Don Nickles

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that Senator from Kansas (Mr. Roberts) is necessarily absent.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, if there is no further business to come before the Senate, I now ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in adjournment under the previous order. Thereupon, the Senate, at 10:13 p.m., adjourned until Thursday, May 20, 1999, at 9:30 a.m.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. For the information of all Senators, the Senate will convene at 9:30 a.m. and immediately resume debate on the juvenile justice bill. Under the order, following 60 minutes of debate, the Senate will proceed to two consecutive votes. The first vote will be in relation to Senator Smith's amendment on pawnshops, to be followed by a vote in relation to the Lautenberg amendment. Additional amendments are expected; therefore, votes will occur throughout the day and evening, with the expectation of completing the juvenile justice bill during Thursday's session. In addition, the Senate will consider the emergency supplemental appropriations conference report on Thursday; therefore, all Members can anticipate a vote with respect to that conference report on tomorrow as well.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in adjournment until 9:30 a.m. on Thursday, May 20. I further ask that on Thursday, immediately following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be approved to date, the morning hour be deemed to have expired, and the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day. I further ask that the Senate then immediately resume the juvenile justice bill under the previous consent order.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to a period of morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) is necessarily absent.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) is necessarily absent.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) is necessarily absent.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) is necessarily absent.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) is necessarily absent.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I wish to compliment my colleagues from Tennessee and from Missouri for an outstanding amendment, one that I hope will be overwhelmingly supported by all of our colleagues. It is important we not discriminate, in a way we would say if this child happens to be under the IDEA program, individuals with disabilities, that the laws or the rules and regulations say we will not discipline you if you happen to carry a gun or bomb to school. Clearly, we want any student who is carrying a gun or a firearm or bomb to school to be disciplined--any student. We want safe schools. This amendment would provide for that. It is a commonsense amendment. It is an amendment that should be passed overwhelmingly. I ask unanimous consent to be added as a cosponsor to the amendment.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. I further ask unanimous consent that in the permanent Congressional Record, the text of the agreement be printed immediately following my remarks of May 3, 1999.

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, on May 3, 1999, I addressed the administration policy regarding the Federal Republic of Kosovo. During my remarks, I asked unanimous consent to have printed in the Congressional Record the text of the Rambouillet Agreement. It is 44 pages long. Consistent with the Standing Rules of the Senate, I ask unanimous consent that the text be printed in the Congressional Record. The cost of printing the text will total $3,758.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe), the Senator from Utah (Mr. Bennett), and the Senator from Florida (Mr. Mack) are necessarily absent.

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe) is necessarily absent.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Cochran) is necessarily absent.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I would like to announce for the information of the Senate and the public that a hearing has been scheduled before the Subcommittee on Energy Research, Development, Production and Regulation. The hearing will take place on Tuesday, May 18, 1999, at 2:30 p.m. in SD-366 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington, DC. The purpose of the hearing is to receive testimony on S. 924, the Federal Royalty Certainty Act, introduced April 29, 1999. Because of limited time available for each hearing, witnesses may testify by invitation only. However, those wishing to submit written testimony for the hearing record should send two copies of their testimony to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, United States Senate, 364 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510-6150. For further information, please contact Dan Kish at (202) 224-4971.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. Inhofe) is necessarily absent.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Kansas (Mr. Brownback) is necessarily absent.