Samuel Nunn

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from West Virginia but I will wait.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the next area I am concerned about relates to earmarking. I have been one of the leaders, and the Senator from Arizona, Senator McCain, has also been a real leader, in trying to prevent earmarking. Usually it has been in the appropriations bill. Time after time after time, we have come to the floor and opposed these items in appropriations bills. One time, I even voted against the entire appropriations bill, as the Senator from West Virginia may recall, because it was full of earmarks. We in the authorization committee have not been perfect, but we have strived not to have earmarks in these bills. That has been a long practice of our Armed Services Committee. We provide appropriate guidance under development and procurement of major weapons systems and leave to the executive branch the process of awarding contracts. We do not get into micro- management. We try not to micromanage. This bill is crammed full of micromanagement, and I find this supremely ironic, having seen Secretary Cheney, Secretary Carlucci, and Secretary Weinberger, those Secretaries under Republican administrations, complain over and over again about congressional micromanagement of the Defense Department. This bill goes further in micromanagement than any bill I have seen. We have done this to ensure, in terms of our practices, that the Government achieves the best price and quality based upon bids and proposals reviewed under merit-based criteria. We have endeavored to avoid legislation and conference report language which earmarks specific contracts to specific contractors. We have avoided earmarking because there is too great a danger that awards under such a system will be based on political and parochial considerations rather than the best interest of national defense and the taxpayers. I am very concerned about the shipbuilding provisions of the conference report which could lead to substantial unnecessary expenditure for the procurement of naval vessels. The conference report has translated, I think, an innovative Senate concept, which makes sense under very unique circumstances. The concept would provide more ships within the same cost projections that was developed by Senators Lott, Cohen, and others--into something that was not what they envisioned when they started; that is, a shipbuilding grab bag with something for everyone. Section 1013 of the bill has the effect of directing the procurement of two additional large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships, known as LMSR vessels, at specific shipyards. Likewise, section 135 has the effect of directing procurement of six destroyers to specific shipyards. In the absence of a clear industrial base requirement--and I have seen no such showing--these sole-source-directed procurement situations undermine the cost-saving potential of competition. Again, I regret to say, these are sweetheart deals for certain shipyards. Mr. President, at a time when we are striving to get the taxpayers' fiscal budget under control and the national budget under control, I find it very, very paradoxical that we are setting up this competition with earmarks with sole-source-directed procurement going to certain shipyards and making certain these companies are happy at the expense of both taxpayers and national security. Mr. President, I am also concerned that section 1016 of the bill has the effect of earmarking a ship maintenance contract for a specific shipyard. Once we start down this route, other shipyards, as well as repair and maintenance contractors for aircraft and vehicles, will certainly want their share of these directed, noncompetitive contracts. The Competition in Contracting Act is designed to save money through effective competition. From time to time, there are exceptions which can be justified on the merits, in terms of industrial base considerations. Those decisions should be made on the basis of sound analysis and thorough consideration of executive branch views, not on the basis of a conference with legislated earmarks. This earmark is not meritorious and, again, I can only describe it as a sweetheart deal for a certain shipyard. Mr. President, I am also concerned about title 31 of the bill, which covers the Department of Energy defense programs. Section 3133, 3135, 3137, 3140, and 3142 and the associated statement of managers language provide funds--many not requested by the administration--for development of technologies and other programs at specify Department of Energy sites instead of allowing the Department to determine which site, on the merits, would be the best location for conduct of the program. Hundreds of millions of dollars are so allocated in the DOE section of this bill. In summary, Mr. President, the numerous earmarks in this bill far exceed the tolerance level of anything justified in the ``give and take'' of a conference. It sets the authorizing committee on a bad policy path that we have studiously avoided and that we should not start now. We have objected when the Appropriations Committee has done this over and over. I spent literally hours out here at night, late in a session, objecting to earmarks in appropriations bills under Democratic control of the Congress. Now, I find that we do it over and over again in our own authorization bill. Mr. President, aside from shipbuilding earmarks, I am troubled by the submarine research and development language. Section 132 of the bill requires the Secretary of Defense to design, develop, and procure four nuclear attack submarines using ``new technologies that will result in each successive submarine * * * being a more capable and more affordable submarine than the submarine that preceded it.'' There is no recognition in the language of the costs and risks of transforming the submarine procurement program into a research and development prototype endeavor. No one argues with the goal of having military equipment that is both more capable and more affordable. Experience demonstrates that when dealing with complicated systems and advanced technology, it is quite difficult to obtain greater capability at less cost. The Russians, for example, tried to increase the capability while cutting costs of their submarines, and several of the products of that effort, along with their crews, lay at the bottom of the ocean. New attack submarines are among the most complex and sophisticated systems procured by the Department of Defense. It is one thing to establish a goal--there is no problem with a goal--it is something very different to require the Navy to structure its program to make new submarines both better and cheaper without any concern for the difficulty of trying to achieve greater capability at less cost and without any consideration of the risk involved. I believe it is important that the language of the submarine research provision be reviewed and revised to ensure greater consideration of the tradeoff between cost and risk. Mr. President, I am also concerned that the conference contains a spending ``floor,'' which mandates that $50 million of the funds in the National Defense Sealift Fund can be used only for advanced submarine technology activities of the Advanced Procurement Projects Agency. Mr. President, for a long time, this authorizing committee has strenuously avoided putting floors in bills. We always felt we were the ceiling; appropriators should not go over our ceiling. Neither should we say they cannot spend less than a certain amount, because that basically undercuts the appropriations process. It says to the appropriators that you cannot spend less than a certain amount. We would object to the appropriators going over our ceiling and have tried to avoid having floors in our bill. In this case, we have a floor of $50 million. In fairness, because of my past work with Senator Byrd, the Senator from West Virginia, and my pledge to him that we would try to avoid these items, I feel I need to point out the floors that is in this conference report. Mr. President, on National Guard and Reserve procurement, the conference report provides $777 million for Guard and Reserve procurement, allocating all funding to specific line items. This is an unfortunate reversion to the way we added funds for the Guard and Reserve years ago. This is not a breakthrough. It has been done before, and it was a mistake. Now, we are repeating that mistake. In recent years, we have gotten away from specific earmarks, and we have authorized various portions of the Guard and Reserve procurement account in a ``miscellaneous equipment'' category. This served two purposes. First, it provided the Defense Department with the flexibility to allocate the funds to DOD's highest-priority requirements without going through a lengthy reprogramming process. Two, it avoided placing Congress in the position of picking literally hundreds of ``winners and losers'' from a long list of items that have not been subjected to any merit-based review within the Department of Defense. In other words, this is an added package for the National Guard and Reserve. These items have not gone through the procurement process or any review by the Department of Defense, but we are picking the items in this report in great detail. I think that is a mistake. In this conference report, nothing is provided for the generic ``miscellaneous'' account. As a result, the conference treatment of Guard and Reserve procurement is, I believe, worse than either of the two original bills. I note again that this earmarking of every dime in the Guard and Reserve procurement fund departs from the policy followed in recent authorizations and appropriations acts. In fact, the fiscal year 1996 Defense Appropriation Act provides $777 million for Guard and Reserve procurement, with $377 million--about half of it--provided for miscellaneous procurement. In this area, the appropriation bill has a far better ``good Government'' approach than does the authorization conference report before us today. I say this as one who has been on the Senate floor many times