John McCain

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, at a time when vital defense programs are threatened due to a lack of funding, the Federal Government has wasted billions of dollars attempting to procure new large information technology systems, consistently disregarding lessons learned from past failures and well-established acquisition best practices. Even with a current annual budget of $80 billion for information technology projects, the Federal Government struggles to make those systems work. The American people can still remember the embarrassing failure of healthcare.gov, the Obama administration's most recent information technology fiasco. What they may not realize is the Health and Human Services' healthcare.gov mess is not unique and is, in an important sense, merely business as usual in how the government, particularly the Department of Defense, acquires large information technology systems. The Pentagon is responsible for many of the most egregious cases of wasted taxpayer dollars when it comes to government information technology programs. Lack of planning for these acquisitions within the Armed Forces has made the adoption of new information technology systems an expensive and risky endeavor. The Air Force's Expeditionary Combat Support System, or ECSS, is a prime example of how a system designed to save money can actually waste billions of taxpayer dollars without producing any usable capability. Today the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a bipartisan report on the failed acquisition of the ECSS, a program that was supposed to decrease costs and increase efficiencies by consolidating the Air Force's hundreds of legacy logistic systems into a single new system. It is important to recognize that what happened with ECSS is not an isolated case of incompetence. Unfortunately, it is one of the many examples that show how billions of dollars can be wasted if the intended acquisition is not started off right with a detailed plan that includes clear, stable requirements and achievable milestones supported by realistic original cost estimates and reliable assessments of risk. The subcommittee's report notes that the Air Force started the ECSS acquisition in 2004 with the goal of obtaining a single ``transformational'' unified logistics and supply chain management system that would allow the Air Force to track all of its physical assets worldwide, from airplanes, to fuel, to spare parts. These types of computer platforms; that is, large business systems that companies use to make their businesses operate more efficiently, are known as enterprise resource planning systems or ERPs. Basically, ECSS was supposed to be an enterprise resource planning system that would have combined all of the Air Force's global logistics and its associated supply chain management activities under one streamlined management information technology system. As the Department of Defense's overall strategy to become fully auditable hinges on how successfully it procures and integrates these systems into its business enterprises, failures such as the ECSS are not only costly to the taxpayer but also disastrous to the Department's larger financial improvement efforts. To keep costs down, the Air Force intended to build its new ERP system using already available commercial software instead of a software system designed from scratch. That type of commercial software, however, works best when the organization using it follows efficient business processes. In order to take advantage of the commercial software that supported ECSS, the Air Force needed to dramatically change longstanding internal business processes that supported how it managed global logistics and its associated supply chain. That never happened. Unfortunately, the culture of resistance to change in the Air Force made it difficult to make those changes. The Air Force needed strong leaders who could communicate not only the goals of ECSS to end users and get their buy-in but also develop sound program management strategies to overcome resistance to change among those lower level personnel. Ultimately, the leaders of the ECSS Program did not effectively communicate with the end users. Without their buy-in, ECSS was doomed to fail before it even started. Because the Air Force had not adequately planned what needed to be done to procure ECSS effectively, it was easier for program managers to order changes in configuration that in effect customized the commercial software on the fly rather than alter the Air Force's own culture. That caused costs to skyrocket and delivery schedules to slip. The Air Force's eagerness for expensive customization was especially troubling given that as early as 2004, the Air Force identified the need to avoid customizing the commercial software lest costs explode. But in the end, it failed to heed its own advice. The subcommittee report finds that the Air Force's customization of the commercial software was a major root cause of ECSS's failure. Such customization could have been avoided had the Air Force fully and timely implemented a congressionally mandated procedure for improving its operations called business process reengineering. Business process reengineering, which is a proven private sector management approach, offers a structured way to introduce major new changes into an organization to help it run more efficiently and ensures that careful planning goes into every stage. Not infrequently, Fortune 500 companies use business process reengineering to, for example, restructure existing business units to work more efficiently, passing resulting savings on to consumers and to absorb effectively new business units from companies they have acquired or merged with to maintain overall competitiveness in the marketplace. Had the Air Force actually used business process reengineering in connection with the ECSS; that is, redesigned those business processes that needed to be changed for the Air Force to absorb its commercial off-the-shelf software effectively, the risk identified in 2004 would have been consciously addressed at each stage of the procurement, not essentially disregarded for 8 years. In its 2004 risk assessment, the Air Force also identified a lack of stable program requirements as a risk to the program. That risk, too, was not accounted for. From the beginning of the ECSS procurement, the Air Force failed to properly define and stabilize the program's requirements, what the system would do, and how it would do it. Even those who were going to use ECSS felt as though they were in the dark. In 2008, 4 years later, a technician stated: ``My [number one] complaint is that E.C.S.S. has yet to identify . . . any time line [for when] we can expect to receive detailed information [or] requirements about what E.C.S.S. will provide.'' This user's complaint reflects the lack of planning that went into the Air Force's attempt to procure ECSS. To this day, the Air Force still does not know how many legacy systems it actually has on hand, let alone the number that ECSS was to replace. The Air Force's lack of knowledge about its current information technology systems led to confusion when it tried to construct a replacement. That is why I offered an amendment to the NDAA--the National Defense Authorization Act--for fiscal year 2015 that would require program personnel to have a proper understanding of existing legacy systems and clear goals in connection with its efforts to procure new information technology systems, but more has to be done. The subcommittee's report recommends the Department of Defense should also start assessing how much BPR would need to be done--and how feasibly it can be done--earlier in the acquisition lifecycle of these ERPs. Also, investment review boards, which are critically important governance tools used in connection with the Department's efforts to procure ERPs, should be integrated into the budgeting process when these programs begin. That would help make sure that not only is BPR being implemented early and effectively but also that the large information technology system being procured lines up with the Department of Defense's broader efforts to modernize its business systems. Collectively, these initiatives would help these programs start off right and allow both the Department of Defense and Congress to conduct better oversight and hold leadership accountable for future failures. In this case no one within the Air Force and the Department of Defense has been held accountable for ECSS's appalling mismanagement. No one has been fired and not a single government employee has been held responsible for wasting over $1 billion in taxpayer funds. With six program managers and five program executive officers over 8 years having transitioned in and out of the program, the Air Force has had trouble determining who should be held responsible. On scores of other failed programs, this of course is a study we are all familiar with. Let me repeat: Not a single government employee has been held responsible for wasting over $1 billion--six program managers and five program executive officers over 8 years in and out of the program. This is a chronic lack of accountability, and I think efforts in the National Defense Authorization Act amendments to align the tenure of program managers with key decision points in the acquisition process is badly needed. That provision would allow us to not only hold accountable those responsible for blunders such as ECSS but also to reward those involved with successful acquisition strategies. The subcommittee's report details many leadership failures within the Air Force and the Department of Defense in the ECSS Program that should serve as a warning for current and future information technology acquisitions. Since 1995 the Government Accountability Office has placed the Department of Defense business systems modernization efforts; that is, its efforts to replace its existing information technology systems to improve how the Department of