Frank Murkowski

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, on behalf of the majority leader, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period of morning business.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Further, it should be noted that using this program to feed his people and to provide medicine frees up other resources that can be used to finance his factories of death. Moreover, the increase in illegal sales of petroleum products coincided with implementation of the oil-for-food program in 1995. Part of this oil is moving via truck across the Turkey-Iraq border. A more significant amount is moving by sea vessel through the Persian Gulf. Exports of contraband Iraqi oil through the Gulf have jumped seven-fold in the past year, from $10 million in diesel fuel sales in 1996 to $75 million in 1997. Furthermore, Iraq has been steadily increasing exports of oil to Jordan, from 60,000 barrels per day at the end of Operation Desert Storm to an expected 96,000 barrels per day this year. An ABC News report in December of 1997 cited the Center for Global Energy Studies' estimate that Saddam Hussein was generating $300 million to $400 million a year from contraband oil sales. Mr. President, I have absolutely no doubt that allowing Saddam to increase his oil production under the new resolution means that contraband oil exports will increase proportionately. It is this illegal flow of oil that is the lifeline that keeps his Republican Guards well fed and his weapons of mass destruction program on track. Finally, Mr. President, Resolution 1153 does more than address humanitarian imports; it finances almost the full range of imports that Iraq would make were it not under the sanctions. The resolution provides for infrastructure improvements, such as sewers and electricity--all activities that would normally be undertaken by the Iraqi Government. I have a few theories about the motivation of the interested parties. From the standpoint of the Clinton administration, this may have been viewed as a counterbalance to the call for military action. I think it was certainly counterproductive. But in any event, that was their decision. But for the other members of the Security Council, particularly those who oppose the use of military force--Russia, France, and China--the motivation is clear. The motivation is economic. As a recent Wall Street Journal article observed: For Kremlin envoys, more than $10 billion in contracts and debt is at stake in bringing an end to the United Nations economic sanctions against one of Russia's biggest trading partners. Indeed, even under the U.N. embargo, Russian oil companies have been the prime beneficiaries of the oil-for-food program. It is reported that Russia signed and delivered 36 contracts to supply pharmaceuticals worth $100 million to Iraqi hospitals under the U.N. deal. Russia's heavy industry would also benefit by supplying oil equipment, such as platforms and rigs, to Iraq, as would Russian arms makers. Of course, some Russian companies have not waited for the end of the sanctions. Iraq obtained several Russian gyroscopes used for aiming Scuds back in 1995. We know that. And just last week, U.N. inspectors accused Russia of selling Iraq huge steel drums that can be used to produce biological warfare agents. I should note that both China and France have similar conflicts of interest in that their close economic ties to Iraq and their desire for Iraqi oil have made them hard set against any military action. With the United Nations having now negotiated a deal with Saddam Hussein that appears, in the short term at least, to have sidetracked military options, and with members of the Security Council actively working to let Saddam off the hook, what can the United States do unilaterally to advance our national security interests? I am pleased to announce that Senator Helms and the Foreign Relations Committee and, in my capacity as chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, will be holding hearings on this matter in the very near future. Our Committees will look specifically at enforcement and monitoring of the oil-for-food program, the flow of contraband oil out of Iraq, the effect of the lifting of the sanctions on Iraq by the United Nations, and the beneficiaries of that change of policy. I believe Congress should instruct the administration to pursue means to tighten the oil-for-food monitoring program so that we are assured that we have the accountability--and the United Nations has never been particularly adept at accountability--and to develop measures that will prevent the illegal leakage of oil into the world marketplace. I introduced a resolution 2 weeks ago--Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 76--which would send that message to this administration. I plan to amend the resolution to reflect what is learned in the congressional hearings, and will ask the Senate to take action on it in the near future. My resolution will call on the administration to consider a few options. The first would be expanding the Multinational Interdiction Force, MIF, in the Gulf of Arabia and ensuring that the rules of engagement allow MIF forces to effectively interdict vessels containing contraband oil. Second, using all diplomatic means available to ensure that other countries in the region are not aiding illegal oil exports in violation of the U.N. resolution. Third, inspecting all vessels leaving the Iraqi Port of Basra to ensure that the economic sanctions are not being circumvented. This type of blockade is justified under existing U.N. resolutions implementing economic sanctions. We maintain in the skies, in effect, what amounts to a blockade, and we certainly have the right to enforce the movement of illegal oil that is coming out of Iraq. And, fourth, entering into negotiations with oil-producing nations to encourage them to make subsidized sales of oil to Jordan so that Iraqi- Jordanian oil-flows can simply be shut off. Mr. President, oil is the key to controlling the future of the military capacity of Iraq. We have to control it if we are ever going to control Saddam Hussein. This concludes my remarks. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania for yielding me time to talk on this Iraqi issue. Exhibit 1 [From Policywatch, Feb. 26, 1998] `Oil for Food' or the End of Sanctions? (By Patrick Clawson) While Kofi Annan's diplomacy has received headlines, another Security Council action last week--approval of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1153 on February 20--was subject to remarkably little scrutiny. This resolution, designed to expand the existing oil-for-food program with Iraq, was intended to blunt criticism from Arab and others as the way was prepared for a military option. However, in vastly expanding the amount of oil Iraq can export and loosening the restrictions on what it can import, this U.S.