguing that its job is really different from DOJ's--that DOJ makes sure that a merger won't harm competition, while the FCC makes sure that the same merger will help competition. In other words, according to the FCC, DOJ looks at a merger's effect on business; the FCC looks at its effect on people. For example, last week FCC Chairman Kennard gave a speech in which he proclaimed that, despite the strain these merger reviews were imposing on the agency, ``We will not rest until on each transaction we can articulate to the American public what are the benefits of this merger to average American consumers, because I believe that's what the public-interest review requires.'' If that's true, I have good news for Chairman Kennard--he can take a rest, because DOJ is doing exactly the same thing. In a separate speech last week Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein, DOJ's chief merger review official, said that what most people do not understand (including, evidently, the FCC), is that ``everything we do in antitrust . . . is consumer driven.'' He then went on to say precisely what that means: We are a unique federal agency. Our interest is to protect what the economists call consumer welfare. And there is one simple truth that animates everything we do, and that is competition--the more people chasing after the consumer, to serve him or her better, to get lower prices, to get new innovations, to create new opportunities--the more of that juice that goes through the system, the better. To be accurate, there is one big difference between the way the FCC and the DOJ do merger reviews: DOJ is infinitely better at it. Two weeks ago the FCC's already-faltering merger review process hit rock- bottom when a staff member (an ostensible antitrust expert) heading up the FCC's review of the SBC-Ameritech merger (which DOJ has already approved) publicly proclaimed that, unless the FCC imposed major conditions, the proposed transaction ``flunks the public interest test.'' An ``unnamed agency spokeswoman'' then cheerfully agreed that a majority of the Commissioners shared the same view. Can you imagine either the FTC or DOJ countenancing such happenings during the course of their merger review processes? I think not. This appallingly unprofessional behavior by the FCC staff drove the value of SBC and Ameritech stock down over $2 billion, and it confirmed that, if this is what passes for FCC merger review ``expertise,'' the FCC has no business being in it. Mr. President, this bill will restore integrity and professionalism to federal review of telecommunications industry mergers. It does not touch either DOJ's or FTC's broad authority to review all mergers, including all telecommunications industry mergers. It would make sure that any FCC concerns are heard by incorporating the FCC into DOJ and FTC merger review proceedings. Nor does it touch the FCC's broad authority to adopt and enforce rules to govern the behavior of telecommunications companies. What it does do is tell the FCC that, in cases where either DOJ or FTC has reviewed a proposed telecommunications merger and stated in writing no intent to intervene, the FCC must follow the determination of these expert agencies and transfer any FCC licenses without further delay. Under this bill the FCC may independently review proposed mergers when neither DOJ nor FTC states in writing its intent not to intervene. Nevertheless, because DOJ and FTC review all mergers and have authority to intervene in any merger, their nonintervention is any proposed merger appropriately signifies that they find the transaction at issue is unobjectionable. Therefore, any FCC review in such cases is subject to a strict 60-day deadline, and the FCC is directed to presume approval without attaching further conditions or obligations on any of the parties. Nothing (except extreme unlikelihood) would preclude the FCC from rebutting the presumption with hard facts, nor would the FCC be precluded from subsequently exercising its existing enforcement and rulemaking prerogatives to deal with any unanticipated problems. Mr. President, we can streamline the way the federal government reviews telecom industry mergers and still safeguard the public interest. That's what this bill is intended to do by eliminating bureaucratic mismanagement while preserving essential federal review and enforcement prerogatives. I urge my colleagues to give it careful consideration and support. This bill, the Telecom Merger Review Act of 1999, would do nothing to change the authority that the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission currently have to review all telecom industry mergers. Mr. President: I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Motor Vehicle Rental Fairness Act of 1999. The measure is short, simple and important. It will assure that companies who rent or lease motor vehicles are not held liable for accidents caused by their customers when there is no way the companies could prevent these accidents. Normally under our system of jurisprudence, defendants in lawsuits are held liable based upon their action or inaction. Unfortunately, a small number of states ignore this general principle. This minority of states subject rental and leasing companies to unlimited liability for accidents caused by their customers that involve the company's vehicles--despite the fact that the company was not at fault. This type of vicarious liability, liability without fault, holds these companies liable even when they have not been negligent in any way and the vehicle operated perfectly. The measure I am introducing prevents states from holding companies liable for accidents based solely upon their ownership of the vehicles. The bill makes clear that rental companies would still be liable if the vehicle did not operate properly. It makes clear that companies are not excused from meeting state minimum insurance requirements on their motor vehicles. Minimum insurance requirements ensure that people involved in accidents with vehicles owned by rental companies have recourse to recover