Frank Murkowski

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, we have had an extended discussion on the matter of the sale of the Alaska Power Marketing Association, as well as the proposal to allow the export of surplus oil on the west coast of the United States. During the course of the day, the Senate came in at 9:30 a.m. and a proposal was to take up the bill. There was an objection to moving to the bill from my friend from the State of Washington. As a consequence, from approximately 9:30 a.m. until noon, the Senator from Washington had a quorum call in effect, and I had hoped that we could hear the particular position of the Senator from the State of Washington. Unfortunately, that was not the case. There was an agreement to move to the bill at 12 o'clock, and it is now 3 o'clock. The amendment that we just tabled is significant and I think was an expression of the attitude of the Senate towards this. Mr. President, furthermore, the majority leader tried to accommodate Members. Mr. President, in view of some of the changes----

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, what is the pending business? Committee Amendment on Page 17, Line 10

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the motion was agreed to.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, the hour of 2:30 has come, and I would move to table the first committee amendment and ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, yes, the Senator from Wyoming is correct. As I recall specifically, the Department recommended in their Department of Energy report to the U.S. Treasury that by the year 2000 that would be approximately $180 million in tax revenue to the Treasury and there would be an increase of employment by some 11,000 to 16,000 U.S. jobs immediately, and by the year 2000, 25,000 jobs. I think that was evident in the base of support that was evident when the vote came out of the committee, 14 to 4. The Senator from Wyoming will recall, Senator Domenici, Senator Nickles, Senator Craig, Senator Thomas, Senator Kyl, Senator Graham, Senator Jeffords, Senator Burns, Senator Campbell, Senator Johnston, Senator Ford, Senator Bradley, and Senator Bingaman voted to vote out of committee the issue of the oil export relief, as well as the proposal on the Alaska power authority. I think the jobs issue was well covered in that report. [[Page S6662]] Mr. President, I would like to refer to an article that appeared on February 22, and it appeared in the Seattle Times. I think it was an editorial or an op-ed. It was a column, in any event. It suggests a number of reasons why it might not be in the national interest to continue the restrictions on the export of Alaska's North Slope crude oil. I feel that the facts as confirmed by the U.S. Department of Energy report, the General Accounting Office, and other objective sources show that the export of ANS crude oil on what has been agreed upon, that is U.S.-flagged and U.S.-crewed vessels would, indeed, create jobs, increase our energy production, and as a consequence our national security, and increase Federal and State revenues. Now, in that particular column there was a reference to the Senator from Washington that suggested that exports would ``not meet the statutory test designed to protect broader national interests.'' Further, exports would ``seriously hurt consumers, jobs, and the environment in our own State.'' Again, I would refer to the comprehensive June 1994 study by the Department of Energy which concluded that exporting ANS crude oil on U.S.-flagged vessels would, one, again add as much as $180 million in tax revenue to the U.S. Treasury by the year 2000; two, increase U.S. employment by 11,000 to 16,000 jobs immediately and by 25,000 jobs by the year 2000; third, preserve as many as 3,300 maritime jobs; fourth, increase American oil production by as much as 110,000 barrels a day by the year 2000; fifth, probably decrease crude oil tanker movement in U.S. waters; six, have minimal or nonexistent effect on prices to consumers, since the benefit of the current subsidy to west coast refiners from exports is not shared with consumers of refined products. Now, the statement in the article indicated and was referenced to the Senator from Washington that ``over the years Alaska North Slope crude oil has fueled Washington State. Ninety percent of our crude oil comes from the North Slope and our refineries are operating at 90 percent capacity. Today this secure supply of oil faces a threat.'' The fact is, if exports are permitted, the Pacific Northwest will continue to be the closest market for ANS crude. Given the low cost of transporting oil to Puget Sound, there is no economic reason why any oil now going there be in jeopardy. Even the Coalition To Keep Alaskan Oil, which is a rather interesting organization--it is an oil refinery-sponsored group, just a few refiners are supporting it now--is opposed to exports. They admitted in a paper last year that if exports were permitted, only the ANS crude oil surplus to the west coast requirements would be exported. Excess west coast oil formerly went to Panama and was transported across the isthmus for transfer to smaller United States tankers that moved the oil to gulf coast refineries. That process, which involved dual handling of the oil, is now prohibitively expensive given the low world price of oil. Now, the article further attributes to the Senator from Washington that the North Slope has given us a reliable oil supply. Carried aboard U.S.-flagged vessels, the ships employ Washingtonians as crew members, and ``the tankers, that transport Alaska oil are repaired in the Pacific Northwest. If export restrictions are lifted, this work will go overseas. We could lose 5,000 jobs within our own region and $160 million in annual employment income. This is more than half of the maritime industry's total west coast employment.'' That is not the case. The fact is that exports will aid substantially the maritime industry, and all North Slope crude oil would continue to be carried aboard U.S.