Samuel Nunn

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. NUNN. Is the Senator saying if we are going to consider a resolution on this sensitive subject that we ought to hear every word of exactly what we are doing, not do it at this hour of the night when people are not paying attention and understand what we say on the floor of the Senate? Sometimes we do not take it seriously but other countries do. I have reservations about the way this resolution is worded. It is not what is in it. It is what is not in it. There is not much I disagree with, but it leaves out the whole history of the United States relationship with China, how it evolved under President Nixon, what happened when we normalized, the Reagan communique in 1982. All of that is left out of it. We are all concerned about what is going on in China, but we do not further the cause of stability and peace in that area of the world by ignoring what we have agreed to, by ignoring the history of President Nixon's visit, by ignoring the one-China policy which was adhered to not only by the United States when we said that we would respect China's view that that was their policy but also by the people on Taiwan. For years that is what has brought stability and prosperity to that part of the world. If they are going to change that policy politically by Taiwan or certainly by military force by China, then we ought to oppose both. We ought to oppose it vigorously because that is going to cause turmoil in that part of the world for a long time to come. So if the Senator from Louisiana is saying let us go slow, let us do not pass this tonight, I am with him. I think he is absolutely right. We are not going to solve anything. This is more heat than it is light. And we need to be very careful. I would be glad to work with Senators on that side of the aisle in carefully wording and making sure we reflect the history, making sure we have an overall perspective, making sure we understand the U.S. agreements, what we have agreed to. We have not always lived up to what we said we were going to do either. I think we all have deep concern about the dangerous situation developing there. We have deep friendship for the people on Taiwan and deep admiration. So I would just ask the Senator, have I captured the essence of the point he is making here?

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise today to bring to the Senate's attention a practice that has crept into our popular culture with little notice. This practice relates to the Federal holiday we observe every year on the third Monday in February. According to current Federal law, this holiday is ``Washington's Birthday'' in honor of our great first President. In its de facto observance, however, this holiday has become known as ``President's Day'' because of its proximity to the birthday of our 16th President, Abraham Lincoln. This matter was recently brought to my attention by the President of the Society of the Cincinnati. The Society's concern is that by combining the two holidays in popular observance, we dilute the remembrances of the gravity and importance of the achievements of both men--one who fought to found our Nation and one who fought to preserve it. According to law, President Lincoln's birthday is observed on February 12.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, yesterday, I joined with my distinguished colleague Senator Domenici, in submitting Senate Resolution 226. This resolution which, I strongly support, would designate the week of October 13-19, 1996, as the third annual National Character Counts Week. For the past 2 years, I have joined with Senator Domenici and several of our other colleagues in introducing the previous character counts bills, and I have been very pleased with its reception by our colleagues and our constituents. We have come together again this year to draw attention to the fact that our Nation is experiencing a crisis of values. This crisis is reflected in the rising tide of violence that kills children in the cross-fire on school yards and in front of their houses, and in the increasing number of children who kill each other. This crisis goes beyond crime. It is reflected, also, in the recent survey of youngsters conducted by the Josephson Institute of Ethics. These ordinary youngsters may never be involved in crime, drug abuse, or teenage pregnancy, but they still acknowledge disturbing ethical lapses; Two out of five high school age boys and one in four girls have stolen something from a store. Nearly two-thirds of all high school students and one-third of all college students had cheated on an exam. More than one-third of males and one-fifth of females aged 19-24 said they would lie to get a job and nearly one-fifth of college students had already done so in the last year. Twenty-one percent said they would falsify a report to keep a job. As a character in John Steinbeck's novel ``Of Mice and Men'' complained, ``Nothing is wrong anymore.'' Unfortunately, a lot is wrong and our society seems reluctant to admit the problem, and to teach again and live by the values of right and wrong. This is the core message of character counts--that there are core values that our society agrees on and that should guide our decisionmaking. These values, as set out in the resolution, are trustworthiness, respect, responsibility, fairness, caring, and citizenship. These values are and have been supported by an extremely broad and diverse coalition of people, including former Secretary of Education Bill Bennett, the late Barbara Jordan, actor-producer Tom Selleck, and Children's Defense Fund founder Marian Wright Edelman. Among our colleagues, Senators with such diverse political viewpoints as Senator Helms and Senator Boxer have supported similar efforts in the past. I come before the Senate today on behalf of this group to urge continued attention to this important problem. In recent months, I have joined with my colleague Senator Lieberman and Secretary Bennett in an effort to raise awareness of the connection between what people see in the media and the way they live their lives. One of the points we have tried to stress to media producers and the advertisers who support these shows is that they have a responsibility to consider the societal context in which their programs play. It is difficult for our children to see trash and violence on television every day and avoid falling into those habits in their own lives. By the same token, we as citizens have a responsibility to provide an example of good character for our children to follow. If they see us upholding the pillars of good character in our everyday lives, it becomes easier for them to live that way. This is a resolution considered by members of the Senate and House in Washington, DC. But it is the parents, teachers, coaches, ministers, big brothers and sisters in local communities who will lead the fight for values in our Nation. As a result of the efforts by the Character Counts Coalition, people in all areas of the country are more aware of the problems we face, and have begun to incorporate these values into their everyday lives and those of their children. Senator Domenici has outlined some of these efforts. We resubmit this resolution to remind the Senate that the work on this issue is far from over, and again to enlist our colleagues' support in reenforcing that these values are fundamental to our society. I am proud to join my colleagues, especially Senator Domenici, in this effort once again, and I urge the Senate to support this resolution.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, on January 24, 1996, I joined many of our colleagues in honoring the late Senator Richard Brevard Russell of Georgia. Almost 25 years after the death of Senator Russell, hundreds of Russell family members, friends, and former colleagues dedicated a 7-foot marble statue of Senator Russell in the rotunda of the Senate Office Building which bears his name. In the near future, our distinguished colleague, the Honorable Robert C. Byrd, will insert a transcript of the ceremony into the Congressional Record. Today, I want to share with the Senate excerpts from a speech delivered last fall at the Governor's Mansion in Atlanta by Mr. Charles E. Campbell, president of the Richard B. Russell Foundation in Atlanta. I am grateful to Mr. William Jordan, my friend and a former senior staff assistant to Senator Russell, for making this text available to me. Mr. President, I ask that excerpts of Mr. Campbell's speech be printed in the Record so that it may be part of the historical record of Senator Russell's distinguished career in public service. The material follows: Remarks by Charles E. Campbell at the Russell Statue Luncheon, October 23, 1995 Thank you, Governor Miller. First, I would like to express the appreciation of the Russell foundation to Governor Miller and Senator Nunn for hosting this luncheon today. Zell Miller and Sam Nunn have long been friends of Richard Russell and of the Russell Foundation. I had the privilege of working for the last 6 years of Senator Russell's life as a member of his staff in Washington. Today, I have the honor to serve as Chairman of the Richard Russell Foundation. The Russell Foundation is a non-profit corporation established by admirers of Senator Russell in Georgia. It supports numerous activities related to the preservation of the Senator's memory, his records and discussion of public policy questions in which Senator Russell had a particular interest. Next January will mark the 25th anniversary of Richard Russell's death. At that time, we will have an opportunity to participate in an event that will not only bring great credit to Senator Russell but to our State as well. I refer to the dedication of the Richard B. Russell Statue. The Russell Statue is a 7-foot marble statue that will be placed in the Rotunda area of the Russell Senate Office Building. The Russell Senate Office Building is the oldest and most prestigious of the three senate office buildings in Washington. In 1972--the year after Senator Russell died--the Congress, through joint resolution, renamed what had been known as the ``Old Senate Office Building'' as the ``Richard B. Russell Senate Office Building.'' The Russell Senate Office Building is one of the most important buildings in our Nation's Capitol. It was there that such momentous events in the history of our country took place as the hearings to inquire into President Truman's dismissal of General Douglas McArthur during the Korean War (hearings which Senator Russell chaired incidentally), the announcement of John F. Kennedy's presidential campaign, the Senate Watergate hearings (of which Senator Talmadge was such an important part), and, more recently, the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings. The dedication of the Russell Statue at 4 p.m. on January 24, 1996 will focus on three distinct aspects of Senator Russell's Senate career: (1) Richard B. Russell--A President's Senator; (2) Richard B. Russell--A Senator's Senator and (3) Richard B. Russell--Georgia's Senator. The President of the United States has been invited to speak on the first topic and, while he has made no final commitment, the initial indications are positive for his participation. Senator Robert Byrd, the former Majority Leader of the Senate, and Senator Robert Dole, the present Majority Leader of the Senate, have both agreed to speak on Richard B. Russell--a Senator's Senator. Our Governor will speak on the topic of ``Richard B. Russell--Georgia's Senator.'' Senator Sam Nunn will serve as Master of Ceremonies. Many of you in this room knew Richard Russell personally and many others of you know him by reputation. His career was one of the most outstanding in our Nation's history. He served 50 continuous years in public office. he served 10 years in the Georgia House of Representatives, including the last 4 as Speaker. He became Speaker of the Georgia House in 1926 before he was even 30 years of age. He became Georgia's youngest Governor in 1930 at age 32 during the depths of the great depression. The administration of Governor Russell was one of decisive change in our State--he cut the number of State agencies from 102 to 17 and cut the cost of Government by 20 percent. At the same time, there were numerous progressive achievements of the Russell administration including the creation of a unified system of higher education under a Board of Regents insulated from politics. That system survives today. When a Senate seat became vacant in 1932, Governor Russell ran successfully and took office at the age of 34 on January 12, 1933. He was the Nation's youngest Senator. Richard Russell served 38 years in the U.S. Senate, becoming the first person in the history of the United States to serve over half their life in the Senate. During this time, from 1933 through 1970--he never missed a single opening session of Congress. You might call him the Cal Ripken of the Senate. Senator Russell's Senate career was perhaps unique in the history of our Country. No Senator, at least in modern times, has amassed the power and influence that Richard Russell enjoyed both in the Senate itself and at the White House. When we refer to Richard Russell as a ``President's Senator'' we are referring to the fact that he enjoyed an extremely close relationship with every American President from Franklin Roosevelt through Richard Nixon and was a confidential advisor of every one of them. Four of the Presidents with whom Senator Russell served-- Harry Truman, John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon--had previously served in the Senate where Richard Russell was the preeminent Senator. He knew them all well and they all knew before they arrived at the White House that Richard Russell was the foremost congressional authority on national security and a Senator who was good to his word in all matters. The other two Presidents--Franklin Roosevelt and Dwight Eisenhower--also had extensive prior relationships with Senator Russell. Franklin Roosevelt and Richard Russell became friends as young men when they were both serving as Governor of their States--Franklin Roosevelt in New York and Richard Russell here in Georgia. In fact, at the 1932 Democratic National Convention, Richard Russell made a nominating speech for Franklin Roosevelt in the first of Roosevelt's four successful campaigns for the White House. Even though he was a new Senator at the time, Richard Russell had a significant leadership role in the Senate in passing New Deal farm legislation that created the Farmer's Home Administration, established farm price supports and soil conservation protection measures. During this time, he authored the National School Lunch Program. Senator Russell, as a result of his position of influence on the Senate Armed Services Committee, dealt extensively with Dwight Eisenhower when General Eisenhower was the Supreme Allied Commander in World War II. They had become close friends before 1952 when General Eisenhower was elected President. Their friendship continued and grew during the Eisenhower Presidency. One characteristic that was dominant in Senator Russell's relationship not only with Presidents but with everyone else was his staunch independence. No matter how close a friend he was of a President nor how much political pressure was brought to bear on him, he steadfastly refused to support any measure in which he did not personally believe. Probably the two Presidents who were the closest personally to Richard Russell were Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson. However, in both instances, Richard Russell could not support important legislative matters pursued by them. He was one