Michael McCaul

Mr. McCAUL

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chair, I am deeply troubled by the one-sided nature of this resolution and what is missing from this resolution, which I just stated earlier, and that is Iran, the world's leading state sponsor of terror and the Houthis' benefactor. By staying silent on Iran and by not condemning the Houthis in this resolution, it sends a green light to the Houthis and to the Iranian backers to press on. This resolution is counterproductive, also, to the efforts that are ongoing right now to negotiate peace in Yemen between the Houthi rebels and the Government of the Yemen Republic. As we speak, the U.N. envoy is working with the full support of the United States to negotiate a political resolution to this conflict. Getting to these talks has required placing substantial pressure on all parties involved. The U.N. is encouraging the Houthis to uphold these agreements and to make further agreements with the Yemini Government and the Saudi-led coalition. But this resolution might cut the U.N. efforts off at its knees. The Democrats can't tell specifically what assistance this resolution cuts off, but what I can say for sure is that what this resolution says to the Houthis and to Iran is: You have got a green light. Keep going on. You can gain more ground and cause more destruction and humanitarian crisis and cause more problems for Israel and our Saudi ally. Advancing this pro-Houthi, pro-Iran, anti-Israel resolution does not help to end this war. In Yemen, it only emboldens the rebels in Iran who violently overthrew Yemen's Government and the radical regime that backs them, Iran. So I would say, Mr. Chairman, in closing, this resolution is not only a dangerous precedent legally--it violates the construction of the War Powers Act--but it is damaging and very bad policy, and I urge my colleagues to vote against it. Mr. Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chair, I include in the Record this second document, which is a Statement of Administration Policy on this point. Statement of Administration Policy S.J. Res. 54--To Direct the Removal of United States Armed Forces from Hostilities in the Republic of Yemen that Have Not Been Authorized by the Congress--Sen. Sanders, I-VT and 16 cosponsors The Administration strongly opposes passage of S.J. Res. 54, a joint resolution that purports to direct the removal of United States Armed Forces that have not been authorized by the Congress from hostilities in the Republic of Yemen. The fundamental premise of S.J. Res. 54 is flawed--United States forces are not engaged in hostilities between the Saudi-led coalition and Houthi forces in Yemen. Since 2015, the United States has provided limited support to member countries of the Emirati and Saudi-led coalition, including intelligence sharing, logistics, and, until recently, aerial refueling. This support is provided in accordance with licenses and approvals under the Arms Export Control Act, statutory authorities to provide logistics support, and the President's constitutional powers. United States counterterrorism operations and an October 2016 strike on radar facilities in Houthi-controlled territory, which was the subject of a prior report consistent with the War Powers Resolution of 1973, are separate matters. Other than those engagements, no United States forces have been introduced into hostilities, or into situations where hostilities are clearly imminent, in connection with ongoing support to the Saudi-led coalition. As a result, this United States support does not implicate the War Powers Resolution. In addition to its erroneous premise, the joint resolution would harm bilateral relationships in the region and negatively impact the ability of the United States to prevent the spread of violent extremist organizations such as al- Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and ISIS in Yemen. The continued cooperation of the United States allows the Administration to support diplomatic negotiations to end the war, ensure humanitarian access, enhance efforts to recover United States hostages in Yemen, and defeat terrorists that seek to harm the United States. Accordingly, if S.J. Res. 54 were presented to the President in its current form, his advisors would recommend that he veto the joint resolution.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chair, I have no further speakers, so I am prepared to close, and I yield myself the balance of my time. Mr. Chair, let me state a few points. We all condemn the murder of Khashoggi. I have condemned it publicly, very strongly, what happened with the Saudis killing Khashoggi, executing him. We are talking about the situation in Yemen. Who started this humanitarian crisis in the first place? The Houthis tried to take over the Yemeni Government--the Houthis, backed by Iran. This is about the geopolitics of Iran, Houthis in Yemen, Iran and the Shia crescent in Iraq and Syria, and a direct threat to Israel by the largest state-sponsored terror, Iran, that is a mortal sworn enemy to Israel, as they chant ``death to Israel,'' ``death to America.'' So let's put this all in proper context of what we are really talking about here. Are we defending Iran and the Houthis here today? So I would like to close by putting two documents in the Record. The first is a letter sent by the Department of Defense Office of General Counsel stating that ``DOD opposes the resolution because the resolution's fundamental premise is flawed'' because the United States support to the Saudi-led coalition ``does not involve