Jerrold Nadler

Mr. NADLER

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky).

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, the distinguished chairman said a moment ago that in the Innocent Child Protection Act of 2000 we made settled law the personhood of the fetus. It is not correct. In the Innocent Child Protection Act of 2000, we simply said that a pregnant woman could not be executed, and we defined a pregnant woman as someone who had a child in utero, and then defined, as the chairman said, the words ``child in utero.'' It is not what we are talking about here. For the purpose of saying you cannot execute a pregnant woman, we have defined what a pregnant woman means. That is all that bill did. This bill seeks to establish a fetus as a separate legal person by giving it separate legal rights in order transparently to make it a separate legal person within the meaning of the 14th amendment that says no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. That is exactly the opposite of what the Supreme Court said when it said we have never held a fetus to be a person in the full meaning of the term. This bill is an attempt to whittle away at that term. The distinguished chairman of the subcommittee says we have to acknowledge the particularly heinous nature of the crime, and indeed, we do. The Lofgren substitute acknowledges the assault on the fetus as a separate crime to be separately punished, to be additionally punished, but a separate crime against the woman because her interest in carrying that pregnancy to term and bearing a healthy baby is assaulted. It does not recognize it as a separate crime against a separate person, which is the object of this bill and what we are debating, and which is why this bill, despite the disclaimers of the proponents, is a direct assault on Roe v. Wade, a direct assault on abortion, and if all they are interested in is to make a separate crime when you assault a fetus, when you harm a fetus, then the Lofgren substitute is perfectly adequate for that. But their aim is to damage the right to choose, and that is the real purpose of this bill. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Lowey).

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the so-called Unborn Victims of Violence Act. Here we are again to consider a bill which has now, for three Congresses, unnecessarily mired what should be a laudable and uncontroversial effort to punish truly heinous crimes in the emotionally charged and legally suspect back allies of the abortion debate. This is regrettable, Mr. Speaker, because real people are suffering real harm, while this House has played abortion politics instead of acting to punish truly barbaric crimes. The issue today is straightforward: Is it or is it not necessary to enact a bill making a statement endorsing the controversial and legally revolutionary notion that a fetus is a legal person from the moment of conception in order to punish these criminals with the severity that they justly deserve? That is the heart of the issue. The proponents of this bill are taking what should be a straightforward issue and unnecessarily turning it into a controversial one. Why does this matter? Quite simply, because if the law recognizes that a fetus is a legal person from the moment of conception, as this bill would do, when it is a zygote, a blastocyst, an embryo, a simple collection of undifferentiated cells, then the law must recognize and protect the rights of that person on a legal basis with the rights of the adult pregnant woman. If our laws recognize that, then there can be no right to choose, because, logically, terminating a pregnancy even in its earliest stages would be killing a fully legal person. So when the proponents tell you that this is not about the right to choose, this is not about the right to have an abortion, remember that very simple and clear fact. And, remember that we have an alternative that is just as tough on these criminals: the Lofgren substitute. We do not have to choose between an assault on Roe v. Wade and permitting these heinous criminals to walk free. That is a false choice, but I do not ask my colleagues to believe me. Take the proponents at their word. Senator Orrin Hatch, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, a sponsor of this bill in the other body, had this to say, ``They say it undermines abortion rights. It does, but that's irrelevant.'' CNN, May 7 last year. January 19 last year, Samuel B. Casey, executive director of the Christian Legal Society, told the Los Angeles Times, ``In as many areas as we can, we want to put on the books that the embryo is a person. That sets the stage for a jurist,'' a judge, ``to acknowledge that human beings at any stage of development deserve protection, even protection that would trump a woman's interest in terminating a pregnancy.'' May 19 last year, Dr. Joe Cook, vice president of the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists, was quoted by the Associated Press as saying, ``We have to approach this in a way that's doable, a step at a time. This bill is aimed at establishing that a fetus in utero is a human being and has human rights.'' So please do not insult our intelligence by saying this bill is not about abortion rights. The proper question is not whether we will recognize a separate or a new crime, but how we will do so. The Lofgren substitute recognizes a special kind of evil embodied in these crimes, but would recognize the assault on the fetus as a second crime against the pregnant woman, a second, separate crime, but against the pregnant woman, not against the fetus. The distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on the Constitution criticized that point of view as the ``ideology of those who are unwilling to recognize the unborn child in the law.'' Precisely. That is the threat to Roe, and despite the disclaimers in the bill and the disclaimers of the distinguished chairman a few minutes ago, that is what we are talking about today. If a fetus is recognized as a legal person, then this bill would open the door to barring abortions, to prosecuting women or to restraining them physically for the sake of the fetus. Some courts and State governments have already experimented with this approach. The last time we had occasion to consider this bill, the Supreme Court had just struck down a practice in the then-sponsor's home State of South Carolina in which a hospital would give the result of pregnant women's blood tests to local law enforcement for the purpose of initiating legal action against those women who might take action that might in some way endanger the fetus. Once we recognize even a zygote, two cells, as having the same legal status as the pregnant woman, it would logically follow that her liberty could be restricted to protect its interests. The whole purpose of Roe is to say that her liberty interests trump the interests of the fetus. This bill says exactly the opposite. For those of us who are prochoice, the right to choose extends not just to a woman's right to have an abortion if she wants, but also to her right to carry a pregnancy to term if she wants and to deliver a healthy baby in safety. That is why we supported the Violence Against Women Act. That is why we support programs to provide proper prenatal care and nutrition to all women. That is why we support proper health and nutrition services after a birth. That is why we support other initiatives like the Family and Medical Leave Act. We do not believe that life begins at conception and ends at birth. We have an obligation to these children and to their parents both prenatally and postnatally. Let there be no mistake, using physical violence against a woman to prevent her from having a child that she wants is just as much an assault on the right to choose as is the use of violence against women who wish to exercise their constitutional right to choose to end their pregnancy. A woman, and only a woman, has the right to decide when and whether to bring a child into the world; not an abusive partner, not a fanatic, not even Congress. If we are serious about this problem, and the problem of domestic violence against pregnant women, we have effective remedies at our disposal. If we want to play abortion politics, we have an appropriate vehicle, this bill, before us for that purpose. Violence against a pregnant woman deserves strong preventive measures and stiff punishment. According to the Journal of the American Medical Association, homicides during pregnancy, and in the year following birth, are the leading pregnancy-related death among women in the United States. Among nonpregnant women, it is the fifth leading cause of death. Mr. Speaker, it is a disgrace that while these preventable crimes continue to occur, Congress fiddles with largely symbolic legislation designed to interfere with the right to choose rather than taking affirmative steps to deal with this real problem. Why does this Republican-controlled Congress and White House continually refuse to fund fully and adequately the Violence Against Women Act? It appears that many of the Members who have signed on to this bill are the same ones who voted to divert funds from protecting women from violence to protecting stock dividends from taxation. We owe it to these victims to enact strong penalties, ones which are not constitutionally suspect, to end these heinous crimes. I urge that we adopt the Lofgren substitute to make an assault that harms a fetus a second crime with just as severe or more severe penalties as with this bill, but a second crime against the women so as to not to get into the question of rights of the person to full personhood, which is, of course, the purpose of this bill, but would undermine Roe v. Wade, despite the disingenuous disclaimer of some of the other people on the other side. Let us not crowd the issue of fighting domestic violence, of fighting violence against women and pregnant women, by plunging a legitimate law enforcement effort into the murky waters of the abortion debate. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California (Ms. Solis).

