Frank Murkowski

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent the bill be deemed read a third time, passed, and the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and any statements relating to the bill be placed at the appropriate place in the Record.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of calendar No. 398, H.R. 1642.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, on July 16, 1996, I filed Report 104-322 to accompany S. 901, to amend the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, that had been ordered favorably reported on June 19, 1996. At the time the Report was filed, the estimates by Congressional Budget Office were not available. The estimate is now available and concludes that enactment of S. 901 would ``not affect direct spending or receipts''. I ask that a copy of the CBO estimate be printed in the Record. The estimate follows: congressional budget office cost estimate 1. Bill number: S. 901. 2. Bill title: A bill to amend the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992 to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to participate in the design, planning, and construction of certain water reclamation and reuse projects and desalination research and development projects, and for other purposes. 3. Bill status: As reported by the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on July 16, 1996. 4. Bill purpose: S. 901 would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to participate in the design, planning, and construction of eleven water reclamation and reuse projects and two desalination research and development projects. The projects would be subject to the following conditions: No funds could be appropriated until a feasibility study is completed and the Secretary has determined that the nonfederal project sponsor is financially capable of funding the nonfederal share of the project's costs; The federal government could not pay more than 25 percent of the total cost of constructing the water reclamation and reuse projects or more than 50 percent of the cost of the desalinization and research and development projects; and The Secretary would not be authorized to provide funds for the operation and maintenance of any project. 5. Estimated cost to the Federal Government: Assuming the necessary appropriations, CBO estimates that enacting S. 901 would result in new discretionary spending totaling $112 million for fiscal years 1997 through 2002. Additional spending of $20 million would occur after 2002. Appropriations in fiscal year 1996 for water reclamation and reuse projects totaled $20 million. Assuming appropriations of the needed amounts, the Bureau of Reclamation anticipates spending an average of $30 million a year over the 1997-2007 period on projects that have already been authorized. [By fiscal year, in millions of dollars] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise to support Senator Domenici's amendment. This amendment would restrict all International Military Education and Training [IMET] funds to Mexico until the Mexican Government extradites the leading drug trafficking figures hiding there. It is clear that there is a flood crossing our borders that threatens the very health and lives of all Americans--a flood of drugs, crime, and money laundering. The source of that flood is Mexico. At a joint Finance Committee and Senate International Narcotics hearing Senator Grassley held earlier this week, I brought the deteriorating situation in Mexico to the attention of Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin. At that hearing I raised the issue of Mexican cooperation in apprehending and extraditing drug traffickers wanted in the United States. I also questioned whether Mexico is really making any effort to enforce its own laws on official government corruption or if it is just spinning its wheels in endless prosecutions that never result in convictions. I am expecting answers to the questions and more in the coming week as we hold another hearing on this issue. The dramatic increase in drug trafficking from Mexico is one of the unfortunate by-products of NAFTA trade liberalization and our success in getting tough on drug smuggling in the Caribbean. Reacting to the pressure of U.S. efforts such as ``Operation Gateway'' in Puerto Rico, drug smugglers have found even greater access to the U.S. in Mexico. The Mexican Attorney General has estimated that traffickers accumulate $30 billion in revenues each year. Mexican traffickers or their front companies have also purchased numerous ranches or Maquiladora plants in Mexico and the United States to ferry drugs across the Rio Grande. The impact is undeniable. Only ten years ago, almost no cocaine came across the border from Mexico. Today, nearly 70 percent of all cocaine coming into the United States passes through Mexico. Mexico also supplies between 20-30 percent of the heroin consumed in the U.S. and up to 80 percent of the imported marijuana. In fact, the Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA] estimates that Mexico earns over $7 billion a year from the drug trade, making illegal drugs Mexico's third largest export to the United States. The United States response to this escalating crisis has been inadequate. While the President talks tough on drugs and crime--backing it up in the case of Colombia--when it comes to Mexico he has bent over backwards to accommodate failure. Based on mutual declarations of cooperation at the Summit of Americas and the limited success of Mexican and United States efforts to seize large drug shipments, President Clinton certified to Congress on March 1, 1996 that Mexico was ``fully cooperating'' with U.S. counter-narcotics efforts. This allowed $38.5 million in bilateral aid to continue to go to the Mexican government in addition to the $20 billion of U.S. taxpayer funds provided in the tesobono bail-out last year. Our good intentions and assistance have produced few results. Mexico's efforts to eliminate corruption among government officials and capture the worst drug offenders have produced thunder but no rain. To date, there have been no convictions in the hundreds of ongoing prosecutions for corruption among officials in the Mexican Attorney General's office. There has been little more success within the Ministry of Finance or federal police. Laws which have been on the books for years to end government corruption have been ignored while hundreds of cases have been thrown out of court over minor technicalities. Even more glaring is the lack of a bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico. As of April 15, 1996, there were 99 outstanding formal extradition requests by the United States to Mexico involving 110 different individuals. Mexico has acted on only one of these requests--that of Juan Garcia Abrego who is being held without bond in Texas in advance of his September trial. He faces a life sentence. I have asked Secretary Rubin to provide detailed information on the current status of all the United States requests, especially for members of the drug cartels that have been indicted in the United States and are fugitives in hiding in Mexico--Denjamin Arellano-Felix and his brothers Francisco, Ramon and Javier; Amado Carillo Fuentes; and, Miguel Caro Quintero. Enough is enough. It is time to get tough with Mexico just as we did in the