Frank Murkowski

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, we are so close, yet so far away in our differences here. I think it is fair to say that when the viability assessment is completely at the discretion of the President, we would all agree that it is subject to political pressures. I think we all agree that we have an obligation to make a decision. We have agreed to withhold on a decision until the viability assessment is available. My friend from New Mexico has indicated a concern about the viability and the suitability. I am told that the suitability is 80 percent likely. Viability is 90 percent. Those are very high odds. The problem of how we resolve this and whether or not we are going to be delaying this action again, I think, has to be related to the fact that when we get the viability assessment, we either choose Nevada if it is positive, or give the President time to choose another site if it is negative. Only if we are unable to choose another site--only then--would it go to Nevada. That would imply that the President wasn't doing his job, and that Congress wasn't capable of doing their job. And I think we both agree that there would be a significant shirking of an obligation or duty. I am just fearful with the history of this that without some kind of closure that might happen. I believe my friend from New Mexico has stated that the only reason for putting interim in Nevada is if Yucca is permanent. But if Yucca doesn't pan out then we desperately need an interim site, and I think we need it quickly because Yucca is the year 2015 from being ready to accept waste. We have 80 sites in 41 States, and we have lawsuits coming on, and damages coming on. From the looks of this place, Congress doesn't make decisions very quickly. Let me just say one more thing with regard to delay. Although we may not know the ultimate site of an interim facility, there is one indisputable fact. We need a central temporary storage facility for our Nation's nuclear waste. If Yucca Mountain is viable then it makes sense to put the material at the Nevada test site. If Yucca Mountain is not viable, it will take 50 or 60 years of process at a minimum to find and license another permanent repository site under our present permitting process. We cannot leave nuclear waste at 80 sites around the country over this period of time. That is why the crisis is here. The spent fuel pools at nuclear reactors were not designed for long-term storage. Mr. President, in all due respect, Senate bill 104 was designed to make sure there were no trapdoors, and that no matter what happens this loop is closed. And this decision has to lead to a safe central storage facility ultimately at a permanent repository in Yucca Mountain. So, Mr. President, the decision is ours. The time is now. Let's not shirk this duty and this responsibility by leaving an open-end alternative that I guarantee will be used. Mr. President, I believe my time is up. I yield the remainder of my time.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, first of all, let me spend a little time thanking the efforts of Senator Bingaman from New Mexico for his efforts on this bill. He and his staff have worked very, very hard. I think what we have up to this point is a much better piece of legislation as a consequence of the efforts of Senator Bingaman and his staff. In the committee markup, as I recall, Senator Bingaman had amendments touching about eight different issues, and we were able to eventually accommodate the Senator from New Mexico on seven of those. We unfortunately could not accept all the amendments, but we certainly resolved to work with him and his staff and continue to do so as we debate the substitution, and the Bingaman amendment that is before us. I think we have made progress. Progress was made on licensing requirements for the temporary storage facility. Progress was made in the application of NEPA. Progress was made on leasing standards for a permanent repository. Progress was made on preemption of other laws, and certainly progress was made on nuclear waste fee requirements. I think it is fair that we agree that Nevada should be chosen as the permanent repository. I was a little confused in his statement where he implied that it was unfair that Nevada would necessarily be chosen as the last, I guess the last possible choice or the choice of last resort, or words to that effect. We have 50 States out there and nobody wants it. I have said time and time again, you can't throw it up in the air, it is going to come down somewhere. So I think it is imperative that we recognize that we have to choose a site, and that site is going to be objected to by the delegation from that State. We have chosen a permanent repository in Nevada, assuming that it meets the requirements. Yucca Mountain was chosen after looking at other sites, other sites in other States. Nevada is the preferred site for a repository. Nevada has been selected and, as a consequence, we have 5 miles of tunnel that have been completed there. We have expended $6 billion. We are committed, probably, by the time we are complete to spend up to $30 billion. So that is a given. I would say we agree Nevada should be chosen for an interim facility if the viability assessment for the permanent repository at Yucca Mountain is positive, and I think that is, more or less, the opinion of my friend from New Mexico. I think it is further apparent we agree that the President should have time to pick an alternative site, even in the event that Yucca Mountain is determined not to be viable as a permanent repository. We have come a remarkable distance toward total