Defense is managed, on its high-risk list every year. It has been on that list for many of the same reasons ECSS failed, including inadequate management controls to oversee how it acquires these large systems. According to the Government Accountability Office, the Department of Defense ``has not fully defined and established business systems modernization management controls.'' It further noted that these management controls are ``vital to ensuring that [DOD] can effectively and efficiently manage an undertaking with the size, complexity, and significance of its business systems modernization and minimize the associated risks.'' I challenge the new Deputy Secretary of Defense, who acts as the Chief Management Officer, to work with the Government Accountability Office to get the Department of Defense's business systems modernization efforts off the high-risk list, and I look forward to a plan from him on how he intends to do it. Such a plan is clearly necessary, given the current difficulties the Department of Defense is facing in procuring major information technology programs. The Army has spent roughly $1.89 billion on its logistics modernization programs. Yet just recently, in May of this year, the Department of Defense inspector general reported that the Army will most likely miss the congressionally mandated auditability deadline in September of 2017 because it failed to properly implement the BPR. Additionally, the defense enterprise accounting and management system, or DEAMS, is a current Air Force acquisition effort that has received roughly $425 million in funding and is scheduled to receive billions more. DEAMS has faced similar issues to those witnessed in the failed ECSS procurement program. For instance, similar to ECSS, the Air Force has been frustrated by its inability to get the buy-in it needs from DEAMS' intended end users for them to change their business processes and allow for DEAMS integration into the Air Force. According to a December 2013 Department of Defense internal report, end users at McConnell Air Force Base indicated that the training for this program ``did not provide them with a real understanding of the system and its application to their day-to-day work process.'' Sound familiar? In this case, the Air Force and the Department of Defense are again failing to properly procure and implement a program that is crucial to its business operations and to the Air Force becoming fully auditable by 2017. The Navy has also struggled with the procurement of large information technology as a program called Navy ERP illustrates. According to the Department of Defense's Deputy Chief Management Officer, these guidelines demand that program officers for information technology acquisitions effectively map out current legacy systems and business processes that need to be changed or retired and then lay out a new plan that would improve and transform the shortcomings of the old systems. These ``as is'' and ``to be'' process maps help guide the DOD components and agencies in how they procure large information technology systems. But when the Department of Defense inspector general asked the program office for Navy ERP's process maps, disturbingly, the Navy said no such plan existed. This is particularly unsettling because the Under Secretary of the Navy at the time, who is now the Deputy Secretary of Defense, certified that those plans were actually completed. In addition to the lack of process maps, the Department of Defense inspector general found that Navy ERP could not be used to track and account for the Navy's $416 billion in military equipment assets. That means the Navy's program would not even allow the Navy to become fully auditable, as required by Congress, raising questions about why the Navy would spend $870 million on a program that would not even fulfill congressional mandates. This lapse in oversight is unacceptable, which is why the subcommittee's bipartisan report recommends that the Department of Defense review its internal policies to make sure information technology systems that receive BPR certifications on paper are actually implementing BPR in reality. These certifications are required for a reason: They help decisionmakers in the Department of Defense and Congress make informed decisions on whether a given program is ready to go further in the acquisition process and whether taxpayer funds should be authorized and appropriated for that purpose. As I mentioned earlier, information technology procurement is not only a Department of Defense problem. In November of last year, in response to the disastrous healthcare.gov rollout, President Obama himself said: One of the things [the Federal Government] does not do well is information technology procurement. This is kind of a systematic problem that we have across the board. I agree with him that information technology procurement in the Federal Government is in desperate need of reform. The White House's Office of Management and Budget has expressed significant concerns about 42 Federal information technology investments, totaling $2 billion. According to the Government Accountability Office: ``despite spending hundreds of billions on I.T. since 2000, the federal government has experienced failed I.T. projects and has achieved little of the productivity improvements that private industry has realized from I.T.'' The Department of Homeland Security's Secure Border Initiative Program, or SBInet, was another notable major IT procurement failure. My colleagues might remember SBInet as the high-tech surveillance program that, when it began in 2006, promised a single ``transformational'' integrated security system for hundreds of miles of border protection on our southern border. Well, I remember SBInet as a system that, according to the Government Accountability Office, cost $1.2 billion and was on a path to spend 564 percent more than its initial cost estimates when it was canceled in 2010. Once again, ever- changing requirements, a lack of internal management controls, and not really understanding what we were trying to procure, how hard it would actually be, and planning effectively for those difficulties, led to the Federal Government squandering over $1 billion with nothing to show for it. The Federal Government's incessant inability to procure major information technology systems is especially concerning since, in the coming months, the Department of Defense will be selecting a contractor to develop a centralized military health care information technology system. That program is supposed to provide seamless sharing of health data among the Department of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and private sector providers. In light of the recent tragic consequences stemming from mismanagement at the Phoenix VA Health Care System and VA hospitals around the country, we cannot afford to further jeopardize veterans' health care because of information technology failures. Yet any serious effort to reform how care is delivered to our veterans will largely turn on the effective delivery and integration of this system. We need to put the Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans Affairs on notice that we will monitor this program carefully throughout its acquisition. In closing, there is still much to be done at the Department of Defense and throughout the Federal Government to ensure the acquisition of large information technology programs is improved. If we do not want to repeat past failures, the Department of Defense's attempts to procure large business IT systems must be supported by the right leadership, proper planning, and a workforce that is open to changing ``business as usual'' in order to help make sure the Department operates more efficiently, effectively, and transparently. I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask to address the Senate as in morning business and take such time as I may consume.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. McCAIN. First, I thank him for the resolution. On behalf of myself and others, I appreciate the representation of the people of Texas who are literally experiencing a crisis on the southern border of our States--of the Senator's State as well as mine. I note the presence of the Senator from Illinois. There is no greater advocate for the DREAMers, the children who were brought here, not willfully, and I believe that in our immigration reform bill we address that issue in a humane and compassionate fashion. But I ask my colleague now: Isn't it terribly inhumane to see these children taken from these countries by some of the most unspeakable people on Earth--these coyotes? And their trip along the way these hundreds of miles is so cruel and inhumane to many of these children that it is chilling. These coyotes are terrible people. They commit crimes to these people and on these young children. They do terrible things. They sometimes ride on the top of a train where the safety is-- obviously, their lives are literally in jeopardy. Again, I appreciate the work that has been done on behalf of the DREAMers. But shouldn't we care a great deal about these children, even if they are not in the United States, for what they are undergoing now? And isn't it a humanitarian issue of the highest order, and wouldn't we be better served if we told these children and the people who are motivating them and making a lot of money bringing them here--wouldn't it be better for us to say: Look, anybody who shows up at our border is not going to be allowed to stay in this country. But if you go to our consulate, if you go to our embassy in the country in which you reside and make a case that your life is being threatened, you are being persecuted--whatever the conditions are for asylum in our country--then those cases can be judged, and then if it is a humanitarian case that warrants it, we can bring them into the United States of America. But say: If you come to our border, you cross those--how many miles is it from the Guatemalan border?