Mr. NADLER

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, this past Sunday morning I was in Jerusalem, and I was within 100 yards of a bus on the number 14 route when a bomb was set off by the Alexa Brigades which are affiliated with the Fattah movement chaired by Chairman Arafat. The bomb was timed to destroy a bus and the people on it during the rush hour when schoolchildren were going to school, when men and women were going to work. Eight people, including two high school students, were killed, over 50 wounded. Chairman Arafat's group later claimed credit for this ``successful military operation.'' That was in Arabic. Later during the day, of course, he condemned it in English. Mr. Speaker, the bomber came in through a gap in the security fence which has not yet been built. The Israelis must finish that fence as a pure defensive reaction. To criticize the Israelis for building a security fence when any other country that was under the kind of sustained terror attack that Israel is under would not be building a security fence, but would be attacking with bombs and missiles, is the height of hypocrisy. Frankly, it reminds me of the criticisms of the Czechs in 1938 for endangering the peace of Europe by getting in the way of the peaceful territorial demands of Chancellor Hitler of Europe. The Israelis should be applauded for trying to stop this carnage and the murder of civilians, not by invasion and by bombs and missiles, but simply by a security fence; and we ought to support it, and we ought to hail the Israelis for their restrained reaction instead of allowing hypocrites to, in effect, support the campaign of terror by opposing completion of the fence.