some damages. The reason most often cited for imposing vicarious liability is to ensure that an innocent third party can recover damages in an accident. Unfortunately, this quest for a financially responsible defendant has lead to absurd results. If a vehicle is purchased from a bank or finance company, then there is no vicarious liability. However, if that same vehicle is leased, vicarious liability applies. This problem attracted my attention because of the impact the policies of a small number of states have on interstate commerce. Settlements and judgments from vicarious liability claims against rental companies cost the industry over $100 million annually. And let me be clear, it is the consumer who is paying this cost. For these reasons, this bill and the reforms it implements are long overdue. Everyone, companies and individuals alike should be held liable only for harm they caused or could have prevented. The only way these companies can prevent this harm would be to go out of business. This is an absurd expectation that will be remedied by this bill. I look forward to hearings on this matter and working with my colleagues to ensure its passage. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise to introduce the Motor Vehicle Rental Fairness Act of 1999. The measure is short, simple and important. It will assure that companies who rent or lease motor vehicles are not held liable for accidents caused by their customers when there is no way the companies could prevent these accidents. Normally under our system of jurisprudence, defendants in lawsuits are held liable based upon their action or inaction. Unfortunately, a small number of states ignore this general principle. This minority of states subject rental and leasing companies to unlimited liability for accidents caused by their customers that involve the company's vehicles--despite the fact that the company was not at fault. This type of vicarious liability, liability without fault, holds these companies liable even when they have not been negligent in any way and the vehicle operated perfectly. The measure I am introducing prevents states from holding companies liable for accidents based solely upon their ownership of the vehicles. The bill makes clear that rental companies would still be liable if the vehicle did not operate properly. It makes clear that companies are not excused from meeting state minimum insurance requirements on their motor vehicles. Minimum insurance requirements ensure that people involved in accidents with vehicles owned by rental companies have recourse to recover some damages. The reason most often cited for imposing vicarious liability is to ensure that an innocent third party can recover damages in an accident. Unfortunately, this quest for a financially responsible defendant has lead to absurd results. If a vehicle is purchased from a bank or finance company, then there is no vicarious liability. However, if that same vehicle is leased, vicarious liability applies. This problem attracted my attention because of the impact the policies of a small number of states have on interstate commerce. Settlements and judgments from vicarious liability claims against rental companies cost the industry over $100 million annually. And let me be clear, it is the consumer who is paying this cost. For these reasons, this bill and the reforms it implements are long overdue. Everyone, companies and individuals alike should be held liable only for harm they caused or could have prevented. The only way these companies can prevent this harm would be to go out of business. This is an absurd expectation that will be remedied by this bill. I look forward to hearings on this matter and working with my colleagues to ensure its passage. I ask unanimous consent that a copy of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, all I can assume is that perhaps this vote may be getting close because a list was distributed, which can only be to try to frighten Members, which has no basis in anything except the imagination of some Senate staffer. It is really unfortunate we have to get into this kind of damn foolishness. I mean really, this is just foolishness. It does not have my State on it, yet three bases were ``considered'' by BRAC between 1991 and 1995. Whoever is responsible for this really ought to be a little ashamed--a little ashamed, maybe. The process exists. It was used before. Every single expert, whether they be inside or outside the military--unless they are a Member of Congress--says that we have to close bases. Find me one, find me one military expert, former Secretary of Defense, any general, any admiral, any expert, anyone from a think tank, right or left on the political spectrum, Heritage Foundation, Brookings--find one. Find one who does not say we have too many bases and we have to go through a procedure to close them. This procedure was used in years past. Strangely enough, strangely enough we have arguments like it costs more money to close bases than it does to keep them open. If that is the case, we ought to build more bases. If that is the case, we never should have closed the bases after World War II. The fact is, that has saved billions and will save billions. We have young men and women at risk all over the world who are not properly equipped, who are not properly trained, who are leaving the military--11,000 people on food stamps and we have not even got the nerve and the political will, some might even say guts, to do the right thing. The right thing is to save money, transfer that money to the men and women in the military who are serving under very difficult conditions with equipment that has not been modernized, with a readiness level that we have not seen since the 1970s, and morale at an all-time low. Meanwhile, our commitments grow and grow and grow. I guess, given this incredible, bizarre list that some intellectually dishonest staffer--intellectually dishonest staffer compiled, we will probably lose this vote. But I tell you, this will not be a bright and shining hour for the Senate of the United States of America. I yield the remainder of my time.