Mr. McCAIN. Don't subject yourself to a 1,200-mile trip, which is hazardous to your life and terrible things can happen to you. Why don't we send a message: If you think you deserve asylum, then go to the consulate, go to the embassy, and we will have sufficient personnel there to take up your case. And if your case is compelling and meets our standards for asylum, then we are going to give it to you. But whatever you do, don't risk your life and your well-being to travel 1,200 miles in the hands of a coyote. I would say to the Senator from Texas, sometimes when we say we have to have a secure border and the things we need to do, we are viewed sometimes as inhumane. My question is: What is more inhumane than what is happening to these children now? Some of them are only 4, 5, 6 years old. What is more inhumane than what is happening to them as we speak? Shouldn't the President of the United States do as the Secretary of Homeland Security did yesterday and say: You cannot stay in our country even if you show up on the border, but you can apply for humanitarian asylum in the United States of America?

Mr. McCAIN. The only way we are going to stop this right now is to convince these people not to listen to the coyotes who are advertising on regular television in these countries and to convince these people that trip will not lead to the result of being able to stay in the United States of America. Until that happens, they are going to believe that if they can get here, they can stay here. All of our hearts and sympathies go out to people who live in these countries in terrible conditions. We understand why they want to come to the United States of America, but they are on a fool's errand. Meanwhile, they are putting their very lives at risk by taking that arduous journey to Texas from Honduras, Guatemala, or some other Central American country. I see my friend--and there is no greater advocate for the DREAMers than Senator Durbin--on the floor. He was one of the earliest and most outspoken on this issue. I hope he will join us in recognizing that the only way we can stop this is to make sure people know there is no pot of gold at the end of this terrible trip they are on.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. I would ask my colleague one question before we go on; that is, in addition to this overwhelming information in which the Senator and I were deeply involved that proves conclusively that the President of the United States did not want to leave a single troop member behind in Iraq and succeeded in doing so, did the Senator from South Carolina ever hear the President of the United States, either before the decision was made, during or after--did the Senator ever hear any record of him saying he wanted to leave a residual force behind?

Mr. McCAIN. The President of the United States, in the last couple of days--please correct me--it was the first time he said it was Iraqis who did not want to leave a force behind.

