Bob Menendez

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, I yield back all time.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. MENENDEZ. I know we are shortly going to be voting on, among other issues, the nomination of Senator Max Baucus to be the next U.S. Ambassador to China. I would expect that he would have a unanimous, if not nearly unanimous, vote in the Senate. I said in the Foreign Relations Committee this week that clearly one of the biggest challenges and the biggest opportunities before U.S. foreign policy today is getting the relationship between the United States and China--in the context of our rebalance to the Asia-Pacific-- right. I can think of few more able or qualified at this important moment in history than our friend and colleague, the Senator from Montana, to help provide advice and guidance to the President and to Congress about how to get that relationship right. He is an expert on trade issues. He understands what we face in the coming years as China's economy continues to grow. He is fully aware of the facts that we have had U.S. exports to China that have increased by almost $40 billion in the past 4 years alone, creating and sustaining millions of sustaining U.S. jobs in sectors across the board-- automobiles, power generation, machinery, aircraft, and other vital industrial sectors. His trade missions to China, since he has been the chairman of the Finance Committee, have given him the perspective he needs to deal with the realities of our policy options. From the hearing he clearly understands that through the rest of the 21st century and beyond, much of the strategic, political, and economic future of the world is likely to be shaped by decisions made by Washington, Beijing, and the capitals of Asia over the next 4 to 5 years. How we get that rebalance right is incredibly important, and the Ambassador to China is incredibly important in that regard. Finally, trade is not the only issue as it relates to China. Our collective security, having China pursue a rules-based system, is incredibly important, as well as what happens in the South China Sea-- all of the issues Senator Baucus addressed in his nomination hearing with great ability, insight, and a willingness to take them on. As the very final point, human rights is an incredibly important issue as it relates to China. I want to read briefly from the transcript where he was asked about the question of human rights. He described a moment as a Senator in which he raised the issue with then- President Jiang Zemin. Senator Baucus said: He said [the President of China] I did not know what I was are talking about, basically. But then I went to Tibet, went to Lhasa and raised the same point there. And sure enough, within about 2 or 3 weeks, this person was released. . . . Protection of human rights is the bedrock. It is the underpinning of American and world society. . . . People look to America, look to America to lead on so many issues, including the protection of human rights, religious freedoms, freedom of the press, all the rights that are enumerated in the universal declaration. It is what most progress springs from. And the answer is yes, Senator [Cardin]. You have my commitment [on human rights]. I think the totality of trade, currency manipulation, security, human rights, and the answers that he gave in his hearing, clearly show manifestly that he is very capable of being the next Ambassador. I urge a unanimous vote in the Senate, and I yield the floor.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I come to the floor to speak about one of our greatest national security challenges, which is a nuclear-armed Iran. I have long thought of it as a bipartisan national security issue, not a partisan political issue. At the end of the day, it is a national security issue we must approach in the spirit of bipartisanship and unity, which has been the spirit for which we have worked together on this matter. I hope we will not find ourselves in a partisan process trying to force a vote on a national security matter before its appropriate time. Let me say at the outset that I support the administration's diplomatic efforts. I have always supported a two-track policy of diplomacy and sanctions. At the same time, I am convinced that we should only relieve pressure on Iran in exchange for verifiable concessions that will dismantle Iran's nuclear program. Our success should be measured in years, not months, and that it be done in such a way that alarm bells will sound from Vienna to Washington should Iran restart its program anytime in the next 20 to 30 years. I am here to unequivocally state my intention as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee to make absolutely certain that any deal we may reach with Iran is verifiable, effective, and prevents them from ever developing even one nuclear weapon. Let's remember that while we in the Senate are not at the negotiating table, we have a tremendous stake in the outcome and an obligation, as a separate coequal branch of government representing the American people, to provide oversight and an expression of what we expect as to what the end result would be. But it is the administration that is at the negotiating table with the Iranians, not us. The administration is ultimately responsible for negotiating a deal to conclusively end Iran's illicit nuclear program. It is the administration that will have to come back to Congress and tell us whether Iran will continue to be a nuclear threshold state. My sincere desire is for the administration to succeed. No one has worked harder for a peaceful outcome or to get Iran to comply with sanctions than I have. But based on the parameters described in the Joint Plan of Action and Iranian comments in the days that have followed, I am very concerned. This is not a ``nothing ventured, nothing gained'' enterprise. We have placed our incredibly effective international sanctions regime on the line without clearly defining the parameters of what we expect in a final agreement. Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's nuclear agency, spoke last month about the agreement on Iranian state television and said: The iceberg of sanctions is melting while our centrifuges are also still working. This is our greatest achievement. Well, it is my greatest fear. Any final deal must require Iran to dismantle large portions of its illicit nuclear program. Any final deal must require Iran to halt its advanced centrifuge and research and development activities, reduce the vast majority of its 20,000 centrifuges, close the Fordo facility, stop the heavy-water reactor at Arak from ever possibly coming online, and it should require Iran's full disclosure of its nuclear activities, including its weaponization activities. For the good of the region and the world, Iran cannot remain a nuclear weapon threshold state, period. A final agreement should move back the timeline for a nuclear breakout capability to beyond a year and insist on a long-term, 20- year-plus monitoring and verification agreement. That is the only way to force Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons aspirations. Anything else will leave Iran on the cusp of becoming a nuclear state while it rebuilds its economy and improves its ability to break out at a future day. David Albright, a respected former International Atomic Energy Agency inspector, said that for Iran to move from an interim to a final agreement, it would have to close the Fordo facility and remove between 15,000 and 16,000 of its 20,000 centrifuges. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had a long list of elements that he thinks are critical toward a final agreement. However, even after such dramatic steps, we are looking at a breakout time of between 6 and 8 months--depending on whether Iran has access to just 3.5 percent enriched uranium or access to 20 percent enriched uranium. Dennis Ross, one of America's preeminent diplomats and foreign policy analysts who has served Republican and Democratic Presidents alike, has said Iran should retain no more than 10 percent of its centrifuges, which is, in essence, no more than 2,000. These estimates are crucial because at the end of the day we in this body will have to decide whether this is enough to merit terminating sanctions. Is a 6-month delay in Iran's breakout ability enough, even when combined with a robust 20-year inspection and verification regime--understanding that in allowing Iran to retain its enrichment capabilities, there will always be a risk of breakout. It may be that this is the only deal we can get. The real question is whether it is a good enough deal to merit terminating sanctions. My concern is that the Joint Plan of Action does not speak to these recommended centrifuge limitations Dennis Ross or Dr. Albright suggests. In fact, Iran has already made its views about the limitations of the agreement quite clear. What the Joint Plan of Action does concede is that Iran will not only retain its ability to enrich but will be allowed a mutually agreed upon enrichment program. Here is what Iran's Foreign Minister Zarif said about the interim agreement: The White House tries to portray it as basically a dismantling of Iran's nuclear program . . . we are not dismantling any centrifuges, we are not dismantling any equipment, we're simply not producing, not enriching over 5 percent. That is a quote from their Foreign Minister. What does President Ruhani of Iran say? He was adamant in an interview on CNN in saying that Iran will not be dismantling its centrifuges. He said: We are determined to provide for the nuclear fuel of such plants inside the country, at the hands of local Iranian scientists. We are going to follow on this path. On that program, Fareed Zakaria asked him: So there will be no destruction of centrifuges, of existing centrifuges. President Ruhani said: No. No, not at all. In fact, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said that Iran would comply with the interim agreement by removing the connections between networks of centrifuges that have been used to enrich uranium to 20 percent so they can enrich only to 5 percent. Then he said: These interconnections can be removed in a day and connected again in a day. That is not the type of safeguard we need. Clearly, their intention-- at least in these negotiations--is to retain their capability notwithstanding the agreement. That is pretty clear to me. In January President Ruhani tweeted: Our relationship with the world is based on Iranian nation's interest. In Geneva agreement world powers surrendered to Iranian nation's will. When this tweet was broadly reported on, President Rouhani took it down. In a speech when Rouhani was leaving his post as Iran's chief negotiator in 2005, he said: While we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the facility in Isfahan-- which is a uranium conversion facility-- which is a uranium conversion facility-- but we still had a long way to go to complete the project. In fact, by creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work on Isfahan. In essence, they were able to complete the work of the uranium conversion. Now, sometimes I think it is worthy to listen to the words of these individuals now in leadership positions to understand the mindset of the negotiations that are taking place. Basically, what President Rouhani was saying is that he was able to get the West to not pursue sanctions and ultimately to not take any other action, as Iran continued to march forward with its nuclear program. I find comments such as that deeply troubling. I find troubling the fact that even after an agreement was reached in November, the Iranians reportedly fired a rocket into space to improve their ability to develop a long- range ballistic missile system. In an interview with Reuters, U.S. missile defense expert Rikki Ellison said of the report: If it's true, they continue to expand and grow their long range missile capabilities regardless of their overture to the West with self-reduction of their nuclear capabilities . . . These realities--these statements, these actions--are just as much about the spirit of the interim deal as it is about the letter of the deal, and it places in question the political will of the Iranians and our ability to reach a verifiable agreement with those who have been willing to so deceive. In terms of both Iran's political will and its ballistic missile capability, James Clapper, the Director of National Intelligence, said the following: Tehran has made technical progress in a number of areas-- including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles--from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. These technical advancements strengthen our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so. So what the analysis reveals is that years of obfuscation, delay, and endless negotiation has brought the Iranians to the point of having, according to the Director of National Intelligence, the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. As to their will to do so, I would say that if they are--I would say that what they are hiding at the Parchin Military Industrial Complex, if revealed, would clearly show their will to build a nuclear bomb. The only thing that has thwarted that will is crippling sanctions. The Iranians have fought back every step of the way with the international community getting access to Parchin, and the world largely views Parchin as the place in which their militarization of nuclear energy--therefore nuclear weapons--was taking place. In my view, the Iranians are negotiating in bad faith, as we have seen them do in the past. They say one thing behind closed doors in Geneva and say another thing publicly. I know the administration will say this is what President Rouhani needs to do for his domestic audience. But his deeds need to go beyond his words, and they need to be verifiable. In fact, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, David Albright, of the Institute of Science and International Security and an expert on the proliferation of atomic weapons, said that under the interim agreement: The breakout times, if Iran used its currently installed centrifuges, would lengthen from at least 1 to 1.6 months to at least 1.9 to 2.2 months. That effectively means that without dismantling currently installed centrifuges, Iran has a breakout time of 6 to 8 weeks, unless we demand real consequences in a final agreement--6 to 8 weeks. That figure is going to be very important, as