-flagged vessels with American crews. Labor leaders representing 50,000 members have written the President supporting exports, stating that ``ANS exports will create jobs, help maintain our merchant marine and encourage energy production.'' Estimates of job losses are completely unsupported. Further, most of the U.S.-flagged tankers are lifted for repairs in yards currently in San Diego and, to some extent, Portland. The Portland shipyard being built in Japan and floated to Portland, portions of that yard have been facing financial problems. I understand there is a competitive posture between Portland and San Diego. We have encouraged that consideration be given to the Portland bids. As a consequence, it is my understanding that there are two ships that are currently under contract to be repaired in the Portland yard. Further, the article attributes the Senator from Washington saying, More than 2,000 jobs at refineries, and Anacortes, Bellingham, and Takoma would be lost. Ninety percent of Alaskan oil is consumed by west coast refiners, and these refiners go into refineries as attributed to the Atlantic Richfield Company, Texaco Company, and Shell, plus independents such as Tosco and a smaller refinery, Summit Oil. Six of these refineries are in our State, the State of Washington, competing against foreign barges willing to pay premium prices. Industry experts predict our refineries will shut down or be forced to pay a premium price to keep their Alaskan supply or to purchase substitute foreign crude. That argument just is not based on fact. The facts, the hard, cold facts, are that two of the refiners mentioned support exports--that is ARCO and British Petroleum--and we have evidence of that, which will be entered into the Record. And for Texaco, which has not taken a position on the issue, supply will be sure. In fact Tosco, one of the refiners, has a supply agreement with British Petroleum that offers, in Tosco's own words, ``a reliable, economic supply of Alaska North Slope crude oil for the next 5 years,'' although it is my understanding there are some 4 years to go on that contractual agreement. Foreign buyers have no reason to pay premium prices for Alaska crude, because they can get their crude oil elsewhere. As stated above, even export opponents have admitted at world prices for Alaska crude oil now going to Puget Sound, it will not be exported. Some independent refiners have opposed exports because the market distortion created by the current restrictions allow these refiners to enjoy, according to the Department of Energy, ``the largest gross refining margins in the world.'' No credible evidence supports the assertion that, ``If forced to compete in a world market like everyone else in the United States, any refiner would have to lay off workers.'' Again, I remind my colleagues, one refiner in question, Tosco, already has a long-term contractual supply. Further attributed to the article, the Senator from Washington states: Tosco alone has predicted a $1 per gallon increase if exports are permitted. The fact is, the Department of Energy has concluded that the ``economic benefits of export could be achieved without increasing prices either in California or in the Nation as a whole, and that the current subsidy to west coast refiners from exports is not shared with consumers of refined products.'' The refiner, Tosco, in their 1994 quarterly report to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission stated that: At the Ferndale refinery in Washington, refining margins average $4.66 per barrel; retail margins continue to be strong, averaging 11 cents per gallon on sales of some 2.4 million gallons per day. Tosco, of course, may be worried about losing this price advantage, but that will not hurt consumers or the national interest. It will continue to allow this firm to reap profits, which they are entitled to. But they are certainly not passing on any savings to the consumer. It is kind of interesting to note why Washington State has some of the highest gasoline prices in the country while the refiners, including Tosco, have the highest profit margins between the price paid for crude oil and the amount at which they sell their refined product or gasoline. In the sense these refiners are closest to the point of the Alaska oil coming down from Valdez, these refiners are those that have the shortest shipping distance; as a consequence, the least transportation costs. But one might conclude the consumers in the State of Washington are certainly not recipients of the transportation advantage that is enjoyed by the geographic location of the proximity of the refiners to the Alaska oil supply at Valdez. Further reference in the article by the Senator from Washington: Since the Arab oil embargoes of the seventies, our reliance on foreign oil has not diminished and the arguments for retaining [that is, the oil export restrictions] remain strong. The fact is that exporting Alaska's North Slope--ANS--crude would increase U.S. energy security by stimulating additional production, estimated by the Department of Energy at 100,000 to 110,000 barrels per day. This will reduce U.S. net oil imports. The United States has already removed restrictions in place in the 1970's on petroleum product exports and on the price and allocation of oil, thus improving the efficiency of the market. Exports from every State other than Alaska are allowed if certain regulatory requirements are met. The effective ban on ANS exports is unique and discriminatory. Further, the article makes reference to comments from the Senator from Washington: With 99 percent of Alaska's crude coming through Puget Sound and 94 percent of this carried on U.S. tankers, foreign replacement oil would not only be more costly, but would be carried on more environmentally risky tankers. The U.S. Coast Guard rates as high-risk one-half of the current foreign tanker fleet that carries crude oil through Puget Sound. The fact is, there is simply no basis to assert that the Pacific Northwest will need to import oil to replace ANS crude for the reasons already listed, or that foreign-flag tankers in Puget Sound waters are environmentally risky. In fact, the Department of Energy has concluded that exports would ``probably decrease crude oil tanker movement in U.S. waters.'' Further, virtually all the oil coming into Vancouver, BC, comes in through the Straits of San Juan, adjacent to the State of Washington and British Columbia, and it comes in foreign tankers. So there is a high concentration of foreign tanker activity already coming into the San Juan area, and some of its goes into Puget Sound as well. Another contention is that British Petroleum Corp. would also save money by having its tankers built and repaired in foreign countries. The fact is that British Petroleum uses and would continue to use U.S.