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak on the amendment for approximately 5 minutes. I probably will not take that long.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise this morning to introduce The Telecommunications Merger Review Act of 1999, which will make the government's review of telecommunications industry mergers more coherent and effective. It seems like hardly a week goes by without the announcement of yet another precedent-setting merger in the telecommunications industry. Consumers are right to be concerned about the possible effects of these mergers, and the Congress is right to be concerned that government review of these mergers is careful and consistent in keeping consumer interests uppermost. The urgent need for competence and clarity in reviewing telecom industry mergers highlights a glaring problem in the current system. That problem, Mr. President, arises from the fact that different agencies sequentially go over the same issues, and, after considerable delay, can make radically different decisions on the same sets of facts. Two of these agencies, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, have extensive expertise in analyzing the competition-related issues that are involved in mergers, and they approach the merger review process with a great deal of professionalism and efficiency. The third agency, the Federal Communications Commission, has comparatively little expertise in these issues, and only limited authority under the law. Nevertheless, the FCC has bootstrapped itself into the unintended role of official federal dealbreaker. How? By using its authority to impose conditions on the FCC licenses that are being transferred as part and parcel of the overall merger deal. Because the FCC must pre- approve all license transfers, its ability to pass on the underlying licenses gives it a chokehold on the parties to the merger. And it uses that chokehold to prolong the process and extract concessions from the merging parties that oftentimes have very little, if anything, to do with the merger itself. Mr. President, many people might ask, what's so bad about that? Won't the FCC's conditions make sure that consumer interests are served? The short answer is, the FCC is simply duplicating the review and that the Department of Justice performs with much more competence and efficiency. About the best you can say is that the FCC is wasting valuable resources that could more productively be spent elsewhere. But the real harm lies in the fact that the FCC is foisting needless burdens and restrictions on the merging companies that translate into higher costs for consumers. The FCC tries to defend its efforts by arguing that its job is really different from DOJ's--that DOJ makes sure that a merger won't harm competition, while the FCC makes sure that the same merger will help competition. In other words, according to the FCC, DOJ looks at a merger's effect on business; the FCC looks at its effect on people. For example, last week FCC Chairman Kennard gave a speech in which he proclaimed that, despite the strain these merger reviews were imposing on the agency, ``We will not rest until on each transaction we can articulate to the American public what are the benefits of this merger to average American consumers, because I believe that's what the public-interest review requires.'' If that's true, I have good news for Chairman Kennard--he can take a rest, because DOJ is doing exactly the same thing. In a separate speech last week Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein, DOJ's chief merger review official, said that what most people do not understand (including, evidently, the FCC), is that ``everything we do in antitrust . . . is consumer driven.'' He then went on to say precisely what that means: We are a unique federal agency. Our interest is to protect what the economists call consumer welfare. And there is one simple truth that animates everything we do, and that is competition--the more people chasing after the consumer, to serve him or her better, to get lower prices, to get new innovations, to create new opportunities--the more of that juice that goes through the system, the better. To be accurate, there is one big difference between the way the FCC and the DOJ do merger reviews: DOJ is infinitely better at it. Two weeks ago the FCC's already-faltering merger review process hit rock- bottom when a staff member (an ostensible antitrust expert) heading up the FCC's review of the SBC-Ameritech merger (which DOJ has already approved) publicly proclaimed that, unless the FCC imposed major conditions, the proposed transaction ``flunks the public interest test.'' An ``unnamed agency spokeswoman'' then cheerfully agreed that a majority of the Commissioners shared the same view. Can you imagine either the FTC or DOJ countenancing such happenings during the course of their merger review processes? I think not. This appallingly unprofessional behavior by the FCC staff drove the value of SBC and Ameritech stock down over $2 billion, and it confirmed that, if this is what passes for FCC merger review ``expertise,'' the FCC has no business being in it. Mr. President, this bill will restore integrity and professionalism to federal review of telecommunications industry mergers. It does not touch either DOJ's or FTC's broad authority to review all mergers, including all telecommunications industry mergers. It would make sure that any FCC concerns are heard by incorporating the FCC into DOJ and FTC merger review proceedings. Nor does it touch the FCC's broad authority to adopt and enforce rules to govern the behavior of telecommunications companies. What it does do is tell the FCC that, in cases where either DOJ or FTC has reviewed a proposed telecommunications merger and stated in writing no intent to intervene, the FCC must follow the determination of these expert agencies and transfer any FCC licenses without further delay. Under this bill the FCC may independently review proposed