Mr. NADLER

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, we are here again to consider the Unborn Victims of Violence Act, which has for several years unnecessarily mired what should be a laudable and uncontroversial effort to punish truly heinous crimes in the emotionally charged, and legally suspect, back alleys of the abortion debate. This is regrettable because real people are suffering real harm while this House has played abortion politics instead of punishing truly barbaric crimes. This rule provides for consideration of this bill once again, and a reasonable substitute that will be offered by the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lofgren). That substitute would deal harshly with the perpetrators of these crimes, in some cases more harshly than would the underlying bill itself. It would also punish these offenders without treading into constitutionally suspect territory. From day one, it would be enforceable without question. I urge my colleagues to support the substitute and to oppose the underlying bill. For those of who are prochoice, the right to choose extends not just to a woman's right to have an abortion, but to a woman's right to carry a pregnancy to term and to deliver a healthy baby in safety, if that is her choice. That is why we supported the Violence Against Women Act, that is why we support programs to provide proper prenatal care and nutrition to all women, that is why we support proper health and nutrition services after birth, and that is why we support other initiatives such as the Family and Medical Leave Act. Life does not beginning at conception and end at birth. We have an obligation to these children and parents throughout and after the pregnancy. Let there be no mistake, using physical violence against a woman to prevent her from having a child she wants is just as much an assault on the right to choose as is the use of violence against women who exercise their constitutional right to choose to end their pregnancies. A woman and only a woman has the right to decide whether and when to bring a child into a world, not an abusive partner, not a fanatic, not a Congressman. My colleagues should understand we are not talking here just about viable healthy fetuses who are ready to be born. This bill says ``at any stage of development.'' That means any stage, including violence to embryos, violence to zygotes, violence to a blastocyst. I do not apologize to my colleagues who have in the past taken offense to the use of the correct medical terms for the subject matter we are discussing. We should have no illusions about the purpose of this bill, that it is yet another battle in a war of symbols in the abortion debate in which opponents of a woman's constitutional right to choose attempt to establish that fetuses, from the earliest moments of development, are persons with the same legal rights as the adult women who are carrying them. The implication is that anyone who does not share the metaphysical slant of the radical antichoice movement that a two-celled zygote is a person on exactly the same basis, and with exactly the same rights, as a child or adult must secretly favor infanticide. This bill, by making the destruction of a fetus, or even a zygote, crime against the fetus, without any reference to the terrible harm suffered by the pregnant woman speaks volumes. Recognizing an embryo as a legal person is at odds with Roe v. Wade. The Supreme Court clearly said, ``The unborn have never been recognized in the whole sense,'' and concluded that `` `person,' as used in the 14th amendment of the Constitution, does not include the unborn.'' The rhetoric used by supporters of this bill urging that the law must ``recognize the fetus as a victim'' makes clear the purpose of this bill, which is a direct frontal assault on that holding in Roe v. Wade. Rather than debate the abortion issue yet again, we should pass the Lofgren substitute that provides for the same severe penalties for the same terrible crimes without getting into the thorny issue of whether an embryo at 30 days of gestation is a legally recognized person. The Lofgren substitute provides for two separate crimes, one conviction for the assault and murder of the woman, and a new crime involving injury to the fetus or termination of the pregnancy. The major difference is that the Lofgren bill gives recognition to and imposes serious penalties for the additional and truly grotesque crime against the woman, not against the fetus. If we are serious about this problem of violence against women, we have effective remedies at our disposal. If we want to play abortion politics, we have an appropriate vehicle before us to do that. Violence against a pregnant woman is first and foremost a criminal act of violence again a woman that deserves strong preventive measures and stiff punishment. According to the Journal of the American Medical Association, homicides during pregnancy, and in the year following birth, represent the leading cause of death among women in the United States. Among nonpregnant women it is the fifth leading cause of death. Mr. Speaker, it is a disgrace that while these preventable crimes continue to occur, Congress fiddles with largely symbolic legislation rather than taking affirmative steps to deal with the problem. Why has this Republican-controlled Congress and White House continually refused to fund fully the Violence Against Women Act? It appears that many of the Members who have signed on to this bill are the same ones who have voted to divert funds from protecting women from violence to protecting stock dividends from taxation. No one who listened to the testimony we have heard in our subcommittee could be left unmoved by the murders and assaults against women who wanted nothing more than to have a child. We owe it to these women, and to those who are closest to them, to ensure that early intervention is available, and that States and localities receive the full resources of the Violence Against Women Act to prevent violence against women by intervening before the violence escalates to that level. We must enact strong penalties which are not constitutionally suspect for these heinous crimes. We should not cloud that issue by plunging a legitimate law enforcement effort into the murky waters of the abortion debate. Finally, this bill opens the door to prosecuting women, or restraining them physically, for the sake of a fetus. Some courts have already experimented with this approach. The last time we had occasion to consider this bill, the Supreme Court had just struck down a practice in the then sponsor's home State of South Carolina where a hospital would give the results of pregnant women's blood tests to local law enforcement for the purpose of initiating legal action against those women if they had used crack. Once we recognize a zygote, two cells, as having the same legal status as the pregnant woman, it would logically follow that her liberty could be restricted to protect it. The whole purpose of Roe was to protect that liberty interest. This bill would undermine it.