of four Senators to provide the decisive votes against President Roosevelt's efforts to pack the Supreme Court after it declared several of the New Deal programs unconstitutional. His independence also caused strains in his relationship with Lyndon Johnson 30 years later when he opposed certain provisions in the President's civil rights legislation, the social programs of the ``Great Society'' and the way in which the War in Vietnam was conducted. In all things, Richard Russell remained true to his view of what was best for the Country. If Senator Russell's friendship with Presidents was unusual, his standing in the Senate itself was perhaps unique. His power was such that he could have become Majority Leader or Minority Leader on any number of occasions. However, he declined because of his desire to maintain independence of thought and voting, making it impossible for him to agree in advance to support the program of any administration. Instead of becoming Majority or Minority Leader of the Senate, he largely selected several such leaders and became the Senate's mentor. Senators of both parties, of all political persuasions and from all parts of the country turned to Richard Russell more than anyone else for guidance and for help in the discharge of their Senate duties. They knew he was a man of integrity, independence and good faith. Richard Russell was, in deed, a Senator's Senator. He was also Georgia's Senator. Many times, it seems that one who achieves the position of national prominence and power as did Richard Russell, forgets his or her home state constituents because of the press of what are viewed as more important duties. Such was not the case with Richard Russell. Up until the very end, he considered among his most important duties that of faithfully representing the people of Georgia in Washington. He was fond of saying ``I have been elected to represent and work for Georgia's interest in Washington and not Washington's interest in Georgia.'' Georgians have benefited immensely and continue to benefit from Richard Russell's public service career. Benefits directly traceable to his representation of Georgia in the Senate include Lockheed--Georgia as a prime military contractor and a principal employer in this State, the National Communicable Disease Center here in Atlanta, the Richard Russell Federal Building that houses our federal court system, the numerous Corps of Engineers lake developments on Georgia's rivers, and too many outstanding military bases to even mention. I relate two brief stories to illustrate the importance serving Georgia had to Richard Russell up until the very end. Several years before he died, Senator Russell became the President Pro Tempore of the Senate--which is in some ways roughly equivalent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. As President Pro Tempore, he was the titular head of the Senate and third in line of succession to the Presidency. A part of the job as President Pro Tempore was to make appointments to various national commissions or boards where the President had an appointment, the Speaker of the House had an appointment and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate had an appointment. After routinely approving recommended appointments for a couple of weeks, Senator Russell called me into his office one day and had on his desk a proposed appointment to a national commission. He asked me: ``Isn't there anyone in Georgia qualified for any of these positions?'' We got to looking around and found out that the particular appointment in question was in a discipline in which a professor at Georgia State University here in Atlanta was a nationally recognized expert. Senator Russell deleted the name of the recommended appointee and inserted the Georgia State professor instead. Amazingly, thereafter the names of qualified Georgians started appearing with greater frequency on the lists. A second true story I would relate involves Senator Russell's decision regarding activities relating to his death. Before he died, he specified that his body was to be returned to Georgia immediately upon his death. This is because he wanted his body to lie in State at Georgia's Capitol here in Atlanta as opposed to in Washington. It is ironic that when the President's Senator and the Senator's Senator died, there were only three official activities marking his death in Washington: (1) The President of the United States ordered American flags to half staff; (2) the President paused in his State of the Union Address for a moment of silent prayer and (3) the hearse carrying Senator Russells' body was viewed by the entire Senate standing on the Capitol steps on its way to Andrews Air Force Base to be returned via Air Force One to Georgia. Richard Russell, was, in deed, Georgia's Senator. The inscription selected by the Russell Foundation to be placed on the Russell Statue will read simply as follows: ``Richard B. Russell, Jr.--Senator from Georgia--1933- 1971.''

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise today to talk about the relationship between the United States and China. Last summer the Aspen Strategy Group--cochaired by Ken Dam and myself--under Director Michael Armacost and Associate Director Bruce Berkowitz met in Aspen, CO, for 4 days. We had an intensive and productive discussion with a number of China experts participating, including Michel Okensberg, Chas. Freeman, and Stapleton Roy. The views of all three of these American China experts and my subsequent discussions with Michel Oksenberg, Charles Freeman, and others have been very helpful in my own analysis of United States-China relations. I also made a recent trip to Asia that included a stimulating and informative forum in Malaysia sponsored by the Asia Policy Group under the leadership of Doug Paal and hosted by the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim. during this conference--attended by Senator Kit Bond, Senator Bill Cohen, and myself from the Congress--we had broad and stimulating discussions with government and business leaders from the ASEAN countries and the entire Pacific region. Some of those discussions included China, but the agenda was much broader than just China. I have greatly benefited from these meetings and discussions with Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and the other leaders from throughout the region and with Doug Paal, who led our group. During my trip to Asia, I joined Senator Dianne Feinstein and Senator John Glenn in China for a series of meetings with top Chinese leadership. Mr. President, the growing importance of China in world affairs demands a purposeful, coherent, and consistent American policy toward China. History is littered with the uninformed and ineffective responses of an established power toward a rising power. often the rising power suffered from its own ambitions seeking to accelerate its rise through military means. In modern history, we need only recall the pre-World War II rise of Germany and Japan and the former Soviet Union and the opportunities and mistakes our country and the free world made in coping with their rise. History should teach us that established powers must provide consistent and credible signals about their expectations and set forth reasonable terms on which they are willing to incorporate the rising power into the international system. We are now watching the rise of China--a development of at least equal historical significance and implication as the rise of Russia, Germany, and Japan. This is occurring with the important background of the rapid industrialization of Asia. Within 25 to 50 years, Mr. President, the lives of 3.5 billion people who live in the arc from Korea to India to Pakistan are being transformed. This development is as significant for humanity and for the citizens of our country as the Renaissance or the Industrial Revolution which transformed our people into the most productive, wealthy, and free people on Earth. At the center of Asia's rise is China, a nuclear power with the largest military forces in terms of manpower, in the world, and a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. China is a nation with 1.2 billion people, an economy growing at nearly 10 percent a year for over the last decade, and as we too often forget--a distinctive civilization of great antiquity. China is in the midst of four major transitions: First, from a planned economy to a state-guided market economy. Second, from rule by the Long March revolutionaries who established the Communist regime to a rule by bureaucrats, technocrats, and military professionals. Third, from a rural agricultural society to an urban, industrial society. Fourth, from a largely self-sufficient, largely isolated economy to one that is moving into the international economy and is increasingly dependent upon it. Each of these alone is an enormous transformation. These transitions are occurring at varying speeds and with a scope unprecedented in history. The process and outcome of China's transformations are unknown. Much about the Chinese future is unknown. What will the nature of the political system be a decade or a generation hence? Will the succession to Deng Xiaoping continue to be an orderly one? Will there be widespread social disorder? What about China's military? What will be its force structure a decade hence? How is its military doctrine likely to evolve as it acquires new weaponry? What are and will be China's foreign policy proclivities? Will the Communist Party remain in power? What are the chances for democratization in China? Can the Central Government remain in control or will China fragment or break apart, as we saw with the former Soviet Union? What would happen to its nuclear arsenal under such a situation? There is no consensus on the answers to these questions among the experts, either in or outside the Government. The uncertainty about the Chinese future has several important implications. In light of China's growing importance, it is imperative that our country make a maximum effort to understand it. This entails ensuring that our Government has sufficient means to collect and analyze information about China, including extensive contact with Chinese leaders and bureaucrats at the national and provincial levels, and certainly people-to-people programs with the Chinese people themselves. President, our Nation must prepare itself intellectually for China's more extensive involvement in world affairs. This is absolutely essential. It is difficult to conceive of the international community effectively addressing a number of pressing issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, international terrorism, and narcotrafficking, environmental challenges, and the regulation of trade, without China's participation. Because of the profound Chinese transition, American engagement is essential. We are not likely to significantly affect events over the short run, but--by engaging in dialog about our mutual interests and our grievances, by speaking in clear terms in this dialog; by participating in China's development; by greater military transparency between our countries; by helping to educate China's next generation of intellectuals, which we are doing by assisting it in alleviating some of its economic and institutional problems--its evolution is more likely to be in directions favorable to peace and stability in the Pacific as well as to American interests. China's transition is likely to be protracted. The experts do agree on one point: Uncertainty is a permanent quality of modern China. Even were China to embark a process that we would call democratization, the development would be a lengthy one. History shows it takes a long time to create a legal system, guarantees for private property, a parliamentary system, a vigorous and free press, and the political culture that can sustain a pluralistic and tolerant civil society. As the American and British experience demonstrates and as we can now see in the former Soviet Union, that process takes decades. Not only must our expectations be realistic, but we cannot wait to engage extensively with China until it has become more like us or until it has settled down and its future is more certain. Realistically, we must engage with China and its current leaders now rather than remaining aloof from this vast, complex, ancient, and proud civilization until it becomes to our liking. In short, China's transition and its potential impels America, insofar as possible, to be actors on the scene. Mr. President, as I mentioned earlier, I visited China last month with Senators Dianne Feinstein and John Glenn. We had an opportunity to meet with President Jiang Zemin, Executive Vice Premier Zhu Rongji, Minister of National Defense General Chi Haotian, Vice Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing, and others within China's leadership. We had cordial, informative and frank discussions on a number of issues relating to the relationship between our two countries and stability in the entire region. Our discussions were greatly facilitated by Senator Feinstein's longstanding friendship with President Jiang Zemin, a friendship that grew out of their being mayors of sister cities--San Francisco and Shanghai at the same time. They had many visits during that period. In recent weeks, China has stepped up its military exercises in areas close to Taiwan. It has mobilized a large number of forces on the mainland across from Taiwan. There have been credible reports that China has provided nuclear technology to Pakistan in contravention of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its solemn treaty obligations to over 150 state parties to the treaty. If those reports are verified, sanctions would be triggered automatically under U.S. law, unless they are waived by the President. In recent months, China's behavior has raised concerns in Asia and in the United States. The concerns which have been expressed not only in this country, but also in Asia include: China's military expenditures continue to rise along with its economy. It continues to test nuclear weapons despite the protests of its neighbors. It has made territorial claims far into the South China Sea. It has adopted an unyielding posture toward Hong Kong and has repeatedly threatened Taiwan. Its record on missile sales to Pakistan is troubling and in probable violation of its assurances to both the Bush and Clinton administrations that it would respect the missile technology control regime [MTCR] even though it is not a member. Its human rights record, including the sentencing of Wei Jingsheng, raises basic human rights concerns, affronting American sense of fairplay as well. And its inability to crack down on violations of trade agreements, including intellectual property violations, raise serious trade concerns. It is certainly possible that these developments which are troubling, are also harbingers of difficult relations between our Nation and China in the months to come. But there are also developments on the other side of the ledger that are too often ignored. China has not obstructed U.N. and NATO peacekeeping operations and sanctions even though it openly doubted their appropriateness or efficiency. It has made important contributions to maintaining stability in Korea and in settling the Cambodian civil war. It continues to expand economic and cultural relations with Taiwan and, until 1995, it was regularly expanding people to people ties to Taiwan and reducing military tensions in the strait. It is in the process of opening itself to foreign direct investment and to wide-spread consumption of U.S. consumer goods in ways that go well beyond the opportunities many other Asian countries