-backed measure went a long way towards undermining the existing sanctions regime and removing much of the incentive for Iraq to fulfill its arms inspection obligations. No Effective Limits on Iraqi Oil Exports: UNSCR 1153 authorizes oil exports of $10.66 billion per year ($5.256 billion per 180 days). By contrast, Iraqi oil exports in 1981-89 averaged $9.54 billion per annum; adjusting for inflation, that would be the equivalent of about $11.5 billion now. In other words, Iraq is now authorized to export nearly as much oil as it did before it invaded Kuwait. Indeed, the Iraqi government actually complained to the UN that the oil export level authorized by UNSCR 1153 is too high. In his letter, Tariq Aziz said Iraq's operational capacity was limited to $8 billion a year in exports and that any higher target was ``unrealistic and unfeasible'' (Security Council Press Release 6478). The UN-authorized limit translates into 2.25 million barrels per day (MBD), if the price averages $13 per barrel. In addition, Iraq produces .4 mbd for domestic use and .2 mbd for export to Jordan and smuggling out the Gulf or to Turkey. That means Iraq would have to produce 2.85 mbd to make use of the full UN quota. In fact, it is unlikely that Iraq could produce more than 2.5 mbd today and it may take Iraq until the end of 1999 before it could reach a production level that takes full advantage of the UN-authorized exports. In short, Iraq faces no effective limit on its oil exports, because it is now permitted to export all the oil it is now capable of pumping. To assist Iraq in expanding its oil production, the Security Council (in UNSCR 1153 para. 12) ``expresses its readiness [to] authoriz[e] the export of the necessary equipment to enable to increase the export of petroleum'' if the Secretary-General reports this is necessary after consulting experts. Were Iraq to resume large-scale imports of oil-field equipment, that would pose serious arms control problems. Not only is some equipment dual-use (e.g., heavy trucks), but it is important to remember that Iraq disguised its ``super gun'' barrel as an oil pipeline, convincingly enough to mislead some of the ``pipe'' producers. Imports at Half of Pre-War Level: UNSCR 1153 does more than provide humanitarian imports: it finances almost the full range of imports that Iraq would make were it not under sanctions. (One remaining exception are consumer durables, like automobiles.) In fact, UNSCR 1153 provides imports at about half the pre-war level, putting the lie to the idea that Saddam is stuck in an ever-constricting ``box.'' Here, the numbers are instructive. Of the $10.66 billion a year in UN-authorized exports, $3.20 billion (30 percent) will be withheld as compensation payment for war losses, to be distributed by the Geneva-based UN committee handling such claims. After deducting for UN operations in Iraq, about $7.1 billion will remain for imports ($3.5 billion each 180 days). Iraq will also have about $.5 billion a year from its non- 1153 oil sales, mostly to Jordan. In total, then, Iraq will have about $7.6 billion a year for imports. By contrast, Iraqi non-arms imports in 1981-89 averaged $12.1 billion per year; adjusting for inflation, that would be about $14.5 billion per year now. In other words, Iraq will be authorized to import goods at about half the pre-war level. Another wrinkle in UNSCR 1153 is that it allocates large sums to items other than food, the main focus of the original oil-for-food resolution (UNSCR 986). Of the initial 180-day imports of $3.5 billion, the plan includes $1.1 billion for investment (non-recurrent costs). That includes $449 million for the rehabilitation of hospitals and clinics, $305 million in water sanitation, $143 million in agriculture, $77 million in electricity, $30 million in resettlement, and $92 million in education. This is far more than humanitarian relief; it is a significant investment program. Furthermore, the large authorized imports of agricultural and sanitation chemicals, including dual-use precursors for chemical weapons, will provide Iraq many opportunities to divert part of this incoming stream. (And it will not be practical to post UN monitors at every Iraqi farm, barn or field to ensure that all the agricultural chemicals are being used as claimed.) Another component of UNSCR is its authorization for the import of medicine and other recurrent health costs. In fact, this resolution permits Iraq to import $117 million of such goods, an amount that exceeds the health-related imports its neighbors Iran or Turkey, each with populations three times Iraq's. More than Sufficient Food: If the principal international concern is to alleviate malnutrition, the food imports under the original oil-for-food program were already sufficient. UNSCR 1153 will take the average Iraqi's intake to levels far beyond which the U.S. government recommends for the average America. While the food distribution program under the original oil- for-food resolution began, the situation improved markedly after the arrival in Baghdad last September of Dennis Halliday, an Irish public administration expert. Three million tons of food has arrived in country, more than 90 percent of which has been distributed. This has amounted to regular distribution of a ration of 2,030 calories per Iraqi day from flours, rice, legumes, sugar, cooking oil, and baby milk. In addition, tea, salt, soap, and detergent are also distributed. UNSCR 1153's new distribution plan envisages increasing Iraqi rations to 2,463 calories a day. In addition, Iraq produces fruits, vegetables, and lamb--none of which are in the rations--sufficient to provide on average an extra 500 calories per day. That means the Iraqi diet will rise to an average 2,950 calories per day, a level that equals almost 95 percent of the Iraqis' pre-1990 intake of 3,100 calories per day. To put this in context, the U.S. Department of Agriculture recommends that a healthy diet for an adult American is 2,200-2,400 calories per day. Furthermore, the money authorized for food imports is well above that needed to produce this diet. The UNSCR 1153 plan allocates $1.4 billion for food imports for 180 days. That works out to $129 per person per year, which is way out of line with the cost of other international relief efforts. Perhaps the UN plan is to provide Iraqis with a more tasty and varied diet. But the possibility remains that Iraqis will find ways to divert funds, for instance, by over-invoicing (claiming goods cost more than they actually do). Humanitarian Crisis? The Iraqi government makes lurid claims about hundreds of thousands of infants dying because of the sanctions. These claims are parroted by international organizations, like UNICEF, which release reports based entirely on Iraqi-provided data. However, there is no reason to expect Iraqi data about malnutrition to be any more accurate than Iraqi data about weapons of mass destruction. Yet even if one were to take Iraqi data at face value, without the international inspection of Saddam's humanitarian situation that Baghdad prevents, then some Iraqi statistics suggest there may not be as acute a humanitarian problem as Iraq contends. Iraq's 1997 census showed a population increase of 3.5 million since 1990's 18.5 million. As even the official newspaper Al-Jumhurriyah admitted (October 18, 1997), ``This is an unusual increase for a people who have been exposed to embargo, starvation, and disease and who have consistently lost 20,000 persons per month.'' To have the increase shown in the census (500,000 a year) and allowing for deaths, there must have been each year 700,000 infants who survived. Iraqi pre-war data on births show that 700,000 births a year is about what could have been expected in Iraq in the mid-1990s, given the past pattern. That does not leave room for the claimed 100,000-plus deaths a year of infants due to sanctions. In other words, unless there was some unusual increase in the birth rate, the Iraqi census data are consistent with a normal level of births and a normal level of infant mortality and inconsistent with Iraq's claim of a high infant mortality rate. Implications: UNSCR 1153 is a big victory for Saddam. He has come a long way towards his goal of the lifting of sanctions. He is now authorized to export oil effectively without limit and to import nearly all types of civilian goods at about half the pre-war level, which is about all his war-ravaged country could absorb in any case. This effectively eviscerates one of the main incentives for Iraqi cooperation with UNSCOM--i.e., the prospect that sanctions would be lifted once UNSCOM certifies Iraqi compliance on weapons of mass destruction, as outlined in UNSCR 678 paragraph 22. By going much of the way towards lifting sanctions, UNSCR 1153 gives Saddam less reason to cooperate with UNSCOM than ever before.