criticizing the appropriations bill. In fairness, I have to point out that we are doing now what we have accused others of doing in the past. Although I and a number of other Senators voted for Senator Levin's amendment to the Senate bill that would have restored the generic nature of the funding, this amendment failed. I accept the fact that the Senate decided to use a different approach, but I note that even under the Senate-passed bill, $65 million was allocated for miscellaneous procurement. Because there is not a single dollar left in a miscellaneous category in this bill, the Department will have absolutely no flexibility to determine the priorities for purchasing additional equipment for the Guard and Reserve--even though the appropriators provided that flexibility. Mr. President, in closing my remarks, there are several items of particular concern to the Clinton administration that I think Members would at least like to know about. The conference report contains permanent restrictions on access of servicewomen and dependents overseas to privately-funded abortions and restrictions on service by HIV-positive service members, both of which are objectionable to the administration. The administration has written letters on these points. The administration also objects to use of the power of the purse to limit the authority of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to place U.S. forces under U.N. command and control. In addition, the administration objects to the portion of the contingency funding provision that would require the President to submit a supplemental appropriations request to replenish funds used for contingency operations. Mr. President, I regret that I cannot support this conference report. I know it means a great deal to Senator Thurmond and the other members of the committee and I understand their feeling. I know firsthand the feeling. There are many provisions in the bill which should be enacted into law. But there are many, many more which should not. If this legislation is vetoed by the President as has been recommended by his senior advisers, we will have an opportunity to correct the many flaws in the bill and produce an authorization bill that can be signed into law. I believe it is important for us to do so. I pledge to continue to work toward passage of a subsequent bill if the legislation in this conference report is not enacted into law. Mr. President, could I be informed how much time is remaining?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, as we debate the conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1996, I again want to express my admiration for the hard work, determination, and commitment of Senator Thurmond, the chairman of the committee. Regardless of our individual and differing views on the specifics of this conference report, I believe everyone knows that Senator Thurmond worked with diligence and dedication to reach an agreement with the House. I also want to express my appreciation for the hard work of the majority staff director, Dick Reynard; deputy staff director, George Lauffer, who is here on the floor; general counsel, Don Deline; and all the majority staff. They put in many late nights and 7-day weeks over the course of this conference, which has provided them with far too little time to spend with their own families. The same applies to Arnold Punaro, Andy Effron, and many others on my staff who have worked with equal diligence and dedication. This bill was in conference for over 3 months. The chairman, Senator Thurmond, has shown great patience and endurance through long and difficult negotiations with the House. Out of respect for Senator Thurmond, particularly in his first year as chairman--although he has been on the committee for many years--I signed the conference report, and I voted for the motion to proceed, thereby providing the Senate with the opportunity to consider this report. I do not support the legislation, for reasons I will explain. I feel it is essential that the Senate at least make a determination and vote on this conference report. The conference report contains important legislative authorities, which I strongly support. I want to point out the important military pay and allowances provisions, including a 2.4-percent pay raise for the troops and a 5.2-percent increase in the basic allowance for quarters. Without this bill, the pay raise under permanent law will be 2 percent, or 0.4 percent less. The basic allowance for quarters increase would be 2 percent, instead of the current 5.2 percent, if this bill passes. If we do not have this bill enacted into law, I intend to join others in doing everything possible to see that this key legislation for pay raises and for basic allowance for quarters be inserted in another bill before we leave this session. Second, approval of Secretary Perry's family and troop housing initiative, which would provide new authorities--including shared public and private sector funding--to finance needed construction and improvements in military housing. Third, detailed acquisition reform legislation that complements last year's landmark Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act. Key provisions would: Use simplified procedures to streamline the process of procuring commercial products and services while preserving the requirement for full and open competition. Reduce the barriers that inhibit acquisition of commercial products by eliminating the requirement for certified cost and pricing data for commercial products. Streamline the bid protest process by eliminating the separate bid protest authority of the General Services Board of Contract Appeals and providing for all bid protests to be determined by the General Accounting Office. Consolidate and clarify the standards of conduct for Federal officials in the acquisition process to ensure consistent treatment of such personnel on a governmentwide basis. Fourth, establishment of a defense modernization account. This provision will encourage the Department of Defense and give them a strong incentive to achieve savings in procurement, research and development, and operations and maintenance by allowing the Department to place the savings in a new account, the defense modernization account. Funds in the account would be available for the services to spend on the most pressing long-term needs of our military--that is modernization of our military forces and equipment and procurement. The Department could use amounts in the account to address funding shortfalls in the modernization of vital weapons systems. Mr. President, I would like to see these provisions enacted into law, but I cannot support the conference report in its present form. This will be the first time, in my 23 years in the Senate, that I will vote against a Defense authorization conference report. I have supported every previous Defense authorization conference report during my Senate career, including 6 years in which I served in the minority under two Republican chairmen. In the past, when we had a Democratic Congress and a Republican President, we routinely faced a House bill that was unacceptable and a Senate bill that was acceptable to the Republican President. In those years most of the compromising had to come from the House if we were going to get a bill signed into law. We knew that when we saw the shape of the two bills coming out of the House and Senate. We faced the same situation in reverse this year with a Republican Congress in the House and Senate and with a Democratic President. This year, we have a generally acceptable Senate bill and a generally unacceptable House bill in terms of Presidential signature. This is just the opposite of what we have had year after year with Republican Presidents and Democratic Congresses. Unfortunately, this year, the House was unwilling to make the compromises necessary to get a bill that is likely to be approved by the Clinton administration. Instead of compromising more toward the Senate bill, which could have received Clinton administration support, most important compromises strongly titled toward the House position. The conference report before us contains fundamental flaws that I believe are contrary to the best interests of the taxpayers and sound management of our national defense activities. On balance, I have concluded that this bill's bad policy outweighs its good policies in its current form. Mr. President, I will discuss again, as I did last week, the missile defense part of this conference report at a later point in my presentation. I would like to turn to other elements of the conference that give me great concern. repeal of the requirement for an independent director of operational test and evaluation When the House drafted its version of this year's bill, they developed a DOD reorganization proposal which included a provision abolishing the position of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. That position was created in 1983 at the initiative of Senators Roth, Grassley, and Pryor, to ensure that testing of major weapons systems would be evaluated by an office independent of the responsibility for program and contract management. During the Senate debate on this bill, we adopted without dissent a bipartisan amendment--sponsored by Senators Roth and Pryor--reaffirming congressional support for the Office of the Director of Test and Evaluation [OTE]. That was the Senate position. In that amendment, we noted that the OTE position was ``created by Congress to provide an independent validation and verification on the suitability and effectiveness of new weapons, and to ensure that the * * * military departments acquire weapons that are proven in a operational environment before they are produced and used in combat.'' In summary, Mr. President, Operational Test and Evaluation has as its main purpose objective--evaluation of weapons systems before they are purchased. There has been a whole history to indicate the need for this kind of office because program managers inevitably get wedded to programs. If they are responsible not only to develop the programs, present them, sell them, and market them on