I will get to later, because 6 to 8 weeks is a lot shorter than the time frame to invoke and make sanctions effective. Another major concern is the Arak heavy water reactor--a facility that Dennis Ross has described as ``grossly inefficient for producing electricity, but not for generating plutonium for nuclear weapons.'' The Senate was told that this facility would be taken care of in the final agreement, which most of us understood to mean that it would be dismantled. Now, the Joint Plan of Action and the implementing agreement suggest something less than dismantlement. The implementing agreement says that Iran has to ``take steps to agree with the IAEA on the conclusion of a safeguards approach to Arak.'' Iran has not provided required design information for Arak, as we thought was going to happen, and in the final agreement it seems possible that either Iran will be allowed to complete the reactor and operate it under IAEA safeguards or the reactor will simply be mothballed--not dismantled but mothballed--or perhaps converted to a light-water facility that carries its own risks. Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister has said that the Arak reactor is the fastest way to get the material for a nuclear weapon. So while I understand the agreement also does not permit Iran to construct a related reprocessing facility at this time, the implication of the agreement's language is that the final agreement will not actually require the dismantling of the Arak reactor, meaning that Arak could, at a future date, give Iran a relatively quick path to a weapon, and I find that simply unacceptable. In my view, Iran's strategy, consistent with their past approaches that have brought them to a nuclear threshold state, is to use these negotiations to mothball its nuclear infrastructure program just long enough to undo the international sanctions regime. Iran is insisting on keeping core elements of its programs-- enrichment, the Arak heavy-water reactor, the underground Fordow facility, and the Parchin military complex. While they may be subject to safeguards so they can satisfy the international community in the short run, if they are allowed to retain their core infrastructure, they could quickly revive their program sometime in the future. At the same time, Iran is seeking to reverse the harsh international sanctions regime against them. The bottom line is this. If they get their way, if they dismantle nothing, we gut the sanctions, and troubling signs have already appeared. Since the interim deal was signed, there was an immediate effort by many nations--including many European nations--to revive trade and resume business with Iran. There have been recent headlines that the Russians may be seeking a barter deal that could increase Iran's oil exports by 50 percent; that Iran and Russia are negotiating an oil-for- goods deal worth $1.5 billion a month--$18 billion a year--which would significantly boost Iran's oil exports by 500,000 barrels a day in exchange for Russian goods. To the administration's credit, when we have raised this issue, they have said they are aware of those concerns and have told the Russians that, in fact, if they were to pursue that, it would be actionable, meaning it would be subject to sanctions. But I am not sure that Vladimir Putin really is going to be thwarted by such warnings. A coalition of France's largest companies is already visiting Tehran. Iran welcomed more than 100 executives from France's biggest firms on Monday, the most senior French trade mission in years. Since November there have been 20-plus trade delegations from Turkey, Georgia, Ireland, Tunisia, Kazakhstan, China, Italy, India, Austria, and Sweden. What is the result? Iran's economy is recovering. The Iranian rial, which is in essence their dollar, had plummeted from an official rate of 10,440 rials to the dollar to a staggering 41,000 to a dollar in October of 2012. But it has begun to recover. As of January 29, that rate has gone from 41,000 to a single dollar to 25,000 rials to the dollar. International Monetary Fund figures also show Iran's negative growth turning around, with Iran having a projected growth rate of 1.28 percent to almost 2 percent in 2014 and 2015. As Mark Dubowitz, the executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this week, the $7 billion in actual relief Iran will definitively receive under the Joint Plan of Action is very significant--comprising approximately 35 percent of Iran's fully accessible cash reserves, which are estimated to be $20 billion. So while the Iranian economy is described as being much larger, the assessment that this is a drop in the bucket is simply not accurate. Moreover, that relief fails to consider the $4 billion to $5 billion in revenue that Iran would have lost if we had not suspended sanctions on Iran's crude oil exports as required under existing law. Sanctions relief, combined with the ``open for business'' sign that Iran is posting, is paying returns. It seems to me the sanctions regime we have worked so hard to build is starting to unravel before we ever get a chance to conclude a final agreement with Iran. The fact is that any final deal as inadequate as the one I have outlined will end any pressure on Iran for the foreseeable future. Put simply, we need a policy that guarantees Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons capability, period. To understand how to proceed, we must also understand the facts. We need to put the negotiating into context. First, Iran has a history of duplicity with respect to its nuclear program, using past negotiations to cover up advances in its nuclear program, and, most startling, at the undeclared Fordow enrichment site, buried very deep in a mountain to prevent its discovery and protect against destruction. That begs the question: Why would they bury a facility so deep so that it could not be discovered if it was solely for the peaceful purposes they claim? It seems unlikely, as Iran's leaders have made clear in recent days, that Iran will make any concessions that fundamentally dismantle its nuclear program. The fact is Iran is simply agreeing to lock the door on its nuclear weapons program, as is, and walk away. Should they later walk away from the deal as they have in the past, they can simply unlock the door and continue their nuclear weapons program from where they are today. It sounds a lot like North Korea. Let's not forget that President Rouhani, as the former negotiator for Iran, boasted: The day that we invited the three European ministers to the talks, only 10 centrifuges were spinning at Natanz. We could not produce one gram of U4 or U6. We did not have the heavy water production. We could not produce yellow cake . . . Our total production of centrifuges inside the country was 150 . . . We wanted to complete all of these--we needed time. We did not stop. We completed the program. So 150 then; 20,000 today. The simple truth is he admitted to deceiving the West. Given President Rouhani's own words on his country's nuclear weapons ambition, it seems to me a good deal is not one that equates dismantling with mothballing. A good deal would prevent Iran from being able to get back to work on its nuclear weapons program from where it left off. Second, despite