allow. It has announced the reduction of tariffs by 34 percent and plans further reductions to the average of developing countries in the region. It has modified its social and cultural control over its people, so that its authoritarian government, while still harsh, has moved far from the reign of terror of the cultural revolution days. While far from acceptable by our present standards, by every conceivable measure, China's treatment of its own people in 1996 is far better than at the time of President Nixon's opening in 1972 and President Carter's normalization in 1979. In the last 10 years, an enormous number of Chinese people have moved from poverty to a decent standard of living. I will have more to say on the subject of human rights in China in the weeks ahead. Mr. President, China has pledged to cease nuclear testing, but not before the negotiation and entry into effect of a comprehensive test ban treaty. It has played a quiet but positive role in assisting our quest--a very important quest--for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. In the Middle East, the Chinese have now developed ties with the moderate states, including Israel. This combination of welcome and troublesome developments requires a United States policy that is carefully managed. Unfortunately, the U.S. Government, the executive branch, as well as Congress, currently have not developed such a policy toward the most populous and the most rapidly developing country on Earth. To allow this vacuum to continue would be both irresponsible and dangerous. As we begin to think about a China policy, perhaps we should begin, not just with our litany of concerns about China, but also with some understanding of their concerns about us. China has its own list of grievances about the United States. Although I believe that most of these complaints are due to misperceptions and misunderstandings, we must be aware that if China's leaders conclude rightly or wrongly that the United States looks upon them as adversaries, they will respond in kind. We have a right to demand that the Chinese keep their agreements--we must also keep ours. America is seen by many in China as attempting to isolate, divide, encircle, and contain China. They cite, among others, the following list of grievances: First, delay on China's application for membership in the World Trade Organization which they believe is a violation of our 1992 bilateral agreement on market access. Second, refusing to grant China permanent, unconditional, most favored nation treatment. Third, constant U.S. criticism on human rights. Fourth, preventing China from hosting the 2000 Summer Olympics. Fifth, 1992 sale of F-16's to Taiwan. Sixth, visits to Taipei of U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills in the Bush administration and Transportation Secretary Pena in the Clinton administration. Seventh, visit of Taiwan's head of state to the United States, after being assured by top U.S. officials that the visit would not occur. Beyond these frequently cited grievances, the leaders of China have several broader concerns about the United States. They are concerned that the United States wishes permanently to separate Taiwan from the mainland and perhaps to foster an independent Taiwan. They question whether the United States wishes them to be a full participant in the establishment of the post-cold-war order. They cite Washington's reluctance to see them as a member of the World Trade Organization or to invite them to join other groupings that formulate policy for the international community. Perhaps most important, though these words are seldom spoken directly, with communism dead as an ideology and with no real democratic process conveying power and legitimacy, the Chinese leadership is vulnerable to nationalistic sentiment at home if they yield to what is seen as American pressure and demands. As a result, China is reluctant to undertake the responsibilities that the United States expects her to fulfill as an emerging great power. We should not, however, underestimate American strength in Chinese eyes--economically, militarily, and ideologically. They understand and respect our military strength. They understand the importance of China's access to the American market. They admire our technology, and assuming a positive relationship, I believe the Chinese prefer buying from Americans over both Japanese and Europeans. I think we need to take that sentiment into account in our own trade posture and our own export posture. Thoughtful Chinese know the United States is not seeking to contain China--I want to underscore that--but there are many in China who do not see it that way. We have welcomed over 40,000 Chinese students now enrolled in our universities. We are one of China's principal export markets. American businesses have invested $9.45 billion in China since 1978. We have welcomed Chinese participation in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and regional multilateral organizations. With our Government's encouragement hundreds of American foundations, philanthropic organizations, and education and research institutes now have wide-ranging exchanges with counterpart Chinese institutions. This is the record of a partner, not an adversary, in world affairs. China would like to build a stronger military-to-military relationship, and though it does not say so openly, it understands the stability that the United States military force presence brings to Northeast Asia. I believe that with some notable exceptions, including Taiwan, the Chinese military is more open to warmer United States-China ties than some other elements of the Chinese leadership and these inclinations have been strengthened by the visit and the leadership of Secretary of Defense Bill Perry. Thus, America has many strengths in dealing with China, yet there are serious limits on our ability fully to utilize these strengths. We need to also understand that. First, China is embedded in Asia, politically and economically, and the United States cannot pursue a successful policy toward China in isolation from the rest of the region. Our allies in Asia would not be prepared or willing to follow America's lead if we decided to isolate China nor are they willing to employ economic sanctions. Our friends in Europe and Japan will be most delighted to fill any Chinese need which develops if the United States employs economic sanctions. America is still viewed in China and in Asia as a land of wealth and opportunity. But, in China and elsewhere in Asia, among even United States friends, many believe and privately say, that we are a declining power economically and culturally. The attraction of American society has eroded not only in China, but elsewhere in Asia, primarily, in my view, as a result of our own social ills, which are publicized all over the world. In Asia, as elsewhere, perceptions matter. The Chinese see much that is attractive in the Asian model of development pursued by Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. The United States had a relationship with China that expanded and prospered from 1972 to 1989. We worked together in areas of common interest, exchanged views, tried to harmonize our views whenever we could, sought common policies, and sought to narrow and contain differences. Since 1989, we have been deferring discussion of common interests and emphasizing differences. To continue down this path is a prescription for posturing, animosity, brinkmanship, and danger. Mr. President, our Nation must develop a purposeful, coherent and consistent American policy toward China and a strategy to implement our policy. We must also explain in clear terms to both our own citizens and to the Chinese the underlying rationale for our policy and our actions. In the absence of a clear policy, it is inevitable that we in the Congress will chase off in separate directions with different priorities, while the executive branch lurches from one transitory issue to the next, addressing each problem in an ad hoc fashion. In the absence of an overall policy framework, policy becomes fragmented, the captive of single issue constituencies. Those in the executive branch bear the primary responsibility for enunciating our policy, but as we see from Taiwan's President Li's visit to the United States, the actions of Congress often influence U.S. policy, for better or worse. United States policy towards China must be developed in close consultation with the congressional leadership of both parties. In the immediate future, we should begin a dialog between China and the United States at all levels, including the highest levels--to discuss and where appropriate to act in unison in addressing these areas. Both the United States and China must get away from the current practice of diatribe and criticism. This dialog should not be portrayed as resolving our differences but rather beginning to find common ground and to reserving our different views for those issues that cannot be immediately resolved. Similarly, established channels for dialogue between Washington and Taipei must be utilized and strengthened so that there is a clear understanding of our respective views. And may I remind my colleagues that 7 years have passed since an American President or Vice President has journeyed to Beijing or the President or Premier of China has been in Washington. During that time, the leaders of China have been to every major capital in the world, and the leaders of other major countries have visited Beijing on many occasions. Misunderstandings and misperceptions are bound to flourish in the absence of dialog. Meetings do not guarantee agreement. But they reduce the chance of conflict through miscalculation. It would be irresponsible and dangerous for the United States and China to continue on our present course. It is time to end the period of estrangement between the United States and China. President Clinton's meeting in New York with President Jiang Zemin was a beginning down that road, and I hope we can greatly intensify those visits to the top level and, indeed, the working level. This dialog can inspire mutual confidence and understanding, but only if we display an unambiguous willingness to be firm when China's leaders do not meet their responsibilities and commitments, as well as a meticulous management of our China policy to ensure that we adhere to our commitments. Mr. President, I do not pretend today to offer a comprehensive China policy, but I do offer a few observations and suggestions. First, the Clinton administration should develop a broader policy framework regarding United States-China relations and stability in Northeast Asia and a strategy to advance that policy. Regarding this framework, I believe some of its components--and I am not pretending to name them all this morning--are clearly visible: a continued and robust American military presence in Asia is fundamental to the stability of Northeast Asia and peace in the region; and we should approach China in close coordination with Japan, Korea, and our Asian partners. We cannot pursue a successful China policy unless that policy is supported in the region. We must make clear that the cooperation we seek from our traditional allies and friends is not for the purpose of confronting or containing China, but for involving China more extensively and constructively in regional affairs. We should strengthen the linkages between China, the United States, and the rest of Asia so that China becomes firmly integrated with the United States in the emerging Pacific community. We must reverse a widespread perception that America's role in the region is in decline. Second, we should make it clear that we are prepared to facilitate China's participation in the international economy and international security arrangements in the expectation that China will abide by the norms of those international regimes. The incorporation of China in the world community will entail some mutual adjustments, but China cannot expect to derive the benefits without bearing the burdens of its newly acquired status. China's admission to the various international institutions will be facilitated and accelerated if they are able to demonstrate a solid record of compliance with their international commitments, including trade agreements, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which they were not part of formulating, but they have agreed to the basic principles of it. In the nonproliferation arena, China should be involved in formulating the policies we expect them to abide by. Our strategy should be to welcome and incorporate China in the world community at a relatively early stage in its rise, with the explicit Chinese commitment to abide by international standards and to develop the domestic institutional capacity to do so. This approach should serve not only America and international interests, but China's interests. Our strategy should be intended to elicit Chinese cooperation rather than to compel Chinese behavior. Third, a framework with China must be based upon mutual dignity and mutual respect. We must seek to identify our important mutual interests and make progress in these areas while striving to ensure that our points of disagreement do not dominate every agenda. If we proceed in this fashion, the areas of disagreement are likely to be put into a broader perspective where progress can be made toward resolution over time. In spite of our recent disagreements, there are clearly crucial areas of strong mutual interests between the United States and China, including avoiding an arms race in Northeast Asia; avoiding confrontation on the Korean Peninsula and preventing a nuclear weapons buildup by either North or South Korea. Also, avoiding the introduction of nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf area; avoiding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; easing tensions in South Asia between India and Pakistan; maintaining stability in Northeast Asia and the general area of the Pacific; maintaining stability in Southeast Asia, including the emergence of a peaceful Vietnam and ending and healing the conflict in Cambodia. Also, enhancing the efforts of the U.N. Security Council to maintain international peace and security; keeping sea lanes open for commerce; addressing transnational problems, such as illegal narcotics and terrorism; protecting the environment, including the seas; enhancing the rule of law in China; and, finally, maintaining the prosperity of Hong Kong and Taiwan. This is clearly in the interests of China, as well as the United States. Our two nations will not always agree on how to address these interests, but we have enough mutuality to find significant areas of common approach and cooperation. Without this framework for the discussion of mutual interests, little progress is likely to be made on the issues where we differ. With this framework, I believe that progress can be made even in difficult areas of disagreement. Finally, Congress should pass no laws or concurrent resolutions on China or Taiwan at least until after the elections in Taiwan which take place on March 23--in just a few weeks. I believe that Members of Congress should speak their views on these issues frankly and candidly, but in the present tense atmosphere congressional legislation or resolutions are likely to create more heat than light. I also hope that our China policy will not become a partisan political issue during the United States Presidential election campaign. Each time that has happened in past Presidential campaigns, our China policy has been the victim rather than the beneficiary of that kind of partisanship. Mr. President, we have a number of