Mr. McCAIN. Yes; he was saying they did not. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the following quotes, including October 2012. I quote the President of the United States: What I would not have done is left 10,000 troops in Iraq [as Candidate Romney proposed], that would tie us down. That certainly would not help us in the Middle East. Jay Carney said on October 1, 2012: When President Obama took office, the Iraq War had been going on for years and he had campaigned with a promise to end that war, and he has done that. One of my favorites is December 2011: In the coming days the last American soldiers will cross the border out of Iraq. . . . with honor and with their heads held high. After nearly nine years, our war in Iraq ends this month. Anyway, the list goes on. In fact, the President campaigned for reelection in 2012 on the premise that he had gotten us out of Iraq. The Senator from South Carolina and I predicted this would happen if we didn't leave a residual force behind. I say to my colleagues again, if we repeat this same total pullout of Afghanistan, we are going to see this same movie in Afghanistan. So I plead with the President of the United States, please revisit your decision that every American troop be pulled out. The Afghans do not have the capability, whether air assets, intel or other capabilities, to defend themselves against an enemy that has a sanctuary in Pakistan. I plead with the President of the United States, do not make the same mistake in Afghanistan. I point out again, at the end of the surge we had won the conflict in Iraq. The conflict was won, and instead obviously we blew it. I would like to talk for a few minutes with my colleague from South Carolina because we need to understand what is happening in Iraq. In the last 3 to 4 weeks, this whole part of Iraq has been taken over by the forces of ISIS. The second largest city in all of Iraq, Mosul, has been taken over, which triggered 500,000 refugees--500,000 refugees left Mosul. Tal Afar--a major city, Kirkuk, where the Kurdish forces came in and took over Kirkuk and made it now part of the Kurdish part of Iraq. What is most concerning, I say to my colleagues--and I know the Senator from South Carolina and I have been focusing on this--is the Jordanian- Iraq border. The border crossings from Iraq into Jordan have been taken over by ISIS. As we know, Jordan is a small country. It is overburdened now with hundreds of thousands of refugees. It has significant problems on the Syrian side of its border. This can be a terribly destabilizing factor to our--probably outside of Israel--strongest and best ally in the entire Middle East. Ramadi, Fallujah, every Iraq veteran will remember Ramadi and Fallujah. Every Iraq veteran will remember the second battle of Fallujah where we lost 96 brave soldiers and marines and over 600 wounded. Now the black flags of Al Qaeda fly over Ramadi and Fallujah. The border to Syria no longer exists, my friends. If we look at Syria, all the way to Aleppo, all the way around, a part of the Middle East that is larger than the State of Indiana is now overtaken by the richest and most powerful terrorist organization in history; that is, ISIS. We cannot address Iraq, if we do, without addressing Syria, as well as the movement of men and equipment back and forth. By the way, the Sunni don't like these people. They are the most radical form of Islam. They don't like them, but they prefer them to the government--the Shiite-run government by Maliki--which has been systematically discriminating against them. So what do we need to do? As the Senator from South Carolina said, what we want is Maliki to be in a transition government that transitions him out of power, but we cannot wait until that happens. By the way, they have also taken a place just north of Baghdad where the largest oil refinery is, Baiji, that provides energy to the 7 million people in Baghdad, and they have also come to a place called Haditha, where a dam is that holds a water supply. If they get hold of both of those places, they basically have a stranglehold on Baghdad itself. This is serious. So what has the President of the United States and the administration decided to do? Send 90, 200 or 250 people over to Iraq and with the stated purpose of ``assessing the situation.'' Those of my friends and colleagues who have been to Iraq know it is a flat desert area, including very hot now. These people, these ISIS forces, are moving in convoys of 100, 200, 300 vehicles. They can be taken out by air power. Right now the President of the United States has refused to do that, but they can be taken out by air power. Air power does not determine conflicts, but air power has a profound psychological effect on your adversary. We have drones, and we have the air capability to take out a lot of these forces. Remember, they are probably at a maximum of about 10,000, and as the Senator from South Carolina said, they started out with about 1,000, but don't forget they are moving back and forth between Syria and Iraq in this now huge area. They are moving on Baghdad. I don't know exactly what is going on. I don't believe they can take Baghdad with a frontal assault. I do believe it is possible that they could cause assassinations, bombings, breakdowns in electricity, and breakdown in law and order. In other words, this place where we sacrificed roughly 4,450 American lives is now in the hands of the largest terrorist organization in history. I say to the President of the United States: We can't wait. If the next 2 weeks that the administration says they are going to use to assess this situation is wasted in assessment, I don't know what is going to happen in Iraq. I don't know what is going to happen to Jordan. I don't know what is going to happen as far as the continued increasing influence of the Iranians. Published reports today indicate there are Iranian forces, Iranian assistance all through Iran. An article from the New York Times, ``Iran Secretly Sending Drones and Supplies into Iraq, U.S. Officials Say,'' states: Gen. Qassim Suleimani, the head of Iran's paramilitary Quds Force, has visited Iraq at least twice to help Iraqi military advisers plot strategy. And Iran has deployed about a dozen other Quds Force officers to advise Iraqi commanders, and help mobilize more than 2,000 Shiite militiamen from southern Iraq, American officials said. Iranian transport planes have also been making two daily flights of military equipment and supplies to Baghdad--70 tons per flight--for Iraqi security forces. While the United States is assessing, Iranians are exercising more and more influence. I have also been told--and I cannot verify it--that the Russians are now offering to provide assistance to Maliki. There has to be a transition government. There has to be a transition of Maliki out of government, but to wait until that happens, it may be too late. I would ask my colleague from South Carolina, are you concerned about the Iranian influence and what do you believe is the situation that could evolve on the Jordanian border?

Mr. McCAIN. I wish to emphasize with my colleague from South Carolina, continuously we hear from the President of the United States that those of us who are in strong disagreement with his strategy-- well, there is none. The fact is there is no strategy. We keep being accused of wanting to send ``thousands of troops'' on the ground in Syria or in Iraq. That is patently false. I know of no one who shares our concern who wants to send ground combat troops into Iraq. So I wish the President of the United States would stop saying that. Second of all, what we do want is we want some people who can be forward air controllers, some of our special forces people, to direct these air strikes against what is movement of these hundreds of vehicles in convoy across open desert. It can be done. The next thing I wish to emphasize is how dangerous it is becoming, particularly at the most holy Shiite shrines of Samarra and Karbala. Those two are the holiest shrines of the Shia. If ISIS comes into those holy sites and destroys them, we are going to see this thing explode even more. There are many other things I would like to say, but I don't want to continue too much longer on this, but to point out again, this is not just an Iraq problem. This is the border which runs along between Syria and Iraq. We cannot address just the Iraqi side. Lately, interestingly, Bashar Assad has been using his air power to attack ISIS. If the United States does not become involved, then people such as Bashar al-Assad, people such as the Iranians will fill that vacuum. It is time for us to act. What do I mean by that? First of all, why don't we send Ryan Crocker and David Petraeus back to Baghdad. They are the smartest people I have ever known, and everybody agrees with that: Send them back to Baghdad and sit down with Maliki. Also, send some military planning teams that can assess the situation and address the needs of the Iraqi military, those that can still function effectively. Go ahead and orchestrate the air strikes, and understand that the problem in Syria is going to have to be addressed as well. So there are concrete steps that every military leader I know advocates as a way of turning this around. There is no good option. Because of the situation we are in, there is no good option. But the worst option is what the administration is doing today, which is nothing, except sending a few advisers over to give some assessment of the situation. No one wants to get back into any conflict. No American wants to do that. I am the last one who wants to do that. But we have to understand what our Director of National Intelligence has told us, what our Secretary of Homeland Security has told us, what our common sense and eyes will tell us: If you have a terrorist organization that has hundreds of millions of dollars, that has control of an area the size of the State of Indiana where they are consolidating power and they have promised they will attack us--the United States can't afford another 9/11. We can't afford to see these jihadists pouring out of Syria and Iraq into Europe and into the United States of America, because these extremists have flowed in from all of these countries. The President of the United States can make the American people aware of this threat, and that we have to take action, without sending ground combat troops into the conflict. And I am confident--because the memory of 9/11 has not faded in the memory of the people of this country. We remember that tragedy graphically. All of us remember where we were that day. But this is a clear and present danger, and it is long time overdue for the United States to react as the strongest and most powerful Nation in the world. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the article from the Atlantic by Peter Beinart entitled ``Obama's Disastrous Iraq Policy: An Autopsy.'' I further ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record an op- ed by Dennis Ross, one of the most respected individuals on the entire Middle East, entitled ``Op-ed: To contain ISIS, think Iraq--but also think Syria.''