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, yesterday, Senator Inhofe and myself, Congressmen J.C. Watts, Frank Lucas and Steve Largent, as well as the Governor of Oklahoma, and James Lee Witt, Director of FEMA, toured the Oklahoma tornado disaster. I have been in the Senate, I guess, 19 years now, and I have looked at the damage of several tornadoes in the State for the last many years. But I have never seen this type of devastation nor this level and this extent before. This may be the most devastating tornado that we have had in total damages in our State history. It has certainly produced one of the largest tornadoes, probably the largest number of tornadoes. I read one press account that said there were 45 tornadoes in the State of Oklahoma on Monday. One particular tornado was much larger than the others. Many reports said it was a quarter of a mile wide, or maybe half a mile wide, and at some points it was maybe a mile wide and stayed on the ground for a long period of time--some people said maybe as much as 2 hours. What we did see was a tremendous amount of damage--a devastating amount of damage that destroyed, it was estimated, 1,500 or 2,000 homes. We will find out. Unfortunately, it has taken 40-some lives. I say unfortunately. I think Oklahoma is very fortunate. I think the fatality toll could have been in the hundreds if not thousands, because we looked at homes that were just totally demolished as if a bomb had gone inside each one of those homes and absolutely exploded the homes. There was nothing but just some elements of rubble. To think that people survived in many of these homes is truly a blessing, truly a miracle that I think we will find recounted day after day. Needless to say, we are moved by the tragedy, and also by the compassion that is being expressed by so many people from across the country. We were there to say that we wanted to help, that our government would help, that we will do everything that we can. Our government steps in in times of tragedy and national disasters to help lend assistance. And we will do that. I will also say that won't be enough. It will take a lot of support from individuals, from churches, from communities, from families and friends to try to replace these homes and these families, and to make them whole again. And they will. They will survive. They are very solid. One of the things I will never forget was seeing this area that is totally demolished and one house which hardly had anything left standing, and there was an American flag flying very high with people very proud. Mr. President, it makes me proud to be an Oklahoman. It makes me proud to be an American, and proud to represent the great people of Oklahoma. With that, Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to my colleague from Oklahoma, Senator Inhofe. Mr. INHOFE addressed the Chair.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed as if in morning business for 10 minutes.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. I thank the Chair. I want to go through a little bit of the chronology to show, at least in my opinion, how we got into the bombing campaign, because what this resolution is kind of implying is, well, the bombing campaign is not working. And we call it a campaign because the polls don't like the word ``war.'' It is interesting, I was with some of our colleagues, and we went to the Kosovo region into the Balkans. We talked to our military planners. They use the word ``war.'' But the politicians do not use the word ``war.'' It doesn't poll very well. People don't like war. So this is called an air campaign. This is a mission. I disagree with that terminology. How did we get into the air campaign? How did we get into this air war? I want to go through several statements, because, as I mentioned in my opening comment, I think this has been a diplomatic disaster that has led to a humanitarian disaster. It is not working, and some people are saying, let's double the ante again. Let's throw in troops now and then maybe we can win. I do not think that would be the result. I want to win, but I question, what is winning? Are we going to have a NATO presence, a U.S. presence in Kosovo forever? Are we going to go all the way into Serbia and occupy Belgrade and take Milosevic out and have him tried as a war criminal? He is a criminal. He is a thug. I have met with him. He doesn't tell the truth. He is responsible for a lot of serious atrocities, and he should be punished. But something tells me this body is not going to say, let's mount up 250,000 or 300,000 troops so we can invade Serbia and occupy Serbia and go door to door at the expense of that. So I just mention that. Let me go through a little chronology of how we got into the bombing campaign as classified by the State Department. Just to put this in context, we started bombing on March 24. The Senate voted on March 23. This is from the New York Times on February 19: As the deadline neared for a settlement in the Kosovo peace talks, the military and diplomatic pressure mounted today on President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia to choose between tolerating NATO-led peacekeepers in Kosovo or suffering NATO air strikes for refusing them. Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright said she had again spelled out the choice in a telephone call to the Yugoslav leader and that she would return Saturday to the talks, which she visited last week. That was on February 19th. February 20th: President Clinton warned President Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia today not to ``stonewall'' a peace settlement in Kosovo and threatened to bomb Serbia if Mr. Milosevic missed the Saturday deadline for an end to the peace talks. So we are threatening bombing. ``Mr. Clinton said the two NATO allies''--in this case, he is talking about President Chirac of France--stood ``united in our determination to use force if Serbia fails to meet its previous commitment to withdraw forces from Kosovo and if it fails to accept the peace agreement.'' I will talk about the peace agreement in a moment. He also says, this is President Clinton, ``I don't think there is an option other than NATO airstrikes.'' This was in the New York Times, February 20th. Also February 