important differences and misunderstandings with China which must be discussed firmly and frankly within our overall strategic framework. These issues include arms proliferation, trade disputes, and human rights concerns, which I will discuss in the coming weeks. The most dangerous of these differences is the issue of Taiwan. The Chinese leaders by their words and by their actions make it abundantly clear that any attempt by Taiwan to establish its independence from the mainland will result in a confrontation with the mainland. It is clear that the Chinese do not desire a military clash, but it is also clear that they believe that their national sovereignty and national pride are at stake on the question of Taiwan's future. Neither America nor Taiwan should take lightly this Chinese position. Beijing has drawn a firm line on this question. It is essential that America also should make our policy and our intentions clear. The framework for American policy on Taiwan already exists in the three joint communiques under President Nixon in 1972, President Carter in 1979, and President Reagan in 1982 and the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. The joint communiques establish that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China, that there is but one China, that the United States acknowledges China's claim that Taiwan is part of China, and that the resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter to be worked out peacefully by the two sides themselves. This is America's solemn agreement with China entered into by Presidents Nixon, Carter, and Reagan and followed as United States policy by Presidents Ford, Bush, and Clinton. President Reagan stated our policy very clearly in his letters of April 5, 1982, to Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and Premier Zhao Ziyang. In his letter to Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping, President Reagan stated ``There is only one China. We will not permit the unofficial relations between the American people and the people of Taiwan to weaken our commitment to this principle.'' In his letter to Premier Zhao Ziyang, President Reagan stated, ``The differences between us are rooted in the long-standing friendship between the American people and the Chinese people who live on Taiwan. We will welcome and support any peaceful resolution to the Taiwan question.'' The Chinese should understand that the Taiwan Relations Act is the law of our land. This act, passed in 1979, underscores that America's relations with the People's Republic of China rest upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; that we would consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States. This act also declared it to be our policy to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capability of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan. This framework of the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act has served both sides of the Taiwan Strait as well as the United States and the Pacific region well for almost 17 years. For example, it made possible the relaxation of tensions in the strait which allowed trade and interaction of the two sides to take place. It encouraged Taiwan to abolish martial law and become a prosperous democracy. It made available to the Chinese on the mainland the talents and capital of the people on Taiwan. It played a major role in the success of China's drive for modernization. It produced a sense of security that allowed the emergence of critical conditions in which both Taiwan and the mainland could prosper. Americans have applauded the building of economic and people-to- people ties across the strait. These ties have not just been between individuals and families but also between businesses and academic institutions. We have applauded the efforts of both sides to build on those ties toward an expanded relationship. Such an expanded relationship advances the realization of longstanding American hopes for the peaceful settlement of the dispute between the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. A military confrontation between China and Taiwan would harm both China and Taiwan. It would have long-term consequences for Northeast Asia and the Pacific and would likely set off a serious arms race in Asia as Charles Freeman pointed out in his op-ed piece in the New York Times last week, a war in the Taiwan Strait ``would not only threaten Taiwan's democracy but also finish any hopes of America's building a constructive relationship with China.'' And, in commenting upon a United States decision to either intervene or not do anything in the case of a war, he stated that ``the results in either case would probably be Japanese rearmament, military rivalry between Tokyo and Beijing, a loss of confidence between Tokyo and Washington and alarm throughout Asia.'' And as Michel Oksenberg points out, while war is not the primary danger at this point, a protracted military confrontation could produce many of these same results. It would also disrupt the economies of China and Taiwan and would result in a tragic loss of life and property. Surely we all wish to avoid a repeat of Quemoy-Matsu tension, which lasted for a long time, to the detriment of the people on both the mainland and Taiwan. Americans feel very close to the people of Taiwan. We are very proud of their accomplishments. The people of Taiwan have made enormous strides economically as well as politically. There are an example to much of the developing world. It is important for the United States, as a friend, to be clear with the Taiwanese that they must not misjudge China on the question of Taiwan independence. It is important that the people of Taiwan understand that a unilateral declaration of Taiwan's independence would be inconsistent with United States foreign policy as set forth and followed by President Nixon, President Ford, President Carter, President Reagan, President Bush, and President Clinton. It is also important for the Chinese to understand that the United States values its friendship and its relationship with the people on Taiwan. It is crucial that the Chinese understand that if China uses force to resolve the Taiwan issue, the United States will not stand idly by but will surely respond. For our part, the United States should make it very clear that we will oppose either side's attempt to change the status quo either by the use of force by Beijing or by unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan. The United States position should be clear that we are prepared to live with any outcome negotiated in good faith between China and Taiwan. The future of Taiwan must be settled by mutual agreement between the parties, not by the unilateral actions of either. For that to happen, Taipei must stop its political provocations and Beijing must stop its military provocations. The people of China and the people of Taiwan should resume a high- level dialog to foster clear understandings and increased cooperation. Enormous progress has been made in economic cooperation and people-to- people contacts as well as visits on both sides of the strait. While economic development and people-to-people cooperation are emphasized, political questions are complicated and emotional and their resolution will require a long-term effort. This will involve a trait for which the Chinese people are famous--patience. I thank the Chair, and I thank my colleagues. Mr. BREAUX addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. The Senator from Georgia will accommodate any request from the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Maurice Huthinson, a legislative fellow on my staff, be permitted the privilege of the floor during my remarks on the floor this morning.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, first, I would like to associate myself with the remarks made by the Senator from Alabama [Mr. Heflin] the Senator from Georgia [Mr. Coverdell] and others opposing the Santorum amendment on the peanut program. I will summarize my remarks in about 20 seconds in the following points. I oppose the Santorum amendment for three basic reasons. First, even without the reforms included in S. 1541, the peanut program is already one of the least expensive Federal commodity programs. Under S. 1541, it will be a no cost program. So this bill without the Santorum amendment represents fundamental changes in the peanut program. Second, the Santorum amendment does not recognize the evolutionary changes in the peanut program which began with competition from GATT and NAFTA. The peanut title reforms included in S. 1541 reflect the inevitable fact that peanut producers in this country are going to have to compete in the international market by reason of those agreements. Third, even those who support changing the peanut program, in my opinion, should oppose the Santorum amendment. The Santorum amendment does not give peanut producers or the rural communities which depend so much on the peanut program the time to adjust at all. I urge my colleagues to oppose the Santorum amendment. Amendment No. 3450

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I object.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the ratification of the START II Treaty by the Senate. The case for ratification is, I believe, overwhelming. Both the START I Treaty, negotiated under President Reagan, and the START II Treaty, negotiated under President Bush, are the end-products of bipartisan arms control support by both the Congress and the American people. Ratification of the START II Treaty is supported by the President, as well as by Secretary of Defense Perry and General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of Defense is satisfied that the START II Treaty will be fully verifiable, and that ratification and entry into force are in our national interest. The START II Treaty is a continuation of the substantial reductions in strategic weaponry brought about by the signing of the START I Treaty. The signing of the START I Treaty occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall, at the end of the cold war, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the development of democratic movements and free elections in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. These events have transformed the longstanding bipolar relationship between the United States and the now-vanished Soviet Union. Given these historic changes, ratification of the START II Treaty is the next logical step. Upon entry into full force, the START II Treaty will further reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads held in the active inventories of the United States and Russia from about 8,000 weapons at START I levels by more than 50 percent. By the time START II is fully implemented, the START I and START II Treaties will have led to more than a three-fold reduction in the numbers of strategic nuclear warheads on line. Moreover, the entry into force of this treaty will eliminate all of the land-based, multiple-warhead, or MIRV'd, inter-continental ballistic missiles from the arsenals of both sides. It has long been a goal of U.S. arms control policy, under both Republican and Democratic Presidents and Congresses, to eliminate these poised-for-instant-launch MIRV'd ICBM's from the inventories of both sides. Elimination of these land-based ICBM missiles, a required measure under the START II Treaty, will help both to avoid a return to hair-trigger strategic postures on both sides, and to put an end to any conceivable incentive for a ``bolt-from-the-blue'' attack. Ratification of the START II Treaty is a highly cost-effective way to reduce the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by nuclear weapons. It will eliminate some 5,000 warheads from the Russian force posture. Our modest verification cost will be dwarfed by the U.S. defense budget savings that will flow from the retirements of our excess strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the ratification of the START II Treaty today, and to work to build support and understanding of the advantages of the START II Treaty among the members of the Russian Duma, prior to their consideration of the treaty later this year. We need to take every opportunity to explain to the new Duma the advantages that will accrue to Russia from the entry into force of this treaty.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I object.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, that vote was easier cast than to respond to the aftermath. I would have to say that I was surprised. I knew that I was nearing the 10,000 mark, but I did not know I would reach it today. I must say that to be honored in this fashion is, indeed, touching and is a reminder of how much serving in this body has meant to me. I thank my friend from Mississippi, and my friend from South Carolina, and my friend from Nebraska. I thank the majority leader, and I thank the man that is really the person we all look to to carry on the traditions and ideals of the Senate, Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia. Mr. President, I am also delighted that my friend and colleague from Georgia, Senator Coverdell, is presiding at this special moment in my life. I think this has been a historic week not because I have cast my 10,000th vote but because we have placed in the Russell Building, named after my predecessor from Georgia, Senator Dick Russell, a statue of Senator Russell, and as the Vice President said, Dick Russell, one of the greatest Senators who ever served in this body, is now where he belongs. He is standing tall in the Russell Building. So this is the culmination of a very historic week, and I cannot help but recall the words that Senator Byrd offered in the dedication of that statue this week when he said that he had never--in spite of the fact of serving with Senator Russell all those years, had such reverence for him; he knew him well--called him anything but ``Senator Russell.'' That is a tribute that cannot be exceeded. I have used the word ``Robert'' time and time again because we are such good friends, but in that tradition I would like to address you for the rest of my days here as ``Senator Byrd,'' in the great respect that I have for you because in the heat of battle, when we have so many substantive differences, I think too many times all of us forget what a tremendous honor it is to serve in this Senate, which is in my mind, without a doubt, the greatest legislative body not only in the world today but in history. We have all of our frustrations with delays and schedules, and we always have a hard time knowing what we are going to do from day to day, but when you think about the things that make the schedule so uncertain here and the things that make us so many times so frustrated are also the things that make this body unique, the right of any Senator to take the floor and continue uninterrupted as long as they choose until there is an appropriate implementation of cloture, and even then someone has to get the floor, it is a rare body. It has its distinctions from any other body in the world and I think we should always remember that. I cannot say, I say to my friend from West Virginia, and my colleagues, that I have enjoyed every vote I have cast here. Some of them have been agonizing, as we all know. And I cannot say I have enjoyed every hour I have served here. But I can say I have enjoyed every day I have served here, and I will always cherish as long as I live my service in the Senate and my friendship with each of you. So I thank the Chair and I thank my colleagues, and I look forward to a lot more votes before my day is done. [Applause, Senators rising.]