any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities.'' Are we going to go around and second-guess every security cooperation agreement we have with 117 countries, including Israel and NATO and other partners? Mr. Chair, I include in the Record this letter from the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Washington, DC, Feb. 27, 2018. Hon. Mitchell ``Mitch'' McConnell, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Majority Leader: On February 22, 2018, the Department of Defense (DoD) briefed your staff concerning DoD support to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's (KSA) operations in Yemen. Subsequently, you requested an unclassified letter reflecting DoD's views on a draft joint resolution that would ``direct[] the President to remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities in or affecting the Republic of Yemen, except United States Armed Forces engaged in operations directed at al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula or associated forces. . . .'' DoD opposes this Joint Resolution. Even if enacted into law, the Joint Resolution would not achieve its apparent purpose of restricting U.S. support to the KSA-led coalition, because, as described below, that support does not constitute ``hostilities.'' In addition to the potential constitutional concerns raised by such a proposal, the draft resolution's restrictions on U.S. military support to our partners could undermine our ability to foster long-term relationships, increase interoperability, promote burden sharing, and build strong security architectures throughout the world. The KSA is a key U.S. partner in the Middle East and we rely on our strong military partnership to promote regional security. DoD opposes the resolution because the resolution's fundamental premise is flawed. Specifically, the draft resolution incorrectly asserts that U.S. forces have been ``introduced into hostilities between the [KSA-led] coalition and the Houthis. . . .'' The limited military and intelligence support that the United States is providing to the KSA-led coalition does not involve any introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution or of section 1013 of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985 (50 USC 1546a). Since 2015, the United States has provided limited support to KSA-led coalition military operations against Houthi and Saleh-aligned forces in Yemen. With the exception of a defensive strike in October 2016, U.S. forces are not taking direct military action in this Saudi-led effort in Yemen. Instead, the United States provides the KSA-led coalition defense articles and services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and military advice, including advice regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict and best practices for reducing the risk of civilian casualties. The draft resolution incorrectly describes United States support to the KSA-led coalition as an operation that introduces U.S. forces into hostilities or imminent involvement in hostilities for purposes of the War Powers Resolution. It has been the longstanding view of the Executive Branch that ``hostilities'' refers to ``a situation in which units of U.S. armed forces are actively engaged in exchanges of fire with opposing units of hostile forces.'' U.S. personnel providing support to the KSA-led coalition are not engaged in any such exchanges of fire. Further, the limited U.S. support to the KSA-led coalition does not implicate the activities identified in section 8(c) of the War Powers Resolution. Section 8(c) defines the term ``introduction of United States Armed Forces'' but does not address the term ``hostilities.'' ``[W]hen applying section 8(c), the relevant question remains whether U.S. forces--not the foreign forces they are accompanying--are introduced into hostilities or situations involving the imminent threat thereof.'' With respect to U.S. support to the KSA-led coalition, U.S. forces do not currently command, coordinate, accompany, or participate in the movement of coalition forces in counter-Houthi operations. Thus, no U.S. forces are accompanying the KSA-led coalition when its military forces are engaged, or an imminent threat exists that they will become engaged, in hostilities. Accordingly, U.S. forces supporting the KSA-led coalition have not been introduced into hostilities or situations where hostilities are imminent. Although the resolution's requirement to remove U.S. forces from hostilities would not implicate U.S. support to the KSA- led coalition, this requirement could call into question the statutory authority for ongoing U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen. Pursuant to the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) (Public Law 107-40), U.S. armed forces are currently engaged in hostilities against both al Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Yemen. Hostilities against AQAP and associated forces are explicitly exempted from the resolution's termination requirement, but hostilities against ISIS are not similarly exempted. The resolution also asserts incorrectly that there is no authorization for U.S. participation in a Joint Combined Planning Cell with the KSA and mid-air refueling of KSA-led coalition aircraft. President Obama directed such military and intelligence support pursuant to his authority under Article II of the Constitution as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and his authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations. See Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850) (explaining