diplomatic entreaties to the Iranians in recent years where hands were extended and secret talks were pursued, Iran has grown its support and advocacy for terror. The history of Iranian terror against U.S. citizens and interests is lengthy and robust, grounded in the view that the United States is the great Satan, and with its funding and support of Hezbollah that has carried out attacks against American interests. Colleagues will recall that 241 American servicemen died in the 1983 Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon and 19 in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia. In recent years, we have traced responsibility for lethal actions against American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan to Iran, as well as the fortunately thwarted attack on the Saudi ambassador at a Washington restaurant in 2011. Today Iran is actively sponsoring a proxy war in Syria, sending money, weapons, and fighters on a weekly basis. Simultaneously, it is sponsoring attacks against Sunnis in Iraq and promoting regional sectarian violence that could easily result in a broader regional conflict. So while smiling at our negotiators across the table, they are simultaneously plotting in the backroom. With all this in mind, I believe in the wisdom of the prospective sanctions I proposed. I believe in the lessons of history that tell us Iran cannot be trusted to live up to its word without external pressure, and I believe an insurance policy that guards against Iranian obfuscation and deception is the best way forward. I know there is a difference of view, but I truly believe that what got Iran to the negotiating table is the only element of peaceful diplomacy that can keep it there and ultimately drive a successful negotiation. My legislation, cosponsored by 59 Senators, would simply require that Iran act in good faith, adhering to the implementing agreement, not engaging in new acts of terror against American citizens or U.S. property, and not conducting new ballistic missile tests with a range beyond 500 kilometers. The legislation is not the problem and Congress is not the problem. Iran is the problem. We need to worry more about Iran than we need to worry about the Congress. We need to focus on Iran's long history of deceptions surrounding its nuclear program and how this should inform our approach to reaching a comprehensive deal. To those who believe if negotiations do not result in a deal or if Iran breaks the deal we can always impose new sanctions, then let me be clear: If negotiations fail or if Iran breaks the deal, we will not have time to pass new sanctions that would have a real consequence. New sanctions are not a spigot that can be turned off and on, as has been suggested. Even if Congress were to take up and pass new sanctions at the moment of Iran's first breach of the Joint Plan of Action or if they do not reach an ultimate agreement that is acceptable, there is a lag time of at least 6 months to bring those sanctions online and at least 1 year for real impact to be felt. That has been our history here. I authored most of these, and they need a lead time. You need to give countries and companies the time to be noticed as to what is going to be sanctioned so they can rearrange their engagements. Then you have to have the regulations to go through and then you have to have the enforcement take place. This would bring us beyond the very short time Iran would need to build a nuclear bomb, especially since the interim agreement does not require them either to dismantle anything and basically freezes their capability as it stands today. So let everyone understand, if there is no deal, I do not think we are going to have the time to impose new sanctions before Iran can produce a nuclear weapon. Everyone agrees the comprehensive sanctions policy against Iran-- which was led by Congress and originally opposed by the administration--has been an unquestionable success. Iran's oil exports fell to 1.1 million barrels a day in the first 9 months of 2013, down from 1.5 million barrels in 2012. The fall in exports was costing Iran between $4 billion and $8 billion a month in 2013, and the loss of oil revenue had caused the rial to lose two-thirds of its value against the dollar and caused inflation to rise to more than 40 percent. There is no dispute or disagreement that it was the economic impact of sanctions that has brought Iran to the negotiating table in the first place. But passing those sanctions and having them in place long enough to be effective took time--time that I am concerned we no longer have. The question now is whether our goals align. Has the ideology of the regime altered so substantially in the last 6 months that they are ready to forswear a 20-year effort--a 20-year effort--to develop nuclear weapons or are they, as the Supreme Leader has stated, seeking to beat us at the game of diplomacy--``to negotiate with the Devil to eliminate its evil''--and retain their nuclear threshold and enriching abilities while degrading the sanctions regime? Let's not forget it is the Ayatollah--I know we are placing a lot of faith in President Ruhani and the Iranian Foreign Minister--but it is the Ayatollah who holds the nuclear portfolio, and his main goal is what. Preservation of the regime. It is the Ayatollah who gave the green light to Ruhani to negotiate. Why? Because the sanctions were causing the Ayatollah to be concerned about regime change taking place within Iranian society due to the consequences of sanctions on the Iranian economy. Interestingly enough, who benefits from the sanctions relief? The Ayatollah. In a Reuters story with the title ``Khamenei's business empire gains from Iran sanctions relief,'' it goes on to talk about that: Khamenei controls a massive business empire known as Setad that has invested in Iran's petrochemical industry, which is now permitted to resume [its] exports. It also states: In an interview with Reuters this week, a Treasury Department official estimated that Iran would generate at most $1 billion in revenue-- Mr. President, $1 billion in revenue-- from petrochemical exports over the next six months. Who is the one who has a great deal of interest in the petrochemical section? The Ayatollah, by his control of Setad. I have worked on Iran's nuclear issues for 20 years, starting when I was a Member of the House, pressing for sanctions to prevent Iran from building the Bushehr nuclear powerplant and to halt IAEA support for their uranium mining and enrichment programs. For a decade I was told my concerns had no legitimate basis; that Iran would never be able to bring the Bushehr plant online; and that Iran's activities were not the most major concern. History has shown us that those assessments about Iran's abilities and intentions were simply wrong. The fact is Iran's nuclear aspirations did not materialize overnight. Iran has been slowly, methodically working up to this moment for decades, and now--if its capability is mothballed rather than dismantled--they will remain at the cusp of being a declared nuclear state should they choose to start again because nothing will have changed if nothing is significantly dismantled. Make no mistake. Iran views developing a nuclear capability as fundamental to its existence. It