Mr. NADLER

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, there is a long list of people and institutions that have helped our nation flourish through our nearly 228 years of independence. One of our greatest traditions as Americans is to welcome friends from around the world into our lives--sometimes professionally and sometimes personally. Most congressional offices host American college students, to help our nation's future leaders understand the political complexities affecting our constituents and our jobs as their representatives. Now, thanks to the Uni-Capitol Washington Internship Program, some of Australia's best and brightest university students have had the opportunity to participate in six-week, full-time internships in House and Senate offices. These internships have proved to be an invaluable learning experience, both for the students and for their hosts. The program is the brainchild and pro bono non-partisan effort of former long-time House and Senate staffer Eric K. Federing, who began lecturing at Australian universities in the early 1990s while working for our former colleague Norman Y. Mineta of California. Mr. Federing wanted to bridge what Australians call ``The Tyranny of Distance,'' which can prevent Americans and Australians from knowing each other as well as our mutual interests and traditions suggest we should. Five universities now participate and a dozen Australian students travel to Washington, DC annually as part of the program. An important reason for the exchange's success is the careful matching of students and their interests with our work and constituencies. This year, Laura Crommelin, a law student from the University of Melbourne, joined my staff for most of January and February. She is professionally poised, and sophisticated in her understanding of our mission as a chamber and my work for the 8th District of New York. Meeting Laura has given my staff and me an insight into Australian politics and society, as well as a fresh perspective on the work we are doing here in Congress. Mr. Speaker, I believe my experience has not been unique. The students and other congressional hosts in 2004 should be congratulated for their participation in this exchange: Richard Abraham, of Macquarie University, in the office of Senator Christopher Dodd of Connecticut; Kirstin Ferguson, of the University of Wollongong, in the office of Representative Alcee Hastings of Florida; Netta Goussac, of the University of Western Australia, in the office of Representative Loretta Sanchez of California; Elli Jacovides, of the University of Melbourne, in the office of Representative Jim Clyburn of South Carolina; Leng Lee, of the University of Melbourne, in the office of the Joint Economic Committee, minority staff; Ian Repper, of the University of Western Australia, in the offices of Representative Bob Ney of Ohio and the House Administration Committee, majority staff; Heather Rietdyk, of the University of Canberra, in the office of Representative Sam Farr of California; Louise Squire, of the University of Western Australia, in the office of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, minority staff; Lisa Sharland, of Macquarie University, in the office of Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska; Ken Shaw, of the University of Melbourne, in the office of the House Small Business Committee, majority staff; and Jane Stewart, of the University of Melbourne, in the office of Representative Louise Slaughter of New York. In closing, Mr. Speaker, it is important to note that this effort has received programmatic assistance from both the U.S. and Australian governments, as well as numerous individuals and institutions in Washington, DC that have welcomed these students during their visit. I am proud to participate in this worthwhile program, and wish it continued success in the future.

Mr. NADLER

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words. Mr. Chairman, there has been a misconstruction here of what this amendment is all about, in particular by the gentleman from Georgia who just spoke. This amendment will restore the Civil Rights Act as it was from 1964 to 1998. It undoes an amendment put there in the dead of night, after no hearings and almost no debate, only 6 years ago. And from 1964 to 1998, the gentleman is quite correct, we had no problems with this. Now, Community Service Block Grants help communities provide services for low-income families and individuals who address the ever-rising number of people living in poverty through employment programs, housing programs, nutrition programs, and education programs. For years these grants have been praised by both sides of the aisle. Yet today we find ourselves debating the issue of whether or not religious discrimination should play a part in providing these services. Religious discrimination is not the American way. Asking someone his or her religion in a job interview is simply wrong. Asking people what they believe before they can feed the poor, help the homeless, or provide protection to battered families is, frankly, immoral. Government saying that this is okay and funding it is a betrayal of our most cherished values. Now, no one with this amendment, or with the law as it existed between 1964 and 1998, which this amendment would restore, no one is telling any religious person not to adhere to his or her faith or to advocate it. No one is telling religious institutions what to teach its members or who should conduct their religious ceremonies. No one is even telling a religious institution who to hire as the janitor. And if the Presbyterian church wants to say only Presbyterians could be hired to be the janitor or the priest, that is fine. Nor, despite the rhetoric, are religiously affiliated charities under this amendment barred from participating in publicly funded programs. Every Member, including myself, has worked to obtain public funding for these worthwhile organizations. These religiously affiliated charities are the backbone of our social service delivery system, and no one is suggesting we change this, except for this administration and the Republican majority, which wants to destroy what has worked well for years. What is at issue here is not whether a church or a religiously based group can have a religious test for anyone at all. What is at issue here is whether they can have a religious test for people, paid for by public funds; paid for by public funds to provide a public service. If the church wants to have a religious test, as I said, for the minister or for the singers or for the choir director or for the janitor, it is free to do so. But those things are not paid for by public funds. If the church wants to compete for a public contract to provide services to the homeless with public funds, or to provide housing with public funds, it should compete for that contract. It should get that contract if it has the best proposal. But it should not be permitted, as it was not permitted until 1998, to have a religious test to say no Jews or no Irish or no Catholics and no Muslims may apply for the publicly funded position to help administer these public funds. For the nonpublicly funded positions of doing anything at all in the church or in the charity, have any religious test you want; that is religious freedom. It is not religious freedom to put a religious test on employment in a public program paid for by the tax dollars of everybody. Protestant, Catholic, Jew, Hindu, Muslim, atheist, we all pay taxes, and our tax policy, our tax funds, should not be used to discriminate against any of us on the basis of religion. No one should ever see a sign at a government-funded program that says ``No Catholics need apply'' or ``No Jews need apply'' or ``No Presbyterians need apply,'' but that is what this bill would allow. In the Yorker case, an applicant for employment with public funds was asked on his job application what his religion was, on the job application. Is that the America we want to live in? I know that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle complained about what they view as religious tests when it comes to approving judges in the Senate. Why should the person who serves soup in the soup kitchen, the publicly funded soup kitchen, or who aids the poor or the homeless with public funds be entitled to any less consideration? The amendment in the existing law that we are trying to take out was passed in the dead of night in 1998 with few Members understanding the full implications of the language in it. The gentleman from Virginia and I were here at 1 in the morning to talk about the dangers this kind of publicly funded discrimination posed to our social services programs. Perhaps many of my colleagues were not fully aware of the scope of these change. Now, as we debate this in the light of day, I urge everyone to take a close, hard look at what is being done. I urge my colleagues to reject this betrayal of our first freedom, our most fundamental of values, the freedom of conscience. I urge support of the Woolsey amendment, and I urge that, again, we are not talking about telling church-based organizations not to participate in public programs; they can do that as they always did prior to 1998. We are simply saying you can only use public funds in a public contract in a nondiscriminatory manner. I urge support of the Woolsey amendment to restore the law as it was.

