Bob Menendez

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 638 and ask that it be reported by number.

Mr. MENENDEZ. If we were talking about poker chips, I would be all in with Senator Kennedy. But what we are talking about is the ability to prevent a crisis in the world. That is something we can use. That is why the Senator's amendment needs to fail. Vote on Amendment No. 1034

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, that only means I got there before you. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to Senator Kennedy's amendment. I have a great deal of respect for my colleague. No one--no one--in this Chamber has taken a harder line against the Iranian regime than I have. No one. But in this case, a well-intended motion can produce very bad consequences. So let me speak to why I oppose the Senator's amendment. These special drawing rights--I always love how my colleague from Louisiana can bring it to an earthy tone. We have poker chips we are throwing around, but these aren't quite poker chips; they are a critical liquidity tool to support lower income countries in response to global financial youcrises. It is in our interest to do so, to create stability. They assist in creating economic stability. They are an absolutely essential part of U.S. foreign policy tools, especially as we are dealing with the China challenge. We want to help these countries instead of China helping them. The Biden administration supported a new round of special drawing rights allocations at the IMF. This funding played an essential role in helping countries address the COVID-19 pandemic and the related economic fallout of the pandemic, which we are still hearing about from many of these countries. Without this funding, many of these countries would have fallen to economic crisis, which means political instability, which means chaos, which means refugees coming to the shores of many countries. The International Monetary Fund's rules dictate that a new general issuance of special drawing rights must go to all members. That means a requirement to prohibit SDRs for one country would prohibit SDRs for all countries. As a consequence, Senator Kennedy's amendment would effectively kill the possibility of issuing SDRs to any country ever again. Now, Senator Kennedy offered the same exact amendment with the Endless Frontier Act on the floor in May of 2021. That amendment failed by a significant vote. Of course we oppose those state sponsors of terrorism. Of course, we oppose those who would be responsible for genocide. But I would note that most of our adversaries the Senator wants to pursue--which I would agree if we could do it antiseptically, but we can't--already face obstacles to drawing special drawing rights because of the sanctions that we have against them. So due to the harmful impact this amendment would have on the Treasury Department's ability to respond to deficit in the global supply of reserves on a global crisis, I would vote no and I would recommend my colleagues do so, as well. I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I ask that there be unanimous consent for 3 minutes, equally divided.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise in opposition. Senator Paul's amendment is entirely unnecessary, but worse than that, it is dangerous. There is no question that, like any other treaty, the NATO treaty does not supersede the Constitution. However, specifically calling out article 5 of the North Atlantic treaty here erroneously implies that there is a tension between it and the Constitution. This sends a damaging message about the U.S. commitment to the alliance at a time when support for NATO is as critical as ever given Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Further, by only referencing the NATO treaty, Senator Paul's amendment erroneously implies that other treaties may supersede the Constitution--a proposition that no Senator would accept. Because Senator Paul's amendment is both unnecessary and harmful at a critical time of our engagement in Ukraine, I urge all Senators to vote against it. I reserve the balance of the time.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, for the Committee on Foreign Relations I report favorably the following nomination lists which were printed in the Records on the dates indicated, and ask unanimous consent, to save the expense of reprinting on the Executive Calendar that these nominations lie at the Secretary's desk for the information of Senators.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I rise to call upon the administration to take urgent action, as we did in 2012-2013, to pressure Rwanda to end its support for United Nations sanctioned M23 rebels and stop destabilizing eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC, and to stress the need for DRC to hold credible, on-time elections in December 2023. According to the final report by the U.N. Group of Experts for the DRC, Rwandan support for the M23 extends from the highest levels in Kigali, including the Minister of Defense, an alarming allegation. Rwandan troops now are fighting alongside the M23 inside DRC, and the Rwandan Government is providing the M23 with weapons, uniforms, and equipment. M23 has killed hundreds of Congolese civilians over the past year, including the November 29 massacre of more than 170 men, women, and children in the village of Kishishe. With Rwandan support, M23 downed a U.N. helicopter, killing U.N. peacekeepers, recruited child soldiers, and displaced more than 1 million Congolese in eastern DRC. Incidents of sexual violence targeting internally displaced persons are also skyrocketing. On June 13, Human Rights Watch reported that, ``Rwanda-backed M23 rebels in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo have committed unlawful killings, rape, and other apparent war crimes since late 2022.'' There is overwhelming evidence of Rwandan support for M23, and M23 has repeatedly failed to adhere to ceasefire agreements brokered by the East African Community. Despite this, the United States, the United Nations, and other members of the international community have been slow to respond. The last time Rwandan President Paul Kagame supported M23 rebels in eastern DRC, in 2012, the United States suspended Foreign Military Financing--FMF--for Rwanda, a decision that prompted several European donors to also suspend or redirect assistance away from Rwanda. The U.S. also imposed additional security assistance restrictions under the Child Soldiers Prevention