Caribbean. The United States must send a strong message to Mexico that there are limits to our patience. We must continue to strengthen our partnership to stop the drug trade. But we cannot continue to flail in endless investigations and prosecutions nor can we continue to allow criminals to avoid extradition to the United States to face judgment. We must ratchet up the pressure on the government of Mexico to clean up this tide of drugs, crime, and official corruption or risk our neighbor becoming another Colombia. This amendment by Senator Domenici provides that message. It provides a targeted and flexible response to the building problems in Mexico. It also serves notice that the Mexican Government must improve the enforcement of its laws and agreements. We must make clear that our relationship cannot continue to be one where the United States gives and gives while Mexico takes and takes. This was not acceptable with Colombia and it should not be with Mexico either. Mr. President. If Congress and the President are really serious about keeping Mexico from ``becoming Colombia'' and reducing international crime and drug trafficking, we must take action now. I urge my colleagues to support Senator Domenici's amendment.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Cohen amendment on United States policy toward Burma. The current language within the foreign operations appropriations bill mandates immediate unilateral sanctions against Burma. The purpose of these sanctions is to punish Burma's ruling junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council or SLORC, for failing to accede to the desire of the Burmese people for democracy and freedom and for its many past violations of basic human and civil rights. I agree with the goals of Senator McConnell and Senator Moynihan. Not one person in this distinguished chamber will disagree that the United States has a clear national interest in seeing a democratically elected government in charge of a free society in Burma. The question is whether the immediate imposition of unilateral investment sanctions is the best policy to achieve that goal. I do not believe that they are. First, Burma is not a throw-away issue. The wrong U.S. policy could substantially damage our relations with our close friends and our regional influence. The United States has a clear national security interest in balancing the rising influence of China in Asia. Our full engagement in southeast Asia is an integral part of that balance. Unfortunately, the administration has long been unable to articulate and clearly demonstrate the reliability of our long-term commitment to the region. In the face of this uncertainty, ASEAN is taking steps to ensure Burma and Vietnam become members to counterbalance Chinese influence. The U.S. willingness to work with them on Burma is seen as a key test case of the U.S. commitment. Second, our allies do not support sanctions now and said as much to Presidential envoys Ambassador Brown and Mr. Roth. Bringing Burma into ASEAN and the ARF force the SLORC to accept and live up to the values and responsibilities that membership entails in much the same way as NATO membership will require of the countries of central Europe. This approach establishes a forum for pressuring the SLORC to negotiate with Aung San Suu Kyi and other democracy movement leaders. Unfortunately, U.S. moral suasion on behalf of sanctions will have little impact unless the situation in Burma deteriorates dramatically. Expecting others to follow our lead even if it goes against their own cold calculation of national interests only ensures that we are falling on our own sword. I want to make it clear that the SLORC and Burma are not the 1990's equivalent of apartheid in South Africa. South Africa relied on access to the outside world. Isolating them cut off the very roots of their export-oriented economy. For most of the past 30 years, Burma isolated itself from the world. Only now is Burma establishing ties with the outside world. Isolating them now would be about as effective as prunning a tree. In particular, United States investment in Burma--save for oil interests--is minimal and even its loss would have little impact because others will take our place. With South Africa, sub- saharan Africa was also united in support of sanctions. There is no similar regional mandate for action with Burma. When sanctions were imposed against South Africa they were accompanied by extensive contact and assistance to the black community in South Africa and the NGOs working with them. The current language on Burma has none of that and would cut off our access and ability to support the democracy movement. There are no potential incentives for the SLORC to work with Suu Kyi as none of the sanctions will be lifted until a fully democratically- elected government comes to power. But, as we saw in South Africa and before that in Poland, the movement to democracy is often a slow, tentative process and include transitional governments. If events unfold in a similar fashion in Burma, the current language has no means for easing or eliminating sanctions to cultivate the growth of democracy. The current language would also give SLORC the wrong signal that it can do whatever it wants because we have already used up all our bullets. our policy and the current amendment Instead of the current draconian sanctions proposed in the legislation before us, we should adopt an approach that effectively secures our national interests. The Cohen amendment does just that. One, it establishes a framework for United States policy towards Burma that stimulates intimate cooperation with our allies in the region, especially ASEAN, that is clearly in the national interest. Two, it draws a clear line in the sand that should the situation in Burma deteriorate the United States and our allies would impose multilateral sanctions on Burma or the United States would go it alone if necessary. SLORC will be on notice and have to be on their best behavior. Three, it provides incentives for SLORC and Suu Kyi and the other democratic leaders and ethnic minorities to start talking and move towards democracy and freedom. It would permit assistance to the democracy movement, support efforts to curb the flow of heroin, and ensure that Americans can visit, talk with, and influence the people in Burma as they have everywhere from the Albania to South Africa. Four, it allows the President to remove sanctions and other restrictions should there be progress towards the establishment of a full democratic government or if we are merely punishing U.S. investors. Finally, it requires the administration to work closely with the Congress developing a multilateral strategy to bring democracy to Burma and in implementing the sanctions. Mr. President. This is a solid strategy and bipartisan view of what the United States' policy towards Burma should be. It is a far better one than that currently envisioned in the legislation before us. I strongly urge my fellow colleagues to support this amendment.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the Burma debate be set aside while I offer an amendment.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the amendment be dispensed.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Amendments Nos. 5084 through 5087, En Bloc, and Amendment No. 5082, As Modified