sees the development of nuclear weapons as part of a regional hegemonic strategy to make Tehran the center of power throughout the region. That is why our allies and partners in the region--and not just Israelis, but Emiratis and Saudis, among others--are so skeptical and so concerned. Quite simply, our allies and partners do not trust Iranian leaders, nor do they believe Iran has any intention of verifiably ending its nuclear weapons program. So while I welcome the diplomatic efforts, and I share the hope that the administration can achieve a final comprehensive agreement that eliminates this threat to global peace and security, I am deeply-- deeply--skeptical based upon these 20 years--based upon these 20 years--of experience. The simple and deeply troubling fact is Iran is literally weeks to months from a breakout, and the parameters of the final agreement laid out in the Joint Plan of Action do not appear to set Iran's development capacity back by more than a few weeks. The Joint Plan of Action conceded, even before negotiations had begun, Iran's right to some level of enrichment, despite a U.N. resolution calling for Iran to suspend enrichment. It provides no guarantees that we will resolve our concerns about Iranian weaponization activities, that Iran will cease advanced centrifuge research. Why is that important? Because we heard testimony that the more advanced the centrifuge, the less centrifuges you need, the quicker you can produce enriched uranium to be able to acquire that bomb and the increasingly less verifiable it is. So Iran should have to cease its advanced centrifuge research. It also provides no guarantees that we will resolve our concerns that the IAEA will gain access to the Parchin military base, that Iran will dismantle thousands of centrifuges or that the Iranians will disclose the scope of their activities. It suggests that the resolution for the Arak heavy-water reactors, which can provide a quicker plutonium pathway to nuclear weapons, may be to put it under IAEA safeguards rather than require its dismantlement. It seems to me we do not have time, under the testimony taken before the committee, for Iran to hedge and obfuscate. They have done a pretty good job of that, and that is what has brought them to the cusp of being a nuclear state. There should be no chance for Iran to buy more time, which, in effect, leaves us exactly where we are-- just hitting a pause button--with the state of play unchanged and Iran weeks from breakout. To me that is a bad agreement, and in my view we should be negotiating from a position of strength. Last Tuesday night in the State of the Union, the President said: If John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan could negotiate with the Soviet Union, then surely a strong and confident America can negotiate with less powerful adversaries today. I agree. But I would point out to my colleagues that they did so from a position of strength. President Kennedy sent U.S. warships to face down the Soviets in Cuba, and Ronald Reagan dramatically built up U.S. military might to an extent that what was the former Soviet Union could not keep up the pace. We need to negotiate with Iran from a position of strength, and then, yes--then we should have no fear about any such negotiation. The concerns I have raised are legitimate. They are not, as the President's Press Secretary has said, ``warmongering.'' This is not saber rattling. It is not Congress wanting to ``march to war,'' as another White House spokesman said, but exactly the opposite. I find it interesting--as someone who was then in the House of Representatives and was in a small minority voting against the war in Iraq, when an overwhelming number of my colleagues and many Members of this body were voting for the war--to somehow be portrayed as a warmonger. It is my mind that the use of sanctions--which is a limited part of an arsenal of peaceful diplomacy tools--can get us to the successful negotiations we want. At the end of the day, trying to keep the pressure on Iran to completely satisfy the United Nations' and the international community's demands for Iran to halt and reverse its illicit nuclear activities is the best way to avoid war in the first place--to avoid war in the first place. Iran has proven in the past it will not negotiate in good faith except when it has no other choice--as the tough sanctions we passed have proven, by getting Iran to the table. Iran says it will not negotiate with a gun to its head. I would suggest it is Iran that has put the potential of a nuclear gun to the world's head. At the end of the day, name-calling is not an argument, nor is it a sound policy. It is a false choice to say a vote for sanctions is equivalent to warmongering. More pressure on Iran does not in any way suggest that Congress wants war or that the Iranians feel backed into a corner and will themselves choose war over reason. So let's stop talking about warmongering. Let's instead fixate on the final deal which, in my view, cannot and should not rely simply on trust but on real, honest, verifiable dismantlement of Iran's capability to produce even one nuclear bomb. The ball is in the administration's court, not in Congress's. In fact, the agreement specifically states--there has been a lot of talk about how we should not consider any new sanctions, even if they are prospective, which the legislation says nothing would happen until up to 1 year, unless Iran violates the interim agreement or fails to conclude an agreement in 1 year. But if we read the Joint Plan of Action, what does it say? It says: The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. It does not say the United States of America. It does not say the Congress. It says the ``Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.'' That is because the agreement acknowledges that the administration, not Congress, will refrain from imposing new sanctions. The administration knew it could not bind Congress to refrain from imposing new sanctions because Congress is a separate coequal branch of government. So let's focus on what was agreed to by those at the table rather than attributing blame to those who were not. We will not be the scapegoats for a bad deal if it does not take the nuclear weapons option off the table by insisting on dismantling existing capability, not simply mothballing it. So let me say I want diplomacy to work. That is why we worked so hard to get to the opportunity. I wanted to produce the results we all hoped for and have worked for. But at a minimum, we need to send a message to Iran that our patience is not unlimited and that we are skeptical of their intentions and a message to the international community that the sanctions regime has not weakened, that this is not an opportunity to reengage with Tehran. I would urge everyone to look at the legislation I have drafted with my colleague from Illinois and Members of both caucuses as a win for the administration. They succeeded in convincing us--the administration succeeded in convincing us to provide up to a 1-year window to negotiate. That is not the way the legislation was originally intended. But they convinced us they needed an opportunity to negotiate and, hence, the legislation was worked in such a way to create that opportunity. I