mergers when neither DOJ nor FTC states in writing its intent not to intervene. Nevertheless, because DOJ and FTC review all mergers and have authority to intervene in any merger, their nonintervention is any proposed merger appropriately signifies that they find the transaction at issue is unobjectionable. Therefore, any FCC review in such cases is subject to a strict 60-day deadline, and the FCC is directed to presume approval without attaching further conditions or obligations on any of the parties. Nothing (except extreme unlikelihood) would preclude the FCC from rebutting the presumption with hard facts, nor would the FCC be precluded from subsequently exercising its existing enforcement and rulemaking prerogatives to deal with any unanticipated problems. Mr. President, we can streamline the way the federal government reviews telecom industry mergers and still safeguard the public interest. That's what this bill is intended to do by eliminating bureaucratic mismanagement while preserving essential federal review and enforcement prerogatives. I urge my colleagues to give it careful consideration and support. This bill, the Telecom Merger Review Act of 1999, would do nothing to change the authority that the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission currently have to review all telecom industry mergers. Mr. President: I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Could I ask my friend from Virginia, would he agree to an amendment which had the base closing round begin in the year 2002?

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment authorizes a single round of U.S. military installation realignment and base closures to occur in the year 2001. It is an argument and a debate that we have had several times in the past few years, but obviously the argument deserves to be ventilated again. I am reminded, in considering this amendment, of a comment made by my old dear and beloved friend, Morris Udall, of my home State of Arizona, who once said after a long discussion of an issue that had been fairly well ventilated: Everything that could possibly be said on this issue has been said, only not everyone has said it. I think that, again, will be the case with this base closing amendment, because we have been around this track on several occasions. But I do have to credit the imagination and inventiveness of the opponents of the base closing round because they continue to invent new reasons to oppose a round of base closings. They are charming ideas. One of them you will probably hear is that base closings don't save money. That is a very interesting and entertaining argument. I wish we had held to that argument after World War II was over, because we would still have some 150 bases in my State of Arizona, which I am sure would be a significant benefit to our economy. Another aspect of this debate you will hear is that the issue of base closings has been politicized and, therefore, we can't have one. I think my friend, the distinguished chairman, has come up with a new and entertaining argument that every time we go through a base closing, every town, city, and State goes through a very difficult period of time. I agree with him. I certainly agree with him as he will pose that argument. But that doesn't in the slightest change the requirement that we need to close some bases. I have to tell my friend, the chairman, it doesn't ring true to stand and lament the state of the military, our declining readiness, our lack of modernization of the force, all of the evils, the recruitment problems, and the failure to fund much-needed programs, and then not support what is clearly most needed, according to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and according to the Secretary of Defense--and according, really, to every objective observer of our military establishment. Why is it that it took us a month to get Apache helicopters from Germany to Albania? Why is it that we are now hearing if we decided tomorrow to prepare for ground troops--an idea which was soundly rejected by this body--but if finally the recognition came about that we are really not winning this conflict, that Mr. Milosevic is achieving all of his objectives, and we continue to hear great reports about how we have destroyed so much of their capability, yet, the ethnic cleansing is nearing completion and Mr. Milosevic has more troops now than less, why is it that it would take many, many weeks, if not months, to get a force in place in order to move into Kosovo to help right the atrocities that have been committed there? It is because we have not restructured our military establishment. It is that simple. The military establishment in the cold war, very correctly, was structured for a massive conventional tank war on the plains of Europe, the central plains of Europe. That was what our military was all about, and that was the major threat to our security. And now we have a military, which we have failed to restructure, we have failed to make mobile, we have failed to become capable to move anyplace in the world--in this case rather a short distance, from Germany to Albania-- and, once there, decisively impact the battlefield equation. There are many reasons for this. There was a great article in the Wall Street Journal a few weeks ago about how the Army had plans to restructure; yet, at the end of the day, they failed to do so for various reasons--by the way, the lesson being that the military will not restructure itself. It has to be done with an active role by the Congress. But to sit here, as we are today, with all these shortages, where all of us are lamenting the incredible problems we have; yet, we then support a base structure which cannot be justified for any logical reason, is something that I think causes us great credibility problems--first, with people who pay attention to these kinds of things, and, second, at the end of the day with the American people. I say this with full realization and appreciation that there are bases in my home State that may be in danger of being closed. There