agreement. Unfortunately, we have this one area where we have not been able to agree and I think that is, of course,the substance of the Bingaman amendment. I think what we have here, in our opinion, and I tried to cite this early in our debate, is an effort to try and get this resolved informed by past debates on this subject and the history of the issue. If there is any way out of a conclusion to address the disposition of this waste, somebody is going to find it, Mr. President. We clearly see a lack of direction from the administration on this. I personally communicated in three specific letters to the President asking what the administration's position is. The administration, in all fairness, simply does not have a position. You can look at some of the rhetoric that has come out of some of the newspapers relative to the administration's position. It is kind of surprising to comment on whether they are a little bit naive or not well informed, but from the Thursday, April 10, Congress Daily, White House Council on Environmental Quality Chairwoman Kathleen McGinty said yesterday that the administration would be ``loathe to consider'' legislation that would force the Energy Department's hand in building the temporary storage facility before it knows the waste would be able to stay at Yucca Mountain. ``Loathe to consider'' legislation that would force the Energy Department's hand in building the temporary storage facility before it knows the waste would be able to stay at Yucca Mountain. That is totally inaccurate because if one looks at the schedule in the bill, in my substitute, if Yucca is viable by December 1998, a viability assessment will go to the President. March 1999 would be the deadline for a Presidential determination on viability. If there is no negative determination, the Nevada test site is determined to be the site. The reason for that is obvious. If we do not name a site, we are going to be drifting around here where we are today. April 30, 1999, the Secretary files licensing application with NRC. Approximately August of the year 2000, construction begins when the EIS is complete. No later than June 30 in the year 2003, fuel acceptance begins. Now, how can the administration interpret that this legislation would force the Energy Department's hand in building a temporary storage before it knows the waste would be able to stay at Yucca Mountain? Construction cannot begin until August in the year 2000. Somebody might say, ``Well, Senator, what's the big deal here? Why not wait for Yucca Mountain to be done?'' Well, we are told by the Secretary of Energy, Hazel O'Leary, that it will be the year 2015 before Yucca is completed, certified, licensed, and ready to take fuel. That is why, Mr. President. The ``why'' is that the time is now. We have a contractual commitment to take this waste beginning next year, 1998. We made a contract with the nuclear power industry. We have collected $13 billion from the ratepayers of this country. They are expecting performance, and the Government has not any capability. The Government is not going to be able to accept that waste. And the Government is going to be liable for damages. Every Member of this body has an obligation to minimize the Government's liability associated with those damages. That is what a temporary repository at Yucca Mountain is all about: expediting the process. So if there is anybody in anybody's office who is misconstruing the timing of this--Katie McGinty, of the White House Council on Environmental Quality, has somehow gotten an interpretation that we would force the Energy Department's hand in building a temporary storage facility before it knows the waste would be able to stay at Yucca Mountain. It is totally inaccurate; and that is an understatement, Mr. President. Let us talk about Yucca not being viable. If Yucca is not viable, September of the year 2000 would be the deadline for the President to designate a site. February of the year 2001 would be the deadline for Congress to approve a site. And if no site is designated and approved, the Nevada test site is the site. March 2001 the Secretary files a license. July 2002, construction begins. September 2005, fuel acceptance begins. So this is where Senator Bingaman and I have our departure. We feel we have to have a bottom line on this debate. We feel that we must firmly chart a predictable and sure course to a safe, interim storage facility and get it done now, not next year, not in 2 years or 5 years or 2001 or 2010 or 2011. I do not want to be standing here in another 4 our 5 years and have to find that we are still hung up on a decision. Congress dealt with this issue in 1982. We thought it had resolved the problem forever. In 1987, we had to deal with it again. At that time we were told we had resolved nuclear waste once and for all. This is the problem, Mr. President. This is the legacy of the program. If it is possible to delay a decision, a decision gets delayed. It has been in progress so far. If it is possible to push the decision off to somebody else's watch, that is what is going to happen. And that has been suggested time and time again. If the process is vulnerable to political pressure, then political pressure will be used. We have learned the hard way that any trap door left anywhere in the process inevitably, Mr. President, gets used. And it will happen in this case. Any weakness in the approach gets exploited. That is why we have spent $6 billion over 15 years and the Federal Government is still unable to meet its promise to take the waste in 1998. I implore my colleagues, let us not be fooled again. Let us face up to our obligation. Our