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I appreciate my dear friend Senator Coons' patience. At this time I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. I ask unanimous consent to address the Senate as in morning business, and I appreciate the wonderful courtesy of my friend Senator Carl Levin.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, next week I look forward to traveling to India, where I look forward to meeting with Prime Minister Modi, his national security team, and other Indian leaders. I am excited to be returning to New Delhi, and I am so hopeful about what the Prime Minister's election could mean for the revitalization of India's economy, its rising power, and for the renewal of the U.S.-India strategic partnership. National elections in India are always a remarkable affair. Over several weeks hundreds of millions of people peacefully elect their leaders--the largest exercise of democracy on the planet. But even by Indian standards, the recent election that brought to power Prime Minister Modi and his party, the BJP, was a landmark event. It was the first time in 30 years that one Indian political party won enough seats to govern without forming a coalition with another party. This gives the Prime Minister a historic mandate for change, which Indians clearly crave. I want Prime Minister Modi to succeed because I want India to succeed. It is no secret that the past few years have been challenging ones for India--political gridlock, a flagging economy, financial difficulties, and more. It is not my place or that of any other American to tell India how to realize its full potential. That is for the Indians to decide. Our concern is simply that India does realize its full potential, for the United States has a stake in India's success. Indeed, a strong, confident, and future-oriented India is indispensable for a vibrant U.S.-India strategic partnership. It is also no secret that India and the United States have not been reaching our full potential as strategic partners over the past few years, and there is plenty of blame to be shared on both sides for that. Too often recently we have slipped back into a transactional relationship, one defined more by competitive concession seeking than by achieving shared strategic goals. We need to lift our sights again. To help us do so, I think we need to remind ourselves why the United States and India embarked on this partnership in the first place. It was never simply about the personalities involved, although the personal commitment of leaders in both countries has been indispensable at every turn. No, the real reason India and the United States have resolved to develop the strategic partnership is because each country has determined independently that doing so is in its national interests. It is because we have been guided by our national interests that the progress of our partnership has consistently enjoyed bipartisan support in the United States and in India. This endeavor began with closer cooperation between a Democratic administration in Washington and a BJP-led government in New Delhi. It deepened dramatically during the last decade under a Republican and a Congress-led government. It reached historic heights with the conclusion of our civil nuclear agreement--thanks to the bold leadership of President Bush and Prime Minister Singh. This foundation of shared national interests has sustained our partnership under President Obama, and it is the common ground on which we can build for the future as a new prime minister takes office in New Delhi. When it comes to the national interests of the United States, the logic of a strategic partnership with India is powerful. India will soon become the world's most populous nation. It has a young, increasingly skilled workforce that can lead India to become one of the world's largest economies. It is a nuclear power and possesses the world's second largest military, which is becoming even more capable and technologically sophisticated. It shares strategic interests with us on issues as diverse and vital as defeating terrorism and extremism, strengthening a rules-based international order in Asia, securing global energy supplies, and sustaining global economic growth. India and the United States not only share common interests, we also share common values, the values of human rights, individual liberty, and democratic limits on state power, but also the values of our societies--creativity and critical thinking, risk-taking and entrepreneurialism and social mobility--values that continue to deepen the interdependence of our peoples across every field of human endeavor. It is because of these shared values we are confident that India's continued rise as a democratic great power--whether tomorrow or 25 years from now--will be peaceful and thus can advance critical U.S. national interests. That is why, contrary to the old dictates of realpolitik, we seek not to limit India's rise but to bolster and catalyze it--economically, geopolitically, and, yes, militarily. It is my hope that Prime Minister Modi and his government will recognize how a deeper strategic partnership with the United States serves India's national interests, especially in light of current economic and geopolitical challenges. For example, a top priority for India is the modernization of its armed forces. This is an area where U.S. defense capabilities, technologies, and cooperation--especially between our defense industries--can benefit India enormously. Similarly, greater bilateral trade and investment can be a key driver of economic growth in India, which seems to be what Indian citizens want most from their new government. Likewise, as India seeks to further its ``Look East'' policy and deepen its relationships with major like-minded powers in Asia--especially Japan, but also Australia, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam. Those countries are often U.S. allies and partners as well, and our collective ability to work in concert can only magnify India's influence and advance its interests. Put simply, I see three strategic interests that India and the United States clearly share, and these should be the priorities of a reinvigorated partnership: First, to shape the development of South Asia as a region of sovereign democratic states that contribute to one another's security and prosperity; second, to create a preponderance of power in the Asia- Pacific region that favors free societies, free markets, free trade, and free comments; and, finally, to strengthen a liberal international order and an open global economy that safeguards human dignity and fosters peaceful development. As we seek to take our strategic partnership with India to the next level, it is important for U.S. leaders to reach out personally to Prime Minister Modi, especially in light of recent history. That is largely why I am traveling to India next week, and that is why I am pleased President Obama invited the Prime Minister to visit Washington. I wish he had extended that invitation sooner, but it is positive nonetheless. When the Prime Minister comes to Washington, I urge our congressional leaders to invite him to address a joint session of Congress. I can imagine no more compelling scene than the elected leader of the world's largest democracy addressing the elected representatives of the world's oldest democracy. Yet we must be clear-eyed about those issues that could weaken our strategic partnership. One is Afghanistan. Before it was a safe haven for the terrorists who