- flag, U.S.-built, U.S.-crewed tankers to carry Alaska crude because, Mr. President, they are a foreign corporation and cannot own U.S. vessels. It would make no economic sense for British Petroleum, or any other exporter, to reflag foreign-built tonnage to carry Alaska crude, when abundant U.S.-flag, foreign-built tonnage is already in existence in the trade. The ban on the exports of Alaska North Slope crude oil simply makes no sense. Reality dictates that it creates an inefficient market that breeds extraordinary returns for a few special interests. And some of these, unfortunately, do not seem to be inclined to pass the benefits along to the consumers. Meanwhile, maritime and oil industry jobs would be lost to this destructive trade restriction. I am sure the Senator from Washington does not begrudge the fact that Alaska might benefit from lifting the ban, any more than the fact that Alaskans recognize activity in Alaska is very beneficial to the State of Washington. I would again suggest, even on this issue, what is good for Alaska is good for the State of Washington. Our States are too close and too intertwined to believe that restrictions on each other's commerce will be good for one at the expense of the other. Mr. President, there are some other items that I want to bring to your attention; that is, some of the charges relative to what the passage of this legislation would do. Some have made the argument that as part of the original deal in 1973 to authorize construction of the pipeline, Congress saw fit to ban the ANS exports. Again, I think it is important to note that is not totally accurate. Congress did not ban exports in 1973. Instead, for the first time, it restricted all domestically produced crude oil, including ANS oil, to the same general export restrictions. At the committee's hearing on March 1, Senator Stevens, one of the few Senators still sitting in this body today who actually cast a vote in 1973, confirmed that there had been no such deal. Mr. President, there is a question of increased foreign oil reliance. The argument is made that by exporting ANS oil, we will increase our dependence on the Mideast and other foreign sources of oil. The reply to that is quite simple. The Department of Energy concluded that enactment of the legislation will decrease our net dependence on imports by spurring additional domestic energy production. We have heard the concern expressed from time to time about the potential that refinery workers would lose their jobs because refiners would have to pay more for crude oil. Yet, again in response, the Department of Energy concluded that independent refiners on the west coast have such high gross operating margins that they will be able to absorb any increased crude oil acquisition costs without significant job losses. And as the chart that I previously showed, based on the figures at hand, clearly there is justification to understand that is indeed the case. There is a question of lost work to foreign yards that would provide repairs. The argument has been made that once exports are authorized, the tankers in the Alaska oil grid will all be repaired in those subsidized foreign shipyards permitting domestic ship repair yards to be no longer economic. Tankers in the Alaskan oil trade are free to go abroad for repairs today. They rarely do, however, because foreign repairs are subject to a 50-percent ad valorem duty. One might wonder about some of our restrictive and protectionist types of legislation. This is one of them. A recent court decision, the Texaco Marine decision, will ensure that U.S. Customs will aggressively enforce collection of that 50- percent duty, as they should. Some suggested that customs is not doing it adequately. I certainly see no reason why customs should not actively enforce the law. Furthermore, every tanker that is scrapped as a result of the declining ANS production is one less tanker that will ever come in for need of repair. By spurring energy production, the bill will actually increase repair opportunities for U.S. shipyards. As long as U.S. shipyards, such as the Port of Portland, San Diego, and others, remain competitive, they should expect to do most of the repair work on the fleet simply because the vessels are traversing the waters of the west coast. An argument has been made that ANS exports will destroy the shipbuilding sector opportunity to build 1,200 to 1,500 120,000-dead- weight-ton tankers over the next 5 years. After this charge was made at the committees hearings, the leading trade association for the tanker industry advised us that not one of its members had a vessel under construction and not one planned any new building with so many vessels sitting. Furthermore, there have been suggestions that there has been some violation of GATT or OECD. The argument has been made that the U.S.- flag requirement is an unprecedented extension of cargo preference and violates our international obligation under GATT and GATT's standstill agreement and the OECD code. The reply to that is that the U.S. Trade Representative formally advised the committee that the U.S.