Capitol Hill but also to test them, there is an inherent inability for the kind of objectivity that is needed in making sure the weapons work before we buy them. The conference agreement is contrary to the Senate position--in fact, just the opposite of the Senate provision--and would repeal the legislation requiring that there be an independent Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. Mr. President, it is important to differentiate the provisions affecting the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation from other aspects of the DOD reorganization provisions proposed by the House and adopted in conference which reduce the number of positions in DOD requiring Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. With the exception of the language affecting the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the language affecting the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations--which I shall address later in my remarks--I have no objection to some of the other DOD reorganization provisions proposed in the conference agreement which largely came from the House. The unobjectionable elements of the conference agreement merely repeal the statutory designation of certain positions and the requirement for Senate confirmation. The Operational Test and Evaluation proposal goes further. It would repeal section 139 of title 10, which contains a number of key protections for the Director of OTE. Under current law: The Director can only be removed by the President, and the President must report his reasons to Congress. The Director is guaranteed statutory independence from the Under Secretary for Acquisition. The Director may communicate directly with the Secretary without obtaining the concurrence or approval of any other official. The Director has specific authority over all test and evaluation activities of DOD. Mr. President, those are key provisions. That is the only way you can have an objective official in terms of ensuring that he is not subject to the normal bureaucratic pressures of the Pentagon. Under the conference agreement, effective January 31, 1997, there would no longer be an independent Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. The Secretary of Defense would be free to subordinate the operational test and evaluation function under any Under or Assistant Secretary--including those with direct responsibility for the management of major weapons systems programs--or even relegate it to the military departments. Congress specifically created this position in light of major acquisition problems of the late seventies and early eighties so that realistic and independent operational test and evaluation functions would be conducted without direct interference by acquisition officials. Congress wanted to make sure that those who were being tested were not also grading their own tests. DOD has never fully embraced this position and its independence. Under the House approach, now incorporated in this conference, the key concept of ``Fly before you buy'' will be significantly weakened because this office is in effect terminated. This is an ill-considered proposal with no foundation or justification. Congress should not be put in the position of having to refight and reinstate this legislation next year. This is an example of ``Ready, fire, aim'' that I think is destructive to the overall furtherance of our national security. We should not support legislation that cripples this vital organization. repeal of the statutory requirement for the assistant secretary for special operations and low-intensity conflict There is another aspect of the House's DOD reorganization language which was adopted in conference to which I have similar objections. My concerns relate to the provision that would abolish the requirement to designate one of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense to be responsible for special operations and low-intensity conflict. Mr. President, in 1986, Congress created the statutory position of Assistant Secretary, Special Operations and low-Intensity Conflict as part of comprehensive legislation concerning the organization and management of special operations forces. The 1986 legislation also established a unified combatant command for special operations. The CINC was given unique authorities--possessed by no other CINC-- for administration, acquisition, and budgeting--authorities that are more akin to the powers of a civilian Service Secretary than a military CINC. We specified in law that there be an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations in order to ensure adequate civilian control over the CINC. The statute specifically makes the Assistant Secretary responsible for ``the overall supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of special operations * * * and low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense.'' Senator Cohen, a Republican from Maine, a member of our committee and leader for many years, is an expert on this subject of special operations. He and I drafted this legislation which was based on the determination that the subject of special operations was receiving inadequate attention by the Office of Secretary of Defense and the military departments. Mr. President, this is one of the least expensive parts of our overall military forces, but the one that is most likely to be used, whether it is on the cutting edge of a major operation. The special operations forces are the best trained military forces we have. They are required to operate with great secrecy and great care, and they need civilian supervision. This conference report eliminates that civilian supervision as we had envisioned. The conference report would repeal this requirement to have an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, effective January 31, 1997. The Office of the Assistant Secretary has provided valuable oversight and supervision of an activity that still receives to little attention within the Pentagon. The circumstances that required creation of the position are largely unchanged. The Department, again, has not fully embraced the special operations reforms and this repeal will energize the enemies of special operations. When Congress created this position, we were not simply trying to give visibility to an Assistant Secretary. There are significant substantive differences between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and each of the other Assistant Secretaries. The position of Assistant Secretary for Special Operations is tied directly to a unique combatant command that exercises management powers similar to those of a civilian Service Secretary. The conference report would repeal that statute, effective January 31, 1997, and remove that direct civilian oversight of the CINC. This, again, was done without foundation and without substantive consideration. requirement to sell the naval petroleum reserve within 1 year Mr. President, earlier this year, the Budget Committee provided reconciliation instructions to the Armed Services Committee to achieve savings through sale of the Naval Petroleum Reserve at Elk Hills within 1 year. That was because they wanted to raise money for the deficit. Faced with that requirement, the committee developed legislation with a number of safeguards, including provisions that would enable the Secretary of Energy to suspend the sale, and to require a subsequent vote by the Congress upon a determination that the sale was not proceeding in the taxpayer's best interest. The Congressional Budget Office, however, refused to score the provision in the DOD authorization bill as achieving any savings because CBO believed there was a significant chance that the sale would be suspended and that subsequent legislation would be required. As a result, when the Armed Services Committee submitted its reconciliation legislation to the Budget Committee, the Armed Services Committee, on an 11-to-10 vote, recommended to the Budget Committee that the reconciliation bill include a different version of the provision without a number of key safeguards. Those of us who opposed this recommendation expressed great concern about the potential for a huge loss to the taxpayers by a rushed sale without sufficient safeguards. Subsequently, CBO estimated that the up-front proceeds from the sale would be $1.5 billion, but the net revenue foregone would be $2.5 billion over the next 7 years--leading to a $1 billion loss. As a result, the requirement to sell the naval petroleum reserve was dropped from the Senate reconciliation legislation and was not included in the reconciliation conference report. We are no longer under a mandate from the Budget Committees on the reconciliation process to raise this $1.5 billion. They wisely dropped the provision when the Congressional Budget Office said it could cost us money. It could cost us $1 billion. What do we do? The conference report before us today continues to mandate the sale with a year with the option for the Secretary to suspend the sale. It is now out of step with reconciliation and out of step with common sense. Mr. President, because of the budget pressure, there will be tremendous incentive for this administration or a subsequent administration at the end of next year, if we have a change of administrations, to sell Elk Hills quickly to meet the deadlines of the overall budget and fiscal picture. A 1-year timeframe, I believe, is unwise. Right now, there is one company with the potential inside track. Chevron is a part owner and manager of Elk Hills. There is concern, I think legitimate concern, that a requirement to sell Elk Hills within 1 year will give that company a tremendous advantage, an advantage that could be reduced by giving other potential bidders sufficient time and information to develop competitive bids. Mr. President, since the leadership of the Budget Committee has already decided to drop the sale of Elk Hills from the reconciliation bill there is absolutely no need to present with the Secretary of Energy with the choice of either making the sale or losing the authority to sell the NPR. Contrary to the assertions we have heard on the floor, the