Frank Murkowski

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. That is the intent of the unanimous-consent agreement.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I will withhold the unanimous consent pending a clarification from the ranking member of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee. I yield to my friend from Idaho, the cosponsor of the bill.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I renew my request at this time. I ask unanimous consent the cloture vote scheduled at 5:15 today be vitiated, and further the Senate begin consideration of Senate bill 104 at 1 p.m. on Wednesday, April 9. The leader advises me, for the information of all Senators, there will be no rollcall votes during the balance of today's session of the Senate.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I yield back to my colleague.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, the parliamentary procedure relative to time on this, in view of the fact that the vote has been vitiated, suggests that we are still bound by our time agreement.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there now be a period for the transaction of morning business with Senators permitted to speak therein for up to 5 minutes each.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Personnel of the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet on Tuesday, April 8, 1997, at 10 a.m. in open session, to receive testimony on active and reserve military and civilian personnel programs and the Defense Health Program in review of S. 450, the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1998 and 1999.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Subcommittee on Seapower of the Committee on Armed Services be authorized to meet at 2:30 p.m. on Tuesday, April 8, 1997, in open session, to receive testimony regarding submarine development and procurement programs and global submarine threat in review of S. 450, the national defense authorization bill for fiscal years 1998 and 1999.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of H.R. 412, which was received from the House.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until the hour of 10:30 a.m., Wednesday, April 9. I further ask unanimous consent that on Wednesday, immediately following the prayer, the routine requests through the morning hour be granted and that there be a period of morning business until the hour of 1 p.m. with Senators to speak therein for up to 5 minutes each, with the following exceptions: Senator Thomas, 30 minutes; Senator Grassley, 30 minutes; Senator Wyden, 20 minutes; Senator Daschle or his designee, 10 minutes; Senator Campbell, 10 minutes; Senator Lautenberg, 10 minutes.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, tomorrow, following morning business, at 1 p.m. the Senate will begin consideration of S. 104, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. It is our hope that the Senate will be able to make substantial progress on S. 104 during Wednesday's session of the Senate. All Members can, therefore, anticipate rollcall votes throughout tomorrow's session and into the evening, if necessary.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I ask that following the statement of the Senator from Illinois, the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. I wish the occupant of the chair a good afternoon. The Senate proceeded to consider the motion to proceed.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Sure. Privilege Of The Floor

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I am going to be speaking this afternoon at some length on Senate bill 104. This is a bill that provides a comprehensive plan for the Federal Government to meet its obligations to provide a safe place to store spent nuclear fuel and nuclear waste. Mr. President, I think it is important to reflect on some of the background associated with nuclear waste and the status of our continued dependence on nuclear energy. First of all, let me refer to an article by Bertram Wolfe. Mr. Wolfe is a consultant at Monte Sereno, CA, and a former president of the American Nuclear Society. He suggests that by midcentury, the Third World population on this Earth will double from 4 billion to 8 billion people while the population of the industrial world will grow by about 20 percent, to 1.2 billion. He further suggests that unless we expect to see the majority of the world's people living indefinitely in dire poverty, we should be prepared for per capita energy use to rise rapidly with economic progress. Even if the Third World per capita energy use rises to only one-third of the United States level, that increase, in combination with the expected population growth, will result in a threefold increase in world energy use by the year 2050. He further suggests that if fossil fuels are used to supply these increased energy needs, we can expect serious deterioration of air quality and possibly environmental disaster from global climate change due to the greenhouse effect. In addition, increased demand for fossil fuels, combined with the dwindling supply, undoubtedly will lead to higher prices, slower economic growth, and the likelihood of energy- related global conflicts. I wonder if anyone in this Chamber would doubt that Kuwait's oil resources were a major factor in the United States willingness to take military action against Iraq. Unfortunately, alternatives to this scenario are few. Perhaps the future world energy use can be stabilized at a level much less than a third of present U.S. per capita use. Of course, that demand could be much higher. Perhaps solar or wind power will become practical on a larger scale. Perhaps fusion, or even cold fusion, will be developed. But as we enter the world's energy needs in the 21st century, we have to focus on one area that currently provides us with nearly 21 percent of our electricity in the United States, and that is nuclear power. Even conventional nuclear powerplants will face fuel supply problems in the next century if their use expands significantly, which is why we ought to consider the use of the advanced liquid metal reactor which can produce more than 100 times as much energy per pound of uranium as conventional reactors. The United States, as we know, has been a leader in the development of nuclear power technology and in the adoption of stringent safety standards. It is important to note that not a single member of the public has been harmed by the operation of any of the world's nuclear plants that meet U.S. standards. The Chernobyl reactor, which lacked a containment structure, did not meet U.S. standards. But the future of nuclear energy in the United States is now very much in question. Since 1973, all nuclear energy plant orders have subsequently been canceled. In 1993, U.S. utilities shut down three nuclear energy plants rather than invest in needed repairs. Of the 110 presently operating U.S. nuclear energy plants, 45 will reach the end of their planned 40-year lifetime in the next two decades. Mr. President, this is the wrong time for the Nation, and for the world, for that matter, to ignore nuclear power. Demand for energy will grow. Our options are limited. Ironically, environmentalists who have opposed nuclear power since the 1970's should have the strongest rationale for promoting nuclear energy. Like all large endeavors, nuclear power has its problems and it has its risks. But the problems of nuclear power do not look so bad when compared with air pollution, global warming, and the supply limitations associated with fossil fuels. Besides, the major drawbacks of nuclear power from cost to waste disposal are due more to institutional impediments than to technological difficulties. Considering the growth in energy demand and the risks associated with other energy sources, the benefit-risk ratio for nuclear power is very attractive. We recall that peaceful nuclear power development started slowly in the 1950's. But by the mid to late 1960's, commercial nuclear powerplant orders began to take off. And by the 1970's, 30 to 40 nuclear plants were being ordered each year. This outlook resulted from several factors. The first was that electric use was growing at a rate of about 7 percent per year, leading to a need for doubling of electric capacity every 10 years. Responding to some very negative public reactions to his company and the company's announcement that it would be starting up a new coal- fired plant in 1961, McChesney Martin, chairman of Florida Power and Light, promised never to build another coal plant. Shortly thereafter, Florida Power and Light submitted a plan to build a nuclear station in the mid-1960's. Mr. President, the Sierra Club became the major supporter of the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant in California. This period of rapid nuclear expansion and environmental support of nuclear power ended in 1973 after the Arab oil embargo and the boycott. As a consequence of that, the rate of growth fell dramatically. As the years went by and the costs of