Mr. MURKOWSKI. It would be my intention to ask for a voice vote on my second-degree amendment to the underlying amendment, to the Lieberman amendment. Perhaps it would be in order to do that now. Then I can proceed with my statement.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Outside of the windup, which I understand I have been entrusted with, I have no further comments. Mr. LIEBERMAN addressed the Chair.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I offer a second-degree amendment, and send it to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Let me yield to the Senator from Wyoming who has a unanimous consent request. Amendment No. 5088

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, first let me acknowledge the statement by my friend from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, relative to his willingness to cosponsor my second-degree amendment and for the statement in support of the Lieberman amendment which specifically restores the administration's request for $25 million to support the Korea Peninsula Economic Development Organization. The significance of this is that, if the job is going to be done and done right, it is going to take a commitment. To suggest it is going to be done with half the amount of money is simply unrealistic. We might as well address reality. The administration is prepared to suggest, with the $25 million, it will be able to implement the agreed framework with North Korea. I also want to recognize Senator McCain, who joins with me, as well as Senator Lieberman, in the second degree to the Lieberman amendment. Mr. President, I believe I have asked for the yeas and nays. I will be very brief in my remarks, assuming I am correct, that we have requested the yeas and nays?

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be agreed to.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I understand there is an amendment at the desk offered by Senators Bond and Bumpers. I ask for its immediate consideration.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the committee amendment, as amended, be agreed to, the bill be deemed read a third time, passed, the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table, and any statements relating to the bill be placed at the appropriate place in the Record.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in adjournment until the hour of 9:30 a.m., Friday, July 26, further, that immediately following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be deemed approved to date, the morning hour be deemed to have expired, and the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later on in the day, and the Senate immediately resume the foreign operations appropriations bill and the previously scheduled votes.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, tomorrow morning, beginning at 9:30, the Senate will begin a series of rollcall votes on or in relation to the remaining amendments to the foreign operations appropriations bill, to be followed by a vote on final passage of that bill.

Mr. MURKOWSKI

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, I now ask unanimous consent that following passage of the foreign operations appropriations bill, the Senate then begin consideration of Calendar No. 496, S. 1959, the energy and water appropriations bill.

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, amendments are expected to be offered to the energy and water appropriations bill; therefore, Members can expect additional rollcall votes on Friday following the stacked sequence beginning at 9:30 a.m.