-flag requirement did not violate our internal obligations. In adopting the United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, Congress specifically required the use of so-called Jones Act vessels to carry Alaska oil exports to Canada. No foreign government currently complained at that time. There has been some concern that the U.S.-flag requirement violates the Treaty of Friendship. That is the FCN, commerce and navigation with many nations. The reply to that is that just this past week the administration testified again that the U.S.-flag requirement does not violate any of our international obligations. The FCN treaties permit measures in furtherance of our national security such as preserving a militarily useful tanker fleet. California offshore production. There has been an argument that exports will encourage or increase pressure for California offshore production. I reply to that that the Department of Energy concluded that the California offshore production will not increase because State moratoriums are effectively in place. They simply block any further development. At the committee's March 1 hearing the witnesses representing the State of California especially rejected the argument saying [[Page S6664]] that the moratoriums in effect ban further offshore development. Mr. President, let me enter into the Record at this time a letter from our U.S. Trade Representative, Mr. Kantor, to Senator Bennett Johnston, dated March 9, 1955. Dear Senator Johnston: This replies to your letter of March 2, 1995, requesting information on the implications of cargo preference provisions of Senate bill 395 on our obligations under the World Trade Organization and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD. Specifically, you asked if the legislation violates any trade agreements, the potential legal and practical affects of a challenge as well as its effect on the ongoing negotiations on maritime in Geneva. As to WTO violation, I can state categorically that Senate bill 395, as currently drafted, does not present a legal problem. Further, we do not believe that the legislation will violate our obligations under the OECD's code of liberalization of current invisible operations or its companion common principles of shipping policy. However, the OECD does not have a mechanism for the settlement of disputes and its associations and the rights of retaliation. While parties to the OECD are obligated to defend practices that are not consistent with the codes, the OECD process does not contain a dispute mechanism with possible retaliation rights. The OECD shipbuilding agreement, by contrast, does contain specific dispute settlement mechanisms although the agreement does not address flag or crew issues. Your letter requests guidance on the implications of Senate bill 395 on the GATT's ministerial decision on negotiations of maritime transport service . . . which is the document that guides the current negotiations on maritime and the WTO. The maritime decision contains a political commitment by each participant not to adopt restrictive measures that would improve its ``negotiating position'' during the negotiations which expire in 1996. This political commitment is generally referred to as a ``peace clause.'' Actions inconsistent with the ``peace clause'' or any other aspect of the maritime decision cannot give rise to a dispute under the WTO since such decisions are not legally binding obligations. There are, of course, potential implications for violating the ``peace clause'' by adopting new restrictive measures during the course of the negotiations. These implications could include changes in the willingness of other parties to negotiate seriously to remove maritime restrictions that might lead to certain parties simply abandoning the negotiating table. But the maritime decision does not provide the opportunity for retaliation. Our view is that the U.S.-flag preference provisions of Senate bill 395 do not measurably increase the level of preference for U.S.-flag carriers and actually present opportunities for foreign flag vessels to carry more oil to the United States in light of the potentially new market opportunities resulting from enactment of S. 395. Thus, it would be very difficult for foreign parties to make a credible case that the U.S. has ``improved its negotiating position'' as a result of S. 395. For reasons I have explained, we are certain that the U.S.- flag preference does not present legal problems for us under the WTO. However, in the event any U.S. measure were found to violate our obligations, WTO does not have authority to require alterations to affect statutes. That remains the sovereign decision of the country affected by an adverse panel ruling. A losing party in such a dispute may alter its law to conform to its WTO obligations to pay compensation or accept retaliation by the prevailing party. Finally, we agree with you that it would not be appropriate to include a requirement that ANS export in U.S.-built vessels. I trust this information is of assistance to you. Please do not hesitate to contact me. Sincerely, Mickey Kantor. Vote on Motion to Table committee amendment beginning on page 1, line 3