crude oil continued to increase, we found a change in attitude. The surplus of oil distorted the Nation's perspective on energy in general and nuclear energy in particular. A number of environmental organizations, such as Greenpeace and the Sierra Club, insisted that the Nation should hold out for ideal or risk-free sources, such as energy conservation, solar power, and wind energy. No one suffered from a shortage of electricity as the construction time for nuclear powerplants expanded a full 6 years--to 10 or 15 years, or even longer. These extended construction times have been ascribed to an even more complicated and inefficient regulatory system, and court delays resulting from suits brought by those opposed to nuclear power. In Japan and France, for example, where demand for electric energy continued to grow rapidly, new nuclear energy plants of U.S. design are today still being licensed and built in 4 to 6 years. First, I personally would question whether Congress would have tolerated the delays if the new electricity were truly needed. One of the results of the delays, however, was that the cost of building a nuclear plant in the United States increased dramatically, making nuclear power uncompetitive and unattractive to many investors. But let's look at the benefits. Although the rate of growth of electricity use declined after 1973, demand increased, as the economy expanded, to U.S. electric use, increasing 70 percent between 1973 and 1994. Coal generation doubled between 1973 and 1994, and today coal provides over 50 percent of U.S. electricity. The 74 nuclear energy plants that came on line in this period increased the nuclear share of electric generation from 4 percent in 1973 to more than 20 percent today, second only to coal. The other sources, for the benefit of the Members, are natural gas at 4 percent, hydropower at 9 percent, wood, wind, and solar 3 percent, and oil 3 percent. The added nuclear capacity allowed for the shutdown of oil-fired plants and permitted the utilities to reduce oil imports by some 100 million barrels per year. The substitution of nuclear or fossil fuel plants has reduced the present CO2 atmospheric emissions by 140 million metric tons of carbon per year--roughly 10 percent of the total U.S. CO2 production. Nevertheless, the United States still needs to reduce carbon production by an additional 10 percent to reach its goal of returning to the 1990 production level. In addition, replacement of fossil fuel plants with nuclear power has reduced nitric oxide emissions to the air by over 2 million tons annually, meeting the goal set by the Clean Air Act for the year 2000, and has reduced sulfur dioxide emissions by almost 5 million tons per year, half the goal for the year 2000. The dilemma that we are in is a real one, because we are not able to store our waste that has accumulated as a consequence of our nuclear powerplants. As a consequence of that, we have not been able to move from a temporary storage to a safe, permanent storage. We have the temporary storage in the areas, in the pools, next to our reactors. But, as a consequence of that, we seem to face the situation where environmental Neros fiddle while Rome burns. The current generation of U.S. nuclear powerplants has performed remarkably well and an even better generation of new designs is ready. General Electric, in a partnership with Hitachi and Toshiba, has developed the advanced boiling water reactor. Construction of this reactor began in Japan in 1991, and the plant is already operating at full power. The ability to build and begin operation of a new design in less than 5 years is a testament to the quality of the firms that stand behind this. Experience with the U.S. licensing and court review procedures suggest that today it can take 2 to 4 times as long to construct a nuclear plant in the United States as it does abroad, with the exorbitant cost increases. Mr. President, this brings me to the point in the debate where I think it is appropriate to reflect on history. I am referring to an article that appeared in Scientific American in July 1976. Mr. President, let me just read an excerpt from that particular article, because I think it reflects on something that has been overlooked. That is the natural element of nuclear fission as we know it today.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the motion to invoke cloture on Senate bill 104, the Nuclear Waste Act, occur at 5:15 on Tuesday, with the time between 2:15 and 5:15 equally divided between the proponents and opponents.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, the waste was supposed to have been taken by the Federal Government for safe, central storage by, as I said earlier, 1998. Will that happen, Mr. President? The answer is clearly no. No, because we have not addressed the problem; we simply put it off. Even though this $12 billion collection from American ratepayers to pay for this storage has gone into the Federal coffers, and even though a Federal court has reaffirmed that the Government has a legal obligation to take the waste by 1998, still, today, there is no plan for action. By 1998, 23 reactors in 14 States are going to be full. What are we going to do then? Are we going to shift over to some other power? We are going to have to do something. By the year 2010, 65 reactors in 29 States will be full. What are we going to do then? The conservative estimate is that 25 percent of our nuclear plants will not be able to build onsite storage and will be forced to shut down. That would mean the loss of over 5 percent of our Nation's electric generating capacity. When is Yucca Mountain going to be ready for a permanent repository? Not until at least the year 2015. What do we do in the meantime? Simply leave it there? Let the litigation mount up for our inability to honor a contractual commitment? How good is a Government contract if the Government can simply ignore it? Therefore, in the mind of this Senator, what this Nation needs and what S. 104 is all about is a temporary solution. When S. 104 passed the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, it passed with a solid bipartisan vote of 15 to 5. Almost half of the members and all majority members voted in favor of the bill. Americans have waited too long for a solution to this environmental and public safety challenge, and there is absolutely no purpose to be served by waiting any longer. I am, of course, sensitive to the concerns of my colleagues from Nevada, but this is a legacy of our generation, and we have an obligation to address that legacy. To put it off to somebody else's watch, another Presidential administration, simply puts off a responsibility and an obligation that we have. We have an obligation to act, and to act in a timely manner, because we are going to be in breach of our contract next year. So there is a critical need to construct a safe, central storage facility to eliminate the growing threat to the environment and to the American people. As I said earlier, I worked with Members on both sides of the aisle to attempt to solve the problems that they have with this bill. In the markup, we accepted several amendments from the Democratic side, and I am ready to work with other Senators on amendments they may have to improve the bill, because our goal is a responsible one. It is safe, central storage as soon as reasonably possible after 1998. We have offered, time and time again, to work with the new Secretary of Energy, Secretary Pena, and the staff at the Energy Department. During his confirmation, we pressed the White House to ensure that the Secretary has the portfolio to respond to this pressing problem, and they indicated that he did have that portfolio. Over the recess, the committee staff has worked on a proposed compromise. Senator Bingaman's staff has been very constructive in this regard. Much of what Senator Bingaman has proposed appears acceptable. However, the bottom line is the need for a predictable path, with certainty, to interim and permanent waste storage. We simply cannot leave trap doors that allow central storage to be delayed for decades. I want to refer to a chart to identify just what we are talking about relative to spent fuel and radioactive waste that is destined for geologic disposal. This chart on my right shows the United States, and for some reason or another they left Hawaii and Alaska off, but that is not uncommon around here. The brown areas show commercial reactors, and they are primarily in the Midwest--Illinois, Minnesota--and on the eastern seaboard. Those are some 80 sites where we are generating nuclear power at the present time. One of the things we have to keep in mind is, unless we find a way to take care of this waste--we are still going to have reactors, some of which have already shut down and have spent fuel in onsite storage--we will simply be storing spent fuel in shutdown reactors. Currently, we have, designated by the blue little pyramids, a number of shutdown reactors in Oregon, California, and a few in the Midwest. The next little block we have