that the President ``is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and military forces placed by law at his command''); Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 Op. Att'y Gen. 58, 62 (1941) (``[T]he President's authority has long been recognized as extending to the dispatch of armed forces outside the United States, either on missions of goodwill or rescue, or for the purpose of protecting American lives or property or American interests.''). Because, as discussed above, this limited support to the KSA does not involve the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated, it does not implicate section 4(a)(l) of the War Powers Resolution. See 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1543(a)(l). The Obama Administration published its summary of that limited support to the KSA-led coalition as part of the December 2016 ``Report of the Legal and Policy Framework Guiding the United States Use of Military Force and Related National Security Operations.'' As discussed further below, DoD and the Department of State have implemented the President's direction through statutory authorities available to the respective Secretaries. Article II of the Constitution likewise supplied the legal authority for the October 2016 strikes against radar facilities in Houthi-controlled territory in defense of U.S. Navy ships in international waters. The President has authority pursuant to Article II to take military action that furthers sufficiently important national interests. The limited October 2016 strikes were taken to protect U.S. vessels and personnel. Consistent with the War Powers Resolution, President Obama notified Congress of these strikes on October 14, 2016. The Obama Administration also published a summary of its legal analysis for the strike in its December 2016 report. In late July 2017, President Trump completed a review of the Obama Administration's policy of limited support to the Saudi-led coalition. President Trump decided to continue that support, adjusting the priorities in light of the recommendations of Secretary of Defense James Mattis and intervening developments in Yemen. President Trump's policy guidance for support to the KSA-led coalition's operations in Yemen is to focus on ending the war and avoiding a regional conflict, mitigating the humanitarian crisis, and defending Saudi Arabia's territorial integrity and commerce in the Red Sea. Authorized types of support continue to include intelligence, logistics, and advisory support to the KSA-led coalition. DoD and the Department of State have implemented the President's policy guidance to provide limited support to the Saudi-led coalition pursuant to legal authorities available to the respective Secretaries. The most prominent forms of support to the KSA and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as well as the corresponding legal authorities, are detailed below. Arms and Other Defense Articles: The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) is the underlying authority through which the United States provides or licenses defense articles and defense services to the KSA, UAE, and other members of the KSA-led coalition; many of these defense articles and defense services have been used in the conflict in Yemen. The AECA and associated delegations of authority provide the Secretary of State with the authority to approve the transfer of arms and other defense articles and defense services, primarily through the Foreign Military Sales program (which is overseen by the State Department and implemented through DoD) and through the State Department's licensing of Direct Commercial Sales to foreign partners. The authority to approve such transfers or licenses is not contingent upon whether the foreign recipient is engaged in an ongoing armed conflict, although the existence of such a conflict clearly increases demand and can be a policy factor in approval decisions. Transfers and licenses made pursuant to the AECA are subject to various requirements (such as notifications to Congress when transfers are above certain monetary thresholds) as well as restrictions on end-use (including no further transfer by the end-user without U.S. consent and that proposed uses must be consistent with the law of armed conflict). Logistics: Pursuant to licenses issued by the State Department under the AECA, U.S. contractors provide defense services in the form of essential maintenance and sustainment for KSA and UAE combat aircraft engaged in hostilities in Yemen. The in-flight refueling of KSA and UAE aircraft, including combat aircraft, and certain other support, may also be provided pursuant to 10 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 2341 et seq., which authorizes DoD to provide logistic support, supplies, and services to the military forces of a country with which DoD has an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in force. DoD must first obtain State Department approval to conclude an ACSA; DoD has ACSAs with the Ministry of Defense of the KSA (applied provisionally pending its formal entry into force) and with the Armed Forces General Headquarters of the UAE. I trust that this response will be helpful to your understanding of U.S. support to the KSA's operations in Yemen, and the reason for the DoD's opposition to this proposed Joint Resolution. Thank you for your continued support of the Department of Defense. Sincerely, William S. Castle, Acting.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chair, I continue to reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Davidson).