20th, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright says, at a press conference: Let me stress that we expect nothing less than a complete interim agreement, including Belgrade's acceptance of a NATO-led force and a civilian mission building on OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission. Until the parties have accepted all provisions of the agreement, preparations for NATO military action will continue and if that agreement is not confirmed by Tuesday, Secretary General Solana will draw the appropriate conclusions. I.e., the bombing will begin. It is also interesting that on February 21 she says, according to the New York Times, ``If this fails because both sides say `no,' there will be no bombing of Serbia.'' Mrs. Albright said that on February 21, as Rambouillet talks were winding down. It is also interesting to note that 2 days after Rambouillet ended, the European Union envoy to the talks, Mr. Petritsch, said, ``the Yugoslav President decided he was not going to accept NATO troops--and mustered his own forces and propaganda to prepare for this military showdown.'' It is also interesting to note in this same article, it says, In a meeting with Italy's new Prime Minister in the Oval Office with the President on March 5, Mr. Clinton said Mr. Milosevic had ``accepted almost everything,'' according to Italian officials, except for the international peacekeeping force. I added that comment. That wasn't in the quote, but that is what he had not accepted. This individual was skeptical. He asked the President, what was the plan if there was no deal and NATO airstrikes failed to subdue the Serbian leader. The result, he said, would be 300,000 to 400,000 refugees passing into Albania and crossing the Adriatic into Italy. ``What will happen then,'' Mr. D'Alema wanted to know, according to the Italian officials. Mr. Clinton looked at Mr. Berger for guidance; that is, Sandy Berger. ``NATO will keep bombing,'' Mr. Berger replied. After Rambouillet fell apart, a follow-up conference was called in Paris 3 weeks later. While the world waited, Mr. Milosevic continued to build up his forces in and around Kosovo. A defining moment came on March 18 at the International Conference Center on the Avenue Kleber in Paris. To polite applause, four ethnic Albanian delegates signed the peace plan that would give their people broad autonomy for a three- year interim period. The Serbs did not sign. That paved the way to airstrikes. Ms. Albright said that setting up a deal signed only by one side was a crucial step forward. ``Signing Rambouillet was crucial in getting Europeans two things,'' she said. ``Getting them to agree to the use of force and getting the Albanians on the side of this kind of a settlement.'' February 23, this is, again, Secretary Albright talking about Rambouillet. Rambouillet talks to a close. The Kosovo Albanians have requested two weeks for consideration. Belgrade must be ready to move by then as well, or prepare to face the consequences. This period of reflection should not be taken by either side as an excuse for military activities on the ground. We're particularly concerned by recent movements of Serb forces and harassment of members of the Kosovo Verification Mission. The mission's security must be assured, and there should be no doubt that NATO's January 30th decision permitting Secretary Solana to authorize airstrikes remains in force. We also call on the Kosovo Liberation Army to refrain from provocations. So there is a 2- or 3-week period for the Kosovo representative to consider this negotiation. March 15, this is in the New York Times: A massacre in the Kosovo village of Racak of more than 40 ethnic Albanians by Serbian forces in January spurred the current efforts of Ms. Albright to persuade NATO to authorize air strikes against the Serbs if they reject a settlement. So there was a massacre, according to this press report, of 40 people who were killed in January. That led to this effort to use military force in a bombing campaign. March 18, again, this is Secretary Albright, State Department: So the situation is as clear as it could be. The Albanians have said yes to the accords and the Serbs are saying no. At the same time, Belgrade's security forces are stepping up their unjustified and aggressive actions in Kosovo and if Belgrade doesn't reverse course, the Serbs alone will be responsible for the consequences. The war drums are rattling. This is March 19, a few days before the bombing commences. This is also in the New York Times. With the Kosovo talks at a dead end, and the Yugoslav leader more recalcitrant than ever, the Clinton Administration was publicly pushing the threat of airstrikes today, but officials said they have no option but diplomacy, at least for another week. Instead of responding to the threats, Mr. Milosevic has moved in the opposite direction, building up his troops in Kosovo to such an extent there are now deep concerns over whether the 1,400 international monitors in Kosovo can leave safely before his troops trap them by sealing their exit route. Also in the same article it says, ``American military is warning that airstrikes may not be easy.'' March 22, a couple of days before the bombing campaign begins. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that Holbrooke would warn Milosevic that the NATO allies are preparing comprehensive missile and bombing strikes that could devastate much of his military infrastructure. ``He will make clear that Milosevic faces a stark choice: to halt aggression against the Kosovar Albanians and accept an interim agreement with a NATO-led implementation force, or bear the full responsibility for NATO military action.'' This is just a couple days before, the night before bombing began, on March 23, on Larry King's program. Mr. King asked Secretary Albright: Is there a timeframe here, Madam Secretary? Like you are going to keep this up for 3, 4 days, let us know by Saturday? Is there a plan? Secretary Albright: Well, again I am not going to reveal the operation time line, this is a very well-thought-out military mission. I think it would be a mistake. You wouldn't want me to give the details here so that President Milosevic could hear everything that is going on. But it is going to be a sustained attack, and it is not going to go on for an overly long time. Then she continues and says: ``No, I mean what we have said. Ambassador Holbrooke said to him''--talking about Milosevic--``he had an opportunity to accept accords signed by the Kosovar Albanians in Paris and have a peace agreement. He had an opportunity also to stop the fighting. Ambassador Holbrooke told him that if he did not do that, there would be very serious consequences. He has not accepted those two threshold objectives and, therefore, he knows there are now serious consequences.'' The next day the bombing began. I might mention that Secretary Albright said, ``We are very well prepared. This is a well-thought-out campaign.'' I just take issue with that. I am not going to say I told you so, but on the debate we had on March 23, the day before the bombing campaign commenced, I made a speech. On the floor of the Senate, I urged colleagues to vote no because I said I was afraid it would be a mistake. I said--and history has proven--that bombing alone doesn't work. The President has said we are only going to bomb and not use ground troops. Then, I also said that I was afraid it might make things worse. Instead of stopping atrocities, it may turn a guerrilla war into an all-out war. I am afraid that is what has happened. I think we had a diplomatic failure and, as a result, now we have a humanitarian disaster, a catastrophe. I was in Kosovo a week or so ago with some colleagues and I saw some of these refugee camps. There are 600,000-plus people who are now outside of Kosovo, driven away from their homes--in my opinion, because of a diplomatic disaster. We turned a guerrilla war into a real war. We started the bombing campaign, and I stated this on the floor of the Senate before the bombing started. I said: Mr. Milosevic, instead of his response being to move back into greater Serbia away from Kosovo, moving his forces out, he may be more assertive and aggressive, and he may want to strike out against the U.S. airplanes that are flying. He might find that unsuccessful. He might have no success against our pilots and our planes, but if he is not successful against our planes, what can he be successful against? Maybe the KLA, or maybe he would be more aggressive in striking out where he can have results on the ground. So by initiating the bombing instead of bringing stability, we may bring instability. We may be igniting a tinderbox that has been very, very explosive for a long time. I am afraid that is what happened. The bombing campaign has made things worse. I am afraid if we go in and say let's use all necessary force, send in 300,000 troops, we may make things worse. I don't want to compound a past mistake that was a mistake, in my opinion, diplomatically as well as a mistake now through the air campaign, and certainly has turned into a humanitarian disaster. I don't want to further compound that. Again, when I read the resolution it says to accomplish NATO objectives--we are going to use all necessary force and other means to accomplish United States and North Atlantic treaty objectives with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I have the Rambouillet agreement. I wonder how many colleagues have read this thing. I urge you to do it. It is 44 pages. I am looking at some of the comments or statements made in this Rambouillet accord. They said, ``We negotiated and Mr. Milosevic would not sign this accord.'' I will read one paragraph. I brought this to the President's attention last week, and Secretary Albright said: Mr. Milosevic would not even talk to us about an international peacekeeping force. In one paragraph, we were insisting that if he didn't comply, we were going to bomb him. On page 41, paragraph 8 of the appendix B, it says this, talking about the NATO force--and some people say let's give NATO all necessary force. This is one of the things about which we said we are going to bomb you if you don't sign: NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations. Basically, it says NATO gets to occupy not only Kosovo but Serbia as well. Isn't that interesting? I brought that to the President's attention. I don't know if he knew that was in there. I kind of doubt it. Secretary Albright almost acted taken aback. ``What are you doing reading the Rambouillet agreement?'' This is what we were saying he has to sign, or else ``we are going to bomb you.'' I think that is diplomacy failure. It has led to a bombing campaign. We threatened that we were going to bomb and now our credibility is at stake. I have heard that time and time again. I want NATO to be credible, but for crying out loud, when you are so arrogant to say here is our wisdom, here is this accord, we determined this is in your best interest and you must sign it or else we are going to bomb you--I stated in my speech on the bombing resolution that I don't think you can bomb a country into submission or into signing an agreement. I doubted then that Mr. Milosevic, after the bombs were going to fall, was going to raise the white flag and say: Now I see the wisdom. That didn't happen in Bosnia. It got his