are the commercial spent nuclear fuel storage facilities. We have fewer of those. We have a couple of them in the Midwest. We have non-Department of Energy research reactors scattered all throughout the country, in blue. We have naval reactor fuel in Idaho, Washington, New Mexico, Georgia, and we have the Department of Energy spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste. I could go on and on with a description of this chart. One can quickly recognize that we have nuclear waste all over the country, and I am sure those in opposition to this bill will suggest that the best thing we can do is simply leave it there. I do not know, Mr. President, if that makes sense to you. It does not to me. Do we want this scattered all over the country when it simply makes sense to put it in one area where we have had testing for some 50 years, where we have an experienced work force, a security capability and the knowledge that we are proceeding with a permanent repository in that area of Yucca Mountain in Nevada? The fact is, as we proceed with Yucca Mountain in Nevada and the realization that might be completed by the year 2015, or thereabouts, the question is, why not move it, move it now, transport it now to a interim repository adjacent to the permanent site? Then one might say, ``What happens if the permanent site does not become suitable?'' Let me tell you a couple things about that permanent site, Mr. President. We have expended some $6 billion so far. It is estimated to cost some $30 billion by the time it is completed. So we are well on our way, assuming it is licensable and assuming that it receives the certification necessary. So you are going to hear the argument, if you move it out there and it is not suitable, then what are you going to do? Then you obviously are going to have to find someplace else to take it, and that is not going to be easy. By the same token, it has to go somewhere. There are 48 States on that map. It has to go somewhere. We have another chart that I want to bring up which shows what S. 104 is all about. If we look over at the lower left-hand corner, we find that in 1998, if we accept the status quo, we have 81 sites in 40 States. If we look over at the red arrow and find that Yucca Mountain is viable for a permanent repository, then we have achieved our objective, we have one safe, central storage site. What are we going to do if Yucca Mountain is not viable for a permanent repository? We are going to address our obligation. We are going to take that blue arrow right up to the top, and if Yucca Mountain is not a viable site for a permanent repository, then it requires the President to pick an alternate site. If the President refuses, we are not going to let the President off the hook. The President still has an obligation. If the President does not select an alternate site, the site defaults back to the Nevada test site. If the President picks an alternate site and Congress ratifies the site, then we have one safe, central storage site. The point of this chart is to show where we are trying to go with this bill, which is to address our responsibility and resolve this situation. This Senator, the chairman of this committee, is not going to accept amendments that penetrate the objective of this legislation, which is to address it and resolve it and do it now. So we have alternatives framed in this debate. The alternatives are a little more complicated, but we have the status quo, 81 sites in 40 States. That is a given. The red line says Yucca Mountain is viable for a permanent repository. If that is fine, we have one safe, central storage site. If the license application for Yucca Mountain is not filed, then we go back, if you will, and take the blue line--Yucca Mountain is not viable for a permanent repository--the Secretary picks an alternative storage site. If no site is chosen, it goes back to one central storage site. So what we have attempted to do here is address concerns of Members and still get the job done, because if we do not get the job done, we are going to waste several hours in debate and find ourselves not addressing the obligation we have to take this waste under the contractual commitment that we have. I am willing to be flexible in the shape of either one of these boxes, but the result must always be the same. We now have an opportunity for bipartisan action, and I think that we must seize that opportunity. I know that my friends from Nevada will object to the bill. They consider it probably a political necessity to oppose it. I can understand that. If it were not for Nevada, I am sure it might be Vermont where they have a lot of marble, or it might be Montana, where they have a lot of rock. The point is it has to go somewhere. There are going to be allegations that there is some bad science here. There are going to be efforts to try to scare us with references to ``mobile Chernobyl.'' That is an irresponsible statement, Mr. President. Everybody who has looked at Chernobyl knows it was not poor reactor design and human error that resulted in the accident. There was no containment building. The design was flawed, and not to United States or western standards. The technicians bypassed the safety systems, the reactor went critical, and we had a terrible accident. But to suggest that our bill is mobile Chernobyl is just simply irresponsible. What we are trying to do is accept an obligation, a legacy of our generation, and that is to properly dispose of this waste, and properly disposing of it does not suggest leaving it where it is. Those nuclear reactors and those pools that are being filled now were not designed for extended storage. They are reaching their capacity. Many in the environmental community see this as an opportunity to shut down a portion of the industry because any additional storage, once the storage is filled, will require additional licensing. Some of that licensing is going to be controlled by States. The States will attempt to block it by using various concerns, little of which have any scientific foundation. But nevertheless, they see this as a way to substantially reduce the contribution of nuclear energy to generate power in this country. Some will imply if this bill does not pass, nuclear waste will not be transported through this country. Well, let us take a little look at that. I have another chart here, because if one looks at the record, there have been 2,500 shipments of used fuel across this country in the last 20 years. It is just not history, Mr. President, it is happening today. The Department of Energy is transporting spent fuel from nuclear reactors all over the world into the United States virtually as we speak, by truck, by train, by barge, by boat. If you do not hear about this from the other side, there is probably a reason. And that reason is because these shipments have been and continue to be completely uneventful. They are shipped in casks that have been designed to address the emergencies forecast. In short, these spent fuel shipments, history shows, are safe. As a consequence, Mr. President, they are not news anymore. At our hearing in February, all four members of the Nevada delegation acknowledged there was no process and no level of scientific proof that would decrease their opposition. I understand that, Mr. President. I appreciate that. I know where they are coming from. They are coming from the reality that regardless of what State we are talking about, there would be an objection. But we have a responsibility, Mr. President. The objections are based on politics, not science. One of the Nevada Senators was in favor of sending high-level materials to the Nevada test site as a State legislator. He voted for A.J.R. 15 which was signed by the Nevada Governor in May 1975, which asked, in my opinion, the Federal Government to simply do just that. I think he was right the first time. It is safer, smarter, and cheaper to contain these materials at one location in the remote Nevada desert. The Nevada test site was used, as stated, for decades to explore testing of nuclear bombs and it helped win the cold war. And now it can help us win the war on radioactive waste disposal. High-level nuclear waste, as I have stated time and time again, Mr. President, is our legacy, and it is our obligation to dispose of it. It is irresponsible to let this situation continue. It is unsafe to let dangerous radioactive materials pile up. Pile up where, Mr. President? Back in the 80 sites in 41 States. It is unwise to block safe storage in a remote area when the alternative is to simply leave it in the 41 States. Mr. President, this is a national problem. It requires a national solution. We need to pass Senate bill 104. I should comment briefly on the administration's attitude toward nuclear waste storage because it has been a rather interesting one. They have been content to simply ignore the problem as though they did not have one, as though there was no obligation to take the waste, and simply disregard the Government's contractual obligations. The American people, I think, deserve