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with Senator Thurmond in support of the revised conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996, which has just passed. The annual Defense authorization bill is one of the major responsibilities of the Congress each year. It has become the primary vehicle for fulfilling the responsibility of Congress, set forth in article I, section 8 of the Constitution, to raise and support the Armed Forces and to provide rules for the governance and regulation of our military forces. The fact that we have a Defense authorization bill that is likely to be approved by the Congress and signed by the President reflects the determination of Senator Thurmond, and many other Members, to make significant changes in the bill that was vetoed on December 28, 1995. The Senate debated the first conference report on December 19, 1995. I voted against that conference report, which was the first time in my 23 years in the Senate, that I voted against a Defense authorization conference report. I had supported every previous Defense authorization conference report, including 6 years in which I served in the minority under two Republican chairmen. I concluded then that the conference report contained fundamental flaws that were contrary to the best interests of the taxpayers and the sound management of our national defense activities. On balance, the bill's bad policy outweighed its good policy. My floor statement on December 19 detailed the serious reservations that I had about the first conference report. major changes Mr. President, the revised conference report satisfies a number of the concerns which I addressed in my December 19 remarks on the Senate floor in opposing the bill and in the President's veto message. I view these changes as very substantial. The revised conference report completely eliminates the objectionable National Missile Defense language from the previous conference report. As I noted on the Senate floor, the language in the first conference report amounted to an anticipatory breach of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. I had expressed serious objection, as had the administration, to that language. The language in the first conference report could have had a significant impact on Russian consideration of the START II Treaty which is designed to produce a major reduction in Russian nuclear weapons. The language also could have lead the Russians to abandon other arms control agreements if they conclude that it is United States policy to take unilateral action to abandon the ABM Treaty. All that language is has been removed from the conference report. The revised conference report changes the first conference report in a number of other significant respects: The new report completely eliminates the proposed restrictions on U.S. forces under U.N. command and control, which the administration had viewed as interfering with the constitutional prerogatives of the President. The new report eliminates the mandatory requirement in the contingency funding provision for a supplemental appropriation, and replaces it with a sense-of-Congress provision, thereby removing another constitutional concern expressed by the President. The new report completely eliminates the language which would have repealed the statutory authority for an independent Director of Operational Test and Evaluation--a key position in terms of ensuring unbiased tests of major weapons systems. The new report makes it clear that the conferees support placing the oversight of special operations under a senior DOD official who is subject to Senate confirmation in order to ensure strong civilian control of special operations activities. The action of the conferees reflects the fact that when Congress created this position of Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, we were not simply trying to give visibility to an Assistant Secretary. There are significant substantive differences between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and each of the other Assistant Secretaries. The position of Assistant Secretary for Special Operations is tied directly to a unique combatant command that exercises management powers similar to those of a civilian Service Secretary. The conference report makes it clear that there is a continuing requirement for a senior, Senate-confirmed official to exercise these responsibilities as the individual's principal duty. The new report extends the time period for the sale of the naval petroleum reserve from 1 to 2 years. The 1 year period in the previous version was insufficient to ensure that the taxpayers would obtain the maximum value through knowledgeable competitive bidding. The new report specifically requires consideration of costs and risks in the development of plans for future submarine technology. The previous report omitted these vital factors, which could have lead to a great deal of wasted effort on theoretical and impractical approaches to modernizing our submarine fleet. important legislative initiatives The conference report contains important legislative authorities which I support, such as: Important military pay and allowance provisions, including a 2.4- percent pay raise for the troops and a 5.2-percent increase in the basic allowance for quarters. Approval of Secretary Perry's family and troop housing initiative, which would provide new authorities--including shared public and private sector funding--to finance needed construction and improvements in military housing. Detailed acquisition reform legislation that complements last year's landmark Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act. Key provisions would: Use simplified procedures to streamline the process of procuring commercial products and services while preserving the requirement for full and open competition; reduce the barriers that inhibit acquisition of commercial products by eliminating the requirement for certified cost and pricing data for commercial products; streamline the bid protest process by eliminating the separate bid protest authority of the General Services Board of Contract Appeals and providing for all bid protests to be determined by the General Accounting Office; consolidate and clarify the standards of conduct for Federal officials in the acquisition process to ensure consistent treatment of such personnel on a government-wide basis. Establishment of a Defense Modernization Account. This provision, which I sponsored, will encourage the Department of Defense to achieve savings in procurement, R&D, and operations and maintenance by allowing the Department to place those savings in a new account, the Defense Modernization Account. The Department could use amounts in the account to address funding shortfalls in the modernization of vital weapons systems. continuing flaws I am disappointed, however, that the conferees retained a variety of flawed provisions that were contained in the previous conference report. I recognize that there was a reluctance to rewrite the entire conference report at this point in time, but I am particularly concerned about a number which are contrary to the best interests of the taxpayers and the national interest. I detailed the problems with these provisions in my floor statement on December 19, and I will simply highlight a number of my continuing concerns today. earmarking Mr. President, I am particularly concerned about the provisions of the bill which earmark the procurement of specific ships in specific shipyards. These anticompetitive provisions are contrary to the longstanding practices of the Armed Services Committee. In the past, we have provided appropriate guidance on the development and procurement of major weapons systems and to leave to the executive branch the process of awarding contracts. We have done this to ensure that the Government achieves the best price and quality based upon bids and proposals reviewed under merit-based criteria. We have endeavored to avoid legislation and conference report language which earmarks specific contracts to specific contractors. We have avoided earmarking because there is too great a danger that awards under such a system could be based on political and parochial considerations rather than the best interests of national defense. I am very concerned about the shipbuilding provisions of the conference report, which could lead to substantial unnecessary expenditures for the procurement of Navy vessels. I am also concerned that section 1016 of the bill has the effect of earmarking a ship maintenance contract for a specific shipyard. This is a provision that not only precludes competition, it also directs work to be performed that the Navy says is unnecessary. Once we start down this route, other shipyards--as well as repair and maintenance contractors for aircraft and vehicles--will want their share of these directed, noncompetitive contracts. The Competition in Contracting Act is designed to save money through effective competition. From time to time, there are exceptions which can be justified on the merits in terms of industrial base considerations--but those decisions should be made on the basis of sound analysis and thorough consideration of executive branch views, not on the basis of legislated earmarks. protectionism The conference report establishes new Buy American legislative provisions for ships and naval equipment which will result in enormous cost increases for naval vessels and which could produce an unfavorable reaction against U.S. military sales abroad--one of the strongest elements of our export economy. As a result of the conference, foreign countries which lose the right to bid on American contracts as a result of this provision will likely retaliate by imposing their own restrictions on American products, thereby damaging the export sector of the United States that currently has a strong surplus. There is ample existing authority for DOD to exclude foreign companies from competing on contracts when there is a valid industrial base requirement for a domestic producer. The Department of Defense has not requested any additional legislative authority to impose specific Buy-American requirements on the components listed in the conference report. There has been no showing of a critical domestic industrial base need that would justify singling out these vessel components, among the hundreds of thousands of items procured by the Department of Defense, as warranting protection from competition. Mr. President, I find it strange that a Republican majority in the House and Senate committed to free trade and market competition, would inject the most sweeping Buy American provisions we have placed in a Defense authorization bill I have ever seen. This will damage the U.S. defense industry and the American taxpayer. A more onerous Buy-American provision is set forth in the bill's authority to use sealift funds to purchase vessels for the National Defense Reserve Fleet. Unlike the Buy-American provision that applies to components, which I previously discussed, the provision governing National Defense Reserve Fleet vessels has no waiver authority. As a result, DOD would be precluded from purchasing foreign vessels for the five additional Roll-on/Roll-off ships called for in the mobility requirements study, despite the potential for major savings to the taxpayers. This provision could add over $1 billion to the cost of these ships. The result could be a bonanza for certain domestic shipbuilders at taxpayer expense, or--what is more likely--the Navy will decided that the cost is likely to be so high that the Navy might forego purchasing enough ships to meet mobility requirements. That would be bad for the taxpayers and bad for national defense. unwise personnel policies The conferees have approved legislation mandating the discharge of HIV-positive servicemembers. Out of the 1.4 million members of the Armed Forces on active duty, only 1,150 are HIV positive. That is less than one-tenth of 1 percent. Moreover, these HIV-positive servicemembers constitute only 20 percent of the total permanent nondeployable personnel in the military. The other 80 percent nondeployable for reasons such as cancer, heart disease, asthma, and diabetes. The bill requires discharge only of the HIV-positive servicemembers--not any of the other medically nondeployables. This is particularly unfortunate because many of those who are HIV positive are not adversely affected in terms of their ability to perform useful military service. Mr. President, we need to put a human face on these statistics. There is a sergeant with 16 years of service, with a wife and two children, who contracted HIV from a blood transfusion. He is performing sophisticated personnel management activities in a nondeployable status. When he heard about our bill, he said to his commander: ``The service is my life. I've given everything I have to it. When this bill passes, I'll be out of the service and out of a job. How am I supposed to support my family?'' What do we tell that sergeant and his family? How can we justify to the taxpayers the waste of 16 years of military training and education? There is a female staff sergeant with 8 years of service who is assigned to a high level administrative position in one of the military departments. She contracted HIV from her husband, who subsequently died. She is the mother of a 4-year-old child. Under the bill, she will be out of the service, out of a job, and ineligible to reach retirement. She is perfectly capable of continuing her outstanding performance of duty, but now she will be fired. There is an E-6 married for 10 years, who has a child and who is HIV positive. His service record includes a Navy Commendation Medal, two Navy Achievement Medals, and four sea-service deployment ribbons. His Navy Commendation Medal was awarded for automating a warehouse system that saved the Navy an estimated $2 million over a 2 year period. He has 12 years of service and has been HIV positive for 5 years. There is a reasonable likelihood that he could serve for many more yeas, with the potential to develop systems that will save millions more for the Navy. This bill deprives him of his livelihood and deprives and taxpayers of the contributions that he can make to greater efficiency and savings. There is a sergeant with 13 years of service who is married, with three children. He is HIV positive, as is his wife and two of the three children. Under the bill before us, he is the only one of the family who will retain a right to DOD medical care. His family, including his HIV-positive wife and two HIV-positive children, will be excluded from any DOD health care. As a result of the bill, he will be discharged from service, lose his employment, lose his retirement potential, and lose his family's medical care. This is an individual who is perfectly capable of performing military duties, yet we are going to throw away our investment in him and place him in dire financial straits. This is unacceptable. Mr. President, these are but a few examples of the many productive servicemembers who will be discharged at great personal harm to them and their families, and at a great personnel investment loss to the taxpayers. This is not a situation where we have a large number of nondeployables. The numbers are small--well within the range of the number of nondeployables who have been retained on active duty under longstanding military manpower policies. In my view, Mr. President, the HIV provision is counter productive should have been stricken from the bill. In an effort to forge a compromise, I proposed that the conferees establish a waiver procedures. My compromise proposal would have permitted a Service Chief and Service Secretary to recommend waiver of the mandatory discharge, on a case-by-case basis, when retention of the individual would be in the ``best interests of the Department of Defense'' or would ``prevent an unacceptable hardship for the individual service member and the immediate family.'' The majority conferees, however, refused to consider this approach. It is my hope, Mr. President, that we will come to our senses, take a rational look at this policy, and repeal it before it can do any harm. Other flawed personnel provisions include unwarranted restrictions on access of servicemembers and dependents overseas to abortion services at private expense and the unnecessary interjection of the judiciary into POW/MIA determination process.