attacked America on September 11, 2001, Afghanistan was a base of terrorists that targeted India. Our Indian friends remember this well, even if we do not. For this reason I am deeply concerned about the consequences of the President's plan to pull all of our troops out of Afghanistan by 2016, not only for U.S. national security but also for the national security of our friends in India. If Afghanistan goes the way of Iraq in the absence of U.S. forces, it would leave India with a clear and present danger on its periphery. It would constrain India's rise and its ability to devote resources and attention to shared foreign policy challenges elsewhere in Asia and beyond. It could push India toward deeper cooperation with Russia and Iran in order to manage the threats posed by a deteriorating Afghanistan. And it would erode India's perception of the credibility and capability of U.S. power and America's reliability as a strategic partner. The bottom line here is clear: India and the United States have a shared interest in working together to end the scourge of extremism and terrorism that threatens stability, freedom, and prosperity across South Asia and beyond. The President's current plan to disengage from Afghanistan is a step backward from this goal, and thus does not serve the U.S.-India strategic partnership. For all of these reasons and more, I hope the President will be open to reevaluating and revising his withdrawal plan in light of conditions on the ground. Another hurdle on which our partnership could stumble is our resolve to see it through amid domestic political concerns and short-term priorities that threaten to push our nations apart. For most of the last century, the logic of a U.S.-India partnership was compelling, but its achievements eluded us. We have finally begun to explore the real potential of this partnership over the past two decades, but we have barely scratched the surface, and the gains we have made remain fragile and reversible, as our largely stalled progress over the past few years can attest. If India and the United States are to build a truly strategic partnership, we must each commit to it and defend it in equal measure. We must each build the public support needed to sustain our strategic priorities, and we must resist the domestic forces in each of our countries that would turn our strategic relationship into a transactional one--one defined not by the shared strategic goals we achieved together but by what parochial concessions we extract from one another. If we fail in these challenges, we will fall far short of our potential, as we have before. It is this simple: If the 21st century is defined more by peace than war, more by prosperity than misery, and more by freedom than tyranny, I believe future historians will look back and point to the fact that a strategic partnership was consummated between the world's two preeminent democratic powers: India and the United States. If we keep this vision of our relationship always uppermost in our minds, there is no dispute we cannot resolve, no investment in each other's success we cannot make, and nothing we cannot accomplish together. I thank my beloved friend from Michigan for allowing me to speak, and I yield the floor.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Republicans be allowed an additional 15 minutes.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Presiding Officer.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, today we see reports that now ISIS has taken over the major oil refinery in Baiji, Iraq. Names that we used to hear quite often, such as, Tal Afar, Mosul, Fallujah, Ramadi--all of these areas are now under the black flag of Al Qaeda and ISIS, which is an even worse organization than Al Qaeda, if that can be believed. We now see the forces of ISIS marching on Baghdad itself, which I don't believe they can take. But the second largest city in Iraq-- Mosul--is now under the black flag, and quantities of military capability and equipment have clearly fallen into the hands of what has now become the richest, largest base for terrorism in history. This has all come about in the last couple of weeks. What has the United States of America done? Today we see on the front page of the Washington Post: ``U.S. Sees Risk in Iraqi Airstrikes.'' The President of the United States goes for fundraising and golfing and now is fiddling while Iraq burns. We need to act, but we also need to understand why we are where we are today. The Senator from South Carolina and I visited Iraq on many occasions--more than I can count. We know for a fact that if we would have left a residual force behind, this situation would not be where it is today. The fact is that the President of the United States, if he wanted to leave a residual force, never made that clear to the American people. In fact, on October 22, 2012, the President said: ``What I would not have had done was left 10,000 troops in Iraq that would tie us down.'' In 2011 he celebrated the departure--as he described it--of the last combat soldier from Iraq. The fact is that because of our fecklessness and the fact that we did not leave that residual force behind, we are paying the price, and the people of Iraq are paying a heavier price. What do we need to do? First of all, we have to understand there are no good options remaining. This is a culmination of failure after failure of this administration. But for us to do nothing now will ensure this base for terrorism. We have tracked over 100 who have already come back to the United States of America. There are hundreds who are leaving--not only the battlefield in Syria and Iraq--and they will pose a direct threat to the security of the United States. I say to the critics who say ``Do nothing and let them fight it out,'' you cannot confine this conflict to Iraq and Syria. The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security have said these people will be planning attacks on the United States of America. What do we need to do? Of course, Maliki has to be transitioned out, but the only way that is going to happen is for us to assure Iraqis that we will be there to assist. Let me make it clear that no one I know wants to send combat troops on the ground. But airstrikes are an important factor psychologically and in many other ways, and that may require some forward air controllers and some special forces. We cannot afford to allow a Syria-Iraq enclave that will pose a direct threat to the United States of America. And if we act, we are going to have to act in Syria as well. A residual force of U.S. troops in Iraq could have checked Iranian influence in Iraq. The other question is, What are the Iranians doing while we are not making any decisions? Well, probably the most evil man on Earth, the head of the Quds Force--an Iraqi terrorist organization--has been reported to have been in Baghdad. There are reports of Iranian forces moving into Baghdad. I say to my colleagues that we must meet this threat. The President of the United States must make some decisions. I am convinced that the national security of the United States of America is at risk, and the sooner all of us realize it, the better off we will be. I yield to my colleague from South Carolina.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, earlier this week I came to the floor to discuss ethics in defense procurement contracting, specifically relating to the Joint Strike Fighter. I ask unanimous consent that an article on this topic from Inside Defense be printed in the Record.