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I rise in support of Senator Specter's resolution which calls for the establishment of a war crimes tribunal to bring Saddam Hussein to justice. I agree that it is justifiable that Saddam Hussein be prosecuted as an international war criminal, thereby removing him from power. Such an action would eliminate the problem facing the United States and a good part of the free world today. Certainly with his systematic action to destroy the population of the civilian Kurds in Iraq through the use of chemical weapons in 1988, his war of aggression against Kuwait in 1990, his missile attacks on Israel in 1991, and his involvement in the attempt to assassinate former President Bush in 1993, there is no doubt in my mind that there is sufficient evidence to pursue him as a war criminal. Mr. President, I think this resolution is only one of the policies that this administration should pursue to shut down Iraq's terrorist regime. I propose one more, one that I raised earlier in this body this week. I think we must go back to the original purpose of the economic sanctions against Iraq and shut down Saddam Hussein's ability to fund his programs for weapons of mass destruction. In other words, Mr. President, cut off his cash flow, which comes from illegal oil sales. Mr. President, this is the only way we can bring Saddam to his knees. We must effectively cut off the flow of oil from Iraq. I would like to share a few facts that my colleagues may not be aware of but that are critical to the issue of how Saddam Hussein maintains his current grip on power. Revenue from oil exports have historically represented nearly all of Iraq's foreign exchange earnings. In the year preceding Operation Desert Storm, Iraq's export earnings totaled $10.4 billion, with 95 percent of that attributed to petroleum exports. So make no mistake about where the revenue comes from. It comes from his oil. Iraq's imports during the same year, 1990, totaled only $6.6 billion. U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, passed in 1991 at the end of the Gulf war, requires that international economic sanctions, including an embargo on the sale of oil from Iraq, remain in place until--I emphasize ``until''--Iraq discloses and destroys its weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities and undertakes unconditionally never to resume such activities. Well, where are we? The teeth in Resolution 687 have effectively been removed with the expansion of the so-called oil-for-food exception to the sanctions. The first loosening of the sanctions occurred in 1995 when Security Council Resolution 986 allowed Iraq to export $1 billion in oil every 90 days, which is $4 billion over a year. Most recently, during the period when Saddam was again violating Security Council resolutions by refusing to allow international inspectors to conduct their work, the United Nations voted to more than double the amount of oil Iraq can export next year. On February 20, the U.N. Security Council, with the Clinton administration's support, adopted Resolution 1153, which will allow Iraq to export $10.52 billion in oil sales per year. That is $5.256 billion every 6 months. In other words, Iraq is now authorized to export nearly as much oil, in today's dollars, as it did before it invaded Kuwait. So what are we doing, Mr. President? We are obviously increasing Saddam Hussein's ability to generate a greater cash flow to fund his purposes, that are certainly suspect, to say the least. The question is, Will the United States force Iraq to wait to rebuild its oil production capability until it meets the conditions imposed at the end of the Gulf war? We clearly have that answer: It is quite the contrary. In fact, paragraph 12 of Resolution 1153 directs the Secretary General to establish a group of experts to determine whether Iraq has the production and transportation capacity to export the full amount allowed. Well, the resolution goes on to say that the Security Council ``expresses its readiness'' to authorize ``the export of necessary equipment to enable Iraq to increase the export of petroleum or petroleum products.'' Clearly, we are giving him the green light to increase his production capabilities. Nowhere does the resolution mention the potential arms control problems presented by allowing Iraq to resume the import of petroleum equipment, some of which is dual-use and some of which can easily be disguised. We witnessed his efforts in the early 1980s to disguise shipments into Iraq that, at that time, were explained to the United States as ``parts for his refineries,'' when in fact they turned out to be parts for his huge cannon or pipe gun. Even as President Clinton vowed to ``keep the sanctions on'' Iraq until the regime lives up to most of its commitments, we are obviously creating a giant loophole for Iraq's most important commodity--and that is oil--to find its way out into the markets of the world. Mr. President, I recommend to my colleagues an excellent analysis of the problems with the expansion of the oil program by Patrick Clawson, which came out of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, entitled ``Oil for Food Or the End of Sanctions.'' I ask unanimous consent that the text of this article be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I ask unanimous consent the amendment be considered as read and agreed to.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I ask unanimous consent reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, on behalf of the leader and on behalf of Senator Specter, I call up amendment numbered 1933 to the pending resolution