administration has not recommended a forced sale within 1 year. The President's budget for fiscal year 1996 clearly states, on page 148 that ``The administration proposes to privatize the Elk Hills, CA oil and gas fields in 1997 * * *.'' Mr. President, that date is 1997, not 1996. Likewise, the administration's balanced budget proposal, submitted on December 7, 1995, provides for disposition of Elk Hills ``not later than September 30, 1997.'' Again, an extra year so we ensure that we taxpayers get their money's worth out of this sale. Mr. President, because the current contractor and co-owner, Chevron, has a potential advantage in terms of the information needed to submit a realistic bid, it will not be easy to establish a competitive bidding and evaluation process that will get the best deal for the taxpayers. There are serious questions about whether the 1-year period is sufficient to ensure that the taxpayers get the maximum value through knowledgeable competitive bidding. This provision is a loser-- potentially a $1 billion loser. I find it strange that the same Congressional Budget Office, which our Republican majority is insisting we use for its numbers for the budget deal we are talking about, basically says we are possibly or even probably going to lose about $1.5 billion on this, but we have it in the conference report anyway. I think it is a mistake. Buy American provisions Mr. President, one of the strongest elements of our export economy is the sale of overseas military equipment. This is an area in which the value of our sales overseas far exceeds the amount we buy from other countries. This is one of the areas where we have a favorable trade balance. The overall trade balance is unfavorable, but the trade balance in military equipment is favorable. The conference report before us would expand and impose Buy American restrictions that are not justified by industrial based or arms control considerations. This says that you have to buy these items in America, even if the sales from our allies abroad or from others are substantially cheaper. This means that when foreign companies cannot bid on American contracts, foreign countries are likely to retaliate by imposing their own restrictions on American products, thereby damaging the export sector of the United States that currently has a very strong trade surplus and advantage. Section 806 of the conference report contains a buy American provision for components of naval vessels which is, derived from the House passed bill. The Senate bill, under Senator Thurmond's leadership, did not have these buy American provisions. The conference report comes back, and it is absolutely loaded with them. Mr. President, there is ample existing authority for DOD to exclude foreign companies from competing on a contract when there is a valid industrial base requirement for domestic producers. That is already the law. The Department of Defense has not requested any additional legislative authority to impose specific buy American requirements on the components listed in the conference report. There has been no showing of a critical industrial base need that would justify singling out these vessel components, among the hundreds of thousands of items procured by the Department of Defense, as warranting protection from competition. The existing buy-American list in title X covers only five items. This is after years and years of struggling. Every year we have had buy-American provisions in the House bill under a Democratic House. This year, nothing has changed under a Republican House as they loaded up the report with buy-American provisions. Every year we have held firm. We have said, ``No, it's bad government, it's bad for the taxpayers, and it's a bad deal for the military.'' We are going to spend more money, get less national security, and hurt our exporters. This is particularly true with the aerospace industry, because they are indeed the best in the world. We have five items in title X: buses; a chemical weapons antidote; air circuit breakers for vessels; specified valves and machine tools; and ball bearings and roller bearings, which may be affected. I am not here to debate those items. They are in there. They were put in the report at one time or another. The conference agreement, without any justification that I can see and in contradiction to bipartisan opposition to similar positions in past conferences, would add the following items: First, ``welded shipboard anchor and mooring chain with a diameter of 4 inches or less.'' Second, ``vessel propellers with a diameter of 6 feet or more.'' You cannot buy those anywhere except in America and, in some cases, there is only one contractor in America. Only one. What you are doing, in some cases--not all--is locking in sole-source procurement by law and eliminating competition. Third, the following vessel components having unique marine applications: gyrocompasses; electronic navigation chart systems; steering controls; pumps; propulsion and machinery control systems; and totally enclosed life boats. All of those are going to have no competition from abroad. In addition, the proposal would not only extend the expiring buy- American requirements for ball bearings and roller bearings, but would expand it to cover all purchases, even those below the $100,000 simplified acquisition threshold. That directly undermines one of the key goals of last year's Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act: removal of special interest protection and paperwork for all purchases of $100,000 or less. Mr. President, I find it a supreme irony that a Republican majority in the House and Senate, which committed at least rhetorically to free trade and market competition, would inject the most sweeping buy- American provisions we have ever placed in a defense authorization bill since I have been in the Senate. This will damage the U.S. defense industry, it will damage our trade position, and it will damage the American taxpayers. Sure, it will benefit a few companies. They will do well because they will not have any competition. Some people in the House, I suppose, will be able to go back and say in their districts, ``Look what we've done for you. You're going to get these Government contracts.'' Our responsibility is beyond one company in one district. It is the overall good of America and our national security. In this case, this conference report flunks that test. I recognize the Secretary currently has authority to waive buy American requirements under a number of conditions, such as when there would be unreasonable costs or delays or there would be an adverse effect on national security. The conference agreement would slightly expand that authority by allowing the Secretary to use it to avoid retaliatory trade actions by a foreign nation. However, the waiver authority is very difficult for the Secretary of Defense to exercise. I think it is irresponsible to place a Secretary in the position of mediating between political pressures to impose restrictions on the one hand and a combination of foreign and domestic pressures to promote free trade on the other hand. We are the board of directors. We should not put the executive in charge of the Department of Defense in that position. The waiver authority puts the Secretary in an extremely difficult position, because there is substantial pressure not to use the waiver from the very same sources that insisted on putting the provisions in law in the first place. Moreover, the retaliatory action from a foreign nation may well come after a buy-American provision is imposed rather than beforehand, and the Secretary's waiver authority, in terms of retaliatory trade, would be useless in this case. That is the way it would normally happen. The waiver authority has to be anticipatory. For example, we may impose a buy-American provision on a vessel component only to find later that a foreign government has imposed a domestic-source requirement that hurts our aircraft exports. In the absence of a compelling case to impose the costs and burdens of restricting competition, we should avoid adding new items to the buy- American restrictions list. A more onerous buy-American provision is set forth in the bill's authority to use sealift funds to purchase vessels for the National Defense Reserve Fleet. Unlike the buy-American provision that applies to components which I previously discussed, the position governing National Defense Reserve Fleets has no waiver authority. As a result, DOD will be precluded, under this conference report, from purchasing foreign vessels for the five additional roll-on/roll-off ships called for in the mobility requirement study, despite the fact that there would be major savings to the U.S. taxpayers. Mr. President, the Maritime Administration has been purchasing foreign-built ships and upgrading them in U.S. shipyards. It is not like we are not getting a good portion of the work. We are. The cost to purchase and upgrade this type of ship is about $30 million each. This means we could obtain the five additional ships for about $150 million. Building new U.S. ships will cost $200 million to $250 million each, for a total cost of $1 billion to $1.5 billion for five ships. I think the Senate ought to recognize this is basically taking taxpayers' money and simply giving it to certain defense industries in this country. If you want to do that, that is fine, but everybody ought to acknowledge that is what is happening. That means the taxpayers could be paying an additional $1 billion or more without any increase in Navy capability. This provision is, simply put, a sweetheart deal for certain domestic shipbuilders. Alternatively, the cost could be so high that the Navy may forego purchasing enough ships to meet the mobility requirements. Either we are going to cost the taxpayers about $1 billion here or we are going to buy less ships and not have the mobility requirements for our own military forces. That is bad for the taxpayers and bad for our national defense. (Mr. FRIST assumed the chair.) Earmarking

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, what is the current order of the Senate?