believe that is significant and generous, given Iran's history of treachery and deceit. If Iran steps away from the negotiations or does not live up to its agreement, it will be because they are not serious about reaching a comprehensive deal. I have heard the concerns of the administration. I know we share the same goals. We have taken steps in the Foreign Relations Committee in pursuit of those goals. We have worked with the administration to pass legislation to help reform the Organization of American States. We have moved 129--more now with the last week of nominees--that the administration has put forward. We worked through Labor Day in a bipartisan effort to quickly pass a resolution authorizing the use of military force in Syria, which gave the President--there are those who are critical of that as well--but that authorization gave the President the ability to go to Russia and get a deal to end the use of chemical weapons in Syria. We passed and the President signed PEPFAR into law, the President's emergency plan for AIDS relief. We have worked with the administration on embassy security after Benghazi. We have worked with countless administration officials and held two hearings on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In all of those actions and much more, I have worked closely with the administration. My intention now is to assist the administration again in its negotiations by keeping the pressure on Iran, which has always proven an unreliable negotiating partner at best. In my view, it is time to put Iranian rhetoric to the test. If we are to take President Ruhani at his word, when he said in Davos last week that Iran does not seek nuclear weapons, if that is true, then the Iranian Government should not have any problems with the obvious followup to that claim, starting with the verifiable dismantling of its illicit nuclear infrastructure. That is all the sanctions legislation does. I do not think we should settle for anything less. So let's be clear. I do not come to this floor in opposition, I come in comity and in the spirit of unity that has always dictated our foreign policy. But the Senate has an obligation to challenge assumptions in a free and open debate. That is what is most extraordinary about our government, and it echoes in the many debates we have held in this Chamber on war and peace, on justice and freedom and civil rights. At the end of the day, we have an obligation to speak our minds on what we believe is in the best interests of this Nation. It is in that spirit that I come to the floor today. As GEN George Marshall said, ``Go right straight down the road, to do what is best, and do it frankly without evasion.'' Today I am advocating for what I believe is in our national interests and to do so as frankly and comprehensively as I can. As John Kennedy said about having differences of opinion, ``Let us not be blind to [them], but let us also direct our attention to our common interests and to the means by which those differences can be resolved.'' The administration and the Senate have a common interest to prevent a nuclear weapons-capable Iran. We have differences as to how to achieve it. We have an obligation to debate those differences and concerns. But I will not yield on a principled difference. It is our obligation to debate the issues, express our differences and outcomes, and come to the floor to work together to resolve them. At the end of the day, my hope, as someone who has been working on this for 20 years, can see the fruition of a successful negotiation by the President and the administration so Iran will never have a nuclear weapons capability. But by the same token, I think we need to be poised to ensure that we use the last elements of peaceful diplomacy, which is to ensure there are sanctions that create consequences to the regime so they can put that in their equation as to it is better to strike a deal and end our illicit nuclear program than it is to pursue a course that creates nuclear weapons. Because, if not, I fear, if we continue down this path and our sanctions erode and all we do is limit and have safeguard notices, warning signs, we will get the warning signs, but the sanctions will be gone and the only options left to a future American President will be do you accept a nuclear-armed Iran or do you have a military option. Those are not desirable options. It is our effort to avoid that being the ultimate question. That is what we embody in the sanctions legislation that has passed this Chamber and has been signed by the President and that we believe, prospectively, can increase the pressure on Iran to come to that peaceful conclusion, so that option of either accepting a nuclear-armed Iran or having to have a military option to prevent it from doing so is not the option for our country and for any future American President. I yield the floor and I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I want to commend my colleague from New Jersey for an eloquent and soaring speech that speaks to the collective aspirations we should have in this body on behalf of the collective Nation we represent. I am not at all surprised at Senator Booker's ability to relate to this body the lives of people from New Jersey and across the country who depend upon us to respond to them in their times of need and to remind us of the greater nature of what we should stand for as an institution and on behalf of this country. He did it with such aplomb and such passion and intensity, yet at the same time with such sincerity that I think it is an excellent beginning to what will be a very long series of remarks in the Senate on critical issues that will both inform us and at the same time remind us of the high calling for which we are all brought to the Senate. I want to take one moment to add to what Senator Booker said, specifically on the topic he ultimately drove home, and that is this question of unemployment. I want to relate one story--I see the Senator from Utah is up, so I will relate only one story--but it speaks to the very heart of what Senator Booker was conveying here. I get thousands of letters from people who depend on their meager unemployment benefits to avert economic disaster while they desperately look for work. As Senator Booker said, these people are not lazy; they are not looking for a handout. They just want a job, any job. I want to talk about one constituent in particular--Noelle from Atlantic County, who described herself as ``a middle-aged unemployed single mother trying to raise two sons to be successful contributing members of our society.'' She relates what happened after her marriage ended: I didn't shrug my shoulders and give up, even though the ``system'' said I didn't qualify for assistance . . . I took care of children in my home to pay the bills and avoid child care costs. In 2000, when my children were school age, I found a minimum wage seasonal job and worked hard to become a permanent employee . . . I worked even harder to rise up in the organization and become a respected manager. When that company went bankrupt in 2009, I found another job within two weeks taking a large pay cut and making far less than I would have made on unemployment. I stayed with that company for 4 years until I was