attention in Bosnia. In fact, the Croatian army was ethnically cleansing their own, and he was losing the war. He decided to be more interested in a peace agreement. I think Rambouillet was a diplomatic disaster and a failure and to say, OK, well, we tried to bomb them into agreeing to this, but I don't think that is going to work; maybe now we should use ground forces so they can sign onto NATO objectives. I think it is a mistake. What should we do? I don't want to just complain, but I think this is a disaster. If you had seen the refugee camps, you would know it is a disaster. There were several hundred thousand people. Senator McCain pointed out that it is not just the several hundred thousand people who are outside of Kosovo and Albania and Macedonia, but the hundreds of thousands who are displaced inside of Kosovo. What should we do? I have heard several people in the administration say that he must withdraw forces and accept this international peacekeeping force, and if he stops all the aggression, then we will stop the bombing. Mr. President, I think we need to have two or three things happen simultaneously. He needs to get his aggressive forces out. We need to have an international peacekeeping force to protect the returning refugees allowed back in. And simultaneously with that, we need to stop the bombing. We need to do all of them simultaneously. The big difference I can see going on now is the negotiation of who should compose the international peacekeeping force. I heard Secretary Cohen say, and I have read time and time again, that it must be NATO- led or a NATO corps. They are talking about U.S. participation. I think our objective should not be so much just what is the composition of the peacekeepers; it should be to keep the Kosovars safe and sound and return them back to their homes. Those people are living in terrible conditions, living in tents. They have absolutely nothing to do. They are waiting hours to pick up food. They have to wait for a long time to use the restroom facilities--latrines would be a more accurate description. It is not a pretty sight. In the first place, I want to compliment many of the international relief agencies that are doing a miraculous job. They have a very difficult, if not impossible, job. Mr. President, I think we need a very aggressive diplomatic effort. I don't think this is a situation where one says, ``Well, let's just double up our military forces; well, if the bombing sorties''--and we are running so many thousands of these bombing sorties--``that is not working; let's throw in another three or four hundred planes, double up the bombing; let's get ready to have ground troop invasion into Kosovo, into Serbia.'' I don't think that is the solution. I think we need a diplomatic solution. I believe I heard Strobe Talbott, Under Secretary of State, yesterday say we are not negotiating. I almost fell off my chair when he said that. Obviously, Jesse Jackson did some negotiation. I want this administration to be negotiating. They need to be negotiating aggressively to save lives, to minimize the human disaster, the humanitarian disaster, the diplomatic disaster. Let's do everything we can to allow the Kosovars to return safely as soon as possible-- hopefully as soon as possible under the guise of an international peacekeeping force. And it can be with NATO participation. It can be U.N. led. It can be the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. But let's make it happen, and make it happen soon. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on this resolution tomorrow. Again, my compliments to the sponsor of the resolution. I think this debate is important. He was requesting the debate, and I think we have had an excellent debate as well. I yield the floor.

Mr. NICKLES. I thank my friend and colleague, Senator McCain, for recognizing me, and I also compliment him for his leadership, although I oppose the resolution that is before us. I also wish to compliment Senator Warner for his comments. And I agree with his comments. I think we have had some good debate. I think it is an important debate. I have heard many things on both sides of the issues. I happen to concur with a lot of the statements that some of the proponents have made on this resolution. I just disagree with its conclusion. I think it is going to be interpreted, this resolution, as a blank check for the President to do whatever is necessary to win in Kosovo, whatever that means. ``If you win, you are going to own Kosovo.'' Are you going to occupy Kosovo? Maybe Kosovo is second prize; first prize will be Serbia. And then we get to run Serbia. I do not think we want to do that. I think it would be a mistake. I stated on the floor, prior to the bombing resolution, that I thought it was a mistake. And I think it really kind of resulted as a failure in diplomatic effort. As a matter of fact, I think the diplomatic mission in this area has been a disaster. Unfortunately, it has resulted in a humanitarian disaster. Mr. President, could we have order?

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Texas (Mr. Gramm), the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning), and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain), are necessarily absent. I further announce that the Senator from Alaska (Mr. Stevens) is absent on official business.

Mr. NICKLES

Mr. NICKLES. I announce that the Senator from Texas (Mr. Gramm), the Senator from Utah (Mr. Hatch), the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Bunning), and the Senator from Arizona (Mr. McCain) are necessarily absent. I further announce that the Senator from Alaska (Mr. Stevens) is absent on official business.