bill, Senate bill 104, is destined to make sure there are no trap doors here, no copouts, no more delays. This chart shows our selection process. No matter what happens, the loop is closed. It is a box. Every decision leads to a safe, central storage facility. Let me explain to you this effort. Here we sit in 1997, as you see over in the left-hand corner of the chart, with the status quo. We have waste in 81 sites in 40 States. That is just the harsh reality. If we do not do anything, that is where it will remain. Your reactors may go down for lack of storage. Your waste is going to remain. If you want the waste to move, it has to be transported. That is a given. We can do that safely. We have transported 2,400 individual shipments. So let me follow the red line from next year when we are under contract, the Federal Government, to accept the waste. If Yucca Mountain is viable for a permanent repository, then we have one safe central storage site, it is over. That is one end of the square. Let us go up. If Yucca Mountain is not viable for a permanent repository, what happens then? Well, then the President can pick an alternative site. OK. And Congress will ratify it, and we come right back with a square box, one safe, central storage site. If the President does not select an alternative site; in other words, if the President says--``Well, I just won't act''--our bill deals with that possibility. If the President does not act, then where does it go? It defaults. It defaults to the Nevada test site. That is evidently a problem for my friend from New Mexico. But on the other hand, history of this matter suggests that if we leave it to the Bingaman amendment--and let me refer to the next chart--this is the exposure. And this is where Senator Bingaman and I part company, because, if Yucca Mountain is viable, we are fine. If Yucca Mountain is not viable, then the Secretary picks an alternative site. But if he does not, if he does not do that, no site is chosen and we are right back to where we are. We are leaving it where it is. Let me run through that again to make sure everybody understands it. This is the difference between the Bingaman and our particular approach with S. 104. If Yucca Mountain is viable, we have a central storage site, no problem. But if Yucca Mountain is not, the Secretary picks an alternative storage site. That is fine if he does--if he does--Mr. President. But if he does not, we are right back where we were. Look at the other chart. That is the difference between the two particular versions of this amendment. We give the President the authority to pick an alternative site. Congress ratifies the site, and we are all right. But if the President does not select an alternative site, it goes back to the Nevada test site. That is where we are, Mr. President. I think it is fair to say that our concern with the Bingaman amendment is that in our opinion it creates the trap door, it opens the process to political pressure. It invites indecision, and it invites pressures that will be apparent to do nothing so we will all be back where we are now, 40 States, 81 sites, reactors potentially shutting down because storage sites are filled up, and the stuff sits. It still is not moving. The Department of Energy tells us that the odds of Yucca Mountain being suitable as a permanent repository are good. I think that they used the odds currently of 90 percent. Well, that is pretty good around here. So the President's finding of suitability looks pretty good. But it is still at his own discretion. I ask all of my colleagues and those in their offices who listen, do you think the Senators, our good friends from Nevada, will try to influence the President's decision? Sure they will. They should. We acknowledge that. Wouldn't you if you were placed in that situation? If the President decides Yucca Mountain is not viable, not a viable site for a permanent repository, the need for an interim repository becomes even more desperate. The waste simply cannot stay where it is, Mr. President, in 80 sites in 41 States. We cannot afford to start closing nuclear plants that have run out of room for spent fuel because, remember, Yucca, if it is viable, if it is licensable, is not going to be ready until the year 2015. Under the Bingaman amendment, if the President were to determine that Yucca Mountain is not viable, then all the Secretary needs to do to prevent the designation of a central storage site is to simply fall back to another site; that is my point, leave the waste where it is. There is another area that I am concerned about in the Bingaman amendment, and that is even if the Secretary does pick a site, the tools provided to make that site a reality are somewhat limited. Of course, we know that the Secretary does not have the authority to withdraw land for an interim repository. The Secretary does not have the authority to condemn land for an interim repository. I am fearful, under Senator Bingaman's amendment, under this goal, we would not be able to reach our mutual goal, which is something where we are both on the same track. We want this waste to move. But we both want it to move now. With the loopholes in here, I am just convinced they would be used. With the U.S. court of appeals ruling that DOE has a binding legal obligation to take the spent fuel, Mr. President, I just cannot believe that we can accept more failures, more runaround, more delays. We cannot expose the taxpayer to the liability of more damages resulting from the court cases that are going to come up when we are not able to take this spent fuel next year. Mr. President, I do not want to settle for a failure. The