better. Safe nuclear storage should not be a political issue. It is a scientific and legitimately environmental issue. We need a solution now. And why I do not know, but the administration has again turned a blind eye and a deaf ear. In addition to threats in the environment and safety, 22 percent of our electric capacity is at risk now by not taking decisive action on what to do with the waste generated by our nuclear powerplants. Mr. President, starting in January 1998, taxpayers throughout the Nation, whether you use nuclear power or not, are going to be subjected to claims of billions of dollars in liability payments because our Government has not met its obligation to take that waste. There is a contractual commitment outstanding, Mr. President. The estimate of taxpayers' liability under a recent lawsuit blocked by States are estimated to run as high as $80 billion. How much is that per family, Mr. President? That is about $1,300 per family. You may say, what do you mean? Why are we subjected to liability if the Government does not take the waste? There was a contractual commitment, Mr. President, to take the waste beginning in 1998. The Government is not going to be able to take that waste, so there are going to be claims filed and there is going to be interest accrued. If they have to relocate it or expand facilities, there are additional costs. The last estimate I saw was about $59.9 billion. The estimate, as I indicated, could run as high as $80 billion. The cost of storage of spent nuclear fuel: That is about $19 to $20 billion. Return of nuclear waste fees: About $8.5 billion. Interest on nuclear waste fees: $15 to $27 billion. Of course, depending on the interest rate used. Remember the interest rate in December 1980? The prime rate was 20.5 percent. A lot of people have forgotten that, Mr. President. Consequential damages for shutdown of 25 percent of the nuclear plants due to insufficient storage, power replacement costs: Some $24 billion. I do not know what it is, but it is going to be full employment for all the lawyers certainly. Inaction is not an option. Inaction is simply irresponsible. That is why we have attempted to craft this legislation to address a reality that we are not going to be able to take the waste in a permanent repository until the year 2015. So this allows a temporary action to move the waste out so it is retrievable for disposition when a permanent repository is constructed. Mr. President, many of the opponents' claims, I think, have little foundation. If we look back, interim storage at the Nevada test site will not delay construction at Yucca Mountain. The type of construction we anticipate would be a concrete pad with a cask designed to hold the waste until a permanent repository is at hand. There will be a viability assessment that will occur before the interim site is built. The President will have a choice of interim sites after the viability assessment. This Nation faces a major decision, Mr. President: Either continue storing high-level radioactive waste materials at these 80 locations in 41 States indefinitely, for the next administration, for the next Congress, or the next Congress, and pay the claims and subject the taxpayers to more litigation, or more safely contain them in one centralized facility. I am indeed sorry that facility has to be in one State, but it simply has to be. So the option is clear and safer. It is safer and cheaper. And the time for action is now. Mr. President, I would like to refer to another chart relative to a misnomer that has been brought up time and time again. And it is a legitimate concern but it escapes a reality, and that is the issue of transportation. There has been 2,500 shipments of used nuclear fuel over the past 20 years. There has been no fatality, no injury, or no recorded environmental damage that has ever occurred because of radioactive cargo. I have a map here behind me that shows the routes for transferring used fuel. And this took place from 1979 to 1995, the routes used for 2,400 shipments. They cover from Washington down through Oregon, close to California, Montana, Idaho, Salt Lake, Nevada, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, North Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, up and down the entire east coast seaboard, Minneapolis, and Milwaukee. I could go on and on but, Mr. President, I am sure that you will agree it is a pretty impressive transportation route. The map shows roads, rail lines. Some would say that they did not know these shipments took place. Maybe that is why they have become uneventful. There has been an accident with a truck carrying a cask, but the cask that contained the nuclear materials performed as designed. They have not broken open. They were designed for an accident of that nature. We currently have about 30,000 metric tons of spent fuel in the United States. The French alone have shipped that amount of spent fuel all over Europe, all over the world. The Japanese are moving spent fuel from Japan to France for reprocessing until they build their own reprocessing plant. This is not history, Mr. President. This is happening today all over our country and all over the world. There seems to be somewhat of a double standard why the Department of Energy claims it cannot possibly fulfill its obligation to the U.S. electric ratepayers and the obligation to take spent nuclear fuel. The Department of Energy is doing exactly that for foreign countries. Let me show you another map. Here are foreign research reactors throughout the world--Canada, South America, Africa, Europe, Asia, Australia. They may ask why American taxpayers are paying for the Department of Energy to transport, store nuclear waste from foreign countries while American ratepayers are subjected to a Government that refuses to honor its contractual commitments, refuses to take the waste. All the countries in color ship fuel to the United States for storage at the Department of Energy facilities. It seems to be a mystery. There are a lot of mysteries around here. If they support taking fuel waste from overseas, then you wonder if the issue of safety is really an issue. How can it be safe for the Department of Energy to ship spent fuel halfway across the world but not across some of our States? Well, let us take a little closer look because this is going to be the crux of a lot of the arguments. Let us look at what the Department of Energy does to transport nuclear waste across the United States. This map, Mr. President, shows America's research reactors. They are all over the place--all the red lines. Idaho National Engineering Lab in Idaho; University of Missouri, Missouri; University of Missouri, Columbia; Iowa State University; Purdue University; the University of Michigan; Ohio State University; Massachusetts, MIT; University of Lowell, Maine; Rhode Island Nuclear Science Center; Brookhaven National Labs; University of Virginia; University of Florida; Georgia Institute of Technology; Oak Ridge; Sandia National Laboratory; Los Alamos, and on and on and on, Mr. President. They are scattered all across the country. They move all over the country. What we have here is a double standard. Why does the Department of Energy pay to transport and store nuclear waste from foreign countries but will not do its duty for U.S. power reactors that have paid for the service? They do it for research reactors. The Department of Energy says they may take foreign fuel to help with nonproliferation. That perhaps is all well and good, but spent nuclear fuel is spent nuclear fuel wherever it is. If transportation storage is safe for some, why should it not be safe for all? I think this proves my point that I mentioned earlier. The obstacles to moving our Nation's spent nuclear fuel are political; they are not technical. Senate bill 104 provides the authority to coordinate a systematic, safe transportation network that requires the Department of Energy to use NRC-certified transportation containers to transport fuel along special routes. That transportation cannot occur until the Department of Energy has provided specific technical assistance to funding, to States, and to Indian tribes for emergency response planning across the transportation routes. The language builds on what is already a set system for spent fuel in the country. It is further interesting to note with this volume of traffic, some 2,400 shipments, the problem has never been exposure to radiation from spent fuel cargo, even in the fuel accidents between 1971 and 1989. The Department of Transportation tells us that only seven accidents occurred involving trucks carrying nuclear waste. There was no radioactivity released in any of these accidents. Why? Because transportation containers were designed to maintain their integrity. At one time they were designing transportation casks, and the objective was to have it so they would withstand a free fall from 40,000 feet, assuming there was an accident, and they were anticipating moving it by airplane, and the engineers claimed they could do that. Mr. President, we will