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, on behalf of the majority leader, tomorrow the Senate will resume consideration of S. Con. Res. 78, a resolution regarding Saddam Hussein, with a vote occurring on the resolution to begin at 9:30 a.m. Following the vote, the Senate will be in a period of morning business with Senator Bennett being recognized for 45 minutes. During Friday's session, the Senate may also begin consideration of S. 270, the Texas low-level radioactive waste, Senate bill 414, the international shipping bill; and/or H.R. 2646, the A+ education bill. For the information of all Members, one or two votes can be expected to occur during Monday's session of the Senate beginning at approximately 5:30 p.m.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I ask unanimous consent that following the 9:30 a.m. vote, the Senate proceed to a period of morning business with Senator Bennett immediately being recognized for up to 45 minutes.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, on behalf of the majority leader, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in adjournment until 9:30 a.m. on Friday, March 13, and immediately following the prayer the routine requests through the morning hour be granted and the Senate immediately proceed to a vote on S. Con. Res. 78, a resolution regarding Saddam Hussein, as under the previous order at the hour of 9:30.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, on behalf of the majority leader, as in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that at 12 noon on Monday, March 16, the Senate proceed to executive session to consider the nomination of Frederica Massiah-Jackson to be a U.S. district judge, and it be considered under the following agreement: There be 6 hours of debate on the nomination on Monday, March 16, to be equally divided in the usual form, with a vote to occur on or in relation to the nomination at 10 a.m. on Tuesday, March 17.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, my amendment on major investment study requirements for highway projects in metropolitan areas was cleared by the managers and adopted during today's debate, but I wanted to say a few words about it. Mr. President, regulations now require a major investment study for all large metropolitan projects. This requirement needlessly duplicates planning and study processes already required for such projects under other long range transportation planning efforts required in Title 23. The result is a significant slow-down in planning and project completion. In my home state, major projects in our largest city, Anchorage, have been frozen in place by this needless insistence on needless studies. This amendment directs the Secretary to adopt regulations eliminating the Major Investment Study as a stand-alone requirement within six months, and to integrate any non-redundant and worthwhile portions of it into a new, streamlined transportation planning process that involves all concerned parties as early as possible in the planning and decision process. This is a very important step in alleviating needless red tape and confusion for metropolitan planners, and moving forward on some vital projects, and I appreciate the managers' help in resolving this issue.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, I thank the managers for accepting my amendment on the reconstruction of the Alaska Highway. The Alcan is the only road link between the contiguous states and Alaska. It was constructed in 1942 during World War II to respond to a critical strategic need for such a highway. This amendment adds language needed to fund the last stages of a multi-year reconstruction project on the Alcan, which runs 1,520 miles from Dawson Creek, British Columbia to Fairbanks, Alaska. The still-unfinished portion is the last 95 miles of the 325-mile northern, or ``Shakwak'' section, so-called because a good part of it runs through a geological formation called the Shakwak Trench. At this point, Mr. President, I want to provide a little of this highway's fascinating history. Since the British burned the Capitol here in Washington during the War of 1812, the United States' territory in the mainland of North America has suffered only one invasion. That invasion was during World War II, in Alaska. In 1940, construction began on Fort Richardson, outside Anchorage. However, immediately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, it became clear that Alaska had great strategic importance as a staging area for forces in the North Pacific. Construction on the Alcan began in the spring of 1942. In June 1942, Japanese aircraft bombed Dutch Harbor, Alaska. Four days later, they invaded and fortified sites on Attu and Kiska, two of the Aleutian Islands, which they held for nearly a full year before our forces liberated them. During the Japanese occupation of these U.S. islands, the Alcan was built. It provided a secure route to move essential supplies and equipment safe from German or Japanese submarines. In a feat of engineering that is still unprecedented, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers managed to build this 1,520-mile road across trackless wilderness in just eight months. At first, naturally, the Alcan was just a dirt road punched through trees and across the tundra by bulldozers. After the war, however, civilian contractors began the long task of upgrading to a graveled road that civilian vehicles could manage. But traffic continued to increase, with 79% of the traffic Americans on the way to Alaska and back. A gravel road just isn't up to the task. In 1977, the United States and Canada joined in an agreement in which the United States government committed to pay the costs of reconstructing the Alcan to a modern, paved standard, and Canada undertook to pay for all maintenance and upkeep, such as snow removal. In passing, Mr. President, let me note that where the U.S. commitment in that agreement has been approximately $20 million per year and is now dropping to $16 million per year, Canada spends $40 million to $50 million per year on its portion of the highway agreement. Mr. President, if I may, I have a copy of that 1977 diplomatic agreement that I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I compliment the staffs and I thank Senator Chafee. Mr. President, Ferries are a small but extremely important part of our transportation system. This amendment reauthorizes the ferry discretionary program at $30 million per year, with an authorization to appropriate $20 million more annually, and it calls on the Secretary of Transportation to conduct a thorough review of existing ferry services and potential new routes, and to both report back to Congress and to discuss his findings with interested local and state governments. It is our hope this will both maintain this important link in our transportation chain, and stimulate thought and action toward both standard and high-speed ferries as cost effective and environmentally sensitive alternatives for traditional solutions such as bridges and causeways. Included is a provision setting aside $12 million for ferry systems that are in the national highway system. Mr. President, in my state of Alaska, where roads are few and far between our ferry system--the Alaska Marine Highway System--is the only scheduled transportation link between many island communities which are not connected by roads. Many of these villages are too small even to have the smallest of landing strips, and expensive float planes are the only other option for travel. It is absolutely irreplaceable. It carries senior citizens from their small communities to doctors' offices and hospitals in larger communities. It is how basketball and swimming and other sports teams from remote villages are able to reach out to meet and interact with other teams from other communities. It is how small communities receive their fresh milk, their fresh bread, and their canned goods and other foodstuffs. Most of these are fishing communities, and quite often the ferry system is now a fishermen sidelined by an engine breakdown will get