U.S. Senate should not settle for a failure. I think we can do better, and I hope that we can work out, if you will, some way to address the concerns of my friend from New Mexico. As we look at this chart and recognize--here they are, Mr. President. These are the 80 sites throughout the Nation, in 41 States. They are the sites that have a problem. If we don't relieve this problem with meaningful legislation and if we do it with legislation that provides a trapdoor or a copout or an exit that is convenient, politically or otherwise, it is going to be used. So our liability and our damages are going to be higher, and the fuel is going to stay right where it is now, at 80 sites in 41 States, instead of getting on with the process that we have outlined in S. 104, which is to close the loop. Let me show you one more time, Mr. President, what we have attempted to do here. We have attempted to force this body to make a decision once and for all. All the safeguards are in here, Mr. President. I want to refer to them again. Under the substitute, if Yucca Mountain is viable, OK, starting in 1998, in December, the viability assessment goes to the President. March 1999 is the deadline for the viability determination by the President. If there is no negative determination, the Nevada test site is the site. That is, if Yucca is viable. On March 30, 1999, the Secretary files license application with NRC. In approximately August 2000 construction begins when the EIS is completed. The importance of that, Mr. President, is to begin to allay the concerns of the White House and Katie McGinty. They have been loath to consider building a temporary storage site before it knows that the waste would be able to stay at Yucca Mountain. I think that takes care of that. If Yucca Mountain is not viable, September 2000 is the deadline the President has to designate a site. So he has time. Then another deadline for Congress, February 2001, is the deadline for Congress to approve the site. If no site is designated or approved, OK, it goes back to the Nevada test site. But, even then, there are more delays. In March 2001, the Secretary files a license. In July 2002, construction begins. In September 2005, fuel acceptance begins. But, Mr. President, I swear that if we do not close in this loop, we won't get the job done. We know that's what the administration prefers--not to address it at this time. We have already seen the smoke and mirrors relative to their side of the story. I will run through the difference I have with Senator Bingaman's amendment. If Yucca is viable, OK, the same, except that Senator Bingaman would add a new provision, which is that after the Department of Energy files a licensing application in the year 2001 and NRC finds that Yucca cannot be licensed for some reason, they suspend operations at the interim facility and the NRC has 24 months to recommend another interim site or restart operations at the NTS. But if Yucca Mountain is not viable, Mr. President--here is where the bear goes through the buckwheat--the deadline for the Secretary to designate an alternate site up here is February 2001. But what happens if he doesn't do it, Mr. President? I will tell you what happens. Nothing. If he doesn't do his job in February of the year 2001, and no site is designated, the stuff stays where it is, at 81 sites in 41 States. I think that should identify sufficiently for the Members the differences relative to Senator Bingaman's view of how to resolve this problem and the view of the Senator from Alaska. I have the deepest respect for my friend, but I am firmly convinced that we have to get it resolved, and if we don't do it now, it isn't going to be done. That loophole out there will be utilized and we will be back here another day, another month, another year on this same process. Mr. President, I will be happy to try to work out some way to accommodate my friend from New Mexico. I reserve the remainder of my time. I yield the floor.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. If I may, I would appreciate it if we could find out if there is going to be any further Members wishing to speak on the Domenici amendment.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Anything that moves us saves time.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. How much time is remaining on our side?

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire addressed the Chair.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, my understanding is that the disposition of the S. 104 will take place tomorrow. We will have a vote on Domenici, we will have a vote on Bingaman, and a vote on final passage. The Parliamentarian has set down I believe on Friday the voting procedure. I might ask for the benefit of Members when we could anticipate votes to occur and the time between the votes.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. It is not the manager's intention that section 101(g) limit the liability of the Federal Government for anything other than a deadline. The manager does not intend that any other obligation imposed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997 be affected by section 101(g).

Mr. MURKOWSKI. It is not the manager's intent that section 101(g) proscribe anything other than financial liability for failure to meet a deadline imposed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997. To the extent other forms of relief are available for the Government's failure to comply with a deadline imposed by the amendment, the manager does not intend that such a remedy be prohibited.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. And the other side has?