have an extended debate on this issue in the coming days. As a manager of the bill, I will be sharing time with my colleagues on various statements, accommodating amendments and pursuing the debate with my colleagues from the other side. I think it is important as we reflect on reality that there is no excuse for continuing to delay this obligation any further. I have gone over the liability of the taxpayers. I have gone over the transportation that is in existence where we have moved nuclear waste around this country safely. And to suggest that we are somehow going to gain some significant benefit by putting off the decision is not supported by any logic or rationalization that would convince this Senator that there is any other action than moving forward on Senate bill 104, accommodating Members' amendments, with the idea of getting the job done. Getting the job done now is a responsibility for all of us for the future of nuclear energy in this country and the world. We simply cannot move forward in this regard, we cannot address our concerns over greenhouse gasses, which are increasing, without looking toward relief. Nuclear energy offers us that relief. We have the technology. We are seeing that technology move over to France and Japan. The bottom line is, unless we address the issue of a repository for waste that has been generated by the nuclear powerplants, we simply are going to be unable to meet our responsibility in this body relative to that contractual commitment that we made several years ago. This bill provides a responsible alternative. The time to do it clearly is now. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Hagel] and the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Levin] be added as cosponsors on Senate bill 104, to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I think it will be of interest for my colleagues to note that a high level radioactive waste experiment occurred some 1.8 million years ago in west Africa, in what is now the nation of Gabon, at a place called Oklo. The French were prospecting in their former colony for uranium for their developing nuclear program. Some 2 billion years ago, all the uranium on Earth contained some 3 to 4 percent uranium 235, and the rest is the normal level of uranium 238. But, because of natural radiation decay, all U-238 today contains only about 0.7 percent of U-235. U-235 is fissionable, and at about 3 percent enrichment can sustain a chain reaction. That means it can undergo fission. That is just what happened to the uranium in Oklo, approximately 1.8 million years ago. Some water seeped into the vein and began a slow chain reaction which continued for some several hundred thousand years, generating some 10 tons of radioactive waste, including almost a ton of plutonium. The reactor became dormant and scientists have now measured all the minerals at that site and they have shown that all the plutonium created at the site has decayed and that all the original radiation decay products of fission were recovered, close to the original natural fission reactor. This, altogether, released only a few feet from the surface. It is interesting to note the plutonium did not migrate away, even though there were no engineered barriers to prevent transport of the waste product. This natural experiment shows that it is difficult, if not impossible, for such waste to enter the biosphere. It clearly demonstrates that geological repositories can successfully isolate radioactive waste from the biosphere. There is nothing unique about the geology of Oklo. That occurred, as I have indicated, some 1.8 million years ago. As we enter the debate on a comprehensive plan for the Federal Government to meet its obligation to provide a safe place to store spent nuclear waste and nuclear fuel, I think it is important to refer to the historical natural occurrence that took place in Africa some 1.8 million years ago because it represents a phenomenon, if you will, that shows, indeed, a natural experimentation that resulted in no unfavorable outfall associated with the process. Getting back to where we are today, our Government entered into a contractual commitment to take the waste generated from our nuclear powerplants and provide a safe storage and disposition of that waste. That was some years ago. That contract is now due, for the Government to initiate performance, in 1998. As a consequence of the recognition of the inability of the Government to take that waste, on March 13 my committee on Energy and Natural Resources reported Senate bill S. 104 on a bipartisan vote of 15 to 5. As you will recall, last year a similar bill passed the Senate by a bipartisan vote of 63 to 37. The bill would provide one safe, central, temporary storage site at the Nevada test site or, if the Nevada test site is found to be inadequate, another chosen by the President. At the same time, S. 104 reaffirms our Nation's commitment to development of a permanent repository for nuclear waste. Why the Nevada site? We have been conducting nuclear detonations related to the weapons testing program in the Nevada desert for some 50 years. One can fairly conclude that the area has radioactivity. The area has been, time and time again, subject to underground explosions of various types. The area is well established with an adequate security capability and an experienced work force. Furthermore, when we get right down to this issue, we have to come to the conclusion that nobody wants the waste--not one of the 50 States. But clearly the experience in Nevada at the test site suggests that it is the best site that has been examined so far, and as a consequence we are committed to proceed with the effort to establish a permanent repository there. What S. 104 further attempts to do is to reaffirm our Nation's commitment to development of a permanent repository for nuclear waste, which is our ongoing objective. Over the past several weeks I have worked with many of my colleagues, notably Senator Bingaman from New Mexico, to address concerns that he has with the bill and other concerns. As a result of these discussions, I am prepared to offer an amendment that makes significant changes to S. 104. Let me comment a little further on this bill, because while this bill was resolved with a tremendous amount of work by the staff, what it really is is an effort to meet our obligation to take our nuclear waste in a timely manner and reduce the associated liability that is going to come from suits brought to the Federal Government for nonperformance of the contract. If someone has a better idea for this bill, or a better proposal to address the problem now, why, this Senator is certainly willing to listen and very likely accommodate it. But let me explain the amendment. The amendment, first of all, extends the schedule for siting and licensing an interim facility, specifically siting and licensing an interim facility. This means we can start the process that we have had underway for a long, long time. Further, this allows even more time for the progress at Yucca Mountain to be taken into account in siting the interim facility. It would provide that the interim facility will be licensed by existing NRC regulations with no exceptions. It shortens the licensing term of the interim facility to 40 years, so it puts a limit on how long it can be used, and provides that its capacity will only be that needed to fulfill the Government's obligation until a permanent repository is available. And it preempts only State laws that are inconsistent with the provisions of the act. This language is virtually identical to that in the Hazardous Waste Materials Transportation Act. These changes are significant, but do not harm the ability to reach the ultimate goal. The ultimate goal is safe, central storage; safe, central storage of our Nation's spent nuclear fuels and waste. High level nuclear waste and highly radioactive used nuclear fuel is, today, continuing to pile up. It is piling up in 41 States at some 80 sites, and it is stored in areas that are populated; near neighborhoods, areas where schools are not too far away--you might say in the back yards of people across America. One example that comes to mind is the Palisades plant in Michigan, which is within 100 feet of Lake Michigan. Another is the Haddam Neck plant in Connecticut. My colleague from that State has observed that he can see the plant from his home. I refer to an editorial from the Hartford Courant that observes, ``With the closing of the Connecticut Yankee plant at Haddam Neck, the issue of what to do with the State's high level nuclear waste has moved from the theoretical to the here and now. Experts say that Connecticut Yankee spent fuel could be stored at Haddam Neck for another 30 years, ``another 30 years, Mr. President'' if Congress fails to approve a temporary facility. Unfortunately, the hands of the clock cannot be turned back to a time when nuclear waste didn't exist. In terms of its disposal, a remote desert site in Nevada is simply the lesser of two evils.'' (Mr. ENZI assumed the chair.)