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Colorado (Mr. Lamborn).

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Watkins), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Zeldin), the ranking member of the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chair, I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Perry), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Yoho), the ranking member on the Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation Subcommittee.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Wilson), the ranking member on the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee.

Mr. McCAUL. Madam Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee.

Mr. McCAUL. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Let me just begin by extending my appreciation for the chairman. I know his arguments are well-intentioned, as are mine. I believe that we both completely agree and completely support Congress' solemn duty under Article I of the Constitution, to authorize the commitment of U.S. troops to foreign hostilities; and perhaps there will be another example where we can join forces in that. But that is not the issue here. Allow me to quote the actual War Powers Act, from Title 50 of the United States Code. This procedure applies to ``the removal of United States Armed Forces engaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States.'' This has always meant, historically, and today, U.S. troops being directly involved in live-fire combat. As the Department of Defense has repeatedly confirmed, U.S. Armed Forces are not engaged in hostilities against the Houthi forces in Yemen. This resolution is directing us to remove troops that simply, Madam Chair, are not there. Even the aerial refueling of coalition jets, which does not constitute traditional hostilities, ended last November. This resolution, in my judgment, misuses the tool to try to get at the different issue of security assistance to third countries. It provides no clear decisions on which forms of assistance are cut off. It does not address the humanitarian catastrophe inside Yemen and, alarmingly, it completely ignores the destabilization role that Iran is playing in Yemen and the region. This irresponsible measure is trying to hammer a square peg in a round hole. This resolution really stretches the definition of ``hostilities'' to cover non-U.S. military operations by other countries. It reinterprets U.S. support to those countries as ``engagement in hostilities.'' This overreach has dangerous implications far beyond Saudi Arabia. This approach will now allow any single Member to use this privileged mechanism to second-guess U.S. security cooperation relationships with more than 100 countries throughout the world. Under this model, if one Member doesn't like something that any of our security partners does overseas, that Member can force quick consideration of a resolution directing the removal of U.S. forces from hostilities ``in or affecting'' that situation. It no longer matters that U.S. forces are not actually conducting those hostilities. This could impact our assistance to Israel. It could affect our cooperation with our NATO allies. It could impact counterterrorism cooperation with African nations in the Sahel. We could recklessly undo critical security relationships that we have spent decades building. That is not what the War Powers Resolution has ever meant, and I don't think that is what Congress designed it to do, and it should not be used in this way now. No one is saying that U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia, or anyone else, is beyond congressional scrutiny. Congress has many tools at its disposal. Our committee receives regular arms sales notifications. Congress can condition or cut off security assistance through targeted legislation or the annual appropriations process. But this resolution is the wrong tool. It is vague and irresponsible. It will create new doubts for our partners and allies around the world. For those reasons, Madam Chair, I strongly oppose this measure, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL

Mr. McCAUL. Madam Speaker, I want to thank Ranking Member Cole for yielding. Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the previous question so that we can consider H.R. 336, the Strengthening America's Security in the Middle East Act, under a rule that would allow an amendment to add a section recognizing the dangers of a precipitous withdrawal from Syria and Afghanistan. This amendment would change H.R. 336 to mirror the text of the Senate companion bill S. 1. S. 1 passed the Senate just last week by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 77-23. I introduced this House companion in January. This package of bipartisan bills from last Congress bolsters the security of America and our allies in the Middle East. This bill authorizes U.S. security assistance to Israel over a 10- year period and updates key elements of our security cooperation to ensure that Israel can respond to the significant threats it faces from its neighbors. It also reauthorizes the United States-Jordan Defense Cooperation Act, allowing Jordan to remain eligible to receive special treatment for the transfer of U.S. defense articles and services. Jordan is a critical ally in the fight against ISIS and other extremist groups. We need to make sure that they are adequately equipped to help maintain stability in the Middle East. H.R. 336 also contains the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act. This bill passed the House earlier this year. It should have been law a long time ago. This act will impose long-overdue sanctions against Syria's Assad regime and its backers, including Iran and Russia, for their egregious human rights abuses. Finally, this bill empowers State and local governments in the United States to counter the anti-Israel Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions, otherwise known as BDS, movement's discriminatory economic warfare against Israel. These provisions have already passed the Senate with bipartisan support. I urge all my colleagues to join me in voting ``no'' on the previous question in order to consider this important bill to shore up U.S. interests and allies in the Middle East and take action against Assad's murderous regime.