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I do not have need for further discussion. I wonder if the other side would consider yielding back their time since we are going to have a rollcall vote on this tomorrow.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. It is my understanding.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. The Senator from Idaho is direct.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. The Senator from Idaho is correct, and the reason for that is, it was felt it was necessary to either have Congress address the responsibility of a temporary repository at Yucca Mountain or the President designate it, and if the President chose not to designate it, it would be at Yucca Mountain. What we have attempted to do by this legislation is basically close the box so we simply could not walk out of here after a week of debate without a definitive solution to putting our waste, at least in a temporary repository, until Yucca Mountain is done. And we spent a great deal of time discussing and fashioning the bill and felt it imperative that we had to conclude some solid solution as opposed to simply finding ourselves going through an extended debate and leaving it where it is at 80 sites in 41 States.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I will take Senator Bumpers while he is in the mood. Senator Bingaman, as I understand, has agreed to 20 minutes on either side, so 40 minutes total. That gives you an idea of what to anticipate for the remainder of the evening. We anticipate two votes. I will ask unanimous consent that the time on the Bumpers amendment No. 33--might I ask if I heard the Senator from Arkansas correctly, that he wanted 2 minutes?

Mr. MURKOWSKI. The Senator from Idaho is absolutely correct. We would not anticipate accepting fuel until into the year 2001 or possibly 2002. So that verification must take place. So there would be the assurance that, indeed, Yucca Mountain would be closer to the reality of being a permanent repository.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. It is my understanding that the figure is in that range of $40 billion to $80 billion. There was a more precise figure. It was figured at about $59 million. I think it is important for the Senator from Idaho to note evidently there was a meeting recently between the Secretary of Energy and some representatives of the nuclear power industry where the Department of Energy offered to pay the nuclear power companies for storing the fuel at the sites of the reactors. It is my understanding the industry declined to accept or pursue that proposal any further because it would simply leave the fuel in those temporary areas and would not solve the problem of getting rid of the fuel. It would simply transfer, if you will, a funding mechanism. I think it is rather ironic the administration would make that kind of a proposal when, clearly, the intent of Congress is to provide a permanent repository or, as this bill provides, a temporary repository until such time as Yucca Mountain is predetermined to be suitable. So what they are doing is kind of, on the one hand, acknowledging their financial responsibility by offering to reimburse them, and acknowledging that they, in 1998, have to take title to the fuel but physically not wanting to take it because they have no place to put it. That is why I have been so critical of the administration's lack of any substantive suggestions on, as they opposed S. 104, what they are for, and they have yet to communicate to this Senator what they are for or what their proposal is relative to the immediacy of these reactors that are facing maximum capacity and potential shutdown.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, for the benefit of all Senators, I am advised by the leadership that we can expect a vote very soon on the disposition of the Thompson amendment, followed by at least one vote on the Bingaman amendment and a vote on the Bumpers amendment yet tonight.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I am just going to read the reference to the question of exposure on transportation. He is responding to the questions relative to his area of responsibility in cask design and transportation, and I quote: As a result of these efforts we reached the conclusion---- And this is the National Sandia Laboratories---- We reached the conclusion that transportation of spent nuclear fuel in casks designed to meet NRC standards evaluated and certified by NRC would never---- Now, this is something---- Would never encounter a transportation accident severe enough to challenge the integrity of the container. This is a pretty broad statement by a professional who stands behind his statement with his career. Would never encounter a transportation accident severe enough to challenge the integrity of the container. Some of these accidents, I am told, involved flat tires. Well, I am not going to get into all seven accidents. One other reference, and that is to the Japanese situation. Yes, there was a leak in the sodium liquid coolant associated with the Honshu reactor in Japan. That reactor is currently shut down. Again, like with all mechanical devices, accidents can occur. In this particular case the accident was addressed by a professional procedure. No one was exposed to radioactivity. And to suggest Japan is somehow abandoning its commitment to nuclear power defies reality. Outside of Matsue, Japan, is a place called Rekosha. The Japanese are committed to spend $24 billion. I went in the plant. I physically saw it. It is absolute state of the art--$24 billion to initiate a fueling, reprocessing mox fuel facility which would be the most advanced in the world. The reason the Japanese are pursuing this, they obviously have a great deal of sensitivity to nuclear radiation based on their unfortunate experience in the Second World War, but they feel nuclear power generation is appropriate for Japan. It addresses the concern they have over air quality, and it addresses an economic concern they have on dependence on oil from the Mideast. So they have made their decision, Mr. President. It is important that we keep facts in mind as we address where we are in this debate. Again, the debate boils down to my point: Nobody wants it. We have to put it somewhere. Unfortunately, Nevada seems to be the site that has been selected for the permanent repository. Mr. President, I am told that there is a colloquy pending which would, I believe, wind up our side's discussion for now. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I guess I am incorrect. I yield the floor. Mr. REID addressed the Chair.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I think, again, we have to address the question of informed speculation, and the reference made a few minutes ago by my friend from Nevada to what happened in Germany mixes apples and oranges. The issue was not spent fuel leaving Germany. It was vitrified waste coming back to Germany. There is a substantial difference. What happens in the vitrifying process is that they recover the radioactive material and mix it with a glass form. It is radioactive. There is no question about it. But to suggest, as my friend from Nevada would, that this is the same stuff as shipping spent fuel, that's the apples and oranges issue. I think what we have seen today proves my point, which is that nobody wants this. I am not being critical of my friends from Nevada. It doesn't make any difference whether it be the State of Michigan--and Vermont has been suggested as having one of the best types of granite- based rocks, from the standpoint of stability and geology. But I am sure if that were a selected site for a permanent repository, or temporary repository, we would have the delegation from Vermont right where the delegation from Nevada is. That is the reality of this. We have had representatives from the West exempt Washington, and for reasons that Washington says they are fed up, they have had enough waste. They continue to have waste, several hundreds of tons of waste, thousands of tons of waste. They don't want any more. The reason they don't want any more is there is no way to dispose of it. They are beginning to start a vitrification process. The same is true in South Carolina. They don't want any more. They have it there now. The reason they don't want any more is there is no way to dispose of it. They are vitrifying now. The vitrification is, for the most part, military waste. They are recovering liquid waste from the tanks. I have been out to Hanford and I have been to South Carolina. Now, we are seeing Tennessee. Tennessee has high-level nuclear waste stored there. Idaho does, too. I am kind of surprised we don't have every Senator down here exempting his or her State. That is one way to ensure that they are not going to get it. Then where are you going to put it if you can't put it in one of the 50 States? Are you going to put it on the Atlantic coast? No. Are you going to send it to Canada? They don't want it. You might be able to send it to Europe for a fee, I don't know. So you move to the Pacific. What do you have there? You have some islands. Maybe we have some Indian reservations that might be interested. But, undoubtedly, that would not be suitable to the State governments. We have Palmira off of the Hawaiian islands being mentioned from time to time. There is a group, as a matter of fact, that was promoting it--for a fee. They said they owned the island. They have islands in the South Pacific. Some of them are individual nations, and they have been interested in doing it, perhaps, for a fee. But that is a bit dangerous, Mr. President, because we are not sure what the proliferation capability might be in that kind of situation. So what has happened today on the floor of the U.S. Senate proves my point, which is that nobody wants it. So we have seen three States exempt themselves. The unfortunate part is that we are still left with our friends from Nevada. I was here when the decision was made to put a permanent repository in Nevada. Several of the staff members were there at that time. There was a Republican Senator from Nevada, who is not here anymore, perhaps as a consequence of that decision being made by that body to put a permanent repository at Yucca Mountain. He fought valiantly, he fought hard, and he is not back here. He lost. That is just the reality of being honest with the facts. The facts are that we have to put it somewhere. Now, the Nevadans would have you leave it where it is. Well, there is a democratic process around here. Nobody ever said it was fair. I convey that in all humility, relative to the reality of what it means. But Nevada has had an extraordinary experience with nuclear weapons over a long period of time. It has been named as a permanent repository. The reality is that when that permanent repository is done, the waste at the 80 sites in 41 States will be transported there. It is rather inconsistent that we don't hear from our colleagues in Nevada the objection about the continued expenditure that is going into Yucca Mountain; $6 billion has been expended and 4\1/2\ miles of tunnel is already done, and they continue to work on the tunnel and continue to spend money. And $30 billion is probably going to be expended before it is licensed and opened. That has some benefit. But what it really says is that the decision that was made