Mr. NUNN. As the ranking member of the committee, I also concur with the Senator's statement.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, today a grateful Nation pays its final tribute to a true patriot and hero, Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, who died on Monday at the age of 94. Admiral Burke will be buried on the grounds of the Naval Academy in Annapolis, where he graduated in 1923. His service to the Nation will serve as a model to Academy graduates as well as all members of the Armed Forces for generations to come. Admiral Burke said he was attracted to the Navy because, in his words, the rules were ``strict, known and observed.'' His adherence to the rules was a matter of personal honor, not bureaucratic timidity. When it came to strategy and tactics, he was a bold innovator. During World War II, he initiated dramatic changes in naval doctrine, developing and implementing tactics relying on the speed and maneuverability to destroyers armed with torpedoes to undertake offensive operations. Admiral Burke's Destroyer Squadron 23, known as the ``Little Beavers'' compiled an outstanding combat record in the Pacific in 1943, which earned him the Distinguished Service Medal, the Navy Cross, and the Legion of Merit. During the assaults on Bougainville and Buka in the Solomon Islands, he made two dramatic high speed runs, crippling Japanese airfields and sinking a large number of Japanese vessels. Reflecting the speed and daring of these maneuvers, Adm. William F. Halsey gave him the nickname ``Thirty-One Knot Burke'' after Burke sent a message to American transports announcing: ``Stand aside! Stand aside! I'm coming through at 31 knots.'' A Presidential Unit Citation praised the squadron's ``daring defiance of repeated attacks by hostile groups'' and its attacks on the ``enemy's strongly fortified shores to carry out sustained bombardments against Japanese coastal defenses and render effective cover and fire support for * * * major invasion operations * * *.'' Subsequently he helped plan the invasions of Iwo Jima, Guam, the Marianas, and Okinawa. At Okinawa, the ship on which he was serving was hit by kamikaze suicide planes, and he was awarded the Silver Star for rescuing sailors trapped in a compartment by smoke and fire resulting from the attack. After the war, he served in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, where he produced an influential report emphasizing the vital role of the Navy in the post-war national security establishment. Although the inter-service rivalries of the period nearly cost him promotion to the grade of admiral, President Truman recognized his skills and character and he was promoted. During the Korean war, Admiral Burke served as commander of a cruiser division and as a member of the Military Armistice Commission. In 1955, he was appointed by President Eisenhower and confirmed by the Senate as Chief of Naval Operations, a position he filled for an unprecedented three terms. He played a key role in the development of antisubmarine technology, the Polaris submarine, and strengthening allied navies. President Kennedy offered him the opportunity to serve a fourth term as CNO, but Admiral Burke declined so that the Navy could have younger leadership. After retiring from the Navy, he helped to establish and lead the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which has provided numerous influential studies on national security matters. He also served as president of the Capital Area Council of the Boy Scouts of America. In January 1977, Admiral Burke was awarded the Nation's highest civilian award, the Medal of Freedom, by President Ford. The Navy's Arleigh Burke class is named in his honor. When the lead ship, the Arleigh Burke, was commissioned in 1991, he gave the crew a simple, direct message reflecting his belief in providing the Navy with the best equipment and hard training: ``This ship is built to fight,'' he said. ``You'd better know how.'' It is most fitting that the crew of the lead ship, the Arleigh Burke, will be present to honor him today. The current Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Mike Boorda, summed up Admiral Burke's career when he said: ``Admiral Arleigh Burke defined what it means to be a naval officer: relentless in combat, resourceful in command and revered by his crews. He was a sailor's sailor.'' I wish to express my condolences to his wife of 72 years, Roberta ``Bobbie'' Gorsuch Burke, and to express my appreciation for his devoted service to our Nation. I think we can indeed say--all of us can say--that he followed military affairs, and that Admiral Burke, in Admiral Boorda's words indeed ``* * * defined what it means to be a naval officer: relentless in combat, resourceful in command and revered by his crews.'' He was, indeed, ``a sailor's sailor.'' Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for the time, and I will yield back any I have.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, my friend from New Mexico talked about the rights of the Congress regarding the purse strings, and the rights of the President regarding the veto. And he emphasized that this is a two- way street. I agree that the budget dilemma, the budget challenge, the effort to balance the 7-year budget, is indeed a two-way street. The American people should hold all of us accountable for that. But this continuing tactic to keep the Government closed down is not a two-way street. There are a group of people who believe--I think erroneously so--that it gives them leverage. In effect they are saying that the President should care more about the health of the American people, about the workers out there, than the Congress does. Otherwise, why is it leverage? Is it leverage for you to hold somebody hostage if both have an equal stake in returning that innocent victim without being harmed? If it is not leverage, then why do it? If it is leverage, that means that the Congress does not have an interest in the workers and does not have an interest in the people who are being affected in this country, and indeed abroad. Mr. President, I do not understand any logic behind the House Republicans' position. And I again am gratified that the leadership of the Senate on both sides of the aisle recognize that this is counterproductive, and recognize that the wrong people are being held hostage in this high-level game of Russian roulette. Mr. President, one closing thought again in response to the thoughts voiced by my good friend from New Mexico, Senator Domenici. This effort to get the budget under control is indeed a two-way street. As I think we have set forth in the Chafee group composed of about 10 Democrats and about 10 Republicans, there is no reason the parties cannot come together. It is not easy. It is not something that can be done in an or hour or two hours but over a 2-, 3-, 4- or 5-day period should be able to be done. I do not think there is any question about the responsibility of keeping the Government closed. That is a tactical decision made by House Republicans. But all of us are involved in the effort to try to get the budget under control. It is very clear what has to be done. The administration and Democrats have to be willing to save more on entitlements, to restrain the growth of entitlements more than has thus far been indicated. Republicans have to be willing to come down some on what they are doing in terms of the cuts in Medicare and Medicaid which are too severe. That is very apparent. It is also apparent that both the Republicans and the White House need to take another thorough look at tax cuts. It is to me almost unbelievable that we can be starting a quest to get the budget under control by declaring a very large dividend at the very beginning before we have implemented anything. That is what large tax cuts do. So I am hoping that the tax cuts will come down, and that the Republicans will agree to that. I am hoping that those of us on the Democratic side will recognize that we have to restrain the entitlement growth. That is the heart of what has to be done. It is apparent for all of us to see. There are a lot of complexities in doing it. But we will have to make those movements. In the final analysis, there is a right of the President to veto, and there is a right of Congress not to appropriate. There also is a right of the American people to say, ``We have had enough; a plague on both your houses. We send people to Washington to be able to reach reasonable compromises to govern this Nation effectively and both political parties are failing at that task.'' At some point the American people are going to come to that conclusion, and they are going to come to the conclusion that both parties are to blame. I hope everyone recognizes that because that day, if it has not already arrived, is fast approaching. I believe it is up to all of us to put aside some of the harsh and unreasonable rhetoric and some of the incivility that has gone into this debate and to recognize we all have an obligation to the American people and to our children and grandchildren to get this Nation's fiscal house in order and to do it in a responsible way, a way that will not be looked back on in a year or two as an absolute march of folly but a way that is fair and effective for the American people.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I have made it clear in previous remarks and other public statements that I oppose shutting down portions of the Federal Government as a tactic in the budget debate. I have supported the continuing resolutions that would restore funding for full Government operations as we continue to move toward the objective of a balanced budget. I applaud the leadership of Senator Dole, Senator Daschle, and others in this body who have concluded that the current situation is artificially created, it is unnecessary and is a wasteful burden on Federal workers and on the taxpayers they serve. Mr. President, I recall here over the last 20 years, several debates on holidays, whether we ought to add another holiday to the overall holidays the Federal Government observes. I remember people totaling up the amount of money it costs to have one holiday and projecting that over 20 years and talking about the astounding cost when you pay people for a holiday. If anyone stops and thinks about what we are doing now, I believe we are about on day No. 20--there may be a few more days in that counting the previous shutdown--we really have had 20 to 25 additional holidays this year where the taxpayers of this country are paying for people who want to work but who are not allowed to work, but they are going to be paid. And that is, to me, a real paradox, as to how you possibly can start off a quest to save $1.2 trillion over 7 years by declaring over 20 paid holidays for workers. And then, it is not only the workers themselves--it is unfair to them because they want to work, they are not getting paid now, and that is a hardship--but also it is terribly unfair to literally hundreds of thousands and growing to be millions of Americans who are suffering because of this shutdown. Mr. President, there are many examples of the harm being done by the shutdown. One example which has not drawn much attention is the fact that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the CDC in Atlanta, GA, is virtually shut down. Today is the 50th year of operation of the Communicable Disease Center, and it is effectively closed. Except for a skeleton staff, no personnel are available to fulfill the functions of the CDC. This is bound to have an impact on the health and safety of the American people and, indeed, citizens around the world. The workers at the CDC are the same Federal workers who pinpointed the cause of Legionnaire's disease and toxic shock syndrome. These are the same men and women who risked their lives to investigate the recent outbreak of ebola and track the course of influenza, AIDS, and TB across the Nation and indeed the world. Their job is to investigate, to define, to monitor and to prevent disease--to get out in front of emerging infectious diseases, food and waterborne diseases, respiratory inspections, birth defects, lead poisoning, air pollution, radiation, and other environmental health emergencies. The problem in this area is you do not know it is an emergency if you are not out in front of it before it is too late. We will be lucky if we get by with this shutdown and closedown of the CDC without having some serious problem and erosion in the health of the American people. In some cases, the CDC implements control measures during a critical time when minutes and even seconds count. Rarely a week passes by without the CDC directing the Nation's attention to important new research findings on public health issues. At this point, we do not know what public health crisis will emerge in 1996. With a CDC shutdown, we do not know what might be happening right now. What we do know is that the CDC plays a critical role in watching for signs and sustaining sophisticated surveillance and monitoring communications with medical health officers in our Nation and throughout the world. We do not know the impact of the Government shutdown on the health of the U.S. citizens. We may not know it until it is too late. Like other Federal employees, the people in CDC are deeply dedicated, hard-working persons, scientists, physicians, and public health professionals. Some even risk their lives to investigate outbreaks of unknown, sometimes even deadly diseases. These people are protecting the Nation's health and they are anxious to return to their jobs. In addition, the CDC personnel who are not at work, who would otherwise be there, they would be providing critical funding for technical assistance to State and local programs for sexually transmitted diseases, TB, HIV, childhood immunization, environmental health, national and international chronic and infectious disease prevention, breast and cervical cancer. We all need to recognize they are not on the job. Mr. President, diseases, viruses, bacterial infections, and cancers do not stop because of a Government furlough or a partisan political and budget debate. CDC grants to State health agencies to fund prevention programs that are fundamental to saving lives and maintaining the health of our population are also being affected adversely. Programs in 20 States for rape prevention are in danger, and funds for staffing hotlines for public health emergencies, such as violence, STDs, and HIV, may halt operations. All of this is in great risk. We cannot afford to wait to open the doors at the CDC. The health of the Nation and the world could be at stake. I urge our colleagues in the House to think again about the tactics they are using. They are trying to get the budget balanced, and that is a goal that all of us should work toward. And I hope we can achieve that. But the tactics being used are totally counterproductive to the taxpayers and to the country and to the health of our citizens. We must not continue to hold hostage the health and safety of American citizens who are paying for a service that is not being rendered.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I yield the 30 seconds.