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, in compliance with paragraph 11(a) of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources has obtained a letter from the Congressional Budget Office containing an estimate of the costs of S. 104, the Energy Policy and Conservation Amendment Act, as reported from the committee. In addition, pursuant to Public Law 104-4, the letter contains the opinion of the Congressional Budget Office regarding whether S. 104 contains intergovernmental mandates as defined in that act. I respectfully request that the opinion of the Congressional Budget Office be printed in the Record. The opinion follows: U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC, March 21, 1997. Hon. Frank H. Murkowski, Chairman, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 104, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997. If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Kim Cawley. Sincerely, June E. O'Neill, Director. Enclosure. congressional budget office cost estimate S. 104--Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1997 Summary: S. 104 would amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act by directing the Department of Energy (DOE) to begin storing spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste at an interim facility in Nevada no later than November 30, 1999. The bill would direct DOE to continue site characterization activities at the proposed permanent repository site at Yucca Mountain, also in Nevada. Title IV would modify how the nuclear waste program is funded after 2002. Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO estimates that implementing S. 104 would cost about $4 billion over the 1997-2002 period. (The increase in 1997 spending only would be about $15 million.) In addition, enacting the bill would affect direct spending--but not until 2002. Because S. 104 would not affect direct spending or receipts in either 1997 or 1998, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply. The state of Nevada and localities in the state would incur some additional costs as a result of this bill, but CBO is unsure whether the provisions causing those costs would be considered intergovernmental mandates, as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA). We estimate that the costs incurred by state and local governments would total significantly less than the threshold established in the law. (UMRA set a threshold of $50 million for 1996, adjusted annually for inflation). CBO estimates that S. 104 contains private-sector mandates that exceed the $100 million threshold identified in UMRA. Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary impact of S. 104 over the next five years is shown in the table below. CBO estimates that building and operating an interim storage facility and continuing the study of the Yucca Mountain site as authorized by the bill would require appropriations of about $4 billion over the 1998-2002 period, resulting in outlays of about $3.8 billion over that period. In addition, section 401 would result in an increase in offsetting receipts in 2002 because it would require certain utilities to make a one-time payment of nuclear waste fees to the government of about $2.7 billion before the end of fiscal year 2002. Under current law, this payment is not expected to be made until 2010 or later. S. 104 also would affect direct spending in later years by ending the current mandatory nuclear waste fee. Lost receipts would total about $630 million annually beginning in 2004. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- By fiscal years, in millions of dollars

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, high-level nuclear waste and highly radioactive used nuclear fuel is piling up at 80 sites in 41 States. It is stored in populated areas, near neighborhoods and schools, in the backyards of people across America. An example is the Palisades Plant in Michigan, which is within 100 feet of Lake Michigan. Another is the Haddam Neck Plant, in Connecticut. A U.S. Senator has observed that he can see it from his house. Without objection, I would like to place in the Record an editorial from today's Hartford Courant that observes that ``with the closing of the Connecticut Yankee Plant at Haddam Neck, the issue of what to do with the State's high-level nuclear waste has moved from the theoretical to the here and now. . . . Experts say Connecticut Yankee's spent fuel could be stored at Haddam Neck for another 30 years if Congress fails to approve a temporary facility. Unfortunately, the hands of the clock can't be turned back to a time when nuclear waste didn't exist. In terms of its disposal, a remote desert site in Nevada is the lesser of two evils.'' The waste was supposed to be taken by the Federal Government for safer, central storage by 1998. Will that happen? The answer is ``no.'' Even though $12 billion has been collected from Americans to pay for storage--and even though a Federal court reaffirmed the Government's legal obligation to take the waste by 1998--there is no plan for action. By 1998, 23 reactors in 14 States will be full. By 2010, 65 reactors in 29 States will be full. A conservative estimate is that 25 percent of our nuclear plants will not be able to build onsite storage and will be forced to shut down. That would mean the loss of over 5 percent of our Nation's total electricity generating capacity. But Yucca Mountain won't be ready until at least 2015. Therefore, the Nation needs a temporary solution. That solution--S. 104--passed the Energy and Natural Resources Committee with a solid, bipartisan vote (15-5). Almost half the minority members and all majority members voted in favor of the bill. Americans have waited too long for a solution to this environmental and public safety challenge--we must not wait any longer. There is a critical need to construct a safe, central storage facility to eliminate the growing threat to the environment and to the American people. I have worked with Members on both sides of the aisle to solve any problems they have with this bill. We accepted several amendments from the democrat side. We continue to meet with Democrat Members and the administration to resolve remaining concerns. We will continue to work with new Secretary Pena and his staff at the Energy Department, now that the Secretary has the portfolio to resolve this pressing problem. Over the recess, committee staff will be available to work on proposed compromises which can be considered in April. Senator Bingaman has been very constructive in this regard. Much of what he is proposing appears acceptable. However, the bottom line is the need for a predictable path to interim and permanent waste storage. We simply cannot leave trap doors that allow central storage to be delayed for decades. We now have an opportunity for bipartisan action. Let's seize that opportunity. It is no secret both Nevada Senators will do what they feel they need to to derail this important bill. They consider it a political necessity to oppose it. There will be allegations that the science is bad and try to scare us with references to mobile chernobyl. They will imply that if this bill doesn't pass, nuclear waste will not be transported through this country. That is not true. The fact is that there have been 2,500 shipments of used fuel across this country in the last 20 years. This is not just history--it is happening today. Doe is transporting spent fuel from nuclear reactors all over the world into the United States, virtually as we speak--by truck, by train, by barge, by boat. If the Nevada Senators do not tell you about this, there's a reason. Its because these shipments have been, and will continue to be, completely uneventful. In short, these spent fuel shipments are safe, and they aren't news. At our hearing in February, all four members of the Nevada delegation admitted there was no process and no level of scientific proof that would decrease their opposition. This is about politics, and little about science. Senator Bryan was once in favor of sending high-level materials to the Nevada test site. As a State legislator, he voted for A.J.R 15, which was signed by the Nevada Governor in May 1975, which asked the Federal Government to do just that. I think he was right the first time. It is safer, smarter, and cheaper to contain these materials at one location in the remote nevada desert. The Nevada test site was used for decades to explode nuclear bombs. It helped win the cold war--now it can help us win the war on radioactive waste disposal. High-level nuclear waste is our legacy: Now it's our obligation to dispose of it. It is irresponsible to let this situation continue. It is unsafe to let dangerous radioactive materials pile up at 80 sites in 41 States. It is unwise to block safe storage in a remote area when the alternative is to simply leave it in 41 States. This is a national problem that requires a national solution. We need to pass S. 104. So far, the administration's attitude toward nuclear waste storage has been to simply ignore the problem and disregard the Governments contractual obligation to take this waste. The American people deserve better. Safe nuclear storage should not be a political issue. It is a scientific and an environmental issue--and we need a solution now. Sadly, the administration has turned a blind eye and a deaf ear. In addition to threats to the environment and safety, 22 percent of our electric capacity is at risk--22 percent. Starting in January 1998, taxpayers may have to pay billions of dollars in liability payments because the Government has not met its obligation to take waste. Estimates of taxpayers' liability under a recent lawsuit brought by States run as high as $80 billion. That's as much as $1,300 per American family. Here's how the damages break down: Cost of storage of spent nuclear fuel: $19.6 billion. Return of nuclear waste fees: $8.5 billion. Interest on nuclear waste fees: $15 to $27.8 billion (depending on the interest rate used). Consequential damages for shutdown of 25 percent of nuclear plants due to insufficient storage (power replacement cost): $24 billion. Inaction is not an option. Inaction is irresponsible. Many of the opponents claims are also irresponsible: Interim storage at the Nevada test site will not delay construction