laid off in July of 2013. Once again, I didn't shrug my shoulders and give up. For the following 26 weeks I sought employment. I have joined every employment website I could find and I applied for any job remotely within my limited job skills. Unfortunately, the responses I have gotten have not been encouraging. Thirteen years of retail experience, including nine years of management experience, translates into few opportunities. No one will consider me for any entry level positions based on my previous experience. She closes by saying: No, I do not think unemployment should be a way of life. No, I do not think you can be unemployed and disabled. No, I do not think 3 million unemployed Americans are going to find jobs in 26 weeks. She is so right, and these are the type of Americans Senator Booker was talking about, and this is why the Senate should act. I don't believe that is too much to ask, and I am pleased Senator Booker has come to this floor to lend his voice to the debate and to stand for people such as her. Again, I congratulate my colleague from New Jersey on an eloquent speech on such an important issue. I am pleased that he chose to speak about unemployment insurance, an issue critical to so many families in New Jersey and across this Nation so they can make ends meet while they're looking for work. Senator Booker has always been a voice for the voiceless, given hope to the vulnerable, and a helping hand to those who need it. It is why he chose public service. It is who he is and what he has always stood for. He spoke eloquently and I commend him for his remarks. He rightfully pointed out that the issue of unemployment insurance isn't just about the poor. It is about all those people who need help while they continue to look for work. We have seen the recession chip away at the middle class, pulling more and more families to the edge. In this job market, they need more time to find work, and extending unemployment benefits will give them that time. It will allow them to step back from the edge. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, it is good to see my colleague from New Jersey presiding. I rise in support of this legislation we are about to consider, the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act, which, again, is unique insofar as it is a bipartisan, bicameral piece of legislation, to ensure families will be able to afford flood insurance so they can stay in their homes, so that businesses can stay open, and property values will not plummet. Amendment No. 2707 I also rise in opposition to the Toomey substitute amendment, which would completely undermine our bill and perpetuate a failed policy. While we support putting the National Flood Insurance Program on a path to solvency, current law hikes rates so fast and so high that it will actually undermine the solvency of the program. These drastic increases will act as a de facto eviction notice for homeowners who have lived in their homes and played by the rules their entire lives. That is going to drive down property values, as the housing market is struggling to recover. What is most alarming is the fact that FEMA does not even know the size or scope of this problem. They were supposed to complete a study on the affordability of rate increases mandated by Biggert-Waters by last April, but they failed to do so. That is simply unacceptable. While there is no question we need to put the flood insurance program on a more solvent trajectory, we first need to understand the impact these dramatic changes in Biggert-Waters will have on the housing market and be sure the mapping process they use to set these rates is accurate. That is why our bill would impose a moratorium on the phaseout of subsidies and grandfathers included in Biggert-Waters for most primary residences until FEMA completes the affordability study that was mandated in Biggert-Waters and proposes a regulatory framework to address the issues found in the study. Whether FEMA does that in 6 months, 1 year--whatever periods of time--as soon as they do that and propose that regulatory framework, we are ready to go. So those who say this is somehow an inordinate amount of time, that is going to be determined by FEMA's promptness in getting the affordability study that was supposed to have been done under law by last April. It would also require FEMA to certify in writing that it has implemented a flood mapping approach that utilizes sound scientific and engineering methodologies before certain rate reforms are implemented. The reason that is important is because, for example, we saw in New Jersey where FEMA maps were put out, and we ultimately heard a hue and cry from communities and counties across the State that said: Look, that can't be right. We have had properties that have never flooded. Even in Sandy they did not have virtually any flooding, and now they are in the zone, and particularly in the most difficult zones, called V zones, where the consequence of being in a V zone may very well be whether you can keep your house. When we challenged and brought municipal and county engineers to bear, what did we find? In some counties we had an 80-percent reduction. Had we not challenged those maps, where would those families be today? So we want the basis of these maps to be scientific, using engineering methodologies that are sound. Also, this new legislation would reimburse qualifying homeowners for successful appeals of erroneous flood map determinations. If we are going to say these maps are somehow sacrosanct, and you go and challenge them, and find out they were wrong, you should be able to not have to bear that burden. It would give communities fair credit for locally funded flood protection systems. It would continue the fair treatment afforded to communities with floodproof basement exemptions. It would provide for a FEMA ombudsman to advocate for and provide information to policyholders. It would streamline the registration process for insurance brokers and agents so they can provide better timely services to policyholders during a disaster. Just as important as what this bill does is what it will not do. The legislation would not stop the phaseout of taxpayer-funded subsidies for vacation homes and homes that have been substantially damaged. It would not stop the phaseout of taxpayer-funded subsidies for properties that have been repetitively flooded, including the 1 percent riskiest properties that account for over a third of all claims. It would not encourage new construction in environmentally sensitive or flood-prone areas. And it would not stop most of the important reforms included in Biggert-Waters. This legislation reaches a delicate balance that recognizes the need to improve solvency and phase out certain subsidies but tries to do so without discouraging program participation. Finally, Senator Toomey acknowledges that Biggert-Waters, I think, is totally flawed and must be changed, but basically his amendment falls far short of what all of us who have come together in support will do. I yield the floor.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, parliamentary inquiry: Is my understanding correct that Senator Toomey has used his minute as part of his presentation or is there a minute still pending for each side?