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, many mistakes have been made in Yugoslavia, the most tragic by the parties themselves. All of the mistakes made by the international community added together do not even register on the scale compared to what the parties have done to each other. Nevertheless, we should learn from our mistakes. Such mistakes include premature international recognition of the separate states before any agreement on minority rights or before any basic test for state viability. Another mistake was the United States and European failure--primarily, at the first instance, European failure--to deal decisively with the first Serb aggression. Commitment of a lightly armed U.N. peacekeeping force in the middle of a civil war was another mistake. Dual-key arrangements required for military action with the United Nations in control was certainly a fundamental violation of any kind of a real effective command structure. And the United Nations constantly posed threats and deadlines with no followthrough, thereby steadily losing credibility. I could go on and on. This is not, however, meant to denigrate in any way the efforts, often heroic, of the U.N. forces and the numerous international organizations that provided humanitarian assistance to the Bosnian people. Tens of thousands of lives were saved. There are many lessons for Europe, the United Nations, for NATO, and for our own country in this tragedy that has caused so much hardship and cost so many lost lives. Mr. President, the job now is to learn from the past and also face the reality of the future. United States and NATO forces face many obstacles and risks in Bosnia, but there is also a bright side based on events that have already occurred and also an opportunity for the future. II. Positive Side Let me start today with the positive side. On the positive side, the NATO allies finally seem to mean business. Just a few examples: French President Chirac led an effort to provide greater combat capability to the U.N. protection force, and he exercised leadership in firming up the allies' commitment. NATO, urged by the Clinton administration, sent a clear and unmistakable signal of its determination with its bombing campaign against Bosnian Serb command, control and communication facilities when they continued to flaunt their own obligations. President Clinton seized the opportunity presented by the bombing campaign and the Federation ground campaign to launch an intensive diplomatic effort under the effective leadership of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke that resulted in a comprehensive peace agreement between the parties. The Croatian and the Federation ground campaign, together with the peace agreement, greatly improved the clarity of lines separating the parties making a peace enforcement mission more feasible and less dangerous. Finally, strong leadership by President Clinton and the United States in this area is producing tangible and positive results in NATO. Just a few of those results in NATO, some of which are truly remarkable. First of all, Germany is providing troops for this first time ``out of area'' NATO operation. Second, French troops will be operating under NATO command and control. France has announced its return to regular participation in the NATO military committee. This is a reversal, Mr. President, of 30 years of French policy. Russia has agreed to place its forces under the operational control of an American general. Russia will consult with NATO on a 16-nation to one-nation basis, but will not have a veto over NATO decisions. These events have the potential to lead to future developments with Russia that could have a decidedly positive impact on European security in the years ahead. There are also, of course, potential downsides to this arrangement. There will be no substitute for constant high-level vigilance to this Russian military participation, both in Washington and in Moscow, as well as in the field. This one bears very careful and close nurturing and attention. All NATO nations except Iceland, as well as many other nations, have committed forces to Bosnia. The United States forces will be primarily in the Tuzla area where the roads and terrain are difficult but not as severe as some other areas of Bosnia. The Nordic brigade comprised of Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and recently joined by Poland, that will be colocated with American forces, have operated in the area for some time. They have heavy equipment. They have not tolerated interference. They have been friendly with the people of the area, and they have been firm. They are helping our advance team immensely with their advice and their knowledge of the area and of the people. The Turkish brigade will be near American troops, which should help to temper the more extreme elements of the Moslem communities. Turkey is a key NATO ally with strong influence in the moderate Muslim world. All of our commanders who have testified before our committee or who have spoken to me privately believe that the rules of engagement are clear, they are robust, and they are appropriate. They authorize the use of force, including deadly force, in response to both hostile acts as well as, in the judgment of the commander, hostile intent. These are the same rules of engagement as were utilized in Haiti. Most importantly, the mission and the military task are doable, according to all of our military witnesses. III. Military Mission A. Mission Definition The military mission is a subject of considerable importance in how it is defined. General Shalikashvili has defined our military mission as follows: ``In an evenhanded manner, monitor and enforce compliance with the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement.'' General Shalikashvili has further listed the military tasks of the Dayton agreement as follows: Supervise selective marking of cease-fire line, inter-entity boundary line and zones of separation. Monitor and, if necessary enforce, withdrawal of forces to their respective territories within agreed periods as follows: Ensure withdrawal of forces behind zones of separation within 30 days of transfer of authority from UNPROFOR to the Implementation Force; Ensure redeployment of forces from areas to be transferred from one entity to the other within 45 days of transfer of authority; Ensure no introduction of forces into transferred areas for an additional 45 days; Establish and man a 4-kilometer zone of separation--2 kilometers on either side of cease fire/inter-entity boundary line; Establish liaison with local military and civilian authorities; and Create a Joint Military Commission and subordinate military commissions to resolve disputes between the Parties. In order to accomplish these military tasks, the Military Annex to the General Framework Agreement provides that ``the IFOR Commander shall have the authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to do all that the Commander judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect the IFOR and to carry out the responsibilities'' under the agreement. The peace agreement, thus, gives the NATO Implementation Force well defined responsibilities--basically to separate the parties and create a stable environment--and grants it broad authorities to carry out its mission and to protect itself. In many ways, NATO's clearly defined responsibility with very broad authority and robust capability is the opposite of what the U.N. forces evolved into: broad and ill-defined responsibility with narrow authority and limited capability. The worst kind of combination. General Shalikashvili has testified that the military mission and the military tasks are appropriate and executable. B. Definition of success and Exit Strategy There is a strong correlation between the definition of success when you are using military forces and also the exit strategy. I would like to briefly discuss those. In discussing the obstacles to the success of the military mission we first must avoid confusing the military mission with the much broader U.S. and international political goals in Bosnia. It is a part of the overall political goals, but it is only one part of the broader goal. In my view, we should view the military mission as a success if the Implementation Force provides the time and space for the parties, assisted by the international community, to begin a peaceful building process. I use the term ``building'' in both the physical and political sense; that is, both building the democratic processes for a unified nation and reconstructing the economy and the physical infrastructure of the nation. The military part of the mission is to create the climate and stability required to begin the building process. The civilian part of the mission is to build the political and civil institutions that can endure. In the long run, only the parties themselves can bring about this success. The building process is separate and distinct from the military mission. It is entirely possible that the military mission will be carried out with great professionalism and accomplish the military goal and still have the civilian building process end in dismal failure. That is what I think we have to recognize. The success of the military mission will require a great deal of coordination with the Parties' military and civilian representatives and with the High Representative and the participating civilian organizations. The Joint Military Commission and subordinate military commissions at the brigade and battalion level will bring all of these parties together under the chairmanship of the Implementation Force commander and his local commanders. One of the principal uses of these forums is for the IFOR commander--U.S. Admiral Smith--and his subordinate commanders to work with the military commanders of the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs at all levels to convince them that peace is in the best interests of their respective peoples and that the military goal of regaining and holding lost territory is not achievable. Mr. President, they do not have perfect civilian control in this part of the world. If we are going to really get a peace there that endures, a key part of that will be having the military leaders of each one of the parties, the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Moslems, Bosnian Croats, to recognize that peace is in the interests of the people that they represent. That is a key. Our military forces will play a key role in that kind of understanding. This is very, very important. Bringing the military leadership of the opposing parties together under U.S. and NATO auspices to begin the slow and tortuous process of building trust and cooperation may be one of the most important NATO challenges and opportunities. The exit strategy and the definition of a successful military mission flow together, in my view. Separating the parties--providing time and space for the civil building process--creating an environment of peace and stability--and through non-U.S. military means, leaving a reasonable military balance which gives the parties an opportunity to defend their own borders. These are all key components of ``success'' in the broad context and are required for a successful exit of U.S. and NATO forces within approximately 1 year. iv. risks a. risks to the military mission Mr. President, I get a lot of letters, and I know all of my colleagues do, about the risks to the United States military forces. These risks are very much on the minds of all of us as we send our young men and women to this dangerous area of the world. There are certainly risks involved in this military operation. There are a number of risks to U.S. military personnel. First, I believe, is accidents, based on all the records of the U.N. Forces. Then landmines, snipers, attacks by extremists, hostage taking, and, finally, one that is overlooked many times; complacency of our military forces when things are going well. This complacency can lead to carelessness and can only be avoided by strong leadership from the unit level right on up. General Shalikashvili testified that he does not believe that our forces will be subjected to attacks from organized combat units. He believes the greatest risk will come from accidents on the dangerous Bosnian roads. In this regard, it should be noted that the U.N. Protection Force sustained 213 deaths, of which 80 were due to combat and 133 due to other causes. I am confident that the excellent equipment, training and discipline of our forces should minimize the risks, but there will undoubtedly be American casualties. Potential attackers should be on notice that the forces available to NATO and the robust rules of engagement mean that swift and overpowering responses will take place if NATO forces are attacked or provoked. Our forces are supposed to be even-handed, and I am sure they will be. But evenhanded does not mean, nor should it imply, being gentle when they are either attacked or when they detect hostile intent. NATO and the United States must insist that President Izetbegovic of Bosnia, fully meet his commitment to ensure that the mujahedin forces depart Bosnia within 30 days of the signing of the peace agreement. This has been a firm pledge by the Bosnian President. This will be seen by the United States as well as a number of other parties, including the Bosnian Moslems, Bosnian Croats, as well as the Bosnian Serbs, as an indication of the extent of the Iranian and other outside Islamic fundamentalist influence on the Bosnian Moslems. It is hard to imagine that the Bosnian Moslem and Croat Federation could hold together if there is a pervasive extreme Islamic fundamentalist influence within the Bosnian Muslim entity. It is also hard to believe that the Bosnian Serbs, particularly those who are living in the suburbs of Sarajevo, and whose cooperation or at least acquiescence is necessary to the security of the forces of the French contingent in that area, will be reassured if the mujahedin do not depart as scheduled. Although I will not dwell on this today, while we are talking about risk, there is also a risk of renewed conflict in Eastern Slavonia or a flare-up in Kosovo. B. Risks relating to arming and training There are also risks relating to arming and training, which is a mission that I would like to discuss just for a few minutes. The Regional Stabilization Annex to the Framework Agreement gives the parties 180 days after the agreement was signed to negotiate limits on the levels of armaments. These negotiations are to be carried out under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). I want to emphasize that this is a civilian and not a military task and the NATO Implementation Force is not responsible for this effort. The fact that it is a civilian task does not mean that the United States will not play a leadership role in this effort. On the contrary, the United States should endeavor to play a strong leadership role since a general reduction in the number of arms in former Yugoslavia will reduce the risk to the United States and allied forces participating in the Implementation Force as well as improve the chance for lasting peace. The U.S. commitment to lead an international effort to arm and train the Federation forces was essential to securing the peace agreement but we should make no mistake that it carries substantial risk. An assessment is already underway to identify the capabilities of the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslim-Croat Federation, to assess what the Federation needs to redress its deficiencies, to plan how those needs will be met, and to commence training, since training may be provided immediately under the Regional Stabilization Annex and the UN Security Council resolution that lifts the arms embargo. If arming and training is not carried out with care, it could wind up increasing the risk to United States forces in Bosnia and alienating our allies. It will be important to ensure that United States forces in Bosnia are not involved and that the involvement of active duty United States military personnel is kept to administrative functions. In this regard, I was pleased to note that President Clinton, in his letter of December 12, 1995 to Senator Dole on this issue, stated that ``I will do nothing that I believe will endanger the safety of American troops on the ground in Bosnia.'' Mr. President, I believe all of us agree with that goal. It will also be important for the Administration to keep our allies informed on the steps we are taking and to take into consideration their comments. The use of a third country, such as Turkey--a secular Muslim country, to carry out the training seems to be the best choice. In the case of training, I believe the emphasis should be on small unit training and the maintenance, repair and use of defensive weapons and equipment. In the case of arming, I believe that whatever arms are provided to the Federation, the emphasis must be on defensive capability. By defensive capability, I mean that the weapons, equipment, and training that are provided are suited to allow the force to defend itself rather than to enable it to conduct offensive operations to gain and hold territory. That is a very important distinction--in the kind of equipment we encourage to be furnished by other countries. In the case or weapons and equipment, it would mean emphasizing counter battery radar, night vision devices, communications equipment, anti-armor, ammunition, light vehicles, and the like rather than providing large numbers of tanks and artillery tubes. There also may be a need to perform some modest military construction to relocate the Federation forces out of the cities and towns in which they are presently located. There are also risks to the military mission that relate to the accomplishment of the civilian political goals. C. Risks to Civilian/Political Goals It is obvious that the planning for the accomplishment of the military tasks is far ahead of that for the civilian tasks and that there is a serious and growing gap between the two. NATO planning at the strategic and operational levels benefitted greatly from the planning accomplished over the last year relating to a possible NATO operation to extract the United Nations Protection Force from Bosnia. Our military people have been going through contingency planning on this situation for some time. Both