Mr. NADLER

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I anticipate that this debate on this motion to instruct will take only a small fraction of the time allotted to it. Mr. Speaker, this motion would instruct the conferees to strike section 414 of the bill. Section 414 would repeal important protections in the Bankruptcy Code against conflicts of interest on the part of investment bankers involved in the reorganization of a bankrupt company. Section 414 would relieve investment bankers of the duty of being disinterested persons before they can be retained as professionals by the bankruptcy trustee. This disinterestedness standard has been in the code since 1938. It protects the estate from conflicts of interest by professionals in the case. Mr. Speaker, many, many people who support this bill, which I do not, are opposed to this provision and support this motion to instruct. Judge Edith Jones of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, a very conservative judge who is a member of the Bankruptcy Reform Commission and supports the bill, has written: ``Such a standard can alone protect integrity in the bankruptcy process. If professionals who have previously been associated with a debtor continue to work for the debtor during a bankruptcy case, they will often be subject to conflicting loyalties that undermine their foremost fiduciary duty to the creditors. Strict disinterestedness required by current law eliminates such conflicts or potential conflicts. Section 414, in removing the rigorous standard of disinterestedness, is out of character with the rest of this important legislation, however, and it should be eliminated.'' Mr. Speaker, that letter is as follows: United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Houston, TX, March 11, 2003. Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Chairman: I understand that the House Committee on the Judiciary will consider H.R. 975, bankruptcy reform legislation, on the morning of March 11, 2003. I also understand that the Committee may consider whether or not to retain Section 414 of the bill, which would amend the ``disinterested person'' standard codified at 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(14). As a former member of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission and, in that capacity, a consistent advocate of maintaining strict disinterestedness standards for bankruptcy professionals, I urge the Committee not to change existing law. I support Congressman Bachus's effort to remove Section 414. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission was asked to recommend a modification of the disinterestedness standard in order to accommodate, as I recall, the geographic growth and increasing sophistication of professional firms of all kinds involved in Chapter 11 bankruptcvy practice. Despite fervent lobbying by prominent bankruptcy professionals and scholars, the Commission resisted making such a recommendation. We voted (by a lopsided majority, I believe) to retain the standard as it has existed since the 1930's. The Commission report cites two reasons for retaining a strict prophylactic standard for all bankruptcy professionals. These are worth brief restatement. First, such a standard can alone protect integrity in the bankruptcy process. If professionals who have previously been associated with the debtor continue to work for the debtor during a bankruptcy case, they will often be subject to conflicting loyalties that undermine their foremost fiduciary duty to the creditors. Strict disinterestedness, required by current law, eliminates such conflicts or potential conflicts. Second, enforcing a strict standard of disinterestedness is necessary to maintain public confidence in the integrity of the bankruptcy system. A bankruptcy case should not be subject to the criticism that professional fees are generated to no purpose or for a bad purpose such as delay. The courts' efforts to ensure that fees remain reasonable are enhanced when, because of the complete disinterestedness of participating professionals, no hidden motives may be imputed to the actors in the case. One need not focus solely on today's high-profile bankruptcy cases to realize that the challenge of maintaining disinterested professional services has permeated modern corporate reorganization law. The Commission, for instance, voted to retain the original standard in the wake of the criminal conviction of a prominent bankruptcy lawyer and several well-known instances in which law firms were required to disgorge part of their fees--all for violating disinterestedness standards. Given the ongoing nature of the problem, I do not see how any professional group can advocate, consistent with the public interest, eliminating the statutory requirement of disinterestedness. Moreover, as it appears likely that many future complex bankruptcy cases will arise in which the role of investment bankers will have to be explored, it seems particularly unwise to grant that group--alone among bankruptcy professionals--a status insulated from the strict disinterestedness requirement. Since the close of the Commission's work in October 1997, I have been a proponent of the bankruptcy reform legislation that has been repeatedly passed by Congress. I still believe the bankruptcy reform legislation is essential to restoring integrity to personal and business bankruptcies, redressing the imbalances and opportunities for manipulation that plague current law, and encouraging individual responsibility in financial affairs. Section 414, in removing investment bankers from a rigorous standard of disinterestedness, is out of character with the rest of this important legislation, however, and it should be eliminated. Very truly yours, Edith H. Jones. Mr. Speaker, why are we voting on this technical issue? Because, Mr. Speaker, it has significant real-world consequences for employees, retirees, shareholders, and creditors of a bankrupt company. Current law prevents an investment banker who had been part of the financial affairs, and perhaps of the problems, of a bankrupt company from being responsible during the bankruptcy for advising, organizing, and overseeing the reorganization. Anyone who has read a newspaper in the last few years cannot fail to understand the importance of this motion. This deals with conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest among investment bankers, accountants, management, and other insiders have been at the heart of the most outrageous corporate scandals that have ended up in bankruptcy court, which have been in the headlines in our front pages in the last few years. Perhaps when this provision was first proposed several years ago, some Members may have thought it was a minor technical change. No one any longer can believe for a moment after everything that has happened that this is just a small benign change. The chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, William Donaldson, has written to Senators Leahy and Sarbanes in opposition to this provision. The former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Arthur Levin, has written to us in opposition to this provision. Mr. Speaker, that letter is as follows: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, DC, May 22, 2003. Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. Senate, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, DC. Hon. Paul S. Sarbanes, U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC. Dear Senators Leahy and Sarbanes: Thank you for requesting the Commission's views on Section 414 of H.R. 975, which would amend the ``disinterested person'' definition in the conflict of interest standards of the Bankruptcy Code to remove the specific provisions covering investment bankers. On May 7, in response to a question from Senator Sarbanes at a hearing of the Senate Committee on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs on the Impact of the Global Settlement, I expressed my personal views about this amendment. Now I am pleased to convey the view of the Commission, which is that, while it may be possible to draft language that would address some of the concerns of the proponents of the amendment, Congress should proceed very cautiously before loosening any conflicts of interest restriction. While we recognize that this one-size-fits-all statutory exclusion is controversial, we believe that it would be a mistake to eliminate the exclusion in a similar one-size-fits-all manner at a time when investor confidence is fragile. The current ``disinterested person'' requirement was adopted at least in part in response to a 1938 study by the Securities and Exchange Commission that provided extensive documentation and analysis of abuses in corporate reorganization. The study concluded that a firm that served as underwriter for a company's securities should not advise the company about distributions to those security holders in a reorganization plan. It further found that such a firm should not advise the company about potential claims against those involved with the company prior to the bankruptcy since this often would involve an assessment of transaction in which the firm participated. However, we should note that in the 65 years since the 1938 study was issued, bankruptcy practices and procedures have improved significantly with the addition of a dedicated bankruptcy judicial system, the establishment of the U.S. Trustee's office, and the strengthening of active creditors' committees. We are aware of the arguments of proponents of the amendment that the current statutory exclusion is too broad because it covers firms that participated in any underwriting of the debtor, even if it was years ago and the firm has had no further involvement with the debtor. However, if the exclusion is eliminated entirely, we are concerned that the general protection in the statute--which relies on the judge, at the outset of the proceedings, to forbid those with materially adverse interests to the estate, its creditors, or its equity security holders from advising a company in bankruptcy--may well be insufficient. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this proposed amendment. If you or your staff need any further information, please contact my office. Sincerely, William H. Donaldson, Chairman.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman from Utah (Mr. Cannon) misunderstands the question of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott). The question as I understand it was not if someone owes $2 million and can pay $10,000 should be then forced to pay $10,000. Yes. The question was, is it not true that under this bill if he owes $2 million, can afford to pay only $10,000, he can never get relief even if he pays the $10,000 he can afford to.