Mr. MURKOWSKI. The Senator from Alaska calls for the question. Mr. SARBANES addressed the chair.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I call for the question.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I do not believe a quorum call is in order.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, this is an act entitled Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, as amended (43 U.S.C. 1652), is amended with the new subsection, ``Exports of Alaskan North Slope Oil.'' I believe the Chair has the amendment. What we have attempted to do here by this amendment, as reported by the committee, S. 395 would immediately authorize ANS exports carried in U.S.-flagged vessels. When the administration testified in support of lifting the Alaska North [[Page S6667]] Slope crude oil export ban, they indicated the bill should be amended, one, to provide appropriate environmental review; and second, to allow the Secretary of Commerce to recommend action against anticompetitive behavior by exporters, and to establish a licensing system. Mr. President, if no one seeks recognition, I propose the question be put to the floor.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. My statement is very short and is on the bill.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I have a very brief statement with regard to the legislation. If you are looking for a few moments of free time, I could do that.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Landfills in remote areas of Alaska do not have the resources to comply with Federal solid waste management regulations. Many communities have no local government at all, or operate all community services on an annual budget of $25,000 to $80,000. If landfills close, the result will be illegal dumping on the lands, or into the rivers, because no other alternatives exist. Unlike areas in the lower 48 States, if Alaska's village landfills are forced to close for economic reasons, the waste often cannot be disposed of in regional facilities because the necessary transportation infrastructure simply does not exist. Many villages are accessible only by aircraft, or in some cases, seasonal water transportation. Alaska is different from the lower 48 where distances may be great, but communities are connected by road to regional landfills.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I want to thank Senator Chafee, and Senator Baucus, the floor managers; Senator Smith, the subcommittee chairman; and Senator Kempthorne for accepting my amendment last night which extends the efforts of Senator Kempthorne, who amended the interstate waste disposal act to provide for practicable solid waste regulations that take into account the remote nature of Alaska Native villages--that is, relief from covering landfills, controlling access to landfills by an operator, et cetera--to cover all Alaska villages. This provision is not a blanket exemption from all landfill standards for these facilities; rather, the governor of Alaska will have flexibility to set appropriate standards based on local conditions. My amendment provides for workable solid waste regulations for all Alaska villages. The problems faced by Native village landfills are the same as those faced by other small, remote villages; both need regulatory relief. I have a list of Alaskan villages not classified as Native villages'' under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the Record.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Sure.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the public that a hearing has been scheduled before the full Committee on Energy and Natural Resources to review Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing activities with regard to the Department of Energy's civilian nuclear waste disposal program and other matters within the jurisdiction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The hearing will take place Tuesday, May 16, 1995, at 9:30 a.m., in room SD-366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington, DC. Witnesses may testify by invitation only. For further information, please call Karen Hunsicker at (202) 224-4971. subcommittee on parks, historic preservation and recreation

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I would be happy to enter into a colloquy with my good friend from Louisiana on this point.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I believe this resolution is consistent with our agreements with the People's Republic of China and is consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act as well. This resolution does not, in this Senator's opinion, violate our one-China policy. I believe that the United States can allow a private visit by President Lee to his alma mater, Cornell University, and to a business conference in Alaska without compromising United States foreign policy toward the People's Republic of China. This resolution merely calls on the administration to recognize that President Lee should be admitted to attend private events in the United States to promote our friendly, albeit unofficial, ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan, as envisioned under the Taiwan Relations Act. Since 1979, circumstances have changed between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan. I would direct my colleague's attention to the relationship that has developed between the People's of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan through their unofficial entities: the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits in Beijing and the Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan. The two sides get together and talk about everything but politics. Trade and investment has ballooned. It seems entirely appropriate that the United States should also be able to take actions to increase our trade and economic ties with Taiwan.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank my friend from Louisiana for that colloquy. Mr. JOHNSTON addressed the Chair.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I ask unanimous consent that Senator Nickles be added as the 54th bipartisan cosponsor.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair. Concurrent Resolution 53, which is a concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the President of the Republic of China on Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, be allowed to visit the United States. House Concurrent Resolution 53 is almost identical to my concurrent resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 9, which has 52 bipartisan cosponsors, including both the majority and minority leaders, for which I am most grateful. I ask unanimous consent the names of the cosponsors of Senate Concurrent Resolution 9 be printed in the Record.