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. If the Senator would state it in a form that does not have a time limit.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. NUNN. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, the Senator from Alaska, Senator Stevens, who is a real defense expert, having been involved in defense appropriations for quite a while, made a point this morning that I had been making about this bill that I think bears repeating, and that is he said there are far too many reports and certifications. And one example he gave was a delay of all defensewide research funds until 14 days after a report is received. That includes even the BMD program which so many people here are concerned about. Mr. President, this report can be made, but it is a 14-day interruption. This is the kind of thing that drives defense management crazy because this interrupts ongoing defense research contracts. So this is just one example of what I call micromanagement that is all the way through this bill. Mr. President, as we close this debate, I wish to summarize the reasons why I am voting against the defense authorization conference report for the first time since I have been in the Senate, including 6 years that I have served in the minority. While there are a number of provisions I support, and I enumerated those this morning, the conference report contains many fundamental flaws that are contrary to the best interests of sound management of our national defense activities as well as the U.S. taxpayers. On balance, Mr. President, this bill's bad policy outweighs its good policy. I am particularly troubled by the bill's numerous provisions which are simply what I would call bad government. These include elimination of the independent oversight position of Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. This position was established in 1983 under an initiative from Senator Roth, Senator Grassley, and Senator Pryor to ensure the testing of major weapons systems would be evaluated by an office independent of those developing and managing the weapons programs. Senator Pryor has spoken on this subject, and I had expected Senator Grassley and Senator Roth to speak on the subject, but I am sure this is of some concern to them. It not only abolishes the position, but it repeals key protections for the Director of the OTE. Second, elimination of the key civilian oversight position for special operations. This was part of a comprehensive effort in 1986 by Senators such as Senator Cohen and myself to improve our special operations forces. The military commander of those forces was given authority akin to a civilian service secretary, making the Assistant Secretary even more important to civilian control, and this position is eliminated in this bill. Third, the unseemly and I think unnecessary rush to sell the Naval Petroleum Reserve in 1 year, which the Congressional Budget Office estimates could cost the taxpayers up to $1 billion. Because of the CBO reservations, the reconciliation bill dropped this provision altogether, yet this conference report still mandates the sale within a year, and one company has a potential inside track, according to all the information I have received. This lessens the competitive climate and could cost the taxpayers a lot of money. Fourth, the inclusion of numerous ``buy American'' protectionism provisions where there is no showing of a critical domestic industrial base need. The conference agreement does not add just one ``buy American'' provision; it adds over eight. It also makes existing ``buy American'' provisions more onerous and undermines some of the key goals of last year's Acquisition Streamlining Act. And I repeat what I said this morning, Mr. President. Our advantage in defense exports is a significant part of our trade picture. We have an advantage here. It is very strange that we would be inserting ``buy American'' provisions in this bill in large number when that is likely, very likely to end up hurting our own export capabilities. I find it strange that the Republican majority of the House and Senate, committed to free trade and market competition, would inject the most sweeping ``buy American'' provisions we have had in a defense bill in many years. Fifth, a prohibition on purchasing foreign vessels to convert the remaining five sealift ships. All conversion is currently done in U.S. yards but this provision would mean an expenditure of $1 billion to $1.5 billion for new ships versus the $350 million for conversion of existing ships. This provision is a sweetheart deal for certain domestic shipbuilders. Sixth, nonmerit, noncompetitive earmarkings. Through the bill are numerous legislative and report language earmarkings for specific contracts to specific contractors. We worked very hard over the years in the authorization committee to avoid this approach because there is too great a danger that awards under such a system could be based on political and parochial considerations rather than the best interests of national defense. These earmarks are costly to the taxpayers because they freeze out competition, and they are bad for defense capabilities because they are not based on merit or quality. Seventh, the shipbuilding provisions contain numerous provisions that can only be labeled sweetheart deals for specific shipbuilders. A very innovative Senate concept developed by Senator Lott and Senator Cohen was broadened in conference into a shipbuilding grab bag with something for everyone. This includes directed procurement of roll-on/roll-off ships at specific shipyards, directed procurement of six destroyers at specific shipyards and directed use of a ship maintenance contract at a specific shipyard. Mr. President, while we are trying to reduce the budget, I find it very ironic and sad that we are restricting competition; we are basically making every effort in this bill to assign certain ships to certain places without competition, which is the most expensive possible way you can build these ships and repair the ships. Eighth the conference committee includes submarine research and development language that ignores the crucial tradeoff in very high technology, cutting-edge technology, which is what submarines really involve. The tradeoff, the critical tradeoff is between cost and risk. There simply is no accounting for risk in this provision. Ninth, the Guard and Reserve equipment. The bill that came out of conference in this area is worse than either one that went in. This is because all of the additional funds for Guard and Reserve equipment are designated for specific programs, thus eliminating any kind of real weighing or prioritization within the Department of Defense. The appropriations bill which took a generic approach and put the money in a broad account for the determination of the Secretary of Defense and others familiar with the procurement system is a much better approach. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that my detailed listing of provisions here as well as information from the Secretary of Defense and the administration with their objections be printed in the Record.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, in closing, I understand the give and take of a conference and that no bill is perfect. I have never seen a perfect bill on this floor, and I do not have that as my standard. However, this conference report goes far beyond that which can be justified in that give and take context. I would further point out that a full defense appropriations bill including $7 billion more than the President requested has been signed into law. I supported that bill. I spoke for it. I urged that the President not veto it. I urged that he approve it. So the money is not the issue here with me. I favored increasing the defense budget. We are not debating the funding bill. We are debating an authorization bill and the issues of matters of policy, very important matters of policy, not matters of the level of appropriations. I cannot vote for the bad policy embedded in this conference report. If the bill is vetoed, as has been recommended by the Secretary of Defense, we will have an opportunity to correct the many flaws and produce a bill that can be signed into law. There are other provisions which I enumerated this morning which I strongly support, and I will work certainly with Senator Thurmond in retaining those and in making whatever corrections are required if this bill is vetoed by the President and if a veto is not overridden. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

Mr. NUNN. I ask to be notified if I exceed 10 minutes. This morning during remarks on problems that I see in the conference report, I noted that I would have a separate statement addressing the missile defense provisions in the conference report. I had adressed this subject at the end of last week. After I spoke, Senator Lott made an eloquent, but occasionally inaccurate, statement in defense of the conference report. I want to briefly comment on and correct a few of the Senator's statements about missile defense, particularly regarding my role. The Senator from Mississippi suggested that, since I supported the deployment by a fixed date--1996--of a limited NMD system in the 1991 Missile Defense Act, I was being inconsistent in opposing the deployment of an NMD system by 2003 in the conference report. I first observe that I was not a party who injected the 1996 date in that act. I thought it was unrealistic but I did not oppose it in theory, I opposed it in terms of practicality. But it did go into the report and I did not oppose the overall act. I supported the overall act, notwithstanding my feeling at that time that 1996 was not realistic. There are a couple of very, very significant differences between the 1991 Missile Defense Act and the language in the conference report before us today. Let me begin by quoting exactly what the 1991 Missile Defense Act says about the NMD system: (2) Initial deployment.