by Congress many years ago to site the permanent site at Yucca Mountain, as it progresses, will become a reality and, indeed, Nevada will be the site of a permanent repository. Virtually everybody is in agreement that we need a permanent repository for our waste, unless we abandon our current policy of burying our high-level nuclear waste. It is kind of interesting because we are one of the few nations that continues to pursue burying waste with plutonium in it. The French and the Japanese recover it through reprocessing. That is how you get rid of the proliferation threat. But there is a mentality and a group of environmental organizations that simply think that that would foster and expand the nuclear power industry in this country and advance nuclear development. I am not here to argue that point today, Mr. President. But that is the harsh reality. We are still talking about burying it. The rest of the world is developing a technology that says it is too valuable to bury. We don't want the proliferation threat, so we reprocess it in MOX fuel and burn it in our reactors. We even have the technology in the United States at Palos Verdes. I was out there in Arizona. That reactor was built to take MOX fuel. We could do that. If there was ever a crack in the administration's armor relative to nuclear waste, it is their reluctant acknowledgment that they must begin vitrification of military waste in this country. Whether that will lead, ultimately, to the recovery of plutonium and putting that back in the reactors, we have yet to see. So we are proceeding under the tired old argument that we have to bury it. We are committed on that path, and we are going to spend $30 billion and we are going to put that site in Nevada when it is licensed. So we have a democratic process, we have 50 States, and we have to put it in one of them. Now, we talk about praying to the Lord and the comment that the President is likely to veto S. 104. Well, if anyone would ask the administration, as I have done--I have sent three letters to the President in response to the assertion that the administration doesn't approve of S. 104 --for what their proposal is, the truth is that they have no proposal. You have heard it. Leave it where it is. Leave it where it is until Yucca is done in the year 2015. I have extensively gone through an explanation of how many of our reactors would have to shut down, what percentage of the 22 percent total power generated by nuclear power contributes to this country. We have reactors that are shutting down now. We have some that will shut down next year. We are going to lose power in various States. Maybe we can temporarily put that high-level waste in casks on the surface. But, remember, these areas were not designed for permanent storage. These reactors are in areas of population. They weren't designed to carry long-term high-level waste in the adjacent areas surrounding them. This needs to be in one place, not 80 sites. Nobody has come up with a better site than the Nevada desert. So when we talk about the administration's plan, there is no plan. During the confirmation of Secretary of Energy Pena, the best we could get was a commitment that the problem of disposal of nuclear waste was ``in his portfolio.'' Well, that is a gracious acknowledgment. Of course it's in his portfolio; he's the Secretary of Energy. We have had no input from the administration about what to do because the administration has yet to perform under the contractual agreement that is due next year. I suppose it is a stacked deck, if I could respond to my friends from Nevada. But it could be a stacked deck against West Virginia, or a stacked deck against Vermont, or a stacked deck against Alaska. But to leave it where it is, it is a stacked deck against 41 States. That simply is not an alternative, Mr. President. That is where we are in this debate today, and that is where we have been from the beginning. We wander in and out of concerns relative to casks. Good Heavens, if American engineering can't develop casks designed to withstand whatever the threat is--if the British, the Swedes, the Germans, the Japanese and the French can do it, we can do it. One more time, if I may, let me show you what has happened in this country. It speaks for itself. There is the transportation network, 2,400 shipments. Do you think those were shipped in rubber bands? Those were shipped, according to Federal and State law, in approved containers. To suggest that we don't have approved containers to ship out, we will get what we have to have. You are not going to build these containers and these casks until you have permission to move it. But these are moving now in approved vessels, just as they would be if they are placed in a temporary repository at Yucca Mountain; they would be placed in appropriate casks. They would either be within a cask, a transportation cask, and removed out there, or left in a double cask, or put in a semipermanent cask. So what we have here, Mr. President, is a lot of informed speculation, which I guess this place has an abundance of, whether it be spring, winter, or fall. But let's be honest with one another. Where we are in this debate is to either leave it where it is or move it to Nevada where, clearly, my friends don't want it moved. I admire their conviction, diligence and commitment. It is almost like they are willing to lay their lives in the path of whatever movement is occurring on this side. But, unfortunately, that is just the way it is because there is no other alternative. I believe my friend from Tennessee may want to speak a bit on the pending business. Am I correct in my assumption?

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Yes.