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, Senate Concurrent Resolution 9 was unanimously reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in March of this year. That resolution specifically calls on President Clinton to allow President Lee Teng-hui to come to the United States on a private visit, and I wish to emphasize private. House Concurrent Resolution 53 was submitted in the House by Congressmen Lantos, Solomon, and Torricelli, and adopted by the House by a rollcall vote of 396 to zero last week. Mr. President, the question is, Should we let the People's Republic of China dictate who can visit the United States? The current State Department policy of claiming that allowing President Lee to visit would upset relations with the People's Republic of China officials personally is offensive to this Senator. Taiwan is a friend. They have made great strides toward American goals--ending martial law, holding free and fair elections, allowing a vocal press, and steadily improving human rights. Taiwan is friendly, democratic, and prosperous. Taiwan is the 6th largest trading partner of the United States, and the world's 13th largest. The Taiwanese buy twice as much from the United States as from the People's Republic of China. Taiwan has the largest foreign reserves and contributes substantially to international causes. Unfortunately, the United States continues to give the cold shoulder to the leader of Taiwan. You will recall last May, we were embarrassed when the State Department refused an overnight visit for President Lee, who was in transit from Taiwan to Central America. His aircraft had to stop for refueling in Hawaii and he would have preferred to stay overnight before continuing on. Unfortunately, the State Department continues to indicate that the administration will not look favorably on a request for a private visit. Mr. President, Taiwan and the People's Republic of China are making significant progress in relations between the two of them. I call my colleagues' attention to the existence of an organization known as the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. That organization operates in Beijing. The counter to that is the Mainland Affairs Council in Taiwan. These two groups get together regularly. They talk about everything conceivable except the political differences between the two countries. That conversation includes such things as hijacking; it also includes such things as eliminating the necessity of goods from Taiwan having to go through Hong Kong before they can come into the People's Republic of China. They are addressing now the direct shipment of goods from Taiwan to the mainland of China. So here we have evidence that there is this dialog based on trade and commerce, but still the United States is afraid to take steps to encourage our trade and commerce with Taiwan because of the objections from the People's Republic of China. Now, we know that the People's Republic of China will object to a visit by President Lee because the People's Republic of China complains loudly about many United States initiatives such as United States pressure at the United Nations with regard to China's human rights practices, criteria for China's World Trade Organization membership, and anything we do to help Taiwan. But in the end, the People's Republic of China Government makes a calculation about when to risk its access to the United States and our market. And I think we should make the same calculation. The precedent does exist, my colleagues, for a visit by President Lee. The administration has welcomed other unofficial leaders to the United States--the Dalai Lama called on Vice President Gore, over the People's Republic of China's objections, I might add. Yasser Arafat came to a White House ceremony. Gerry Adams has been granted numerous visits over Britain's objections. In these cases, the administration I think has made the correct choice to allow visits to advance American goals, and President Lee's visit would do the same thing. The USA-ROC Economic Council Conference is going to be held in Anchorage, AK, in September. Visiting Alaska would not be a political statement, by any means. We consider ourselves, as my Alaskan colleague Senator Stevens often remarks, almost another country. President Lee's alma mater, Cornell University in New York, would like him to visit in June to give a speech. It is completely a private matter. It is not a matter of a state visit. I have heard suggestions that the Special Olympics, which will be held in Connecticut, might extend an invitation to President Lee, as well. So I would call on my colleagues to vote to send a strong signal to the administration that President Lee should be allowed to make a private--and I emphasize ``private''--visit. I call on the administration to change the policy because it is simply the right thing to do and it is the right time to do it. If the administration does not change the policy based on this resolution, I think they are going to face binding legislation that would force the President to allow the visit. The administration should act before facing such a situation. Mr. President, it is my intention to ask for the yeas and nays on this resolution. I also ask unanimous consent that editorials from cities around the country supporting the Lee visit be printed in the Record.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for the evidence of support to extend an invitation to President Lee Teng-hui to visit the United States in an unofficial capacity. I think the support, as evidenced by the vote of 97 to 1 is a clear message of the prevailing attitude in this body toward extending this invitation. It is my hope that the administration and the State Department will understand the intensity of the feelings with regard to our friends in Taiwan as evidenced in President Lee visiting his alma mater and to a send him to the United States-Republic of China Economic Council Conference in September of this year. I thank my colleagues for their assistance, understanding, and support of this resolution. I yield the floor, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.