--The Secretary shall develop for deployment by the earliest date allowed by the availability of appropriate technology or by fiscal year 1996 a cost- effective, operationally-effective, and ABM Treaty-compliant anti-ballistic missile system at a single site as the initial step toward deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile threats, including accidental or unauthorized launches or Third World attacks. The system to be developed should include-- (A) 100 ground-based interceptors . . . (B) Fixed, ground-based, anti-ballistic missile battle management radars; and (C) optimum utilization of space-based sensors, including sensors capable of cueing ground-based anti-ballistic missile interceptors and providing initial targeting vectors, and other sensor systems that also are not prohibited by the ABM Treaty, such as a ground-based sub-orbital tracking system. Mr. President, it is clear from this paragraph that the NMD system specified in the 1991 act was to be developed to be fully compliant with the ABM Treaty as it then existed. A similar paragraph was included in the Senate compromise language passed last September, which stated that it is the policy of the United States to: (8) carry out the policies, programs, and requirements of (this Act) through processes specified within, or consistent with, the ABM Treaty, which anticipates the need and provides the means for amendment to the Treaty. This language, which was dropped in conference, stands in sharp contrast to the language in the conference report, which merely states in a completely different section that the programs contained in the conference report, quote, ``can be accomplished'' in ways consistent with the ABM Treaty--it nowhere requires that the NMD Programs shall be carried out in compliant fashion. As a matter of fact, it implies very strongly just the opposite, which is the reason so many of us oppose it. The conference report also abandons other safeguards found in the Senate compromise. Gone is a requirement for a congressional review prior to a decision to deploy the system to determine whether the proposed deployment would be affordable and cost effective, whether the threat has developed as anticipated, and whether ABM Treaty considerations should affect the decision to deploy. In other words, Mr. President, all of these safeguards that we had in the Senate bill are omitted from the new conference report language. There is no requirement to determine prior to a decision to deploy whether the proposed system would be affordable, cost effective, whether the threat has developed as anticipated, and whether the ABM Treaty considerations should affect the decisions to deploy. In my view, all of those are absolutely essential preconditions to making an intelligent decision about whether to deploy a system and when to deploy a system. So, the conference report language, contrary to the assertion made earlier, does not have the same effect as the language in the 1991 Missile Defense Act--not by a long, long shot. That act clearly calls for a ABM-compliant system--a system compliant with the ABM Treaty. In my view, the administration has rightly found the language in the conference report to be unacceptable because of these considerations. I repeat what I have said earlier. The last thing we want is to take an effort to mandate now certain language that the administration--and they are the ones negotiating this with the Russians--that the administration believes is likely to have the result of not having a ratification of START II, and perhaps not even a continuation of START I reductions. We have had two Republican Presidents do a very good job in negotiating both START I and START II. Those treaties, if they are complied with, will require a two-thirds reduction in the number of missiles aimed at the United States, including the missiles we have always felt were more likely to be launched early, perhaps by mistake, perhaps by the other military leaders making a mistake in terms of warning, because these are highly MIRV'd systems with a lot of warheads and the fear would be, by the other side, that they might be knocked out on a preemptive strike. We have always worried about those MIRV'd missiles. These two treaties are able, after lots of negotiations over more than 10 or 12 years, to get rid of those systems that we have always considered to be highly destabilizing as applied in the cold war period. We finally achieved that. And to take language in this bill and to take a real risk that the results of those two treaties would be obviated is not only unwise but it is totally unnecessary. I repeat, also, what I have said earlier. The administration and those of us negotiating offered to take on the section of national missile defense language, we offered either the House version or the Senate version, on the national missile defense language. Why in conference you cannot solve the national missile defense language with either the House version, as passed by the House, or the Senate version, as passed by the Senate, when you offer the conferees either version, is beyond me. It is a real puzzle. Of course, what happened is that we made the compromise on the Senate floor--which Senator Levin, Senator Warner, Senator Cohen, and I worked out and which every Republican voted for except one, and the people who were opposed to it were mainly on the Democratic side, because they felt it went too far. We had an unusual 4- or 5-day intensive, word-by-word examination and we got, not only the agreement in this body, with every Republican but one voting for it, but we got the administration signing off on it, albeit reluctantly with some concerns. And then we went into conference and we offered either the Senate-passed language or the House language--not the entire language of the House on everything, but on the national missile defense part--and we could not satisfy people because they wanted to go much further than either the House version or the Senate version. To me that is just very puzzling. It is sad to see a bill jeopardized, in terms of becoming law, because of that. Mr. President, I will now address the negotiations as I saw them, from my point of view, and the possibilities that still exist in putting this bill together if it is vetoed, and if the veto is not overridden. ballistic missile defense The administration strongly objects to the ballistic missile defense language adopted by the conferees, and I agree with the administration's assessment. Mr. President, the Congress has been dealing with difficult issues related to BMD since the star wars debates of the early 1980's. I have been part of putting together bipartisan agreements on BMD for over a decade, many years facing much more difficult challenges than this year. That is why I am puzzled that the Republican majorities--with two bipartisan paths open to approval by the President--chose a third path to certain opposition. As Members will recall, the issue of ballistic missile defense was one of the primary subjects of debate and difficulty when the Senate considered the National Defense Authorization bill during the summer. There was strong opposition on the floor to the BMD provision reported by the committee. During the debate, the bipartisan leadership designated a group of Senators to address this subject. Senator Dole designated Senators Warner and Cohen to represent the Republicans. Senator Daschle designated Senator Levin and myself to represent the Democrats. Mr. President, we dealt with that issue in the old-fashioned way, with Senators closely examining each word of the proposed amendment. Senators Warner, Cohen, Levin, and I worked and reworked the amendment, line-by-line, to address the issues raised by the administration and our respective party caucuses. It was clear to all concerned that the administration had serious reservations even bout the bipartisan amendment we developed in the Senate. After expressing their concerns and examining every word and every phrase carefully, the administration reluctantly agreed to accept this final Senate compromise language. On August 11, 1995, Senators Warner, Cohen, Levin, and I each provided detailed explanations of the bipartisan amendment in speeches to the Senate. We also placed extensive information in the Congressional Record, including the text of the bipartisan amendment, a detailed comparison to previous language, and related materials. As a result, detailed explanatory information was available to all Senators and the public for a thorough review for nearly a month before we actually voted on the amendment on September 6. The bipartisan amendment provided extensive guidance to ensure that the United States would develop a more focussed missile defense program than we had previously authorized, particularly in the area of national missile defense. The bipartisan amendment stated that it-- . . . is the policy of the United States to . . . develop for deployment a multiple-site national missile defense system that: (i) is affordable and operationally effective against limited, accidental, and unauthorized ballistic missile attacks on the territory of the United States, and (ii) can be augmented over time as the threat changes to provide a layered defense against limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile threats. The bipartisan amendment required the Secretary of Defense to ``develop an affordable and operationally effective national missile defense system to counter a limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attack, and which is capable of attaining initial operational capability [IOC] by the end of 2003.'' The bipartisan amendment also set forth the understanding of the Senate as to the demarcation between theater and ballistic missile defense systems, and established a prohibition against use of funds-- . . . to implement an agreement with any of the independent states of the former Soviet Union entered into after January 1, 1995 that would establish a demarcation between theater missile defense systems and anti-ballistic missile systems for purposes of the ABM Treaty or that would restrict the performance, operation, or deployment of United States theater missile defense systems except: (1) to the extent provided in an Act enacted subsequent to this Act; (2) to implement that portion of any such agreement that implements the criteria in subsection (b)(1); or (3) to implement any such agreement that is entered into pursuant to the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution. The amendment was approved overwhelmingly by a vote of 85-13, with only one Republican voting against the amendment. Without this bipartisan agreement and approval, it is doubtful the Senate would have passed the authorization bill. Although the conference on this bill was convened on September 7, there were no Member-level bipartisan House-Senate discussions on this subject by members of the conference for over 2 months. Eventually, we were able to reach agreement on the theater missile defense demarcation language, but could not reach a consensus on the national missile defense provisions. The failure to reach an agreement is puzzling to me, since the administration was prepared to accept either the House- passed or Senate-passed versions of the national missile defense language. The Senate, as I noted earlier in my remarks, established a requirement to ``develop an affordable and operationally effective national missile defense system to counter a limited, accidental, or unauthorized ballistic missile attack, and which is capable of attaining initial operational capability [IOC] by the end of 2003.'' The House established a requirement to ``develop for deployment at the earliest practical date an affordable, operationally effective national missile defense [NMD] system designed to protect the United States against limited ballistic missile attacks.'' Either version of this language--approved overwhelmingly by each House--would have been acceptable to the administration, but neither was approved in conference. The main stumbling block was the insistence of some of the conferees that Congress go beyond language approved by either the Senate or the House and mandate a specific requirement to deploy a national missile defense system by 2003. This problem was compounded by an insistence that the conferees use a new baseline draft proposal