Act, CSPA. President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Sherman, and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Carson all engaged directly with the leaders of DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda to end the conflict and pressure Kagame to cease his support for M23. Our response to the current M23 crisis has been, by comparison, woefully inadequate. Although Secretary of State Blinken travelled to the region in August 2022 to discuss the instability in eastern DRC, the United States did not publicly call on President Kagame to end Rwanda's support for M23 until October 2022, months after the first U.N. Group of Experts report documented Rwanda's actions. We have not imposed any new sanctions on M23 leaders or Rwandan officials implicated in gross violations of human rights in eastern DRC, nor have we completely cut security assistance and military-to-military engagement to Rwanda. In fact, as recently as May of this year, Rwanda participated in the African Land Forces Summit sponsored by the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. In February 2023, the United States invited members of the Rwandan Defense Force to participate in a multinational exercise in Kenya called Justified Accord, where the U.S. reportedly provided Rwanda cyber capability training. The decision to provide cyber-related training to Rwanda is particularly difficult to comprehend in light of 2021 reports by Freedom House and Amnesty International. According to the Amnesty report, ``Rwanda used NSO Group's spyware to potentially target more than 3,500 activists, journalists and politicians.'' The Freedom House report states that ``Rwandans abroad experience digital threats, spyware attacks, family intimidation and harassment, mobility controls, physical intimidation, assault, detention, rendition, and assassination.'' The United States cannot continue to support Rwandan efforts to serve as peacekeepers in some parts of Africa while the very same Rwandan military is fomenting violence and instability next door in DRC. In addition to disrupting the lives of more than 1 million people in eastern DRC, Rwanda's support for M23 is also undermining efforts to prepare for elections. The last elections were so poorly managed that the United States sanctioned the leadership of the National Independent Electoral Commission--CENI--a precedent that should serve as a warning to future electoral commissions across Africa. While CENI is under new leadership, procurement and management of the voter registry seem as opaque now as they were before. This is a problem. It is important for CENI to be transparent about its spending and its management of the voter registry. Contrary to its actions in 2018, the DRC should welcome international election observers and do everything it can to help, not hinder, domestic election observers. Even if all of those shortcomings are addressed, violence in the east may disenfranchise voters by preventing them from registering to vote or casting a ballot on election day. Credible and timely elections are crucial to the future stability of the DRC and in the interest of the United States, the region, and the international community. The U.S. and its partners must increase pressure on Rwanda to end its destabilization campaign and must encourage the CENI and the Congolese Government to do all they can to hold timely, credible elections in December 2023. Although the situation is dire, it is not hopeless. There are steps that the United States can take. First, the State Department must complete a review of its Rwanda policy, which it committed to undertake in response to a letter I sent last July. As I also requested in July, the Department should continue suspending security assistance until Rwanda ceases support for the M23. This suspension should apply to security cooperation and exchanges with Rwanda at all levels. The U.S. should impose sanctions on Rwandan Government officials implicated-- either directly or indirectly--in human rights violations or corruption, to include the theft of minerals or other resources from eastern DRC. And there are steps the Congolese must take. I encourage President Tshisekedi and DRC officials to do more to combat corruption in their country, particularly within the judiciary and the armed forces, and to lift the ``state of siege'' in eastern DRC. It is clear that conditions for civil society have improved under President Tshisekedi, but much more should be done to ensure that Congolese are able to criticize their government freely, particularly in eastern DRC. I am troubled by multiple reports that journalists have been arrested, including by national intelligence agency operatives, for reporting on what is happening in the east. There have also been disturbing reports that the DRC Government or individual DRC military officers are enlisting the support of rebel groups or militias to help combat M23. If these reports are true, it is incumbent upon President Tshisekedi to put an end to such efforts. Finally, I urge CENI and President Tshisekedi to ensure that international organizations are able to obtain accreditation and visas in a timely manner, so that they are able to support domestic election observation efforts without impediment. The situation in eastern Congo is not going to fix itself. It requires a collective effort--from us, from our partners, from the U.N., and from the Congolese. I urge us all to act.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I love your booming voice. I just want to come to the floor very quickly. I look forward to working with Chairman Wyden so we can forge even stronger economic ties between the United States and Taiwan. As Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Democratic cochair of the Senate-Taiwan caucus, I can tell you that such efforts are deeply important to U.S. businesses and our economic and national security. I reviewed the United States-Taiwan 21st Century Trade First Agreement Implementation Act. It reasserts important Congressional prerogatives with which I agree, and I appreciate Chairman Wyden's leadership in this regard. I want to just add this point: If we truly want to help our businesses and if we are committed to taking our economic ties with Taiwan to the next level, we have to pass the Taiwan tax agreement. Taiwan has made clear that they want a tax agreement with the United States, and U.S. businesses want a tax agreement with Taiwan, but there is a gap in the law that means there can be no agreement unless there is some new legislation. The Taiwan Tax Agreement Act eliminates this gap. It sets into motion an agreement with Taiwan that matches the substance of the commitments we have with our partners around the world, and it does so consistent with our Taiwan Relations Act. I know that Chairman Wyden has also another aspect of this, and I look forward to working together so we can come to a mutually agreeable conclusion to achieve it.