his new parts so that he can get back to making a living for himself and his family. Mr. President, I could go on, but I trust the message is clear. In my state, the service provided by our ferry system is an integral part of the fabric of life. When I say it is irreplaceable, that is not just a figure of speech, it is the literal truth. In other states, Mr. President, ferry services may have slightly different impacts, but they are all equally essential. In Hawaii they offer a necessary alternative to a strained road system that is close to its limits. In the southeast, they quickly and safely evacuate those threatened by hurricanes. In the Pacific Northwest and in the northeastern states they move hundreds of thousands of vehicles and millions of passengers quickly and safely and with a minimum of pollution. In all, 25 states have benefited from the ferry discretionary program under ISTEA. In alphabetical order, these are: Alabama, Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Mississippi, Maryland, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia and Washington. Puerto Rico and the Virgin islands have also received funds. Mr. President, that is an impressive list, but the sad fact is that the funding that has been available under this program is not keeping pace with the need. Ferries--like any vessel--are very expensive to operate, let alone the cost of maintaining the necessary shoreside facilities, and of expanding both those facilities and the capacity of our nation's ferries in response to increasing demand. Let me offer a little comparison here. The national highway program has paid for and is paying for the construction and replacement of over 483,000 bridges over waterways of various sizes. In FY97 alone, almost $2 billion went to bridges. The ferry program was a puny $18 million-- less than one percent of the bridge dollars, and not nearly enough to do the job. And what of those communities that are beyond the reach of bridges and are dependent--literally dependent--on ferries? The communities may not be physically or reliably reachable by road, but they are full of American citizens who deserve the same priority treatment from Congress as those who are reliant on bridges. My amendment gives those communities the recognition and assistance they need and deserve. I urge the support of all my distinguished colleagues, and ask for it's immediate adoption.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. The U.S. commitment to reconstruct the Alcan is only logical. The Alcan is an international highway from one part of the United States to another. It is considered as a national defense highway, and it is of direct benefit not only to Alaska, but to the United States as a whole. This is not an Alaska issue, Madam President. This is a project undertaken by the United States Government--a project that benefits the country as a whole and which protects our strategic interests. More importantly, it is one which we should now complete.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, seeing no other Senator seeking recognition, I ask unanimous consent to speak briefly for 5 minutes.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, although stories about Iraq have moved off page 1, history teaches us that we should be prepared for another crisis, and I will tell you why. Most of the previous debate on Iraq has focused on military options or support for opposition groups, but I am here to call the attention of my colleagues to an issue that seems to have been lost. Where is the will of the world to enforce the economic sanctions, including the embargo on oil sales, that date back to the end of Operation Desert Storm? We must go back, I think, to the original purpose of the economic sanctions against Iraq and simply shut down Saddam Hussein's ability to fund his program for weapons of mass destruction. Because there is a significant amount of oil that he is able to sell, and the proceeds are not going for humanitarian needs in Iraq; they are going into Saddam Hussein's pocket, and, as a consequence, he is fueling his military machine. In my opinion there is only one way to shut down Saddam's military machine. We must effectively cut off the flow of oil from Iraq. I would like to share a few facts that my colleagues may not be aware of, but that are critical to the issue of how Saddam Hussein maintains his current grip on power. He does that by the cash flow generated from illegal oil sales. Revenue from oil exports have historically represented nearly all of Iraq's foreign exchange earnings. In the year preceding Operation Desert Storm, Iraq's export earnings totaled $10.5 billion with 95 percent attributed to oil exports, so that's really his cash flow. Iraq's imports during the same year, 1990, totaled only $6.6 billion. United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, passed in the 1991 at the end of the gulf war, requires that international economic sanctions, including an embargo on the sale of oil from Iraq, remain in place until Iraq discloses and destroys its weapons of mass destruction programs and capabilities and undertakes unconditionally never to resume such activities. But the teeth in Resolution 687 have effectively been removed with the expansion of the so-called ``oil-for-food'' exception to the sanctions. The first loosening of the sanctions occurred in 1995, when Security Council Resolution 986 allowed Iraq to export $1 billion in oil every 90 days--$4 billion over one year. And most recently, during the period when Saddam was again violating Security Council resolution by refusing to allow international inspectors to conduct their work, the United Nations voted to more than double the amount of oil Iraq can export per year. On February 20, the U.N. Security Council, with the Clinton administration's support, adopted Resolution 1153 which will allow Iraq to export $10.52 billion in oil per year--$5.256 billion every 180 days. In other words, Iraq is now authorized to export nearly as much oil, in today's dollars, as it did before it invaded Kuwait. So we have now given Saddam Hussein the green light to completely rebuild his oil export capacity. As Patrick Clawson, from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, observed in a recent analysis of Resolution 1153: The UN-authorized limit translates into 2.25 million barrels per day (mbd), if the price averages $13 barrel. In addition, Iraq produces .4 mbd for domestic use and .2 mbd for export to Jordan and smuggling out the Gulf or to Turkey. That means Iraq would have to produce 2.85 mbd to make use of the full UN quota. In fact, it is unlikely that Iraq could produce more than 2.5 mbd today and it may take Iraq until the end of 1999 before it could reach a production level that takes full advantage of the UN-authorized export. In short, Iraq faces no effective limit on its oil exports, because it is now permitted to export all the oil it is capable of pumping. Mr. President, will the United States force Iraq to wait to rebuild its oil production capability until it meets the conditions imposed at the end of the gulf war? Quite the contrary. In fact, paragraph 12 of Resolution 1153 directs the Secretary General to establish a group of experts to determine whether Iraq has the production and transportation capacity to export the full amount allowed. The resolution goes on to say that the Security Council, ``expresses its readiness'' to authorize ``the export of necessary equipment to enable Iraq to increase the export of petroleum or petroleum products.'' Analyst Patrick Clawson correctly pointed out the dangers of allowing Iraq to resume the import of petroleum equipment: Were Iraq to resume large-scale imports of oil field equipment, that would pose serious arms control problems. Not only is some of the equipment dual use (e.g., heavy trucks), but it is important to remember that Iraq disguised its ``super gun'' barrel as an oil pipeline, convincingly enough to mislead some of the ``pipe'' producers. Even as President Clinton vowed to ``keep the sanctions on'' Iraq until the regime lives up to its commitments, we are creating a giant loophole for Iraq's most important commodity--oil. Of course, expansion of the food-for-oil program is sold as a humanitarian gesture. U.S. Ambassador Peter Burleigh described the Security Council action as the ``largest U.N.