in conference, rather than work off the carefully crafted bipartisan Senate language. As a result, the conference report lacks many of the carefully drafted provisions of Senate-passed bill. During attempts to forge a conference agreement acceptable to the administration, I emphasized that we could use national missile defense language that had received overwhelming Republican support this year. I believe that it is still possible to do so if this bill is not enacted. There are two primary options, each of which would use language approved by an overwhelming majority in the Senate or the House. The first option would simply use the bipartisan national missile defense and theater missile defense provisions which were approved by the Senate on September 6, 1995 by a vote of 85 to 13, with only one Republican Senator voting against that amendment. The second option would substitute the House-passed national missile defense language for the national missile defense portion of the bipartisan Senate-passed bill, using the Senate-passed bill for the remainder of the missile defense language. Either of these provisions would provide the basis for renewed focus in our National Missile Defense Program and an even stronger effort on theater missile defenses. Mr. President, if the national missile defense language in the Senate bill was strong enough to win virtually unanimous Republican support, it should have provided an adequate basis for our conference report. If the national missile defense language in the House bill was strong enough to win overwhelming Republican support in the House, it should have provided an adequate basis for a conference agreement. Either of these approaches could have represent a solid step forward on the important subject of national missile defense. The alternative ultimately chosen by the conferees was to use language that was in neither bill mandated a specific requirement to deploy a national missile defense system by 2003. That language is unacceptable to the administration, and is a major element of the administration's announced intention that this bill will be vetoed. The administration is very concerned that the national missile defense language in the conference report goes well beyond the mandates of both the House-passed and Senate-passed bills. The administration has expressed serious concerns about the impact of the conference report language on Russian consideration of the START II Treaty, which is designed to produce a second major reduction in United States and Russian nuclear weapons. The administration is also concerned that the language could lead the Russians to abandon other arms control agreements if they conclude that it is United States policy to take unilateral action to abandon the ABM Treaty. Russian spokesmen have made plain that Russia has neither the technology nor the defense resources to allow them to match United States missile defense efforts. Therefore, they state that their only available reaction to a large-scale U.S. national missile defense program would be to retain additional strategic missiles and nuclear warheads, which would require them to forego START II and perhaps even abrogate START I limitations. This is what is at risk. These are not small stakes. In a letter to Senator Daschle, dated December 15, Secretary of Defense Bill Perry stated: [B]y directing that the NMD [National Missile Defense] be ``operationally effective'' in defending all 50 states including Hawaii and Alaska, the bill would likely require a multiple-site NMD architecture that cannot be accommodated within the terms of the ABM Treaty as now written. By setting U.S. policy on a collision course with the ABM Treaty, the bill puts at risk continued implementation of the START I Treaty and Russian ratification of START II, two treaties which together will reduce the number of U.S. and Russian strategic warheads by two-thirds from cold war levels, significantly lowering the threat to U.S. national security. In my judgment, the administration's concerns are well-placed. Moreover, this struggle over language is, in my judgment, completely unnecessary. I believe we can achieve both START II ratification and progress toward the deployment of a highly-effective national missile defense system to protect against accidental, unauthorized, or limited third-world attacks. Since the late 1980's I have advocated development of a National missile defense system in the form of an accidental launch protection system [ALPs]. Mr. President, it is important to understand the historical context for this concept. National missile defense proposals began with President Reagan's star wars proposal in 1983, designed to render ballistic missiles ``impotent and obsolete.'' This was followed in the mid-1980s by a slightly more modest proposal, called the ``Phase-I'' system, with the objective of defeating a full Soviet counterforce first-strike. This, in turn, was followed in the early 1990s by G-PALS, or Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, which also turned out to be too ambitious. This progression was what led to the Missile Defense Act of 1991, which envisioned simply getting on with the development of a treaty- compliant NMD system. And, when I say ``treaty-compliant,'' that means with the treaty as it currently exists, not as it might someday be modified. In my judgment, even if the ultimate answer to our requirements is a system requiring amendment to the ABM Treaty--such as a multiple-site NMD system with more than 100 interceptor missiles--there is no need to insist on a commitment to that today. Common sense tells us that even if a multi-site system is the end-objective, we will begin by deploying a small number of interceptors at a single site. At this stage, we do not know what the performance or cost of the various NMD system components under development will be, or whether such a system would be ``affordable and cost-effective.'' Also, Mr. President, the strategic environment is different today than it was in 1991. When the Missile Defense Act of 1991 was passed, we faced thousands of Soviet missiles and more than 10,000 warheads, all aimed on hair-trigger alert at the United States or its military forces. The consequences of even a small accidental launch would have been enormous, because of the likelihood of escalation. Today, START I has cut the inventory of weapons, and START II will cut levels further, once it enters into force. Moreover, the Soviet Union is gone, replaced by a less hostile Russia; United States and Russian missiles are now targeted on broad ocean areas, rather than on each others' territory. The policy of targeting broad ocean areas has reduced but not eliminated the consequences of an accidental launch. Finally, there is a future threat of missile attack on the United States by some rogue Third World power. This was recognized as a possible threat in the 1991 act, and in the Senate compromise. However, no such threat has yet materialized, and the latest from the intelligence community on the likelihood of such an event reads as follows: Several countries are seeking longer range missiles to meet regional security goals; however, most of these missiles cannot reach as far as 1,000 kilometers. A North Korean missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Alaska-- but not beyond--may be in development, but the likelihood of it being operational within five years is very low. The Intelligence Community believes it extremely unlikely that any nation with ICBMs will be willing to sell them, and we are also confident that our warning capability is sufficient to provide notice many years in advance of indigenous development. That information was provided in a December 1, 1995 letter on behalf of CIA Director Deutch by Joanne Lsham, CIA Director of Congressional Affairs. The missile defense language in the conference report is misguided. There is no need for: First, strident language or second, ironclad commitments today to deploy by a date certain an NMD system that is clearly an anticipatory breach of the ABM Treaty. Enactment of this language is likely to prevent the START II Treaty from entering into force, which would compound the problem of developing affordable and cost-effective defenses. Without the START II reductions, missile defenses capable of dealing with potential accidental or unauthorized launches would likely have to be much more extensive. If the 5,000 or so warheads to be retired under START II remain in Russian inventories, this will greatly complicate our missile defense problem. Because of the magnitude of the threat, star wars and its successors were deemed too costly and of too limited effectiveness to be worth pursuing. In my judgment, we should be pursing first things first. First, the development of all the components of an NMD system, and a limited deployment of a strictly treaty-compliant system, so as to learn more about the cost and effectiveness of NMD systems. Then, depending on cost and effectiveness, depending on the evolution of the threat and the course of negotiations to amend the ABM Treaty, we can make further decisions on further deployments. But, let us not jeopardize the advantages of the START II Treaty by a headlog rush to deploy something. Mr. President, there are four fundamental aspects to an effective protection against nuclear weapons. The first is to reduce nuclear warheads by two-thirds as envisioned by START I and START II, thereby substantially decreasing the weapons that could be used against us deliberately or accidentally. The second is to vigorously pursue the Nunn-Lugar program for dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the states of the former Soviet Union. The third is to develop and deploy effective theater missile defenses. A strong majority in the Senate and the Congress fully support the development and deployment of highly effective theater missile defenses. The fourth is to develop for deployment an affordable and cost- effective national missile defense program to address the potential for accidental, unauthorized, or limited strikes. No one of these programs, by itself, is sufficient. Each one can have a significant impact on the other. The national missile defense program, in particular, could have either a positive or negative impact on the pace and likelihood of START I and START II reductions. Moreover, even in combination, these programs are not a guarantee against threats by other means, such as conventional delivery by a terrorist through a smaller aircraft or vessel. That threat will require additional counterproliferation and counterterrorist efforts. In summary, Mr. President, it is important to pursue the development of a national missile defense system, but we must do so in a manner that preserves and encourages the important reductions we can achieve through START I, START II, and Nunn-Lugar. Because the language in the conference agreement is likely to severely undermine these efforts in Russia, I cannot support the conference agreement in its current form. Mr. President, I reserve the remainder of my time.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, how much time do I have at this point?