Mr. McCAIN

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to address the Senate as if in morning business, and I wish to enter into a colloquy with the Senator from South Carolina when he arrives.

Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I come to the floor this morning with my colleague, the Senator from South Carolina, to put to rest once and for all the claim we hear so often today: President Obama wanted to leave a residual force of U.S. troops in Iraq after 2011. He tried his hardest to do so, but Iraqi leaders prevented that from happening because they demanded that Iraq's parliament approve legislation to grant privileges and immunities for U.S. troops that would remain in the country. This is a very important item and aspect of the debate that is now going on, and it is a claim that was made in growing desperation these days as it becomes increasingly clear for all to see that the President's mishandling of Iraq for the past 5 years and his consistent inaction on Syria has now brought us to the verge of disaster. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria--a more ambitious, more violent, and more radical offshoot of Al Qaeda--has now taken over a swath of territory in Iraq and Syria that is the size of the State of Indiana. It is the largest terrorist safe haven in history. The ISIS's offensive is now reigniting sectarian conflict in Iraq and threatening to erase the gains that nearly 4,500 brave young Americans gave their lives to secure and was largely secured when the President took office in January in 2009. In January 2009 the surge had succeeded. Iraq was not violent. The surge had succeeded. We had won the war. In the words of General Keane: We won the war and lost the peace. And that is a fact. The administration and its defenders are now scrambling to pin the blame for this catastrophic failure on anyone but themselves. They are trying to blame the Bush administration, and they are trying to blame people like myself and the Senator from South Carolina for voting to authorize the war while conveniently forgetting that Vice President Biden, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, his predecessor, Secretary Clinton, and many other Democrats still serving in this body voted for the war in Iraq as well. They also seem to have forgotten that the Senator from South Carolina and I began criticizing the Bush administration as early as 2003 for their mishandling of the war and calling for a change in strategy. In fact, in 2006 I called for the firing of the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld, because of the mishandling of the war. Indeed, the very strategy that was finally adopted with enormous success was thanks to a great leader named General David Petraeus and a great ambassador by the name of Ryan Crocker. Most of all, the administration and its defenders are trying to blame the failures of Iraq on Iraq's leaders. To be sure, the lion's share of the blame for Iraq's current problems lies squarely with Prime Minister Maliki and other Iraqi leaders. But the administration cannot escape its own responsibility for the current disaster. This is something that the Senator from South Carolina and I saw firsthand, and we stated that over and over. In order to set this debate to rest once and for all, we would like to review the record. We predicted that when all the troops were withdrawn there would be the events that are taking place today--not as rapidly, but we predicted that Iraq would fall into chaos if we withdrew all the troops and did not leave a residual force behind as we have in South Korea, Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and other countries after the conflict had ended. From its first day in office, the Obama administration signaled a hands-off approach to Iraq. It immediately pushed for a faster drawdown of U.S. forces than our commanders recommended. It appointed an ambassador to Iraq, Christopher Hill, who had no experience working on Iraq or serving anywhere in the Arab world. I think he is a fine man, but he had no experience. It adopted a hands-off approach of shaping Iraqi politics, which was demonstrated most vividly as it refused for months and months to take a hands-on approach with Iraqi leaders and help them broker the necessary compromises about the country's future in the aftermath of the 2010 elections in Iraq. Nowhere was the Obama administration's failure more pronounced than during the debate over whether to maintain a limited number of U.S. troops in Iraq beyond the 2011 expiration of the 2008 Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA. The administration is quick to lay blame on others for the fact that they tried and failed to keep a limited presence of troops in Iraq. They blamed the Bush administration, of course, for mandating the withdrawal in the 2008 SOFA. This does not ring true, however, because as former Secretary of State Condolezza Rice has made clear, the plan all along was to renegotiate the agreement to allow for a continued presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. ``Everybody believed,'' she said in 2011, ``it would be better if there was some kind of residual force.'' Most of all, the Obama administration blames Iraqis for failing to grant the necessary privileges and immunities for a U.S. force presence beyond 2011. This too is totally misleading because as we saw firsthand--Senator Graham and I traveled to Baghdad and Erbil. We met with Allawi and Maliki, and we met with Barzani. We met with all of the leaders of the main political blocs, and we heard a common message during all of these conversations: Iraqi leaders recognized that it was in their country's interest to maintain a limited number of U.S. troops to continue training and assisting Iraqi security forces beyond 2011. But when we asked Ambassador Jim Jeffrey and the commander of U.S. Forces in Iraq Lloyd Austin--in direct response to a question in a meeting with Maliki--what tasks U.S. troops remaining in Iraq would perform and what their missions were, the answer was they had still not made a decision. In Erbil, Barzani said he would fly to Baghdad. Allawi, the actual winner of the election, said that he would agree, and then after that, Prime Minister Maliki announced that if his partners agreed, which they did, he would agree to a residual force in Iraq. Those are just facts. Just days after the Senator from South Carolina and I left Baghdad, Prime Minister Maliki, as I said, signaled his willingness--and it is a matter of public record--to a residual presence of U.S. troops if 70 percent of Iraqis agreed. The Kurds agreed, the Sunnis agreed, and Maliki himself signaled his support. Had the United States and our Iraq partners used our influence then and there, we could have lined up the remaining Shia support to enable Maliki to make this difficult decision. Unfortunately, that did not happen. Instead, months and months passed and the administration made no decision on what missions and troop levels it would be willing to maintain in Iraq. By August 2011 the leaders of Iraq's main political blocs joined together and stated that they were prepared to enter negotiations to keep some U.S. troops in Iraq. Another entire month passed and still the White House made no decision. During this long internal deliberation, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey later testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the size of a potential U.S. force presence kept ``cascading'' down from upwards of 16,000 to an eventual low of less than 3,000. By that point, the force would be able to do little more than protect itself, and Prime Minister Maliki, and other Iraq leaders, realized that the political cost of accepting this proposal was not worth the benefit. To blame this failure entirely on the Iraqis is convenient, but it misses the real point. The reason to keep about 10,000 to 15,000 U.S. forces in Iraq was not for the sake of Iraq alone. It was first and foremost in our national security interest to continue training and advising Iraqi forces and to maintain greater U.S. influence in Iraq. That core principle should have driven a very different U.S. approach to the SOFA diplomacy. The Obama administration should have recognized that after years of brutal conflict, Iraqi leaders still lacked trust in one another, and a strong U.S. role was required to help Iraqis broker their most politically sensitive decisions. For this reason the administration should have determined what tasks and troop numbers were in the national interest to maintain in Iraq and done so with ample time to engage with Iraqis at the highest level of the U.S. Government to shape political conditions in Baghdad to achieve our goal. I focus on this failure not because U.S. troops would have been engaging in unilateral large-scale combat operations to this day. In fact, they had won the conflict, and there was literally no further combat that the United States was engaged in. By 2011 U.S. forces were no longer in Iraqi cities or engaged in security operations. However, a residual U.S. troop presence could have assisted Iraqi forces in their continued fight against Al Qaeda. They could have provided a platform for greater diplomatic engagement and intelligence