planning efforts required a common set of data relating to the all-important logistics effort to insert forces rapidly, to stabilize the security situation, and to extract the force safely once the mission had been carried out. Additionally, NATO has an in-place staff that specializes in such planning and is trained to adapt its plans as more information on the specific military tasks become available, as was the case during the negotiation of the General Framework Agreement and its Annexes. By comparison, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the other organizations that will be involved in the civil political mission have no counterpart planning staffs and have no experience in carrying out many of the tasks they will carry out in Bosnia. For example, the High Representative was only named a little more than a week ago to the London Conference. The broad international political goal is to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unified country in a region in which peace and stability endures. Accomplishing that broad goal would require overcoming a number of obstacles that could defy its attainment and the civilian side of this will really have to address many of these obstacles. Mr. President, all we have to do is look at Haiti to find out that you can have a military mission go extremely well but not have the economic development, the infrastructure development, and even the political development keep up with that. And you can still have a country that is hanging on the bare edge. That is the case in Haiti today, and that will also be the case in Bosnia unless the civilian side begins to catch up with the military side and really understand the obstacle to having stability in this region. Such obstacles include the history of the region, the ethnic consciousness of significant parts of the population, the residual hatred resulting from the cruel and inhuman behavior of the warring parties, such as ethnic cleansing carried out by but not limited to the Bosnian Serbs, and the tendency of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs to identify with Croatia and Serbia respectively rather than with a unified Bosnia and Herzegovina. Faced with such obstacles, reaching the broad political goals will be extremely difficult. The underlying causes of the conflict cannot be cured by the military mission. And it is important for all of us to understand that. D. Bosnia--One Nation or Partition Mr. President, the broad goal is to have one nation called Bosnia. There are other tugs in the direction of partition and those tugs have not ended. The General Framework Agreement and its 11 Annexes contain a number of provisions that both reinforce and undermine the broad political goal of a united Bosnia. On the positive side for unity, for example, the following provisions reinforce that goal: the commitment to free and fair elections and the protection of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms in the agreement; the vesting of responsibility in the Federal Government for foreign policy, foreign trade, customs, immigration, and monetary policy; the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly, a Presidency, and a Constitutional Court; and the arrangements for international assistance for rehabilitation. On the other hand the following provisions are contrary to that goal of one Bosnia. On that side of the ledger, the recognition of two semi- autonomous entities, the Croat-Muslim Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic, within clearly demarcated geographic boundaries, each of whom will have their own army; a Parliamentary Assembly whose legislation can be blocked by two-thirds of the representatives from the Federation or the Serb Republic or, in the case of a proposed decision deemed to be ``destructive of a vital interest of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb people,'' by a majority of the Bosniac, Croat, or Serb Delegates. We can understand in this parliamentary body how dicey that proposition is. A three-member Presidency, consisting of one Bosnian, one Croat, and one Serb, in which a decision may be blocked by declaration of one Member that it is ``destructive of the vital interest of the Entity'' he represents. e. fragile assumptions Another very tricky proposition, Mr. President, that I would like to mention before closing today are two fragile assumptions that are very important to the overall peace agreement. These are fragile assumptions, and they are interrelated assumptions. The first assumption is that the Moslem-Croat Federation, which was formed as a result of a U.S. diplomatic initiative in the February 1994 Washington Agreement, will stay together. One only has to recall that the Muslims and Croats armies were actively fighting each other prior to the Washington Agreement and that, even afterwards, the functioning of the city of Mostar has essentially been stymied for more than a year as a result of the inability of the Moslem and Croat mayors to work together. So that is a very questionable assumption. The second assumption, pertains to the Sub-Regional Arms Control Annex which contains a ``default'' formula for limits on armaments that kicks in if the Parties cannot agree otherwise within 180 days. They first have the opportunity to negotiate. If they do not negotiate, then this so-called default formula and ratios kick in. The assumption is that it is stabilizing to establish a ratio based on the population of the respective parties. Under that formula, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, commonly referred to as Serbia, has a baseline or a limit of 5. The Republic of Croatia has a limit of 2 compared to 5. And Bosnia and Herzegovina have a limit of 2. So the ratio is 5 Serbia, 2 Croatia, and 2 for the Bosnia and Herzegovina entity. The limit for Bosnia is further divided on the basis of a ratio for the Federation 2 and 1 for the Serb Republic. Assuming the ratios are met in the default formula--it requires a great leap of faith--but even if they are reached, unless there has been significant political and economic progress, stability is far from assured. If the Moslem Croat Federation stays together, the Bosnian Serbs' 2 to 1 disadvantage in arms compared to the Federation could serve as an incentive for them to align more closely with Serbia, to the detriment of the goal of a unified Bosnia. If, on the other hand, the Federation does not stay together, the Bosnian Moslems will be at a 2 to 1 disadvantage in a potential two- front conflict with the combined strength of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs. Now, I would say that it is unlikely that the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs will join in some kind of unified or coordinated attack against the Bosnian Muslims, but the Bosnian Muslims could in the future easily find themselves in a conflict with both parties. These fragile assumptions, which could go awry very easily, make it even more essential from my perspective that the goal of the arms control builddown, the first effort to build down the weapons, as well as any arm-and-train program, leave all the parties with primarily a defensive capability. If we start basically building up offensive arms, these ratios and all the complexities are going to be vast. In spite of these fragile and questionable assumptions, I believe that a builddown process is worth a try. I believe that we must undertake at least the effort. Finally, it will be imperative for the United States to remain engaged at the highest diplomatic levels to assure that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other civilian organizations utilize the time available to them to undertake an intensive and focused effort to accomplish their task. F. risks to military mission relating to civilian tasks Mr. President, possibly the greatest risk to the military mission is that there will be confusion of the military mission and the much broader U.S. and international political goals--confusion in the Congress and confusion in the country. This has two aspects. The first is that there will be mission creep on the ground with the U.S. military being expected to assume more and more responsibility for the political or civilian aspects of the framework agreement. These include the task of continuing humanitarian aid, rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction, the return of displaced persons and refugees, the holding of free elections, police functions within borders, and the like. One of the trickiest areas is not about separating the forces. That is a clear military mission. But what happens within an area if you start having murders take place within the borders? Whose job is it to take on the policing of that? Certainly, the civilian mission will be to do what they can to restore the function of the police forces, but in the meantime what does the United States military and what do other NATO militaries do when there is really chaos within the borders? These are a few of the areas that could very easily lead to mission creep. The second danger--and this is something I think all of us in the Congress have a keen responsibility to keep in mind in our remarks-- relates to public perception of how we define the military mission's success or lack thereof. I noted earlier that the military mission is limited. Assuming the United States military leaves Bosnia in approximately 1 year and the conflict there resumes shortly thereafter, has the military mission been a failure under these circumstances? If the news media and the American public confuse our narrowly defined 1- year military mission with the long-term political goals for a united and stable and peaceful Bosnia, the perception of failure after 1 year is possible and perhaps even probable. So I think it is important for us to define these terms very carefully. V. residual force Since the plans for carrying out the civilian tasks are far behind the military side and since they are so important to the building process, the best case is that there will be a solid beginning toward accomplishing the civilian tasks during the first year of the military deployment. But it will be far from complete. Because of this, I believe that planning must start now for a residual military force to replace the NATO implementation force at the end of a year to give the parties and the organizations helping them the secure environment and confidence they need to continue the longer-term civilian task which without any doubt is going to take far longer than 1 year. A residual force should not include United States ground forces, in my view, but could be supported by the United States in those military areas where we have unique capabilities. Such a residual force can be a United Nations peacekeeping force or a coalition of forces from European and other nations that are committed to seeing the building process continued. This will in most likelihood take a number of years. The point is that the planning for a residual force needs to commence as soon as possible. Finally, as a necessary contingency, the United States should begin to work with our allies to ensure continuing cooperation to contain the conflict if the peace process breaks down, either while our troops are there or after we leave in about a year. NATO's vital interests in my view have never been involved in Bosnia itself--important interests, but not vital. But NATO's vital interests could certainly be involved if there is a spread of this conflict. Strategic planning within NATO must begin now for a long-term containment strategy if that breakdown occurs. Mr. President, the United Nations deployment to Macedonia in which United States and Nordic forces are participating is a first step, only a first step but at least a first step, toward this broader containment strategy which may be essential in the long run. Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their attention, and I thank the Chair for the time. I would at this point yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I ask unanimous consent to proceed as in morning business.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for his remarks. I had voted for the welfare reform bill when it first came through, not because I thought it was perfect, but I thought the system was so badly broken and that we must move in a different direction, even if we have to patch it up as we go. However, the conference report had excesses and some provisions in it that I felt were simply going beyond the point that I could support. I appreciate the Senator's remarks today, both in explaining the conference report and also laying out some hostile areas, and the need for putting this back together if indeed it is vetoed. I think it is important for the country that we get a welfare reform bill signed into law, at least in the next session, and I appreciate very much his leadership in this area.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I rise in support of the ratification of the START II Treaty by the Senate. The case for ratification is, I believe, overwhelming. Both the START I Treaty, negotiated under President Reagan, and the START II Treaty, negotiated under President Bush, are the end products of bipartisan arms control support by the Congress and the American people. Ratification of the START II Treaty is supported by the President as well as by the Secretary of Defense, Secretary Perry, as well as General Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The START II Treaty is a continuation of the substantial reductions in strategic weaponry brought about by the signing of the START I Treaty. The signing of the START I Treaty occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of the cold war, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the development of democratic movements and free elections in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. These events have transformed the longstanding bipolar relationship between the United States and the now vanished Soviet Union. Given these historic changes, ratification of the START II Treaty is a very logical step. Upon entry into full force, the START II Treaty will further reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads held in the active inventories of the United States and Russia from about 8,000 weapons in START I levels, to between 3,000 and 3,500 weapons, a reduction of more than 50 percent. By the time START II is fully implemented, the START I and START II Treaties will have led to more than a threefold reduction in the numbers of strategic nuclear warheads online in both sides. Moreover, the entry into force of this country will eliminate all of the land- based multiple warhead or MIRV intercontinental ballistic missiles from the arsenal of both sides. It has long been a goal of U.S. arms control policy both under Republican and Democratic Presidents and Congresses to eliminate these poised for instant launch MIRV ICBM's from the inventories of both sides. There was too much incentive on both sides if there was warning of some attack to feel that these weapons had to be used or lost in large numbers, and the ratios gave the wrong incentives. Elimination of these land-based ICBM's, a required measure of the START II Treaty, will help avoid a return to hair-trigger strategic posture on both sides and put an end to any conceivable incentive for a bolt-from-the- blue attack. Ratification of the START II Treaty is a highly cost-effective way to reduce the threat to the United States' national security interest posed by nuclear weapons. It will eliminate 5,000 warheads from the Russian force. Our modest verification costs will be dwarfed by U.S. defense budget savings that will flow both from the reduced threat and the retirements of our excess nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to support the ratification of the START II Treaty today and to work to build support and understanding of the advantages of the START II Treaty among the members of the Russian Duma prior to the consideration of the treaty next year. There is considerable work that has to be done, Mr. President, by I think Members of this legislative body if we are going to see the Russian Duma ratify this treaty. They are very dubious about the treaty. They are very concerned about the antiballistic missile developments and discussion and legislation in this country, and it is going to take a considerable amount of effort on the part of the United States and our other allies, as well as friends of Russia, to see that they ratify this treaty also. It is their decision. We cannot force it. But certainly we ought to have every dialog we can with them on this because this treaty is truly in the interests not only of both the United States and Russia but also of mankind.