Mr. NADLER. I yield to the gentleman from Utah.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. I have two basic comments. First, in response to the comments of my distinguished colleague from New York, it is not the case that anyone who worked as an investment banker for the banker company 50 years ago is affected by this provision. If you actually read the provision in the statute book, a disinterested person is defined as a number of things, but it says the following: ``Was not an investment banker for any outstanding security of the debtor.'' If it is still outstanding, then he has still got a relationship and he still has an interest in that. ``Has not been, within 3 years before the date of the finding of the petition, an investment banker,'' et cetera. So in other words, it is a 3-year bar for outstanding securities. So the situation we were told about a moment ago does not apply. Let me say that this is not a question of discretion; it is a question of protection. And, again, all the professionals in the field, everyone to whom we ought to be looking for guidance in this comes to the same conclusion. I do not claim to be an expert in investment banking or bankruptcy law, but everyone who is basically says the same thing. I am going to read three quotes and that will be that. This is from the senior professor at Harvard Law School, an expert on bankruptcy, Elizabeth Warren: ``There is a reason why the professionals who have worked for a business that collapses into bankruptcy are not permitted to stay on. ``The company must go back after bankruptcy and examine its old transactions. Having the same professionals review their own work is not likely to yield the most searching inquiry.'' Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission: ``I haven't read a single argument made by the investment banks that would persuade me that that prohibition should be changed. What we are talking about is a significant potential conflict of interest, and I think it is outrageous that investment banks would even try to go down that road.'' William Donaldson, the current Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission: ``We are aware of the arguments of proponents of the amendment that the current statutory exclusion is too broad because it covers firms that participated in any underwriting by the debtor, even if it was years ago, and the firm has had no further involvement with the debtor. However, if the exclusion is eliminated entirely,'' which is what this provision does, ``we are concerned that the general protection in the statute, which relies on the judge at the outset of the proceedings to forbid those with materially adverse interest to the estate, its creditors or its equity and security holders from advising a company in bankruptcy may well be insufficient.'' So there is a unanimity of judgment among the people involved in protecting shareholders and stakeholders and 401(k)s and employees and everybody else with a stake in this matter. We should not do this. And just one further observation. This has been the law since 1938. We have had no problems with it. We have no great hordes of people coming to our offices saying, Get rid of this. It has caused all kind of problems. Leave it alone. Vote for the motion to recommit. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Simpson). Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to instruct.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to instruct.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise to plead for our Nation's family farmers and family fishing operations. And some people may ask why the representative from Manhattan and Brooklyn is rising to plead for family farmers. When I was a child, we had a family farm which we lost to foreclosure because of policies similar to what the majority party is urging on us today. This is the 11th time we have been here to debate a temporary extension of chapter 12. To string farmers along, especially in these very hard times, is simply unconscionable; but this is even worse. Instead of passing this bill last year, the chapter 12 extension bill, when we could have sent it directly to the President, the majority refused to act and allow chapter 12 to sunset. Even now they refuse to act and instead are using family farmers again to try to pass an overall bankruptcy bill that is not going to pass again because the Senate will not go along with it; so they are just using it as a charade and putting at risk all the farmers. But a bill that should not pass anyway. A bill whose main and essentially only effect is to enable the big banks and the credit card companies to reach their hands into the pockets of low- and middle-income people who, because usually of either a divorce or being laid off from their jobs or health emergency, are in bankruptcy and at that time to enable the big banks and the credit card companies to put their hands into these low- and middle- income pockets and take more money out of it for the big banks and the credit card companies in 60 or 70 different ways. That is what this bill does. And this bill is a lot more important, the majority would have us believe, than extending chapter 12 for the benefits of family farmers and family fishing operators. Even if we pass this bill as amended by putting on the entire bankruptcy reform bill, so-called, on the back of the chapter 12 extension, and even if the Senate agrees to allow the House to circumvent them entirely, family farmers would still have to sit and wait while Congress fiddles. We do have another choice. We could reject this maneuver entirely and send the 6-month extension to the President today. We could adopt the gentlewoman from Wisconsin's (Ms. Baldwin) substitute and enact a part of this bill that is both uncontroversial and necessary immediately to make chapter 12 permanent and update it to provide needed relief. But the Republican leadership appears unwilling to do either. They appear intent on using the plight of family farmers yet again to advance the agenda of the credit industry and to do so by threatening and hurting the family farmers by engaging in a legislative maneuver that has already resulted in chapter 12's expiring and that they know will now result in its being allowed to lapse further. This is simply wrong. I urge my colleagues to reject this outrageous stunt. This bill has been on the verge of passing ``any minute'' since 1997. How much longer must our farmers and fishermen and women wait? They have waited long enough. I urge my colleagues to support the gentlewoman from Wisconsin and save our family farms and stop using the plight of the family farmers to try to put the entire agenda of the banks and the credit card companies on the backs of the family farmers. Pass a family farm bill; then bring in a bankruptcy bill. We will debate it on the merits or demerits of that, I would say the demerits; but stop trying to put that entire burden on the family farmers' backs because their backs are already broken.