cooperation with our Iraqi partners. It could have made Iranian leaders think twice about using Iraqi airspace to transit military assistance to Assad and his forces in Syria. And most importantly, it could have maintained the significant diplomatic influence that the United States still possessed in Iraq--influence that had been and still was essential in guaranteeing Iraq's nascent political system, reassuring Iraqi leaders that they could resolve their differences peacefully and politically despite their mistrust of one another and checking the authoritarian and sectarian tendencies of Prime Minister Maliki. There is a need for immediate action. Every day that goes by, there is greater sectarian violence, and there is greater success by ISIS. I do not believe they can take Baghdad. But look at the places they have already taken. By the way, they are now threatening the major oil refinery in Iraq. I can assure you that will affect the world price of oil. There is a need because there is more polarization of Iraq, there is a return of the Iraqi Shia militias, there is wholesale killing and slaughter going on, and it will get worse every single day. Is there any good option now in Iraq? No, there is no good option. The worst option is to do nothing, and apparently, according to the Wall Street Journal this morning, that is basically the approach that has been taken. We need to recognize that taking military action now is difficult because our intelligence has been so severely degraded since 2011 because ISIS is becoming so integrated with the Sunni tribes. We need to be careful about striking targets, even convoys in the open. There is a real risk of killing Sunni tribal elements and pushing the tribes closer to ISIS. We also have to recognize that political change in Baghdad has to take place. But the question is: Do we wait for political change? Every day we wait there is more and more Iranian influence. The chief--one of the most evil people in the world--of the Iranian Quds Force has been in Baghdad planning with Maliki. So what does Maliki do when he doesn't see us giving him any real assistance? He turns to the Iranians. There are published reports of Iranian combat troops now coming into Iraq as more and more of the radical ISIS people are flowing from Syria into Iraq. As I said, I admit that I was surprised at the rapidity of the success of the ISIS. But I also believe that the longer we wait to carry out some airstrikes--as difficult as it is--that we can identify with the few people we have on the ground--it sends a signal psychologically over these people who are traveling long distances in the desert--the ISIS--of an American aircraft flying overhead and perhaps taking some of them out if we have sufficient information. That is a psychological effect on any enemy. Air power alone does not win conflicts, but air power can have a significant effect on the morale of your people, on your capability, and of at least inflicting some damage and changing the enemy's plans. Obviously, political reconciliation is the key, and we must do everything in our power to make sure that Maliki appoints a government of reconciliation. But it can't be the prerequisite for U.S. military action because the events and time are not on our side. We also have to recognize this is not an Iraqi conflict. This is an Iraqi-Syrian conflict now. The most, the largest, and the richest center of terrorism in the history of the world is now in the Iraq- Syria area. They have hundreds of millions of dollars from the banks in Mosul, and, obviously, they acquired a whole lot of equipment during their incredible progress across Iraq. I urge my colleagues to have a look at the maps of Iraq and Syria and look at the places that are now controlled by ISIS. As I say, I don't believe they can roll into Baghdad in their vehicles with their guns mounted on them, but they sure as heck can cause a lot of problems: bombings, assassinations, the radicalization of these Shiite militias. If one of these Shiite shrines is damaged by ISIS or by Sunni militants, we are going to see a very bigger explosion which will bring us back to the days of 2003, '4, '5, and '6, before the Anbar awakening. The same Sunnis who were part of the Anbar awakening that joined us in putting down Al Qaeda are now being polarized by Maliki. The Shiites, as well as the chickens, are coming home to roost as far as Maliki is concerned because of the continued marginalization and persecution of Sunnis all over Iraq, much less in Anbar Province. So we have to act. We have to act. We must act. I know there are always people who will tell our leaders reasons why we can't, but I know of no military expert who believes that doing nothing is a recipe for anything but further chaos and eventually threats to the United States of America. Our Secretary of Homeland Security has stated it and our Director of National Intelligence has stated it: that people in this part of Iraq and Syria will be planning attacks on the United States of America. That is their view. It also is mine. But we can do some effective air strikes. We can. And it is more difficult because of our degraded intelligence. By the way, when we left Iraq, all of those intelligence capabilities were shut down. To make them more effective and mitigate the risks that could push Sunnis deeper into the arms of ISIS, they have to be accompanied, as I mentioned, with a limited presence of special forces on the ground. These forces could gather intelligence to improve our targeting by ISIS control, air strikes from the ground, and provide advice to Sunni tribes. I believe several other steps could be taken. No. 1, who are the most respected people in Iraq today? Probably David Petraeus and Ryan Crocker. Send them back. Send them back, those who worked so closely with the Sunnis such as General MacFarland--then Colonel MacFarland-- the people who built up these long relationships with the Sunnis. Send them back. Maliki will listen to David Petraeus and Ryan Crocker. Send them back. Send back a planning team, a group of smart people who can work with what is left of the Iraqi military leadership and identify tactics and a strategy that can reverse this tide of the ISIS which is about to engulf them. Send some air power. Send some air power with targets we can identify. I am fully aware of the risks associated with it. I wish to repeat over and over and over: There are no good options. Also, we need to make it very clear to Maliki that his time is up; that he must arrange for a transition. The Shia won the election, a majority of the votes--not a majority of any of the parties but an overall majority of the vote. This new government could be headed by a Shia, but it has to be a Shia who can reach out to the Sunni and bring them together in a government of national reconciliation. All of my colleagues have seen the pictures of the young Shia who are now joining up and are ready to die--the movement from Basra of the Shia militia organizations which had been put down before that are now rising from the ashes. We have seen the horrible pictures of the executions that are taking place and the incredible displacement-- 500,000 people from Mosul alone. The Kurds have now taken Kirkuk. That is an ambition they have had for the last 50 years. We will see now a drive for total Kurdish autonomy from the government in Baghdad, and they will be making their own deals as far as oil is concerned, and the Kurds will now be pursuing their centuries-old ambition for a Kurdish state, which will cause the Turks to be very concerned. I also wish to point out that if ISIS continues to succeed and they move back and forth to Syria, they will now pose a direct threat, first of all, to Jordan, and then to other gulf states, and finally, eventually, Saudi Arabia, but those right next to Iraq will be most under threat. So I urge the President and I urge my colleagues to understand the gravity and the seriousness of this situation; to understand that if ISIS succeeds, even without taking Baghdad, and they are able to establish what they call a caliphate in the Syria-Iraq area--larger than the State of Indiana--and are able to train, equip, and export terror not only throughout the region but throughout the world, it will pose a direct threat to the security of this Nation.

Mr. McCAIN. I wish to thank the Senator from South Carolina for showing up.

Mr. McCAIN. I know of no military expert who believes that without the use of U.S. air power they will be able to at anytime soon regain the lost territory, which is a sizable part of Iraq.

Mr. McCAIN. No, I did not, but I did hear him say on December 14, 2011: ``We are leaving behind a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq with a representative government that was elected by its people,'' and other quotes throughout the campaign.

Mr. McCAIN. I totally agree.

Mr. McCAIN. I would also like to point out what the Senator from South Carolina knows and I know: The air power has a psychological effect. When an aircraft flies over the enemy, they are going to do things differently if they fear they are going to be hit from the air, as we all know. Air power does not determine the outcome of conflicts, but it sure is important in the battlefield equation.