of Yucca Mountain. A viability assessment will occur before the interim site is built. The President will have a choice of interim sites after the viability assessment. This Nation faces a major decision: either continue storing high- level radioactive materials at 80 locations in 41 States indefinitely, or more safely contain them at one, centralized facility. The option is clear--it's safer and cheaper. The time for action is now. The editorial follows: [From the Hartford Courant, Mar. 20, 1997] The Lesser of Two Evils With the closing of the Connecticut Yankee plant at Haddam Neck, the issue of what to do with the state's high-level nuclear waste has moved from the theoretical to the here and now. The dilemma for Connecticut--and for other states that are home to any of 109 nuclear reactors--is whether to continue to store the spent nuclear rods on site or. . . . Or What? Or begin shipping the radioactive waste to a temporary repository in the Nevada desert, but only if Congress approves such a facility. Senate action is expected shortly. Already, utility ratepayers have contributed $13 billion nationally, and $500 million in Connecticut, for the purpose of disposing spent nuclear fuel at a central repository. But the federal government is more than a dozen years behind in developing a permanent underground vault at Yucca Mountain, Nev., thus heightening the need for a temporary holding place. To be sure, concerns about transporting 85,000 tons of waste in 15,000 shipments over 30 years should in no way be minimized. Any leak, accident or terrorist attack would have disastrous consequences for the 75 percent of the nation's population who live along the designated truck and rail routes. But nuclear engineers have done everything humanly possible to ensure the integrity of the operation. The casks that contain the radioactive material have been dropped 30 feet onto hard surfaces, engulfed in 1,475-degree fires, submerged under three feet of water and crashed at 80 mph into a 700- ton concrete wall. In every test, the casks survived intact. In the seven transportation accidents that have occurred, no radioactivity was ever released. Although the risk will never be eliminated, the alternative is unacceptable. High-level nuclear waste cannot continue to be stockpiled at the 73 existing sites. Many reactor sites either have been decommissioned or are running out of room. Experts say Connecticut Yankee's spent fuel could be stored at Haddam Heck for another 30 years if Congress fails to approve a temporary facility. Unfortunately, the hands of the clock can't be turned back to a time when nuclear waste didn't exist. In terms of its disposal, a remote desert site in Nevada is the lesser of two evils.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, along with Senators Akaka, Domenici, and Kyl, I am today introducing legislation to address several issues associated with hydroelectric projects. Section 1 gives the State of Alaska jurisdiction over small hydroelectric projects 5 megawatts or smaller. Section 2 precludes the voluntary licensing of hydroelectric projects on fresh waters in the State of Hawaii. Section 3 provides an exemption from licensing for the transmission line portion of a hydroelectric project located in the State of New Mexico. Section 4 gives the FERC the authority to extend for up to 10 years the deadline for commencement of construction of hydroelectric projects. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of this bill are virtually identical to sections 7, 8, and 9 of S. 737 as reported in the 104th Congress. By unanimous vote, S. 737 was ordered reported by the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (Report No. 104-77). On September 27, 1996, the Senate unanimously passed S. 737 (Senate Calendar No. 100). Unfortunately, just a few days later, on October 6, the House of Representatives went out of session not having acted on the Senate- passed bill. Sections 2 and 3 are of direct interest to Senators Akaka and Domenici, and they will speak separately on their merits. I will discuss sections 1 and 4, which are of direct interest to me. Section 1 gives the State of Alaska jurisdiction over hydroelectric projects 5 megawatts or smaller. It goes into effect when the Governor of Alaska notifies the Secretary of Energy that the State has in place a comprehensive process for regulating these facilities. The required process is modeled on the one contained in the Federal Power Act for the FERC. The authority granted to the State of Alaska would apply only to projects that are located entirely within the State. Moreover, these projects may not be located on an Indian reservation, a unit of the National Park System, a component of the Wild and Scenic Rivers System, or a segment of a river designated for study for potential addition to such system. In the case of a project that is already licensed by the FERC, the project sponsor may elect to make it subject to State authority. Projects located on Federal lands are subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Federal agency having jurisdiction, and that Secretary may include such terms and conditions as may be necessary for the protection of the public interest. The provisions specifically provide that nothing preempts the application of Federal environmental, natural, or cultural resources protection laws according to their terms. Section 4 amends section 13 of the Federal Power Act to give the FERC authority to extend for up to 10 years the deadline for the commencement of a hydroelectric project. Under existing law, a project must commence construction within 2 years of the date of the issuance of the license. That deadline can be extended by the FERC one time for as much as 2 additional years, for a total of 4 years. If construction has not commenced at the end of the statutory time period, the license must be terminated by the FERC. Termination not only results in the licensee losing its investment of time and many tens of thousands of dollars to obtain the license, it also delays the construction of the project by requiring a new licensee to start the licensing process all over. In the past, 4 years was adequate time to commence construction. However, with growing uncertainty in the electric power market, it is proving increasingly difficult for licensees to obtain the power purchase contract necessary to secure financing so as to permit commencement of construction. This has resulted in a number of individual requests to Congress to legislatively extend on a case-by- case basis the commencement of construction deadline. During the 104th Congress, for example, 28 bills were introduced in the House and Senate to extend the deadline for individual projects. Acting on these individual requests proved to be very time consuming for the committee and for the Congress. Had this provision been enacted, all of these requests could have been accommodated administratively by the FERC. Hence, I am introducing this bill to give the FERC the generic authority to extend the deadline for the commencement of construction for up to 10 years. Mr. President, it is for these reasons that I am introducing this legislation along with Senators Akaka, Domenici, and Kyl.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, along with Senators Akaka, Domenici, and Kyl, I am today introducing legislation to address several issues associated with hydroelectric projects. Section 1 gives the State of Alaska jurisdiction over small hydroelectric projects 5 megawatts or smaller. Section 2 precludes the voluntary licensing of hydroelectric projects on fresh waters in the State of Hawaii. Section 3 provides an exemption from licensing for the transmission line portion of a hydroelectric project located in the State of New Mexico. Section 4 gives the FERC the authority to extend for up to 10 years the deadline for commencement of construction of hydroelectric projects. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of this bill are virtually identical to sections 7, 8, and 9 of S. 737 as reported in the 104th Congress. By unanimous vote, S. 737 was ordered reported by the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources (Report No. 104-77). On September 27, 1996, the Senate unanimously passed S. 737 (Senate Calendar No. 100). Unfortunately, just a few days later, on October 6, the House of Representatives went out of session not having acted on the Senate- passed bill. Sections 2 and 3 are of direct interest to Senators Akaka and Domenici, and they will speak separately on their merits. I will discuss sections 1 and 4, which are of direct interest to me. Section 1 gives the State of Alaska jurisdiction over hydroelectric projects 5 megawatts or smaller. It goes into effect when the Governor of Alaska notifies the Secretary of Energy that the State has in place a comprehensive process for regulating these facilities. The required process is modeled on the one contained in the Federal Power Act for the FERC. The authority granted to the State of Alaska would apply only to projects that are located entirely within the State. Moreover, these projects may not be located on an Indian reservation, a unit of the National Park System, a component of the Wild and Scenic Rivers System, or a segment of a river designated for study for potential addition to such system. In the case of a project that is already licensed by the FERC, the project sponsor may elect to make it subject to State authority. Projects located on Federal lands are subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Federal agency having jurisdiction, and that Secretary may include such terms and conditions as may be necessary for the protection of the public interest. The provisions specifically provide that nothing preempts the application of Federal environmental, natural, or cultural resources protection laws according to their terms. Section 4 amends section 13 of the Federal Power Act to give the FERC authority to extend for up to 10 years the deadline for the commencement of a hydroelectric project. Under existing law, a project must commence construction within 2 years of the date of the issuance of the license. That deadline can be extended by the FERC one time for as much as 2 additional years, for a total of 4 years. If construction has not commenced at the end of the statutory time period, the license must be terminated by the FERC. Termination not only results in the licensee losing its investment of time and many tens of thousands of dollars to obtain the license, it also delays the construction of the project by requiring a new licensee to start the licensing process all over. In the past, 4 years was adequate time to commence construction. However, with growing uncertainty in the electric power market, it is proving increasingly difficult for licensees to obtain the power purchase contract necessary to secure financing so as to permit commencement of construction. This has resulted in a number of individual requests to Congress to legislatively extend on a case-by- case basis the commencement of construction deadline. During the 104th Congress, for example, 28 bills were introduced in the House and Senate to extend the deadline for individual projects. Acting on these individual requests proved to be very time consuming for the committee and for the Congress. Had this provision been enacted, all of these requests could have been accommodated administratively by the FERC. Hence, I am introducing this bill to give the FERC the generic authority to extend the deadline for the commencement of construction for up to 10 years. Mr. President, it is for these reasons that I am introducing this legislation along with Senators Akaka, Domenici, and Kyl.