-sanctioned humanitarian program'' in its history. I have no disagreement with finding ways to reduce the misery of the Iraqi people, who have suffered greatly under Hussein's leadership, but I do have a problem with the oil-for-food expansion, because I am not convinced it is controllable under the current U.N. proposal. The administration has not yet convinced me that the monitoring of this program is so airtight that it does not allow kickbacks that benefit Saddam Hussein directly. But even if the monitoring is airtight, Mr. President, I am convinced that the program indirectly benefits Saddam Hussein for several reasons. First, using this program to feed his people and to provide medicine frees up other resources that can be used to finance his factories of death. Second, the increase in illegal sales of petroleum products coincided with implementation of the oil-for-food program in 1995. Part of this oil is moving via truck across the Turkey-Iraq border. A more significant amount is moving by sea vessel through the Persian Gulf. The Multinational Interdiction Force that operates in the gulf reported last fall that exports of contraband Iraqi oil through the gulf has jumped sevenfold in the past year from $10 million in diesel fuel sales in 1996 to $75 million in 1997. Furthermore, Iraq has been steadily increasing exports of oil to Jordan, from 60,000 barrels per day at the end of Operation Desert Storm to an expected 96,000 barrels per day currently. An ABC News report in December of 1997 cited the Center for Global Energy Studies estimate that Saddam Hussein was generating $300 to $400 million a year from contraband oil sales. Mr. President, these are illegal sales that have generated funds for Saddam Hussein's war machine. I have absolutely no doubt that allowing Saddam to increase his oil production under the new resolution means that contraband oil exports will increase proportionately. It is this illegal flow of oil that is the lifeline that keeps his Republican Guards well fed and his weapons of mass destruction production program on track. A former head of Iraq's military intelligence, in an interview with ABC News, said that the dollars generated by smuggling ``enable Saddam Hussein to support his intelligence services and the military to keep them loyal. That is how he stays in power.'' Finally, Resolution 1153 does more than provide for humanitarian imports. It finances almost the full range of imports that Iraq would make were it not under the sanctions. Again quoting from Patrick Clawson: In fact, UNSCR 1153, provides imports at about half the prewar level, putting the lie to the idea that Saddam is stuck in an ever-constricting ``box.'' He is not stuck in an ever-constricting box; the box is full of holes. The resolution provides for infrastructure improvements such as sewers and electricity--all activities that would normally be undertaken by the Iraqi Government. To the extent this U.N. action quells citizen discontent with Iraqi leadership, we are just prolonging the life of this horrible regime. So why did the U.N. Security Council adopt Resolution 1153? I have a few theories about the motivation of the interested parties. For the Clinton administration, this may have been viewed as a counterbalance to the call for military action. I think it was counterproductive, but that was their decision. But for other members of the Security Council, particularly those who oppose the use of military force--Russia, France and China--the motivation is clear. It is an economic motivation. As a recent Wall Street Journal article observed: For Kremlin envoys, more than $10 billion in contracts and debt is at stake in bringing an end to the United Nations economic sanctions against one of Russia's biggest trading partners. Indeed, even under the U.N. embargo, Russian oil companies such as NK Zarubezhneft and AO Surgutneftegas have been the prime beneficiaries of the ``food for oil'' program . . . Russia signed and delivered 36 contracts to supply pharmaceuticals worth $100 million to Iraq hospitals under the U.N. deal. The Wall Street Journal correctly observes that Russia's heavy industry would also benefit by supplying oil equipment, such as platforms and rigs, to Iraq, as would Russian arms makers. Of course, some Russian companies have not waited for the end of sanctions. Iraq obtained several Russian gyroscopes used for aiming Scuds in 1995, and just last week we became aware that U.N. inspectors accused Russia of selling Iraq huge steel drums that could be used to produce biological warfare agents. In spite of these actions by Russia, it was reported this weekend that U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan was studying a Russian request to have a Russian named as codeputy chairman of the U.N. special commission overseeing the weapons inspections. I sincerely hope the United States will use its veto power to prevent this appointment in light of the obvious conflicts of interest. I should note, Mr. President, that both China and France have similar conflicts of interest in that their close economic ties to Iraq have been in existence for some time, and their desire for Iraqi oil is well known. These have made them hard set against any military action for some time. With the United Nations having now negotiated a deal with Saddam Hussein that appears in the short term to have sidetracked military options--and with members of the Security Council actively working to let Saddam Hussein off the hook--what can the United States do unilaterally to advance our national security interests? I have some suggestions. First, the Congress should hold hearings to examine the impact of increased oil sales on Saddam Hussein's ability to stay in power. As chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, I would like to conduct these hearings jointly with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and my good friend, Senator Helms. Second, the administration should keep our forces in the gulf region while we test whether this time Saddam Hussein means what he says. Third, Congress should instruct the administration to pursue means to tighten the oil-for-food monitoring program and to develop measures that would prevent the illegal leakage of oil into the world marketplace. I submitted a resolution 2 weeks ago, Senate Concurrent Resolution 76, which would send that message