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, first of all, let me clear up some things. No. 1, the administration has not come and said it supports Senator Toomey's amendment. So let's be clear about that. As a matter of fact, my understanding is the administration has called him out and said they do not oppose our legislation. I think we do transition ultimately to a place where we have an actuarially sound flood insurance program. There is a CBO score out there of over 10 years of zero. Look. The reality is, if you want the real estate markets to take a real hit, if you want families to be displaced from their homes, you adopt the Toomey amendment. If you want to do what on a bipartisan basis has been the focus of this legislation, to keep an actuarially sound flood insurance program but at the same time make sure we do not drive people out of their homes and make sure that we get the study done before we get the actions done, then you will oppose the Toomey amendment and support the underlying bill. I yield the floor and ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote and to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendment No. 2697

Mr. MENENDEZ. I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, very briefly, I wish to thank the Senator from Oregon both for driving the issue and for working with us in the process to get to where he wants to be and where we can maximize our votes on this bill. I appreciate his courtesy and cooperation and look forward to working with him. Amendment No. 2700

Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, I have to oppose the Heller amendment. This amendment would weaken consumer protections and completely remove minimum standards with respect to private flood insurance policies. In particular, the amendment strips the requirement that the private policy has to be comparable to a national flood insurance policy, meaning that companies would be able to offer inadequate policies to consumers across the country without any requirements as to what is in the policy. For all of those who have talked about solvency, if you have insurance that doesn't meet a minimum standard to ensure that the consequences of flooding can be paid for by the policy, you want to vote against this amendment. I urge a ``no'' vote on the Heller amendment, and I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, I move to reconsider the vote and lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, I urge all of our colleagues to cast a ``yes'' vote on the final passage of the homeowner flood insurance act. I think this has been an excellent week for the Senate. We were able to break through what sometimes is partisan gridlock and far too often pervades this auspicious Chamber. We have had an honest and open debate on this issue that is critical to the American people. We have had a respectable debate on good-faith amendments that were germane to the bill and lived up to the ideals of the Senate, and now we are poised to pass a critical piece of legislation which I believe enjoys overwhelming bipartisan support which will provide real relief to millions of American families. I thank all of our cosponsors and their staffs, including a very large list of Republican colleagues who support the bill. I particularly thank my lead Republican cosponsor, Senator Isakson, for his efforts and the partnership on this issue and many others. I have had the pleasure to work with Senator Isakson on a number of issues and have come to respect his honesty and his desire to come together and get things done, regardless of the issue. I think he is one of the most well-respected Members of the Senate. Together, working with our colleagues, I think we are poised to give some real relief to families and to send a strong message to the House and hope they will follow suit.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate recess until 1:50 p.m. today.

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation be authorized to hold a meeting during the session of the Senate on Thursday, January 30, 2014, at 10 a.m. in room 253 of the Russell Senate Office Building. The committee will hold a hearing entitled ``West Coast and Western Pacific Perspectives on Magnuson-Stevens Act Reauthorization.''

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate to conduct a hearing on Thursday, January 30, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., in room 366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. The purpose of this oversight hearing is to explore opportunities and challenges associated with lifting the ban on U.S. crude oil exports. For further information, please contact Todd Wooten at (202) 224-3907, Abigail Campbell at (202) 224-4905, or Lauren Goldschmidt at (202) 224- 5488.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Environment and Public Works and the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on January 30, at 9:30 a.m., in room 406 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building to conduct a joint hearing entitled ``Oversight Hearing: NRC's Implementation of the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendations and other Actions to Enhance and Maintain Nuclear Safety.''

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Finance be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, January 30, 2014, at 10 a.m., in 215 Dirksen Senate Office Building.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Foreign Relations be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, January 30, 2014, at 9:30 a.m., to hold a hearing entitled ``Section 123: Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreements.''

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on January 30, 2014, at 10 a.m., in SD-226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, to conduct an executive business meeting.

Mr. MENENDEZ. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Emergency Management, Interfovernmental Relations, and the District of Columbia of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate on Thursday, January 30, 2014, at 2:30 p.m., to conduct a hearing entitled ``Shutdown: Examining Federal Government Closure Impacts on the District of Columbia.''

Mr. MENENDEZ

Mr. MENENDEZ. I thank the Senator from Louisiana for his input into the legislation, his work, and his advocacy. I agree with him on the other underlying statements that he made, particularly as it relates to the necessity for the legislation, as well as the opposition to the Toomey amendment. I understand what Senator Toomey is trying to do, but I agree it doesn't meet the ultimate challenge. I agree as well on the budget point of order for the reason Senator Vitter says. I thank the Senator for his support. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.