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, this year marks the 20th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the United States and Chile and 20 years since Congress approved a free-trade agreement between our two countries. In April, I led a codel to Chile. I had a chance to meet with Chile's leaders and American businesses operating there. We were a bipartisan group. I went with Senator Kaine, Senator Hagerty, and Congressman Tony Cardenas. We met with tech companies. We met with insurance companies. We met with mining companies--you name it. Do you know what every single one of them said to us? Do you know what they all wanted from the U.S. Senate? To approve the Chile tax treaty. They said, if the United States doesn't ratify the treaty, they will continue to be at a huge disadvantage. The world is changing--we are undergoing an energy transition--and without this treaty, we are going to fall behind on critical minerals and manufacturing of the future. And they are right. China already has a tax treaty with Chile. If the United States wants to level the playing field for American businesses and deepen our ties with Chile, we need to act. Chile is one of our strongest democratic partners in the Americas, and the Chileans want us to ratify the treaty as well. We heard that message loud and clear when we spoke to the President and senior Members of Chile's Senate. We heard it from the Speaker of the Chilean Congress, and we heard it directly from President Gabriel Boric, a strong democratic leader who seeks closer ties with the United States. We live in a world with increased global competition and in a contest between democracy versus authoritarianism. The United States needs to be strategic about how we deepen our relationships with key democratic partners like Chile and President Boric. We must avoid unnecessary delays that undercut our competitiveness. Remember, we signed this agreement in 2010--that was 13 years ago-- and this would be only our third bilateral tax treaty in all of Latin America. China is not waiting around. So, if we want to be competitive, we need to move forward with the same determination, and the Chile tax treaty is an incredible opportunity in that regard. Chile is an important market for U.S. goods and manufacturing, including aircraft, vehicles, and machinery. Chile is a leading producer of copper, and Chile has the second largest lithium reserves in the world. This critical mineral is the building block for many modern technologies. As global demands skyrocket in the coming years--by as much as nearly 4,000 percent--this tax treaty will make it easier for U.S. businesses to be competitive in this emerging sector. U.S. businesses and their Chilean counterparts want predictability and consistency in tax treatment. As they continue to scale up operations and as the United States and Chile forge even stronger economic ties, they want to know that they won't be taxed twice on the same income in two different countries. That is why the Chile tax treaty has overwhelming support from the U.S. private sector. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has expressed its resounding support for the treaty. It has support from U.S. companies across a range of industries and sectors. And the treaty enjoys strong bipartisan support as is evidenced by the fact that it passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by a nearly unanimous vote of 20 to 1. By approving this treaty, we not only give the Senate's stamp of approval right now, but we have high hopes for where this treaty will take our two nations in the future. While we are debating this tax treaty, I do want to take a minute to speak about how we engage on treaties more broadly. Treaties are a shared constitutional responsibility of the Senate and the executive branch. Nonetheless, as we worked last year to move the Chile tax treaty through the Senate, the Biden administration withdrew from our tax treaty with Hungary without consulting with the Senate or providing advance notice, let alone having approval. It is deeply disappointing that Presidents of both parties have advanced these types of unilateral actions and omissions in the past. Let me be clear. Such actions are completely inconsistent with our constitutional structure. I have asked the President to commit, at a minimum, to meaningful consultations with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee prior to terminating any treaty. Without such a commitment, I will work to address this issue in future resolutions of advice and consent, as well as in legislation, and I will continue to work to make sure the Senate protects our constitutional prerogative on treaties. Abiding by our Constitution--standing up for our democratic values and institutions--this is what binds us with close partners like Chile. It was in 1823 that this very Senate confirmed our first diplomatic representative to Chile. This established, for the first time, official relations between our two young nations. We took that action then because our countries were determined that the rest of the world take us seriously as independent states. Our shared values and ambitions have given us 200 fruitful years of working together--in science and technological innovation, on immigration visas and academic exchanges, and, yes, on the question of critical minerals and renewable energy, which this treaty will take to new heights. This treaty will advance U.S. interests by building partnerships that will position our country, our economy, and our manufacturing sector for the future. I appreciate the ranking member of the Senate Finance Committee. We had some issues originally. We worked together, and we came to a conclusion that is satisfactory to all. I urge my colleagues to vote to advance this treaty and to ultimately vote to provide advice and consent to its ratification. With that, I yield the floor. Vote on Veto Message

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification, the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received. If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations Committee, room SD-423.