to the administration. I plan to amend that resolution to reflect what is learned in congressional hearings, and I will ask the Senate to take action on that in the near future. My resolution will call on the administration to consider the following options: First, expanding the multinational interdiction force, the MIF, in the Gulf of Arabia and ensuring that the rules of engagement allow MIF forces to effectively interdict vessels containing contraband oil. Second, using all diplomatic means available to ensure that other countries in the region are not aiding illegal oil exports in violation of the U.N. resolutions. Third, inspecting all vessels leaving the Iraqi Port of Basra to ensure that the economic sanctions are not being circumvented. This type of blockade is justified under existing U.N. resolutions implementing economic sanctions. While it may sound like an extreme measure to initiate a blockade, I remind my colleagues that we have a blockade of the airspace over that part of the country, which we have taken the initiative to enforce. Fourth, and finally, entering into negotiations with oil-producing nations to encourage them to make subsidized oil sales to Jordan so that the Iraqi-Jordanian flow of oil can be shut off. Taken together, all these measures will serve to increase Iraq's economic isolation and provide a deterrence to illegal actions. This is an approach we used successfully in confronting the former Soviet Union, and I think we should return to it right now. Again, oil is the key to controlling the future military capability of Iraq. We must control it if we are ever going to contain Saddam Hussein. Mr. President, that concludes my remarks. I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I hope that Taiwan now continues its forward march and finishes its two outstanding bilateral negotiations with the European Union and Switzerland. And I call on our administration to continue to show leadership on this issue. I am also encouraged by the leadership of the Director General of the World Trade Organization, Renato Ruggiero, in his recent comments that, ``Taiwan's entry does not depend on China. The negotiations of Taiwan are progressing well. At the World Trade Organization we are not, fortunately, ruled by political principles.'' I hope the rest of the WTO members, the United States included, will abide by those words. Mr. President, I am not ignoring that Taiwan's entry into the World Trade Organization faces hurdles not faced by other prospective entries. It is well known that the People's Republic of China, which is not yet a member of the World Trade Organization, has indicated that Taiwan should not join the WTO before the PRC. The optimistic solution, of course, is that the PRC conclude its outstanding bilateral negotiations with the United States and the other countries and is prepared for entry at the same time. I would certainly support that outcome. Unfortunately, negotiations with the PRC are not proceeding quickly, and there is always the risk that the PRC will decide to drop its bid for WTO entry altogether. What happens then to Taiwan? Well, that isn't addressed, Mr. President. Fortunately, Mr. President, we are not yet faced with that situation, so I will not speculate on possible alternatives. But it does call to mind the delicate nature of the three-way relationship between the United States, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and the People's Republic of China. Recently, comments of Dr. Arthur Waldron, a prominent Asia scholar and a professor of international relations at the University of Pennsylvania, have been brought to my attention because of the insight that he offers on American policy on this triangular relationship. I would like to share with my colleagues some of the observations Dr. Waldron made at a recent forum hosted by the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Waldron said that, ``although we have a military policy toward the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, we don't really have a political policy.'' He was referring, of course, to President Clinton's decision in 1996 to send a pair of aircraft carriers into the region when the PRC began a series of missile tests in the Taiwan Strait on the eve of the first direct democratic presidential elections in Taiwan. Waldron argues that, while the United States showed military support for Taiwan in 1996, there has been little discussion of a long-term political policy. One of the reasons he says--and I agree--is that, ``there are all kinds of taboos around,'' particularly with regard to the language we use when discussing the issue. ``We have a very strong relationship with Taiwan, but we're not allowed to go public with it,'' Waldron said at last month's forum. We can't call them by their official name. You even look in the CIA guide and it has Taiwan, and where it says ``official name'', it says ``none.'' It's called the Republic of China, or the Republic of China on Taiwan. Those who work for our government aren't allowed to say that. I don't know why. Waldron believes that the American policy toward the PRC-Taiwan issue is based on similar problems of language. The three communiques between the PRC and the United States, along with the Taiwan Relations Act, outline the official U.S. position on the issue, which is that the United States supports ``peaceful reunification'' of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. But in the 1970s, when the first two communiques were signed, it was generally thought that Taiwan would not survive on its own for very long. ``There was a real underestimation of the resilience, the capability of Taiwan and its people. There was a sense . . . that they would reach some sort of an agreement with the PRC, which would eliminate this issue,'' he says. Of course, that has not happened, Mr. President. And today, with the PRC's Communist regime still in place and Taiwan's democracy growing every day, it is unlikely to happen any time soon. Waldron calls the current situation ``the policy of denial.'' ``The idea is if you can get everybody in the world to say that Taiwan is no more than a renegade province, then somehow it will become a reality. Well, just having somebody say that something is so doesn't [necessarily] make it so,'' he said at the AEI forum. Waldron concluded his remarks last month with the comment that he was not calling for ``a sudden and dramatic change in policy.'' Instead, he said: What I am calling for is a change in the way we talk and the way we think. We have to start saying to ourselves, suppose that there isn't going to be this wonderful peaceful unification that we've all been talking about, suppose Taiwan keeps on developing the way it is, with even more legitimacy in its political organizations, freer speech and independent capabilities that make it impossible for anybody to compel them. And suppose the PRC doesn't evolve in ways that would make a solution more possible. What should we do? Let's call things by their true names, and talk about real possibilities and real scenarios for the future, rather than imagining that somehow this problem has been solved. Mr. President, I found Dr. Waldron's comments refreshing. Back in 1993, I requested a hearing on Taiwan in the Foreign Relations Committee on how we could update our relations with Taiwan. This hearing was