Mr. McCAUL

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. In closing, I want to again thank the author, Mr. Lieu, and his primary sponsor, Mr. Yoho, for this creative effort to harness private- sector know-how to improve cyber defenses at the Department of State. As the gentleman, Mr. Lieu, indicated, I moved this very same legislation when I was chairman of the Homeland Security Committee for the Department of Homeland Security, and I believe it is working very effectively. The Department of Defense has done the same thing. Now it is time for the Department of State to take on this challenge as well. Mr. Speaker, I support this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Hack Your State Department Act, which will help address lingering cybersecurity gaps at the Department of State. The massive breach of the State Department's unclassified computer network in 2014 exposed grave weaknesses. In the years since that attack, problems have continued to mount. The Department's cybersecurity response program received a ``D'' rating, the lowest of any agency, on its Federal Information Security Management Act report card in 2017. Last September, the Department revealed that it recently suffered a breach of its unclassified email system, which exposed the personal information of some of its employees. The Department needs cost-effective solutions to these IT security challenges. Today's legislation directs the Secretary of State to develop and implement a vulnerability disclosure process that will allow threat researchers from the private sector to identify and report cybersecurity flaws. Currently, there is no legal avenue that allows them to do so. This bill fixes that problem. The bill will establish a ``bug bounty'' pilot program to reward ethical hackers for discovering and reporting vulnerabilities at the Department. These programs have been used successfully by the Defense Department and numerous private companies to improve their cyber defenses at minimal cost. In fact, I remember introducing a similar bill for the Department of Homeland Security. As a national security agency, the State Department must do more to secure its networks. The Hack Your State Department Act is a small but important step towards cost-effective solutions. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the author, Mr. Lieu, for putting his computer science background to work here in the Congress, and he understands, I believe, the nature of the threats that we face in the cyber realm and the importance of a strong cybersecurity partnership between the public and the private sectors. Mr. Speaker, I urge support, and I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I have no further speakers. I am prepared to close, and I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, we cannot overstate the critical role that NATO has played in the history of the 20th century, and for 7 decades, it has been the cornerstone of international security and a force for freedom around the world. I look forward to its continued vitality in defending America and our allies for another 70 years. Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to support this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, let me first say to Mr. Connolly, we have a lot of passionate partisan debates on this floor, but I have to say, that was a class act on his part, and I thank him for his comments. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Hurd), an original cosponsor of the bill.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, in the spirit of the bipartisanship behind supporting this bill, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Connolly).

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to endorse the NATO Support Act. We are rapidly approaching the 70th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a fitting time for the House to reaffirm the importance of the transatlantic alliance. NATO was born out of the chaos of World War II and built to fortify European democracies against Soviet totalitarianism. Time and again, the alliance has proven that the free peoples of the world are strongest when they stand together. From the confrontation with communism during the Cold War, to the defeat of Milosevic in Kosovo, to the battlefields of Afghanistan, American soldiers and those of her NATO allies have fought and bled together to protect our country and to make others free. This alliance has enhanced our military capability, increased our intelligence collection, and created a bulwark against international terror. NATO is critical to our national security and to the preservation of our military prowess around the world. It solidifies our friendship with the individual countries in the alliance. But friends also must be honest with each other. That is why I am glad that this bill strongly supports the decision of the Wales Summit in 2014, that each member country should ramp up defense spending to 2 percent of their GDP. An alliance of mutual defense is only as strong as each country's commitment to its spending goals. While some member countries have made great strides toward this commitment, others are still lagging behind. Statements of support, like this bill, are important in affirming our relationships around the world. But actions speak louder than words. No statement about the importance of NATO speaks as loudly as the tangible commitment each country makes to ensuring the strength of the alliance. In the meantime, I am glad to join this effort to reaffirm the continuing importance of NATO, which deserves our full support. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to close, and I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, diseases and pandemics know no borders. Taiwan is a critical player in the global health and the internationally connected transportation hub. By excluding Taiwan from participation in the WHO, the Communist Party of China is placing the world at risk because of their own insecurities. I again thank Mr. Yoho and Chairman Engel for this bill which deserves our unanimous support. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. McCAUL. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Chabot), a cosponsor of this bill.