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I heard the comments expressed by my good friend, the Senator from Minnesota, Senator Grams, relative to his concern and the concern of his State over the disposition of high-level nuclear waste that is in some 80 locations in 41 States throughout the country, and the inability of the current administration to address its responsibility and hence the responsibility of Congress to meet the contractual commitments made some years ago to take that nuclear waste next year, in 1998. The reality is that the ratepayers in this country have paid over that period of time some $12 billion which has gone into the general fund. And, as consequence, we are facing a reality that next year we are not going to be able to meet the obligation of taking that waste. So we can anticipate an opportunity for full employment for the lawyers that are associated with this issue because there is going to be a giant liability that is coming to the American taxpayer. It is estimated to be somewhere in the area of $40 billion to $80 billion. The current estimate is about $59 billion. But usually it goes up from there. This is the liability, or at least a portion of it, which the Federal Government will be subjected to as a consequence of its inability to perform on its contractual commitment. I do not take that lightly. As a consequence, as we address on the floor later on today the nomination of the Secretary of Energy, Federico Pena, I think this is a significant question. I rise today in support of that nomination. I also rise to advise my colleagues that the delay in considering the nomination has not been about the nominee's qualifications. The nominee is qualified. The committee has held hearings on the nomination. We have investigated matters brought to our attention. We found him to be qualified and reported the nomination favorably on a 19-to-0 vote with one Member voting ``present.'' But there has been an issue, and that issue has been whether the new Secretary is going to have the ability, the flexibility, and the authority to work with Congress to solve the looming nuclear waste storage problem. As I indicated earlier, this waste is stacking up in our towns and in our communities near our homes and schools at 80 locations in 41 States. Some have said, ``How important is nuclear energy?'' Well, nuclear energy is contributing about 22 percent of the total power generated in the United States today. People look at power. They take it for granted. They expect it to work. It is always there. It is almost an entitlement. But it has to come from somewhere. It has to come from investment and from transmissions. It has to come from some kind of energy source, and nuclear is an important contributor. Nearly a quarter of the energy produced in the United States. But the waste, as a consequence of these nuclear power plants, has been stacking up. A Federal court has said that the Government must take that waste by 1998. As I have said before, Americans put $12 billion into the nuclear waste fund. What do we have to show for it? Nothing. The problem that is unique about this is that nobody wants it. Absolutely no State wants to have this waste. You can throw it up in the air. It has to come down somewhere. It will not stay up there. That is the basic problem. The States in question are running out of space. These are the States that have reactors, and the storage that they have is not permanent storage. It wasn't designed for long-term storage. It was designed for short- term storage. That space is filling up. As a consequence, they may have to limit the construction of new storage capacities. States might not license for new storage capacity. Mr. President, I ask for another 4 minutes under the time remaining on the 30 minutes that was given to the Senator from Minnesota.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. In light of that, I am prepared to urge my colleagues to vote favorably on Mr. Pena's nomination this morning, and I look forward to working with him and members of my committee on the nuclear waste issue as well as other issues facing the Department of Energy. Mr. President, I thank the Chair and I yield the floor.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, today I am pleased to be joined by my colleagues, Senators Stevens, Gorton, Burns, Craig, Kempthorne, and Senator Smith of Oregon, in introducing the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1997. Our legislation will create a new twelfth circuit comprised of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana. This legislation will ease the current burdens of the ninth circuit, as well as effectively create a new northwest circuit that is historically, economically, culturally, and philosophically united. Mr. President, one look at the contours of the ninth circuit reveals the need for this reorganization. Stretching from the Arctic Circle to the Mexican border, past the tropics of Hawaii and across the international dateline to Guam and the Marianna Islands, by any means of measurement, the ninth circuit is the largest of all U.S. circuit courts of appeal. There is also no denying the ninth circuit's mammoth caseload. It serves a population of more than 45 million people, well over one-third more than the next largest circuit. Last year, the ninth circuit had an astounding 7,146 new filings. By 2010, the Census Bureau estimates that the ninth circuit's population will be more than 63 million--a 40-percent increase in just 13 years, which inevitably will create an even more daunting caseload. We believe that this legislation is long overdue. Because of its size, the entire appellate process in the ninth circuit is the second slowest in the Nation. As former Chief Judge Wallace of the ninth circuit stated: ``It takes about 4 months longer to complete an appeal in our court as compared to the national median time.'' Mr. President, what this means is that while the national median time for filing a notice of appeal to final disposition is 315 days, the ninth circuit median time is 1 year and 2 months. Furthermore, the massive size of the ninth circuit often results in a decrease in the ability to keep abreast of legal developments within its own jurisdiction. This unwieldy caseload creates an inconsistency in constitutional interpretation. In fact, ninth circuit cases have an extraordinarily high reversal rate by the Supreme Court. During the Supreme Court's 1994-95 session, the Supreme Court overturned 82 percent of the ninth circuit cases heard by the Court. This lack of constitutional consistency discourages settlements and leads to unnecessary litigation. Mr. President, the legislation I am introducing is not novel. Since the day the circuit was founded, over a century ago, there were discussions of a split. Nearly a quarter century ago, in 1973, the Congressional Commission on the Revision of the Federal Court of Appellate System recommended that the ninth circuit be divided. Additionally, the American Bar Association has adopted a resolution expressing the benefits of dividing the ninth district. Since 1983, Senator Gorton and many others in this Chamber have initiated legislation to split the circuit. There have been Senate hearings. In December 1995, Senator Hatch stated in a committee report that: The legislative history, in conjunction with available statistics and research concerning the Ninth Circuit, provides an ample record for an informed decision at this point as to whether to divide the Ninth Circuit . . . Upon careful consideration the time has indeed come. Furthermore, splitting a circuit to respond to caseload and population growth is by no means unprecedented. Congress divided the original eighth circuit to create the tenth circuit in 1929, and divided the former fifth circuit to create the 11th circuit in 1980. The legislation that I and my colleagues introduce today is the sensible reorganization of the ninth circuit. The new ninth circuit would embrace California, Nevada, Arizona, Hawaii, and the U.S. territories. And the new 12th circuit would be comprised solely of States in the Northwest region. Most importantly, this split would respect the economic, historical, cultural, and legal ties which exist between the States involved. Mr. President, no one court can effectively exercise its power in an area that extends from the Arctic Circle to the tropics. The legislation introduction today will create a regional commonality which will lead to greater consistency and dependency in legal decisions. Mr. President, we have waited long enough. The 45 million residents of the ninth circuit are the persons that suffer. Many wait years before cases are heard and decided, prompting many to forego the entire appellate process. In brief, the ninth circuit has become a circuit where justice is not swift and not always served. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the Record.