delayed for over a year as the administration completed the ``Taiwan Policy Review.'' That review was finally released in September 1994. Although the administration did take some positive steps, which I welcomed, it left unanswered many of the inconsistencies that Dr. Waldron discussed. Further on the subject of Taiwan, Mr. President, yesterday's Washington Post carried yet another in what is clearly a series of Clinton Administration trial balloons on the subject of a Taiwan- Beijing dialogue. This article, authored by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, indicates the Administration is continuing to use third parties to increase pressure on Taiwan to return to the negotiating table with Beijing. I, for one, would welcome fruitful dialogue between Taiwan and Beijing, but I think we in the United States would do well to ensure that it takes place on mutually satisfactory terms. We promised Taiwan in 1979, when we withdrew recognition of the Republic of China, that we would never pressure Taiwan into direct negotiations with the communist authorities on the mainland. I am troubled by Dr. Nye's thesis and the whole premise of the messages the Administration his been sending to Taipei through former government officials. That is, that Taiwan should hasten to sit at the negotiating table with a nuclear super power that refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan's democracy. I believe a renunciation of the use of force by Beijing would be an important demonstration of good will and would facilitate a meaningful dialogue so our democratic friends in Taiwan are not pressured by Washington to negotiate with a gun to their head. Further, Dr. Nye states that the United States should publicly announce that it will not defend Taiwan if Taiwan declare independence. While I agree that it is undesirable for Taiwan to declare independence, I think Nye's logic is backward. Do we want to encourage people to think that Taiwan is ripe for the picking? Our policy of creative ambiguity has long served U.S. interests. So has our demonstrated readiness to use force, as we did when we introduced the two carriers into the Taiwan Strait two years ago when China tried to intimidate the people of Taiwan on the eve of their presidential election. I believe we should not change this policy. The U.S. should continue to be prepared, under appropriate circumstances, to deploy our defense resources in support of democracy in Taiwan. Finally, Dr. Nye suggests that there is nothing but second class status in Taiwan's future. I do not think that the United States should endorse such a fate for the proud, free democratic people of Taiwan. With creative solutions, I hope Taiwan can assume its full and rightful place in international organizations. I don't think the United States through current officials, former officials or trial balloons should walk away from our support in this regard. As President Clinton prepares for another summit with President Jiang of China, I hope that he will take into consideration Dr. Waldron's comments and the input of interested Members of Congress who have long followed this issue. Taiwan is a strong democracy. It is not going to simply bow to coercion from China. The United States should recognize this and work to find a policy that will ease regional tensions and promote future stability in the Asia-Pacific area. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise today to call my colleagues' attention to the recent conclusion of the bilateral trade negotiations between the United States and the Republic of China on Taiwan. I think it is significant because it is this event that moves Taiwan one step closer to entry into the World Trade Organization. This event has particular significance to me because I was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee in 1990 when Taiwan first applied for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the predecessor organization to the World Trade Organization. Then chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Claiborne Pell, and I and a number of others initiated a letter to President Bush, signed by 13 members of the Foreign Relations Committee, urging our Government to support the formation of a working group on Taiwan's application to GATT. A similar letter to the President, initiated by then chairman of the Finance Committee Lloyd Bentsen and ranking Republican Bob Packwood was signed by 20 members of the Senate Finance Committee. Mr. President, I am gratified that Taiwan and the United States have reached this important milestone in our bilateral relationship. I also congratulate Taiwan for committing to adopt WTO principles at this time, particularly when many countries in the region are questioning the merits of opening doors and providing freer access to their domestic markets. Taiwan, once again, is serving as a model for the region. Last week, members of the Finance Committee had an opportunity to meet with the U.S. Trade Representative, Charlene Barshefsky, to discuss this issue, among others. The members of the Finance Committee attending that meeting signed a letter to Ambassador Barshefsky congratulating her and the other USTR negotiators for reaching a deal that will dramatically open Taiwan's markets to U.S. agricultural products, services, and other industrial goods. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of that letter be printed in the Record.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the public that a hearing has been scheduled before the full Committee on Energy and Natural Resources. The hearing will take place Thursday, March 19, 1998 at 9:30 a.m. in room SD-366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington, D.C. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony on S. 1488 and accompanying Senate amendment No. 1618, legislation to ratify an agreement between the Aleut Corporation and the United States of America to exchange land rights received under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act for certain land interests on Adak Island, and for other purposes; and S. 1670, a bill to amend the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act to provide for selection of lands by certain veterans of the Vietnam era. Those wishing to testify or who wish to submit written statements should write to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510. Presentation of oral testimony is by Committee invitation only. For further information, please contact Brian Malnak or Jo Meuse at (202) 224-6730.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I wonder if I may speak as in morning business for about 10 minutes?

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the public that a hearing has been scheduled before the Full Energy and Natural Resources Committee to consider the following measures: S. 1100--To amend the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, the legislation approving such covenant, and for other purposes. S. 1275--To implement further the Act (Public Law 94-241) approving the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America, and for other purposes. The hearing will take place on Tuesday, March 31, 1998, at 9:30 A.M. in room SD-366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. For further information, please call Betty Nevitt, Staff Assistant at (202) 224-0765.