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. NUNN. I think that is completely adequate. We may not need to limit the time, though, if we just have a time certain Tuesday for the vote. That would be just up to----

Mr. NUNN. Actually we could perhaps have a longer period of debate. If we are going to have tomorrow and Monday, we might want to make it 8 hours. That would give people a lot of time. But with all day Monday for debate, I am sure that we could accommodate whatever Senators want to talk.

Mr. NUNN. That would be very reasonable to my point of view. We have the Senator from Vermont with strenuous objection to provisions here. He has to be heard. I am not in a position to agree to that on behalf of the Democratic side now, but from a personal point of view, I will say I would certainly work with the Senator in trying to get that kind of an agreement. I think it is a very reasonable proposal, and I would support it.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from South Carolina, this Senator would agree with that. I think that is a very reasonable proposal, and I would support it. I urge our colleagues to support it.

Mr. NUNN. If I could just respond. I say to my friend from Virginia, let me tell him a little bit more about why this is a problem. The Congressional Budget Office issued a report--I am not trying to quote their exact words here, but this is a memo based on that report that the estimated net proceeds from that sale anticipated were $1.5 billion and the estimated revenue foregone by the Government over 7 years was $2.5 billion. Overall, this means that this sale that was supposed to reduce the deficit was scored by CBO as increasing the deficit over 7 years by $1 billion. That is the kind of thing you get into in an asset sale. And that is why those of us involved in this need to be very conscious of protecting the taxpayers. Sure, you can say it drives down the deficit by $1.5 billion over the next 2 years if you sold it, but if it loses another $2.5 billion in revenue, it does not drive down the deficit; it increases it. So that is the problem. And that is why you need to give more time here, notwithstanding what the administration's position was at an earlier date. I think the Senator is correct on that.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Virginia, as he recalls in the committee, there were a number of us who voiced objections, and the administration at that stage was in favor of the 1- year provision. I think the Senator is right. They, too, were seeking money. I did not agree with the administration on that. I am not here speaking for the administration on this. I am saying I think it is shortsighted, whether it is the administration or whether it is Congress, to compress the timeframe for the sale of this to a 1- year period because I think it puts enormous pressure on it and it gives undue leverage to the oil companies that are most familiar with it. It takes quite a while for an oil company to go out and find out enough about Elk Hills to make a reasonable bid. I thought it was a mistake to put it in the form of a mandate. If it is going to be sold, it should not be on the pretension it helps balance the budget. It does not matter whether it is sold in 1996 or 1997, it will supply the same amount of money. It will be the height of folly if we try to sell it in 1996 and get a lot less money for the taxpayers, and not give 2 or 3 years to the oil companies to make the kind of assessment needed for a confident and vigorous competitive process. Mr. WARNER addressed the Chair.

Mr. NUNN. Yes.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, before I speak on my frustrations with the War Powers Act and relate some of the most recent debate on Bosnia and most recent deployment of American military forces, I would like to say there was an article in the Washington Times this morning in effect saying I had declared all-out war in an effort to lobby Senators to defeat the Defense authorization conference report. Mr. President, just for clarification, I will vote against the conference report. I worked very hard with Senator Thurmond and with other members of the committee to get a bill that would not only be something that I could support but also, more importantly, that the President would sign. I am afraid we do not have that kind of product coming in the conference report. But I have informed the Democratic Cloakroom and the Democratic leadership that I wish to cooperate fully with Senator Thurmond in getting this conference report before the Senate. I certainly will do everything I can to get a time agreement for a reasonable period for debate where people can express their views both ways, for and against this bill. I will do everything I can to persuade other Senators not to have extended debate. I have no intent of trying to keep this bill from going to the President for his final decision, whether he signs it or whether he does not sign it. This article also said I was busy laying some kind of strategy to defeat the bill and lobbying Republican Senators and that I was trying to get out in front of Chairman Thurmond and defeat this bill. Mr. President, I have not asked a single Senator to vote against this bill. I do not intend to lobby against the bill. I intend to state my views as to why I cannot support the bill. The conference report speaks for itself. There are some people who will be for it, some opposed to it. This article is right out of the whole cloth. I do not know how reporters are able to make these kinds of reports to the public without any check whatsoever with the people they are purporting to report on, in this case me. It is true that I said I would vote against the bill. It is true that I laid out some of the reasons in a press release. It is not true that I am trying to impede the bill and its progress. It is not true that I am launching any kind of all-out effort to defeat the bill. It is my view that the bill will pass. It will have, I think, majority support. It will have support from people, I am sure, from both sides of the aisle. So, I wanted to clarify my view on this. I will vote against the bill. But if I wanted to defeat this conference report, if I felt that was the appropriate route--and I do not--I would certainly be engaged in extensive debate, thereby requiring 60 votes to pass it rather than 50. I do not intend to do that. If there is any kind of effort for extensive debate, it will not only be without my cooperation but it would be against my own advice and something being done by individual Senators. So, I hope that whoever is spreading that message or making that report or seeing that article also will take into account the remarks I have made here on the floor, which happen to be factual and true.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that morning business be extended sufficient time to accommodate my remarks.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I first wish to express my gratitude to the Senator from Nebraska for his fine comments on Reverend Halverson, a man we all dearly loved. There was a beautiful and wonderful memorial service to him in the Senate caucus room this week where not only Senators but, more importantly, Senate family--policemen, people working in the dining room, doorkeepers--expressed their profound appreciation for the life and example of this wonderful, wonderful disciple of God. I will be making more complete remarks, and I will also, at a later point, insert in the Record some of the remarks made at his memorial service so that all Senators can read them. I certainly join at this juncture with my friend from Nebraska and thank him for his poignant and very appropriate observation about this dear brother who meant so much to this body and the entire Senate family.

Mr. NUNN

Mr. NUNN. I would be pleased to.