Mr. NADLER

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support this legislation. I want particularly to congratulate Mr. Delahunt who first introduced the Innocence Protection Act several years ago, and has worked tirelessly on this matter ever since. I want to thank the chairman and the members of the committee from both sides of the aisle for working together to put politics and sound bites aside and to pass meaningful legislation to fight crime and advance the cause of justice. I am pleased that this bill includes the modified Innocence Protection Act that aims to reduce the possibility that innocent people will be put to death. I understand this is a delicate compromise, but I must say that this bill is only a first step, not a final step, in our efforts to reform our Nation's capital punishment laws. These laws are broken and major reform and full funding of this legislation is necessary to prevent the innocent from being wrongfully convicted and executed. It is imperative that we eliminate the shameful backlog of untested rape kits, and this bill will go a long way toward that goal. On the issue of rape kits, again, let me say, ``It's about time.'' Many Members have been personally involved in the fight to test rape kits for several years now. I have worked with NOW, RAINN, and Liftime Television to raise awareness of this issue and to build consensus for decisive action. Together we have pushed, prodded, and demanded that Federal funding be provided to test these kits right away. Today, we are one step closer to our goal. But we are not there yet. These programs still need to be funded, and I am hopeful that we will not simply authorize funding for these programs, but also actually appropriate funding when the time comes to pass the Commerce Justice State appropriations bill. This issue is too important to ignore. Police Departments must have the resources they need to solve crimes and put criminals behind bars. I am pleased that this bill includes a provision similar to the ``Rape Kit DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act'' which I introduced back in March 2002, which would have provided $250 million to eliminate the rape kit backlog 2 years ago. The bill before us today acknowledges that we were right back then when we requested major increases in funding, since this bill offers even more funding for this task. In addition, I am pleased to see that, like my bill, the phrase ``rape kits'' has been specifically added to our current law to further underscore the need for this funding to address rape crimes in particular. These heinous crimes deserve our full attention and the victims of the crimes deserve the certainty that DNA evidence can bring to them. Once again, I am pleased to support this bill because it represents a serious effort to combat crime, locate and apprehend rapists, and use powerful evidence to put them in prison.