was a base closed in the round of base closings before the last one, which, by the way, is now generating more revenue for the State of Arizona than it did while it was a functioning military base. But setting that aside, when the base was closed, of course, there was great trauma. There was great dislocation among many civilians who worked out at Williams Air Force Base. But the fact is that we have to reduce the size of our base structures or we will continue to not be able to fund the much-needed improvements that are absolutely vital to us being able to conduct a conflict or war. Our former colleague, Secretary Cohen, says. Nevertheless, no other reform even comes close to offering the potential savings afforded by even a single round of BRAC. There simply is no substitute for base closure and realignment. The two additional rounds under consideration will ultimately save $20 billion and generate $3.6 billion annually, Moreover, the Department continues to streamline the process, making it even easier for communities to dispose of base property and to create new jobs in the future. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote: We are writing to you to express our strong and unified support for authorization for additional rounds of base closures . . . . * * * * * The importance of BRAC goes beyond savings, however. BRAC is the single most effective tool available to the Services to realign their infrastructure to meet the needs of changing organizations and to respond to new ways of doing business. No other initiative can substitute for BRAC in terms of ability to reduce and reshape our infrastructure. Simply stated, our military judgment is that further base closures are absolutely necessary. Signed by all of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I ask unanimous consent that the letter from Secretary Cohen and the letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank my friend from Virginia. I do have to mention one other aspect of this issue that is important, and then I know the Senator from Maine has been patiently waiting. We do have a credibility problem here. We are asking these young people to do without. Some of them right now are in harm's way. We ask them to spend time in the middle of the desert and the middle of Bosnia under very difficult, sometimes nearly intolerable conditions. We have an Air Force that is half the size of what it was at the time of Desert Storm, and it has four times the commitments. We simply do not have a military that we can sustain under the present conditions. If we are not willing to make a sacrifice of the possibility of a base closure in our home State, how in the world can we ask these young people to risk their lives? This is an issue of credibility. If we are going to make the kind of changes necessary to restructure the military, there are going to have to be some very tough decisions made. Base closing is just one of them. But if we cannot even make a decision to have a base closing commission, on the recommendation of every expert inside and outside the defense establishment of the United States of America, then I do not think we have any credibility in other decisions that the committee or the Senate will make. I realize that bases are at risk. I realize there can be economic dislocation. I recommend and I recognize all those aspects of a base closing commission. But for us to tell these young men and women, whom we are asking to sacrifice and take risks, that we will not take the political risk of approving the base of the base closing commission that would convene under the tenure of the next President of the United States under the most fair and objective process that we know how to shape, then, Mr. President, we deserve neither our credibility with them nor their trust. I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Rhode Island for the very strong and, I think, thoughtful statement. He is a much valued member of the committee. I appreciate his efforts in this area. I do not like to belabor my old and dear friend, the former Secretary of the Navy and chairman of the committee. Our respect and friendship is mutual. It has been there for many, many years.

Mr. McCAIN. In all due respect to my friend from Virginia, he knows where that California and Texas thing came from. It didn't come from the bowels of the Pentagon; it came from the White House. That is why, as he knows, we are saying this Commission should only convene after there is a new President of the United States.

Mr. McCAIN. The Senator has a strange way of displaying that confidence if you don't agree with his primary and most important recommendation.

Mr. McCAIN. May I just say with all due respect, if I may, the amendment calls for a base closing commission to be appointed in May of 2001. The election takes place in November of the year 2000, as I seem to recollect; some 5 or 6 months later is when the commission is appointed. The logic of the Senator from Virginia, in all due respect to my chairman, escapes me. There will be a new President of the United States, there will be a new Secretary of Defense. Obviously, the chairman doesn't trust or have confidence in the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both of whom sent over compelling statements and letters. So if it is a new President that you want, there will be a new President. If I get this right, what the distinguished chairman is saying is that we will just put everything on hold for a year or two until we get a new President, then we can start a process? This amendment says there will be a new President, there will be a new Secretary of Defense, there will be a new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a matter of fact, and that is what this amendment contemplates.

Mr. McCAIN. If the Senator doesn't like the fact that it upsets the communities but believes that we need to close bases, does the Senator have another solution?

Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I yield such time as he may consume to the Senator from Rhode Island.