Mr. NADLER

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, first I would inform the gentleman from Wisconsin that it is the Yankees as well as the Red Sox game. Secondly, I would ask the distinguished gentleman, the distinguished chairman, there are a number of Members who desire at some point tonight to strike the last word, and if we agree to this unanimous consent request, would that preclude an opportunity at some point tonight of striking the last word?

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I would point out that some Members would be interested in doing that after the last vote tonight, but as long as it will be in order. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

Mr. NADLER. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. NADLER

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, last spring Congress approved a $673 billion supplemental appropriation for our troops in Iraq. I voted for that appropriation because I felt that, regardless of whether or not we should have invaded Iraq, the fact is that we are there now, and we cannot afford to allow Iraq to slide into civil war and disorder. That is what happened in Afghanistan after the defeat of the Soviet Union. The failure of the world community to rebuild that country allowed it to become an extremist theocracy and a haven for al Qaeda with catastrophic results. But we have not received an accounting of the use of those funds. We have discovered that American soldiers have died because, despite the funds we voted, the administration did not supply all our troops with Kevlar plates for their body armor or armor plates for their Humvees. We have learned of no-bid contracts for Halliburton and a $15 million contract for cement factories that the Iraqis can build for $80,000. We have not learned of realistic plans to share the costs and the burdens with other countries and to prevent the nationalist guerrilla war against us by demonstrating to the Iraqi people that we are running an international reconstruction, not an American occupation. Last October, I voted against authorizing the use of military force in Iraq. I believed that the resolution was far too broad a blank check to the President and that it would send us down a perilous course. We know now, as some suspected then, that the administration misled us when it asserted that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction, that it was developing nuclear weapons, that it had cooperated with al Qaeda in the 9/11 attacks, and that it posed an imminent threat to this country. I believed then, as I believe now, that the war in Iraq has diverted resources and attention away from the deadly, serious war waged against the United States by al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist groups, a war which poses a very real threat to our safety and security, and to which I do not believe we are giving sufficient resources or attention. This bill is another blank check to the President. I cannot support it, given the administration's obvious failure to plan for the realities of postwar Iraq and its refusal to make good faith adequate proposals to share the power and the burden of the reconstruction of Iraq so that our soldiers do not continue to do almost all the dying and our taxpayers almost all the paying for the cost of cleaning up the mess in Iraq. I cannot support it, given the administration's insistence on increasing the deficit and the debt burden on our children and grandchildren by refusing even to let us vote on paying for this bill by reducing the tax cuts for the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans. Mr. Chairman, we need not approve this bill in order to support our troops. The $63 billion we approved last spring will fund the military personnel and operations through at least next April and May. We should defeat this bill and insist that the President and the Republican leadership of the House come back to us with a proposal that accounts for the public's money, protects our troops and shares the burden with other nations. We have the time and the ability to do this job right.

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NADLER

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to strongly support the Syria Accountability Act. This legislation is long overdue. Syria has funded and encouraged organized terrorism in the Middle East and around the world. Syria controls the Lebanon-Israeli border from the Lebanese side where kytusha rocket attacks are regularly launched against innocent Israeli citizens. Syria openly houses Hamas and Hezbollah training grounds, and its government and citizens knowingly fund their criminal activity. Just today, terrorists operating in the West Bank murdered four U.S. citizens. Were they trained and funded by Syria? We should not have to wonder. If Syria provides aid and comfort to the terrorist enemy, it should not receive aid and comfort from the United States. This legislation is modest in comparison to the recent actions the United States took against Iraq, and it is clear that Syria provides a lot more aid to terrorist organizations than Iraq ever did. This bill provides for economic sanctions against Syria for restrictions on diplomatic activity in the United States and, most importantly, calls for the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. I want to thank the gentleman from New York (Mr. Engel) for his strong leadership in championing this legislation. I give it my full support, and I look forward to the Saudi Arabia Accountability Act.

Mr. NADLER

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the American Jewish community, I am proud to support the designation of an ``American Jewish History Month''. For the last 350 years, Jews have lived and worked in the United States, and have contributed significantly to the shaping of our country. Dating back, prior to the Revolutionary War, Jews have been an integral part of our nation. Over the last three and a half centuries, there have been many famous American Jews, such as Louis Brandeis, the first Jewish Supreme Court Justice, and Lewis Charles Levin, the first Jewish Congressman. Jews have fought and died for our country in every war in the history of the United States. Jews are responsible for the creation of countless Broadway plays, Pulitzer prize novels and Academy Award winning films. American Jews have won Olympic medals, Super Bowls and have been elected to various Sports Halls of Fame. I need to look no further than my own district to be reminded that Jews have literally left their mark on America. The base of the Statue of Liberty has the poem ``The New Colossus'' inscribed on it, which was written by Emma Lazarus, an American Jew. American Jews have been a symbol of both immense religious pride, and fierce patriotism. American Jews are doctors and lawyers, politicians and CEO's, actors and athletes, veterans and volunteers. Jews are fully immersed in this nation's fabric and are one of the primary reasons the material of this country is so strong. I urge you to help celebrate 350 years of Jews in America and to remember that without American Jews, our country would not be as great as it is.